France: driving force of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy?

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Introduction

Preface

France has always been an engine of European integration, especially of its political aspects. It is also one of the most active actors in EU politics and policies. France’s level of “europeanisation” of the national foreign policy is of a high degree. France is considered a big proponent of the EU Common foreign and Security policy (CFSP). However, it is worth asking whether France really play role of the driving force behind the evolution of CFSP.

The aim of the analysis is to identify whether and to what extent:

- France contributes to the successful and positive development of CFSP
- France’s visions of CFSP correspond to those of other EU members

Justification

Firstly, France represents in this regard an obviously significant case of a country, which links its foreign policy with European integration while preserving its national exclusivity and large foreign policy engagement.

Secondly, the nature of the French foreign and security policy as a whole requires an in-depth reasoning of its current state and circumstances

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1 Here at the beginning I would like to pay my sincere tribute to my tutors: Jan Eichler, PhD, Institute of International Relations in Prague, and Michel Perottino, PhD, general secretary of CEFRES in Prague, who both stimulated my ambition to do research on France and EU foreign and security policy.

2 Europeanisation is a relatively new academic term describing the process of the national adaptation to the emerging EU level priorities in the foreign policy as the EU foreign policy itself has been evolving from the EPC to CFSP. For such a definition, I am bound to my colleague and research fellow at EUROPEUM, publisher of Integrace, Dimitris Kavakas who defined the term in his book Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy, Ashgate.
under which it has been developing. Special focus should be dedicated to the internal factors, not easily comprehensible at the first sight but remarkably forming France’s behaviour in the global and European arena.

Thirdly, the importance of France as an actor on the EU and even worldwide level supposes that any effort aiming to understand the fundamental French attitudes to the issues of the contemporary European Union and international relations, and to assess probable French strategies towards these issues, shall facilitate orientation in the complicated and intricate European or global scene.

**Definition and methodology**

The topic is determined as description of the relation and/or interaction between France and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP) while understanding the former being the actor – driving force – and the latter being the output.

The two essential terms are defined in the framework of two major levels: extensive and restrictive. Both levels of the definition are used in the text. They can be discerned according to the context.

The term *France* is defined:

- extensively - as a long-term mainstream policy strategy of the country on the base of the debate in the expert community and following political actions\(^3\)
- restrictively – as the action of the President and the Government

The term *Common Foreign and Security Policy* is defined:

- extensively – as European aspiration to become an important global player either in co-operation with or in rivalry to the US

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\(^3\) In case of France, strong opinion cohesion between the foreign and security policy decision-makers and the foreign and security policy expert community is present. The major opinion of the expert community always prevails also in the official strategy of the country. It is given to the long tradition of relations between the political scene and certain research institutes that are considered as official ones, although their products are not influenced by the political power.
• restrictively – as a concrete project with particular and specific outputs, e.g. the peace-keeping missions

In the report, a frequent reference to the term: “foreign and security policy” can be found. The notion of the term consists of:

• strategy and means in external action towards other internal law actors\(^4\)
• strategy and means in the external security\(^5\)

The author aims to apply such methodology which would target a variety of aspects of the selected topic. These are the basic categories into which facts and conclusions are sorted:

- evolution: Cold War and post-Cold War eras’ foreign and security policies
- unity and diversity of the French political scene regarding CFSP
- minimum and maximum country’s goals in CFSP
- means and instruments to be used in order to achieve these goals
- sustainability of the French goals and means and their acceptability for other EU countries

**Fundamental Assumptions**

**French foreign and security policy priorities**

Since 1950s France has viewed the process of European integration as an important means of promoting the country’s foreign policy objectives.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) Restrictive definition: states and IGOs, extensive definition: states, nations, ethnical units, rebellious and combatant parties, NGOs, movements etc.

\(^5\) External security means mainly defence related issues and military means: army, defence industry, strategic conception, colations etc. Although it is closely with the internal security – battle against terrorism, crime, illegal immigration etc. by non-military means – police, justice, administration.

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The evolution of CFSP\(^7\) has only underlined this attitude: France strives for setting-up such CFSP’s goals that would respond to those of France.

The general ones are\(^8\):

1. respect for human rights and democratic principles\(^9\)
2. respect for state sovereignty and international law\(^10\)
3. general war prevention
4. co-operation among states and nations

The more specifics goals (see below) do have in sight the strengthening of France’s prestige through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The basic argument is: raise of Europe's importance as an global actor implies the raise of France’s importance.

**French motivations**

France aims at promoting creation of a “politically united Europe”. The whole political scene is united over this point. It is because:

- France considers itself the most important political actor in the European continent.
- Europe, from the French perspective, is the “immediate environment” and a strictly determined entity
- France has never disassociated European integration from its foreign policy priority n°1
- Europe is a means of retaining France's world-power status\(^11\)

**CFSP in the light of French interests**

European integration became and still is the platform for the implementation of the traditional\(^12\) French foreign policy. This is despite the fact that the strategic milieu has fundamentally changed: while the period of the Cold War with its division into two major blocks enabled France to ensure the independence of the foreign and security policy, the

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\(^7\) Through establishing the European Political Cooperation (EPC)

\(^8\) Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatie.gouv.fr

\(^9\) However, France is often criticised for its deep relations with states who violate these principles

\(^10\) France neglects the fact that in many cases the two principles (1,2,3) have been in contradiction. e.g. Kosovo Crisis

\(^11\) Represented particularly by French permanent membership in UNSC

\(^12\) I.e. the foreign policy of the V\(^{th}\) Republic: the conception conceived by its founder, Charles de Gaulle
end of it brought about a decline in the importance of France in the chessboard of international politics. Now that the preserving of the foreign and security autonomy seems to be a hard deal for France, facing the power of the US, Europe has commenced to play a key role in the French effort to recover the “super-power status” and re-achieve the “lost independence”. This effort is, however, well framed under “the grand debate” on the emancipation of Europe, which gained piquancy during the Iraq Crisis.

Under the discussion France started to argue that nature of security had changed since the end of the Cold War which brought a change in the American perception of Europe: according to France, Europe should strive for independence from North America since it is not assured for the future that any special relationship between Europe and the US will be sustainable.

France is the main engine of the development of CFSP and the main contributor to the fulfilment of its relatively limited goals. Any capable common European foreign policy and security policy could not be borne and work without French engagement. On the other hand, French radicalism in the domain of European foreign policy and defence activities (due to the internal politics) causes disunity rather than unity amongst the members of the European Union, disregarding the damage to the Transatlantic relations.

Summary of the evolution until present time

**Cold War Era**

Establishment of the Fifth Republic brought a grand change in French foreign and security policy\(^{13}\). Setting the priorities appeared as the most significant effect of this reversal, despite the fact that these priorities underwent various revisions\(^{14}\). The priorities were:

- endeavour to preserve France as a world power (la Grandeur)

\(^{13}\) This fundamental change was firstly cricised by Socialists in opposition. After their arrive to power (1981), they however accepted them as thier own. This so-called „institutional and policy coherence was present in many fields of French politics – and assured high unity of French political scene over foreign and security policy issues.

\(^{14}\) The revision of the two governments lead by Jacques Chirac (1974 – 1976; 1986 – 1988) represented the most important revisions in term of a partial return to the NATO military structures.
During the Cold War Era France played a role of a triple balance. Firstly, balancing between two blocks, secondly balancing the influence of the United States in Western Europe, thirdly, balancing between European states. France, willing to reconcile with Germany, chose it as a strategic partner in Europe. The Franco-German axis, even though undergoing periods of variable intensity of co-ordination and co-operation, was indisputably the very engine of European integration and emerging common European foreign and security policy16, articulated by the European Political Co-operation.

**Post Cold War Era**

The end of the Cold War brought about a decline in the importance of France both at the global level and at the European level. Reunification of Germany and the post-communist transition under American supervision can be described as a failure of the long-term French European policy17. France tried to avoid the decline of its importance in the European field by development (Eurocorps) or initiation (Eurofor, Euromarfor) of projects of military co-operation between some European states in the framework of the Western European Union.

France18 decided to abandon the conception “Europe à la carte19 and started to promote the vision of multi-speed Europe more compatible with the then French interests. This vision was incorporated in the initiation of:

- Monetary union (community method)
- Justice and Home Affairs (inter-governmental method)
- Common Foreign and Security Policy (inter-governmental method)

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15 The major goal of building the nuclear weapons was to abandon dependence of France on American nuclear weapons and American decisions about their usage. France's strategy consists of deterioration of the potential enemy. Today, France disposes with medium-range missiles carried by submarines and strategic bombardiers.
16 Franco-German brigade from 1989 initiated the creation of Eurocorps
17 E.g. failure of the Mitterrand’s project of creation of a European confederation
18 Still lead by Francois Mitterrand
19 European integration in many ways, set for everybody’s choice
Striving for “more Europe” in foreign and security policy

The initiation period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was not at all a success. Just after having signed the Treaty of European Union establishing the CFSP the EU states entered a complete disunion over the war in Bosnia that buried every chance to stop war with European means.

Such hard experience with its own disunion and incapability, notably underlined by the fact that Americans came to save Europe “as usual”, made European leaders seriously consider the project of CFSP as not only an idealistic goal for the future, but as a real alternative. France achieved what it wanted to achieve – political will at the European level to build-up the common foreign and security policy.

While Germany primarily attracted by the EMU, the United Kingdom should have been France’s major partner, for the first time in the European integration’s history, at the construction of CFSP. It could only happen after the arrival of Tony Blair to the 10 Downing Street. He denied the actual British strategy to block any deepening of European integration and approved the two first concrete steps forward in the frame of CFSP:

- inclusion of the WEU under CFSP
- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

This era seemed to generate a very substantial progress in the foreign and defence unification of the European Union.

The external reasons for that are:

- the will of the governing Labour Party to revise traditional European Policy of Great Britain
- unity of Europe after the bad experience with their disunion over the war in Bosnia

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20 Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo, 1998
21 The Amsterdam Treaty
22 European Council Summits: Cologne, Feira, Helsinki
23 The revision concerned both UK traditional foreign policy and Labour Party’s traditional eurosceptical policy
the will of the Clinton administration to co-operate with the European allies including France

The internal French reasons for that are:

- the will of the Socialists as well as the RPR\textsuperscript{24} to co-operate with the US and EU members
- policy of the president Jacques Chirac aiming at strengthening Atlanticism in the French foreign and security policy\textsuperscript{25}
- spirit of collaboration (from the First Gulf War to the Kosovo Crisis)
- weakening of the Franco-German axis

**Break in the new century**

In fact, as late as the Bush administration had been set-up, the spirit of comprehension and co-operation disappeared. This was largely due to the controversy of the American “War against Terrorism” after the September 11 attacks resulting into the Iraq Crisis.

At the beginning European states, including France, joined the anti-terrorist coalition created by US. EU members took also several measures in order to enhance the internal security. Nevertheless, the American policy tending to justify all its unilateral attitudes as well as military actions without UN mandate by the war against terrorism was not finally accepted by certain European states, in particular by France, Germany and Belgium. The fundamental split between US and these states, as well as between Europeans themselves, appeared during the Iraq crisis.

France attacked the American unilateralism derived from the new American Strategic Conception, resumed by the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld: that’s the mission which creates the coalition, not the coalition that creates the mission. France, however, argues that the principles of the American Strategic Conception were not invented by the current administration but represent an American long-term strategy, firstly applied by the Clinton administration\textsuperscript{26} in the case of

\textsuperscript{24} Rassemblement pour la République – main right wing party

\textsuperscript{25} Chirac even strove for return to the NATO military structures by 2000

\textsuperscript{26} Vedrine, Hubert, Face à l’hyperpuissance, Fayard, 2003
the operations Desert Fox in 2002, with the goals as the operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and Allied Force in Kosovo – both of them clearly beyond the framework of United Nations. Additionally to that, France does not judge September 11 a fundamental change in American policy.

As conclusion of the stated above, France found unacceptable the doctrine of the pre-emptive war and bypassing of the UN.

Hence, France is afraid of:

- degradation of the post-WW2 concept of international law, represented by the UN, and in particular the UN Security Council, and consequently the degradation of its position as a permanent member
- fall of the ESDP project, originally born as complementary to the US foreign and security policy, now rather in conflict with it.

France’s reaction to the crucial changes in international relations can be characterised as strategy towards:

- promotion of the respect for the key-role of United Nations in international security
- promotion of the principle of enhanced co-operation in the matter of the foreign and security policy (Gang of Four)
- promotion of the co-operation with Schröder’s Germany
- promotion of the creation of an independent and alternative EU strategic conception, different from that of the USA
- promotion of the idea of permanent chairman of the European Council and European Foreign Minister for more continuity in external action of the Union
- efforts at acceleration of building Defence Union inside the EU on the basis of enhanced/structured co-operation
- efforts at exclusion of UK from CFSP decision-making core
- efforts at rapid launching of the EU military missions

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27 Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations in Paris speaks about total bypassing of UN by Americans: “After September 11 they could get green light in UNSC for attacking Talibans. In spite of that, they started the war without the UNSC mandate because they did not consider it necessary.”, Perspectives 2003, RAMSES, 2003, IFRI
28 Boniface, Pascal, La France contre l’empire, Seuil, 2003
29 Despite the fact that France is the inventor of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
30 France’s position as a global power is dependant on respecting UN and its security mechanism (UNSC)
31 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg
32 Many of French statements and priorities regarding CFSP future development were formulated under the discussion about future of Europe at the Convention
France however did not meet clear and unique acceptance of its visions, except for the idea of permanent chairman of the European Council and European Foreign Minister, and was rather rejected by majority (outside Gang of Four) of EU member states. The disension between the member states regarding the EU foreign and security policy future shape commenced in association with the controversial French Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2000, culminating at the Summit of Nice where France neither succeeded as a roofing leader, nor proved its ability to persuade other states of its visions. The big disunion continued until the Iraq Crisis during which the positions of EU states became without precedence extraordinarily sharp.

France contributed to the disarray of the Transatlantic tie and to division of European states in two camps, even not without mutual blaming. “The Grand Debate” on Europe’s emancipation began again. It is even incredible that first EU operations were launched in this atmosphere.

What kind of CFSP?

Multifunctionality

France has always been in favour of a pro-active and influential CFSP in order to make EU an influential global player. The imperative basis is the frame and mandate of United Nations, rules of collective defence and large-scale and multilateral diplomacy. Critiques of France’s approach argue that France itself rejects any other’s involvement in the area which France understands an exclusive sphere of its interest.

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33 Operationability of forces: planning capacities, mobility capacities (Airbus A400M), navigation (HELIOS) and armament capacities (EUROFIGHTER)
34 EADS – European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (France, Germany, Spain)
35 Summit of Nice was negatively remarked especially with dispute between the president Chirac and prime-minister Jospin
36 Named as „New Europe“ and „Old Europe“
37 E.g. the blaming by Jacques Chirac on the candidate countries for their pro-American positions during the „Irak“ Brussels summit in the spring 2003: „They missed the occasion to stay silent."
38 EU Police Mission in Bosnia, Operation „Concordia“ in FYROM and „Artemis“ in the Congo
39 E.g. French Africa
As to CFSP’s ability, the European Union is, according to France, able to offer variety of “services”\(^{40}\) (unlike NATO – a priori military organisation), the military means only in the last resort\(^ {41}\). In addition to it, EU is more acceptable than the US for many nations. The EU’s capacity in French view rests upon:

1. diplomacy  
2. peace-forcing and peace-keeping  
3. police, administrative and judicial assistance  
4. development and humanitarian aid

**Globalisation of CFSP: EU as a global actor**

From the geographical point of view, France advances these possible priorities:

- Magreb, North Africa and the Balkans\(^ {42}\) (development of the association and co-operation\(^ {43}\))  
- Sub-Saharan Africa and APC\(^ {44}\) (assistance, aid, peace-enforcing, peace-keeping)\(^ {45}\)  
- Middle East (diplomacy, co-operation)\(^ {46}\)  
- Far East (diplomacy, co-operation)

France prefers building good relations and co-operation with:

- permanent UNSC members and G8 countries  
- key-African states (RSA, Nigeria,)  
- key Middle East states (Syria, Jordan, Egypt)  
- key Far East states (Korea, Vietnam)

\(^{40}\) “The means against terrorism is not only war, but also development and economical co-operation “, Jacques Chirac’s address, 2000  
\(^{41}\) On the other hand, as to the ESDP, France denies the reduction of the ESDP goals to the so-called Petersberg Tasks – originally WEU goals integrated into CFSP – emphasizing peace-keeping missions  
\(^{42}\) Stabilisation of the Mediterranean region – threat of immigration from Africa  
\(^{43}\) MEDA Programme, Barcelona Process  
\(^{44}\) African, Pacific and Carribean Countries: Lomé, Cotonou EU-APC Conventions on co-operation and assistance  
\(^{45}\) France is able to offer its large extend experience given its traditional engagement in the sub-Saharan region  
\(^{46}\) Recently, not only France, but most EU members are worried over the Bush administration activity in the Peace Process, especially regarding the American support to the Israeli effort to accuse Jasir Arafat of being the obstacle to peace. France also proposed deployment of EU peace-keeping forces in the Palestinian territory.
on the basis of promotion of:

- economic and development co-operation
- cultural, scientific and technical co-operation
- political and military co-operation
- conflict resolution
- diplomatic solutions of crisis

and on the basis of fight against:

- poverty, illiteracy and social disparities
- cultural and religious clashes
- WMD proliferation and terrorism
- local conflicts
- sudden international crises

**French recommendations to the powerless and toothless Union**

France is the principle partisan of the raise of capacities of the European Union in foreign affairs and defence, while neglecting the fact that the very lack of these comes with in the non-existence of a single strategic concept. Any such concept must no longer be a mere enumeration of the current issues/crises and tooth-less declarations adopted with regard to these issues/crises. EU misses a credible and long-term strategic concept: it would be nevertheless hard to adopt such a concept when there few common interests and positions amongst Europeans.

Any CFSP, even functional one is unacceptable for France at the cost of being reduced to a sort of compromise. Nevertheless, French president, government, thin-tanks and other policy actors do their best to convince European allies about the necessity of:

- assuring the function of CFSP structures in the framework of the Council

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47 And other contemporary security threats: human, drug and weapon traffic, enviromental and Internet security threats, etc.
48 A certain progress in this regard was made at the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003 where the European Council adopted a strategic concept presented by Javier Solana. This strategy nevertheless does not abandon the general level.
49 Limited goals and means establishing no rivalry to United States and NATO
50 Foreign minister, PSC, EUMC, EUMS, OCCAR, COREU, ECHO
• giving more instruments to EU: positive and negative sanctions, diplomatic service, the most efficient humanitarian & development aid in the world
• unity above the exercising of decisions already adopted
• successful results of the peace-keeping missions
• improvement of the military operationability
• raise of military and R&D budgets
• promotion the European military industry

What did France do to “improve” the situation?

France is well aware of the deficiencies of EU in the area of foreign and security policy. France itself has made a considerable progress in this regard. France decided to:

• transmit the foreign and security policy (in determined areas) decision-making onto the European level, i.e. CFSP structures
• respect the common decisions and declarations
• become the “framework nation” of the EU peace-missions
• offer its military and planning capacities to the European Union

51 In matters of quality and quantity
52 When EU will take NATO peace-keeping in Bosnia in mid-2004, then it will be tremendously challenged
53 France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemourg proposed in April 2003 the creation of a core of collective planning and operational capabilities: European military command headquarters in Tervuren, Belgium = for the EU without using NATO assets and capabilities. France also proposed at the beginning of the IGC in Rome in October 2003 that EU create its own paramilitary ‘gendarme’ force to help create stability after military peacekeeping missions.
54 At the EU summit in Thessaloniki EU leaders agreed to set up a defence agency, during the course of 2004, in the field of “defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.” This agreement responds to the statement in the EU constitutional draft. France was the main militant of this idea.
55 EU Police Mission in Bosnia – 58 policemen out of 500, Concordia (FYROM) – 197 out of 400 members of the Staff and French commander (gen. Maral), ARTEMIS (Congo) 1200 soldiers out of 1400 and French commander (gen. Thonier); source: French Ministry of Defence, defense.gouv.fr
56 Centre National de Ciblage, Helios – navigation, 12,000 GI to the Rapid Reaction Forces (one fourth), weapon systems: TIGER, COBRA, METEOR, MIRAGE, etc.
• increase the humanitarian aid expenditures up to 17,5%\textsuperscript{57} of the whole EU’s expenditures
• sustain the military expenditure at 2,5%\textsuperscript{58} of GDP\textsuperscript{59} and raise of the R&D budget up to 2,18%\textsuperscript{60} of GDP\textsuperscript{61} despite the EU economic recession
• promote merger of Thales\textsuperscript{62} into EADS\textsuperscript{63} in order to connect the electronic systems technology with the weapon systems producer\textsuperscript{64} to face Boeing and Lockheed Martin.
• promote co-operation between EADS and BAE Systems\textsuperscript{65}

Conclusions

What has been treated in this paper is an overall description of the priorities of France related to the shaping the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of the current development in international and European politics. Now we will let us try to evaluate these priorities also in the mentioned context. The principal focal points of this evaluation are:

1. Coherence of France’s strategy
2. Extent of acceptability of France’s visions of CFSP for other EU states

1. Coherence of France’s strategy

France’s endeavour to build-up an efficient, operational and respectable EU foreign and security policy is complex and coherent due to the

\textsuperscript{57} Source: Embassy of France in the USA
\textsuperscript{58} USA – 3,1% of GDP, UK – 2,5% of GDP
\textsuperscript{59} After a decade of decrease from 3,5 % in 1990 down to 2,4 % in 1996, source: Human Development Report, UN Development Programme
\textsuperscript{60} USA – 2,6% of GDP, UK – 1,83% GDP
\textsuperscript{61} Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
\textsuperscript{62} Despite the fact that Thales’s future lies on Pentagon contracts
\textsuperscript{63} „Airbus and A400M company“: merger of the French Matra and German DASA
\textsuperscript{64} Similarly to the merger of GEC-Marconi into British Aerospace (BAE Systems)
\textsuperscript{65} Following the example of the EUROFIGHTER
traditional unity of its political scene over this topic. On the other hand, the extent of this endeavour, its intensity and energy devoted to it rather gathers the camp of France’s opponents.

- France is not willing to search for a compromise in matters of CFSP and ESDP, which – owing to the diversity of positions – is necessary and in fact inevitable.
- France criticises others for neither willing to nor letting their interests converge towards a EU common interests, defined with a high extent of variability, while France itself hardly conforms to this common interest.\(^6^6\)
- France promotes an efficiently functioning CFSP. France, however, refuses the use of community method in this domain and insists on the inter-governmental method with implication of right of veto.
- France advances the idea of a strong and capable Europe – only heading the foreign policy and military emancipation from the US and weakening of the role of the US in Europe and in the world.

### 2. Extent of acceptability of France’s visions of CFSP for other EU states

French visions, illustrated by such an interpretation as above, are not admissible for other European states, both EU members and the candidate countries, possibly except for Greece, Belgium and to a certain extent, Germany\(^6^7\). The upcoming enlargement of EU by 10 new countries will only strengthen the camp of opponents of France’s CFSP concept.

Any real CFSP, i.e. functioning and acceptable for the whole EU in respect of its goals could be established unless the following French perceptions are abandoned:

- enhanced co-operation in external action and defence – creation of a hard core inside the EU\(^6^8\)
- EU foreign and security strategic concept drawn as opposite to that of the USA\(^6^9\)

\(^{66}\) In case EU tends to criticise or condemn states belonging to the sphere of French interest, mostly in Africa

\(^{67}\) For the current government; not for CDU/CSU

\(^{68}\) Especially without the United Kingdom

\(^{69}\) Particularly so-called Non-EU European Allies (NEEA) – non EU European NATO members are hereby worried
• enlarging the missions of ESDP beyond the Petersberg Tasks and heading a defence union challenging NATO\textsuperscript{70}

France is on the one hand the real driving-force behind CFSP but on the other too much eager one. France then could become paradoxically its gravedigger.

**Final recommendations**

Although many of the French ideas and attitudes regarding CFSP are full controversy (see above), many of them are relatively appealing to the France’s EU counterparts\textsuperscript{71}, particularly:

• multilateralism in global governance
• large-scale security (aid, co-operation and assistance)
• emphasis on peaceful and diplomatic solutions of crises, if possible
• high number of peace-enforcing and peace–keeping missions
• improvement of Europe’s foreign policy unity
• improvement of Europe’s military capacity\textsuperscript{72}

The main conclusion of this analysis is that a substantial and realistic revision of French dogmatic positions in order to abate them will bring more consensus to Europe as to CFSP goals and will make the fundamental ideas of CFSP shareable for a majority, if not all EU countries. Additionally, it will weaken the partisans of unilateralism and “bushism” in Europe and would ensure a solid political base for a well-functioning and efficient EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

\textsuperscript{70} The most unacceptable point is duplicating of military and planning capacities (NATO-EU) which would be burden for EU countries’ deficit budgets and duplicating of NATO’s monopoly in the collective defence. UK, Spain, Italy and Portugal in this regard push an idea – an alternative to EU defence autonomy of the “Gang of Four” of involving EU military capabilities under wings of NATO so that EU become one cell of NATO, with its particular command in Mons under SHAPE. This plan is called “Food for Thought”.

\textsuperscript{71} They are acceptable, therefore they could have appeared in the EU Constitutional Draft from the Convention

\textsuperscript{72} In the frame of existing European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)