Migration pressures on Europe

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1. Comment on a definition which cannot be avoided

International migration is a subject of study where the interests of many disciplines meet. For a demographer migration is, above all and most naturally, the mass phenomenon of the movement of people across geographical space, provided that population size or structure (or, in other words, population reproduction) are significantly affected. Simple as it may seem, migration is by no means easy to define and operationalise. What hampers attempts at a plausible and sound definition is the lack of a clear-cut understanding of the movement itself, or, more specifically, confusion surrounding its two principal dimensions: distance and duration. Moreover, migration - inter alia due to its integrally double-ended character (movement from the area of departure to the area of arrival) and a metamorphic character (e.g. an instant change of the intended settlement in an alien geographical area into a return to the place of origin) - might be perceived as a process rather than an event. Unlike other basic demographic phenomena such as birth, death or even the conclusion of a conjugal union, it occurs in a time interval (sometimes of considerable duration), rather than at a particular moment.

Due to such a predicament, a lot of arbitrariness is embedded in practically all definitions of migration. Thus the definitions of migration may substantially differ between countries and over time. As argued by various authors before, a great part of the observed variety of the definitions, either regarding the apparently similar “form” of migration viewed by different observers, or various “forms” viewed by the same observer or - finally - the same “form” viewed by the same observer, stem from policy rather than cognitive/academic premises. This diagnosis is hardly encouraging for a researcher.

Though it would seem nearly suicidal for a demographer to enter a migration analysis without prior juxtaposing and defining of applied categories and concepts (as well as without discussing of their comparability among countries), I have ventured to do so in this paper. And it needs to be clearly admitted - with the full awareness of the risks involved.

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1 In addition, a substantial part of routine information on migration originates from the declarations of intention rather than the evidence on actually completed flows, i.e. most of it is of ex ante (as opposed to ex post) character.
2. Objectives and contents

According to a common universal wisdom, we live in the era of migration in which people are on the move, probably much more than ever before and definitely with much broader territorial range. I do not intend to address the question already discussed by other authors: “whether or not the world is on the move?”. I would rather focus on the causes and effects of that phenomenon, referring explicitly to the recent experience of Europe.

The topic of this paper might bring to mind a Europe once besieged - of the continent whose border was once along the banks of the Oder and Nysa rivers. For is it possible to speak of any real migration pressure on the part of Europe that lies to the east of the Oder and Nysa?

Seen from such a perspective the context of migration processes in Europe would only be two, largely complementary, processes: globalisation and regionalisation. Globalisation, which requires the principle of openness, would create conditions conducive to “migration pressure”. However, the second process, regionalisation, would lead to its minimisation or neutralisation. While not negating the significance of these processes for the most recent European migrations, a close look at migration since the end of the 1980s refutes the stereotype of the dominant role of compass-like South-West, and East-West, migration.

I aim to show that intra-European mobility, especially the processes which arose in Central and Eastern Europe after the Berlin Wall had collapsed, has played a decisive role in population movements since the end of the previous decade. This is worth to be emphasised, even repeatedly, because some analysts have a tendency to miss the fact that Europe consists not only of Western Europe but also Central and Eastern European countries aspiring to join the European Union, and still “something else”, namely Russia and a dozen of other countries. There is no justification for this blind spot.

The analysis presented in this paper, - whose focus is the complexity of international migration movements in Europe, including all their forms and geographical directions - does not only provide arguments supporting the thesis of the predominant (in both a quantitative and structural sense) role of migration within Europe - above all within the former socialist countries but also from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and within the European Union. This analysis also suggests that the influx from outside of Europe - the so-called pressure - has decreased (relatively and after 1994 absolutely as well).

The stereotype of “migration pressure” to a great extent finds more acceptance by the “West’s” perception of migration than by the reality of migration processes.

This paper is organised as follows. At first I outline the overall, global context of European migrations and then go on to characterise the fundamental categories of migration flows placing them in a political or economic context. More specifically, I present their relationship with three fundamental phenomena: globalisation, specifically European regionalisation and the processes which arose in relation to the fall of the communist system. Later on I present reflections on the topic of selected - in my opinion the most important - consequences of these movements. In the conclusion I examine the reaction of European societies to the “new migration reality” and the most likely track of migration policies.

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2 See e.g. Castles and Miller (1993)
3 A number of recent reports and analyses addressed the issue of contemporary international migration under such a motto (e.g. Council of Europe, 1993).
4 See e.g. Coleman (1993).
3. Basic trends: the global context

It is of little doubt for a student of migration that the 1980s and 1990s were the decades of greatly diversified international population movements all around the world. This, according to many analysts, was in line with accelerated (or, as some authors would say, “new”) globalisation.

Globalisation owes this “new course” to a blend of factors which came to the fore in the late 1970s and afterwards. They include: deregulation of the highly developed economies combined with a wider opening up of the less highly developed countries; TNC/corporate expansion due to more friendly oligopolistic inter-firm competition; an easier transfer of more and more advanced technologies; universal availability of means (information, telecommunication and transportation) designed to penetrate (either actually or virtually) the globe; the (institutionalised) collaboration on a world scale in the matters of transnational concern, and the undermining of national sovereignty in such areas as finance, environmental hazards/pollution, human rights, foreign trade, etc. Perhaps the demise of the Soviet Union and cessation of bi-polarity in international political relations has also been of great relevance.

In seeking a direct link between globalisation and international migration, Morawska points out that the restructuring of national economies in the core countries (who also happen to be the net immigration countries), in addition to giving the rise to development of the highly skilled professional sector, “has replaced the ‘lower class’ with an underclass, and has created a growing informal sector largely isolated from mainstream advancement/integration opportunities” [Morawska, forthcoming]. On the other hand, many authors suggest that, contrary to a popular unidirectional view of globalisation, it has recently proven to be a highly dialectic process where decentralisation is continuously counterbalanced by centralisation, universalism by particularism, homogenisation by differentiation and integration by fragmentation.

All in all, at this point of time the outcome of the recent globalisation constitutes the present “world system” which is characterised by unprecedented reach and intensity of symbolic (cultural, institutional) interactions and physical flows.

By and large many new phenomena related to globalisation - especially the metaphorical reduction of distances due to a faster, less costly and more widely available transportation network - seem conducive to accelerated movements of persons. However, a grain of scepticism is being uttered from time to time by “those focusing on the process of globalisation [who] note that although there has been a tendency to free the flows of goods and capital, there has been no parallel trend at the global level to free the flows of people” (Zlotnik, 1998, 430).

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5 Globalisation, whose origins date back to the late 19th century, finds its economic expression in accelerated movement of tangible and intangible goods and services across national borders through trade, investment and the flows of people, where less control of governments is exercised. Some authors view it as a “centrifugal process, a process of economic outreach, and a microeconomic phenomenon”, dominated by activities of individual actors and “spurred by the pressures of competition” (Oman, 1997, 29). From a non-economic perspective, it is usually perceived as the universalisation of cultural values and world outlooks, facilitated by the global media and the “compression of time and space”. Wallerstein’s school of thought would certainly see globalisation a set of increasing - but fundamentally asymmetric - interactions between the expanding core/centre (the “West”) and the subordinate periphery of the (capitalist) world economy and human domain in general.

6 Dahrendorf (1997) metaphorically speaks of a newly emerged “competitive universe” due to the shrinkage of the conventionally conceived “second world” and “third world” (which now, with minor exceptions, embraces only Sub-Saharan Africa).

7 Originally the author refers primarily to the United States but to me the trend is of much wider coverage.

8 For a more specific description of those opposite tendencies, see e.g. Featherstone et al. (1995), Morawska (1997) and Robertson (1992).

9 Also a literary shortening of cultural distances through the universalisation of “mass culture” by means of i.a. recent advancements in telecommunication technologies is often being mentioned in the literature as a relevant factor.
This particularly pertains to the flows of migrants, which have hardly matched tourist movements on the international scale, whose total number rose from around 69 million in 1960 to around 454 million in 1990, not to mention the flows of goods or money. In contrast, between 1965 and 1990, migration led to, at best, a moderate increase in the proportion of foreign-born persons in the total populations. Although on the global scale, the number of documented persons of this kind alone rose by nearly 60 per cent, that did not affect the share of those persons in the total population of the world (2.3 per cent).

The size of the documented migrant stock was around 120 million in 1990 (United Nations, 1998). An estimated population of over 30 million undocumented foreigners (whose number seemed to have increased considerably over the last 20 years or so) might be added to that figure (Stalker, 1994). Parallel to this, the 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the flows of people in need of protection. The total number of refugees alone, which in early 1980 was estimated at over 8 million, reached 15 million in early 1990. A similarly high level was maintained throughout the 1990s although a gradual decline has been observed since 1994 (UNHCR, 1996). Despite such great numbers of foreign-born persons recorded around 1990 and thereafter, and a lot of other evidence which points to that towards the end of the twentieth century many countries have liberalised their control on entry, which particularly affected groups of migrants denied lawful access to those countries before, and that, indeed, the flows - mobility in general and migration in particular - in many areas of the world have greatly intensified, “neither the level nor the trends experienced by international migration - as Zlotnik aptly argues - have been striking” (1998, 432).

What really distinguishes the final quarter of this century from earlier periods of contemporary history of human migration is something other than what stems from the global and highly aggregate figures. It is above all the spatial diversity of flows. What makes that diversity so distinct is not so much the universal availability of non-costly and fast transportation due to which no country remains unaffected and international migrants can be found everywhere. A fundamental novelty lies in that many more regions and countries than before (some of them closely isolated from the rest of the world until recently) have become either important destinations or important sources of international migrants.

The following areas have joined Canada, the United States, Australia, Germany and a few other western European countries in attracting large numbers of international migrants of diversified origin: in Western Asia - Israel and a group of states that form the Gulf Co-operation Council; in Southeast Asia - Japan along with the newly industrialised economies; in Southern Europe - Italy, Spain and Greece; in Central and Eastern Europe - the Russian Federation and certain other countries in transition; and in Western Africa - Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoir). In turn, examples of important sending countries include: Mexico in Latin America; all countries located on the Indian sub-continent; post-Soviet countries of Central Asia; China, the Philippines and Vietnam in Eastern Asia; Burkina Faso in Western Africa; and the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, a worldwide statistical analysis based on country-specific data on foreign-born population for 1965 and 1990 revealed that both the median size of migrant population and the interquartile range had increased considerably, by 110 and 87 per cent, respectively. That implies not only an upward trend in the number of migrants but also a growing variation among receiving countries with respect to their migrant population. The analysis reaffirms this finding in terms of the share of international migrants in the total population of host countries, and leaves no doubts as to the growing diversity of those countries (Zlotnik, 1998).

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11 Refugees, asylees and temporary protection persons are usually not included in the estimates of migrant stocks (or flows).
The present-day variation of international migration becomes even more obvious when compared with that observed at the turn of the twentieth century. "Contemporary (im)migrants themselves are - as suggested by Morawska (forthcoming) - much more diverse in their regional origins, racial identifications, gender and home country socio-economic backgrounds and cultural orientations and, in the host society, in their legal status, the sector of the economy they are employed in, and their modes of acculturation to the dominant society”.

The relationships between new phenomena in international migration and the recent phase of globalisation are seriously obstructed by many factors such as sharply different “time frames” of the two phenomena and various external interferences, especially the politicisation of migration, and therefore not so easy to observe and study. From an analytical perspective, the issue of the incompatible “time frames” seems of primary importance because migration may always be subject to short-term fluctuations and sudden ups and downs, influenced jointly by a synergy of many factors and simple actions of individual actors; whereas globalisation is a long-term, relatively stable and unidirectional trend to which the contribution of individual actors and single factors is usually modest.

Those relationships appear by no means straightforward. Perhaps one of the few exceptions is the impact of the recent globalisation on the growth of flows of highly skilled professionals, which reflects the restructuring of the world economy and a new global division of labour13. In large part it is related to the expansion of TNCs and takes the form of extraterritorial movements of persons. The movements of highly skilled labour have become much more complex than before, and hardly resemble the past pattern of a highly unidirectional periphery-to-core “brain drain” (e.g. Koser and Salt, 1997; Rudolph, 1997 and Salt, 1997a). On the other hand, probably the most highly distorted are the volumes of migrant flows or their geographical directions. Theoretically, more deregulation/liberalisation in the world economy, which might be perceived as a tendency now, should be conducive to a higher volume of international trade and levelling of wage rates between countries which ultimately might result in the lowering of international migration. In reality, however, the opening up of less developed countries and the tightening of their economic ties with the rest of the world usually produces, at least temporarily, the opposite effect, sometimes called “migration hump”. This means that the flows of international migrants from less to more developed countries intensify (Martin and Taylor, 1996). In response many receiving countries adopt various anti-immigrant measures which to a degree limit the flows and partly shift them from a documented into an undocumented channel or from one host country to another.

From among other phenomena that have conspicuously been shaping the present world, new means of penetrating the globe (a dense network of jets criss-crossing the air, wide access to the internet and satellite information system, the global reach of telephone and television network, etc.) seem to have greatly contributed to the development and effectiveness of migrant networks and migration-supporting business. To use a frequent case from my recent research as an illustration, a Sri Lankan travelling nowadays to Germany, having neither documents nor money does not feel lost and helpless in Belarus or almost anywhere else if he is equipped with a magnetic telephone card thanks to which he may instantly request cash from a nearby cousin or friend, or get guidance from a trafficker (Okólski, 1999a).

Similarly, the present-day internal conflicts generate much more sizeable waves of external refugees than before, involving the refugees who do not necessarily seek asylum in the nearest safe country but - with an increasing intensity - head for destinations with well-established migrant networks or those offering the most favourable terms of protection, no matter how far located.

13 A recent analysis suggests that flows of highly skilled migrant workers (although still relatively small, compared to other flows of migrants) are increasing at a faster rate than those of less skilled (documented) workers (Salt, 1997a).
In turn, intensifying economic and social restructuring typical of the present development of the core economies which brings about such phenomena as an increasingly segmented labour market and high demand for irregular workers, attracts and indeed sucks more and more migrants from the periphery of the globe, and ultimately creates ethnic migrant communities, who in many instances are rejected or separated from the local populations.

Finally, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the following opening up of the former communist countries and, to a degree, certain totalitarian states of East Asia (China and Vietnam), which altogether account for around 29 per cent of the total world population (1995) and a large part of Asia and Europe’s territory, triggered off a variety of people’s movements of global reach. It gave rise to four major geographically-different types of flows: intensified migration among those countries, westward outflow from those countries, and - in the case of the European countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet bloc - inflow from the South (but also from the West) and transit South-West migration. By all means those movements significantly contributed to the overall volume and diversity of international migration in the 1990s.
4. Basic trends in the Old Continent: can we really speak of migration pressures on Europe?

4.1. Introduction

Over the last two decades or so Europe experienced rather non-uniform (if not confusing) migration trends. First of all, its status as a net immigration region has been reinforced. However, after the rise of migration movements during the 1980s and the early 1990s, since 1993 a decline in the flows has been observed (OECD, 1998). Referring to official records (and each specific national definition of migration) of each country, the aggregate (minimum) level of foreigner inflow to 16 countries of Western Europe in 1990 can be estimated at 134 per cent of the 1980 level (approx. 1.2 million) and in 1997 at 84 per cent of the 1990 level (approx. 1.6 million).

For the 13 countries considered, the peak immigration year fell in the period 1990-1994; it was a little earlier in the case of Iceland and Norway and a little later in the case of Denmark. On the other hand, in some countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) the outflow of foreign residents, which did not change much during the 1980s, strongly intensified in the early 1990s whereas in many other countries it remained relatively stable (Salt, 1997b). In turn, the outflow of citizens of Western European countries has been generally on the decline, at least as evidenced by the immigration statistics of major overseas destinations.

Migration statistics in the former socialist countries of Central Europe show a rather low and stable, if not declining (Slovakia), level of inflow for the 1990s; it ranged from approx. 1,000 (Bulgaria, Romania) to 10,000-15,000 (the Czech Republic and Hungary) annually. The trends and levels with respect to the outflow were a little more diversified in that part of Europe. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia hardly recorded any large-scale emigration (the actual numbers below 1,000 on a yearly basis), the emigration from Bulgaria, Poland and Romania reached a considerable size. In Bulgaria it was the highest and (after 1991) relatively stable (at the level of approx. 60,000), whereas in the two remaining countries after a rise in the early 1990s, since 1995, when the peak (approx. 25,000) was reached, a gradual decline has been taking place.

According to a plausible estimate, in the mid-1990s Europe hosted almost 22.5 million (documented) foreign residents, which (in the case of its western part) increased in the following manner: Germany - from 7.2 to 8.9 per cent; the United Kingdom - from 2.8 to 3.4 per cent; Switzerland - from 14.1 to 19.6 per cent; and Italy - from 0.5 to 1.7 per cent.

14 For some countries the figures do not include certain categories of migrants (e.g. the French data include only migrant workers and foreigners admitted on family reunification grounds).
15 Austria and Portugal are not included here.
16 In fact, the most recent available data (usually for 1997 but in some cases for 1996 or even 1995) were used for the latter estimate.
17 Distinct exceptions are the trends observed in Hungary and Poland. In the former, after a sharp decline in 1991/92 (following a dramatic rise in 1988-1990, up to nearly 40,000 immigrants), the inflow has levelled off, while in the latter immigration seems to be continuously increasing (from 2,600 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1997).
18 Both countries recorded approx. 20,000 emigrants in 1997.
19 Accounting for 87.5 per cent of the European total.
20 According to the UN estimate, migrant stock (the size of the foreign-born population) in Europe rose from 23.0 to 25.1 million between 1985 and 1990 which brought about an increase in its share in the region’s total population from 3.0 to 3.2 per cent (United Nations, 1997). The magnitudes of migrant stocks as estimated by the UN and Salt are not fully consistent due to differences in the definition.
21 According to the stock of foreign population (in absolute terms); France not included.
Apart from migratory flows recorded by national statistics of respective countries, in recent years Europe also received great numbers of asylum seekers, foreigners granted the temporary protection status and undocumented migrants. As far as the first of these three categories is concerned, the trend was from very low levels (tens of thousands annually) in the beginning of the 1980s to approx. 700,000 in 1992 and to about a half of that level in 1994. The issue of temporary protected persons emerged ad hoc mainly as a consequence of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the movements of those people might be regarded as a short-lived phenomenon. Nonetheless, in early 1997 nearly 837,000 citizens of that country could be found elsewhere in Europe, many of them with no intention of returning home (Salt, 1997b). Finally, many migrants entering European countries remain undocumented (even approximate numbers are unknown). One group among those persons constitutes illicit migrants. According to the ICMPD estimate, in 1993 approx. 350,000 foreigners entered Western Europe illegally (Widgren, 1994). Some reports suggest that since around the mid-1990s the number of illegal entries into Europe might be declining. Probably a much larger group among the undocumented foreigners, however, are irregular migrants who come legally as tourists but overstay (or take employment) without due authorisation.

All those estimates hardly take into account the flows of foreigners, be it documented or not, composed of persons classified as non-migrants. This comprises a wide range of categories: from ethnic German resettlers to students and seasonal workers. The annual inflow of those persons to all European countries in the 1990s might be as high as over 600,000\(^2\). Even leaving aside the population movements within the successor states of the former Soviet Union\(^2\) and former Yugoslavia (which are not specifically dealt with here), the above list of movements and related estimates provides ample ground to conclude that Europe has been an arena of high and increasingly diversified international mobility of people. That mobility, however, has displayed various, sometimes not quite consistent, time trends and sub-regional patterns. The interpretation of such a complex picture requires reference to a multitude of factors or contexts. In order to introduce my interpretation, which is presented throughout the rest of this paper, I will briefly discuss the relevance of three groups of factors: globalisation, regionalisation and political restructuring.

First of all, the “new course” of globalisation, due to \textit{inter alia} strong competition from East Asia, has to a large degree undermined the relatively stable central position of Europe in the world economy. In order to preserve their competitive power, European states have been forced into a drastic reduction of public spending and into accepting the growing social disparities. With the gradual withdrawal of the state from the social and economic sphere, firms became more free to apply various cost-of-labour-lowering measures, which included much larger job offers addressed to low-paid, flexible or irregular workers. Paradoxically, in the 1990s growing unemployment in many European countries went hand in hand with a relatively high, if not increasing, demand for cheap foreign labour. South-North and East-West wage differentials have remained large enough to lure great masses of migrant workers ready to take up jobs symbolically described as “triple-d’s” for dirty, dangerous and demanding\(^2\). 

\(^2\) The inflow of ethnic Germans to Germany involves more than 200,000 each year, the inflow of seasonal migrant workers to countries officially practising this kind of foreigner employment - more than 300,000 (the mid-1990s) and the inflow of temporary skilled workers - from few tens of thousands to more than 100,000 (a decline from 130,000 in 1992 to 70,000 in 1996). With regard to foreign students, in 1980 16 western countries recorded 346,300 students enrolled at the post-secondary level, in 1988 around 423,900 and in 1992 around 523,900 (Salt, 1997a). In addition, the number of foreign students in the former socialist countries may be well in excess of 100,000, and it is also growing in recent years.

\(^2\) For a thorough description of the international population movements within the former USSR, see Okólski, 1998a.

\(^2\) On the other hand, the flows of migrants have been prompted by another fact of globalisation - the progress in telecommunication and transportation technologies, and their widespread access.
Therefore one of the main elements of the recent globalisation has been the evolution of the labour market. Worldwide competition, which has become compelling for economic actors in both public and private spheres, requires a high level of elasticity of labour markets as a means of the reducing labour cost. The following measures are typically found in the attempt to reduce labour costs: cutting out non-wage elements of the cost, outsourcing, recruiting higher proportions of part-time or temporary workers, offering very low-paid jobs, etc. At the same time, the demand has grown for highly skilled professionals engaged in company activities related to cost management. As a result, labour has come to be highly segmented, and (particularly in the West) it is characterised by the re-emergence of huge wage differentials, enormous diversity, instability and uncertainty of careers, and a relatively large proportion of people steadily excluded (Dahrendorf, 1997).

Second of all, there has emerged another new phenomenon of relevance to European migration - regionalisation. Regionalisation in general terms is seen as a centripetal process, which purposefully (rather than spontaneously) leads towards the greater integration of two or more countries. One of the principal aims of this process is to enhance the region’s growth and strength, and to increase the sovereignty of regional institutions vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Oman, 1997). European regionalisation has taken a rather extreme form, i.e. of an exclusive process involving highly selective membership, deep and mandatory deregulation within the region and tight control of links with third countries (Okólski, 1998b). From the perspective of population mobility, it allows for free movements of the region’s residents in all possible forms, and at the same time it heavily limits the inflow of third countries’ nationals. As a matter of fact, in the 1990s restrictions on the entry of third country nationals have become an element of the doctrine of European regionalisation.

Finally, a separate factor which probably should be taken into consideration when the remodelling of the European migration pattern is discussed, has been a new political configuration of Europe as a result of the lifting of the “iron curtain”, and (gradually since 1988) the opening up of the eastern part of the continent to population movements. The Central and Eastern European revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s has given rise to the vehement movements of people assuming a large variety of directions, compasses and forms. Those seemingly simple to interpret developments, however, run parallelly to the migration phenomena of a much more complex context, namely those being “adverse” effects of the accompanying collapse of union or federal communist states, like the ex-USSR and the former FSR Yugoslavia, i.e. huge flows of involuntary migrants.

It might be argued that in Europe all those three - recently emerged, to be sure - groups of factors influenced the population movements through the interplay with other two factors of a very special meaning and long standing: geographical dimension and historical legacy. On the one hand, due to its geographical character, especially in the age of the “compression of time and distance”, Europe is probably more than other parts of the globe exposed to people movements. In the case of numerous countries it lacks distinct natural internal borders, “it is the westernmost corner of the huge landmass of Asia, and the Mediterranean Sea links rather than divides it from Africa” (Geldner, 1997, p. 19). In other words, viewed from a purely physical dimension, Europe is widely open to the penetration of a large majority of the world’s population. This factor seems particularly influential in the case of migrants from North African, West Asian (including those from the Middle East) and European countries with no clear motive or preference concerning the destination of their movement.

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25 See e.g. Lim (1997).
26 Probably more than to other factors, competition and deregulation of markets owe its new global reach to two principal phenomena: worldwide availability of information, its universality and simultaneousness, and the international nature of the financial sector with all its related services.
On the other hand, historically-rooted ties facilitate migration within Europe. From early mediaeval years up to now - as brilliantly evidenced by Foucher (1993) - there has been a continuous (although erratic and by no means unidirectional) penetration and intermingling of European states, nations and societies, with respect to institutions, economy, population, science, art, religion, etc. which resulted in relatively close cultural, economic and institutional proximity among the countries. This also partly applies to the links between Europe and non-European countries, especially countries where the Europeans have predominated among the settlers or - albeit to a much lesser degree - certain former colonies (mainly French and British) in Africa and Asia. Those ties continue to play a particularly important role in ethnicity- or network-driven migration.

4.2. Globalisation and European migration

As stems from the examination of recent global migration trends, the effects of globalisation upon those trends are by no means unambiguous. Europe seems to be no exception to the rule.

Official statistics together with research reports are in agreement that in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the abandonment of active recruitment of foreign labour, Europe continued to host scores of migrant workers or even the more so the family members of those who came to work in earlier period. As Hammar (1997, 7) puts it, the European liberal democracies “could not convince but a small minority of those already since years working as ‘guest workers’ that they should now return to their countries of origin. Most of these workers did not leave but instead invited their families to join them in the immigration countries”.

In some European countries a greater geographical diversity of the origin of those migrants was observed. A distinct novelty has been the arrival of migrants from remote countries of Asia and, to a lesser degree, Africa. For instance, since the 1980s Europe has been witnessing an intensive inflow of people from such countries as China, Iran, Lebanon, Philippines, Senegal, Vietnam and many others, and the numbers of migrants from countries like Morocco and Turkey, the already established leaders in the inflow to Europe, further increased (United Nations, 1998).[27]

At the same time, the outflow to non-European destinations seemed to be on the decline or at best stable. For instance, the United States, by and large the main destination country for the European outmigrants, recorded almost perfectly stable inflow of people from Europe during the 1980s (between 60,000 and 70,000 persons per year, until 1988). Although between 1989 up to 1994 the number of immigrants increased (to around 160,000), it was entirely due to the inflow of people from Central and Eastern Europe, mostly (especially since 1991) ethnic Jews from the ex-USSR. Since 1994 immigration from Europe to the USA has been slowly decreasing. In relative terms, the inflow of citizens of the western European countries declined from 11.7 per cent in 1975-1979 to 6.8 per cent in 1990-1994 (UN, 1998).

Conspicuously, over the last 20 years or so certain countries known in the past as net outmigration areas changed their status to become net immigration areas.

In addition, there occurred (especially in the 1990s) a shift from the predominance of long-term (mostly, for settlement) to the predominance of short-term movements (OECD, 1998).

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27 For instance, during the 1980s the number of (documented) European residents from Morocco increased by a quarter of a million (50 per cent) and from Turkey by 400,000 (30 per cent). The growth continued into the early 1990s (probably until 1993).
28 For instance between 1991 and 1996 the inflow of persons born in western European countries declined from 55,000 to 53,000.
Those basic trends might find only a partial explanation within the framework of ongoing globalisation. The central position in the world economy, which is still occupied by Europe, implies relatively high labour productivity and consequently, relatively high wage rates in the majority of European countries. This fact alone keeps large numbers of European workers from migrating to third countries, especially since the movement to any attractive destination (e.g. North America) involves high “transaction costs” and facing migrants from other continents endowed with comparable skills but probably more prone to accept jobs at competitive terms. On the other hand, thanks to the same factor, i.e. the position in the world economy, in recent years growing numbers of Europeans turned into easily transferable labour within the global corporate network. This, however, remained an option for a small minority, namely, the most highly educated.

In turn, as already observed, the newly shaped (highly flexible and segmented) labour market attracts migrants from outside of Europe, even from very remote countries. The reason is that the lower/inferior segment of that market is undergoing sharp fluctuations marked by phases characterised by excess demand for labour.

Ultimately, the recent facts of globalisations suggest a (steady) positive net migration probably in a large majority of the European countries. While this seems also very obvious in the case of non-highly skilled workers, the balance in the case of professionals might largely be the opposite.

4.3. Regionalisation vis-à-vis migrant flows within the European Union

Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, which provided for free movement by residents of the member states, the issue of international migration has become increasingly institutionalised in the process of the European integration. The major steps with regard to this were taken in the 1990s. First, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1992) included immigration and asylum as matters of common interest. Currently these issues (together with the crossing of external borders and few other) constitute what is known as the third pillar of the Union. On the other hand, by force of the Treaty, since 1993 the citizens of the Union’s member countries are not only free to move within the Union’s space but can also benefit from equal rights to access to the labour market, social security, health care, etc. Next, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) foresees that the provisions of the hitherto intergovernmental Schengen Agreement (and the Dublin Convention) will be written in the Union’s acquis and the issues of immigration and asylum will be given top priority and (after a five-year transitional period, after the ratification of the Treaty) transferred to the first pillar of the Union. Those recent steps reflect the striving towards combating and better control of illegal migration and the reduction of the number of asylum seekers (Lavenex, 1998).

29 By the same token, a growing number of expatriates is being employed in various European outlets of American or Japanese TNC’s.
30 By means of those two conventions (1992) common immigration (or, rather, border control) policy and asylum principles were adopted by the co-signatories.
The impact of regional integration in Europe on people mobility within the area of European Communities could be observed as early as since the period immediately after 1969-1974, when *inter alia* freedom of movement for persons became effective, first in case of the six founding members of then the European Economic Community (EEC) and a few years later in the case of the next three countries and the cessation of labour recruitment primarily affected inflow from third countries. An empirical analysis of international migration in the countries of EEC (until around 1990) led to the conclusion that “the trend [was] towards less intra-Community movement [...] and a sharp rise in immigration from outside the Community” (Tapinos, 1994, 216).

Despite the free movement of people within EEC, the fast convergence of national economies (but probably also rising - since 1975 - unemployment) discouraged intra-Community flows of workers. In turn, despite potential competition (which did not occur) from migrants from within the Community and, a little later, the closing of the EEC external borders, the inflow of persons from third countries, primarily Turkey, the former FSR Yugoslavia and the Sub-Saharan region continued at a very high level. This was mainly due to the external pressures accompanying a high demand in EEC for labour accepting low wages and demanding work. According to the lesson from that phase of European integration, as Tapinos (1994, 220) suggests, “the dynamics of migration show that market forces - the conditions surrounding labour supply and demand, and the nature of economic growth - have had a greater impact than institutional factors, such as in the case of EEC member countries, the institutional introduction of freedom of movements, or, for non-member countries, the closure of frontiers”.

Migration trends observed within the European Union after 1992 seem much less clear than before. Several general tendencies, such as declining documented flows, predominance of migrants admitted on the basis of family reunification and further diversification of regions of origin, either find exceptions in various countries or show non-negligible deformations over time (OECD, 1998). In some EU countries migrants from within the Union tend to increase their shares in the total inflow and participation (relative to non-EU nationals) in the labour market (e.g. Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom) whereas in some others a parity at best is being maintained (e.g. Belgium, Denmark) or fluctuations which would be difficult to interpret are observed (e.g. France, the Netherlands). A spectacular case supporting the hypothesis that recently in the Union, nationals of EU might be forcing out other (legal) foreigners, is presented by Germany where the share of for example two other EU countries - Italy and Portugal - in the total net immigration increased from 3.9 to 25.6 per cent in 1993-1996. The Eurostat survey data (quoted by OECD, 1998) suggest that in 1996 in a large majority of countries of the European Union at least one-third of the foreign labour force originated from the Union itself, with three countries (Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg) recording the share of those persons at over 70 per cent, and in only four countries (Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal) the relevant proportion was relatively low (in fact, below 20 per cent).

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31 Free movement of people for the residents of the founding countries (the Benelux countries, France, Italy and FRG) were introduced by the end of 1968, 10 years after the Treaty of Rome was signed. In the case of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom it became effective almost instantly after the accession (which took place in 1972), whereas in the case of Greece it happened in 1988 (eight years after joining EEC) and in the case of Portugal and Spain in 1992 (six years after).
4.4. “Fortress Europe”: are the doors shut or only half-open?

The question arises then whether the institutional measures introduced by the European Union in the 1990s, within its doctrine of regionalisation, have taken an upper hand over the influences of globalisation which has been steered primarily by the virtues of international competition. It could unquestionably be so if not the great masses of foreigners entering Europe (and the European Union’s countries in particular) under the guise of other categories, such as asylum seekers, persons seeking temporary protection, students, entrepreneurs, tourists or persons who are illegal migrants. I have already pointed out that for the 1990s the annual aggregate numbers of foreigners fitting into each of those categories might be expressed in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands, and that the overall magnitude of the inflow of those non-migrants might be no less than that of the documented migrants.

Obviously many of those people are genuine non-migrants. The assumption that a large proportion (not to mention a “majority”) of them would qualify as such, would be hard to verify. However, doubts might be expressed concerning the time coincidence of the introduction of strict controls on migrant entry in Europe and a rapid increase in asylum claims, on the one hand, and of revisions and harmonisation of asylum laws in the European Union, and the blooming of trafficking in migrants from the very countries of origin of former asylum seekers.

It would not therefore be an exaggeration to conclude that Europe still remains a migration pole of such attraction that people would move (or at least attempt to do so) to that region even when faced with severe obstacles. Consequently, it seems that for a relatively long time into the future migrants will be busy searching for effective ways to elude or circumvent institutional barriers and controls in order to make the shut doors half-open. Confronted with the diversity of flows and numbers of people involved, the region might not be able to resist the pressure. The widely acclaimed notion of “fortress Europe” will most likely continue to be a postulate rather than a fact of reality.

On the other hand, the tendency to select European countries as a destination by the nationals of third countries might be reinforced by the persistence, if not the expansion, of segmented labour markets in the Old Continent, with typical for them increasing division of between the jobs accepted by the indigenous workers and those left vacant for the foreigners (e.g. Lim, 1997).

4.5. European migration after the end of history

This is a paraphrase of the title of an inspiring paper by van de Kaa presented to the 1991 European Population Conference (van de Kaa, 1993). The leitmotif of his predictions was that the collapse of communism would activate in Europe a huge migration potential embodied in the former USSR and its satellites. In particular, van de Kaa suggested (1993, 91) that “the main direction of migration streams in Europe during the next decade or so will be from East to West”. This hypothesis was supplemented by two other relevant hypotheses, namely that Central and Eastern European countries will experience a significant inflow of nationals of third countries, in particular from developing countries, and that in Western Europe migrants from the eastern part of the continent will to a large degree make a labour market niche occupied thusfar by migrants from the South. Have those projections come true?
Indeed, it appeared in the early 1990s that the East-West flows started to be a prevalent component of European migration. Seen from the West European perspective, that new trend was nearly obvious and expected, in view of the gradual lifting, since 1989, of major barriers that in the past prevented great numbers of Central and East Europeans from moving to the West. That expectation found strong support in the experience of a number of East-West emigration episodes, which have taken place since the post-Stalinist thaw of the mid-1950s. According to that experience, whenever the “opportunities32 allowed”, a massive mobilisation of people ready to emigrate took place, and almost instantly the number of emigrants from the East multiplied.

More importantly, European migration statistics for the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to confirm the above prediction. Between 1985 and 1990 not only did the flows of people from East to West increase but in addition that increase was generally (with the distinct exception of Italy and Spain) faster than the growth of the immigration from the South33. The early 1990s saw a continuation (if not - in the case of certain countries of the East -acceleration) of that trend. In addition, an increased presence of the citizens of Central and Eastern European countries in the West was reflected in many other (not strictly migration) records. The number of tourists has virtually multiplied everywhere in Western Europe, and some western countries recorded intensified inflow of asylum-seekers or seasonal workers from the East.

It quickly turned out, however, that the 1990s would not be a decade of East-West population movements. As early as around 1992 or 1993 westbound migration from the East started to slow down. In Germany, which probably receives from two-thirds to three-quarters of all Central and Eastern European migrants coming to the European Union, net migration in the case of Poles (a predominant nationality among the region’s outmigrants) has been declining gradually since 1990 (118,000 in 1989 and 6,000 in 1996), in the case of Hungary since 1992, and in the case of Bulgaria and Romania since 1993, whereas in the case of the Russian Federation it has remained relatively stable (around 20,000 per annum). This trend was to a large extent reflected in changes in the number of foreign residents in Germany. While in 1985-1996 the number of Poles fluctuated, in the case of other Central and Eastern European nationalities two clear tendencies were observed: an initial sharp rise (usually until 1992 or 1993) and a gradual decrease. Romania presents a typical case here: in 1985-1992 the number of the citizens of that country was increasing (from 77,000 to 167,000), and in the following years decreasing (101,000 in 1996).

Concomitant was a shift from permanent to temporary migration and a decline in the number of asylum-seekers’ inflow (Garson et al., 1997). All in all, despite liberalised regulations and step-by-step implemented freedom of movements in the home countries, and actually increased mobility of the Central and Eastern European population, its outflow to the West has begun to decrease, even before climbing to any spectacularly high level. The main reason behind this remarkable trend seems to be the West’s abandonment of a policy of (politically-motivated) preferential treatment for Central and Eastern European migrants, and submitting those migrants to the newly-developed restrictive rules of the “fortress Europe” after 1990.

An important lesson can be drawn from the above: migration takes a particularly high scale when it is - by this or another way, purposefully or unconsciously - encouraged by the institutions of the better-off receiving country, even under outflow-discouraging or prohibitive institutional circumstances in the sending country, and it may not respond to the changes in the institutional arrangement in the latter (e.g. the lifting of the previous restrictions) when the former discontinues its (institutional) support.

32 I.e. a politically-justified East-West deal concerning the transfer of people or an explicit commitment of the West to protect Easterners fleeing at the times of internal turmoil.
33 According to Poulain (1993, 71), “the prime trend in flows from Central and Eastern Europe [was] the exponential increase detected in Germany” where the number of immigrants from that region increased from 267,000 to 1,230,000. In comparative terms, the rise was from 97 to 272 Central and Eastern European migrants per 100 migrants originating from the South.
Taking a different perspective than the East to West migration, however, population movements in the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s were indeed so conspicuous to deserve to be placed among the key developments in European migration (Frejka, 1996). Besides the somewhat traditional outflow to western countries, I have here in mind three new migration phenomena of similarly great importance in the region: firstly, an enormous intensification of international flows within the region; secondly, an influx of people from outside the region; and, thirdly, westbound transit migration. It is precisely the high intensity and great diversity of those flows that recently have led international migration analysts to describe Central and Eastern Europe ever more frequently as a “new migration pole” or a “new migration space” in the global arena.

Convergent diagnoses prepared by many research centres attest to a considerably increased and indeed already very high international mobility of the region’s population. They show, for instance, that from 1987 to 1994 about one third of western and central Ukrainian households were involved in relocations of that kind, while before 1987 foreign travel had been a rarity, and cases of migration noted by researchers had for the most part been connected with redeployments of Red Army units (Pirozhkov et al., 1997). A similar proportion found for Polish households suggests that in the 1990s nearly half of the population has benefited directly from proceeds gained as a result of migration (Frejka et al., 1998).

As regards the mobility of people inside this part of Europe, the diversity of this phenomenon is particular and too great to allow even its brief presentation here. I will therefore restrict myself to a succinct indication of its basic elements (Okólski, 1998a).

The first of them, and most important in terms of numbers, are voluntary resettlement flows between the countries that have emerged from the former USSR. Between 1991 and 1997 they involved about 10 million people, and at their peak in 1994 over one million people flowed into Russia itself from the other former Soviet republics, while nearly a quarter of a million left Russia for the other former republics.

The second element is a stream of refugees or persons in need of temporary protection. Although displaced persons from the former FSR Yugoslavia (over one million by early 1997, including over 600,000 outside the former Yugoslav borders) have taken refuge mainly in the West, yet the list of the top 25 receiving states includes six Eastern European countries. Hungary itself has offered refuge to nearly 80,000 former Yugoslav citizens. A stream of displaced persons from the areas of the former USSR affected by civil wars or exacerbated ethnic or national conflicts has assumed even greater proportions. Russia has received most of them, nearly one million by early 1996. A mass outflow of Romanian citizens, principally Roma and persons of Hungarian nationality, has also been of some importance in this context. Hungary, for example, has become the receiving country for some 60,000 Romanian asylum seekers.

Migrations in search of employment are the third important component of internal Central and Eastern European migrations. There are two forms of such flows: an official one, documented with adequate permits; and an unofficial one, falling into the category of incomplete migration, to be discussed shortly. Legal migrations for work occur between all the countries of the region, with inflows decidedly prevailing in some of them and outflows in others. Actually, Albania is the only country not to have any significant links with the labour market of this part of Europe. Belarus, Bulgaria and, above all, Ukraine are examples of countries sending large numbers of workers to other states of the region, while the Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary are important receiving countries. Poland is a special case here, as it both receives labour from other countries (mainly form Ukraine) and sends its own nationals to work abroad (principally to the Czech Republic, though considerably more outside the region, mainly to Germany).
Finally, the fourth element of the international intraregional mobility is relatively new form, which might be termed incomplete migration. It involves persons described sometimes as “false tourists”, characterised by a flexible employment situation and, generally, a relatively low social status, persons ready to go abroad almost at any time and taking up various simple and extremely low-paid jobs, usually for short periods of time and without the permit required. The basic forms of employment are petty trade, household help, renovation and construction services, fruit picking, assistance at harvest, and sewing. Such persons are continually in touch with the members of their households remaining at home and actually spend most of their time with them. It is a transitory form of spatial mobility, with its source in structural imbalances on the domestic labour markets of many of the countries in the region, and in particular in a relative surplus of rural population. It substitutes, in part at least, for the formerly widespread commuting from the country to nearby towns or short-distance seasonal (internal) labour migrations. According to one estimate, in 1995 some 800,000 people came to Poland from Ukraine alone in such capacity (Okólski, 1998c).

It might therefore be concluded, in view of the foregoing discussion, that the flows that have their origins in the fall of communist system in Europe have recently began to shape the all-European migration trends. Owing to a close geographical proximity and the common history, a predominant proportion of migrants, exilees, asylum seekers and (more or less genuine) tourists from Central and Eastern Europe preferred moving within that region to leaving for anywhere else.

The phenomenon of the inflow of irregular workers is completely new to Central and Eastern Europe and results from the increasing internal economic diversification of the region. Though very recent, it has already assumed large proportions and numerous forms. For instance, in the Czech Republic and Hungary such workers (among whom Ukrainians prevail) are for the most part employed under several months’ contracts, while in Poland and Russia under contracts for performance of a specific task, sometimes executed in the course of several days or weeks. One estimate quotes the number of 100,000 to 200,000 irregular foreign workers in the Czech Republic in 1997, as compared to 125,000 aliens holding work permits (Drbohlav, 1998). In Poland, a mere 18,000 foreigners were employed legally at the same time, while a few hundred thousand (probably over half a million) worked without permission.

The second important stream turning Central and Eastern Europe into a region of migration influx is the immigration of aliens, sometimes whole families, coming to stay for longer periods, often with the intention to settle down. Though the settlement process is usually extended over many years, some countries of the region already have communities of foreigners, numbering from several thousand to between ten- and fifty thousand people, of nationalities rarely found in these countries before 1990. The spectacular examples are: the Chinese community in Hungary, the Chinese and Vietnamese communities in the Czech Republic, and the Vietnamese and Armenian communities in Poland. A certain influx of nationals of Western countries, particularly high-class specialists posted by their companies and young graduates who find it difficult to begin a career in their home countries, seems to be a qualitatively important novelty. In order to help imagine the volume of this influx, one may quote an estimated number of Western migrants in the Czech Republic in 1997. While slightly over 15,000 of them were holders of long-term residence permits, and about 9,000 of business or work permits, as many as 30,000 to 40,000 were employed without the permit required (Drbohlav, 1998).

As a result of these trends, some of the countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have become net immigration countries, and in some of their areas, multinational communities have flourished, with Prague, where foreigners already account for over 10 per cent of the population, being the most significant example. Other countries, such as Lithuania, Poland and Romania follow suit, with their emigration systematically diminishing and immigration growing.

34 Also Croatia, but for quite different reasons.
It seems evident from the above considerations that the influx of people into Central and Eastern European countries is characterised by a high degree of illegality. Illegality in a variety of shades, incidentally: sometimes illegal border crossing occurs, in other cases the permitted period of stay is exceeded, in yet others there is unregistered stay or activity. It is often the case that whole migrant families reside in a host country without legalisation for as long as several years, which slowly forces them out to the margin of society, preventing them from getting a proper education and regular employment, from participation in the social security and health care systems, not to mention other forms of participation in public life.

Proceeding to the third important group of inflows of aliens observed in the countries of the region that is westbound transit, one should note in the first place its strictly illicit nature. Furthermore, the transit in question is increasingly supported by a vast network of trafficking organisations operating on an international scale.

Thanks to their newly liberalised migration policies facilitating border-crossing, convenient geographic situation and lack of experience in combating illegal migration, Central and Eastern European countries have made an excellent anteroom or waiting room before the final stage of a migrant’s journey from his home country to the target country (which mostly turns out to be Germany). This role falls principally to the Czech Republic and Poland as countries bordering Germany, the most important target country in European migrations. A similar function is performed, though on a smaller scale, by countries bordering Austria (Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and, again, the Czech Republic). Migrants are trafficked directly into the West from Central and Eastern European countries also to Italy (from Slovenia or, by sea, from Albania) and Greece (from Albania, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria). The other countries of the region play the role of mobilisation centres or intermediate links in migrant trafficking. Of particular significance in this context are the countries of the CIS, with considerable stretches of their borders poorly marked or unguarded. Thus, the present-day westbound transit migration is a common problem for the countries of the region.

According to estimates by Central and Eastern European countries, some 150,000 to 250,000 migrants from Asia and Africa stay in their territories at any given time, awaiting trafficking into the West. According to a recent estimate by Tajikistan, “the first transit country” for many of the trafficked migrants, about 20,000 Afghan nationals stay in its territory at any given time, prepared for a further organised journey (Olimova, 1998). The numbers of migrants in traffic staying in the territories of countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are even considerably greater. Here is another example. In 1997 alone, some 1,600 convoys with illegal migrants in transit were detained in Poland, including 215 in excess of 10 people. An estimated 30,000 to 50,000 migrants are trafficked annually from Poland to Germany (Okólski, 1999a). Reports from the Czech Republic allow a similar estimate. While the ethnic composition of the group of trafficked migrants varies considerably, the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) have recently prevailed. Persons with Algerian, Chinese, Iraqi, Iranian, Somali and Vietnamese passports are often found among them as well.

The trafficking in aliens in some of the Central and Eastern European countries, including occasional smuggling from the West, is a relatively new derivative phenomenon. The latter occurrence may be illustrated by the smuggling of Vietnamese (awaiting deportation to their country from Germany) into Poland. The trafficking in Ukrainian and Romanian minors and bringing them into Hungary for the purpose of prostitution, and the trafficking in Vietnamese nationals and inserting them in Poland in connection with illegal employment at firms owned by other Vietnamese are, for example, relatively large-scale phenomena.
Migrant trafficking is becoming a highly profitable and, at the same time, well-organised illegal activity, in which use is made of modern technologies (including heavy military equipment) and of international connections between criminal groups, as well as of links between offenders and the border guards or the police. Given its profitability and the high, definitely not diminishing, demand for the services of trafficking networks on the part of potential migrants, it may be expected to become a lasting phenomenon.

Summing up this description of the new migration phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, the following conclusions may be drawn:

- while the international mobility of the residents of the region has grown considerably, the main flows are directed into the countries of the region;
- forms or types of migration flows and the links of the region with the other parts of the globe have become greatly diversified;
- it follows from the two characteristics mentioned above that the region has become a new important unit in the global migration space;
- besides common features accounting for similarity between the countries of the region, there are characteristics clearly distinguishing countries from one another;
- there are strong migration magnets in the region (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Hungary), as well as out-migration areas, sending out migrants attracted by the aforementioned magnets, or by other ones outside the region (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine), and countries experiencing migration on a very moderate scale (Lithuania and Slovakia);
- in terms of the intensity of migration flows, the following types of countries may be distinguished: the first, with strong inflow but weak outflow (the Czech Republic and Hungary); the second, with strong inflow and outflow (Croatia, Poland, Russia and Romania); the third, with weak inflow but strong outflow (Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine); and the fourth, with weak inflow and outflow (Lithuania and Slovakia);
- finally, there is a small number of countries in the region (mainly Russia) where large masses of displaced persons have emerged, awaiting return home or a further journey, i.e. a phenomenon being a starting point for further intensified migration, while some other countries (mainly Bosnia) remain largely abandoned by persons in need of temporary refuge, and thus are bound to experience an intensive wave of returns in the future; on the other hand, in some countries (such as Poland, Russia and Hungary), unlike most of the others, embryos of new, permanent migrant communities have emerged, which in turn means that these countries will need to solve the problems of integration of aliens.

4.6. Europe - the mecca of exilees, displaced persons and refugees

As I was trying to point out, it was not the inflow of people from the East that imprinted the 1990s migration trends in Western Europe. Instead, such a role was assumed by a massive influx of asylum seekers from various areas in a need of protection. It might be estimated that between 1989 and 1994 over 3.5 million foreigners entered that part of Europe either as asylum or temporary protection seekers, of whom 2.9 million belonged to the former category, of whom in turn 1.3-1.4 million originating from non-European countries (the South). To be sure, the annual average number of asylum seekers recorded in Europe in 1995-1997 fell to a half of the exceptionally high 1991-1993 level, but it remained elevated relative to much of the 1980s and the earlier period.
The number of those persons arriving in Western European countries started to grow rapidly in the late 1980s when many of the countries implemented a new generation of restrictive rules and procedures concerning immigration. It is very likely that the flow of migrants denied by a number of western countries entry in capacity of family members, relatives, fiancées, etc. has partly been diverted to the asylum channel. In the early 1990s a host of other factors contributed to the growth in the number of asylum seekers, the most important being probably the flight of refugees from the former FSR Yugoslavia.

In 1993, around the climax time of the asylum seekers inflow to Western Europe, ex-Yugoslavs accounted for approx. 32 per cent of the total. Germany, by far the major receiving country, recorded a sudden rise in the number of asylum seekers from Yugoslavia - from 22,000 in 1990 to 122,000 in 1992 (95,000 in 1993), and in their share in the total - from 11 per cent to 28 per cent. In the peak year (1992) ex-Yugoslavs were followed by citizens of two other former communist countries, namely Romanians and Bulgarians in the ranking of major applying nationalities, and these three nationalities accounted for 59 per cent of all asylum seekers. Obviously a large part of those persons would have entered Germany as migrants provided no tightening in immigration policy had taken place. On the other hand, recording those persons as asylum seekers obscured the trend of East-West migration in the early 1990s, which was discussed earlier.

Another important nation, which in the early 1990s chose the “asylum channel” as means of entering Germany, was Turkey whose citizens were particularly affected by earlier immigration policy restrictions. A few other Asian nations that counted in that inflow included Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. On the whole, between 1990 and 1992 the number of Asian asylum seekers in Germany increased from 24,000 to 56,000 (Turkey not included). Even more spectacular than that was the rise in asylum-seeking by citizens of African countries who before 1989 did so rather sporadically. Over the period of the following five years (1988-1992), however, its incidence rose by factor 10, to reach 67,000 (1992).

The experience of various European countries suggests that after a relatively short time, a large (if not predominant) part of asylum seekers and persons given temporary protection have turned de facto or de jure immigrants. A comparative study of the effects of recent national policies towards the representatives of the latter category conducted in three Scandinavian countries revealed that despite sharp differences between those policies, the ultimate effect was the same: the migrants almost in corpore have become settled (Schwartz, 1998). This might be seen as one of the arguments implying that in the assessments of the European migration trends in the late 1980s and early 1990s more attention should be given to the flows of people requesting various kinds of protection or assistance as an alternative form of immigration.

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35 In that year the countries comprising European Economic Area (19 countries) recorded 554,000 asylum seekers of whom 177,000 were from ex-Yugoslavia (Eurostat, 1995).
36 58 per cent of asylum seekers in Western Europe, both from all countries and also Yugoslavia taken separately.
37 Negligible quantities of Turks were recorded among asylum seekers in the early 1980s (below 5,000 per annum), their number started growing in the second half of that decade to reach 28,000 in 1992.
38 The national composition of those applicants was very unstable, but the following might be mentioned among major nationalities: Algeria, Togo, Ghana and Nigeria.
39 Of three countries concerned: Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the first decided to pursue a clearly “restrictive” policy towards the asylum seekers or displaced persons from Bosnia, aiming at sending those persons back home as soon as possible, whereas the third from the very beginning aimed at their integration in the host society. After some time the three countries were compelled to follow the same policy, i.e. the policy of integration.
Finally, an observation might be made regarding the seeming paradox of Europe hosting growing numbers of refugees or asylum seekers not only originating from remote areas of the world but also, quite often, lacking developed networks in destination countries. For it should rather be expected that those persons would seek safety next to their home countries. Two complementary reasons why this is by no means the rule might be suggested here. First, a considerable proportion among them are genuine migrants whose preferred destination is the well-off core of the world economy and for whom the “asylum channel” might have turned out the easiest (if not the only available) way of getting there. Second, globalisation - which, according to Hoffmann-Nowotny (1991) is increasingly influenced by the Europeanisation of values and mass culture - legitimises and makes technically feasible the effort to become a part of the Old Continent by people from all around the world, even though this may require a lengthy migration and a number of heavy sacrifices.

4.7. European migration of “privileged” ethnic minorities

Migration which was ethnicity-driven, especially the migration whose major effect was to be the ethnic homogenisation of the population in the countries of origin and destination, deserves a succinct discussion here, if only to complement the list of flows that mattered for European migration in the past two decades. Although condition sine qua non for those movements to materialise might be seen in the European history, recently they have been triggered off or accelerated by the political reconfiguration of the continent (and the world system) that began with the falling down of the Soviet system.

That migration, which almost exclusively involved people living in Central and Eastern Europe, erupted in the late 1980s, after a long spell of the levelling off that followed the post-Second World War intensified movements 40. Leaving aside involuntary movements caused by the ethnic cleansing within the former FSR Yugoslavia, four major directions of the migration of ethnic unmixing seemed to have dominated the trend 41:

- ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany;
- ethnic Russians from the Soviet successor states to Russia 42;
- ethnic Jews from the ex-USSR to Israel, Germany and the United States, and
- ethnic Hungarians from Romania and Yugoslavia (Serbia) 43 to Hungary.

It might be estimated that between 1988 and 1996 the four directions that crucially contributed to the ethnicity-motivated outflow from Central and Eastern Europe, embraced as many as approx. 5.7 million persons including 2.5 million ethnic Germans, 2.4 million ethnic Russians, 600,000 ethnic Jews and 100,000 ethnic Hungarians. Taken as a whole, it was probably one of the most sizeable flows observed in Europe over the last 10 years or so. The fact that a large part of those movements is hardly accounted for in statistics and analyses of international migration, implies a severe bias in our understanding of contemporary population movements in Europe.

40 Important exceptions during that “levelling-off period”, whose beginning was marked by the proclamation of the “cold war”, included a massive migration of ethnic Germans (and to a lesser extent ethnic Jews) from Poland, and of ethnic Poles from the ex-USSR which took place in the second half of the 1950s, and in case of ethnic Germans from Poland also in the second half of the 1970s.
41 Other, less important directions comprised ethnic Finns, Greeks and Poles from the former Soviet Union, ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and respective flows of Czechs and Slovaks within the ex-Czechoslovakia.
42 In a similar manner, but in much smaller scale, migration of ethnic Ukrainians to Ukraine (or Russia), ethnic Belarussians to Belarus (or Russia), and Tatars to Crimea (Ukraine).
43 Also, but in small numbers, from Ukraine and Slovakia.
Much of the (discussed here) recent ethnic movements in Europe have been occurring under circumstances of no aggravating tension or no nagging need to leave the country of origin. Moreover a large part of migrants comprised persons whose ancestors had settled in the countries of origin generations ago, and who had been weakly tied to their symbolic “homelands”. Ultimately, the argument of ethnic homogenisation in case of that flow seems rather doubtful in view of that, simultaneously, the sending and receiving countries have been the ground of considerable inflow of other people representing various, often culturally diverse, ethnicities. It seems therefore legitimate to tentatively conclude that, perceived within a broad perspective of contemporary migration trends, the ethnicity-driven flow of people which has been recently observed in Europe, might seem somehow anachronic.

Turning to the differentia specifica of that flow, it was quite distinct relative inter alia to intra-EU movements of migrant workers, immigration on family reunion grounds, inflow of asylum seekers, assisted illegal migration or East-West movements of labour as it primarily stemmed from the causes rooted in the history of Europe rather than relatively recent factors, like the “new course” of globalisation or European regionalisation. Admittedly, the fall of communism has either paved the way for a part of ethnicity-spurred flow or triggered off another part of that flow. On the other hand, in frequent instances the migrants were motivated (if not tempted) by perspectives of living in a more efficient institutional set up and more wealthy environment, and to a large degree prompted to migrate due to a wide access to relevant information and transportation networks. The underlying single factor, however, proved to be the past intra-European political and economic developments. In particular, it turned out that the heritage of some past multi-ethnic empires has continued to bear heavily on ethnic relations in a number of European nation states, not to mention the respective impact of the Yalta agreement.

As Brubaker asserts, recent European migration of ethnic unmixing, despite great internal diversity of that flow, and a variety of direction-specific determinants (from country- or group-level to individual level determinants), had one important thing in common. “These migrations have all been generated by the reconfiguration of political space along national lines” (1998, 1063). Other similarities included uniform implication of the movements from relatively better-off to a relatively less well-off country and their taking place under circumstances of “some special openness on the part of the receiving country, derived from its understanding of itself as being a ‘homeland’” (Brubaker, 1998, 1064). Moreover, quite often, they involved the inconsistency between the legal (or embedded in political rhetoric) notion of co-ethnicity adopted in the receiving country and the respective (widely adopted) customary criteria or self-identification which made the process of co-ethnics’ integration rather difficult.

Despite the deep cultural and ethnic diversity of current movements - in all their forms - of people in Europe, it is still possible that the shrinking pool of potential ethnicity-driven migrants will soon bring that flow to a negligible size and bring about an increased ethnic homogenisation of Central and Eastern European countries. It is, however, also possible that in many cases these migrations will not so much alleviate ethnic conflict in the country of origin but that they will rather contribute to worsening ethnic conflict in the receiving country.
4.8. Towards summing up: has Pandora’s box really been opened up?

In the assessment of recent population movements in Europe it might be tempting to draw the following line of reasoning. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s many European countries actively encouraged the immigration of foreign labour, though usually with the intention of employing migrant workers for a fixed (shorter rather than longer) time and sending them back home upon the expiration of a contract. This had led to an extremely intensive influx of foreigners, mainly from the then sending countries of southern Europe and certain countries of the “western borderland”, i.e. the Maghreb countries, the former FSR Yugoslavia and Turkey. At the same time, the measures taken by Western European countries had aroused great expectations in out-migration regions, and contributed to the establishment of efficient migration networks, facilitating further migration.

After 1973, however, the recruitment of foreign labour was abandoned, which nevertheless failed to halt migration that, for mainly tactical reasons and out of necessity assumed the form of family migration. As the West gradually tightened the relevant laws and procedures in response, and eventually slowed down the inflow of foreigners arriving to join a family member or to marry a resident of a given country, aliens began to avail themselves on a mass scale of the opportunities offered by asylum regulations. However, as in the early 1990s stricter regulations were introduced in this area as well, for many Southerners, and, to a lesser degree, Easterners, using the services of professional networks that assist illegal migration became the only way to fulfil their plans connected with life in the West.

Since the middle of the 1990s, thanks to various preventive measures adopted by European countries, the inflow of unwanted (and illegal) migrants has slightly diminished. At the same time, as scanty but consistent evidence suggests, the number of people staying in “transit countries” and awaiting trafficking into Western Europe has risen. It might be hypothesised that only the time span needed to execute a migration, not the number of migrants, has changed over the last four to five years, and that in the immediate future, once the traffickers have successfully adapted to newly introduced controls and checks, illegal migration will grow again.

Should this order and causation in the developments related to the European migration be the case, one might legitimately compare the depicted trend to the proverbial opening up of Pandora’s box.

The above offered way of reasoning, however, does not seem to fully match the complexity of that trend. At least two important reservations might be raised here. First, the pattern of inflow to Western Europe has been by no means ethnically and geographically stable over time. Second, what has been sufficiently evidenced in the foregoing discussion, the bulk (in not just a predominant share) of the inflow resulted from the intra-European political change. As for the latter factor, the changes expected for the near future, by inter alia fostering the regionalisation in Europe, should be conducive to alleviating the migration pressure per se.

There will still, however, remain the question of migration pressures whose origins are non-European countries. Although many relevant factors are hard to predict accurately, it seems that only structural instability in countries bordering the unifying European space (above all, in Russia) would activate the potential inherent to those pressures. Otherwise the actual outcome might be vestigial flows of people from those countries with no practical consequences for stability, security and welfare in Europe.

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44 As a matter of fact, France and Britain started this even earlier (in late 1950s).
45 Those measures included closer international collaboration in combating illicit migration, creating an effective screening buffer zone around the united Europe, applying more advanced techniques of the surveillance of external borders, etc.
46 This would include strengthening the international co-operation in Europe, stabilising politically new European democracies, and institutionalising the population movements in the enlarged European space.
5. Issues of the late 1990s: a review of challenges faced by Europe

5.1. “Melting pot Europe” vis-à-vis new great migrant communities: the patterns and puzzles of integration

Irrespective of how the recent migration trends in Europe might be viewed from the perspectives of various disciplines and by various scholars, the opinion that over the last quarter of this century a large majority of European countries has received an unprecedented flow of foreigners is unquestionable. Willingly or not, Europe to a large degree has become a continent of immigrants, and its many countries have been, or are being, converted into “multiethnic, pluricultural societies”. The question therefore arises whether the social fabric of those ethnically and culturally reconfigurated societies have been significantly affected, and if so, how.

Arango, in his recent insightful analysis, arrived at largely sceptical conclusions: the prevailing orientation in the integration policies and popular feelings toward foreign residents in European countries seems to be restrictionist and exclusionary. As a result the immigrants are subject to temporariness and the limitation of their rights, and (implicitly or not) have been relegated to the position of underclass on the social ladder. Regardless of the way in which they are incorporated into society, most migrants suffer from political and also, in the case of a considerable proportion of them, social exclusion. In some countries they increasingly play the role of scapegoat when it comes to social tension or when social solidarity is at stake.

This is mostly due to the “framework [within which] immigration is bound to be seen as a threat, or at least a nuisance, to the ideal cohesion of the nation state, rather than a contribution to its formation or enhancement” (Arango, 1998, 11). Such a conclusion should have not come as a surprise for Europe “where a past of out-migration and a tradition of exclusionary conceptions of nationhood have left strong cultural underpinnings that militate against the full incorporation of migrants in society” (ibidem, 3).

Could this picture possibly be reconciled with the motto of the present conference: “unity in diversity”? My answer would be rather cautious: yes, though to a limited degree only. The justification for this somewhat more optimistic diagnosis can be found in the social and demographic statistics (and survey data) of various countries which suggest a gradual -though far from being fast, universal and proportionate - convergence of indicators for the native populations and immigrants.

A recent analysis carried out by Courbage (1998) that focuses on the behavioural patterns of immigrants from the Maghreb, implies that the demographic indicators (pertaining to fertility, nuptiality and mortality) display the fastest convergence rate of the immigrants on the indigenous populations, followed by the indicators that concern the educational structure and the composition of households. The lowest level (or the slowest pace) of convergence is found in employment characteristics (the composition by skill or sector, unemployment level, female participation, etc.). On the other hand, despite the fact that the integration of migrants in Western Europe, as measured by the convergence indicators, proceeds; the differences between individual receiving countries concerning the pace of that process tend to persist, which in turn depends to a large degree on the migration policies of respective countries.

47 Interestingly, the degree of migrants’ integration seems to be inversely correlated with the share of immigrants in the host population. Therefore the greater the number of migrants in society the higher incidence of non-acceptance of foreigners, anti-immigrant feelings and xenophobia, and the higher likelihood of exclusion.


49 See e.g. Coleman (1994) and Courbage (1998). Maffioli and Dell’Arte (1998) seem to suggest that something more than the migration policy of the receiving country, namely the individual migrant’s experience might be of greater importance than the migrant’s cultural background in shaping her/his behaviour and ultimately leading to integration.
Conspicuously, the difficulty in a rapid integration (and, in consequence, the phenomenon of discrimination or ostracism) can also be observed in the case of migrants from culturally non-distant countries. Probably the most striking example is that of the ethnic Germans who have recently resettled in Germany but are said to have experienced various forms of isolation, deprivation or exclusion there (e.g. non-acceptance by the indigenous population, segregation in the place of residence, below-average performance at school, high incidence of pathologies among the youth, difficulty in skill adjustment, relatively high unemployment among youth and females).[50] It appears, however, that many people who are a part of the recent migration wave in Europe, despite all odds and hindrances on the part of the host societies, display a strong determination, if not eagerness, to adapt and integrate. In the long run those migrants are likely to be fully included. On the other hand, some migrants come with the intention to limit themselves to work only, and ultimately to return to their home countries[51], and some others, who are in an irregular situation in the receiving country, by definition have no chances to integrate.[52] This contributes to the perception of migrant communities in many European countries as conglomerates and highly heterogeneous. That factor might be paired with a great concentration of the immigrant population which makes a number of social issues in certain provinces or cities in those provinces overwhelmed with the bare fact of foreigners’ presence (Coleman, 1994).

Nonetheless, in many European countries the perception of immigration does not seem to match the reality: the evolution of the former and the latter are clearly divergent. Moreover in view of the migration trends observed in Europe during the last decade, and particularly the recent five years which were marked by the declining relative proportion of the inflow from non-European countries, and bearing in mind that increasingly a lion’s share of the migration volume in Europe is accounted for by the intra-European movements of people, it could be argued that the impediments in migrants’ integration stem above all from internal problems encountered by individual receiving countries. A striking disproportion between the actual levels and pace of growth of immigrant flows on the one hand, and the degree of migrants’ exclusion and xenophobia on the part of the host population on the other hand, might strongly testify to that. In other words, it might be Europe itself - with its international disparities or incoherence, the crisis of liberal principles, etc. - where the primary causes of that phenomenon are to be sought.

5.2. Transnationalism: towards a supranational/postnational identity of migrants

Putting the mainstream of people migrating recently to European countries aside, a growing importance might be ascribed to the flows of people for whom the social integration in the host country is not an issue. Those flows embrace persons who are either (actually and willingly) short-term migrants and by definition do not seek social integration, or those who come for a relatively long stay (e.g. exceeding one year) but the basic function (and the main purpose) of their movement precludes that kind of integration or makes it a matter of relatively low priority. Below I reflect on the latter.

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50 See e.g. Dietz (1997), Koller (1997) and Muenz and Ohliger (1997).
51 This seems to be particularly common in Italy and certain other countries of Southern Europe.
52 Moreover, as Coleman ascertains, “illegal immigration undermines the position of existing migrants and raises popular feeling against them” (1994, 41).
Typically, the long-term migrants whose social integration in the host country is neither a prerequisite for performing/achieving major objectives of their migration, nor its absence in any significant way harms the migrant and the host country, include diplomatic personnel and foreign students. In the last decade or so, however, this is also (increasingly) the case of highly skilled employees of TNCs, representatives of various international NGOs and other international service providers. Recent estimates for the western part of the continent suggest that the share of those persons might range from over 25 per cent (the Netherlands) to approx. 60 per cent (Norway and the United Kingdom) of all migrant workers, and imply its gradual rise (e.g. France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) (Salt, 1997a). This trend has also been visible in Central and Eastern Europe (OECD, 1998).

The specificity of that phenomenon can be illustrated by using the example of specialists or managers employed by TNCs. Above all, as noted by Rudolph (1997, 13), “internationally mobile managers/experts are privileged in different respects: many countries have passed exceptional regulations concerning their access to the territory and to the labour market; their economic integration is primarily related to their skill level (and not to their ethnicity) and they rarely run the risk of dequalified employment”. Secondly, those persons are to a large degree transnational internal migrants, which means that their recruitment takes place from within corporate internal labour markets, and passes by the international market or market of a given country (Salt, 1997a). Finally, the movements of such professionals are perceived as an instrument of the globalisation process, especially of the transfer of both functional skills and “corporate culture” (norms, values and habits matching the new standards of organisation and technology) between various economies (Castles and Miller, 1993).

Rudolph’s analysis pertaining to the post-1990 European experts’ flows from the West to the East substantiates the validity of this description (e.g. Rudolph, 1997; Rudolph and Hillmann, 1997). It is evident from that analysis that the migrants identify themselves with a multiplicity of functions, in particular with that of restructuring at company, branch and national economy, therefore linking the transformation to the globalisation process.

In effect, the employees of TNCs and other migrants of similar kinds, because of the range of “in-between ethnicisation configurations with varying home-host compositions and emphases” (Morawska, forthcoming, 21), are perceived as a vehicle of the “postnational genre”. Indeed, an entirely new trend emerges in Europe (and elsewhere in the world) whose conceptualisation assumes “creolisation”, i.e. permeable, flux and multiple identities of the migrants ensued by their living in several societies simultaneously with a complex web of social relations characteristic to those societies (Glick-Schiller et al., 1996). This will undoubtedly pose an additional challenge to many European countries, especially to those components of their migration policy which reflect the philosophy of nation-state.

Also, symptoms of the setting up of transnational migrant communities whose founding principle is not necessarily tight social integration with the host country, but which have been built upon the ethnic origin of migrants rather than their skills were recently observed in Europe (e.g. Cesari, 1998 and Haug, 1998). Nyiri (1997), for instance, has described the process of organisation of the new overseas Chinese communities in Europe (including some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, notably Hungary) whose major trait is the high level of internal integration and their strong political and economic affiliation with China. For those communities relations with the host society do not seem of primary importance. They have been created thanks to the world-wide Chinese commercial web, interwoven through traditional family links, which invests large capital in various destination countries and is capable of flexibly moving the stock and distribution centre from one country to another. Nyiri’s analysis is concluded with the following admonition: “A fast and massive Chinese migration to other parts of the world is likely to bring China’s alternative globalisation into conflict with that of the West if not carefully managed” (1997, 19), and with a quotation from Habermas: “the state must respond to the challenge of deterritorialised nationalism by actively engaging, through incentives and law enforcement, transnational migrant communities in the discourse which defines the political culture of the host society”.
5.3. Incomplete migration: a phenomenon of transnational marginalisation

Quite different problems for migrants and sending/receiving societies are posed by the phenomenon of incomplete migration. By the incomplete migration (which has already been referred to in this paper) I mean the specific outcome of an unfinished “mobility transition” (in Zelinski’s terms) in countries of Central and Eastern Europe which left a large part of the rural population halfway through: between its employment in agriculture and residence in a town. Its origins might be sought in the “abrupt decline of migration [from the rural areas] and the rapid rise of commuting”, because the failure of initial “socialist” industrialisation in the 1950s denied “largely agricultural workers recruited for urban labour force as manual or low-skilled workers [...] urban residence” (Fuchs and Demko, 1978). After the expiration of demand for low-skilled commuters or seasonal industrial workers in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, many persons (predominantly Poles) who found themselves in such a situation begun income-seeking activities (mainly, petty trade) in neighbouring former socialist countries. This evolved into the present form of the phenomenon, popular in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine), which is characterised by the following traits (Okólski, 1998c):

- migrants enter the host country under the guise of tourists to trade or work informally;
- migration is considered by the household as an alternative and supplementary source of the income, often within the household strategy of income diversification and minimisation of risks;
- although each flow involves only weeks or days spent in the host country, the migrants do that repeatedly and, in effect, many of them work for a considerable part of the year outside the home country.

Due to the very low cost of living of the migrants’ households, incomplete migration - despite low migrants’ pay - has proved to be a relatively efficient way to generate income under transitionary circumstances. On the other hand, the ensuing effect of that phenomenon is inter alia prolonged precariousness of migrants’ economic situation, family life and, generally, social role. It prevents the migrants from any form of integration in the host country, and at the same time, in the case of people from the rural areas, sustains their socially marginal position in the home country, or, in the case of the inhabitants of urban areas, contributes to their marginalisation (Frejka et al., 1998).

Though it might be argued that the people who resort to that mobility have become another form (strikingly different from that represented by the privileged highly skilled professionals) of transnational migrants, the function of their movements is only peripheral. The solution to the problem of transnational marginalisation of those migrants might not come instantly nor easily. On the contrary, many factors such as their low level of education, an accrued strong habit of flexible behaviours, the demanding socio-economic milieu of the transforming home country, and the existence - in frequent cases - of a “safety niche” composed of a family home and a subsistence-oriented plot of land and supported by extended and strong family ties, suggest - in the long run - that a great proportion of the persons taking part in incomplete migration will neither be able to cope with the challenges of the more and more modern society nor will they be sufficiently covered by the protective umbrella of the state. Therefore coming to terms with the transnational marginalisation of current migrants from Central and Eastern European countries might require the passing of the generation involved.

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53 It partly involves the residents of declining small towns who were unable to move to cities.
5.4. Migration business and its undesirable consequences

In a recent paper, Salt (1998a, 4) has developed the concept of the migration business as “a system of institutionalised networks consisting of organisations, agents and individuals each of which stands to gain some form of remuneration. In other words, there are vested interests in the promotion of migration”. According to this concept, migration is subject to an analysis in contractual terms, in contrast to an approach which has predominated until now and conceives “international migration [...] as a relationship between, on the one hand, an individual or household moving for purposes of permanent settlement or work and, on the other, a government acting as gatekeeper for entry into a country and acquisition of its citizenship” (Salt, 1998a, 3).

Below I leave aside the public business of migration and a large part of the private component of that business, and focus entirely on the illegitimate (thus undesirable) side of the latter.

A major part of that illegal business constitutes trafficking in persons or, in its reduced form: the smuggling of migrants. The importance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that for a large majority of the residents of many countries in the South (or - to a lesser extent - the East) no alternative option currently exists if they strive to migrate to the West. On the other hand, the activities of trafficking networks increasingly affect the numbers of actual migrants, as well as the selection of destination countries and the routes chosen. It might therefore be argued that trafficking in persons is, or might soon become, a significant factor contributing to the emergence of a new geographic pattern of migration.

In contrast to many other illegitimate acts observed in the process of migration, an individual act of trafficking affects more than just one society and its consequences are probably more comprehensive and far reaching. Its prevention and combating seems even more arduous than other forms of illicit migrants’ behaviours. This is because trafficking in migrants involves international groups of organised crime and is closely linked with other illegal activities of those groups, and - last but not least - yields high profits.

Due to many factors, including the opening up of Eastern Europe to international movements of people around 1990 and the relatively favourable location of that part of the continent for illegal migrants, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have recently become a major transit ground and vestibule (and, increasingly, a destination) for tens of thousands (annually) of foreigners smuggled or trafficked into Europe. A survey conducted in 1998 in Poland revealed the existence of two basic premises facilitating further growth of that phenomenon: the world-wide availability of contact points reaching out to the most remote and most difficult to access localities in Africa and Asia, and the well co-ordinated and effective functioning of the trafficking organisations (Okólski, 1999a).

Despite enormously high (relative to the affluence of all countries of migrants’ origin) price of the trafficking54, a mechanism has been observed according to which increasingly money is paid to a trafficker (beforehand) by a future migrant’s employer (as a credit to the migrant) or (after successful arrival to the target country) by those (usually, relatives or other co-ethnics) who commit themselves to the migrant’s insertion at the ultimate destination. Another important finding implies the great role of the “Russian mafia” in running trafficking organisations. At least one-third of all studied cases displayed a very similar pattern: an unattended trip (often, Aeroflot flight) to Moscow (or other city in the ex-USSR), followed (after a shorter or longer wait to compose a migrants’ group) by an escorted trip to Kiev, Minsk or Vilnius, and (usually after the re-arrangement of the group) illegal entry to Poland. Those migrants explicitly pointed to travel arrangements, document issuance, transportation network, hiding on the route and border crossing as facilitated by Russian authorities (official tourist agents, diplomatic representatives, airline staff, policemen, military and border guard officers) who apparently closely collaborated with the traffickers. In turn, while in Poland, a large

54 The average price in the sample of migrants was around 3,000 US dollars per one person but 55 per cent of migrants paid more than 5,000 US dollars (25 per cent more than 12,000 US dollars).
part of the trafficked migrants is introduced to the government refugee services and - for the time when the final trafficking operation is prepared - placed in a refugee reception centre. Gradually, migrants - in newly composed groups - are further trafficked to Germany and other western countries (Okólski, 1999a).

Such modus operandi of migrant trafficking organisations brings a number of immediate, detrimental and socially unwanted, consequences to a country of transit or destination, which *inter alia* include the penetration of foreign (international) criminal networks and the undermining of the national asylum system. It spreads corruption of state officials, increases the incidence of crime, and involves violations of human rights, particularly the right to asylum. The costs of combating that phenomenon are immense.

The problem of migrant trafficking owes very much to the coincidence of two major political trends in Europe: the opening up of the former socialist countries to population movements (in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist system in Europe) and the closing of western European borders to migrants from the South (and certain countries of the East). An effective solution of this problem does not seem feasible without concerted counteraction on the part of both segments of the continent, and, ultimately, arriving at a common European migration policy, including the idea of uniform external borders.

5.5. Probable effects of the EU enlargement

Although the future enlargement of the European Union is still ahead of us, most likely by more than five years, the fact of the possible accession of six new countries, including five countries of Central and Eastern Europe seems to have already affected thinking of the changes in the migration trends, if not actual migration trends in Europe. The possibility of future eastbound extension of the external borders of the EU has stimulated the adaptation of candidate countries’ migration regulations to “European standards” and the tightening of the borders of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This resulted in the deceleration of the pace of the foreigners’ inflow, more efficient control over the movements of citizens of countries allowed visa-free entry and probably also the reduction in illegal immigration to these countries. On the other hand, a tendency to settle and eventually acquire citizenship of the host country (e.g. in the case of Vietnamese in Poland) has been observed among certain groups of migrants. Such a tendency might to some degree be linked with expectations among migrants from the countries with limited access to the European Union that once the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (along with the other three candidates) are granted full membership in the EU, those immigrants will be able to automatically benefit from the free movement right within the Union. Nevertheless this phenomenon seems so far to be of negligible magnitude.

Whereas control over the inflow of foreigners to whom the EU restrictions apply is largely considered manageable in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, more clouds seem to surround the issue of future propensity of the citizens of those countries to seek employment in other EU countries provided the institutional barriers are abolished (Kerremans, 1997). Poland might serve as an illustration of the probable acute migration pressure. This might be so for at least two reasons. A primary consideration is demographic. Between 2001 and 2010 the working age population is expected to grow by nearly 700,000 in Poland while the corresponding total of 15 countries of the EU may decline by over 1,100,000. The second argument pertains to the necessity of restructuring of Polish (highly fragmented and inefficient) agriculture, which presently gives employment to approx. 20 per cent of the labour force. Coming down with that percentage to the current level of Portugal (just above 10 per cent) by the year 2010 would require freeing some 2 million agricultural workers. Spectacular as they may seem, however, these arguments are largely dubious: the above quoted increase in the size of the working age population in Poland will be a combination of a tremendous rise in the “immobile” age group (45 or over) and a decline (by a little more than 600,000) in the “mobile” group (up to the age 45) whereas the majority of the redundant agricultural labour will most likely (again predominantly due to ageing) become pensioners.
Recent analyses strongly posit that no significant increase in migration for work in the EU labour market is likely from the candidate countries after their accession (e.g. Hars, 1998; Okólski and Stola, 1998). This seems to agree with an earlier conclusion arrived at by Tapinos (1994, 220): “Legal barriers cannot be regarded as the main obstacles preventing migration” and therefore “the fear of mass immigration resulting solely from the removal of legal barriers in Central and Eastern Europe is probably unfounded”.

However, the current political debate suggests a very careful approach of the EU countries to that issue. In view of this, following a very comprehensive analysis of the economic and political realities in the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, Morawska (1999) offers the probable scenario of the admission process which assumes that the accession will take place in 2005, the transitional ten-year period after the formal admission will be introduced, and repeated delays in allowing the free international movements of persons will take place afterwards. This in turn, irrespective of the underlying rationale and harmful effects for the future development of Central and Eastern European countries and the future integration of Europe, would make the issue of the migration consequences of the accession irrelevant, for at least one generation.
6. Conclusions: does Europe still need migrants?

The question I am going to address in the conclusion has already been forcefully put (and extensively discussed) by other authors (e.g. Angenendt, 1997; Coleman, 1993), which allows me to limit myself to a few comments stemming from the foregoing analysis.

First of all, in assessing the current or future European capacity in terms of the inflow and stock of migrants, it is essential to observe the changes in the nature of international migration in general and the European migration space in particular. It seems plausible, which has been recently emphasised by Salt (1997c, 5), that “the term ‘migration’ with its overtones of some notion of permanent settlement” has become somehow obsolete, and we ought “to regard migration as a sub-category of a more general concept of ‘movement’, embracing a wide variety of types and forms of human mobility each capable of metamorphosing into something else”. On the other hand, Europe as an arena of international population movements needs to be conceived, on the one hand, as a component of global space, and, on the other hand, as a whole extending from the Urals to the Atlantic.

Referring to those remarks, it should be noted that recent European migrations were marked by intracontinental movements. Not only did relative significance of the inflow from other continents decline, but also the Europeans displayed substantially lower propensity to move beyond the boundaries of Europe. In addition, the short-term movements and paramigratory mobility have come to the fore. On the other hand, many forms and types of movements observed over the last 20 years or so, above all the mainstream of European migration, stemmed from the “political conjuncture”, and it would be rather unwise to consider them to be stable phenomena.

Nonetheless the dominant public perception of migration and, particularly, migrants’ presence in Europe, does sharply contrast with the conclusion denying the expansive nature of that phenomenon, especially with regard to the growth of immigration from the South. This is an important argument to seriously consider the hypothesis that the “threshold of tolerance” to aliens has been crossed in a number of European countries. Even if such a hypothesis is plausible, however, it is not necessarily so much the movements of people over the last 10-20 years that stand behind such heavily strained acceptance of the migrants by the indigenous populations but rather the accumulated outcome of migrations dating back to the 1950s or 1960s.

In the real world the inflow of migrants, regardless of how strong, and even more so the presence - in its direct manifestations - of foreigners increasingly give rise to social concern and tensions in the host countries and threaten their internal stability/security. As noted by Hollifield (1999), some authors represent the view that the fears of excessive migrants’ participation in society, expressed - with a growing intensity - by the public since the 1980s, are not only rational but also justified. Irrespective of the arguments which allude to that a number of European countries might have reached the saturation point in admitting foreigners (e.g. Coleman, 1993) or the opposite arguments claiming endlessly beneficial effects of immigration (e.g. Gosh, 1994), it seems legitimate to ask whether Europe could have avoided the worst of the present “tolerance crisis” without resorting to radically more restrictive migration policies.

Here is a handful of reasons which might suggest the possibility of a different course of migration trends and the process of migrants’ integration in Europe, even under relatively liberal (more liberal than presently implemented or proposed) policies of the western European countries.

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55 The argument of seuil de tolerance was coined in 1991 by the French President Mitterrand.
1. A large degree of tolerance of the “shadow economy” and, particularly, of the irregular labour market by the state, persisting in some of those countries, acts like a magnet for the flows of illegitimate migrants. Although since the 1970s irregular migrant workers have generally ceased to be tolerated in the West, the employers keep offering jobs to them (Brochmann, 1993, Stalker, 1994) Introducing more appropriate sanctions against employers or their more effective enforcement in those countries might by itself have blunted the attraction of the informal market and brought down the number of unwanted migrants.

2. A considerable part of the migrants’ inflow ensues from seemingly incoherent migration policies of the countries of destination, characterised by instability of policy rules or discrepancies among those rules. For instance, the idea of free movement of people, which for a long time was postulated by a majority of western European countries, was perceived by migrants as contradictory to the tightening of controls on entry. Frequently, migrants after not being admitted felt deceived by this, and sought illegal entry. Another illustration of such incoherence presents changing principles applied by some countries to the so-called guest workers, which confused many temporary migrants and drove them into irregularity or to a path leading to permanence. Finally different rules of admission employed to ethnically different categories of migrants, in particular, the granting of privileged status to some, seems to have multiplied the flow of persons who belong to the privileged.

3. A culturally or economically selective approach to asylum seekers usually results in some sorts of adverse consequences, and encourages more members of particular cultural or economic groups to migrate (Levai, 1997; Zolberg et al., 1986). On the other hand, generally generous asylum laws play the role of a powerful stimulus for migrants from all over the world to take advantage of that generosity once the other migration channels are blocked (Zlotnik, 1998). Finally, internationally uncoordinated attitudes towards the asylum or temporary protection seekers either shift the flows of those persons to the countries offering those persons relatively more favourable terms of admission or raise their expectations according to these terms regardless of the actual country of residence (Schwartz, 1998).

4. Another factor of relevance is the rigidity of specific rules or regulations in individual countries of western Europe concerning the citizens of other countries, which seems to contribute to the hampering of the integration of migrants. Above all this pertains to the German attachment to *jus sanguinis* principle in the citizenship (and migrant intergration) policy of this country. This law, for instance, assumes the inclusion of the persons who for generations lived in an alien country but are known to have distant German ancestors, but at the same time the exclusion of the persons of non-German ancestry even though those person have been born and legally living in Germany for longer than one generation. In France, the rigid principle of the separation of fundamentally secular officialdom and privateness, with its possible religious beliefs and connections to church, might be quoted as another example. Particularly affected in this case seems the integration of Islamic migrants for whom the abrupt adjustments to the requirements of the host society is often inconceivable, and thus might lead them in the opposite direction, i.e. towards fundamentalism and militancy (Hollifield, 1999; Todd, 1994). It does not need to be argued that the migrants’ separateness and marginalisation, which at least in part results from that inflexibility of integration policies, only fuel xenophobia among the indigenous population, and introduce a significant bias to the perception of immigration and migrants’ integration in the public opinion.

56 Boehning and Werquin (1990, 32) assert that “the numerical importance of the irregular employment of foreigners deepens largely on the ease with which employers can make use of this labour reserve that is docile and cheap”.

57 Such situations with reference to Germany are discussed in Weiner and Hanami (1998).

58 As a conspicuous example might serve the 1989 flow of ethnic Germans from Poland to Germany. In that single year, on the eve of the expected tightening of admission rules by Germany, a quarter of million Polish citizens of this kind was granted the (privileged) status of *Aussiedler*. This number approximated the total size of German minority in Poland, as estimated by the German Red Cross in the early 1970’s. It seems that, to large degree, that flow reflected the “herd instinct” (aroused by exceptional opportunities) rather than the genuine need of the reunion with a symbolic homeland (Okólski, 1999b).
5. The list of other pertinent factors, which due to limited space cannot be discussed here, seems quite long and includes inter alia such crucial issues as, on the one hand, the discrepancies between the entry measures (e.g. control of borders and regulation of labour markets) and integration measures (e.g. migrant rights) in migration policies of the receiving countries, and, on the other hand, the whole gamut of factors that sustain enormously wide income gaps between countries or the segmented national labour markets.

Bearing in mind the above listed arguments, it appears that migration pressure on Europe on the part of non-European migrants, be it a real fact or just a threat, could be perceptibly alleviated, even under the present institutional arrangements in Europe and within relatively short time. Also visible are the symptoms of a shift in that direction in the distant future. Those symptoms include inter alia a gradual emergence and development of regional migration spaces with their specific poles of attraction outside of Europe; slow but consistent development of the world economy with rising income levels and ever new countries advancing from the periphery to the median position and from the median position to the core; and as a consequence, the “dispersion” of the global migratory potential among the growing number of countries; and, finally, the determination of European states in their striving for an internally and internationally consistent (if not common) migration policy and their (already - since around 1995 - accomplished) preliminary successes in the curtailing of the illegal inflow of foreigners.

On the other hand, unquestionably (if only by sheer necessity), Europe will continue to be a part of the mainstream of the “new course” of globalisation, and will have to keep various channels of population movements open and permeable. The latter will probably be nourished by two powerful factors: the tradition of openness and pluralism (including multiculturalism), and a pragmatic and market-regulated demand for skills, talents and - last but not least - workers ready to accept jobs no longer wanted by the local labour force.

Finally, it seems unlikely for Europe to stand aside insofar as the matters of the “world order” or “global stability and security” are concerned. Globalisation also means greater awareness among the poor of their underprivileged position in the world economy, and more articulated claims for being rescued from the poverty. The rich/poor divide and many other contradictions of the contemporary world call for continuous attention and searching for a solution. As Levai (1997, 183) notes, migration offers “the evolutionary [and peaceful] course to reduce both the resulting political and economic tensions, the increasing labour unrest and labour distress”. According to this logic, in choosing the “lesser evil”, European countries might be persuaded to receive, in the foreseeable future, more migrants than they would actually like to.

59 See e.g. Salt (1998b).
60 Lim (1997) points to growing demand for live-up help due to the sharp increase in the demand for the care of the elderly in ageing western societies. It is believed that the cheap foreign labour will be instrumental in solving this problem.
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