Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September

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Theses

1. A crucial issue for Russia has always been such a shaping of the European security architecture which would guarantee the possibility of its participation in decision-making in issues referring to European security, especially crisis management. Moscow, still perceiving itself as a great world power, even in times when its ambitions are gradually being limited, would like to solve the problem of security architecture by creating a kind of directorate, which would manage European security and would consist of the main European powers, the USA, and Russia. It seems that after the attempts to base this architecture on the OSCE model fell through, Russia has set its hopes on co-operation with the EU and above all with NATO, the key dominator in the European security problem. It has been Moscow’s interest to make NATO gradually evolve in the direction of a collective security system.

2. The issue of NATO enlargement, though vital, is of secondary importance in comparison to the above. NATO enlargement was a crucial political problem for Russia, since in spite of all efforts undertaken, the country was not able to acquire the role of the “co-manager” of European security. Therefore, Moscow tried to block or at least significantly delay the process of NATO enlargement as well as to limit its geographical area and military consequences. Nevertheless, Russia has come to terms with the inevitability of this process and currently does not work against it as determinedly as before. This change is also related to the process of the gradual shrinking and weakening of the zone Russia perceives as its area of influence. In the future, Russia’s attitude towards NATO’s enlargement may positively change on condition that its aims concerning the architecture of security will be achieved.

3. Russia treated instrumentally such issues as the narrowing of relations with NATO and the development of co-operation with the Organisation. Moscow regarded these concerns as the way to discourage NATO from enlarging and presented them as an alternative to the enlargement process. Moscow’s real interest in co-operation with NATO was limited, though. This state of affairs was partly due to the anti-Americanism of Russian foreign policy and partly due to its being unprepared for such co-operation. Differences in approaching the new form of co-operation by Russia and by NATO may hinder its accomplishment. NATO is concentrated on attempts to involve Russia in particular co-operation in selected areas, but it seems that Moscow is not prepared men-

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tally and financially for such co-operation. What is crucial for Russia is setting up institutions and making strategic decisions.

4. The future of Russia–NATO co-operation depends more on real and deep internal transformations taking place in Russia than on NATO’s attitude towards Moscow. The above changes would make Russia the country capable of constructive co-operation with NATO based on common values, interests and standards.

Relations between Russia and NATO in the 1990s

1. European Security Architecture

Russia was well aware of the security deficit created in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). A way to counteract such a state of affairs was primarily supposed to be the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and transforming it into an organisation which would guarantee security and stability on the continent (de facto a system of collective security). Discussions and resolutions of the July CSCE summit in Helsinki were convincing about the feasibility of such a perspective.

The creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in December 1991 was perceived by Russia as a constructive action aimed at managing the security zone in Eastern Europe with Moscow’s contribution. Although the NACC was tightly bound to NATO, its arrangement and functioning made it preserve a certain transition period, during which an evident security “vacuum” existed in Eastern Europe. Such state of affairs was satisfactory to Russia, which therefore, favoured strengthening the NACC’s role.

In reaction to the issue of NATO’s Eastern enlargement, from 1994 Russia tried to put forward the idea of an European security model alternative to the one based on NATO, which allowed for a central role for the CSCE/OSCE and NACC (Moscow wanted to make the NACC independent of NATO). Aiming to put this proposal into force in the summer of 1994 Russia presented the suggestion of reform of the NACC and the CSCE. The advantages of that model from the Russian point of view were obvious: its membership with full rights and consensual decision-making mechanism in these bodies. It was easy to notice that Russian proposal were aimed at limiting NATO’s role, especially regarding “new missions.” It also aimed at granting independence and strengthening the NACC and creating a kind of directorate for making decisions about European security. Russia would be able to block the military activity of NATO members outside the treaty zone and it’s very much credible that NATO enlargement would not take place. The CEE countries would de facto be limited to the role of a buffer zone between NATO and the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (where in reality Russia’s dominance regarding security would be accepted). Sergey Karaganov openly spoke and wrote about the last element, suggesting making the territory of the CEE “a half-demilitarised zone”, a buffer shielding Russia from the West.

However, in spite of softening of the Russian proposals, the 1996 OSCE Lisbon summit did not result in a breakthrough and Charter for European Security (forced by Russia and accepted at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit) did not become, as Moscow wanted, the legal basis of the new security system. Russia lost hope in the possibility of accomplishing its model. The more so as the country was strongly criticised at the Istanbul summit for its operations in Chechnya, which made Moscow regard the OSCE as an organisation dominated by western countries.

Simultaneously to forcing its OSCE/CSCE model, Moscow now and then sent signals about its willingness to consider its membership in NATO. Such proposals appeared mostly in moments crucial for relations between Russia and NATO: at the end of 1991 (after the collapse of the USSR), at the end of 1993 (during the campaign against NATO’s enlargement), and at the beginning of 1995 (after NATO’s decision to start the enlargement process). The aim of such proposals was more to distract NATO’s attention from the process of enlargement and direct it towards co-operation with Russia rather than create a real membership perspective.

In the second half of the 90s the centre of gravity in Russian foreign policy was moved more towards the European Union. Russia realised the importance of the consequences of the processes of integration and expansion of the EU. Moreover, Russia tried to take advantage of disputes between the USA and its Western European allies. This in 1997 gave rise to the creation of an official Russian idea of “The Great Europe”, which had a clear anti-American profile. Russia attentively observed the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the beginning of accomplishing (1999) the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Since then the dialogue on the European security became a Russian priority.
2. NATO enlargement

Until 1993 Russia did not treat NATO enlargement as a real possibility and therefore the country did not present its negative stance. This is the reason why in the spring of 1993 when the debate on the NATO Eastern expansion started in some countries, the Russian reaction was extremely hostile. The problem of NATO enlargement started dominating relations between Russia and NATO, gradually deteriorating them.

The common statement announced after Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Warsaw in August 1993, which expressed the lack of Russian objection to Polish attempts at NATO membership, was therefore surprising. Nevertheless, it was quickly disavowed by Yeltsin himself, who in a confidential letter addressed at the leaders of the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany in the middle of September 1993 repeated Russian objection. It powerfully marked the beginning of a propaganda campaign against NATO enlargement, which was launched by Moscow in the autumn of 1993. One of its crucial elements took place at the end of November 1993 when a special report about NATO’s enlargement, prepared by Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, was presented. The report analysed the interests and standpoints of all the parties contributing to the debate on that subject (emphasising the differences among them). First of all, though, it consisted of a catalogue of arguments against admission of new candidates to NATO, proving that such a process would have catastrophic results for Russia and European security. The American idea of the new form of co-operation between NATO and the NACC partner countries (announced during an informal meeting of defence ministers of the Organisation in Travemunde in October 1993) was officially launched at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit, in January 1994, in form of “Partnership for Peace” (PIP). This idea was benevolently accepted by Russia, as it was understood in Moscow as NATO’s will to calm the impatient candidates down, so in other words as definite alternative to NATO enlargement and not as preparation to the process.

Joy in Moscow did not last long, though. NATO regarded Russian suggestions of special partnership without emotion and during the Brussels ministerial on the 1st of December 1994 it was decided that studies on the possibilities and regulations concerning NATO enlargement would be commenced. Russia immediately showed its dissatisfaction, but its feeling of political solitude (increased by western criticism towards the war in Chechnya) made Russia start a kind of bargain regarding the issue of NATO’s enlargement.

Probably the differences of opinion existing in Moscow itself and the unsatisfactory stance of the USA made some Russian politicians, especially the representatives of the military, sharpen their tone. The spring and summer of 1995 brought threats from the Russian side. It seems that the second period of this psychological war undertaken by Russia was inspired by two features: the Bosnian crisis and “Study on NATO Enlargement” being accepted. After NATO’s presentation of the study in September 1995 a kind of “dead season” in relations between Russia and NATO began.

The problem of enlargement by virtue of an informal decision made by the member countries was postponed because of presidential elections in Russia (June 1996) and in the USA (October 1996). This fact was benevolently accepted by Moscow. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1996 the subject was raised again. The USA proposed a special agreement to be signed between Russia and NATO. Exact negotiations, however, took place as late as at the beginning of 1997. It seems that the Lisbon OSCE summit here and especially the NAC decision made during the July summit in Madrid concerning the admission of the first group of CEE countries to NATO were of decisive importance. What was left to Moscow was launching negotiations concerning mechanisms, which would soften results of this process, in other words a kind of bargain with NATO. The compromise reached in March could not fully satisfy Moscow, but Russia still tried to present the agreement signed in May as a diplomatic success. In this situation Moscow calmly accepted the membership invitation addressed to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary during the Madrid summit in July 1997. It seemed now that the battle was not about the first, but about the following “waves” of expansion. Since 1993 one of the motives (and since 1996 the main motive) of Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion was Moscow’s fear of the questioning of its domination in the security zone on the territory of the CIS and liquidation of the “buffer zone” of the Baltic States. The agreement signed in May 1997 did not give Russia any guarantees that no further NATO’s enlargement, which would cover the Baltic states and the CIS countries, would take place.

This became the major object of Russian diplomatic campaign from 1997. Russia clearly changed the tactics of opposition, leaving threats aside and turning to positive incentives, e.g. encouragement towards co-operation (especially visible in the cases of Lithuania and Ukraine). One of the ways in which Russia tried to influence the politics of these countries was strengthening the pro-Russian economic-political lobbies.

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3. Institutionalising of relations and co-operation between Russia and NATO

In December 1991 began a short transition period, during which Russian Federation took over formal relations with NATO from the USSR. During the inaugural NACC meeting the Soviet ambassador in Brussels, Nikolay Afnasyevski, de facto represented Russia for the first time. Officially, though, Russia became a member of the Council together with the rest of the CIS countries during a special session on the 10th of March 1992. Via NACC Russia developed a dense network of contacts with NATO and its major organs in different political and security spheres. From then the dialogue took place during annual ministerial sessions and (every two months) meetings of ambassadors and a considerable number of appointed working groups. Initially, Russia was an active contributor to NACC.

It would seem, therefore, that Moscow should actively participate in the new program “Partnership for Peace” (PIP) launched in January 1994. Russia, however, in spite of a positive attitude towards PIP, did not rush to sign the Framework Document and the Individual Partnership Program (IPP). NATO’s offer, according to Russia, was an appropriate answer to the CEE countries’ aspirations, it did not, however, live up to Russia’s expectations concerning its special status. Russia did not want to become one of many partners, but the privileged partner, whose world power status would be taken into account by NATO. With time, Moscow started to require that PIP should be realised via the NACC’s mechanisms and under its control, which would give Russia considerable influence on the range of co-operation between other countries and NATO as well as on the character of the program (so as not to allow PIP to become the membership preparatory phase)\(^1\). Moreover, Russian diplomats postulated that Russia and NATO should sign a document launching a special partnership which would set up the mechanism of constant consultations on security, containing references to building anew security system in Europe and recognising the special interests of Russia on the territory of the former USSR.

Treating access to PIP as a bargaining chip and attempting to create special relations with NATO, Russia formulated the whole package of suggestions concerning its co-operation with NATO (presented by the defence minister Pavel Grachev during his visit to Brussels in May 1994). The purpose of this package was clear. It was all about granting Russia the status of NATO’s privileged partner, creating a dense network of contacts and such co-operation which would step considerably beyond NATO’s relations with any other PIP participant country. It would allow Russia to influence decision-making not only in the program but also concerning European security.

In spite of NATO’s failure to fulfil key Russian postulates, the foreign affairs minister Andrei Kozyrev signed the PIP Framework Document on behalf of Russia during his visit to Brussels on the 22nd of June 1994. It seems that a critical element of the Russian decision was the fact that 20 other countries had done it before, including the majority of the CIS countries. Russia was threatened with political isolation. Moreover, Russia must have come to the conclusion that with a positive political gesture and deeper co-operation with NATO it would increase its influence on the shape of PIP and weaken NATO’s will to expand.

Having signed the Framework Document Russia was delaying negotiating with NATO the conditions of its Individual Partnership Program (IPP). Moscow started linking this with expected NATO’s positive answer to its suggestions concerning NACC reform and a promise not to enlarge the Organisation. However, when on the 1st of December the NAC de facto decided to enlarge NATO, Kozyrev unexpectedly refused to sign the Russian IPP. Moscow knew, nevertheless, that strong opposition unaccompanied by alternative proposals, would not be productive in this new situation. Therefore, among the conditions under which Moscow was ready to accept NATO’s enlargement was a postulate to create a permanent consultative body between Russia and NATO as well as signing a treaty to regulate mutual relations.

NATO was not ready to go that far and the partnership suggested to Russia was moderate in comparison to Russian postulates. In spite of this Kozyrev signed the Russian IPP on the 31st of May 1995 during the NAC session in Nordvijk. NATO “rewarded” Russia in September presenting a document project of “Political Framework of NATO—Russia Relations” supplemented with another confidential material specifying the co-operation themes. The text of these documents only slightly expanded Brussels proposals, generally offering “discussing the possibilities” of co-operation in particular domains. Russian disappointment was expressed by… failing to answer to NATO’s proposals.

The stagnation of relations between Russia and NATO was broken by intense negotiations, which took place from January to March 1997 over the document whose aim was to create a base for new relations between Moscow and Brussels (signing such agreement had been suggested by the USA a few months before). Moscow formulated a series of far-fetched postulates concerning the

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\(^1\) C E S s t u d i e s
agreement. The table below presents their fulfilment level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Original Russian postulates*</th>
<th>Important negotiated entries**</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The character of the document</td>
<td>A legally binding treaty</td>
<td>An important political document not binding legally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture of security and use of force</td>
<td>OSCE’s key role in the system and the UN Security Council’s monopoly of decisions of force use</td>
<td>The necessity to strengthen OSCE and its role in particular spheres and the recognition of the primary importance of the UN Security Council and OSCE in assuring security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutionalisation of relations</td>
<td>creation of a high level permanent Russia–NATO body for consultations, co-ordination of co-operation and joint decision-making</td>
<td>Formation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and its regular sessions at the level of permanent civil and military representatives (once a month), foreign affairs ministers, defence ministers and Chiefs of Staff (twice a year) and possible summit meetings for consultation, co-ordination and (“to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate”) making joint decisions and actions with the stipulation that they cannot concern the internal matters of either of the parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of co-operation</td>
<td>All important matters regarding security and mutual relations</td>
<td>a list of 19 areas of co-operation (including the issues of Euro-Atlantic security) and additionally other areas agreed on by the parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic restrictions of NATO’s expansion</td>
<td>a certain form of a guarantee of NATO’s non-expansion to the post-USSR area</td>
<td>Declaration of a will to build common security space without separating borders and spheres of influence, respecting the will of particular countries to choose the means of ensuring their own security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions of NATO’s expansion</td>
<td>NATO’s obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons and military forces in the territories of new members and not to use the existing military infrastructure (warehouses, airports, etc.)</td>
<td>Repetition of the earlier NATO declarations of not planning nuclear weapons deployment and “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in the territories of the newly accepted states, refraining from creating new or adapting the already existing nuclear weapons storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reference to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)</td>
<td>entering the rules of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty into the document recognising the Russian postulates</td>
<td>Basic rules of the CFE adaptation (including maintaining by the CFE parties of the level of military forces commensurate with their security needs and consistent with their international obligations)</td>
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*based on media reports
**based on the text of a document
The signature of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation on 27th May 1997 in Paris could not be seen as a success for Russian diplomacy, especially with reference to their earlier postulates. On the other hand, with relation to the scale of its own capabilities, Russia gained a lot. However, in practice, the Act’s shape conditioned the range of Moscow’s influence on NATO’s consent.

Russia’s certain helpfulness, which had accompanied the initial period of co-operation with the Organisation after the signature of the Act, was soon replaced by disappointment. This was due to the institutional approach of the Russian side to the relations with NATO. The Russians, who interpreted the Act to suit their aims, demanded that all important problems of European security (including those concerning military aspects of NATO’s expansion) be discussed during the sessions of the NATO – Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The conflict especially concerned the introduction to the agenda the discussion of the NATO’s military infrastructure in its new member-states. The Organisation agreed only to give briefings on the subject. Moscow also tried unsuccessfully to transform the Council into a decision-making body of a kind, which would deal with regional security, e.g. in Kosovo. During the Council’s session at the ministerial level in December 1998, the Russian minister Ivanov demanded a discussion of the NATO new strategic doctrine. Russian diplomacy had begun a campaign against the introduction (to the above mentioned doctrine) of the possibility of taking up crisis response operations by NATO beyond the Treaty’s territory without obligatory UNSC approval for such action to take place. PJC’s December session at the level of defence ministers did not take place as Russian delegation demonstratively refused to come there in protest against the NATO’s plans to bomb Yugoslavia. Regardless of numerous acts of encouragement by the NATO side, Russia remained a relatively passive participant of bilateral contacts. Contrary to its announcements, it did not prepare anew IPP within the framework of the “Partnership for Peace”.

A clear-cut co-operation between Russia and NATO constituted another problem. Despite the Organisation’s repeated proposals and the possibilities given by the Act13, Moscow remained extremely restrained. Although a Russian military unit participated (for the first time) in a joint military training within the PIP framework in May 1998 in Denmark and Russian officers took part in conferences and training sessions (e.g. in the George Marshall Centre in Garmish-Partenkirchen), Moscow still delayed the appointment of military liaison missions, would not give serious briefings on its own military infrastructure, did not sign anew IPP and was unresponsive towards the NATO offers on the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia was evidently interested only in a very restricted practical co-operation (especially a military one), putting stress on political issues. Its modest forms which had been initiated did not survive such a test as the Kosovo crisis.

The participation of Russian soldiers under NATO’s tactic control in the Implementation Force — IFOR (and since 1997 in the Stabilisation Force — SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most practical form of Russia – NATO co-operation14. Moscow’s dogmatic stance on the issue of co-operation with NATO led to creation of a complicated system of commanding the Russian forces. This co-operation, however, started to be used by the Russian diplomacy as an argument against... NATO’s expansion.

Frost in Kosovo and Putin’s thaw

1. A Kosovo shock

The Kosovo crisis (1998–1999) constituted a factor which largely determined Russian foreign policy. It influenced both a sphere of consciousness of the Russian elite and a sphere of conceptualisation of the security policy as well as the practice of foreign policy (which regarded not only Europe, but also other regions.) Despite dramatic diplomatic efforts, Moscow did not manage to prevent NATO’s bombings of Yugoslavia which started on 24th March 1999. In fact, this was a great blow to Russia’s international prestige. The reaction of the Russian Federation was seemingly very strong. Yevgeny Primakov, the Prime Minister, ordered the plane taking him for a visit to the USA to divert mid-flight. Representatives of the highest Russian authorities condemned the air-raids as a brutal breach of international law, an act of aggression and a mistake for which (as President Yeltsin put it) America would have to pay. The Russian militaries were not the only ones to hint at the possibility of the war spreading.

However, this rebellious rhetoric (largely resulting from frustration) was contrasted with modesty of Russia’s practical retaliatory actions taken. Most importantly, the freezing of the relations with NATO was announced (including the discontinuation of all official contacts, membership of all joint bodies, e.g. PJC and EAPC, the Partnership for Peace program and the recalling of all
Russian military representatives from Brussels). At the same time Russia did not want to break off the relations with the West and limited itself to propaganda moves meant to help “save face”. The evolution of the Russian approach towards a more constructive involvement contributed to a political agreement between the Yugoslavian authorities and the international community (in fact on the terms of America and the EU countries), which led to a discontinuation of the NATO raids on 10th June. Therefore, the Western countries were even more surprised to see 200 Russian paratroopers of the SFOR units stationed in Bosnia march into Kosovo on the night of 11th/12th June and occupy Slatina airport near Pristina. These actions, apart from a propaganda aspect, served to force NATO into ensuring the participation of the Russian army within the framework of the multinational KFOR force introduced to Kosovo. In the course of stormy negotiations, Moscow failed to get assent for the creation of a separate Russian security sector in Kosovo. A status and dependence of the Russian contingent constituted another contentious issue. The final settlement was not reached until the beginning of July and in fact formed a strange compromise allowing Russia (which in reality subjected its Kosovo forces to NATO’s) to “save face”. The number of the Russian contingent was set as about 3600 soldiers (although Russia had difficulties with financing their stay). Russian authorities put the solution of the Kosovo crisis forward as their great diplomatic success.

Kosovo provoked the increase of anti-Western attitudes in Russian society, especially in its elite. The USA and NATO were unambiguously becoming the main enemies and sources of threat for the Russian Federation. The anti-Western rhetoric had become widespread and encompassed even a part of liberal circles. The newly accepted entries (into the NATO’s strategic concept) of the possibility of an intervention beyond the Treaty’s territory were condemned in Russia. The idea of “humanitarian intervention” was negated as a manifestation of voluntarism and a breach of the fundamental principle of respecting the sovereignty of countries.

New conceptual principles of the Russian security policy (expressed in “The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation” approved in January 2000 and in “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved in April 2000) were largely influenced by the events in Kosovo. The threats analysis which it included showed clear references to the policy of the USA and NATO. Moreover, a new “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” (approved in June 2000) unambiguously judged critically the process of NATO expansion, the entries of its new strategic concept and the ideas of “humanitarian intervention”.

Paradoxically, it was a “Kosovo shock” which created a mental basis for re-evaluation of the Russian policy so far. The Kosovo crisis disclosed the scale of Russia’s weakness. The conclusion, drawn by Russian decision-makers, was a postulate of strengthening the state, especially of its economic and military bases. Russia’s weakness made attempts of political confrontation with the West unproductive. The fiasco of the Russian policy so far became clear. A need was to adapt to the real situation and to improve the relations with the USA and NATO.

This converged with an important change at the highest levels of authority in Russia. Ailing President Yeltsin resigned on the last day of 1999, handing his duties over to a young and energetic Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

2. Putin’s era

The new Russian leader was fully aware of the country’s bad condition and of a need to revise its foreign policy to date. The changes in this sphere, however, took some time to become visible.

New accents in the approach of the new Russian authorities towards NATO became conspicuous relatively soon. Although Russian assessment of the Kosovo crisis did not change, Putin started sending signals of readiness to the normalisation (and what is even more to an important positive change) of relations with NATO. The beginning of such anormalisation was announced in February 2000 in Moscow during the visit of Lord Robertson (the Secretary General of NATO). President Putin’s statement of 5th March 2000 (an interview for the BBC), in which he did not rule out the possibility of Russia’s political membership of NATO, came as a shock to Russian public opinion. The Russian leader stressed mainly that Russia (which pursued a close co-operation with NATO) expected to be treated as an equal partner. Even though Putin criticised NATO’s expansion, at the same time he emphasised that it was not Moscow’s intention to isolate itself for that reason. The Organisation welcomed these declarations and underlined that the issue of Russia’s membership of NATO was not on its agenda. The Russian leader himself changed the tone of his declarations some time later. In a fragment of his address to the Federal Assembly of 3rd April 2001, he made the development of co-operation with NATO conditional on whether
the Organisation would respect the principles of international law (hinting at its breach during the intervention in Kosovo).

In fact, Russia’s positive signals towards NATO (including the issue of possible membership) should have been treated as aimed at giving the member-states incentives to revise their attitude towards Russia and to include it (according to Russian postulates) in the process of making joint-decisions on European security. (NATO became its main addressee, as Russia had lost faith in the OSCE as the possible basis of such a system.) President Putin clearly expressed such a way of thinking during a press conference in Moscow on 18th July 2001. He declared the creation of a uniform space of European security to be the main aim. Out of three possibilities for achieving this aim: the dissolution of NATO, Russia’s joining the Alliance and creation of a new security structure with Russia’s full membership, he supported the latter.

Nevertheless, many Russian experts seriously considered Russia’s membership of NATO. Sergey Karaganov traditionally belonged here. The influential non-governmental Council of Foreign and Defence Policy (under his leadership) put forward an unambiguous postulate of at least political membership of NATO in its theses prepared in spring 2001.

Although there was no breakthrough in Russia—NATO relations, they normalised. The PJC has started to deal with other problems apart from just Kosovo since March 2000. (Earlier Moscow would not agree to this, treating it as a form of a “sanction” towards NATO.) And in May of the same year the first ministerial session of the Council took place. In December the plans for co-operation in maritime rescue were agreed on (the tragedy of the “Kursk” submarine in August 2000 contributed to this). The beginning of 2001 brought about manifestations of further improvements in Russia—NATO relations. The Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson visited Moscow from 19—21 February. He opened NATO’s information bureau there. He also listened to Russian proposals concerning non-strategic missile defence.

However, there were still many contentious issues. NATO’s expansion was one of the more important ones. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Yevgeny Gusarov, during the EAPC session at the end of May 2001 declared that the expansion of the Organisation would challenge the system of disarmament agreements, especially the CFE. This could be interpreted both as an element of counteracting NATO’s enlargement and an attempt to find ways of neutralising the effects of the accession of the Baltic states (through incorporating them into the CFE system).

Nonetheless, NATO was not the only frame of reference for the Russian policy of European security. The European Union was another. It seems that in CESDP development Russia noticed an opportunity for itself. But after a promising beginning of dialogue on Russia—EU security (a summit in Paris in December 2001 in particular) there was adisappointment with lack of progress (at a summit in Moscow in May 2001). At the same time Russian policy towards the USA changed (a ceasing of any manifestations of antagonism towards Washington). Moreover, Moscow noticed that the progress of the dialogue with EU was largely dependent on improvements in Russia’s relations with the USA and NATO.

The events of 11th September brought about fundamental changes.

**After 11th September**

1. Russia’s appeal

The events of 11th September have created a new (and in fact convenient to Moscow) international situation. Russia had already given up the policy of antagonising the USA and undertook attempts to improve relations with Washington. Through its decision to join the anti-terrorist coalition, Moscow at the same time started a political offensive whose aim was to achieve a breakthrough in relations with the Western countries and structures. This pro-Western turn (motivated by rational calculation) has given Russia a chance to benefit e.g. in relations with NATO.

In his speech to the German Bundestag on 25th September, President Putin referred to the idea of a “Great Europe” drawing up a vision of merging the potentials of Europe and Russia (stressing at the same time that this would not be of anti-America character). He judged the existing mechanisms of co-operation with Russia as insufficient in that they did not give Russia the possibility to influence and make decisions. He emphasised a need to create a stable architecture of security and went on to “say that we renounce our stereotypes and ambitions and that we will ensure security to the citizens of Europe and the world”

The European Union was the first to react to this appeal. It announced on 3rd October (during the Russia—EU summit in Brus-
sels) creation of a de facto permanent consultation channel on the subject of security.

However, progress in Russia—NATO relations was even more spectacular.

On 26th September Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov attended an informal summit of the defence ministers of NATO countries in Brussels and a session of the NATO—Russia Permanent Joint Council. It was then decided (in the light of Russian declarations of eagerness to co-operate) that there would be top level contacts and the meetings of Russian and NATO experts concerning the joint fight against terrorism.

On 2nd October, a day before a Russia—EU summit, President Putin declared: “We are ready to change the quality of our relations with NATO and the systems of European security which are currently being created.” The next day (after a meeting with NATO’s Secretary General) he called for “giving up logic when the problem of NATO’s expansion all the time renews discussions of destructive character between Russia and NATO”. During his visit to Brussels, the Russian president also stated that there was no reason for the West not to take up the issue of Russia’s future membership of NATO. (At the same time he let it be understood that this issue currently was not on the short-term agenda.) According to the reports of the meeting’s participants President Putin severely criticised the state of the relations so far and the mechanisms of Russia—NATO co-operation. He called upon the Organisation to put forward some new proposals. They agreed on creation of a special working party (made up of experts from both sides) designed to find ways of tightening mutual relations.

The Russian side did not expound any definite postulates, just some general suggestions of devising a new structure in place of the PJC, on whose every level Russia would be a rightful participant in the decision-making process concerning important matters of European security. The idea was to replace the “19 + 1” formula (NATO’s member-states consulting with Russia) with the “20” formula (making joint decisions with equal rights for each state).

2. NATO reacts

The Russian postulates met with positive responses from a few leading member-states of the Organisation. This was caused by a strong wish to break the deadlock in the relations between NATO and Russia. A working party centred around Lord Robertson as well as Great Britain, Canada and Italy put forward some preliminary proposals relating to the tightening of co-operation with Russia.

On 13th November during a visit in the USA, Presidents Putin and Bush signed a joined declaration on new mutual relations, where they supported e.g. creation of a common Euro-Atlantic space, tightening of NATO-Russia bonds, development of new consultation mechanisms, co-operation and joint decision-making and the realisation of joint actions of Russia and the Alliance. The first disclosed NATO proposal was a letter from the British Prime Minister Tony Blair (sent in mid-November) to the leaders of NATO’s member-states calling them to establish promptly a new formula for co-operation with Russia, which would ensure Moscow’s right to co-decide on some issues within the “20” formula (without pre-co-ordination of the Organisation’s position).

It seems that the initiative of tightening co-operation with Russia undertaken by some NATO countries was a result of three main motives. Firstly, making use of the new international situation to engage Russia in constructive co-operation with NATO in some key spheres (especially in counteracting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and rocket technology). Secondly, expressing political support for the new pro-Western course of Russian foreign policy initiated by President Putin on 11th September. Thirdly, a wish to create an apolitical compensation package for Russia with a view to the approaching decision on NATO’s further expansion involving the Baltic countries. (Offering Russia anew partnership with the Organisation earlier or at the same time would weaken the negative response in Russia to the second wave of expansion and would allow Putin to save face.)

Another important event in the activated Russia—NATO relations was a visit of the Secretary General of the Organisation Lord Robertson to Russia from 21st to 23rd November 2001. The NATO Secretary General disclosed the outlines of the proposals towards Russia. They would boil down to the establishment of a new mechanism of co-operation with Moscow, e.g. inviting Russia to joint sessions (initially some sessions of the North-Atlantic Council were suggested) with an equal right to co-decide on chosen issues. Such a formula (its working name: the Russia—North-Atlantic Council (RNAC)) would enable Russia to participate fully in the process of tenders and reaching consensus, yet only in certain spheres. Their list could include co-operation in the fight with terrorism, counteracting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the creation of a non-strategic Europe-Russia system of
 missile defence and fighting threats to the, so called, “soft” security (organised crime, drug trafficking, etc.)³⁹.

On the other hand, the representatives of the Russian side led by President Putin tried to remove all doubts about Russian aspirations. They declared that Moscow’s aim was not to enter NATO either through the front or the back door but just to tighten the cooperation on equal rights. But, as the Russian president said, the border of this tightening would be set by NATO itself and its readiness to accept Russian interests⁴⁰. It appeared that Russian decision-makers wanted to undermine the political consequences of the relations’ new formula, stressing that Russia did not intend to use them to block NATO from functioning.

3. A new formula

A formal decision on the development of new formulas of cooperation with Russia was reached during a ministerial session of the North-Atlantic Council on 6th December and was confirmed the next day during a meeting of the Joint Permanent NATO—Russia Council. The information from Brussels clearly pointed to a limited (from the Russian point of view) character of NATO’s opening towards Moscow’s postulates. This resulted from divergent opinions among the member-countries. A change in the position of the USA had a particular impact here. The USA signalled the need to approach the new formula of cooperation carefully and indicated some formal obstacles. It seems that in fact this resulted from conflicts within the American administration itself.

The atmosphere of high expectations could have caused certain disappointment for Moscow, which (not wanting the new relations with NATO to be seen as its formal acceptance of NATO’s further expansion) further toughened its attitude towards this expansion. In an interview for Greek media (5th December) President Putin described the planned expansion as “a pointless and mean action” repeating the Russian objection towards the process. In spite of this, Russia felt slightly satisfied though merely with setting the process of building new relations in motion.

However, the divergence of interests between NATO and Russia on the subject of the new formula on cooperation became more and more visible. The NATO countries started to concentrate on creating such safeguards which would prevent Russia from blocking NATO functioning. At the same time they opted for setting of not too wide a list of the areas for possible joint decision making. Moscow, on the other hand, underlined the need to ensure real equality and effective co-deciding. Moreover, it wanted to set quite detailed procedures (also on the realisation of the joint-decisions). It initially stressed the need for drawing up a narrow list of the “negative” subjects on which co-deciding would be impossible (e.g. the article 5., other internal matters and ones regarding NATO’s defence policy)⁴¹. It later agreed on a “positive” list but wished it to be as wide and open as possible. It also wanted to participate in the development of new formula and not to receive NATO’s ready-made offers. The Russian side, most importantly, pressed for time. They wanted to have the principles of new relations drawn up by mid-February and inaugurated in mid-May 2002 during an meeting of the NAC and PJC in Reykjavik⁴².

Both sides informed each other about their common interests during consultations which started at the end of January 2002. But a specific discussion was enabled only after an internal agreement on the principles of NATO’s offer (20th February) had been reached. NATO’s offer was officially presented to Russia during a visit of NATO’s deputy Secretary General Gunter Althenburg in Moscow on 4–5th March 2002. According to this offer, a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was to be created. It would debate (just like the PJC, which it would replace) at least one a month on the ambassadorial level and at least twice a year on the ministerial level. Its sessions would be organised by a special committee (which would include Russia). All participants would be able to propose subjects for discussion (within the framework of the agreed areas of cooperation consistent with the proposals earlier raised in NATO). In this Council Russia would have the same rights as NATO member-countries on the issues of consulting and decision-making. NATO would not agree their common position in advance (formally at least). Consensus would be required to pass a decision. At the same time a particular subject could be removed from the NRC’s agenda on the demand of any member. NATO countries would however retain a right to discuss any matter even without Russia’s participation. The new formula would give Russia the possibility (but not duty) of participating in NATO’s crisis response (with the Organisation’s consent)⁴⁳.

Such an offer (which gave Russia the possibility of specific cooperation, but blocked the possibility of destructive influence) disappointed Moscow. Both the Foreign Affairs minister Igor Ivanov and the Defence minister Sergey Ivanov, during their visit to the USA in mid-March, voiced their doubts and concerns regarding the quality of effective co-operation and underlined...
that the offer differed from the proposals put forward by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in November.

At the beginning of March the Russian side put forward their counter-offers to NATO. They boiled down to larger formalisation and institutionalisation of the co-operation with the Organisation. They were in fact leading to Russia gaining a privileged position towards NATO.

A month and a half before the summit in Reykjavik, it seems that Russia will accept NATO’s offer (despite its earlier critical reactions). Although it differs from Russian ambitions, it still gives Moscow the possibility of increasing its influence on NATO and European security. Most importantly, however, (similarly to the Act of 1997) it gives the possibility of softening the effects of the expected invitation of the Baltic countries to NATO. (Russia seems to have reconciled itself to the inevitability of this process, but still (just like in 1997) wants to limit its military effects.) With the fiasco of the OSCE model and immaturity of the CESDP, the expanding NATO appears to remain a dominating structure in the sphere of security in Europe. Russia therefore does not have any alternative for the policy of tightening the bonds with NATO. At the same time, Moscow hopes that the new formula of relations with Russia will initiate a process which might finally transform the Alliance into a collective security system with Russia’s equal participation.

Conclusions and prognoses

1. NATO and European security in the 90s as seen by Moscow

All through the 90s Russia’s attitude towards NATO was being shaped by a few basic assumptions in the diagnosis of the situation:

a. A fundamental part of the Russian elite saw NATO as an instrument for the realisation of American interests in Europe. The USA was treated as the real leader of the Organisation. Therefore the attitude towards NATO in Russia was a derivative of the perception of the USA and its politics. This perception was varied, but a belief in their clash with Russia’s crucial interests dominated. What it more, NATO’s image was generally negative.

b. Russia carefully followed any manifestations of an increase in the independence of the USA’s West-European allies in the sphere of foreign and security policy as well as the evolution of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). However, Moscow looked sceptically at the prospects of their practical realisation.

c. The process of NATO’s transformation at the beginning of the 90s, the increase in its “out of area” activity, the development of the network of co-operation with non-member countries and the idea of NATO’s strengthening were perceived in Moscow as consolidation of NATO’s central role in the architecture of European security. Since there were no real prospects for Russia’s membership of NATO, the processes were viewed in Russia as threats to its interests. Being outside NATO, Russia did not participate in making important decisions about European security and felt increasingly marginalised.

d. NATO’s expansion to the East was seen in Russia as a political threat, as in its understanding expansion increased the area of American dominance in the sphere of security, eliminated a “buffer zone” in Central Europe and was perceived as a danger to Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet region (since the mid-90s this was the main reason for Russian objection).

e. The foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation were determined by its self-perception as a great power. Accompanying domination of thinking in the categories of realpolitik and geopolitics among the Russian elite made Russia concentrate largely on protection of its “zone of influence” (where it wanted to have, among other things, dominating role in regulation of security). At the same time we were witnesses to a process of shrinking of the defined zone (from the territory of the ex-Soviet bloc to the post-Soviet territory and, finally, to the territory of the CIS) and of a change of the model of realisation of the influence (increasingly “subtle” forms and not force). It directly influenced Moscow’s attitude to NATO’s gradual expansion and tightening of its relations with some CIS countries (unwilling resignation to their inevitability).

2. Evolution of Russia–NATO relations

Russia–NATO relations and the Russian policy towards NATO were undergoing some changes. They were conditioned by international context, especially by the relations with the USA and the leading West-European countries and by regional crises (in the Balkans and the territory of CIS especially). Internal political conditions had some influence here as well. The policy of tightening practical relations with NATO (initiated by the USSR under Mikhail
relations could be contributory to the weakening of the dynamics. A shock in Moscow caused by NATO’s operation in Kosovo in spring of 1999, the take over of power in Russia at the end of 1999 by a pragmatically oriented Vladmir Putin and a new international situation, convenient for Russia, which arose after 11th September. The normalisation of relations with NATO happened in mid-2000, but significant progress was only achieved under a new international situation created after 11th September 2001. The principles of the new formula of NATO—Russia relations were developed between the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002.

3. Conditions of Russia—NATO relations

The following separate processes will crucially influence the further evolution of Russia—NATO relations:

a. The most important will be Russian-American relations, determined mainly by the policy of Washington. It seems that Russia (aware of the disproportion of power) will definitely avoid a political confrontation with the USA and will much rather seek areas for closer relations and constructive co-operation. In such a context a possible stagnation or cooling of the Russian-American relations could be contributory to the weakening of the dynamics of the new formula of Russia—NATO relations. It could be limited (as it has been so far) to the consultations or possibly to joint decision-making only in a narrow scope of matters. Such a situation would deepen Moscow’s disappointment with the co-operation with the Organisation.

b. The relations between Russia and NATO will be additionally influenced by the progress of European integration, settlement of EU—NATO relations and the evolution of the entire relationship between the EU and Russia. Decrease in Moscow’s interest in co-operation with NATO in favour of the EU could be possible in case of CESDP’s success (accompanied by differentiation of competencies and setting of the principles of co-operation with NATO) and Russia’s achievement of some progress in incorporating itself into a European space in the sphere of economics. The prospects of such success seem to be quite distant at the moment. A recently visible attempt (e.g. an agreement with France on strategic dialogue) to build bilateral co-operation with European powers in the sphere of security (whose prospects would be far better in case of difficulties in CESDP’s development and settlement of the EU—NATO relations) constitutes another possibility. Rebuilding the elements of the balance of power on the European scale would decrease the importance of such institutions as NATO and their attractiveness for Russia.

c. Russia’s internal situation will create another factor. The new pragmatic and generally pro-Western course of foreign policy still has many enemies who think anachronistically. However, there is no organised opposition towards the new policy. The Kremlin’s large degree of control over the country’s political processes and the means of influencing society’s awareness, as well as remaining at a high level of social trust in Vladmir Putin prevent the organisation of such an opposition. It could be possible only if Russia simultaneously experienced a complete lack of benefits from its foreign policy and a serious socio-economic crisis (caused by a slump in the world prices of energy). Even then it would be difficult to expect Russia to break off its co-operation with the West (including NATO), but merely to change its rhetoric and temporarily limit the co-operation.
4. The prospects of development of Russia–NATO relations

It seems, regardless of the foregoing conditions, that the Russian Federation’s weakness will for a long time dictate its relying largely upon the mechanisms of multilateral co-operation (even if we assume a future stable increase in its potential). NATO will most likely constitute one of such crucial mechanisms. Russia will try to maintain the dynamics of the process consisting of a gradual extension of the scope of its political (but not military) integration with NATO. Tightening the co-operation between NATO and Russia (accompanied by a pressure to reach consensus in the areas of co-deciding) and the important geographical extension of NATO’s territory may be conducive to a gradual evolution of the Alliance in the direction desired by Russia: towards a system of collective security. Russia will try to use its progress in the relationship with NATO in the respective tightening of co-operation with the European Union in a sphere of security (trying to build a mechanism of feedback between these two processes). Nonetheless, Moscow will pursue the same aim as it has done for years. The aim of an effective and full “co-management” of European security. Such “ politicisation” of co-operation on the Russian side will not serve the aim of achieving serious effects in co-operation in particular civil and military issues. Both for subjective and objective reasons, Russia will not be ready for such co-operation for a long time yet.

The success of the new formula of co-operation with Russia does not depend solely on the position of the USA and its European allies (especially their willingness to meet Russian postulates). The stance of Russia itself will have a great influence here. The crucial elements are:

a. Moscow’s readiness to accept factual equality within the framework of the new formula of co-operation with the NATO countries and renouncing any claims to the status of privileged member

b. Russia’s ability to adapt to the mechanisms of constructive consensus achievement within the framework of new bodies of co-operation and its renouncing of such methods as blackmail or decision-blocking

c. recognising by Moscow the uniformity of the European security space (within the borders of the OSCE) and its ceasing of attempts to give any special status to the territory of CIS (especially one that would give a monopoly to Russian actions regarding maintaining peace and security)

d. undertaking efforts by Russia to conduct a real reform of its armed forces (including the introduction of standards of effective civilian control over the armed forces), which would enable interoperability with NATO forces

e. Moscow’s ability to reject the stereotypical negative picture of NATO and its willingness to spread a positive image of NATO in Russian society

f. recognising by Moscow the fundamental convergence of security interests between Russia and NATO, and the pursuit of implementing this community of interests in the country’s policies

g. the complete introduction to Russia of European standards regarding democracy and the rule of law as well as proving in political practice a non-instrumental attachment to the common values advocated by the NATO countries.

Fulfilling of the above conditions would enable a real, deep and irreversible breakthrough in Russia–NATO relations and would remove all obstacles to its incorporation into the Euro-Atlantic community in the capacity of a full participant.

Marek Menkiszak
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Partnership Council (EAPC), widening the influence of member countries of Independent States. NACC, strengthened and supplemented with neutral conversion. The activity of the Council was based on the annual plan approved at strengthening the CSCE and transforming it into a superior organisation co-operation on the co-operation.

4. Understood as the lack of institutional security protection in the region through multilateral mechanisms;

5. Russian suggestions were expressed in the outline of all-European partnership, presented by minister Andrei Kozyrev in January and February 1994. It aimed at strengthening the CSCE and transforming it into a superior organisation co-operating activities connected with security in other European structures: NATO, the WEU, the European Union, the European Council, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. NACC, strengthened and supplemented with neutral countries, in combination with the CSCE, would function as an auxiliary co-ordinator. It would have its own secretariat, and would take care of such problems as: peacekeeping operations, confidence building measures, and defence industry conversion. The outline was supplemented with further suggestions presented in the summer of 1994, such as appointing the Executive Committee of the CSCE (taking as amodel the Security Council of the UN).

6. Understood as activities stepping beyond collective defence of the treaty zone (mainly peacekeeping operations);


8. President Boris Yeltsin declared during the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg: “The time has come to collectively build anew Great Europe with no dividing lines – Europe, upon which no country could thrust its opinion (…) Today, the Great Europe can become a powerful commonwealth, with the potential no region in the world could compare to. And which could easily provide for its own security”. Text of the speech: Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, no. 3-4, 1994, p. 12.

9. Confident Russian offers according to information leaked to the media were supposed to boil down to Moscow’s agreement for NATO’s CSCE enlargement under aseries of conditions. Russia and NATO (understood as all the member countries) were to sign aspecial legally binding agreement guaranteeing that NATO’s interests are not directed against Russian interests. The agreement was to set up aconsulting mechanism between Russia and NATO (on the level of foreign affairs ministers) in the form of 1+1 (not 16+1) and common political committee. There would also be an agreement about military and military-technical co-operation. Russia would be granted guarantees to keep the political-military status of Kaliningrad. The process of accepting new candidates was supposed to be spread over aperiod of time and begin after presidential elections in Russia (planned for June 1996). Countries would be accepted one at a time and would not be integrated into the military structure of NATO. On the territory of its new members NATO would be forbidden from keeping the troops from any of its member countries, as well as nuclear weapon deployment.


11. The areas of co-operation as enumerated by the Act: conflict prevention, joint peacekeeping operations, exchange of information about defence strategies, doctrines and budgets, arms control, nuclear safety, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Theatre Missile Defence, air traffic safety, conversion of defence industry, training in civil emergency and combating terrorism, and drug trafficking.

12. The Russian brigade (which initially numbered 1800 soldiers and at the beginning of 2001 – about 1200), according to the agreement of November 1995, was taking orders from the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe (SACEUR) (appearing here as the Supreme Commander of the US forces in Europe) solely through aRussian General with the status of his Special Deputy (based in the European Headquarters NATO SHAPE near Mons) and was tactically subordinate to the American Commander of the Multinational Brigade North, taking orders through the commander of Russian contingent. Cf. NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping, Brussels 2001.

13. This risky operation was not only undertaken without any agreement with other countries, but even without knowledge and consent of the members of Russian government (!). The plan was secretly drawn up by a group of staff officers and was immediately accepted by President Yeltsin.

14. However, NATO managed to block the continuation of the operation through the closing of the air space by Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to the Russian transporter planes supposed to deliver reinforcements for the Russian forces in Kosovo, and then negotiated access to the airport in exchange for providing the Russian forces with supplies.

15. The accepted formula said that the Russian contingent accepted orders only from a Russian commander appointed to the position of a special deputy to the Supreme Commander KFOR (the Commander of the NATO forces in Europe) who
himself issued these orders. Furthermore, Russian soldiers had the right to abstain from pursuing Serb war criminals. I. Bulavinov, I. Safronov, Mesto postoyannoy okupaciyi, Kommersant Vlast’, 15.06.1999. Cf. NATO and Russia... 18 See, e.g. “Rol Rossii v menayushchemsya mire”, Igor Ivanov’s speech during the World Congress of the Russian Press of 22.06.1999, MFA of the Russian Federation, a duplicated typescript, pp. 1–8.

19 Igor Ivanov (Foreign Affairs Minister) felt obliged to submit to the NTW TV an interpretation of President’s statement. Ivanov undermined its importance saying it was an expression of Russia’s good will in improving relations with NATO (and not of the factual membership).

20 The transcript of Putin’s statement, see: http://president.kremlin.ru/events/264.html


23 Russia and the EU agreed in this declaration to start regular consultations on the subject of security and to develop (through experts) the possibility of Russia’s participation in the EU’s military operations. France (which then held the presidency of the EU) was the main initiator of dialogue development in this sphere.

24 See transcript of the speech: http://president.kremlin.ru/events/313.html

25 New dialogue forms were supposed to be introduced in the form of meetings of the representatives of Russia and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (the main body supervising realisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP) and of monthly consultations with the PSC Troika (the current Presidency representative, the future one, and the Commission representative). A possible arrangement of the parameters of Russia’s possible participation in the EU’s civil and military missions was also declared.


29 President Putin’s statements during a meeting with the deputies. Strana.ru, 22.11.2001.

30 The countries which were sceptical towards Russia’s further incorporation into co-deciding: France, Germany, Norway, Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

31 This mainly concerned the text of the protocols on the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO ratified by the US Senate (30th April 1998) which included the entries of necessity of an earlier consensus within NATO before negotiations with non-member countries (including Russia within the PJC framework). See: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Senate 04.05.1998. Cf. Detailed principles explained in a letter of the President of the USA to the Senate (21.05.1998). similar entries were present in NATO’s confidential document (Intra-Alliance Understanding) concerning the principles of co-operation with Russia.

32 The interview for “Net-TV” and “Mega”. See: text; http://president.kremlin.ru/events/397.html

33 President Putin himself spoke on this subject during his visit to Great Britain. See: Putin’s speech during a joint press conference, in: http://president.kremlin.ru/events/422.html

34 In fact the Russians wanted the new relations to be implemented before the invitation of new members to NATO during a summit in Prague in November 2002, which would soften its negative effect on the Russian public opinion.

35 Based on the sources close to NATO’s Headquarters.

36 Minister Igor Ivanov said that “20 cannot merely be a consultative and advisory body, as some NATO countries would like, but it should be a body working practically, which would develop decisions, make them and jointly put them in practice”. Interfax, 04.03.2002; Sergey Ivanov said, e.g. “We still believe that the quality and not the process of the mechanism of NATO–Russia co-operation should be changed (…) The project supplied by NATO largely differs in its content from what Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair offered half a year ago. The current project does not even mention the subject of a possible Russia–NATO co-operation”. ITAR-TASS, 14 and 15.03.2002.