Poland’s migration: growing diversity of flows and people

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1. Historical review

The population of Poland has for a very long time displayed a great propensity to emigrate. In contrast, in modern times immigration has never been of significant scale, consisting almost exclusively of returning Poles. Important emigration waves began from different Polish regions between 1860 and 1890 (Morawska, 1989). The major underlying causes were socio-economic underdevelopment and peripheral location which gave rise to rural overpopulation, insufficient demand for labour in the industrial sectors and retarded demographic transition with relatively high natural increase of the population.

It is estimated that by the outbreak of the First World War more than 3.5 million Polish people settled abroad. Between 1919-1939 the number of emigrants was approx. 1.6 million. Between 1860-1940 approx. 1.7 million (or roughly one third) of the total 5.5-6.0 million emigrants went to the United States. According to some estimates, 20-30 per cent of those emigrants returned to Poland. In addition, a large number of persons left temporarily, mostly for Germany (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998).

Apart from these outflows, mass deportations (in particular between 1864 and 1915) to the eastern parts of Russia were also of some meaning. Stalin’s policy of cleansing Soviet society of “politically suspect elements”, the main instrument of which was physical terror, affected Polish people as early as 1934 when several hundred thousand ethnic Poles were deported (mainly from western Ukraine) to Kazakhstan and other remote areas of the USSR. Further sizeable deportations began with the Soviet annexation of the eastern part of Poland in 1939 (Okólski, 1990).

Migratory movements related to the Second World War proved to be the most intensive in Poland’s history. It is estimated that every sixth inhabitant of Poland’s territory (as of 1938) crossed the state frontiers. The total outflow of more that five million persons (between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945) consisted of four basic categories: people deported to forced labour in Germany and countries (other than Poland) occupied by Germany (approx. 2.8 million), prisoners of war (including non-military prisoners) detained in camps in Germany and Austria (approx. 250,000), refugees who fled Poland in September 1939 (125,000-150,000), and ethnic Poles forced into German army or transferred to Germany for germanisation (440,000-490,000). This account does not include ethnic Germans displaced at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, and ethnic Poles from the regions occupied by the Soviet Union who were deported to the East (Luczak, 1984). A substantial part of all these migrants who survived the war did not return to Poland after the war ended.

From 1945 until late 1980s the population movements to and from Poland were rigidly controlled by the state, and the individual freedom of travelling abroad was severely restrained in the case of citizens/residents of Poland.

Between 1945 and 1947, some 3,885,000 persons (mostly ethnic Germans but also ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Jews) emigrated from Poland or were displaced (deported, repatriated), while approx. 3,693,000 persons (mostly ethnic Poles but also Jews) immigrated or were repatriated to Poland (Kersten, 1974). These ethnically-spurred flows gradually subsided in 1948-1950/51, when only 165,000 persons emigrated and 93,000
persons immigrated. As a matter of fact, in that period no movements were allowed but those strictly related to family reunion and with a clear objective of ethnic unmixing.

In the period 1951/52-1955 the international movements were effectively stopped. In turn, the following years, till 1959, saw an enormous increase in migration, though once more limited solely to the “exchange” of ethnic groups. Ethnic Poles and ethnic Jews of Polish origin were repatriated from the USSR to Poland, and ethnic Germans from Poland to Germany (also ethnic Jews from Poland to Israel and a few other countries). Altogether over just two years, 1957 and 1958, approx. 273,000 persons emigrated which accounted for over 30 per cent of the total outflow in 1951-1989. In turn, the four-year period, 1956-1959, saw the immigration of approx. 255,000 persons, i.e. nearly 77 per cent of the total inflow in 1951-1989. Although, despite continuous efforts made by the state administration, the flows of people from and to Poland were never again brought to a standstill, relatively high volume of the movements of 1956-1959 constituted the sole exception in the post-1950 period of the communist rule in Poland (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998).

Since the late 1950s until 1990 the documented flows, in which - in contrast to earlier periods - ethnic Poles took a major part, displayed an astonishingly stable pattern. Annual outflow figures (except in 1970 and 1973-1975 when they were significantly lower) ranged from around 20,000 to around 35,000 and inflow figures from around 1,500 to around 3,000. Family reasons (marriage, reunion with close relatives, return after retirement) constituted the main cause of those flows (ibidem).

The 1970s marked the beginning of gradual (albeit erratic) liberalisation of passport regulations in Poland which led to the multiplication of the number of Poles travelling to other countries. It was precisely in the 1970s when the phenomenon of mass overstaying in the West by Polish tourists started. The number of emigrant-turned overstaying Poles in the whole decade is estimated at some 75,000. Those people largely benefited from easy (if not preferential) access to the asylum or immigration procedures in western countries.

A relatively short period between the rise of the Solidarity movements in September 1980 and the declaration of the martial law on 13 December 1981 saw the freedom of travelling abroad to a degree unknown before in any socialist country. Although in 1982 and 1983 the passport regulations became more restrictive again, shortly liberal measures were reintroduced, and ultimately, in 1988, an almost unlimited right to free movements has been granted to the Polish citizens.

Although the scale of documented flows did not change dramatically in the 1980s, hundreds of thousand Polish travellers effectively became immigrants in the West. A great proportion among those undocumented migrants constituted the persons recognised and accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany as ethnic Germans. Also (in Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece and a few other countries of western Europe) a large number of Poles were granted political asylum or temporary protection, subsequently (at least in a great number of cases) transformed into settlement migration to overseas countries (USA, Canada, Australia and the Republic of South Africa). Largely over-represented among those

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\[\text{However, in 1968 and 1969 another wave of ethnic Jews emigrated from Poland (more than 13,000 persons), and in 1976-1979 the outflow of ethnic Germans was reinforced anew (nearly 136,000 emigrants).}\]
migrants were the young and highly educated, and those originating from urban centres and better-off regions.

In addition, the 1980s were a decade of a rapid increase in the outflow of labour from Poland. In the peak year, 1989, as many as 148,000 Polish workers were employed abroad (though predominantly in non-western countries) on the basis of various intergovernmental agreements or state-sponsored contracts. Last but not least, a mass circular mobility of false tourists was observed, i.e. the tourists then solely engaged in petty trade but at the same time, as soon became evident, the pioneers of a new form of mobility (if not the way of life) called incomplete migration.

In other words, the 1980s were the period of revitalising old and establishing new networks, and acquiring experience in international migration by large masses of the population of Poland. With immigration volume still rather negligible, emigration (both documented and undocumented) involved around 1.1-1.3 million persons. Undocumented short-term outflow might be estimated at some 1.0-1.1 million, and the documented outflow of migrant workers at around 700,000. In addition approx. one million people practised non-tourist circular movements usually contained within at most two months (Okólski, 1994). As survey results reveal from one-third to a half of households, depending on region, who were engaged in at least one of those forms of migration (Iglicka, Jazwinska and Okólski, 1996).

2. Actual situation

2.1. Legal environment

Regulation concerning international movements of people have been deeply modified, extended and made more specific and less arbitrary since 1989. As a matter of fact, the basic change with regard to migration of the Polish citizens – unlimited access to passport and the abolition of “exit visa” institution - has been introduced already in 1988.

The present laws concerning migration and migrants are liberal and in accordance with major international conventions or declarations and bilateral agreements concluded by Poland with other states (Lodzinski, 1998). The legal foundation of migration policy is the Aliens Law passed on 25 June 1997 which regulates the following issues:
- entry, exit and transit of foreign nationals and their stay in Poland;
- spheres of the state activities in the area of migration policy and the respective competence of various organs of the state;
- foreigners’ rights in Poland and safeguards to protect those rights (in accordance with international standards);
- repatriation of ethnic Poles to Poland.

2 In case of those migrants the duration of stay abroad was at least 12 months.
3 In case of those migrants the duration of stay abroad was between two and 11 months.
4 The only important migration-related international convention which Poland has so far failed to ratify is the ILO convention no. 97 on migrant workers which affects the internal Polish regulations concerning migrant workers and their family members.
Polish legal acts pertaining to migration or foreign nationals are in agreement with a general principle of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland passed on 2 April 1997 which recognises free movements of people across state boundaries as a basic human right. Consequently, Poland maintains a visa-free regime, based on the respective bilateral agreements (usually accompanied by readmission agreements), with a great number of countries. In addition, by ratifying in December 1991 the Geneva Convention and New York protocol on refugees, Poland has become widely open to the foreign nationals in need of protection. Poland also – by means of the Act on Employment and Preventing of Unemployment (passed on 14 December 1994) - allows the inflow of temporary migrant workers. The procedures of obtaining work permits and the condition of employment of foreign nationals in Poland are alternatively specified in the bilateral employment agreements signed by Poland with many other states.

Extended legal infrastructure has also been created to prevent illegal immigration and the abuse of foreigners’ rights in Poland. It includes a number of regulations dealing with such concepts as: expulsion, deportation and detention, and stems from the provision of the Aliens Law.

The execution of migration-related laws is supervised by (and subject to appeal to) the courts and the Ombudsman.

The migration matters which are a specific focus of Polish legal regulations also include the development of Polish diaspora abroad, employment of Polish citizens in other countries and the repatriation of persons of Polish origin, particularly the descendants of citizens of Poland deported in the early 1940s by the Soviet Union to remote areas of the ex-USSR.

2.2. Aggregate trends since 1989

2.2.1. Main premises

Two jointly if not synergically operating factors: political and economic transformations, seem of crucial importance for affecting the 1990s migration trends in Poland. The former involves the opening up of Polish borders and the restoration of freedom of travelling in the former socialist countries. In turn, the essence of the latter are creation of business and employment opportunities in Poland, be it within official or shadow sectors of the economy, and acute market imbalances, shortages and disturbances in certain other former socialist countries.

The deep liberalisation of migration policies in Central and Eastern Europe has became a factor strongly conducive to greater international mobility of people within the region and between the region itself and third countries. Migration-fostering effects of that factor notwithstanding, the reforms in Poland and some other countries of the region have provoked an adverse trend as far as the outflow to West is concerned. This is so because the citizens of those new democracies have been denied a preferential treatment by

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5 This section has almost entirely been based on the author’s national SOPEMI reports prepared annually from 1991 onwards.
immigration/asylum authorities of western countries, often available to them in the past. A peculiar distinct manifestation of this in the case of Poland might be a sudden switch of Germany (since 1991) to discouraging of the inflow of ethnic Germans from Poland.

On the other hand, due to a relatively radical and fast transformation of the Polish economy, Poland has become a pole of attraction for migrants in dramatically diversifying the former socialist block. By the same token, its economy has also been stimulating a wave of return migration, particularly of the highly skilled and probably also contributed to the slackening propensity to migrate for work among the persons of high skills.

Besides those transition-related factors, which might be pertinent to all forms of international mobility of people observed in Poland since 1989, a significant role in shaping recent movements of Poles, can also be attributed to a strong tradition of migration, the existence of a large and dynamic diaspora (with its extended networks), a skill, inherited from earlier periods, of extracting unexpected (sometimes even illegal) benefits from migration in defiance of the relevant rules and regulations, and certain deeply-rooted structural characteristics of Polish society.

In addition, the processes of broader compass, leading to the emergence of a new international order, seem to have significantly influenced some categories of the inflow of foreigners to Poland. In particular, this includes the phenomena known in short as “fortress Europe” which make it (increasingly) more difficult than before to enter the member-countries of the European Union by the citizens of many third countries, and prompt large numbers of migrants from the latter countries to seek an illegal passage (often pursued through a multi-stage chain of events and involving complicated routes) to their preferred destination.

All those factors have contributed to the fundamental change of the migration pattern observed in Poland in the period 1945-1988 or in its various sub-periods.

2.2.2. Outflows

Similarly to the 1980s, in the most recent movements of the population of Poland, the documented flows were accompanied by the large-scale undocumented flows. Movements of the latter period, however, were distinctly different from movements of the former period in that they owed illegitimate/irregular character to non-complying with the rules of receiving country rather than with those of the country of origin (i.e. Poland). Four main types of the documented outflow of Polish migrants have been observed since 1989: emigration to overseas destinations, departures of ethnic Germans, flows of asylum seekers and migration for work. In turn, the undocumented outflow included above all incomplete migration.

Emigration to the overseas, as recorded by Polish sources, was rather modest and stable; it oscillated around 5,000 persons annually, with the USA accounting for approx. a half of the total. The records of immigration countries, however, suggest much higher numbers (especially prior to 1995) but they probably incorporate great numbers of Polish citizens coming from the third countries who might have emigrated from Poland years before the date of ultimate immigration.
While in case of a large majority of destination countries the documented settlement immigration of Poles has been promptly subsiding, to became very low by the middle of 1990s (at the latest), the inflow to the United States – despite a significant decrease in 1995 – has retained its large scale. In addition to many regular immigrants (between approx. 20,000 and 30,000 each year in 1990-1994) and many undocumented Poles who have been regularised, Polish citizens turned out by far the main winners of subsequent “immigration visa lotteries”. In 1992, more than 12,000 successful Poles accounted for 24 per cent of the total. The aggregate proportion for 1993 and 1994 went up to 47 per cent.

In turn, the emigration of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), after a peak year of 1989 when the FRG admitted a spectacular number of 250,340 Aussiedler from Poland, has been on a sharp decline. After 1994 annual number of migrants that belong to this category is constantly below 2,000.

Another category of outflow, which in the 1980s was numerically significant – the movements of refugee or asylum seekers from Poland to the West, after 1988 (usually with two- to three-year delay) became generally unimportant, if noticeable at all. Hundreds of migrants of this kind recorded in certain western European countries in the early 1990s were usually from among those who left Poland still in the pre-transition period. The only exception might be the migration of the total few thousand of ethnic Gypsies to the United Kingdom, which was observed in the mid-1990s.

Finally, documented migration for work has substantially increased. It grew from around 150,000 in 1989 to around 350,000 in 1998, of which to Germany alone from around 40,000 to more than 200,000. A large (and steadily growing) majority among the documented migrant workers from Poland constitute seasonal workers, primarily those employed in agriculture.

All in all, it seems that in 1989-1997 the documented flows, while maintaining their magnitude at relatively high level (though showing a moderate downward trend), displayed a clear pattern of changing proportions: the settlement migration shrunk (Table 1) and the short-term migration expanded.

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6 Polish citizens were the leading European nationality among the US immigrants in 1989, and the second (after the citizens of the ex-USSR) in the following years.

7 More than 15,000 persons were granted a legal status by August 12, 1992, which constituted a half of all regularised Europeans.

8 The „lottery” mechanism which initially gave equal chance to the citizens of all eligible nationalities, except Irish (which enjoyed special preferences), has been changed by the introduction of country-wise quota system. This modified mechanism has badly affected the chances of Poles (vis-a-vis other nations) who were granted only 5,000 immigration visas for the 1997 fiscal year and zero for 1998.

9 This is so despite the fact that the estimates of German minority size in Poland in the 1990s were as a rule larger than the respective estimates known from the 1970s or 1980s.

10 In migrant’s perception, asylum application is widely recognised and legitimate means of regularising one’s stay abroad in a situation when the migrant is (or expects to be) lawfully deprived of a regular residence permit.
Table 1. Selected indicators of settlement migration of Polish citizens (or Polish-born foreigners) in 1989-1997 vis-a-vis annual average for 1986-1988 (thousand persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigrants recorded in USA</th>
<th>New asylum-seekers in USA</th>
<th>Immigrants recorded in Canada</th>
<th>Arrivals of refugee-seekers in Canada</th>
<th>Aussiedler recorded in Germany</th>
<th>Emigrants recorded in Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986-1988</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>133.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.3 (a)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.0 (b)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) fiscal year (1 October 1994 – 30 September 1995) figure; the number of pending applications in mid-point year was approx. 3.1 thousand
(b) fiscal year (1 October 1995 – 30 September 1996) figure (less than 50 cases); the number of pending applications in mid-point year was approx. 2.4 thousand

Source: National SOPEMI reports for Canada, Germany, Poland and USA (various years).

Although, for natural reasons, the data on undocumented movements of the Polish population are scarce and, in some instances, far from being meaningful, it would not be very difficult to depict the basic trends. Unlike before 1989, when a large part of undocumented flows assumed relatively lengthy stay abroad of the migrants, a bulk of the latest movements of this character involve relatively short stay in a foreign country. Another distinct difference pertains to the geographical direction of short-term movements: while in the former period the Poles engaged in the respective flows often headed for the former socialist countries, in the latter period the migration was predominantly westbound.

The study carried out in 1994-1996 in four regions of Poland (on the basis of random sample of households in six selected localities) revealed that in the past (from 1975 onwards) from 15 to 58 per cent households (still present in Poland at the time of the study) acquired some of their incomes from international mobility of their members. The share of the relevant migrations, which started after 1988 was between 34 and 57 per cent (Table 2). What seems particularly relevant here is that, according to the study, a predominant majority of the migrant money-earners from Poland (in case of some localities more than 90 per cent) entered the countries of destination under the guise of tourism or

11 For a detailed description of the study and its underlying method, see Iglicka, Jazwinska and Okólski, 1996 and Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998.
family visit, and a large part of migrant workers were in irregular employment abroad. This gives rise to a contention that, irrespective of the time of movements, the undocumented migrants from Poland prevailed in the total outflow (Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).

Table 2. Prevalence of international movements of the population that took place since 1975; six communes (four regions) studied by means of ethnosurvey approach in 1994-1996 (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of migration</th>
<th>Lubniany (Silesia)</th>
<th>Monki (Podlasie)</th>
<th>Namyslow (Silesia)</th>
<th>Nowy Targ (Podhale)</th>
<th>Perlejewo (Podlasie)</th>
<th>Warsaw (Mazowsze)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of migrant households</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First migrations after 1988 as percent of all first migrations</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households studied</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants in sample</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) commune is a unit of the lowest level of administrative division in Poland; it could either be a municipality (usually medium-sized or big town) or a cluster of villages (or villages together with small towns)

(b) the following communes are municipalities: Monki, Namyslow, Nowy Targ and Warsaw whereas Lubniany and Perlejewo are rural communes including respectively 11 and 33 villages


It might be argued that the undocumented migrants are increasingly persons engaged in incomplete migration, which - as I suggested elsewhere (Okólski, 1998a) – implies transnational marginalisation of the migrants. A large proportion among those persons originates from regions and localities where the mobility transition, referring to the concept developed by Wilbur Zelinsky, has not been finished. Though redundant, they mostly live in villages or small towns, some of them of largely traditional or subsistence-type economic character. Those persons have failed to be transferred to urban/industrial areas, and therefore integrated into a modern/transforming economy. In the period of socialism they or
their parents commuted to nearby industrial centres or were offered a seasonal employment there but since the early 1980s, due to shrinking opportunities for earning a living in such way, many those persons found themselves socially useless and virtually in a limbo. Gradually, however, a viable alternative has proved to be shuttle movements to the informal economy in a foreign country and irregular employment in that sector (including “household help” services) or “self-employment” in the capacity of a suitcase trader.

The scale of incomplete migration is huge, although by its nature only vaguely known. According to the 1995 survey, in that year around 1.5-2.0 million Poles travelled abroad in order to earn some money, of whom only a small fraction in keeping with a legal employment contract (Institute of Tourism, 1996). Compared to the pre-1989 period, incomplete migration of undocumented Poles is now more related to employment in a foreign country (mainly in the “inferior” segment of the labour market) than to petty trade. It is exclusively directed to the West, and it by and large exploits the terms of visa-free regime of population movements which has been established between Poland and many western countries in the 1990s.

2.2.3. Inflows

Despite that the changes in outflow trends, observed since 1989 (and relative to the pre-1989 years), have been profound, it was developments in the inflow which really marked the international population movements in the transition period.

To begin with basic information on the number of entries of foreign nationals, it rose from relatively low 6.2 million in 1988 to 36.8 million in 1991, the level from which – in a striking opposition to the past – the inflow of foreigners to Poland started to predominate over the outflow of Polish citizens. In a few more years (1997) Poland recorded 87.8 million entries by the citizens of other countries which signalled the beginning of levelling off the inflow of foreigners to Poland (just 0.5 per cent increase compared to the previous year). Seen from another perspective, this trend means that in 1991 the exits to entries ratio was dramatically shifted: whereas in the past (until 1989) the ratio was usually close to 200 exits of Poles per 100 entries of foreigners (the maximum of 235 in 1989), after 1990 it ranged between 50 and 60. Conspicuously, in a way and in very broad terms, Poland – by all means not a renowned destination for foreign tourists - has proved to be more attractive to foreigners than other countries to Poles.

The inflow to Poland involved five major categories of persons: re-emigrants, immigrating non-Polish citizens, documented migrant workers, foreigners engaged in incomplete migration and illegal migrants.

The documented immigration, which in Poland includes all individuals registered as new permanent residents (in other words, settlers), irrespective of their citizenship, in 1989-1997 brought to Poland approx. 64,000 persons. Annual number of those immigrants was systematically growing to reach more than 8,000 after 1994 (an average for the 1970s and 1980s barely exceeded 1,500). Since it might be estimated that the foreign nationals

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12 The respective annual outflow figures were as follows: in 1988 – 9.9. million, 1990 – 22.1 million and 1991 – 20.7 million (the foreigner inflow in 1990 was at 18.2 million).
13 For a comparison, there were 48.6 million exits of Poles in 1997.
constituted 40-45 per cent of all immigrants, this entails from 26,000 to 29,000 documented foreigners admitted to Poland in 1989-1997. Thus, according to the official records, between 35,000 and 38,000 Polish citizens might have re-emigrated after 1988.

However, many thousands of immigrants of non-Polish citizenship, though perfectly legal and in spite of their lengthy stay in Poland (exceeding one year), failed to be counted as such. This was so either because their applications for permanent residence were processed very slowly or they qualified for a residence visa which enabled those persons to live in Poland (sometimes for many years) without being officially recognised as immigrants. On the other hand, a considerable number of Poles returning from abroad, who despite years spent there have never formally cancelled their permanent residence in Poland, was omitted from any migration records.

The inflow of regular foreign labour did not reach a great magnitude. It, however, deserves an emphasis here if only for being a novelty in the post-Second World War Polish history. To be sure, in the past, from time to time Poland saw teams of foreign construction workers employed by sub-contractors from abroad and individual cases of highly skilled specialists dispersed across various companies and branches but these were always exceptions. However, work permits for individual migrant workers started to be granted in 1991. Although the number of new permits grew rapidly, from 4,300 in that year to 17,500 in 1997, it always constituted only a tiny fraction of the estimated total inflow of foreign labour.

In addition, the documented migrants also embrace: foreign students, foreign entrepreneurs and asylum-seekers (including persons seeking refugee or temporary protection status). The inflow of all those persons, however, is not very intense; for 1997 it might be estimated at some 3,000 persons.

Another entirely new category of foreigners entering Poland proved to be the illegal migrants. The scale of that phenomenon is particularly difficult to estimate. Nonetheless it is claimed that tens of thousand Armenians and Vietnamese settled in Poland in the 1990s. Other numerous nationalities known for contributing to the undocumented immigration to Poland include: Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. After 1993 more and more foreigners chose the assistance of trafficking organisations in their strive to enter and/or stay/settle in Poland (Glabicka, 1999 and Okólski, 1999).

By far the largest foreigners’ flow to Poland in the 1990s, however, has been incomplete migration. Whereas the foreign nationals involved in incomplete migration tend to circulate between the home country and Poland under the guise of tourism, their major task and activity during the migration is money earning.
According to a survey, in 1995 only around 23 per cent of all foreigners’ entries, that is approx. 19.2 million, qualified as tourist on the basis of the duration of stay in Poland. Visits of the respective foreigners were usually very short (five days on the average) but rather frequent (for 50 per cent of those persons it was at least their fifth trip to Poland). In this number as many as 5.3 million entries were primarily related to money earning, of which approx. 70 per cent involved petty trade. It is estimated that in the case of approx. 1.8 million entries, the foreigners came to Poland with an intention to seek a job (Institute of Tourism, 1996).

Estimates of the number of foreigners in irregular employment in Poland differ considerably. According to official sources, there might be annually around 100,000 persons in such situation. Various surveys and media reports claim much greater figures – up to 350,000 persons. The outcome of any estimate, however, depends heavily on the underlying concept of foreigner’s irregular work, which in all cases is highly arbitrary. This is because at present a large majority of migrants are employed by individual households or peasants and take occasional short-term and very simple jobs. An extreme case presents itself the estimate concerning the Ukrainians visiting Poland in 1995 who were engaged in any kind of paid work, irrespective of its duration, which suggests that as many as 800,000 migrants from that country earned money in Poland (Okólski, 1997). If, however, this figure were expressed in annual full-time employment equivalent, it would have to be brought down to no more than 70,000 “conventional” migrant workers.

What seems striking at first sight when it comes to the analysis of various forms of incomplete migration is not only its magnitude but also perseverance. For apart from the massive scale, the importance of incomplete migration to Poland stems from its significant effect on migrant’s household income. This is why it rarely is an accidental event in one’s life history but it is either a chronic state or a preliminary stage in the migration process which transform into a more conventional form of international migration.

2.2.4. Illegitimate transit flows

Due to factors rooted in recent history of Poland, until 1989 the tightness of the Polish frontiers had not been a concern of the state. It had rather been a matter of neighbouring states’ activities, particularly the ex-GDR and ex-USSR. In 1989 Poland, because of her newly introduced liberal stand with respect to international movements of people, became easily accessible to almost all visitors from other countries. This included migrants originating from non-western countries for whom the ultimate destination was Germany or another western country but who could nor reach that destination in a routine/legal way. Apart from the loose control of the borders, another reason why Poland

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14 Petty-traders of the early 1990s were strictly small-scale suitcase traders who almost exclusively operated on local Polish bazaars or street corners where they mainly sold low-quality or even second-hand goods brought by them to Poland. Since 1992 they have increasingly been involved in more specialised and organised activities, including systematic links with wholesalers and retailers in the home and host country, and the exports from Poland grossly prevailed in their operations. After 1997 petty trade of the foreigners in on remarkable decline in Poland.

15 One of recent reports of that kind posits that in 1988 tens of thousand migrants from Germany alone (mostly the unemployed from Meklemburg and Brandenburg) were in irregular (mostly occasional or seasonal) employment in Western Pomerania (north-western part of Poland) (Ornacka and Szczesny, 1998).
attracted those persons and was treated by them as a final transit country was immediate proximity of Germany (or, in a way, Sweden).

Thus since 1989 Poland has been a ground for sizeable South-to-West or East-to-West flows of foreigners. Initially, a typical pattern of those flows involved the legal arriving by air or crossing of eastern or southern border of Poland (often by means of unlawfully obtained or forged Polish visa)\(^{16}\), followed by an attempt at the illegal passage to the West. A number of the foreigners after entering Poland (or after being returned to Poland) requested a refugee status only to prevent an eventual deportation and prepare an illegal passage to Germany. For instance, in 1990 around 1,800 foreign nationals claimed a refugee status in Poland\(^{17}\) of whom only less than 300 were still in Poland in 1991\(^{18}\).

In 1990 the Polish border guard, in what was the beginning of an entirely new trend, apprehended some 300 foreigners on illegal crossing of the German-Polish border of whom 70 per cent came from other Central and Eastern European countries (a majority from Romania and Bulgaria\(^{19}\)). During the first six months of 1991 the number of such apprehensions rose to nearly 3,000. In the second half of that year that number almost tripled to reach 8,800, and in the first half of next year 14,400 apprehensions on illegal crossing of western border of Poland were recorded. The peak in this process was reached in the third trimester of 1992 when the border guard prevented 12,700 cases like that. It was in that period when within a very short time span many foreigners managed to repeatedly attempt an illegal crossing of the border.

The trend until the end of 1992 was almost entirely shaped by a sharply growing propensity of citizens of Romania to migrate through Poland to Germany. In that single year the apprehensions of Romanians on the German-Polish border accounted for more then three quarters of the total (together with Bulgarians their share was in excess of 85 per cent).

From 1993 the situation with respect to illegal transit migration through Poland underwent a radical shift. First, the number of apprehensions of foreign nationals, and most likely the illegal border crossings too, declined\(^{20}\). Second, the number and proportion of apprehension related to entering Poland (mostly, through eastern border of Poland) increased\(^{21}\). Third, and finally, the composition of apprehended migrants by their citizenship changed. As far as the latter is concerned, the share of Romanians and Bulgarians rapidly declined, and in the middle of 1993 the predominant position was temporarily assumed by the nationals of the former Soviet Union while since 1994 increasingly by the citizens of

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\(^{16}\) At least, a majority of those transit migrants attempted to enter Poland through appropriate border checkpoints.

\(^{17}\) A large majority of those persons (approx. 1,000) were the citizens of African and Asian countries, many of them returned from Sweden, after travelling there from Poland with forged documents.

\(^{18}\) However, no case of return to the country of origin was reported.

\(^{19}\) This reflected a sudden and vehement increase in the number of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens’ entries to Poland. For instance, in 1989 only 19,000 Romanians entered Poland while in 1990 as many as 325,000.

\(^{20}\) Two figures seem to reflect that change: in 1992 the total number of foreigners apprehended by the border guard was 33,600 whereas in 1997 10,700.

\(^{21}\) For instance, in 1992 in the case of only 10 per cent of all foreigners apprehended for crossing of Poland’s border, the cause was illegal entry. In 1997 every fourth apprehended foreigner illegally entered Poland.
countries located on (or around) Indian sub-continent (mainly Afghansians and Sri Lankans).

A conspicuous tendency related to that change, which resulted from two major factors: the introduction of more severe asylum regulations and procedures in Germany and the tightening of control on the Polish state frontiers, has been relatively high incidence of trafficking in transit migrants. This has virtually perverted the procedures and institutions related to refugees in Poland because as a rule apprehended illegal transit migrants (and foreign nationals returned to Poland on the basis of readmission agreements but also many foreign citizens in transit who either entered Poland legally or were nor apprehended on their illegal entry) requested refugee status. They did so in expectation of being granted time (in some cases also resources) necessary to prepare an illegal passage to Germany. It became extremely difficult to distinguish between a genuine refugee and an illegitimate migrant and therefore to provide the former with proper protection (Okólski 1999).

2.2.5. Migration balance by type of flows and their geographic distribution

The evaluation of migration balance in the 1990s depends on the category of migrants or the type of movements. It might be claimed, on the highly aggregate level, that (long term or settlement) emigration continues to predominate over immigration although the net emigration sharply diminishes. For instance, according to the Polish official data, in 1988 17.3 emigrants were recorded per 1 immigrant whereas in 1997 only 2.4 (e.g. in 1989 – 12.1 and in 1994 – 3.7). Short-term migration, of at least three-month duration, is recently probably quite balanced which is due to faster growth in the inflow than outflow. The both flows are estimated at approx. 500,000 a year for the second half of the 1990s. Finally, incomplete migration is characterised by (in absolute terms) much higher inflow of foreigners than outflow of Poles; the annual balance might be well in excess of one million²².

As far as the outflow is concerned, an overwhelming majority of movements are directed to the West. The destination for long-term migrants (including settlement migrants) is almost exclusively one of three countries: Germany, USA and Canada, with Germany and USA sharing the lead. More than a half of the migrants taking part in the short-term outflow head for Germany. Other important countries of destination for those migrants include: Austria, Belgium, Italy and a few others. This list should probably be supplemented by adding the Czech Republic, the only important target country for Polish migrant workers which is located outside the West. Germany also plays the role of a major destination for Poles involved in incomplete migration. In addition, in case of those flows the Polish migrants can be met practically wherever the networks have been established.

No such a clear geographic pattern can be suggested for the inflow, and the dispersion by the home country of migrants is much stronger than the dispersion by the country of destination in case of the outflow. Long-term immigrants mainly come from Germany and USA, and those are in a large part returning Poles. Other important countries

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²² Of course, the balance in case of those three major types of flows cannot be numerically compared (not to mention combining them into a whole), because, depending on the flow type, type-specific migration events fundamentally differ with respect to their duration.
of origin embrace: Ukraine, Canada, Kazakhstan, France, Russia, Vietnam and Armenia. In case of short-term migrants, mostly migrant workers, the share of the following countries is the largest: Ukraine, Vietnam, Belarus and Russia; many of them are low-skilled workers or the self-employed. A separate, though less sizeable group of short-term migrants, constitutes professional labour where the citizens of Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and France are most numerous. People taking part in incomplete migration are predominantly Ukrainians, Romanians and the citizens of other ex-socialist countries of Europe.

Finally, a majority of migrants being in transit through Poland head for Germany and they originate from many countries located in Asia and, to a lesser degree, Africa.

In might be therefore argued in conclusion that while presently – what remains in a striking contrast to the pre-1989 period - Poles migrate to a very limited set of countries, almost exclusively located in the West, the migrants coming to Poland originate from almost all regions of the world and their national diversity is rather high.

2.3. Spatial and demographic characteristics

2.3.1. Outflow

Internal (including urban/rural) vis-a-vis international migration. A trend initiated in the 1970s has been continued for the territorial mobility to slow down. This was mainly caused by a gradual and substantial decline in the volume of internal migration, including the outflow from rural areas. Particularly affected were inter-regional flows while this was true to a lesser extent in case of intra-regional flows. Simultaneously growing outflow to foreign countries might be interpreted as a shift from internal to international movements of the population which partly compensated for the decline in the internal migration. In contrast to the pre-transition period, since 1989 more (if not a clear majority of) migrants have originated from villages and small towns, and generally provincial areas (Korcelli, 1994).

Regions of origin. The home of a large majority of emigrants of the 1980s, as evidenced by means of the case of documented and undocumented outflow to the West, were the most highly urbanised and developed regions, especially their big cities. Seven (out of the 49 total) districts23 whose share in total population was barely 32 per cent sent as many as 58 per cent of all those emigrants. In those regions the share of urban population amounted to 80 per cent which grossly exceeded the national average (60 per cent). Interestingly, although a preponderant part of the migrants headed for Germany where they were granted the status of Aussiedler (and ultimately German citizenship), only a relatively minor fraction of them came from regions (Upper Silesia) and areas (rural) inhabited by the German minority (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998).

Despite the fact that since 1989 the main destination for Polish migrants remained unchanged (Germany continued to predominate), to a large degree the migrants have been recruited from quite different regions. In this regard, the settlement migration has become

23 They included: Gdansk, Katowice, Krakow, Opole, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wroclaw.
much more homogenised; for instance, in 1997 almost a half (47 per cent) of the respective emigrants originated from Upper Silesia (two districts: Katowice and Opole) while in the 1980s only 31 per cent. On the other hand, in the same year as many as 42 per cent of all seasonal workers heading for the employment in Germany were the inhabitants of five districts whose share in Poland’s total population was barely 10 per cent. Only one of those districts (Wroclaw) did count in migrations of the 1980s and none was populated in any significant proportion by the members of German minority (Okólski, 1998b).

The population of certain districts or areas have only then started to move in large quantities. The examples of Suwalki or Lomza districts, located close to the eastern border of Poland, might be illuminating in this respect.

Gender and age of migrants. Almost perfect sex parity in documented emigration has been observed in the second half of the 1990s (e.g. 101.3 males per 100 females in 1997). However, according to estimated sex ratio in seasonal migrant workers, in the same period men by and large predominate in that group of migrants. The estimate of Poles who are registered as permanent residents of Poland but who stay abroad for at least two months, based on the Labour Force Survey, implies the sex ratio at around 135 males per 100 females (May 1997) (Okólski, 1998b).

The recently observed parity by sex among the emigrants is not a novelty in the contemporary outflow from Poland. For instance, similarly even proportion was also observed in the 1980s (98 males per 100 females), when the official statistics suggested a huge under-representation of men (63 males per 100 females) which was nearly fully compensated by the male excess in undocumented emigration (118 males per 100 females) (Okólski, 1990).

The community-level survey data which include all kinds of non-recreational mobility, imply a trend towards stronger masculinisation of Polish migrants after 1989. According to those data, whereas in all six communes studied males predominated over females, both before 1990 and during the transition period, after 1989 the share of men in all persons further increased in four of those communes (in three quite considerably, from 7 to 18 percentage points) and it declined in two (by 4-5 percentage points). The proportion of male migrants who begun their movements abroad after 1989 exceeded 65 per cent of the total (186 males per 100 females) in four communes, and in the remaining two it was within the range 51-54 per cent (104-117 per 100) (Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).

In the 1990s the age pattern of emigration remained distinctly different for males and females. Among documented male migrants nearly a half of them were below the age 25, while among female migrants much less; the difference in percentage share, however, grew from 8 points in 1989 to 16 points in 1997. On the other hand, relatively many more females than males were at the age 25-34; in the both years the difference was around 7.5 points. With respect to Poland’s resident population in 1997, male emigrants were over-represented in the groups: 0-24 and 35-44 and under-represented in the groups: 25-34 and 45+. Female emigrants were over-represented in the groups: 25-34 and 35-44 and under-represented in the groups: 0-24 and 45+ (Table 3).

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24 They were the following districts: Jelenia Gora, Kielce, Konin, Walbrzych and Wroclaw.
Table 3. Emigration from Poland (documented and undocumented) by major groups of age (and by sex) *vis-a-vis* age distribution of the resident Poland’s population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Poland’s Population mid-1984</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Poland’s Population mid-1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Females</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sakson, 1998 and Central Statistical Office of Poland

As follows from Table 3, the age composition of undocumented migrants of the 1980s was in striking contrast to the composition of documented migrants. In particular, persons aged 25-34 and (especially among men) 35-44 predominated, and they were over-represented relative to the resident population and documented migrants’ characteristics. Such conclusion would not be in place for the 1990s simply because, by all accounts, the volume of undocumented emigration has became insignificant and that form of flows has transformed into undocumented short-term migration or incomplete migration.

The community-level survey data, which principally pertain to (undocumented) migrant workers, suggest the decline in the median age of Polish migrants (in the case of their first migration). If the period 1992-1994 is compared with the 1980s, then it might be concluded that it fell in four (out of six) communes: from 32.7 to 27.9 in Monki, from 34.8 to 29.5 in Nowy Targ, from 36.1 to 31.2 in Perlejewo and from 31.1 to 28.7 in Warsaw. However, the median age increased in two other communes: in Perlejewo (from 28.0 to 29.3) and Namyslow (from 31.4 to 32.2) (Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).
2.3.2. Inflow

Regions of arrival/work/settlement. Foreigners involved in incomplete migration usually visit areas close to the section of the state border they actually cross. Specialised infrastructure (e.g. large warehouses, local road networks, motels, etc.) have been set up in those areas to facilitate the activities of those migrants. A particular destination for a part of shuttle traders, mainly those engaged in large-scale operations, are largest Polish warehouses or bazaars located in central Poland (Warsaw and vicinity of Lodz).

Immigrants in turn come to (settle in) the most highly urbanised and populated regions of Poland, chiefly in great industrial centres, irrespective of the distance from the point of arrival. In 1997, according to official data, as many as 35 per cent of migrants settled in only five (out of 49) districts: Warsaw, Katowice, Gdansk, Opole and Krakow. Interestingly, two of those districts (Warsaw and Krakow) belong to the regions of Poland where a positive net migration has already become the reality. On the other hand, the remaining three districts are unquestionably the main emigrant-sending regions in Poland accounting for 54 per cent of the total outflow (in 1997) (Central Statistical Office, 1998).

Regional concentration of foreigners is by far the highest in case of the inflow of migrant workers. Five districts alone (Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdansk, Katowice and Lodz) attract more than 70 per cent foreigners who need a work permit in Poland, of which Warsaw is a destination for 52 per cent of those persons (National Labour Office, 1998). The same districts are known to host a large proportion of all undocumented migrants. The latter category can also be, relatively frequently, met in the regions bordering Belarus or Ukraine.

Gender and age of migrants. Males are slightly over-represented in the immigrants. In 1989-1994 111 male migrants were recorded per each 100 female migrants, and that ratio tended to diminish in the course of the years to follow (103 per 100 in 1997). The change was due to increasing participation of highly feminised non-Polish nationals among the immigrants; a survey estimate based on the sample of foreigners who (legally) settled in Poland in 1992-1995 revealed only 65 males per 100 females (Okólski, 1998b).

The excess males in the migrants coming to Poland appears striking when it comes to short-term migrants, refugee- or asylum-seekers or those practising incomplete migration. For instance, according to a sample survey carried out in the district of Warsaw in 1996, the sex ratio among the documented short-term migrants was 271 males per 100 females and among the undocumented short-term migrants 142 per 100. The extreme case represent foreigners who apply for refugee status; over 90 per cent of all in the 1992-1998 were men (or 900 per 100) (Glabicka, Kepinska, Korys and Sakson, 1997; Iglicka, Jazwinska, Kepinska and Korys, 1997).
Migrants coming to Poland are usually the young adults. As many as 56 per cent of those who settled in 1989-1994 fell in the age bracket 18-44. According to a survey pursued in 1996, in the sample of adult foreign nationals who immigrated to Poland approx. 69 per cent were those aged 18-44. The proportion of persons at their young working age was even higher among the foreigners who arrived in Poland for a short stay: approx. 71 per cent in the sample of documented migrants and approx. 88 per cent in the sample of undocumented migrants (ibidem).

2.4. Socio-economic context and structure of migrants

2.4.1. Outflow

*Education.* Migrants distribution by educational attainment seems to be a very sensitive indicator of the change in the pattern of outflow in the transition period. In emigration of the 1980s the highly educated were grossly over-represented; this gave rise to the argument of acute brain drain undergoing in Poland. As a matter of fact, according to the population census data, at the end of 1978 only 7 per cent of Poles aged 15+ had ever continued their education after having completed secondary school whereas for 55 per cent the highest completed level was elementary education. In a sharp contrast, approx. 14 per cent of emigrants (both documented and undocumented) of the period 1981-1988 represented educational attainment above the secondary completed, and only approx. 12 per cent of male emigrants and 21 per cent of female emigrants have never attended secondary school. Thus the selectivity of migrants by education was striking (Sakson, 1998).

Since 1988 a spectacular trend has been observed for the share of the highly educated to decline, and the share of the most poorly educated to increase. After a few years the situation has changed fundamentally: the highly educated emigrants became under-represented (relative to the resident population of Poland) while those with at best completed elementary education over-represented. The share of the former in male emigrants aged 15+ declined from 12 per cent in 1998 to 2 per cent in 1997, and in female emigrants of that age from 6 to 1.5 per cent, which was accompanied by increase of the share of the latter: from 40 to 75 per cent in males and from 35 to 74 per cent in females (Okólski, 1998b).

Various surveys by means of which other categories of people moving out of Poland, especially short-term migrants, were investigated imply a similar conclusion: the outflow has become a domain of non-highly educated (e.g. Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).

*Occupation at home and abroad.* The survey devoted to the causes and consequences of migration from Poland conducted in six regions at community level, revealed that a predominant part of migrants were persons being in a flexible or precarious occupational situation. Many of them in case of town dwellers were the unemployed (or economically non-active) and in case of village dwellers the redundant members of agricultural households (often former commuters to nearby industrial plant) living on a small plot of land. While abroad migrants were involved in a variety of jobs typical for the
inferior segment of labour market (household services, refurbishing of houses/flats, seasonal works in agriculture, the lowest positions in restaurants or hotels, etc.) \( \text{(ibidem)} \).

**Type of employment abroad; regularity of travelling.** The same source indicates that a large majority of migrants from Poland were involved in irregular employment in the country of destination. The employment was usually temporary and often imprinted by “3d’s” characteristics: dirty, demanding and dangerous. A clear majority of those working legally were persons employed in agriculture on the seasonal basis; e.g. in 1997 out of 230,000 Polish workers employed abroad within the framework of various bilateral agreements (estimated 66-75 per cent of the total regular employment abroad of Polish citizens) nearly 200,000 were seasonal workers in Germany of whom 78 per cent found a job in agriculture (Okólski, 1998b).

Many migrants are involved in short-term movements but they migrate repeatedly. The survey conducted in 1994-1996 revealed that in five (out of the total six) communities the average number of non-recreational trips abroad per one person involved in incomplete migration varied between 3.2 and 5.5. In addition, an average migrant in those (but one) communities experienced from 1.5 to 2.0 short-term migrations. The exceptional case was a community from which a majority of migrants travelled to another country to spent there at least one year (Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).

**Household strategies; motives.** In most cases the motives were indisputably economic. This again remains in a clear opposition to what was observed during at least a couple of decades before 1989. At that time numerous cases of genuine ethnic emigration took place, and in addition, in line with the “syndrom of withdrawal” widely observed in the 1980s, the rejection of Poland as a system (in rather broad sense) prompted many people to migrate (Okólski, 1998c).

In the 1990s, however, economic premises of population movements from Poland to other countries had quite different meaning with regard to persons of various generations, various educational backgrounds and, particularly, various life strategies in face of the transition. The relatively young, highly educated and, above all, dynamic in their activities were generally reluctant to migrate because it was Poland more than most of other countries where they were offered the most attractive careers. On the other hand, many of the others were simply too old to move abroad, and even if they ultimately migrated, their “targets” became shallow and unstable employment niches in the inferior segment of labour markets and usually in the shadow economy.

The study carried out in six communities enabled researchers to recognise four basic types of migrants which seem to adequately reflect main strategies followed in realising households’ economic objectives. Those types included: shuttle, short-term, long-term and settled migrants. It turned out that many migrants who represented first two of the types were multiple travellers, and in case of shuttle migrants those who travelled abroad more than once by far predominated. It has consequently been found that strategies corresponding to various types of migrants significantly differed between regions, depending on ethnic specificity, local economic opportunities, the strength of migration networks, etc. Comparing the pre-transition pattern of migrants’ behaviour with the transition pattern, however, an important universal trend could have been noted: while individual regions have
retained their specificity (the main migrant’s type has remained the same in a given region), the short-term type of migrant has greatly gained and the long-term (or settled) type has lost in its importance (Jazwinska, Lukowski and Okólski, 1997).

2.4.2. Inflow

_Education._ The trend concerning the distribution of people migrating to Poland by educational attainment proved to be entirely different from that pertaining to the outflow. It is the best evidenced in case of immigration where the number of migrants with at least secondary education has been on the increase, and since around 1995, despite still substantial overall net out-migration, it exceeds the corresponding number of emigrants. Also in other categories of migratory flows, the people coming to Poland are generally better educated that the Poles moving abroad. There seems to be no exaggeration in labelling this phenomenon an inverse brain drain (Okólski, 1998b).

_Occupation; economic sectors._ A u-shaped migrant distribution by occupation is evident with respect to the persons legally employed in Poland: one upper end constitute the highly qualified (managers, experts) and another upper end the low skilled. The middle position is filled mainly by owners (and simultaneously employees) of small outlets. The highly skilled are employed in finance and banking sector, manufacturing industry (e.g. telecommunication and electronics, food processing, car manufacturing), supermarket chains, education, etc., whereas the medium or low skilled in ship building industry, construction, agriculture and textile industry. The main field of activity for those in the middle includes retail trade and catering (restaurants) _ibidem_.

Irregular migrant workers are usually construction workers or seasonal workers employed in horticulture (and other branches of agriculture). Many of migrants falling into this group perform occasional works, mainly in the household sector. The only significant segment among irregular foreigners that represent high skills are the persons employed as teachers or instructors in various private educational institutions, sports and culture (Iglicka, Jazwinska, Kepinska and Korys, 1997).

It is worth of being mentioned that a predominant proportion of migrant workers, be it persons in regular or irregular situation, are short-term employees. Those in regular situation work typically for 6-11 months while those in irregular situation – for less than 3 months.

_Petty trade of migrants as a phenomenon of economic significance._ There is no justification to point here to the effects for migrants’ households and the home economy as a whole of the shuttle movements of foreign petty traders to Poland. It suffices to mention for illustration that the estimated proportion of the Ukrainian households that benefit from this kind of mobility to Poland might be as high as 25-30 per cent, and the migrant households gain (1994) five times more from a trip to Poland than from the employment in Ukraine (Okólski, 1998a). An estimate of total Ukrainian migrants’ earnings in Poland (in 1993) suggest an amount which would be an equivalent of 3 per cent of the total personal incomes in Ukraine (Khomra, 1994).
As far as the economic effects for Poland are concerned, they are by all accounts tremendous. An official estimate claims that in 1995 the expenditures of migrants (mainly purchase of merchandise for resale) amounted to an equivalent of nearly 18 per cent of all documented export revenues (Central Statistical Office of Poland, 1996). A survey conducted in one of the largest market places (the Warsaw Bazaar) where foreign petty traders are principal (approx. 60 per cent of the total) customers revealed that it is visited by 5.5 million foreigners a year. The value of goods purchased for export in that market place in 1995 was close to 350 million US $, i.e. 1.5 per cent of the total value of all goods exported from Poland. A the survey time the market place gave regular full-time employment to more than 6,500 persons and part-time employment to another 1,000. In addition, some 30,000 workers were employed in local Polish factories that solely supplied that market place and around 25,000 in factories whose more than a half of output were going there (Institute for Market Economy Studies, 1996).

It should be observed, however, that since the beginning of 1998 the magnitude of foreigners’ movements related to petty trade has been decreasing. Some analysts argue that it is due to the falling profitability of petty trade which loses to a more and more effective professional trade while some other think that the contraction of petty trader movements result from the implementation of the (relatively restrictive) Aliens Law of 1997. Irrespective of which diagnosis is correct, many symptoms imply a stable character of this new trend.

3. In place of conclusion: prospective migration trends

The future of international migration in Poland has already - to a large degree - been shaped. A major single fact that contributes to this seems to be willingness of Poland to become an integral part of European initiatives, agreements and consultative fora which aim at the co-ordination of migration policies and close international collaboration in the area of migration management. This involvement is to a large degree fostered by an expected early accession of Poland (along with five other countries) to the European Union.

The participation in European networks and institutions dealing with migration matters has inter alia prompted Poland to modernise her border control infrastructure and to increase the border guard staff (and enhance its skills). Consequences of that relatively recent policy can already be felt, especially that since 1995 the number of successful attempts of illegal border crossing by foreigners has probably been on the decline, despite continuing high pressure on the part of migrants from other countries. Ultimately, Polish migration-related regulations, institutions and practice will became no different from those set forth by the Treaty of Amsterdam, soon to be adopted by the current EU members.

Two specific questions, however, call for a reflection here: first, the effectiveness of population movements control in the future, in a situation of Poland’s very vulnerable geographic location, and second, migration pressure of Polish labour on western member-countries of the EU.
As far as the former is concerned, Poland has already established special relationships with a number of countries which are not immediate candidates for the accession e.g. Lithuania and Ukraine). Those relationships include visa-free movements of the citizens of those countries to Poland. This, however, may soon prove irreconcilable with the requirements of the European Union even if the countries at stake are able to radically enhance the control of their borders and ultimately become successful in preventing unwanted persons from the third countries from entering (and transiting). On the other hand, Poland borders on some countries with whom no special terms concerning transborder movements of people are expected in foreseeable future. Those countries are not only known for being rather inefficient in migration management, protecting their borders and combating illegality among migrants but also for their reluctance to enter a closer collaboration in these matters with Poland (be it readmission agreement alone). It would hardly be feasible to cope by Poland with the requirements of the European migration doctrine without significant improvement of migration management in countries like Belarus or Russia, and more collaborative attitude on the part of those countries.

Another major problem for the future, as perceived by migration analysts, stem from supposedly huge migration potential embedded in the population of Poland. According to this view, the accession of Poland to the European Union may prompt masses of people to emigrate to the West. Demographic argument seems probably the most spectacular in this regard: the working age population (15-64) will go up in Poland in the first decade of the next century by 1,100 thousand while the corresponding segment of the population in EU countries will go down by 450 thousand. Thus overcrowded Polish labour market may push superfluous workers away, and force them to seek employment in EU market. A more thorough analysis, however, suggests that this is rather unlikely (Okólski and Stola, 1999). First of all, Poland will experience two opposite trends: the number of people aged 15-44 who are considered relatively highly mobile will in fact decrease (by 550 thousand) whereas the number of people aged 45-64, much less mobile, will increase (by 1,650 thousand). After 2010 the declining trend will become universal in Poland. The present socio-occupational gradient in the migration of Polish workers additionally supports the view that the future flows to the countries of the EU will not be substantial nor they will necessarily intensify. Polish migrants are increasingly recruited from among the least educated, low skilled and alienated, and those persons do hardly pose any threat to the stability of labour market in the destination country.

The future will bring many other, hopefully less acute, migration-related problems. Two of them might be mentioned here for illustration. First, sooner or later Poland will have to cope with the presence of thousands of undocumented but settled migrants. The alternative: a harsh and costly (but doubtful with respect to the effectiveness) police action aiming at deportation of those persons or their regularisation will not be easy to deal with. In addition, if the latter option is selected, Poland will not be able to resist an upsurge of

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25 It might be argued that a large part of those migrants – thanks to the low price of labour they embody - generate new jobs (rather than occupy or take over already existing jobs), especially in the household sector. For instance, home care of the elderly becomes possible on mass scale only because of the availability of cheap migrant labour.
foreign nationals generated by the regularised migrants and related to family reunion. Second, Polish legislation has widely opened the door for foreigners of Polish ancestry. Under the label of repatriation programme, the arriving persons are instantly granted Polish citizenship (soon likely to be equal to EU “citizenship”) and comprehensive assistance. With increasing number of foreigners coming to Poland within this scheme, the pressure will grow to allot more public funds to it and, consequently, more and more persons will be willing to be repatriated. To be sure, as approx. one million of ethnic Poles live in the ex-USSR alone, the potential for this migratory flow is tremendous.

All those possibly sizeable flows of people, either from or to Poland, may, however, turn out very moderate. This foretells us the experience of initial period of the transition in practically all former socialist countries when, according to widely disseminated predictions, millions of citizens of those countries were expected to storm the borders of the West. In reality, however, there were tens or at most hundreds of thousand migrants, and that makes the difference.
Bibliography


