



**NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA**

The Institute for Public Policy



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NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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FOREWORD

Everyone knows that victory can be obtained by a simple combining of military factors with others: political, diplomatic, economic, technical and scientific, cultural, moral, demographic, geo-climatic, etc. All these factors must be integrated within a general concept designed to assure the amplification, correlated use and, as a consequence the channelling of all the energy and possibilities of the nation (human, material and spiritual) in order to achieve victory. This concept is nothing more than the concept of **national defence**. When a nation is rich in economic resources, in military training, spirituality and especially rich in patriotism, that nation, regardless of historical juncture, will be victorious.

Having a particular importance for each of the European states, the process of building and implementation of national security strategies has a vital significance for countries undergoing transition. The success achieved in this process represents the necessary premises for sustainable economic development and signifies the accomplishment of the necessary conditions for better integration with the European Union.

The examples of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Baltic states are quite telling. In the end the cases are rather significant because, starting practically from similar conditions to Moldova in the nineties, the Baltic countries managed to create a modern security framework, a fact which stimulated the widening and multiplication of the links with European countries, as well as economic prosperity.

In comparison with the successes of these countries, the Republic of Moldova, after a decade from its declaration of independence, does not have a coherent strategy of national security nor of the consolidation and development of stability. In this context, a big problem for Moldovan society is to revise its security strategy, as well as the entire system of defence and national security. We cannot doubt the fact that economic stability and prosperity, as well as the attraction of foreign strategic investments, are directly dependent on the general climate of security, on the assurance of security for the investments, on territorial integrity and solution, and of the Transdnistrian conflict, and on the quality and efficiency of the system of national security and defence. Unfortunately, one of the major national problems that predetermines the fragility and vulnerability of the entire state institution is the insufficient and often superficial attitude towards the issues of national security and defence. The policy promoted by the government teams and political parties, focusing efforts on the accomplishment of immediate objectives (most of them of economic or social in nature)

often ignores the promotion of the true values and national interests of strategic connotation, and fails to accomplish the development and affirmation of a clear option accepted at the national level regarding national strategic objectives and security and defence policies. This inversion of priorities and the ignorance of the role of security stimulate the continuous aggravation of the state of the national security system, as well as undermine possibilities for sustainable economic development and European integration.

Unlike other countries, in Moldova the contribution of civil society institutions, non-governmental organizations in the acknowledgement, study or influence of the solving of national security and defence problems is still very modest. Consequently, one can mention the activities with more or less permanent character of the Euro-Atlantic Centre from Moldova, the „Viitorul" Foundation, some academic institutions (such as the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, the Department of History and Political Science of the State University of Moldova, the Invisible College of Moldova, the Free International University of Moldova, the Academy of Public Administration, etc.).

We can add in this context the initiation, on January 1, 2001, of the research program „Strategic assessment of the national security and defence of the Republic of Moldova," by the Institute for Public Policy, which was implemented in collaboration with the Euro-Atlantic Centre of Moldova, Scottish Centre for International Security (SCIS) at the University of Aberdeen and the Conflict Studies Research Centre of the Royal Military Academy from Sandhurst, Great Britain, and effectively supported by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Moldova.

The project had the purpose to strategically evaluate the national security and defence of the Republic of Moldova at the present time and to develop scenarios and opportunities for the nearest future by researching the country's public policies.

The following priority objectives are needed in order to achieve this goal:

- Analyse and evaluate the following documents:
 - The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova;
 - The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova;
 - The Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova;
 - The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova;
 - The pieces of military legislation adopted in 1991-92, as well as laws, presidential decrees, decisions of the parliament and the government, regulations, etc.
 - Treaties, agreements, framework documents, protocols, programmes and declarations of multilateral and bilateral military co-operation to which Moldova is party.

• Analyse and evaluate the impact of documents concerning international security of the main international organizations and alliances on the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova:

- United Nations;
- OSCE;
- NATO.

• Analyse and evaluate the main components and state of international security at the global, continental (European) and regional (sub-regional) levels and their impact on national defence and security of the Republic of Moldova;

• Analyse and evaluate the strategic concepts of security and defence of the countries that constitute a priority of Moldovan foreign policy: the Russian Federation, Romania, Ukraine, the United States of America;

- Develop scenarios to solve problems related to security and national defence of the Republic of Moldova and to offer expertise and assistance to the decisive factors that are responsible for this field and for implementation of civil-military democratic relations;
- Examine the social and economic aspects of the national system of security and defence, the process of development and improvement of the legal framework, assurance of the constitutional rights of the military, accomplishment of activities that form the image of the armed forces, military service and the status of military in the society;
- To make public the results and conclusions of these studies and draw the attention of public opinion regarding the importance of correct solution of the problems existent in the field of security and defence;

Practical accomplishment of the project has been conducted through investigation, classification, analysis and discussion of the key problems and through publication of results regarding this research in a common academic study performed by the participants of the project, as well as other contributors. It has also been achieved through the organisation of workshops, seminars and roundtables, internships and work visits, also by a large-scale publication of the results and conclusions of these studies.

The Institute for Public Policy

Geostrategic perspectives of the Republic of Moldova

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Moldova is situated at the confluence of three political and geographic regions: Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe. Strictly geographically, the Republic of Moldova is practically placed in the centre of Europe, which does not impede its traditional inclusion together with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia in the East European geographic space. Lately, however, more and more geographers agreed with the inclusion of the Republic of Moldova into another political and geographic macro-region, namely South-Eastern Europe. At the annual meeting of the geographers of the Society for South-Eastern Europe, which was held in October 2000 near München, the frontier between Eastern and South-Eastern Europe was clearly drawn along the Romanian-Ukrainian and Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

The main geo-strategic characteristic of the Republic of Moldova is its position in the buffer zone between two political and military structures – NATO and the military alliance of the CIS. Even if the rivalry between these two military blocks is not a declared one, it is obvious that those two structures are in a state of latent antagonism, well demonstrated by the first wave of NATO expansion towards the east. Another important characteristic is the political and strategic interest of an immense power (Russia) in the territory of this country and even in its effective military presence in the Republic of Moldova. This generates a „negatively-motivated“ interest for Chisinau on behalf of the potential enemies of Russia (USA, European Union, Turkey). This second point is quite significant considering the fact that Russia politically and spiritually supports the conflict from the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova, which ultimately is a source of regional instability.

Besides these two major reasons, there are two other specific points related to political and military security regarding geographic position, particularly the proximity with not too a friendly regional power (Ukraine) and with an increasingly conflict area – the Balkans. Not even these two examples can be avoided by

military geographers and western geostrategists when analysing the strategic importance of our country.

Furthermore, among the biggest geostrategic disadvantages of the country is the distance from any important military and geographic area (among the most important targets from this perspective are the Danube Delta and Odessa; however, not even these can be considered as priority strategic objectives), as well as the distance from any zone of geo-economic interest or the absence of a direct geo-economic interest in the Republic of Moldova.

In the conditions of an ever-increasing economic emphasis of international policy, this fact influences the behaviour of the most important centres of power in relation with the Republic of Moldova. The absence of some „positive“ reasons for interest in our country makes us more and more vulnerable and impose on us a more complete capitalisation of a negative stimuli – the presence of some interests hostile for Western countries, local conflicts and involvement of the territory of our country in international weapons trafficking, and the close proximity with some conflict zones capable of undermining the stability of the West. Unfortunately, due to an excess of modesty Chisinau did not manage to capitalise on this geostrategic potential, fearing the possibility of association of the Republic of Moldova with a negative image of being a vulnerable and unstable country.

In consequence, our country did not get rid of the problems with which it is confronted, and the lack of publicity of these problems has caused only bad turns, including domestically.

The present study will try to analyse some of the key-problems that the Republic of Moldova is facing at the geostrategic level, particularly the problem of frontiers, Transdnistrrian and south Bessarabian conflicts, as well as to point out the main dangers of a spatial nature that jeopardise the national security of our country.

1. THE PROBLEM OF FRONTIERS IN THE WARFARE SCIENCE AND GEOSTRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The problem of frontiers is extremely serious for the Republic of Moldova, with many implications at the geopolitical and geostrategic levels. However, the Republic of Moldova itself represents a frontier, the border between the western Roman and the eastern Slavic world amidst South-Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Eastern Europe. The multitude of frontiers and limits that meet in our country largely represents a consequence of this geographic position. Unfortunately, lately, we get the impression that the Republic of Moldova will become a frontier between political Europe and the Russian sphere of influence or even a neo-communist bloc built around a Beijing-Moscow axis.

The historical frontiers of Moldova represent one of the biggest burdens that contemporary society of the country has to carry. Legally there is no bond be-

tween the present-day Republic of Moldova and the old Principality of Moldova founded in 1352. All of the Republic of Moldova covers the main area of the historical province that was part of Bessarabia of the Principality of Moldova, which was, however, lost by the Principality of Moldova in 1812 to the Russian empire. The loss of Bessarabia did not obstruct the further existence of the Principality of Moldova, which ceased to exist only in January 1862, when it united with the Principality of Walachia. The most rapid and radical changes of the political frontiers from the territory of the present Republic of Moldova take place at the beginning of the twentieth century. During the Russian Civil War, on 2 December 1917, Bessarabia proclaims its independence under the name of the People's Republic of Bessarabia. The independence of Bessarabia was recognized only by Romania, which in January 1918, at the demand of the legislature (*Sfatul Tarii*) from Chisinau, introduced its troops on the territory of Bessarabia and on 9 April 1918 the Bessarabian parliament decided for unification of the People's Republic of Bessarabia with the Kingdom of Romania. According to the Bucharest Peace Treaty of May 1918, Austria and Germany recognised this act of unification. On 28 November 1920, the Entente recognised the legality of the act of 9 April 1918 in the so-called Paris Peace Conference. If we return to the problem of juridical succession, then we have to note that the Republic of Moldova is the legal successor of the Autonomous Moldovan Republic, founded on October 1924 and transformed in August 1940 into the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, and not of the Principality of Moldova, which dissolved within Romania in January 1862.

Initially, the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic included 10 administrative districts and an area of 85,000 square kilometres. It must be noted that the USSR did not recognise the act of unification of Bessarabia and Romania. According to the Constitution of the Moldovan Autonomous Republic, it also included Bessarabia. Thus, when Soviet troops annexed Bessarabia on 28 June 1940, it was automatically included in the Moldovan Autonomous Republic, implicitly in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Considering the size of the territory (53,000 square kilometres) and especially the population of the new republic, Moscow decided to transform the Moldovan Autonomous Republic into a republic within the Union, i.e. into a subject of the Soviet Federation. Thus, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic is, as mentioned above, an evolution of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic that emerged in 1924 in Transdnistria. Accordingly, the present-day Republic of Moldova is nothing else than the continuation of the former Moldovan Soviet Republic.

Returning to the morphogenesis of the Moldovan frontier since 1940, we have to note that Kiev insisted that the Moldovan frontier be revised upon the increase in „rank“ of the new union republic. Ukraine did not agree that the large number of people of Ukrainian origin living in the compact northern part of Bessarabia, in the northern extremity and other parts of Transdnistria be included in the Moldovan Soviet Republic. Based on this rationale, on 2 August 1940, on the day when the Moldavians were escaping from Ukrainian authority, 34.4% of

the territory of the republic was given to Ukraine. As a consequence of these mutations of frontiers of Romania and Moldova, 450,000 Romanians were found on those 25,300 square kilometres arbitrarily attributed to Ukraine by the Stalinist regime. The contemporary Republic of Moldova inherited the frontiers established on 2 August 1940, inheriting at the same time a whole lot of problems generated by this morphogenesis. These problems did not cease immediately after the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the most severe ones, related to the ethnic minorities emerging because of these mutations of borders. As I have mentioned, half a million Romanians presently live in Ukraine, particularly within the territories lost by Romania and Moldova in the summer of 1940. Meanwhile, a quarter million Ukrainians live in the Transdnistrian districts of the Republic of Moldova, a territory that belonged to Ukraine prior to the Soviet experiments. A situation of suspicion and tension has emerged between Kiev, Chisinau and Bucharest that cannot be camouflaged by the „diplomatic delicacy.“ As a result, until now there exists no frontier agreement between Chisinau and Kiev. After ten years of tense negotiations, in 2001 the legislatures from these two countries ratified a border agreement, which however degraded into a political scandal in Chisinau. In fact, Kiev managed to compel Chisinau to revise a series of positions and accept the *de facto* situation that emerged in 1940. More factors naturally contributed to the acceptance of this position: pressure from Western countries, which do not tolerate such type of claims; the complicated situation in Transdnistria, which could never be solved without the support of Kiev; and, last but not the least, the passiveness of the Romanian population living in Ukraine, which due to the extremely poor economic performances of the Republic of Moldova is not too enthusiastic about the revisionist ideas that originate in some political circles from Chisinau. The Moldovan side was forced to ultimately accept the frontier drawn in 1940, furthermore, accepting some other modifications favourable for Kiev, such as the issue related to the 7.7 km portion of the Odessa-Reni route within the territory of the Palanca district. The passiveness and the lack of interest with which Moldovan diplomacy approached this issue in its dialogue with Kiev has generated dissatisfaction among the population and contributed to a light decline of the image of the present Communist rule.

A complex problem that resides in the spatial structure of the Republic of Moldova is the problem of ethnic frontiers, or the so-called ethno-linguistic frontiers. The Republic of Moldova has a very complicated ethnic geography, a typical situation in South-Eastern Europe, as well as for a country that constitutes a border zone between macro-regions like Moldova. A specific moment for the South-East European zone that can be found in the structure of ethnic frontiers of the Republic of Moldova is the phenomenon of „enclave.“

The ethnic zones are scarcely compact and continuous, but sporadic and frequently mixed. The most eloquent example can be seen with the Russian and Ukrainian population. The two communities, very difficult to delimit, form together a quarter of the population of the country. The Ukrainians from the Republic of

Moldova speak mainly Russian and are educated in Russian. In fact, according to the tradition in Bessarabia, the Ukrainians are considered as Russians, or a sub-ethnos of Russians. Although the Russian-Ukrainian community represents approximately 1.1 million people, you can never identify a region where they form a majority. A larger concentration is seen in the separatist region of Dubasari and in Chisinau, where the Russian-Ukrainian community represents approximately 50 per cent of the whole population. A little more „organised“ are the Bulgarian and Turkish-Gagauz minorities that are found in the south-western part of the country. Those two minorities have „their own“ territorial-administrative units, which have a more complicated geography. Even the Romanian „majority“ lacks a clear ethnic frontier in the Republic of Moldova, being perforated throughout the country by the small Russian-Ukrainian enclaves. The Romanian islands and peninsulas radiate along the entire Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Additionally, the ethnic map of the Republic of Moldova gets more complicated due to the problems of national identity. It is very hard to tell what is the share of the Romanian-speaking population that consider themselves Romanians and the share that consider themselves Moldovans. If we are to consider the number that voted for pro-unification parties then we could estimate that 1/3 of Romanian-speaking population consider themselves to be Romanians and 2/3 Moldovans. Obviously, the frontiers that separate the two different „identities“ are not of geographic nature, but solely of social and psychological nature. As a rule, the intelligentsia, students and the younger generation in general recognise themselves as Romanians. Probably due to the fact that those attached to Moldovan identity are particularly the representatives of older generations we can explain the decline of the share of the advocates of „Moldovanism“. For instance, in 1994 less than a quarter of the population voted for pro-unification parties, while in 1998, as mentioned, more than one-third. As a rule, the representatives of the younger generation are the ones who give up their Moldovan citizenship in favour of Romanian citizenship.

In the end, I would mention the last category of frontiers – geopolitical and geostrategic borders. Approaching the issue of these frontiers, we cannot ignore the question – what is the future of the borders of the Republic of Moldova, a country that hosts all the typical challenges of post-communist world within such a small territory? Situated exactly in between the two major poles of geopolitical attraction in the contemporary Europe – the CIS and European Union – the Republic of Moldova did not resist and broke in two. Our Ukrainian neighbour, a lot larger and more consolidated, avoided this painful scission; however we see similar trends within Ukraine, Belarus and the Republic of Moldova: pro-western and national in western regions, pro-Russian and internationalist in eastern regions.

In 1999, the Republic of Moldova underwent territorial and administrative reform. The reform yielded one municipality, eleven counties (so-called Judets) and one autonomous district (Gagauz-Yeri). One of these counties, Dubasari, is not controlled by the Republic of Moldova. It belongs for the most part to the so-

called „Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic.“ Accordingly, the Gagauz-Yeri autonomous district and Taraclia County, populated mainly by Bulgarian ethnics, are sort of continental archipelagos, formed of a suite of enclaves and exclaves. Lately, more and more voices insist on the merger of those two territorial and administrative units into an autonomous administrative district Bugeac and on the creation of an autonomous district Nistru in the territory controlled by the Transdnistrian separatists. Those two autonomous areas would be areas equal with the main part of the Republic of Moldova and altogether form a federation of three parts.

Even if until now Chisinau opposed vehemently to these proposals (often originating in Moscow), there are more and more fears regarding the inflexibility of the position of the new government of the Republic of Moldova in this sense. Even if the idea of transformation of the Republic of Moldova into a federative country will not be promoted openly, Communist leaders may happen to try to adjust the main territory of the Republic of Moldova to Transdnistrian „standards“, so that both Tiraspol and Comrat do not have any reasons for rejecting „the indivisible, unitary state of Moldova.“

2. THE MAIN CHALLENGES FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The limited natural resources and the delay of the social and economic reforms, the placement in a conflict geographic zone and buffer zone between an integrating Europe and the disintegrating ex-soviet space transform the Republic of Moldova into a very problematic country. The national security of our country is challenged by a series of factors of **domestic** nature (internal territorial conflicts, weak internal cohesion of the nation, the criminalisation of political and economic elites, physical and spiritual degradation of the nation), of **external** nature (the moderate or even hostile position of Russia and Ukraine, excessive dependence on the imported energy resources), as well as of **extra-territorial** nature (the transformation of the territory of the Republic of Moldova into a place for trafficking and transactions of drugs, weapons and human beings).

Are the territorial conflicts in the Republic of Moldova a temporary or a permanent threat? It would undoubtedly be too a complicated attempt to provide with an exhaustive answer in this short research, or, the problems that generate the territorial conflicts in our country are too complicated and the scenarios and variants that we could imagine are too many. The first subject that I want to discuss is one related to the terminological aspect, specifying the fact that in the warfare science, the notion of territorial conflict is much extended and includes the notion of geopolitical conflict. Thus, not any territorial conflict has a geopolitical dimension; however, any geopolitical conflict is always a territorial one. In the present study we will examine only the territorial conflicts that can

be qualified as geopolitical. Moreover, the rather small territory of the Republic of Moldova hosts at least three geopolitical conflicts: Transdnistria, the South Bessarabian conflict, and the problem of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. In fact I have to admit that this classification is rather arbitrary and that the respective conflicts intersect and influence each other. We cannot deny the fact that the South Bessarabian conflict is in close connection with the Transdnistria one, as well as with the conflict related to the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

I would say that the Transdnistrian conflict is a classic geopolitical conflict. It is certain that we are not dealing with an interethnic conflict or with an inter-confessional one. Often, in order to prove this fact, one resorts to statistics. It is said that the Moldovan Romanians represent about 40 per cent of the population of Dubasari County, while the Russians and Ukrainians make up around 25-30 per cent each. In fact, these statistics do not prove anything, because a conflict can be interethnic regardless of the configuration of the ethnic structure of a region. When defining a conflict as being interethnic, inter-confessional, political, etc., the rationale of the conflict is important, as well as the factors which maintain the conflict in an active or passive state. In the case of the Transdnistrian conflict, the rationale has always been non-ethnic, or the Moldovan Romanians from that region, whether we like to acknowledge this fact or not, made common cause with the actions of the Tiraspol regime and passively assisted in the confrontation between those two sides. Obviously with the appropriate exceptions.

I am sure that somebody could make reproaches by saying that the Moldovan Romanians from that region were coerced to adopt such behaviour; however, I would say that it is nothing but repression. In reality, the majority of the Romanian population of Transdnistria was not in solidarity with Chisinau during that conflict and did not show sympathy even for its present approach. In fact, this very aspect profoundly demonstrates that the conflict lacks an ethnic rationale. In addition, the same ethnic communities are found in the Transdnistrian part as well as in the Bessarabian part of the Republic of Moldova, and even if the proportions are different the percentages of the three communities are the same.

It is obvious that the Transdnistrian conflict is not a conflict of political nature, as frequently stated by the Bessarabian political circles or by mass media from Chisinau. A political conflict implies a confrontation of political ideas and doctrines. The Transdnistrian conflict is purely geopolitical. Russia speculates with nostalgia and „materialistic“ regrets in the case of the Transdnistrian Romanians and with idealistic ones in the case of the Slavs in order to maintain the Transdnistrian pseudo-state. Due to the passive conflict, Moscow has at its disposal not only a secure bridge for its interests materialised in the Tiraspol regime, and the Republic of Moldova as a whole became a prisoner state. It is absolutely obvious that as long as the Transdnistrian conflict remains unsolved, the Republic of Moldova will be nothing else than a string-puppet for Russians. In this situation, it is very difficult and even inappropriate to talk about an independent

foreign policy and an approach towards Romania or the Western world. The message of Chisinau will remain ambiguous and duplicitous. I am not talking about the economic impact of maintaining a situation of permanent tension and uncertainty on the future of this country. Thus, the Transdnistrian conflict is the most important enemy for the Republic of Moldova, and as long as this conflict is present on the geopolitical map of the region, the future of the Republic of Moldova will be doubtful.

The second territorial conflict I would like to discuss is in fact a conflict knot that reunites several internal and external actors. I am talking about the South Bessarabian conflict knot where we have three domestic actors – the Republic of Moldova, the Turkish-Gagauz and Bulgarian communities and three external actors – Bulgaria, Ukraine and Turkey. The South Bessarabian conflict historically originates at the beginning of the 19th century when the imperial Russian authorities decided to populate the south of Bessarabia with Gagauz and Bulgarians. Geographically, this conflict results from the borderline drawn in the summer of 1940 and politically, in the movement of Bessarabian Romanians and in the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova. The South Bessarabian conflict knot is a complex one involving many dangers.

Even if apparently the Gagauz problem, as well as the problem of Bulgarian minority has been solved, I would not be too optimistic if I had to refer to the future of the region. The two communities are the only ethnic communities from the Republic of Moldova that live in a compact area. From the geopolitical perspective, the presence of an ethnic community is already an aspect that undermines the sovereignty of a state. More dangerous is the presence of a minority that lives in a compact or relatively compact area at the periphery of a state and has a protector-state in the exterior. Unfortunately, the conflict-generating minorities from the south of Bessarabia possess all these qualities far from being favourable to the Republic of Moldova. I realize that what I am saying now is not quite „politically correct” but the truth is that the geopolitics does not come along with a „politically correct language.”

To conclude, the third conflict – the Moldovan-Ukrainian one – is a conflict that partially overlaps with the Transdnistrian and South Bessarabian conflicts. The politicians from Chisinau do not want to admit the existence of such a conflict even if lately it has become a hard-to-contest fact. The Moldovan-Ukrainian conflict also originates back in the summer of 1940 when 17,900 square kilometres from the north and south of Bessarabia, as well as from the eastern part of Transdnistria were arbitrarily included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. These territories, according to the general population census from 1989, were still inhabited by 210,000 Romanians. Obviously, this influenced the relationship between Chisinau and Kiev and could not leave aside the annexation of the north of Bukovina in the relations between Chisinau and Kiev. In order to shirk the exaggerated interest of Chisinau in 1990-91 in the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and the „lost territories” since 1940, Kiev tacitly but obviously supported the seces-

sionist movement from Transdnistria, forming real backing for the „Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic.“

Another latent „detonator“ of the national security of the Republic of Moldova is the „unification“ options oriented towards Romania or towards the rebuilding of a Euro-Asiatic union lost in December 1991. Some people could argue that the options of reunifying Bessarabia and Romania generally do not represent any jeopardy. I argue this track based on the following three arguments: the lack of popularity of this idea among the majority of the population (the pro-unification parties obtained less than 20 per cent of the votes), the idea of unification of Bessarabia and Romania is even less popular among the non-Romanian population from the south-eastern and eastern part of the Republic of Moldova, and the European Union and United States of America watch with much suspicion any intention of revision of state borders in South-Eastern Europe. Hence, the idea of „Romanian unionism“ does not involve the noxiousness, dangers and risks that lie behind the idea of „Euro-Asiatic unionism.“ What is concerning about this situation is the fact that the political forces that have this option are rather well credited among the population of the Republic of Moldova as the „Euro-Asiatic option“ forms one of the key elements of the Communist electoral propaganda. However, if we are to attentively analyse the „geopolitical orientations“ of our political scene, we will generally ascertain an uncommon situation and especially a situation when the majority of Moldovan political forces (including the population) directly or indirectly advocates some variant suppressing the Moldovan state – through the unification of Moldova and Romania or through the inclusion of Moldova in a Euro-Asiatic federation. Most likely in these trends, which also point out the collective political recklessness, resides as part of the failures of our country, or the act on 27 August 1991 does not seem to be taken seriously even by the national and democratic political forces, not to mention nostalgic leftist forces. Ultimately, the independence of the Republic of Moldova as a state is nothing else than a compromise between the two contradictory trends, both camps awaiting a „catastrophic“ denouement in their favour.

Among the biggest challenges to our national security is, as I mentioned before, the excessive energy dependence of our country on import sources. In this century of communications and speed, the energy independence is one of the basic conditions of assuring what we, in geopolitics, call „real sovereignty.“ Unfortunately, the Republic of Moldova is very far from coping with these challenges, being from the perspective of energy dependency possibly the most vulnerable country in all south-east Europe.

The energy situation of the Republic of Moldova was aggravated particularly after 1991 when it became an independent state and when the lack of energy resources and the Transdnistrian conflict became efficient strings of control by its former master. Starting with the military conflict of 1992, the Republic of Moldova became the object of a permanent energy blackmail used on various occasions by Moscow, Transdnistrian separatists or both.

In spite of this situation the neo-Communist government elected in the spring of 1994 did not rush to find a solution. Moreover, even the modest attempts of former governments to increase the import of energy from Romania, in order to diversify the sources of import, have been eliminated. In the same period, the Moldovan government firmly rejected the proposal of Bucharest to participate in the finalisation of the construction of Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant in exchange for a reactor of the plant. Naturally, this proposal demanded a considerable effort on behalf of the Moldovan budget; however, the price of this effort would have been absolutely justified.

Consequently, in 1994-96 the Republic of Moldova made a secure turn towards the East, both in political and economic sense. Russia and Ukraine were delivering the energy at quite a high price but without demanding immediate payment. The neo-Communist government, trained by Moscow, was building its positive image among the Moldovan citizens unaware of the fact that these unpaid invoices will ultimately form a serious burden for the economy of the country, totally reducing national sovereignty. In consequence, the centre-right governments that gained power in the spring of 1998 inherited an external debt equal to the gross domestic product (GDP) of our country and substantially larger than the annual budget. Obviously a large share of the external debt of the Republic of Moldova of more than one billion euro was represented by energy imported from the East between 1992 and 1998, mainly the gas imported from Russia, which at the end of 1999 „contributed” with approximately 500 million euro to the level of external debt. In addition, the Republic of Moldova accumulated in the same period of time a debt of about 250 million euro towards Ukraine, particularly for the import of electricity. In the conditions of aggravated Moldovan-Ukrainian relations related to the territorial disputes from the south of Bessarabia, we can be firmly convinced that Kiev will act knowledgeable to the capitalisation of these debts.

For the moment, the situation of the Republic of Moldova is dramatic. In order to satisfy its necessities of energy, our country is quasi-dependent on Russia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent on Romania. Furthermore, the privileges offered for the restructuring of debts towards the suppliers expired in 1996-98, i.e. exactly at the moment of establishment of a centre-leftist government by then Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc. In 1996, the Ministry of Finance prepared legislation that would have allowed the government to administrate and regulate all official debts, including the internal ones, as well as state guarantees offered to some economic units. The Republic of Moldova together with Russia initiated a program for reimbursement of the debts for the delivered natural gas. This program implied the delivery of Moldovan agricultural and industrial products to Gazprom and other energy companies from Russia. The debts of the so-called „Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic”, at the insistence of Moldovan authorities, were excluded from this program. Fuels, including petrol, natural gas and coal, represent more than half of the cost of the imports of the Republic of Moldova. Unfortunately,

this index is in continuous growth. For example, in 1991 this index was approximately 10-14 per cent. The economic changes in Russia in 1992, which still remains to be the main source of energy resources for the Republic of Moldova, led to a continuous increase of energy prices that equalled global levels and even more. Under the circumstances, it would have been logical to try to diversify the sources of import, which were offering the same products for the same or even lower prices than the Russian ones, but having the big advantage of originating from other countries than the former master, which is characterized by political cheating and economic blackmail.

To our regret, even after about a decade of political independence, the economic independence of the Republic of Moldova remains a simple aspiration. And we do way too little in order to implement this aspiration in real-life. The cornerstone of this economic sovereignty is of course the assurance of energy independence, a moment that, together with the Transdnistrian problem, is crucial for the existence or the length of agony of this country.

3. THE PLACE OF TRANSDNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The Transdnistrian conflict represents, undoubtedly, the main jeopardy for the Moldovan state and the most significant obstacle in the way of stabilising the social and political situation of the Republic of Moldova. A notion of mainly geographic than geopolitical nature, Transdnistria represents the territory between the lower Dniester and meridional Bug rivers. It includes territories of two historical regions – western Novorossiia and southern Podolia. If we consider the present administrative borders, then the clearest image of Transdnistria could be provided by the borders of Dubasari district of the Republic of Moldova and the Transdnistrian districts of the Odessa region. This area would cover 24,600 square kilometres (3,700 square kilometres within the Republic of Moldova and 20,900 square kilometres within Ukraine) and a population of 2,645,000 inhabitants (555,000 on the Moldovan side and 2,090,000 within Ukraine). The Moldovans form approximately 11 per cent and are essentially concentrated in Dubasari district of the Republic of Moldova where they represent approximately 40 per cent of the population. However, a significant community exists in the Ukrainian Transdnistria, particularly in the districts of Balta, Kotovsk (Barza) and Ananiev (Aneni). During the period that followed 1792, when Russia annexed the so-called western Novorossiia, the Moldovan population was continuously decreasing, partly due to Russian and Ukrainian emigration and to the massive „Slavicising” of ethnic Romanians from the region. We cannot, however, affirm that the Moldovans had a permanent presence in the region. The colonisation of the left bank of the Dniester River began mainly in the 17th century, although waves of migration were noted in the 15th and especially the 16th century. In spite of the

fact that Russians and Ukrainians were not massively present in the region prior to 1792, we cannot state that Moldovans have fewer rights regarding this region than Ukrainians. Therefore, the declarations that attempt to justify Transdnistrian separatism on historical grounds are not the most credible ones. Politically, Transdnistria has never been a Moldovan territory; however, it indisputably was part of the Romanian ethno-cultural space. The Transdnistrian Moldovans are the autochthonous, who after 1792 endured a regime of occupation and national suppression by the Russian Empire.

The imminence of a conflict on behalf of the Transdnistrian part of the Republic of Moldova became obvious in the summer of 1988, with the revival of national movements in Bessarabia. In 1989, with the first large victories of the national and democratic movement in Chisinau, the split of the Republic of Moldova along the Dniester border became absolutely obvious. A year later, in 1990, the Transdnistrian conflict was losing its character of an inter-cultural conflict in favour of a purely geopolitical one. This character was to become even stronger after the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova in 1991. Starting with this period, the Transdnistrian conflict was a purely geopolitical one and its ideology or political regime in this situation is absolutely irrelevant. Moreover, even western observers tried not to rush in making such suggestions. Talking about the geopolitical and geostrategic value of the conflict, some political analysts from Chisinau provide this conflict with an exaggerated dimension, by comparing Transdnistria with a „Russian knife in the back of Ukraine,” as well as when Transdnistria is considered a Russian base in the Balkan „direction.” If we are to talk about the Balkans and its „gates,” we do not have to forget that the old and metaphorical quality of Bessarabia as the „gate to the Balkans” was valid for Russia in its geographic configuration from that period. If we compare the maps of Russia and Bessarabia since 1812 and 1992, we will notice that something has changed. Today Russia enters the Balkans sooner through Ukraine, as the south of Bessarabia is no longer part of the Republic of Moldova.

The idea of Transdnistria being a „Russian knife in the back of Ukraine” is even more inconsistent. Transdnistria could have a geostrategic value for the Russians in the case of some dispute with Ukraine only if the Republic of Moldova and Romania are on the Russian side. Otherwise, how could the Russians accede to Transdnistria, which constitutes a continental enclave situated between Ukraine and Moldova configured as a band with a width of approximately 20 kilometres? Transdnistria is neither Gibraltar nor Kaliningrad, which are also small in surface but with exit to the sea, and in geostrategy enclaves have a strategic value only when the communication with these enclaves is facilitated in case of a military crisis. As a rule, the Navy Forces are the ones that make the connection with more dispersed enclaves.

Transdnistria, obviously, has a geostrategic and a geopolitical value; otherwise I would not have insisted from the very beginning on the geopolitical origin of the conflict. The geopolitical purpose of Transdnistria is not to control the Balkans

or to threaten Ukraine, but to control the Republic of Moldova. Paradoxically, the Republic of Moldova owes its existence largely to the Transdnistrian problem. It is not because legally the contemporary Moldovan state originated in Transdnistria in 1924. If this conflict had not existed, then the story of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, in its dominant state among the political elites from Chisinau since 1991, would have ended with the change of the flags over the Kremlin and with the unification of Bessarabia and Romania. The Transdnistrian conflict is something that maintained Moldova as an independent country, inspired many aspects of the new constitution and obliged Chisinau to adhere to the CIS. I would say that for Moldova, this particular region is a factor of dominant geopolitics, but this is the unnoticed „geopolitical value“ of Transdnistria. Instead, we are looking for some mysterious intertwining of spatial interests if not with a global at least a regional impact. The fact that Transdnistria, unlike Bosnia, Kosovo, the Cyprus issue or even Nagorno-Karabakh, has generated a very superficial interest of the West shows us the true geopolitical value of Transdnistria. The Europeans and Americans sporadically note some interest; however, this interest is not generated by the conflict itself but by the stocks of weapons and by the channels through which these weapons surprisingly reach the most undesired parts of the world.

Despite the fact that Transdnistria is a determinant geopolitical factor for the Republic of Moldova, one can say that even after ten years of independence the authorities from Chisinau did not manage to structure at least a consistent behaviour in this issue. Even today, by tradition, we consider that the keys to the solution of this conflict could be found in Moscow. Others say that they could be found both in Moscow and Chisinau but often ignore the role of Ukraine, which is our eastern neighbour. It is a pity, because most of the possible scenarios for the solution of the Transdnistria conflict should take into consideration especially Ukraine, a country that used to offer true backing for the separatists during the armed conflict of 1992. What are those scenarios?

The first scenario would be to block the Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic in case when negotiations reach a dead-end and Chisinau cannot afford to make concessions, something that has yielded no results. Obviously, in this case the discussions would involve Kiev and not Moscow. Due to the geographic position and configuration of Transdnistria, or using geopolitical language, considering the „topopolitics“ and „morphopolitics“ of the region, a blockade is very simple to organise. The idea that Transdnistria would cut off the power and gas supply is too exaggerated to what the consequences of such a stratagem of Tiraspol. The Republic of Moldova can be easily connected to the European power supply networks and to Romanian gas supply. Moreover, the imported electricity from Romania seems to be less expensive than the import from the East.

Thus, we should not forget that Transdnistria is not a producer of natural gas or coal. In case that the Republic of Moldova would be willing to follow such a scenario, Chisinau could ask Ukraine to stop the supply of electric power and gas

in all the networks that cross Transdnistria. A total economic embargo in winter-time, when no one can leave or enter the so-called „Transdnistrian Republic,“ when no single mean of transportation would reach this region, when the consumers from Transdnistria would not have electric power or gas, I wonder: how many days would Transdnistria resist? I bet not too many.

The fact that Chisinau does not resort to a harsher dialogue with Tiraspol and that the Transdnistrians can freely cross our territory and go unhindered to any country is regrettable. If we at least ask Ukraine to prohibit the access of the means of transportation with Transdnistrian license plates, as well as the access of citizens with Transdnistrian passports to its territory – we would create large inconveniences for the separatists. Transdnistria is a continental enclave lacking any means of subsistence, external ties, a subject unrecognised at the international level – why does Chisinau hesitate in case when negotiations reach a total deadlock?

At international level, the embargo is levied to some countries that break the rules of the international community. As a rule, this type of embargo is hard to accomplish and difficult to control its procedure or it has been levied to some rather large countries with significant resources for survival, extended external frontiers and with many neighbouring countries. In the Transdnistrian case, we are talking about an internal blockade that does not require international approval, only consultations eventually. In order to avoid illegal trafficking we can ask the Ukrainians to use their common border control points along the entire Transdnistrian segment. If we resort to such an isolation of the area, the only possibility of contact with the outside world for the Transdnistrian Republic would be aerial, which would ensure the supply of the Russian army stationed in Transdnistria. Anyway, it is not the case to ask the prohibition of these flights – they cannot change anything, as it is impossible to provide food, heat and electrical power to 700,000 inhabitants by using a military airport. Moreover, it will be impossible to diminish the psychological tension of the isolated population deprived of any communication means with the outer world.

Of course, such a scenario should be minutely prepared not only under economic but also diplomatic aspects. Moscow, as well as western governments should be prepared for such an evolution when negotiations prove to be inefficient. Tiraspol must be informed that in case of an embargo all the previous agreements would be terminated.

Another scenario involving Kiev that circulated around 1992, is the idea of territory exchange. Today, as the border treaty with Ukraine has been signed, it is a lot more difficult and maybe impossible to resort to this solution. The mistake was made at the moment of the declaration of independence. The declaration of independence should have condemned not only the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the act of annexation on 28 June 1940 (because, legally, we have been a part of the USSR due to the Paris Peace Treaty since February 1947, signed between the defeated Romania and the victorious nations), but also we should have

declared null and void the act signed 2 August 1940, which modified the frontier of the Moldovan Republic, with its transformation from an autonomous into a union republic. Due to this act, we lost 21,000 square kilometres. In the procedure of territorial transfer operated by Moscow, we can find a series of gaps that can be more „convincing“ than the „gaps“ of the Paris Peace Treaty.

Of course, Ukraine would have maintained its control over the entire territory and not a single country, maybe except for Romania, would have recognised our aspired frontiers. However, no one would have recognised the full legality of the Ukrainian border on this particular segment. The action would have been justified through the fact that we were getting out of the Soviet Union where we obviously had only one administrative frontier to which, with the declaration of independence, we did not want to grant the status of state border. If Chisinau stayed firmly on these positions, then within 10, 20, 30 years, Kiev would have been compelled to accept a dialogue because there is no state that would „feel comfortable“ when a segment of its frontier is contested. The same thing is happening to Russia for instance, which has three disputed border segments – with Japan, Estonia and Latvia. Actually, Estonia and Latvia invoke exactly the type of problem specific for the Moldovan-Ukrainian case, i.e. the mutations of the Russian-Latvian and Russian-Estonian, administrative borders in the summer of 1940. Of course, it is not realistic to believe that Ukraine would have rushed to give up on these territories; at least we would have kept the problem open in the future.

The most important danger for the Republic of Moldova would have been political and economic isolation by Ukraine, in case that the Chisinau authorities had claimed in 1991 to extend their sovereignty over the territory included in the frontiers prior to 2 August 1940. Or the lack of contacts with Ukraine would have involved the lack of contacts with the entire CIS space. Surely, it would have been difficult, as it is for the Armenians and for the Georgians in the situation of identical blockades, but today we would have had better standing. First of all, because our situation compared to that of Georgia and Armenia was facilitated by the closeness of Romania, by the fact that geographically we could (and still can) connect to other gas and power supply networks and have communication routes with the outside world, particularly with Europe. Paradoxically, an isolation from the East would have favoured our access not only to a political but also to an economic independence, and today we would have certainly had a different pattern for our external trade and would have been less affected by the problems generated by the bad geo-economic juncture in the CIS. A firm position of Chisinau regarding the eastern border would have not only strengthened the political and economic independence of the country but also profiled a clear and vertical foreign policy strategy.

At the international level Chisinau cannot be penalised, just like many other states that do not recognize some segments of their borders – Argentina, Estonia, Latvia, India, China, Sudan, Morocco, etc. Our territorial claim is legally founded and we would have expressed our will to solve it only through dialogue.

This should have been Moldova's message before international forums – we should have expressed our will to have a dialogue to Kiev. An economic blockade on behalf of Ukraine corroborated with pressure on the Romanian-speaking minority from within Ukraine on behalf of the authorities from Kiev, Chernivtsi and Odessa would have been nothing else than another ace for Chisinau in the eyes of the international community.

Of course, the western world has particular geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Our neighbour is a regional power to which Americans and Germans grant an increased value in the idea of counterbalancing Russia within the CIS and which they consider a guarantor of the impossibility of reconstruction of the USSR. However, due to these reasons, the West would have been interested that a tense situation, involving several countries from within the region, be solved efficiently through dialogue. This is why, in case that Chisinau did not recognise the frontiers imposed in 1940, we could have quickly obtained a victory, and the problem of Transdnistria would have been solved long time ago. Therefore, what would be the unique scenario for the solution of the Transdnistrian conflict through a territory exchange with Ukraine?

The practice of diplomatic negotiations would have imposed, after the initiation of a dialogue with Kiev, with the help of international mechanisms, on the maintenance of a firm position in claiming the entire territory, even being sure that this is impossible. I will not describe a possible scenario of negotiations but only the anticipated end – the organisation of a plebiscite under the supervision of the international community in the territories that in 1940 were taken from Romania and the Republic of Moldova and included in Ukraine and the Ukrainian territories included in the Republic of Moldova. Thus, the disputed issue of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border would have been solved. Even if, territorially, the acquisition would have been insignificant, under political and economic aspects we would have gained a lot – a wonderful access to the Danube, the solution of the border issue with Ukraine and the „closing of the Transdnistrian case.” In exchange for this acquisition, Ukraine would have created two autonomous republics with a status identical to the status of Crimea – Bukovina, within the present Cernauti region, and Transdnistria, which would have included the Transdnistrian part of the Republic of Moldova (five districts according to the old territorial and administrative system) and those five Transdnistrian districts lost by the Republic of Moldova to Ukraine in 1940 (Kodima, Balta, Kotovsk, Ocnele Rosii and Aneni), which still include an important Moldovan community. It is possible that this scenario, which considers giving up 11 percent of the territory to Ukraine in exchange for a status of limited autonomy for those two regions, will be harshly criticised by the excessively zealous advocates of the integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova and qualified as inadmissible. However, I believe that in real terms we practically give up nothing, since in reality Chisinau has no control over Dubasari district. Moreover, in this case, from the perspective of national security, we would have only gained also in the East, we would have had

an internationally recognised neighbour that is of lesser threat than the hostile and unforeseeable vicinity of the actual separatist regime in Tiraspol. In addition, the Republic of Moldova would have provided by this gesture a decent status for those 180,000 Romanians from Bukovina and those 260,000 Romanians from Transdnistria that are now enduring an intense „Slavicising” by the regime in Tiraspol or by the authorities in Kiev. Under the circumstances when neither Chisinau nor Bucharest can make any illusions regarding the re-inclusion of these territories in the Republic of Moldova or Romania, the provision of a status of autonomy of these two regions seems to me the greatest thing we can do for our compatriots from the north and east.

What are the dangers of such a project? The first one would be the rejection of such a variant by Ukraine, thinking that, eventually, Moldovan Transdnistria will merge with Ukraine. Nonetheless, the Ukrainians can perfectly realize that this could take some time, or could never happen, and that anyhow, in case of absorption of Dubasari County, Kiev will have to provide this region with a status of autonomy at least identical with the status of Crimea. Thus, the eradication of this obstacle would depend only on the ability and capacity of persuasion of the Moldovan diplomacy, as well as the involvement of the western countries in this non-traditional way of solving a conflict.

The second danger could be represented by the opposition of Russia, combined with the opposition of the Tiraspol authorities. This would be a very predictable obstacle in case when Kiev and Chisinau would reach such an agreement. In this case, the only way out of this deadlock would be the pressure of the western world on Russia and the organisation of a plebiscite in the separatist region, a plebiscite where the population would be asked to choose between the absolutely undetermined status of the secessionist region or the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine. I am almost sure of the fact that the largest part of the population would vote for the second option, depriving the arguments of the Tiraspol authorities of any support.

Finally, the third danger does not relate to the future of the Transdnistrian region but of the Bessarabian part of the Republic of Moldova in the event that this scenario is applied. It is certain that the Republic of Moldova, which in this case would officially have 30,000 square kilometres and a population of 3,810,000, would manage to stabilise under social and political aspects. In the short term the „amputation” would be beneficial; however, on a medium term its „noxiousness” would not hesitate to manifest, as the advocates of „Romanian unionism” will not be able to identify and to give any serious argument against the idea of the unification of Bessarabia and Romania. We should not forget that this situation would take place with a faster revival of the Romanian economy and more significant successes of Bucharest in the view of European integration in the background. Meanwhile, the domestic situation of the Republic of Moldova has changed a lot mainly because of quantitative regression of the old pro-Soviet generation and advancement, including on the political and decision making

scene, of a new generation. In conditions when the Republic of Moldova would have (within its new borders) approximately 80% of Romanian population and only 20% of other ethnic minorities and be left without the burden of the conflict from the eastern part of the country, it is clear that the unionist idea would have more chances.

Thus, the Ukrainian cards could be played in three different ways. At the moment, only the first and the last option are valid for us, which I consider easier to accomplish. There is, however, another possible formula for the solution of the Transdnistrian problem, a formula where Kiev would have again a very important role in the dialogue. And here I am speaking about the restoration of the frontier on the Dniester River but with the recognition of the independence of the Transdnistrian Republic, which would be a demilitarised and neutral state having two official languages – Romanian and Ukrainian. This option would be more logical than the giving up of this territory to Ukraine; I believe, however, that this is perceived only at first sight, since I do not see what we would really gain if we grant independence to Transdnistria. It is very clear that in this case, Moscow would be the only side to win, the Republic of Moldova having nothing to gain. If we give up this territory to Ukraine, we get a decent status for those 440,000 Romanians in Cernauti and the two Transdnistrian regions, and we push back the negative geopolitical vicinity of Russia. In the second case, we can be sure that Transdnistria will be ramp for Russian interests in south-eastern Europe and a source of instability and tension. I consider it natural to „freeze“ the conflict and adopt a Cypriot scenario, since no state has given up 11 % of its territory willingly, even if its sovereignty in the area is only theoretical. Furthermore, the cases when a nation gives up willingly a territory it does not possess for the moment are very rare, and the basis for its claims would be rather doubtful under the legal aspect. A conclusive example in this sense would be the claims of Japan regarding the Southern Kuril Islands given up to Russia according to the Potsdam Peace Conference (which decisions are very hard to revise). I believe that the variant regarding the independence of the Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic is not worth being debated, being not only absurd but also dangerous in the geopolitical aspect. We are to examine yet one more option for the solution of the conflict, which has been discussed in whisper in Chisinau and adored by some Bessarabian political leaders – I am talking about the option based on a dialogue with Russia. This option is less promising than the formulas where the main role is played by Ukraine and would imply the gaining of Russia's support in obtaining Tiraspol's agreement for an autonomous status within the Republic of Moldova, identical to the status of Gagauz-Yeri. In exchange for this service, Chisinau would offer Russia the right to keep a military base in the Transdnistrian region for a period of 15 years, which would be calculated however starting with October 1994, when Russia committed itself to withdrawing its troops from the Republic of Moldova. As a compensation for the stationing of these troops, Chisinau would be able to claim the annulment of its financial debts towards Russia.

This option seems attractive through its simplicity but also involves certain risks. The first risk is generated by the unpredictable character of Russia's behaviour, which future in the next decade is obscure. Another risk is represented by the fact that through this act the Republic of Moldova will prove its attachment towards Russia, which contravenes the pro-European aspiration of Chisinau. At the same time, not even the European Union will accept the dialogue with a country that hosts a passive conflict and does not control 11 % of its territory.

In case of such an option, the Georgian example seems relevant. Georgia followed an identical scenario allowing the stationing of Russian troops with the hope that the Kremlin will help solve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. The Russians, however, did not rush to help the Georgian side. It is hard to suppose that the Russians, even if we accept the stationing of their troops in the Republic of Moldova, will rush to pressure the Tiraspol regime to an extent expected by Chisinau. On the other hand, if it manages to solve the Transdnistrian conflict and regain control over Transdnistria, the Republic of Moldova can count on the understanding of the West. The ever-delicate option of Chisinau is the pro-European option and Europe expects Moldova to be responsible for its destiny and territory.

4. THE PLACE OF THE SOUTH BESSARABIAN CONFLICT IN THE GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The Moldovan-Ukrainian border treaty signed in 2000 and the territorial and administrative reform in the Republic of Moldova that took place in 1999 opened the „case“ of the South Bessarabian conflicts. In other words, they kept the conflict opened because starting with 1989 this region was an arena for a passive conflict.

Together with the Transdnistrian conflict, the conflict knot in South Bessarabia has an enormous destabilising potential, with a dimension that has not been enough analyzed. To be fair, if the solution of the Gagauz problem in 1994 seemed to loosen the tension of that situation, at the southern border of the Republic of Moldova there still exist two potential conflict zones: the presence of a Bulgarian minority and the one generated by the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Therefore, this represents the ultimate problem and underlies the genesis of the South Bessarabian conflict knot. Hence, the lengthy process of negotiation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border passed unnoticed by public opinion and the mass media from the Republic of Moldova, which denotes a dangerous tendency of losing interest in politics among the population and a spectacular decline of the civic spirit in Bessarabia. Even the attention of the political circle of Chisinau returned the problem of South Bessarabia to agenda only after the recent incidents related to the border of Palanca village (Tighina County) and the problem generated by the Bulgarian minority from South Bessarabia at the end of 1999.

Referring to the Bulgarian problem or the „Taraclia case," we can affirm that this story was for Chisinau, as well as for other capital cities, a lesson with the topic „the role of minorities in foreign policy strategy." The Bulgarians have managed to do in the Republic of Moldova with only 80,000 people, something that neither Chisinau nor Bucharest managed to do in Ukraine with 500,000 Romanians – they gained a separate county and the right to cultural autonomy.

It is to be noted that, from the point of view of geostrategic opportunities for the Republic of Moldova, this zone has a significant importance, deserving much more political as well as „academic" attention – not only for the aspirations and the pretensions of some countries from the region, but also the interests of some big foreign powers meeting here at the Danube Delta. However, before talking about the South Bessarabian conflict knot, I will try to forge a short geo-historic scheme of the region (implicitly of the conflicts in the region).

The south of Bessarabia, also called Bugeac, has never been a very stable region and the principality of Moldova, in spite of what we think, controlled only superficially these areas. Although this particular territory was included in Moldova in the last decade of the fourteenth century, the Moldovan domination lasted in this region just a century. The territory of Bugeac was annexed at the end of the fifteenth century by the Turks and partly became Romanian territory only in 1856, after the peace conference in Paris. In 1812, the Russian Empire annexed these lands directly from the Turkish Empire and not from the principality of Moldova, which were located in the centre and north of the future Bessarabia. After the annexation of Southern Bessarabia by the Russians, Saint Petersburg launched a campaign of capitalisation and colonisation of the region, identical to the one in the Novorossiysk region. Most of the colonists were of German, Turkish-Gagauz, Bulgarian and Ukrainian origin. Prior to the annexation of the region by the Russians, the zone was clearly inhabited by Romanians, as well as Russians, Tatars, Greeks and Armenians (the last two ethnics lived mainly in towns). In the middle of the 19th century, Bugeac was turned into a kind of Dagestan in the Balkans. Six main ethnic groups inhabited this region: Romanians, Ukrainians, Germans, Russians, Bulgarians and Gagauz Turks. To the ethnic landscape, one could add the Tatars, Greeks, Armenians and Romany. Those two meridional counties of Bessarabia – Izmail and Akkerman were the most non-Romanian regions in the whole province.

On 2 August 1940, Ukraine received a territory of 12,400 square kilometres in the south of Bessarabia, territory that will ultimately form the region of Izmail. The motivation of this fact was the ethnic composition of the region. Obviously, this was only a pretext and not the real cause, because Ukrainians did not represent in the particular region a larger community than Romanians. A relative majority was obtained only after the „repatriation" of those 100,000 German Bessarabians who mainly populated the present districts of Tarutino, Sarata and Arciz. Certainly, the localities that used to be inhabited by them were populated by Russians and particularly Ukrainians from Malorussia. As with the other two important ethnic

minorities from the region – the Bulgarians and the Gagauz Turks – their „repartition“ was done in the following manner: the Bulgarians and the Gagauz Turks stayed within the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, and the majority of Bulgarians was included in the Ukrainian Republic. Thus, according to the general population census since 1989, out of 175,000 Gagauz Turks from the south of Bessarabia, 150,000 were within the Republic of Moldova and 25,000 in Izmail, Odessa *Oblast*. Correspondingly, the Bulgarians constituted 320,000 persons, including 240,000 within Izmail Region, Odessa *Oblast* and 80,000 in the south-west of the Republic of Moldova.

With the decline of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the process of national revival in the Republic of Moldova, the „Bessarabian issue“ „peacefully solved“ in 1940 came to life again. Obviously, due to the decisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947, Romania could not claim these territories anymore. The ones who re-opened the Bessarabian case were the proponents of the national idea from Bessarabia, who, in 1988-1989, were asking not only for language, alphabet or national identity, but also for the unity of the nation. Even though only a decade passed since those events, many have forgotten that initially the idea of „national unity“ had a different geography from the present form. In 1988, many Bessarabians feared to call themselves Romanians and many of them dared say aloud that the tearing of the north and south of Bessarabia from the body of the Moldovan Republic in 1940 was an act of colonial abuse.

These „geographic remembrances“ of the Bessarabian Romanians could not pass unnoticed on the other side of Dniester River, to our Ukrainian neighbour, which, regardless the political colour, took an extremely hostile position towards the Republic of Moldova. Of course, Moscow did not show a friendlier position towards us, but we should not forget that the ones who directly profited from the „28 June –2 August 1940“ affair were our eastern neighbours. This is why Kiev supported and continues to support the separatist movements in the Republic of Moldova in the east as well as in the south. Even if in our view the main guilty part in the Transdnistrian and Gagauz cases is Moscow, it is absolutely clear that Kiev played not a less negative role in both cases. Alternatively, the very conflicts from the east and south of the Republic of Moldova have made the position of Chisinau in its dialogue with Ukraine more „flexible“ and made us believe in the abhorrent idea that Ukraine would be „our natural ally“ against Russia.

Obviously, with such a historical prologue we cannot trust optimistic affirmations that try to persuade us that by the creation of Gagauz autonomy, Taraclia County for the Bulgarian minority and by signing the disputable border agreement with Ukraine the conflict knot from the south of Bessarabia would be annihilated. In reality, we continually postpone the problems but do not solve them. It is, however, very difficult to predict the future of this region. Will we manage to politically „naturalise“ those two ethnic communities, maintain this very non-Romanian territory, as well as in the ethnic composition, within the Republic of Moldova? In my opinion, the status of autonomy offered to the Gagauz-Yeri is not

at all capable to give us a soothing answer in this sense; too big and too dangerous were the rights offered by Chisinau, and at some point in time the „rebellious“ autonomy could have the temptation to capitalise on them. Analyzing the situation created in the south-west of Bessarabia, we have reached the conclusion that in the future, there can only be one possibility to completely solve this conflict, since, as I was saying, the present situation cannot be called solution of a conflict. Moreover, in some instances it seems to generate instability.

This unique option would be the merger of Taraclia County and the autonomous district Gagauz-Yeri into a common autonomous district – Bugeac, with autonomy and having three official languages- Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian. Even under economic and geographic aspects, as well as political, the region would have been more coherent, getting rid of the present complex of a „continental archipelago.“ Thus, for those two communities the project of joint autonomy would only be beneficial. However, what would be the benefits for Moldova? I believe there are two similarly important benefits related to this option. First of all, we would have an autonomous district based on historical and geographic criteria (Bugeac) and not on ethno-geographic terms, as in the case of Gagauz-Yeri. In this autonomy, the Gagauz Turks would represent about 59 per cent of the population, Bulgarians – about 29 per cent and Romanians and representatives of other ethnic minorities – approximately 12 per cent. Thus, we would have a „diminution“ of the majority and equilibrium between the two principal ethnic components. The procedure of „equilibration“ is classic in geopolitics and is used in different complicated situations. The Soviets, for example, used such a method in the 1920s and 1930s in the northern Caucasus, merging the „difficult“ autonomous areas of Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechen-Ingush. In post-war Europe, Italy merged the German autonomous region of Upper Tyrol and the mainly Italian Trentino region into a single rebel autonomous region, in order to diminish the share of the German element within the newly emerged regions of Trentino and Upper Tyrol. Considering that such powerful countries as the Soviet Union and Italy have used these methods, I see no reason why not analyze the possibility of creating an autonomy that would carry the name of a historic province (and not the name of an ethnic group) which would include two basic ethnic components that would counterbalance each other.

Another positive element for the Republic of Moldova that would emerge from this fusion would be the possibility (even the necessity) of a new negotiation of the status of this autonomy. It is the only legal way to withdraw some privileges offered to the autonomous district of Gagauz-Yeri given in 1994. Thus, the price paid for the geographic expansion of the autonomous region would be a qualitative diminution of this and its adjustment to a political status for example similar to the status of Crimea within Ukraine. For the moment, however, the victory of the Communists in the parliamentary elections of February 2001 placed the Gagauz autonomous region in a very favourable political situation. Possessing a status of wide autonomy and protected by the vigilant eye of international

institutions extremely sensible in the issues of ethnic and linguistic minorities, Komrat remains as one of the eventual unpleasant surprises for Chisinau.

CONCLUSION

The Republic of Moldova stepped into the new millennium with its left foot. In addition to the complicated geopolitical situation of the country, new problems emerged, generated by the „political colour” of the new government. Incontestably, the parliamentary elections of February 2001 had a negative impact on the deficient image of our country at an international level. It shattered the last illusions related to the possibility of association of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union, with Chisinau being informed throughout the year about strengthening the regime of circulation for its citizens in different European countries.

In the full process of European integration and opening that dominates the old continent, the Republic of Moldova found itself as an exception that confirms the rule.

Under these circumstances of diplomatic semi-isolation, the risks for national security are accentuated. The more open the reserves of the West regarding the domestic policies of the Communist authorities from Chisinau are, the more decided the latter seem in making new concessions to Russia, subordinating this small south-eastern European state, economically and politically, to Moscow. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on Washington and New York have also contributed to some geostrategic modifications; the most noticeable for the Republic of Moldova being the improvement of the relationship between the Kremlin and the White House, which impact on the future of our country is certain but still hard to decipher. Obvious is the fact that the Republic of Moldova will remain in the first decade of the 21st century a „white spot” on the map of the old continent, a buffer zone between the West-European space, characterized by a full process of political and economic integration, and the East-European space, dominated by the unpredictable behaviour of a large frustrated nation, which cannot cope with the geopolitical conditions that emerged a decade ago.

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Identification of existing and potential dangers
for Moldova's main national interests

The definition and implementation of national security strategies are of exceptional importance for every state. Moreover, this process is extremely important for the European states at the beginning of a new millennium, when integration and co-operation tendencies become more intense in diverse areas, when the desires to overcome the old antagonisms are transformed into common efforts of identification and edification of new security models.

For countries in transition, like the Republic of Moldova, the success obtained within this process represents the necessary premises for sustainable economic development and signifies the fulfilment of a minimum of conditions necessary for a close integration with the European community. The examples of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Baltic states are rather significant. Ultimately, the proof is very representative considering the fact that the Baltic states started in conditions similar to those of the Republic of Moldova in the 1990s; they accomplished the creation of a modern security framework, which stimulated the diversification of links with European states, as well as economic development.

In comparison to the achievements of these countries, the Republic of Moldova, at roughly a decade from the declaration of independence, does not possess a coherent strategy of national security, nor the consolidation and development of statehood. In these conditions, we were bound to ascertain the fact that, among the numerous problems with which the Moldovan state is facing, the revision and redefinition of the security strategy represents a problem of primary importance. We cannot question the fact that economic stability and prosperity, European integration and strategic foreign investments dependent directly on the general climate of security, on the provision of security for these investment, on territorial integrity and settlement of the Transdnistrian dispute, and on the quality and efficiency of the system of national security.

Thus, the topic of this research was conditioned by the exceptional situation of the Republic of Moldova. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the establish-

ment of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and independent state amid some artificial historic frontiers were accompanied by the rejection of the communist doctrine as a state ideology and beginning of democratization and market reforms. In those conditions, Moldovan society was forced to identify itself in time, history and space. In fact, the initial goal of this research was to evaluate the concordance between the concepts of national security and the national interests after a sufficient period.

However, during the research, we had to ascertain that the profound economic, political and social crises which the Republic of Moldova is facing is largely a direct consequence of a spiritual crisis, of a self-identification crisis.

The absence of clear objectives for national development after a period of half a century of apprehending some alien objectives and ideologies, followed by a decade of research and unsuccessful experiments generated a state of general confusion within the society, which brought massively anachronistic and archaic political forces to the political arena.

This exceptional situation compels the entire nation to redefine and reformulate the answer to the following fundamental questions: „Who are we?“ „What do we want?“ „How do we regain self-confidence and overcome the crisis?“

The brief answer to these fundamental questions posed by social thought is contained in two notions: national interests and security. In fact, these are nothing else but the objectives that society is trying to achieve and the means through which it is hoping to achieve them. The Republic of Moldova will decide upon one or the other, and its future depends on its decision.

Therefore, in order to broaden the basis for the elaboration of the security strategy, the objective of this research was to present a synthetic vision of the theories and concepts of national interest, to define a model of definition, evaluation and classification of the national interests of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the existing and potential hazards and risks.

I. NATIONAL INTERESTS: AN ESSAY ON THEORETIC APPROACH

1.1. Complex, Diffuse, Fluctuant, Uncertain Concept

At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the third millennium the „national interests“ syntagma becomes frequently used in legal texts, political debates and academic speeches concerning international problems as well as national ones.

Invoking the necessity to assure their „national interests“ some states concentrate their efforts on assurance and consolidation of peace, while others engage in war and aggression operations. Under the pretext of defending „their national interests,“ the states may strengthen their frontiers against foreign countries and isolate themselves, consolidate relations of co-operation with their

neighbours or, on the contrary, strive to obtain victory over them in wars of conquest.

Using the motivation of „national interests“ states join or reject alliances, establish friendships with former adversaries or fight against former allies, take the side of one or the other belligerents, actively involves itself in the proliferation of weapons and in the development of unseen systems of destruction, or subscribe in favour of measures of restriction and abolishment of an arms race.

The roots of duplicate policies may be found within the same „national interests“ as well as the so-called „double standards“ when the principles and norms of behaviour and attitude, promoted by a certain state in a specific case, are ignored and violated by the same state in another case, which at the first sight might seem similar.

Namely, starting from „national interests“ the states declare their objectives of domestic policies or strategies for development; as well as launch economic, military, legal, social reforms, etc. All of these actions may, however, be initiated in a totally opposite direction after certain modifications in the landscape of domestic or foreign policy, being again declared as conforming to the same „national interests.“

All of these examples, not being at all exhaustive, prove the fact that under the apparent simplicity of this syntagma, an extremely complex and ambiguous concept is hidden and the determination of its contents and essence still remains an extremely difficult task. In addition to the fact that the meaning of this concept does not have a unanimously accepted definition, often it is not even partly motivated or officially reasoned; its interpretation being of a subconscious nature.

On one hand, the ambiguity of the notion of „national interest“ may be explained by the fact that it is the object of multiple concepts that substantially vary in time and space depending on political and historical circumstances, on state ambitions and statutes, on the nature of the governing political regimes and elites, on the dominant domestic and international political ideologies, etc.

Simultaneously, this multitude of concepts has as a purpose a multitude of objectives, whose accomplishment is based on a larger range of objectives. Thereby, the objectives of national interest may be security, expansion, wealth, well-being, propagation of an ideology, glory, survival etc. Moreover, the accomplishment of these objectives may be expressed through different strategies of a general offensive or defensive, pacifist or neutral character, through attitudes and extremely diverse actions with regard to more powerful or weaker states. Due to these reasons, we will rarely see governments giving a unanimous and constant definition of their policies, especially of the foreign policy.

A very important aspect of the problem, from this perspective, is the relationship between national interests of different actors from the international scene and the character of competition of interests. The diversity of governmental projects, the opposition to these, represents the most important source of inter-

national conflicts. The main responsibility of every government is considered to be the preservation of national interests, interests of the people whom they represent in relation to the concurrent interests of other nations.

Attempting to consolidate their own security, to defend their strategic interests, the states risk obtaining the insecurity of their neighbours and mobilizing of negative reactions. This is a vicious circle that can be defined as „security dilemma," which partially explains the arms race. In such situations of permanent uncertainty, governments are compelled to mobilise their military, economic and political resources in order to prepare its defence and to form the so-called „deterrent potential" or to assure in necessary situations the satisfaction of national ambitions by resorting to threats of military interventions or even war.

On the other hand, the ambiguity of concepts, definitions, objectives and strategies related to national interests is a direct consequence of states incapacity to adapt adequately to the profound, rapid and permanent changes and mutations at the domestic and international levels, projects that intensified during recent years.

Thus, the most spectacular evolution of the modern world related to the collapse of the relatively stable „bipolar world" and emergence of a hard to forecast „multi-polar world", a process related to the re-identification of the roles on the international arena, has caused an even bigger state of uncertainty for the future, as well as continuous changes related to the definition of national interests.

Of course, the problem of identifying national interests is more difficult in the case of the newly independent states, which suffer from a lack of experience, from the difficulties of the self-determination process and incompetence and/or superficiality of the governing elites. In such cases, the rapid evolution of national interests from neutrality to non-alignment, occurring through a strategic partnership with NATO, are not surprising, as in the case of Ukraine, for example.

However, a particular case is the situation when the lack of definitions is caused by the lack of a national consensus regarding national interests, and even worse when the efforts of reaching such a consensus are insignificant or are unlikely to succeed. In this case we could estimate that the very fact of existence of such a country is the biggest uncertainty, an existence that almost totally depends on the will and the force of influence of external players.

In general terms, this is the way to define the situation of the Republic of Moldova, where the absence of clear definitions of national interests is conditioned by the overlapping of many negative factors, like insufficient statehood experience, difficulty of the self-determination period, superficiality and selfish ambitions of the governing elites, incapacity to adapt to profound and rapid geopolitical changes, as well as incapacity to reach a national consensus in response to the initial question – „Who are we?"

As a direct consequence of this situation, aggravated by the force, ambition and influence of external players, we had the chance to observe the cardinal

modifications in political orientations that evaluated from the euphoric ideas of unification with Romania from the beginning of the 1990s, to more thoughtful appeals of consolidation of our own statehood and status of permanent neutrality in the mid 1990s, and today – to the humiliating declarations of adherence to the Russia-Belarus union.

Finally, the last argument that we will invoke in favour of the idea of the extremely complex and ambiguous character of the concept of national interests is the fact of its dependence on the nature of human behaviour. As we may observe in many cases, the political elites often avoid public explanatory declarations, starting from the consideration that the absence of a clear and explicit definition of national interests, as well as the maintenance of a relative ambiguity in the objectives and strategies, may be transformed into an important political advantage in the process of promotion of corporate interests and offer a larger space for manoeuvres.

1.2. Historical Evolution of the Concept of National Interests

The concept „national interests“ might seem to have deep historical and theological roots. Some researchers consider that it is related to the pessimistic reality of the 15th century, largely reflecting the rejection of the concepts of the ancient idealism and of Judeo-Christian morality, theories promoted by mediaeval theologians starting with Thomas Aquinas and his advocates.¹

Two centuries later, with the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, French Cardinal Richelieu for the first time introduces this concept in the practice of interstate relations, setting the foundation for a subsequent transformation of this concept into a fundamental element of any security concept.

A more systematic approach of this concept and widening of its philological bases may be detached from the works of the well known Niccolò Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz. Formulated through such wordings as „supreme interests,“ „vital interests,“ and „*raisons d'état*,“ starting with the 19th century this concept becomes more and more familiar, gradually replacing the old formula of „dignity, honour and interests of such and such a crown.“ The last one could no longer be included in the new geopolitical context.

Dignity, honour, prestige, and national interests. The notion of state, power, dignity and honour belongs to the policy of the drastic ages, when the state was indissolubly linked to the king's person, when the internal options were subjective and authoritative, and when the external relations represented his personal relations with his friends. In these circumstances, it was reasonably said that if the king of one state concluded a treaty with the king of a neighbouring state then his honour became involved in its enforcement.

¹ Michael G. Roskin, *National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy*, 1994

However, honour is an ambiguous word. It may have the meaning of conformity with the accepted standards of behaviour (as in English tradition), or may have the sense of pride and state consciousness (as in German tradition). The honour of the powers in international relations tends to be closer to the latter and has probably become preponderant since the monarchic state was replaced by the democratic state or the national state, where the obligation of honour is diffuse and lost among the anonymous electorate. The expression of „national honour“ is about to acquire a rhetorical scent while „national interest“ defines particularly the motivation of powers.

The idea of honour is tightly connected with the idea of prestige. „Honour is the nimbus which surrounds the interests; the prestige is the nimbus from around the power“.² It is difficult to tell precisely what the prestige is. It might be not more substantial than an effect of international imagination – in other words, an illusion. It is however far from being a simple illusion of vanity. This is why the nation possessing a greater prestige is allowed to have its own way and to do things that it could never hope for or accomplish by its own.

„Prestige mysteriously attracts material benefits, while political wisdom never neglects it. Usually it is slowly obtained but is easily and unexpectedly lost.“³ Being one of the imponderable elements of international politics, prestige is, however, too tightly connected with the power to be considered as part of moral order. It is an influence derived from power. In case of an absence of power, prestige is practically nonexistent. Moreover, as long as power is present, it might have such prestige. However, the consideration granted to historic merit and gratitude for past accomplishments are values of little importance in international politics.

No country, even a glorious one, could base its authority on the respect inspired from the past. Accepted sacrifices or victorious battles from the past may serve as examples, but cannot serve as an exchange coin in diplomacy.

„Prestige is when another nation recognizes your power. Prestige is extremely important, because if your power is recognized, you can achieve your goals without using it.“ (E. H. Carr, *Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power*.)

Thus, prestige, as well as honour, is an extremely ambiguous term. It might signify a deliberate abstinence from exploitation of one's own power, because the advantage of not acting in this way is preferred; hence, it comes very close to generosity, which proves not rarely to be the true wisdom in politics. Or, prestige may mean coercion of another nation to recognise your power with any occasion; in this case it is simply an extreme policy for affirmation of „honour“ and one's interests. One is „power based on reputation“ and another one is „reputation based on power“.⁴

² Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ARC, Chisinau 1998

³ F.S.Oliver, *The Endless Adveture*.

⁴ Pierre de Senarclens. *La politique internationale*. Armand Colin Editeur. Paris 1992.

National interests, international interests and the power. With the gradual disappearance of the old formula „dignity, honour and interests of such and such a crown“ through the replacement of this syntagma with one of „national interests,“ emerges the problem of its subjective and fluctuant character, as well as the necessity to establish other rules of behaviour (a new code of behaviour) in international relations. The purpose of these rules was to determine the relationship between the subjectivity of national interests and the objective necessity of a new international order.

The consequences of the First World War had a determining impact on these evolutions, a war characterized by terror and human losses never experienced before, as well as by chaos and deep mutations on the international arena. In these conditions, starting with the 1920s, the contradictions between the archaic Christian-idealistic concepts and the developing concepts of „political realism“ become more and more prominent.

Idealists continued to stake the existence of certain rules and principles of behaviour (or of ethics and behavioural morals) having a universal character and were hopeful regarding the capacity of the international community to define, coordinate and comply with them. Being in the euphoria of peace after this bloodiest war, they were optimistic with respect to the creation of a real „European space“ and the future of the League of Nations (it is worth mentioning that a similar situation occurred after the end of the World War II).

On the other hand, more and more politicians from the West became increasingly attached to the ideas of „political realism,“ which emphasised national interest as primary bases for political theory. Hans Morgenthau, the passionate German advocate of „*Realpolitik*“ was one of the noteworthy philosophers and political scientists who attempted to determine, from the perspective of the new concept: „how the states must behave.“

We will mention only some of the most important theses of the advocates of political realism. They consider that: „politics, as the whole society, is governed by objective laws that originate in the human nature. The main criterion of international political realism is represented by the concept of interests defined through the term of power. The type of interest that determines political action at a given time in history depends on the political and cultural context where foreign policy is formulated. Power may include anything that establishes and maintains the control of humans over humans.“⁵

Realists expressed a pessimistic vision on the international order, asserting that *la force fait le droit* – The force makes the justice, while the alternation of crises, conflicts and wars represents the permanent web of international politics and the objective law of human existence.

⁵ Hans Morgenthau. *Politics among Nation*.

The events that followed the First World War have influenced the strengthening of the concept of „political realism.“ The League of Nations, established through the Treaty of Versailles for the achievement of a collective security system opened to all states willing to maintain peace, has failed as a project and could not avoid the outburst, in just 20 years after the „Great War“ of a even bigger, bloodier and more disastrous war. The main reason of this project’s failure was that the states could not adjust their national interests with the interests of the international community. Once again, the peace aspirations proved to be ineffective, as well as the hopes with which the nations were entering a new catastrophe.

After 1945, the United Nations expresses or symbolises a qualitatively new stage in the aspirations of the states to establish a peaceful international order based on justice and compliance with laws. In spite of the hopes and continuous evolution of its role, in reality this organisation did not possess the means and power to establish a true international community and to translate into reality the principles that were stipulated in its founding charter. Starting with its establishment in San Francisco in 1945, the United Nations has not proven to be a true obstacle to war, while its ability to mobilise the entire international community to apply sanctions against aggressors was discouraging in the majority of cases.

More than one hundred wars have taken place since the establishment of the United Nations. During the Cold War, the United States of America, as well as the USSR and many other UN member countries, have used military force outside their borders in order to serve their own political ambitions, and in order to retain spheres of influence.(USSR in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America; China in Tibet and Vietnam; Turkey in Cyprus, Israel continues to maintain the territories occupied in 1967, etc.)

Periodically, governments resort to the use of force and violate the principles of international law, inventing subtle legal issues in order to camouflage their policy of aggression. We will not enumerate all the regional conflicts from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, which prove the anarchic character of the international politics and the failure of any collective security mechanism. Only during the last twenty years, the wars between Iran and Iraq, Argentina and Great Britain, USA and Lebanon (86), Nicaragua (80), Grenade (83) and Panama (89), as well as the endless conflicts in the Balkans reveal that the use of military force, the use of a „cannon policy“ and of „coercive diplomacy“ still remain available options for states.

The collapse of the bipolar antagonism allowed for the restoration of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and revival of the idealistic hopes for co-ordination and to harmonisation of the national interests of different countries of the world.

Therefore, the Gulf Crisis and the war conducted by an international coalition against a state declared „aggressor“ through the decision of the Security Council may be considered a relative achievement in the materialisation of the efforts of

the international community to reformulate the meaning of the notions of collective security and national interests.

Thus, this coalition complied with international law but it also protected particularly the strategic and economic interests of western countries. In other words, the results of this conflict have been pre-determined by the balance of power and not by legal considerations founded on universally accepted law.

Legal norms that were evoked in order to legitimize this intervention continues to be an object of some divergent and contradictory interpretations. The primary conclusion of these interpretations is that the legal norms of international law are not enforced in a systematic and universal manner, but are used in a selective way depending on the interests and ambitions of states that possess the means, the power and capacities to impose it on others.

Neither the events from the former Yugoslavia, nor the military conflicts accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war in Chechnya, or the recent US bombings of Iraq avoid this pessimistic logic.

These examples adequately prove the fact that the elaboration and enforcement of international law is achieved through the balance of powers, in this context we will quote La Rochefoucauld: *„Virtues are lost in interests in the same way as rivers are lost in the sea“*.

In fact, the great powers, fully subordinated to their own national interests, determine the circumstances of international security and take over large prerogatives for the interpretation of the principles of the UN Charter. The great powers dominate international organisations and often use them to serve their own subjective interests, especially to legitimise their political ambitions and hegemonic aspirations.

Consequently, the major conclusions drawn by the advocates of „political realist“ theory, using the above examples, could be formulated as:

- Legal norms and international institutions are fragile and their domination is weak compared to national interests, due to the fact that states interpret as they like the obligations imposed on them and voluntarily violate them that evokes a defence of national interests. The permanent dilemma that determines the behaviour of states in the promotion of their interests is the subjective assessment of the relationship between estimated advantages and the possible losses caused by the violation of established rules.
- Contrary to what happens in the governmental sphere, there is no universal legal power that could establish and assure a political order by permanently imposing its arbitration in conflicts among states or, in other words, conflicts of national interests; no authority is capable to produce a set of legal norms which would be universally recognized.

As an axiom from these conclusions appears the statement that in order to satisfy their own national interests, the states will do their best to strengthen their own forces and to increase their power. This would signify the domination

of force in politics, of „power politics“ or, more pessimistically, the domination of the rules of the jungle in the international arena.

1.3. Basis, Method of Definition and Classification of National Interests

There is no unanimously recognised dictionary that can define precisely the notion of national interests. There are multiple definitions, with various levels of detail, precision and confusion, but the distinctions among the definitions are the following:

- According to some definitions, national interests are considered to be the fundamental objective and the ultimate determinant that guides the political decisions of a state exclusively in the implementation of foreign policy, while others ascertain a mutual or determinant influence among national interests and internal policy.
- Another difference lies in the fact that according to some definitions national interests are examined as distinct elements, but according to others, simply as parts of a whole and components of a highly generalised concept of those elements that constitute the most vital needs of the state.

However, after the examination of multiple definitions and concepts we notice that the majority of them ascertain the existence of two distinct aspects of national interests: a universal aspect, and a particular or specific aspect for each particular state (Annex 1).

Thus, the **universal component** of the definitions of national interests refers to those needs, aspirations and objectives with a fundamental, permanent and unanimously recognised character for the existence and development of the state, society and individual. These needs are defined using such terms as self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, security and economic well-being.

The problem that follows consists of the different conception of the essence of these terms and notions, as well as of the strategies for the implementation of the same objectives.

The **particular-situational component** of these definitions refers to the necessity of considering the particularity of every state, partly related to its situation and its specific circumstances.

Module of Situational Factors that Influence National Interests. While analyzing the process of creation, identification and definition of national interests according to the examples set by different states of the world, we ascertain the influence and contribution of a series of objective factors that reflect the initial circumstances of the state, society and the individual, as well as the reasons for the occurrence of such conditions, tendencies and the perspectives for their future evolution.

In the attempt to classify these factors, we can determine, as distinct but also interdependent categories, the geographical and historical, demographical

and sociological, political and geopolitical, as well as economic and informational factors. Each category of factors from this list contains a series of constituent elements that contribute in different manners to the development, identification, and definition of national interests. Depending on the particular situation, some of these elements may acquire a determinant and even an absolute character. At the same time, we ascertain that some elements may be common for different factors.

a) **The geographic factor** is the most stable factor, which determines national interests and policy for their achievement. The following might be mentioned as primary elements of the geographic factor:

- The geographic-climatic-natural zone in which the state is situated;
- Territorial dimension and configuration, distances and geographic limits;
- Access to the sea and navigation;
- The situation and character of natural frontiers;
- The condition of the communication networks and connections to the primary arteries of international transportation;
- Relief, soil and vegetation;
- Availability and volume of natural resources and the reserves of raw materials;
- Others.

Therefore, the continental dimensions of the United States for example, situated almost completely in a moderate climatic zone, protected by two oceans from any military aggression, as well as the insufficiency of its own oil reserves may be considered as geographic elements with determined or even absolute values in the definition of national interests of this country.

Another example along similar lines is that Russia lost its advantageous access to the sea in the southwest and northwest. This fact has a major influence on the definition of its national interests and of its foreign policy in general, as well as on the relationships with Ukraine and the Baltic states, especially Lithuania.

In the same context the example concerning the issue access of a segment of the Republic of Moldova to the main European navigational artery – the Danube – can be viewed as a problem of national interest over several years. This territory, extending to several hundred metres, has brought many hopes concerning not only the potential for certain favourable conditions for the development of economic-commercial relations with European states, but also the potential for access to the sea, with all the major consequences of this fact – the main one for the Republic of Moldova being the freedom for energy resource supplies.

b) **The political factor** may be considered the most unstable and variable factor determining national interests. Its constituent elements of may be divided in subcategories with reference to international, external and internal political factors.

Elements Related to the International Political Factor:

- The situation, character and tendencies of developments in international relations;
- Character and degree of influence of international (universal) values;
- Evolution of the superpowers, the relationship between them and their influence on international relations;
- Share and influence in international structures;
- Global and regional security guarantees;
- Global and regional treaties and alliances, communities and spheres of influence;
- Geopolitical significance of the region and the state;
- Others.

Thus, we could mention the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act as examples that design a special code of behaviour in international relations and compel each state to temper its own ambitions – however only at a declarative level.

Another example is the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the bipolar world. These events have launched multiple processes and turbulent transformation all over the planet, have imposed multiple states to redefine their national interests and their security strategies. The example of the so-called „white books“ of security and defence is not less eloquent; these are conceptual documents of strategic significance, which became traditional in western democratic states and reflect, in their majority, the true national interests in a particular historical period.

Thus, in France the first White Book of security and defence, which explicitly determined its national interests, was adopted in 1972 under the predominant influence of the ideology of the Cold War. In the second White Book, adopted in 1994, shortly after the disappearance of the bipolar world and under the circumstances of an overwhelming uncertainty regarding the future of the international relations, the explicit definition of national interests disappeared, being replaced by the redefinition of certain objectives/major political interests and by the determination of new risks and threats. Presently, with the decrease of the probability of revival of old threats and the determination of clearer strategies and security structures in the new international context, a new White Book is in the process of production, where the chapter regarding the definition of national interests has all the chances of reappearing.

Elements Regarding External Political Factor:

- Treaties and alliances to which the state is party;
- Guarantees of external security;
- Degree of external dependence;
- Degree of participation in integration processes;
- Phase of the power cycle where the closest great power is located and the importance of a small state viewed through the prism of the strategic interests of the great powers;

- The attitude of the great powers, of the main states in the region, as well as of international organisations and different alliances;
- Relations with neighbouring countries, mutual and contradictory interests, claims;
- Degree of access to external energy resources and raw materials of vital importance;
- Degree of possibility of conflicts with neighbouring states or those located in an immediate proximity;
- Situation of the national borders (confirmation, recognition, transparency, control);
- Others.

Among the most articulate examples, we might mention the struggle of Central European countries for security guarantees; this fact influenced the inclusion of the idea of joining NATO in their list of national interests.

Elements Referring to Domestic Policy:

- Stability of the constitutional order and of state institutions;
- Degree of independence, sovereignty and integrity, territorial and administrative integrity;
- Type of governmental regime, form of government and dominant ideology;
- Degree of political stability, level of democratisation;
- Degree of political coherence and consistency;
- The existence of interest groups, external influence;
- Internal vulnerabilities;
- Criminality and level of corruption;
- Public opinion, options and orientations of political elites, governing elites and the population;
- Situation of the spiritual, scientific potential, etc.

Obviously, the national interests of a colony or of a state with an authoritarian regime (of course if these are expressly declared) differ from the national interests of an independent and democratic state. The succession of extremist political forces may cause the simultaneous declaration of completely opposite objectives or interests in a short period.

A rather eloquent example that reflects the influence of domestic policy on national interests is the case of the United States, if we recall its evolution from the isolationism of the first half of the last century to the policy of intense promotion of democratic values on the international arena. If we recall, the national defence of the United States, starting from the 1960s, already included the defence of Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Mexico, as well as the entire Caribbean Sea.

In the same context, we may mention the example regarding the emergence of the so-called strategic course of the Russian Federation's relations with member countries of the CIS (1995), which is a consequence of the influence of domestic political forces nostalgic for imperial ideas.

c) **The importance of the economic factor** consists in the fact that beside the major influence on the definition of national interests, this factor also represents the basis or the primary foundation for their accomplishment. The following could be considered as fundamental elements of the economic factor:

- Situation and trends of economic development (positive, stagnating or negative);
- Basic economic indices: GDP and GDP per capita, living standard, power indices and weaknesses, internal and external debt;
- Economic security and availability of economic resources;
- Structure and organisation of the economy, state and private sector, industrial and financial capacity, technical and scientific potential;
- The state of commercial relationships, level of autonomy and economic dependence, evaluation of integration processes;
- Primary economic partnerships for supply;
- Outlets, economic exchanges, implanted enterprises, zones and objectives of interest, foreign investments and external investments, etc.

Dispersed distribution and differentiated access to economic resources of the planet is and will be in the future among the determinant elements of the economic factor and, as a consequence, of the national interests and of the policy for their implementation. Despite the fact that in some cases the states have great difficulties in understanding each other regarding the principles of justice and equity in this field, the problem is even more complex and far from being solved and enforced.

Thus, not a single supranational institution can force the USA, Japan or the European Union to stop their discriminating and protectionist measures regarding agricultural or industrial products originating from developing countries, and the so-called „development strategies“ proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations often remain simple declarations.

d) Another factor that predetermines national interests is **the economic factor**, consisting of the following fundamental elements:

- Historic conditions of the creation of the state and present borders;
- Prior wars and military conflicts held within the country and in the vicinity;
- Traditional alliances;
- Interpretation of historical facts by different actors from the region;
- Historical evolution of the relationship between the small state and the closest great power; etc.

Motivating the importance of the historical factor in the definition of national interests we can express a multitude of examples regarding each particular country. Not a single state, society or individual can deny or neglect the importance of the historical factor in the achieved results and present situation, in the definition of the future objectives and in the selection of the strategies of their accomplishment – simultaneously confronting a major challenge of the historical factor via a subjective interpretation.

The attempts by diverse actors to overcome the deficiencies of this factor, for example by declaring the inviolability of the borders as a fundamental principle of European security, did not achieve optimal results and definitely cannot exclude the influence of the historical factor on national interests.

As an example, we can mention the case of Transdnistria, where different protagonists give priority to different historical facts and treat historical events differently. Thus, the official Chisinau point-of-view interprets the events from 1992 as a military conflict for the re-establishment of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within the border limits existent prior to 31 December 1990; however, the point-of-view of the authorities from Tiraspol is of military aggression against a independent state – unrecognised but created on a territory that does not belong to the Republic of Moldova from the historical point of view.

- e) The fundamental elements of the **demographic and sociological factors** are:
- The number and density of the population, birth-rate and age groups;
 - Number and relations between different ethnic groups, the situation of languages and minorities;
 - The level of social equity and the standards of living;
 - Migration trends of the population;
 - The presence of foreign citizens and refugees;
 - Diversity of religions, relationships between different confessions and the relationship between state and religion;
 - National culture, moral values of the society, social agreement, national character, traditions and patriotism;
 - Education, the level of education, lifestyle;
 - Cultural and scientific potential;
 - The place of women in the society;
 - Sanitary situation; etc.


The elements of demographic and sociological factors become more prominent and their influence on the national interests becomes more obvious. We recall the demographic explosion in a series of states from the Third World, the birth-rate issue in China, the relations between the Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo, the situation of Magyar minority in Transylvania, the confrontations between the Christian world and Islam, the disagreements between Orthodox Christians and the Catholics, the differences between the culture and mentality of Arabic nations and western European ones, the epidemiological and sanitary situation in some African countries, etc.

- f) Information Factor
- Diversity, quality and capacities of domestic means of information and foreign ones with access to national territory;
 - The covered territory and the level of influence;
 - The affiliation to one or several information spaces, fluxes, vectors and the majority of informational messages;

- The level of openness of different fields and the access to information;
- The degree of subordination, control, independence and commitment;
- The safety of informational resources, etc.

The contemporary phase of development of the society is characterised by the rapid increase of the role of information that represents the totality of information, information infrastructure, the subjects that deal with collection, creation, distribution and utilisation of information, as well as the system regulating the social relationships that appear as a result. The informational factor is a factor that forms and creates social life with a major, permanently increasing influence on spiritual values, the creation of human potential, political life, economy, security, etc.

As we notice, there is a multitude of constituent elements for each situational factor, a mutual conditioning among the factors and elements and a multidirectional influence of some elements. Altogether, these influence the complex character of the process of definition of national interests, the diversity of approaches and definitions, the difficulty of approach of the relative or absolute priorities, and subjective character. Inevitable is the fact that national interests, once defined, reflect in a codified way the relative level of perception of the general situation of a certain state. A simplified chart representative of the way national interests are created can have the following configuration:



Structure and Classification of National Interests

Once defined, national interests can be classified or grouped in several ways. The most frequent classification of national interests is based on domains: economy, foreign policy, domestic policy, society, information, military, etc.

Another way to classify national interests can be inherited from the principles and methods of the philosophy of „political realism“ defined by German political scientist Hans Morgenthau. According to Morgenthau, there are four models of classification:

- Depending on the importance (level) of national interests, we distinguish vital national interests and secondary national interests;
- Depending on the time (duration) – permanent interests and temporary interests;
- Depending on the character – general national interests and specific national interests;
- Depending on the degree of compatibility – complementary interests and conflicting interests.

The following could serve as an example as a graphic representation of this model:

Importance	Vital	Economic self-sufficiency
	Secondary	Political relations with countries of a neighbour community.
Duration	Permanente	Friendship, relationships with neighbouring countries.
	Temporary	Participation in peacekeeping operations.
Type	General	Maintenance of neutrality or nuclear power status.
	Specific	Development of energetic base.
Compatibility	Complementary	Support of the efforts in protecting universal human rights.
	Conflicting	Improvement of the situation of fellow countrymen living in other countries.

Another example of classification of national interests could be the one accepted long ago in the United States under the name of the Nuechterlein Matrix ⁶, which delimits the national interests from the strategic ones and examines them in four distinct blocks:

- From the perspective of defence needs of the country;
- From the perspective of economic prosperity of the country;
- From the perspective of creation of a favourable world order;
- From the perspective of propagation of democratic values;

For the evaluation of the importance of national interests the Nuechterlein matrix uses four criteria:

- Necessary and compulsory for survival;
- Of vital importance;
- Of major importance;
- Of minor importance and peripheral.

⁶ Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, 1991 University Press of Kentucky

National Interests and Security

Researching the variety of theoretical and practical approaches of the concept of national interests, we notice a tight and permanent connection between the notion of national interest and the notion of security. From the theoretical point of view, the link is explained by the very logical necessity of a complementary and complex approach of these two notions. Thus, there is no logical sense in the definition of a national interest whose achievement does not imply a certain rational effort on behalf of the nation and, therefore, is lacking risks or threats.

From the practical point of view, the connection between the notion of national interest and the notion of security is explained by the new European traditions. In the former socialist countries, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the concepts of national interests and security or the protection of these were not recognised in the Soviet times from the reason that the basis of Marxist doctrine was based on an internationalist orientation. These concepts were in a way overridden by the inspiration of a higher goal – the union of proletarians from all over the world.

Of course, in the practice this doctrine was not an obstacle for the Communist leadership to act in accordance with its own vision of the interests of the socialist block and when the hopes regarding the victory of the global socialist revolution were shattered, these hopes were replaced with other patriotic slogans. These, however, were referred and were based not on national interests, but on the necessity of consolidation of peace and socialism, as well as of the USSR as a basic pillar.

The major changes that have occurred on the European continent since 1990 up to the present, conditioned by the collapse of the bipolar system, have imposed the quest for new models of behaviour and cohabitation of European nations, which is related, first of all, to the concern for an international security and the harmonization of national interests. As a consequence during these ten years, it has become a tradition of European states, particularly of the new democratic states, to explicitly formulate their national interests in a document of synthesis under the main motto of „security.“ Thus, certain concepts or strategies of security, „white books“ of defence emerged that define or create national interests and strategies for their accomplishment and protection.

Often it is very difficult for an analyst to define the real dimensions of national security of a particular state: „Security inevitably means different things at different places, depending on what people have to protect and the nature of the threat.“⁷

Indeed, the complex character of the problems explains why it is so difficult to formulate a theory of national security that has to choose between the realist concepts of power and the idealist concepts of peace.

⁷ Peter Mangold, *National Security and International Relations* (London Routledge 1990)

Initially, national security was defined as being „the capacity to maintain the physical and integrity of the state territory, to maintain relations with the rest of the world; to protect the nature, the natural environment, institutions and government from a destruction from outside and to control the borders.“⁸ As a result, the essence of national security was considered narrow in military and defence terms.

Later on, the so-called „utilitarian“ approach of national security used broader and more complex parameters. This method has widened the scale of analyses and improved the comprehension of the studied subject.

Security is no longer being simplistically considered as a problem of defending the state against enemies – internal or external. It is considered an issue of protection of its citizens against threats and risks such as epidemics, unemployment, natural disasters, etc.

In the modern vision, security is examined as a system of economic, political, military, informational and other measures for the assurance of a peaceful living of the nation and state, multilateral and stable prosperity of the society as a whole and each member of the society in particular.

Security is also examined as a phenomenon related to the activity of the global community as a whole, of different unions and communities, of the whole state and, respectively, to the activity of all its citizens. In other words, security represents the common results of the efforts of all the country’s citizens, all the state and administrative institutions, national and local authorities, institutions and organisations, with the use of all available forces and resources of the state (union of states, global communities) to assure the protection of human rights and liberties, prosperity of the society, nation and the state itself.

Often, for a thorough research of the essence of the security phenomenon one must use the differentiation of its levels, because different conditions of the political, economic or military juncture, within the country or at the international level, require an adequate assessment of threats in order to make the appropriate decisions.

Thus, the first level, considered as the base, is the national security that relates to the guaranteeing of territorial integrity and state independence, as well as the creation of such internal and external conditions of existence that would guarantee the possibility for a prosperous development of the state, society and citizens.

The second level is regional security, which relates to the creation within a totality of states or in a particular geographic space of conditions that would guarantee the peaceful cohabitation of the subjects of this zone, an equilibrium of their national interests and external forces of influence and, ultimately, would assure the conditions where each subject of this space could achieve its own strategies of security without harming the national interests of other states. Thus,

⁸ Ibid.

one believes that regional security can be assured only when the security of each state within the region is assured.

The third level is global security, which relates to the provision of equal and acceptable conditions for the totality of the members of the international community, which would also exclude the global risks and threats to the global population and future generations such as nuclear, environmental threats, the irrational use of natural resources, etc.

Examining the three levels of security, we ascertain the impossibility of their distinct separation depending on the essence of national interests. Thus, the security of each state includes all three levels, a fact also sustained by the recent theories of globalisation.

A more detailed assessment of the security of a certain state usually requires a classification according to the realms through the use of the notions of military security, political security, economic security, ecologic security, social security, informational security, and other notions that we will try to define later on. Therefore:

- Military security implies the elimination of the possibilities of certain armed conflicts and wars and evaluates the relations between military potentials, capacities of aggression or military intervention and the potential for defence and discouragement of some eventual aggression – even through the prism of perceiving intentions.
- Political security is examined depending on the efficiency and establishment of state and international structures and concepts of organisation, of dominant ideologies and strategies of development at the domestic and external levels.
- Economic security is examined depending on the level of economic development and well-being, availability of human and natural resources, access to the necessary natural resources, as well as development of production relations, financial capacities and outlets.
- Ecologic security implies the preservation of a natural living condition that ensures the survival of humans and human activity.
- Social security is examined depending on the maintenance/development of trends of development of the society, spiritual values, social agreement, protection of the rights and liberties of the individuals, etc.

The complex examination of these notions and types of security, with their evaluation at different levels, represents the traditional model of modern concepts of security and approach of the issue of national interests.

II. NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

In the attempt of assessing of the present situation regarding the definition and achievement of the national interests of the Republic of Moldova we tried to find works, articles, documents and other materials that would reflect the

approach, from the national perspective, of this concept. Unfortunately, we found that, in comparison with Western Europe and the US, where the „national interests“ have been considered fundamental research categories for a longer time, in Moldova this formula is used particularly in journalism (more as an absolute reference point) and only lately it has become the object of some researches and theoretic acknowledgements.

This sad conclusion is fully backed by the results of the search for a syntagma of „national interests“ within the legal texts of the Republic of Moldova, parliamentary decisions and other normative acts, as well as within the programs of parties, which found the absence of a thorough, or even partial interpretation of the national interests of the Republic of Moldova. The ignorance of considering this notion within certain legal texts is often astounding (*Annex 2*).

In spite of the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted in 1994, established a quite solid foundation for the thorough definition of national interests, two legislative acts of a major importance in the policy of the Moldovan state were immediately passed, which contributed in the most decisive manner to the diffuse and ambiguous present situation. These were the Concept of Foreign Policy (8 February 1995) and the Concept of National Security (5 May 1995), both adopted a couple of months after the adoption of the Constitution. Not only once has these documents constituted the object of critics on behalf of different specialists from different fields.

Thus, the Concept of National Security does not contain any reference to certain vital national objectives or interests and does not provide an answer to the questions *what* and *how* to protect but solely states *that have such missions*. In addition, even the principles, objectives, missions and the importance of this document were shortly forgotten. Is it not the main reason why the military reform, started four years ago, was not defined and adopted in an official document. Instead, forced by political juncture, the active military establishments of the National Army are periodically decreased through permanent organisational restructurings, often lacking any military logic. Is this not the reason why the Ministry of State Security was substituted by a service with roles and missions hidden from civil society, but which is more often accused of „political espionage“ in favour of „governmental forces?“

A regrettable confusion is also found in the Concept of Foreign Policy, which fails to establish the national interests and only states some priorities of foreign policy that would assure the consolidation of the Moldovan state:

„The priorities of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova are: the consolidation of independence and sovereignty of the state; assurance of territorial integrity; establishment of the state as a factor of stability on the regional arena; contribution to the promotion of the social and economic reforms necessary for the transition to market economy and assurance of wellbeing of the population; consolidation of democracy where the fundamental human rights and liberties, as well as the rights of minorities, will be guaranteed and adjusted to the international standards.

„The accomplishment of these priorities that form the essence of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova will assure, in accordance with the major national interests, the edification of our state as an independent, unitary and indivisible country maintaining mutually advantageous relations with all the countries of the world..“

(The Concept of Foreign Policy, Chapter II)

Only in one instance – in one of the numerous programmes of activity of various governments (the one dating from 4 June 1998 – we managed to find, between the lines, a definition of national interests in the following formula: „The fundamental priorities of governmental policy derive from national interests that represent the strengthening of statehood, restoration of territorial integrity, creation of a unique economy based on market economy where the material well-being, the physical and spiritual development of the nation will depend on the results of the activities of each person, and the ascendance of Moldova in the nearest future to a well-deserved place within the European and global context.“

In such a situation, it is not difficult to realize that the main question posed from outside and to which we do not have a clear and firm answer is, „What do we want?“ What do we want from Europe, CIS, from our neighbours, from Tiraspol, what do we expect in politics, economy, in security and in society? The answer we hear from the mouths of our political leaders and the lowest state officials can be reduced to „well-being“ – with superficial but numerous explanations of solutions regarding the way this „well-being“ could be achieved. Moreover, the variants of answers are almost equal to the number of respondents.

Moldova and Little Moldovas

„...There are several Moldovas: there is a Moldova belonging to the Moldovan farmers from the countryside and one belonging to the Russians from Chisinau, one of the intellectuals and one of the analphabets, one belonging to the businessmen and one to the state employees, one belonging to the millionaires and one to the beggars, one for politicians and one for the electorate, one for atheists and one for believers, one for nationalists and one for cosmopolites, a pro-European Moldova and a pro-Russian one, one for Romanian Bessarabians and one for the Russified Moldovans, etc.

„Things don't stop here. The issue is that these different Moldovas include some other one or two Moldovas, also very different from the rest. Thus, within the nationalists' Moldova there is one for the patriots, but also one for the so-called paid nationalists; within the pro-European Moldova there is one for the true democrats, but also one for the *Comintern* internationalists; within the pro-Russian Moldova there is one for the Russians that hate us and one for the Russians that do not love us; within the Moldova of the Romanian Bessarabians there is one for the unionist Bessarabians, but also one for Bessarabians that advocate independence, within Moldova of the Russified Moldovans there is one for the anti-Russian Moldovans and also one for the anti-Romanian....and so on.“

(Flux, 20 April 2001)

Unfortunately, the insufficient and often superficial attitude towards national interests, and, obviously, towards their security predetermines the fragility and vulnerability of the entire state body. The most eloquent confirmation in this sense is the fact that presently, within the programmes of political parties and in government programs, the issues related to national interests and national security remain to be of secondary importance and are not approached even during election campaigns.

As a consequence, the policies promoted by the governmental teams and political parties, emphasising the efforts of achievement of immediate objectives, particularly of economic and social nature, often ignore the promotion of true national values and interests and fail to accomplish the assessment and affirmation of a clear, nationally accepted option regarding the strategic national objectives and the objectives of security policy.

This confusing and ambiguous situation forces us not to examine the correctness and the logic of definition of the national interests of the Republic of Moldova, but to propose a model and way of definition.

Approaching the issue of defining the national interests of the Republic of Moldova it is necessary to begin from certain postulates and definitions of syntheses based on notions and argumentations articulated in the previous chapters:

1. The system of national interests of the Republic of Moldova is based on the totality of fundamental interests with the universal character of the individual, society and state and the interests based on specific situation and conditions of the Moldovan state that resulted from geographic, economic, political, historical, demographical, social, informational influence;

2. National interests predominate over all other events, trends, aspirations of separate segments of the population and political situations;

3. National interests exist objectively and cannot be negotiated, treated or randomly reformulated; the denial of national interests by a segment of the population, by some political elites or state institutions can cause the disappearance of the state as independent subject of the international community;

4. National interests are based on state values and patrimony, moral and intellectual potential of society and are achieved/assured through future activities in the economic, political, military, social, demographic, informational and ecologic fields;

5. National interests guide and animate state behaviour in domestic and foreign policies and represent a generalised concept of elements that form their vital necessities and aspirations: existence, protection of the human rights and freedoms, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, economic well-being and ecologic safety;

6. Harmonisation of the national interests of the country at the regional and international levels is a requisite condition for stability and security;

7. There is an obvious functional relation between national interest and policy. The policy, including the security policy, is subordinated to and determined

by the national interests. Any infringement upon national interests represents a hostility that implies a response;

8. The equation of security contains an important number of variables with an economic, political, social, geopolitical and military connotation; the knowledge and appropriate management of these variables, the study of their evolution and interaction, allows the prognostication of their impact of the national interests.

The acknowledgment of these assumptions and definitions, as well as understanding the universal factors of influence, discussed above, would allow a more precise determination and definition of the fundamental national interests.

Accepting the correctness and viability of the universal approach of the concept of national interests, we can determine the following fundamental national interests with a permanent and universal character: **sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity** and **economic prosperity**. This formulation is valid for most of the countries of the world but the major problem that arises from such an approach is the maintenance of its diffuse and diluted character similar to an academic definition.

Limited to these determinations, national interests remain to be ambiguous and allow a variety of subjective treatments, easy manipulation by the political extremes and a diffuse perception from within as well as from outside of the country; or it has no practical or applicative meaning.

The practical meaning and the usefulness of a thorough definition of national interests resides in the formulation of a clear message addressed to the citizen, society, political forces, neighbouring countries and the international community as a whole, a message that can include or attract specific strategies and policies.

In the formulation of some thorough definitions, we base ourselves on the model on situational factors from the previous chapter. After the assessment of each factor, we can establish the following elements that influence the determination of national interests of the Republic of Moldova:

Geographic Factor:

- Small territory;
- Well arranged and controlled border in the west, a semi-transparent and semi-controlled border in the north and south, an uncontrolled border in the east;
- Lack of access to the sea, absence of internal or transit navigable rivers, limited segment of access to the Danube River without a port infrastructure;
- Underdeveloped network of terrestrial transportation (roads and railways) with weak connections to the main arteries of international transportation, under-utilised transit arteries;
- Insufficient energy resources, the absence of reserves of petrol and natural gas, other natural resources;
- Natural resources of little economic importance (with the exception of the fertile soils).

Geopolitical Factor:

- The incertitude of an equilibrium and stability in a forming multi-polar world and with a single distant superpower, unstable international relations with permanent profound changes;
- Integrationist processes with a differentiated implication with different vectors and speeds;
- The lack of some guarantees of security in the region;
- The position in a conflict zone with civilisation, cultural and religious character;
- Attractive influence of NATO for most of the countries from the region, increased probability of its expansion to the western border of the Republic of Moldova;
- Placement at the border between the US and European Union influence on one side, and Russian influence on the other side with the prevalence of interests and influences on the Republic of Moldova on behalf of the latter.

External Political Factor:

- Small state surrounded by two countries larger in territory and power
- The lack of guarantees of external security;
- Status of permanent neutrality unrecognised and not guaranteed externally;
- Member state of the CIS – a semi-dead union with centrifugal tendencies;
- Determinant political influence on behalf of the Russian Federation, which controls a segment of the national territory through a marionette regime and a military presence lacking legal status;
- General international disinterest and different interests of the external factors regarding the issue of Transdnistrian region;
- Participation in mutually conflicting processes of integration;
- Image of a state lacking leadership and clear options in the exterior;
- Period of economic and political crisis in Russia and Ukraine with an uncertain future;
- Situation of political and economic improvement combined with European-oriented integration processes in Romania;
- Foreign relations dominated by external economic dependence and the fluctuant access to energy resources and dependent of the benevolence of the neighbours;
- Problems related to the border with Ukraine.

Internal Political Factor:

- Fragile constitutional order;
- Permanent governmental crises;
- Lack of political coherence and continuity;
- Existence of uncontrolled territories, frontiers and administrations;
- Discredited process of reforms and democratisation;
- The ascendance to power of political extremes that do not have the major objective of the consolidation of statehood, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova;

- Existence of the Gagauz factor – the additional „smouldering“ source of separatism and tension within the country;
- Corruption of a large scale;
- Disoriented public opinion showing a weak support for official policy;
- Degrading spiritual and scientific potential;
- Political forces and elites discredited by the conflicts of juncture and by the incapability to subordinate to national interests.

Economic Factor:

- Poor state, low GDP, standards of living under the poverty line;
- Continuous economic crisis aggravated by a conceptual stagnation;
- Crisis of investment and external image;
- Lack of opening to the global economy;
- Enormous and ever increasing external debts and obligations of reimbursement beyond real capacities, economy on the edge of bankruptcy;
- The „black hole“ in the Transdnistrian region;
- A shadow economy of huge proportion with enormous tax evasion;
- Agricultural country, poorly developed agro-industrial sector, underdeveloped industry, insignificant technical and scientific potential;
- The only real sector – agriculture – situated at the limit of survival;
- Major economic dependence on eastern markets and energy resources;
- Massive exodus of the labour force.

Historical Factor:

- Artificial borders without historical precedent, roots and experience
- A „gifted“ and „undeserved“ independence;
- Short period for the affirmation of traditions dominated by internal political conflicts and intrigues;
- Disagreement between the spiritual links with the West and the economic connections with the East;
- Nostalgia for a more prosperous life.

Demographic and Social Factor:

- Important trends of emigration and depopulation;
- Existence of an important potential of conflicts in relations between ethnic groups;
- Increasing social inequity and a standard of living under the poverty line in continuous aggravation;
- Continuous disagreement regarding the linguistic issue;
- Religious conflict within the same confession;
- Absence of national ideologies, discredited patriotism, social apathy and the lack of confidence in political forces, state institutions and future.

This list, far from being an exhaustive one of the situation factors and elements would seem rather close to objectiveness and represents the minimum of reference points we should take into account in the formulation of the final

definitions. However, the simpler the elaboration of this list is, the more difficult and complex the next step is in selecting determinant elements, their comparison, combination and reformulation and ultimately the definition and classification of national interests. Obviously, at this stage the effort of an independent researcher seems to be insufficient in comparison with the complexity and importance of the problem. And here we risk acting like some parties or pseudo-political movements that select two or three elements from this list, elements that are more comprehensible to the large masses, and transform them into slogans presenting them as source for all present problems.

If we examine attentively these factor and elements, which have increased in number over the years and became more persistent and more pessimistic for the future of our country, we get back to the fact that the permanent and universal interests of academic character (*sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and economic prosperity*), formulated by most of the countries in the sense of acceptance of some universal principles and rules, have a particular importance for the Republic of Moldova, conditioned by real dangers for the very existence of the Moldovan state.

As a consequence, it is important to acknowledge that the vital and immediate national interests of the Republic of Moldova also include the maintenance of national independence and sovereignty, assurance of territorial integrity, maintenance of stability of constitutional order, assurance of civil peace and national harmony, consolidation of the rule of law, finalisation of the process of democratisation of the society, as well as the annihilation of the conditions and motives that contribute to the emergence of political extremism, ethnic separatism with all its consequences – social, interethnic, religious conflicts and terrorism.

In our opinion, the consolidation of state sovereignty and independence means primarily the assurance of supremacy of state power within the state boundaries and political independence from other states, possibility to chose and develop political, economic, social and cultural systems without any interference from outside, territorial inviolability and accomplishment of other generally accepted principles in conditions of compliance with the international obligations assumed by the Republic of Moldova. The accomplishment of these vital interests of the state depends on diplomatic and political activity, collaboration within multilateral interstate relations in the creation of an international mechanism capable of assuring state security and maintain the defence potential of the country. The participation of the Republic of Moldova in the activities of international organisations and integration with European security structures offers the state a real possibility to consolidate national security and to assure the sovereignty and independence of the country, contributing simultaneously to the establishment of political stability in the region and on the European continent.

Assurance of territorial integrity of the state primarily means the solution of the Transdnistrian conflict, re-establishment of the control and sovereignty over the entire territory creating the minimal conditions necessary for the state economy.

Affirmation of the status of permanent neutrality primarily means the creation of a pole of stability and security at the regional level, establishment of equilibrium between the interests of dominant countries and neighbouring countries, elimination of the internal sources of conflict.

Assurance of human rights and freedoms, social equity, legality and political pluralism. Edification of the state of law is indispensably linked to the creation and assurance of conditions for guaranteeing and adjustment to the international standards of fundamental human rights and liberties, as well as of rights and liberties for national minorities.

National interests in the military field represent the creation of a national security potential, of capacities for the defence of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevention and discouragement of military aggression against the Republic of Moldova, and assurance of peaceful conditions for the development of the state and nation.

Obviously, the aforementioned interests could be accomplished through the consolidation of political forces and of the entire society within a national policy, as well as through the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova based on the principles of international co-operation, renouncement of force or threat with force, peaceful settlement of international conflicts, non-interference with the internal affairs of the states and other principles in accordance with the UN Charter. Thus, we believe that the Republic of Moldova should promote a policy of permanent neutrality, committing itself to stay out of any armed conflicts, nonalignment with any political, military and economic alliances that have as purpose the preparation for war, not use its territory for the stationing of foreign military bases, not to possess, produce or experiment with weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the actions supporting the conclusion of and compliance with agreements on non-proliferation of nuclear armaments, arms control, efforts directed to the disarmament and détente, non-acceptance of hegemonic policy of dictatorship, political and economic coercion, delimitation of spheres of influence taking into consideration the unalienable rights of each nation, the sovereign equality of the states and the free option for their development – are considered indispensable.

III. THE RISKS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL INTERESTS

The risks of the present period are characterised by great diversity and by the increase of the share of internal threats over external ones, of unconventional risks over the conventional ones, and indirect risks over the direct risks.

The new geostrategic context, the new economic and ideological framework of Central and East European state in the period following the Cold War put us in a complex situation of confrontation with the new risks related to the exploi-

tation: in the destructive sense, of the differences of religious and ethnic nature; generating conflicts, some with an open military character; risks like international terrorism, drug trafficking, specific risks associated with transition; as well as the acknowledgement of the risk factors that were present for a longer time but were totally ignored, such as the ecologic disasters, natural and technological catastrophes.

These risks of insecurity are extremely complex and are often interlinked just like the very connections in the different fields between the actors of the international system represented by one of the most important contemporary features – incertitude. Therefore, the analysis of the risks and threats to national security, with the obvious purpose of developing strategies of security that would provide credible answers, is included in the natural course of creation of more efficient mechanisms against uncertainty.

The interdependent and trans-frontier character of these new or newly-acknowledged sources of risk requires the harmonisation of security strategies (i.e. cooperation in their management). International, as well as interdisciplinary cooperation, the confrontation with the security and risk issues requires the contribution of politicians and military specialists, as well as the contribution of the engineers, economists, environmentalists, specialists in social sciences, etc.

The elaboration of certain complex and integrated plans, with the use in the decision-making process, with the ultimate purpose of developing a management of risk, is conditioned by the accomplishment of some thorough risk assessments.

The lack of correlation of the programmes of risk assessment and management, at different levels (local, national, sub-regional, regional, global), represents today a true risk. When we talk about the assessment and quantification of risk, we should take into account the possibilities of emergence of an undesired event, as well as the consequences of its emergence, classified in accordance with the affected targets and required measures.

Thus, the sources of risk are not independent but inter-conditioned. They influence each other, generating a diversity of possible scenarios. The importance of a scenario is higher when it influences several other scenarios.

Because the risk not only represents a situation, but also is more of a mental product, the „perception of risk perception“ is important. From this perspective, the necessity to build awareness for public opinion, society in general and different segments of the society, particularly the political one, regarding these issues is imminent. It will act for the creation of a security culture – or „safety culture“ – a problem that is in accordance with the present trend of understanding security not only in terms of state security, but also, explicitly, in terms of safety of the population as groups or individuals.

The development and implementation of certain strategies of protection against external threats (even threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity) must be the full responsibility of certain specialised services (credible services that have no other mission than the protection of national interests) and imply the knowl-

edge and use of national and state goals, psychological techniques (educational, communicative, etc.) of stimulating patriotic feeling and orientation in a constructive direction. This patriotism (a genuine patriotism and not one of reaction or „pseudo-patriotism,“) must represent a fundamental component of this „safety culture.“ The attempt to list the main risks of insecurity characteristic to the zone we belong to can represent a step in the direction of creation of this true culture of safety, security.

Examining the national interests of the country we ascertain the existence of a multitude of political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and military threats, that seriously jeopardise the very statehood of the country. The postponement of solving the problems related to these interests would result in the disappearance of the state or existence of a fictive independence.

The achievement of national interests of the state is directly related to the assurance of appropriate domestic and external conditions for their materialisation. The territory of the Republic of Moldova is placed in the region where the interests of other larger and stronger countries meet, where the geopolitical situation has always been and always will be threatening from the perspective of conflicts and instability. The situation is aggravated by the presence in the country of illegal and foreign military forces without direct control on behalf of the official leadership, and we cannot exclude the attempts of political, economic and military pressures on the state, which represent a threat to national security.

By threat to national security we understand the intention of hostile forces manifested in any form, or the factor of environmental, technical and other nature, whose accomplishment or influence can be a threat to the individual, society and the state.

The Main Threats to National Security are:

- Direct aggression and territorial claims of other states;
- Local or regional conflicts close to the borders of the Republic of Moldova, including the conflicts related to the unregulated relationships between different countries from the region;
- The uncontrolled transportation of weapons, as well as components of nuclear, biologic, bacteriologic and chemical weapons through the territory of the Republic of Moldova or in proximity to its borders;
- The actions directed to the violent change in the constitutional order, the undermining or disappearance of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the republic;
- Actions directed to the undermining or destruction of the economic, technical, scientific, and defensive potential of the country, as well as the creation of situations of environmental threats;
- Actions directed to the worsening of the social situation and provocation of social conflicts;
- Terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration;

– Actions with the purpose of harming of the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens.

Meanwhile, the Republic of Moldova is should take into account the existence of real military threats to its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity:

- The presence in the territory of the republic of foreign troops;
- The existence of illegal military structures in the eastern districts of the country and potential military threats;
- The attempts of interference from outside in the internal affairs, destabilisation of the internal political situation of the country;
- The activity of separatist organisations, orientation to the armed violation of territorial integrity of the republic;
- Creation of illegal military structures;
- Eventuality of territorial claims.

Thus, there are a series of internal and external factors that can combine and mutually complete causing a threat to the national interests of the Republic of Moldova.

The main internal risk factors of political, economic, military nature that should be taken into account at the present time in order to assure the national security are:

- Political and social instability;
- Spiritual and patriotic deficiency within society;
- Massive exodus of the work force;
- Economic decline, the deficits of the balance of payments and state budget;
- Territorial splitting of the economic sector of the country in two systems co-existing in legal conditions and different organisational forms;
- Unilateral dependence on the suppliers of energy resources;
- Social costs generated by the transition to market economy (unemployment, insufficient social security and assistance, the worsening of the level of living of a considerable share of population, low quality of professional training);
- Extremist and separatist manifestations;
- The presence on the territory of the republic of foreign military troops;
- Social unrest and convulsions;
- Imperfections in the legal framework being in the process of modification and adaptation in accordance with the requirements of a democratic society;
- Corruption;
- Weapons and munitions trafficking;
- Narcotics trafficking, organised crime, shadow economy, terrorist actions;
- The low quality of medical assistance;
- Decrease of the birth rate of the population;
- Illegal migration;
- Low quality of the environment.

The importance of these factors for the Republic of Moldova, as a consequence of the domestic vulnerability caused unavoidably by the transition process, is indisputable because the threat of internal subversion tends to gain superiority over an eventual external aggression.

One of the factors that severely affect national security is the existence of regions with a separatist tendency (the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova), where in fact the state cannot exercise its sovereignty. This factor is determined by:

- Existence of conflict in the eastern districts of the country and the lack of a constructive position of the leaders of the anti-constitutional regime regarding its solution; their tendency to create an independent Transdnistrian state;

- Existence of illegal military structures in the so-called Transdnistrian Republic, well prepared and equipped, organized according to the classic model of armed forces;

- Illegal presence of foreign troops in the districts from the eastern bank of Dniester River, as well as the postponement on behalf of Russia for the withdrawal of its military units from the territory of the country;

- Uncontrolled proliferation of weapons and munitions, particularly in these districts, the resulting increase of criminality;

- Launch of local production of weapons and military machinery in the so-called Transdnistrian Republic, a fact contributing to the proliferation and supplies of the illegal military formations;

- Involvement of local as well as foreign Cossacks in the Transdnistrian region;

- Tacit economic, political and military support of the so-called Transdnistrian Republic on behalf of some official personalities and political groups in Russia.

The main international risk factors that could affect the national security of the Republic of Moldova are:

- The phenomenon of instability that characterises the transition from the old to the order of European security, the existence in the proximity of national boundaries of some regions with political, social and military instability, of potential or existent conflicts;

- The aggressive expansion of terrorist-extremist networks and activities, of trans-national organised crime: drug trafficking, economic and financial criminality, illegal trans-frontier traffic in humans, radioactive and strategic materials, weapons and munitions;

- Attempts of foreign pressure against Moldova's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, using the separatist actions from within the country;

- Direct aggression or its possible preparation based on territorial claims or other unregulated interstate disputes;

- Presence of foreign military troops, temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova;

- Geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the great powers in the region;
- Unregulated relations between different states from the region;
- Fragility of the general situation of the country undergoing transition, limitation of the country's access to the vital resources for the population and economy, and economic dependence on external factors;
 - The loss of some traditional markets,
 - Actions undertaken by a state or a group of states oriented to a blockade or economic isolation of the country, underestimation or destruction of its economic, technical-scientific and defensive potential;
 - Attempts and external actions that have the purpose of negative influence over the financial and banking system of the country, the devaluation of national currency;
 - Uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear technologies and materials, means of mass destruction, weapons and other unconventional lethal means;
 - Accomplishment of military activities, the use of technologies, experimentations of new weapons and munitions in the close proximity of the Republic of Moldova, which can cause a threat to the ecologic equilibrium of the environment; the existence in the proximity of national borders of some objectives with a high degree or risk.

Therefore, ascertaining the general state of ambiguity regarding the definition and acceptance at the national level of national interests and strategies of their implementation, the multitude of risks and threats, we reach the main conclusion of this research: the vital necessity of revising the Concept of National Security and the Concept of Foreign Policy, as well as the redefinition of the role and missions of the Supreme Council of Security

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The problems of permanent neutrality

The political events that occurred during the last ten years in the European continent affected the apparent equilibrium between the East and the West that had existed for more than four decades and which often created the illusion of an internal and external stability for a considerable number of states.

With the collapse of the bipolar ideology and in conditions of a vacuum of crisis?? „major authority”, the conflicts, smoldering until then and which often were put down in the incipient phase, outburst with force, turning into bloody focuses or in potential sources of conflicts. In addition, the regional and global security institutions could not provide efficient solutions for guaranteeing peace and stability.

This process accelerated the chaotic, and largely contradictory trends of the states to achieve through their own means the solution of the problems related to security and stability. As a result, the attractive idea of neutrality brought about a special attention and interest on behalf of the states, which along the history were often confronting with the imperial ambitions and territorial claims on behalf of the stronger neighbors.

I. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

There is no dictionary that, being unanimously recognized would define with precision neutrality. In the international law this notion is generally treated as the legal status (or special legal situation) of the states that, during armed conflicts,

do not take part in them and maintain peaceful relations with third-party countries, including with the countries directly involved in the conflicts.

In classic theory, neutrality also appears as a discretionary act related to the exclusive competence of the interested state, as a legal regime with a totality of rights and duties.

The essential obligations that characterize the legal status of a neutral state are *abstention* and *impartiality*.

Abstention is materialized in the duty of the neutral state not to provide, directly or indirectly, any assistance to any of the conflicting sides. The neutral state cannot however be responsible of individual acts contrary to the neutrality of its citizens that act on their own, exposing themselves to the sanctions on behalf of the belligerent state damaged by their behavior, without being able to be protected by the neutral state which citizens they are.

Impartiality implies the duty of a neutral state to maintain a strict equality of treatment towards all the belligerents by continuing normal relations of any nature with these, which however would not be susceptible to create a more advantageous situation from the political or military perspective for anyone of the belligerent parties.

As a response to its attitude of abstention and impartiality, the state does not claim the compliance with its rights grouped around two main ideas: territorial inviolability and the freedom to maintain its trade relationships with the third-party countries, including with the belligerents.

In certain situations, the notion of neutrality could be associated with such terms as „non-adherence“, „nonalignment“, „non-commitment“, „noninterference“, „isolationism“, etc. and sometimes it could be mistaken for neutralism, pacifism or for the ideas based on obedience or political and military passiveness.

II. NEUTRALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

As a security policy of a state, neutrality became a reality beginning with the 16th century, and the first legal definition was given only in 1856 in the Paris Declaration, referring, at that time, only to the maritime neutrality.

The neutrality, as an institution of the public international law as well as of the rights and duties of neutral states, has been granted a large recognition and a larger legal stability through the regulations of the Second Hague Convention since 1907. Six out of the thirteen conventions of this Conference treat the issue of neutrality, serving as a reference up to the present.

1. Neutrality in war on land

One of the essential conventions of this Conference is the Fifth Convention „regarding the rights and duties of the neutral powers and persons in a war on land“.

Article 1 of this convention formulates the fundamental elements of neutrality, namely that the territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Later, this principle is materialized in a totality of duties of the belligerents towards the neutral states and in a correlative way – the duties and rights of the neutral state towards the belligerents.

Articles 2 and 3 state that the belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either ammunition of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power, as well as to install a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus on the territory of a neutral power, for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea.

Article 5 compels the neutral power to be capable of maintaining its neutrality through military defense.

Article 6 states that the responsibility of a neutral power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents.

Article 7, 8 and 9 allow the freedom of decisions of a neutral state regarding the commercial relationships with the belligerent countries without prioritizing (favoring) any of these.

Article 10 recognizes the right of a neutral state to take all the measures it considers necessary, including the rejection through military force, with respect to any attempt against its neutrality, in order to impose on the belligerent states the compliance with its status, without considering this action as hostility.

Finally, *articles 11-15* address the issues of internment of belligerent troops, the situation of prisoners of war, as well as the principles related to the passage over the territory of a neutral state of the sick and wounded belonging to the belligerent armies.

2. Neutrality in Naval War

The norms devoted to neutrality in the war at sea are particularly included in the 13th Hague Convention since 1907 **„regarding the rights and duties of the neutral Powers in Naval War“**.

According to the main ideas of this Convention, the belligerents must refrain from committing hostility acts in the territorial or in the inland waters of the neutral states.

Article 1 of the Convention stipulates that the „Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers and to refrain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any power, constitute a violation of neutrality“.

The acts that do not comply with the neutrality at sea are: capturing enemy ships in the waters of a neutral power; the use of ports and waters of neutral states as a base for maritime operations against the enemy, etc.

A neutral state cannot allow, however, a belligerent state to bring its maritime spoils to its ports, in order to keep them under arrest. The neutrality of a

state is not achieved by the simple passage through its territorial waters of the war ships and spoils of the belligerents if this is done in compliance with the domestic legislation of the particular state.

3. Neutrality in the Air War

The fundamental principle in this field, namely the compliance with the inviolability of the neutral state is also applied in the Air War. The basic rules regarding this aspect were included in a regulation adopted in Hague in 1923.

The basic right of a neutral state is to intercept in its air space and capture any aircraft that does not subject to control, does not comply with or is suspected of violation of the regulations regarding war smuggling, hostile assistance, use of false signs, flight route, etc.

However, as the possibilities of interception of some aircrafts are rather limited, the duty of a neutral state to impede the violation of its neutrality is exercised depending on its capacities, just like in the case of Maritime War.

Some problems arise in situations when the aircrafts of the belligerent countries are forced to land on the territory of a neutral state in case of *force majeure* or fortuitous cases like straying, engine breakdown, running out of fuel, unfavorable weather conditions, etc. In such cases, between the regime applicable in the war on land (confiscation of the aircraft and internment of the crew) and the one applicable in the Naval War (the right of asylum on limited term) the practice of the states oriented to the rules of the war on land.

As a result, we can notice that in these conventions the rights and duties related to the status of neutrality are examined only in case of an armed conflict and therefore do not contain references to the rights and duties of the neutral countries in peacetime. Moreover, these conventions do not address the procedure of proclamation of neutrality and, respectively, the procedure of its recognition by the third countries.

Other documents of international law that approach the issue of neutrality are: the Pact of the Old Society of Nations, „Neutrality Act" on November 4, 1939, Geneva Conference since 1947 as well as the Protocols of Geneva, since 1977. Yet, they do not modify or amend the Hague Convention with respect to the peacetime neutrality.

The United Nations Charter (October 24, 1945) does not cover neutrality and neither does it enumerate the neutral states. Some prerogatives are not recognized for these states and therefore they should comply with the provisions of the UN Charter regardless of their status. Finally, if all the member-states of the UNO behaved in accordance with this Charter, the status of neutrality would become useless. At the same time, the UN does not exclude the neutrality principle and status, specifying in article 48 that the military sanctions determined by the Security Council against a certain state can be enforced by all the member states or by part of them, depending on their individual decisions.

4. Permanent neutrality

The permanent neutrality emerged in the 19th century, beside the classic neutrality directly related to an armed conflict, characterized by the fact that it is established in peacetime through an international treaty or through a unilateral act (an internal law or a state declaration) which sometimes is recognized or even guaranteed by the international community.

According to the international public law, the states that declared their permanent neutrality assume, as a rule, the following additional duties: not to participate in political or military alliances or assume duties that have the purpose of preparation of a war; not to allow the use of its territory for the placement of foreign military bases; not to possess, produce or experiment mass destruction weapons; to pursue a policy of peaceful collaboration and maintain friendship relations with all the countries of the world.

Taking into account its specific duties, a neutral state is free to take any measures considered necessary for the protection of its territory as well as for the accomplishment of its foreign policy. However, the assumed commitments in peacetime, as a country with a status of permanent neutrality, cannot allow any ambiguous treatment on behalf of the third countries in wartime.

III. STATES WITH PERMANENT NEUTRALITY STATUS

Austria

After the World War II, Austria was reestablished as a state unit and was subdued to a regime of quadripartite occupation. In order to maintain its statehood and avoid a territorial split (Germany's example) as well as to reestablish its authority and political respect, Austria self-proclaimed a non-belligerent country, invoking the German Anschluss since 1938.

Beginning with 1953, the Austrian government proposes the declaration of neutrality and independence from any alliance and uses any occasion to promote a dialogue with the USSR regarding the recognition of its sovereignty and integrity. *The permanent neutrality becomes the price paid for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austria.*

The negotiations with the USSR resulted in the signing of the „Moscow Memorandum“, which is not a genuine treaty but rather a „*gentleman's agreement*“. The Austrian negotiators have committed themselves to ratify at the Parliamentary level a declaration of neutrality similar to the Swiss one immediately after the ratification of the State Treaty signed among Great Britain, France, USSR, USA and Austria. On its behalf, the USSR committed itself to recognize the future Austrian neutrality and to participate in the collective guarantees in its favor.

The State Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955. With the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Austrian Federal Government passed, on October 26, 1955, the con-

stitutional law regarding the permanent neutrality of Austria, which stipulates that „in order to keep the permanent external independence and the inviolability of its territory, Austria proclaims, through the present law, of its own will, its permanent neutrality and is decided to maintain and protect this neutrality by all available means“ and that „in this view Austria will never adhere to any military alliance and will not tolerate the stationing on its territory of military bases belonging to a foreign country.“

In this way Austria declared itself neutral through an *internal normative act*, which was however nothing else than the legal consequence of the Moscow Memorandum and of the compromise with the Soviet Union. Shortly after, the Austrian government communicated this neutrality to the states that maintained diplomatic relations with Austria, asking for their recognition of this status.

Finland

The neutrality of Finland originates in the act of sovereignty over the Aaland Islands since 1921, which the Treaty of Geneva of the same year provided with a regime of neutrality and demilitarization. Later, in 1935, the House of Representatives of the League of Nations unanimously approved the policy of neutrality of the northern countries – Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Finland.

As a consequence of the German-Soviet Pact since 1939, Finland was „distributed“ in the Soviet zone of influence. Despite the fact that immediately after the outburst of the global conflict in the summer of 1939 Finland declared its neutrality again, it got isolated in the „winter war“ with the USSR and was forced to give up its territorial claims.

In 1941, Finland enters the war as a Germany's ally and takes back the lost territories and in 1945, like Austria, Finland is considered as Germany's „satellite“. After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty since 1947, on April 6, 1948 Finland and USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which provisions implicitly recognized the Finnish neutrality.

From this moment, Finland pursues a cautious policy of strict neutrality skillfully avoiding the involvement in tensioned relations between the great Powers. Due to its prudent policy, Finland was the only country from the Soviet zone of influence to maintain a market economy and a western type democracy founded on political pluralism, and the loyalty towards the USSR allowed it even some advantages of economic nature.

The spirit of Finnish neutrality was successfully affirmed in 1975 by signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference regarding the problems of security and cooperation in Europe.

Ireland

The neutrality of Ireland is often treated as neutralism (generally defined as a trend of a political system to avoid the association of the nation to a group of forces through alliances and which does not involve the obligation to remain

neutral in case of a conflict) and originates in the beginning of the Irish Republic and the first declaration of independence since 1919.

Beginning with 1921, the young „free country“ of Ireland decides not to adhere to any military treaty, this decision being a consequence of the tensioned relations with Great Britain and its position regarding Northern Ireland.

In 1939, Ireland irrevocably establishes its independence adopting a neutral attitude towards the European crises, attitude maintained through the World War despite the threats of Great Britain and the US pressures.

Its neutrality is not stipulated in any national or international normative act. It is the result of the country's own will not to commit, at least in peacetime, in any military alliance. It has had until now an indisputable character, as a central element of Irish policy, unanimously accepted by the political forces and proved by the public opinion.

Sweden

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, namely in 1814, Sweden did not take part in any European armed conflict. As in the case of Ireland, *the neutrality of Sweden is not stipulated in any national or international legislation*, but represents a voluntary declaration and resides in the traditions progressively and pragmatically established during approximately two centuries. The Swedish government decides the enforcement of neutrality in total freedom, a fact that allows it to promote in the region a balance least affected by the rivalry of the great powers. Thus, free from any legal problems, Sweden can adopt in case of a conflict the most suitable attitude, obviously on condition that this attitude cannot be interpreted as bias to any of the parties.

The Swedish neutrality is primarily a military or an armed one and implies a credible armed defense due to the considerable efforts of the nation for the national defense. As a result, this neutrality was respected during the two World Wars and the Cold War.

The present neutrality of Sweden is self-defined, as a result of the failures of the efforts made in 1948-1949 for the creation of a Scandinavian defense alliance that would have regrouped Norway, Denmark and Sweden. While Norway and Denmark are involved in the alliance with NATO, Sweden prefers to remain neutral, considering the fact that this policy has allowed Sweden to avoid the wars fought in the last century. Thus, Sweden, of its own will, has defined its position of a country nonaligned to military blocks in peacetime, in order to remain neutral in case of war.

Switzerland

The neutrality of Switzerland can be explained or understood only in the historical context. Its neutrality at the beginning wasn't a deliberate choice, it was gradually imposed from within as well as from outside all along history. It does not represent an immobilized and monolithic concept, but evolved under the double pressure of time and events.

The Swiss Confederation was created in 1291 from the alliance of three cantons that united against the will of the Habsburgs. Beginning with the 14th century, the Confederation got involved in numerous wars for the expansion of its territories and consolidation of independence, wars that lasted up to the great defeats since 1515. Often this is considered the beginning of the Swiss desire to search for refuge in neutrality as a mean of survival.

In that period, the Confederation already consisted of 13 independent and sovereign cantons with an almost inexistent central government, yet sufficient for a common foreign policy. In order to continue a policy of expansion, it was necessary to concentrate the forces, i.e. a centralization, a thing in contradiction with the principles of foundation and functioning of the Confederation. This fact was another reason to give up the active foreign policy and advance towards neutrality as a major state idea.

The division according to confessions also favored the implantation of the idea of neutrality. From the very beginning two major confessions (Catholic and Protestant) coexisted within the Confederation in conditions of a relative equilibrium, mutually neutralizing the sympathy and support from within towards the confessionals of a foreign state that, in other conditions, would have provoked the split of the Confederation and would have led to the dissolution of the Swiss nation.

The exceptional geographic position of Switzerland and an important number of Swiss mercenaries involved in serving the French kings have contributed to the fact that France always tended to discourage the countries in the region from taking hostile actions against Switzerland and from interfering in its domestic conflicts resulting in the affirmation of its neutrality from outside.

The historical evolution proved that the Swiss policy of neutrality has always been dependent on the balance of powers. The events during the Napoleonic Wars could serve as an example, when Switzerland was forced to provide France with more than 38, 000 soldiers and when its territory was occupied becoming a scene for military actions.

After Napoleon's defeat, the participants in the Paris Conference on November 20th, 1815 (Great Britain, Russia, France, Austria, Prussia and Switzerland) signed a declaration that recognized and guaranteed the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. Through the same declaration, Switzerland accepted its borders, imposed by the five countries..

The policy of permanent neutrality of Switzerland had been respected until the end of the World War I when the Treaty of Versailles recognized that this fact was possible only due to an international commitment that envisioned the maintenance of the nonbelligerent status by the Confederation.

On February 13, 1920 the Council of the League of Nations recognized and officially guaranteed the permanent neutrality of Switzerland in the „Declaration of London“. The pacifist euphoria that dominated that particular era and the hopes associated with the recently created League of Nations led to the fact that

the Swiss nation pronounced itself in favor of adherence of the Swiss Confederation to the League of Nations. The consequence of this decision was the giving up on the permanent neutrality in favor of differentiated neutrality, as Switzerland accepted the obligation to take part in economic sanctions against a state.

At this time, there was a relatively big number of neutral countries in Europe: Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. As a result of the events that shocked Europe between 1920 and 1938 (the consolidation of the Fascism in Germany and Italy, Italy's occupation of Abyssinia, the Civil War in Spain, etc.) Switzerland demanded the League of Nations to reestablish and recognize its status of permanent neutrality. On May 14, 1938 the Council of the League of Nations accepted this demand.

During the World War II, Switzerland's status of neutrality was, with some insignificant exceptions, respected and, after the War, Switzerland, as probably all the neutral states, was blamed for not joining the belligerents and envied for the fact that by avoiding human casualties and material damages, it managed to profit economically from the commercial relations with the belligerents.

This historical context and the national tradition resulted in the fact that Switzerland did not participate in the creation of the United Nations Organization, maintaining a proper attitude towards it: to observe with attention its activity, to adhere to some specialized international organizations, to facilitate the activities of the UN on its territory, preferring in the meantime the status of observer to the full membership.

* * *

As we notice, the neutrality of those five neutral countries is different in essence and principles. If the neutrality of Austria and Finland is a direct consequence of the World War II, particularly of the Soviet influence, the neutrality of Sweden and Ireland is a result of their own choice and are completely similar only with regard to the expression of their own will. About the Swiss neutrality, we can say that it is a fact created from a historic necessity, the strong desire of a small state to survive being surrounded by large powers and major conflicts, external benevolence and tradition.

IV. NEUTRAL STATES AND SECURITY

The observance of neutrality has always depended on the benevolence and indulgence of the belligerents, namely the comparison of the advantages and disadvantages or possible losses in case of its violation. The neutral states not once confronted the problem of violation of their neutrality status, some of them losing hope in its viability, their own capacities to maintain this status, to ultimately give up.

The principles of neutrality have been considerably violated in the World War I. First of all, the voluntary neutrality was affected, considering the fact that the

hostilities involved 34 countries, including the United States, despite the established traditions of neutrality.

From another perspective, the „permanent neutrality“ was also incapable to protect two out of three countries that had this status at the time – Belgium and Luxembourg. Finally, we cannot neglect the fact that the submarine war practiced by Germany forced France and Great Britain to give up the provisions of most of the conventions that regulated the exercise of neutrality in the naval war.

The World War II also had a negative impact on the hopes of more countries that, beginning with 1935, declared their neutrality. Some of them were incapable to maintain their status of neutrality while others found themselves among the belligerents under the pretext of violation of neutrality.

We can use for example the case of the United States, which, starting with 1935, progressively shifted from commercial relationships with the belligerents, from the principle of impartiality towards a regime that favored only the states possessing a maritime supremacy in order to self-assure (namely Great Britain and France). Declaring the neutrality of the United States of America on September 5, 1939, in the war that had broken out on the European Continent, the US Congress, only after two months, lifted the embargo on the export of weapons and military supplies to Europe, levied with the mentioned declaration. The adoption on March 11, 1941 of the Law on Lend Lease, which established the method of providing material assistance to the states of the antifascist coalition, meant *de facto* that the US gave up their status of neutrality and entered the war

It is however ascertained that the states that had the opportunity to benefit from the status of neutrality until 1945, had to endure many violations in order to sustain it: Portugal let Japan settle on the Timor Islands and the US – on Asor Islands; Sweden was forced to accept the passage of German troops to Norway and Finland; Switzerland witnessed, between September 21, 1939 and December 31, 1944, approximately 3,300 violations of its air space and its government was forced to reduce the exports to Germany starting with March 8, 1945; Spain was compelled to suspend the export of nonferrous metals to Germany. Finally, mentioning the military operations from Northern Africa, we cannot forget the fact that the states from this region, from legal perspective, were considered to be neutral at that moment.

These examples prove the fact that the elaboration and enforcement of the international law is accomplished depending on the relations among the great powers and the observance of neutrality is not an exception to the rule, and here the quote of La Rochefoucaud seems to be appropriate: „*the virtues get lost within interests just like the rivers get lost within the sea*“.

The fragility of the status of neutrality is largely determined by the fact that the unilateral declaration of such a status is insufficient for its viability. Lacking an effective guarantee from the great powers or/and an international recognition (support), a neutral state can count exclusively on its own forces regarding the assurance of its safety and defense against an potential aggression. Thus,

the effort related to security in general and defense in particular is very significant.

The Finnish concept of security

Finland's security policy was largely determined by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed with the USSR in 1948. This treaty guaranteed the security of the neutral Finland by the USSR. However, in a correlative manner, it allowed Moscow to interfere in Finland's problems of national security and, respectively, established essential restrictions in the military field (the limitation of the active armed forces, quantitative and qualitative interdictions regarding some categories of weapons, etc.). As a result, these restrictions have determined the relatively low volume of budgetary investments in the military field, which did not exceed 1.9 % of the GNP and 6.7 % of the state budget in the last decade.

Also, the military doctrine of Finland was defined in this context, which basis is the concept of „territorial defense“ that stipulates the deployment and simultaneous engagement of the armed forces throughout the territory of the country in case of aggression.

Considering the immense and uneven territory, the low population density, the available forces and means, the territorial defense of Finland is based on the depth combat and on partisans (guerillas), with the simultaneous mobilization and deployment of a maximum number of units (550 000 soldiers out of 5 million inhabitants, which represents 11% of the population) in 4-5 days and mainly envisions the defense of the regions (zones) of vital importance.

The key role in the Finnish defense system is played by the armed forces (defense forces according to the Finnish terminology), which are composed of the Terrestrial Troops, Air Force and Maritime Forces. The military force in peacetime is of approximately 32, 000 soldiers.

The Law on Defense, adopted by the Finnish government in 1974, determined two main missions of the Armed Forces of Finland: defense of the territorial integrity of the state and rejection of armed aggression. In peacetime they participate in the maintenance of the general internal order, assuring, in tight connection with the border guard troops, the surveillance of the territory, inland waters and air space, prepare and guarantee the mobilization and participate in peacekeeping operations within the UN.

The collapse of the USSR caused important changes in Finland' security policy, conditioned by the relative instability of the political and economic situation in the territory of the former USSR. These changes are characterized by the attempt to conciliate the status of neutrality with the policy of participation in the consolidation of the European security system.

In this situation, taking into account Russia's position regarding the expansion of NATO, the official position of Finland in the issue of security remains unchanged: assurance of a neutrality status by maintaining armed forces with a

high potential and by active participation in the European and regional security systems.

The Swedish concept of security

The basis of Sweden's security policy is the principle of non-participation in political and military alliances in peacetime, in order to remain neutral in wartime. Following this principle strictly for about two centuries, Sweden not only enrooted it in the national Constitution, not only avoided the bloody wars, but also contributed substantially to the promotion of peace, particularly in the Northern Europe.

In the Swedish opinion, the concept of national security is a lot broader than the ordinary concept of military security and the defense of the country represents a broader concept than the concept of total defense. This makes the Swedish security policy substantially different from the security policies of other neutral states. In this country, the effort made for the defense and guaranteeing of its neutrality is a lot more important.

By the decision to assure territorial security and maintain the concept of neutrality in general, Sweden made important investments in defense. An eloquent example of this fact is the creation of an Air Force of approximately 1000 military aircrafts in the '50s and was one of the first air forces in the world at that time.

This increased attention paid to defense issues is also true at present. The military expenditures in the last years did not get lower than 2.5 % of the GNP and 8% of the state budget – the most imposing index among the North European countries. Another proof is the energetic activity of the renowned Swedish military industry.

For an effective use of all the resources of the society in protecting the country against a potential aggressor, Sweden built the system of total defense which main component is the armed forces. This defense, based, according to the Swedish opinion, on the efficiency of the armed forces, on the civic spirit of the population and on the solidarity of economic structures, is formed of the following main elements:

- A military defense based on mobilization;
- A civil defense (actually civil-economic defense – a model one of a kind in a way) having the purpose to assure the survival of the nation in case of war, based on the protection of the economic potential at a level necessary for long-term autonomous operation;
- A psychological defense, activated only during crises, with the mission to oppose an enemy propaganda.

The military doctrine of Sweden provides the maintenance of a reduced army in peacetime, the possibility for their rapid deployment by the mobilization of trained reserves and maintains in effect the principle of military duty for all the citizens of Sweden.

The mission to maintain armed forces at a sufficient level to discourage the very initiation of a potential aggression, and in case of war to assure the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state is defined as a state priority. In peacetime, the main mission of the Sweden's Armed Forces is the defense of the state borders and the training of reserves. At the human level, the concept of total defense is materialized through the mobilization of approximately 20 percent of the state population (800, 000 persons).

The geostrategic evolutions in Europe, and particularly in the Baltic Sea region, have greatly influenced the Swedish security policy which, quoting the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, „cannot be neutral anymore – a neutrality between two alliances makes no sense after the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact" (1994).

In this context, Sweden adhered to the European Union, Partnership for Peace and participates, with a status of observer, to the Western European Union. In addition, it pleads for nonalignment to any military alliance maintaining the main idea of the security concept.

The Swiss concept of security

In 1993, the Federal Assembly of Switzerland defined four objectives of the security policy: consolidation of peace, assurance of territorial integrity, protection of the population and maintenance of independence in actions and decisions.

A symbol of neutrality, Switzerland possesses a conventional and paramilitary defense for the assurance of its security that involves the active participation of the population and an important economic autonomy.

Swiss military traditions are based on the principle of diffusion of notions like „citizen" and „soldier". Some affirm that Switzerland does not have an army for the reason that Switzerland is an „army-militia" itself or, according to other opinions, has „an army on vacation" with a capacity of rapid mobilization having a reduced number of permanent personnel and frequent trainings.

The system of militia is based on article 13 of the Federal Constitution since 1874, which stipulates that the Confederation does not have the right to maintain permanent troops.

Presently, Switzerland has a career personnel composed of 3,300 people and a smaller number of professionals with permanent functions. The Ministry of Federal Defense collaborates with approximately 15,000 public servants, including 11,000 involved in the maintenance of military equipment and supplies (stored in 57 armories and 8 bases), training infrastructure and Air Force bases. Approximately 2,000 specialists are involved in guarding and maintenance of the fortifications throughout the country. A special category is represented by the 4,500 specialists of 6 federal armament works.

Until 1992, Swiss army could mobilize around 625, 000 of trained people (after 1995 – 396, 000 in the Army and 380, 000 in civil defense) out of 7.1 billion

inhabitants. When mobilized, Switzerland has a military density of 15 soldiers per sq. km and that number is a lot higher than in any other European country. Out of the countries of the world, only Israel with 20 soldiers per square km has a higher military density, being almost constantly in a situation of war. It takes about 48 hours to mobilize the Swiss army reserves. The rapidity is the result of a system of territorial and administrative recruitment and of the fact that every person possesses a rifle, uniform and a sealed box of 24 cartridges.

The Swiss army is created for defense and is inapt of offensive actions outside its territory. The army is based on a numerous active personnel, relatively well trained and armed and profits to the outmost extent from all the advantages offered by the difficult character of the Switzerland's relief.

These essential features compose the foundation of the Switzerland's military strategy, which is based, unlike the strategy of larger countries, not on a threat with an effective response (nuclear in some cases), but on the ability to cause maximal losses for potential aggressors only with conventional weapons. According to the military doctrine adopted in 1973, the main mission of the Armed Forces of the Confederation is to „prevent a war through the will and ability to defend the integrity of the country, to prove that the losses of a possible aggressor will be incompatible with the obtained advantages.“

For this reason, a special attention is paid to the supply of the Armed Forces with weapons – considerable effort accepted by the nation. (According to the official data in 1996, the Swiss army possessed 742 tanks, 1342 armored infantry vehicles, 2573 units of artillery, 153 fight planes, 111 helicopters, etc.)

Another eloquent element of the „doctrine of discouragement“ and military effort is the comparative density of the military forces per 100 square km of the national territory:

	Switzerland	Italy	France	Austria
Active assets	1513	331	90	59
Armored vehicles	2	0,5	0,4	0,2
Aircrafts	0,7	0,1	0,1	0,04

In peacetime, the army provides the public authorities with forces necessary for the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters or aggravation of internal situation (only in case of attempt against public order). Starting with 1990, the Armed Forces of Switzerland have additional missions:

1. The army contributes to the maintenance of general conditions of survival (has security and lifesaving duties in case of catastrophes), deals with protection against violent acts.

2. The army contributes to the promotion of peace through its participation in the process of consolidation of peace in Europe and in the world.

Thus, invited to participate in peacekeeping operations, missions of arms control, responsible for the protection of international conferences, the Swiss army is an important factor in the peace policy of Switzerland.

* * *

As we notice, besides the considerations that the possibility of aggression has been substantially diminished or is practically null, the neutral European countries do not neglect the risk of an armed conflict susceptible to affect the military security and cannot afford a considerable reduction of the efforts of consolidation of the defense system.

The defense system of the neutral states usually represents a vast totality of general defense consisting of the diplomatic structures, army, civil, economic and psychological defense and the state defense structures, which generally have the following tasks:

- *Diplomatic structures*: assure independence, peace and timely prediction of all the attempts of international isolation of the country;
- *Army*: protects the territory and the population, participates in the disaster relief operations and presents a guarantee for peace;
- *Civil protection*: protects the population and the vital importance facilities against the possible effects of a war or natural or technological disasters;
- *Economic defense*: assures the decrease of the vulnerabilities related to external dependence and organizes the self-supply of the economy, something that would allow autonomous actions in case of a long – term conflict;
- *Psychological protection*: maintains a high morale of the population in crisis situations and avoids panic;
- *State protection structures*: guarantee the domestic order regarding the external attempts.

Each neutral country has a characteristic situation, a specific historical context and a specific security policy, in which the importance of the constitutive elements (army in particular) is different. However, none of the neutral states can afford a neglectful attitude towards security issues.

V. THE FUTURE OF NEUTRALITY

What are the opinions regarding the future of neutrality? Most of the analysts are confident that this concept will not disappear in the nearest future as a direct consequence of the end of the East-West confrontation. Neutrality is deeply enrooted in the political conscience and diplomatic practice of the neutral countries. In countries like Austria and Switzerland, the political leaders are very cautious when approaching this issue, being afraid to lose immediately the support of the population. The same thing happens more or less in other neutral countries. However, it would be exaggerated to declare that the neutral states are

immobile in development of this concept. The transition to a more flexible concept of neutrality would be the first possible evolution. All neutral countries are currently engaged in this discussion, being aware of the necessity of careful progress without causing a split among the public opinion.

On December 1, 2001, four out of five neutral countries from the Western Europe, were members of the European Union. And here it would be superficial to draw a conclusion about a soon abandonment of neutrality considering that the European Union is not only a form of economic statehood, but also a political structure with at least one embryo of common foreign policy. The new member-states of the European Union have the tendency to capitalize their own opinion in the development of this common policy and here resides the most important nuance. These countries are Finland and Sweden, which signed the „Partnership for Peace“ with NATO on May 9, 1994.

Unlike WEU, which could possibly become a military alliance, NATO already is a military alliance that is incompatible with the status of neutrality. Still, we cannot say that Sweden and Finland in this way gave up their neutrality, as there is an essential difference between the status of member and the status of partner. One can recognize however, that these two countries made an important step in renouncing their classic permanent neutrality in favor of a neutrality closer to the international public law and different to the one practiced in the Cold War Era.

VI. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND PERMANENT NEUTRALITY

On July 29, 1994, through article 11 of the Constitution, the Republic of Moldova declared its permanent neutrality. Lacking traditions of statehood and, therefore, lacking traditions of neutrality, the main goal of this declaration was to consolidate the sovereignty. This declaration appeared as an indispensable necessity in the process of assurance of an internal stability of the country through the withdrawal of the foreign troops from its territory, neutralization of political forces opposing this orientation and conciliation of the public opinion in conditions of solution of the internal conflict and assurance of a relative equilibrium.

Consequences. Declaring its neutrality in peacetime and defining it as permanent, the Republic of Moldova committed itself to comply with the requirements of countries with such a status, to be capable to fulfill its specific duties to be able to claim the observance of its rights.

In this context, we cannot forget the fact that permanent neutrality is a more extended notion than the classic notion of neutrality, the latter being tightly related to the war situation, and the specific duties of a country with a status of permanent neutrality are additional to the ones of the status of classic neutrality. Considering the provisions of the international public law, through the voluntary proclamation of its permanent neutrality, the Republic of Moldova committed to the following duties:

– Not to participate in political or military alliances or undertake duties that have as a goal the preparation of a war or that involve the unconditional obligation to assist one of the parties in conflict;

– Not to allow the use of its territory for the preparation and unfolding of aggressive actions against other countries and the positioning of foreign military bases, with the exceptions of the cases stipulated in the international agreements signed by Moldova regarding the placement of peacekeeping forces belonging to the UN or OSCE;

– Neither to possess, produce or experiment mass destruction weapons nor to dislocate, store and transit these types of weapons belonging to third-party countries through its territory;

– To have a policy of peaceful collaboration and to maintain friendly relations with all the countries of the world.

Considering its specific duties, the Republic of Moldova is free to take any measure considered necessary for the protection of its territory as well as for the accomplishment of its foreign policy. However, its peacetime commitments as a country with a status of permanent neutrality cannot allow an ambiguous treatment of the third countries in wartime. At the same time, promoting an appropriate foreign and domestic policy, strategic options and avoiding the possible ambiguities in the policy for consolidation of neutrality, the country can avoid the problem of its guarantee in case of war by proving the capability to protect its status with armed forces.

Observance of the status. The examples from the contemporary history prove that in most of the cases a simple unilateral declaration of the status of permanent neutrality has proven to be insufficient for its observance, a fact that implies the necessity of complex actions for the recognition of this status, assurance of its credibility and viability, as well as for its consolidation.

Recognition. Related to the issue of observance of neutrality, an important role belongs to its recognition/guaranteeing by the international community or by some third countries. This act, not being compulsory, in Moldova's case seems to be quite important and necessary due to its specific geopolitical position and the risks of pressures and destabilization within the region. Despite several declarations (rather timid and inconsistent in reality) of the national authorities regarding the option to maintain and consolidate the status of permanent neutrality, this has not been officially recognized by the international community. This fact reflects rather eloquently the complexity of the issue and the ambiguous appreciation of our efforts in this sense.

Another reason is the relation between external guarantees of a permanent neutrality status and the domestic effort dedicated to the creation and consolidation of the defense system. It is obvious that the economic situation of the Republic does not allow allocating the extremely important means for this goal, a fact that conditions the special importance of external guarantees.

At the same time, the act of external recognition will be problematic as long as:

- The problems related to the basic agreements between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania and the delimitation of borders remain unsolved;
- A military force of a foreign country (regardless of the reasons or declarations of concern about the security) will be stationed on the territory of the Republic;
- There will be an ambiguity or, moreover, a tension in the internal relations with the districts from the eastern bank of Dniester River.

Credibility. In general, the credibility of the permanent neutrality status is obtained through:

- Recognition and strict fulfillment of the requirements stipulated in the documents of international law regarding the status of neutrality;
- Accomplishment of efforts adequately appreciated domestically and externally in all the fields related to the consolidation of this status (foreign policy, domestic policy, defense, economy, etc.);
- Assurance of a credibility in defense that implies abilities to maintain the status (by own forces) in case of an armed conflict in the region or in case of war, to reject any aggression and to stop any attempt of its violation.

Viability. The democratic process within the Republic and within the states from the region, their consolidation as rule of law states represent the main guarantees for the viability of the permanent neutrality status of. The viability will be also determined by the comparison of the advantages and possible losses resulting from the violation of the status by the third countries or its abrogation by the Republic of Moldova. In addition, an extremely important influence on the viability will have:

- The security policy of the neighbor countries (Romania and Ukraine), the state of the bilateral relations between these states, as well as the situation of the relationships between these two states and the Republic of Moldova;
- The situation of bilateral relations with Russia and its attitude regarding the problem of observance of the status;
- Creation of a civic spirit attached to the values of neutrality in the society.

Consolidation of the status. Considering the diversity of opinions and definitions regarding the neutrality issue, the contradictory internal and external tendencies, the lack of a determined civic spirit and the ambiguities of the present status, as well as for its consolidation, the development of a political concept regarding the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova is appropriate. The concept of neutrality would define:

- The position of the state towards the principle of neutrality in general and of permanent neutrality in particular;
- The priority principles and objectives of its foreign policy regarding the consolidation, affirmation and, eventually, the recognition of the permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova at the international level;

- The main missions of each component of the defense system, its adjustment to the necessities of consolidation of this status;
- The principles of promotion of the security policy, the objectives of military policy and the structure of the Armed Forces, the relations of military collaboration, etc.

Of course, the issue of the status of permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova will not be solved with the adoption of such a concept, however, the ambiguity and the confusion related to it, within the country as well as outside, can no longer be neglected.

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The concept of national security of the Republic of Moldova for the new millennium

The specialized state institutions for military policy, which later represented the basis for the creation of the national defense system, were created according to the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova on 27 August 1991 and the presidential decrees „Regarding the creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova” from 3 September 1991 and „Concerning the reforms from the State Department on Military Issues of the Republic of Moldova within the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Moldova” from 5 February 1992.

Compared to other former republics of the Soviet Union, which possessed combat-ready military formations on their territories that subsequently transformed into national armed forces, Moldova acquired under its jurisdiction mainly military units whose officers and NCO’s for the most part refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new state. These circumstances led to a situation where military units transferred to the jurisdiction of Moldova were incapable from the point of view of combat capacities, destination, capacity, structure and place of deployment.

The National Army of Moldova started to be structured on a fundamentally new basis, using exclusively the technical-military foundations inherited from former military units.

During this time, the process of creation of military forces and national defense system took place without being based on the concepts and programs of national security and military structure of the state, which are systematized and coordinated with the fundamental interests of the state. The decisions concerning the problems of military structure were made by the Ministry of Defense, taking into consideration its own visions and concepts, without the direct participation of the management and administrative bodies.

The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova was adopted on July 29, 1994, which proclaimed for the country the status of permanent neutrality. The National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova were

elaborated and adopted in 1995, which addressed the inclusion of the military forces in an adequate constitutional framework.

The main objective of these legal acts was the legitimization of military policy pursued by the Republic of Moldova, as well as the unification of all military forces from the state – the National Army, the Border Guards, and the Gendarmerie – in a system aiming to protect national security.

The political and military efforts of the country at the external level were stipulated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova, which defined the priorities, principles, primary directions and its strategic objectives; mainly, it focused on the country's participation in the edification of a new Europe, integration as an equal partner with new European security structures, creation of a system of relationships that will assure the stability and the future of the relationships between the Republic of Moldova and other countries.

The Objectives and Priorities of Military Policy, the Measures and Actions for its Accomplishment

The primary objective of military policy is to insure national security and to prevent wars and armed conflicts within the country and beyond its borders under international law.

The military policy of the Republic of Moldova, as an organic part of the policy of state, is based on the provisions of the Constitution, Military Doctrine and the constitutionally proclaimed status of permanent neutrality.

The consolidation of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova has been and is permanently accompanied by a series of general problems, one of the most important being the guarantee of stability and security for the country.

An important aspect of national security is military security; the protection of the state against internal or external military threats through measures and actions that would ensure the possibility to prevent and respond to some military aggression, and prevent, localize, and liquidate military conflicts of any kind at the borders as well as within the country's territory.

Military security is developed in accordance with the Constitution, legislation of the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan Foreign Policy Concept, and is based on the readiness of the population, territory, national economy, state institutions, and on the ability of the Armed Forces to assure the military defense of the country and to protect its constitutional regime.

The fundamental measures and actions undertaken and promoted by the Republic of Moldova for military security are identified and established in the Military Doctrine adopted by the Parliament on 6 June 1995. This document represents a system of official visions and priorities of the Moldovan state and its leadership regarding the promoted military or security policy, regarding the provision of military and political stability in the country, the security of the country

in the conditions of consolidation of its own statehood and emergence of a new balance of powers on the international arena.

Considering the aforementioned facts, the Military Doctrine establishes the priorities of the state's military policy and determines the set actions needed to assure the military security at the global, regional and national levels. The status of the Republic of Moldova as a neutral country, the aspirations of the leadership in creation of a non-violent world based on civilized relations among countries, as well as mutual trust and co-operation form the base of these priorities.

Such a solution for national security problems is normal for any democratic country; it does not contravene the international duties of a country with the goal of maintaining peace and stability and corresponds to the norms of international law and the UN Charter.

All these points reflect the fundamental interests of the people and state for the political and military aspect of the Doctrine. The technical and military aspect determines the foundation of the military structure of the Republic of Moldova, possible military actions, and the use of the Armed Forces.

The military organization of the state is based on the following principles:

1) Existence of the necessary military infrastructure and regular military forces, reduced in number, professional as a rule, whose equipment and preparedness will be determined by the nature of the potential military threat. They will not exceed nor be insufficient for the ensuring of an effective defense of the country;

2) The existence of a reserve for mobilization as an element of the Armed Forces and its command structure;

3) Defensive orientation of military training and use of the Armed Forces, the ability of the military units to solve offensive issues limited in defensive terms;

4) Simultaneous organization of territorial defense in a particular area or in the whole territory of the country;

5) The complex use of the entire military structures of the state: the National Army, Border Guards, the Gendarmerie in combat actions under the sole leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces – the president of the republic;

6) De-politicising of the Armed Forces.

The assurance of military security of the country is organized through the effective combination of external political and military behaviour with internal technical and military action.

The document is quite specific and stipulates in a concentrated manner practically all aspects in the direction of activities of the Armed Forces. Of course, all these aspects require a correct interpretation on behalf of the authorities and the persons with responsible positions within the military, as well as from the state, which is involved in the assurance of the military security of the country.

The general provisions of the Military Doctrine declare that the Doctrine is determined by the domestic and foreign policy of the state, by the constitution-

ally proclaimed status of permanent neutrality, according to an exclusively defensive character, and is based on the following priorities:

The political sphere: the peaceful solution of disagreements that emerge between states and the exclusion of military confrontations through the common efforts of the countries according to the principles and norms of international law, the establishment of political, economic and military relationships as long as they do not violate the sovereignty and independence of the state;

The military sphere: maintenance of the defense capacity of the state at a level capable to ensure military security, confidence building, and pursuit of mutually advantageous military co-operation based on principles respecting the sovereignty and independence of other states, as well as non-interference with the domestic affairs of other states. It should be noted that nowadays, any co-operation among the states essentially loses its efficiency if this cooperation is not accompanied by an active co-operation in the military field.

The Doctrine identifies the fundamental measures of the state for the achievement of these priorities at the global, regional and national levels:

At the global level: participation in the activities of the global community regarding the prevention of wars and military conflicts and the peaceful solution of problems, creation of conditions that would assure, in case of an external military threat, the conditions to seek assistance from international organizations; active participation in the construction of a unique international system of security (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace, etc.);

At the regional level: establishment of bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of the region that would build a high level of mutual trust and transparency in the military sphere (for example, nine bilateral military co-operation agreements signed with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States, as well as the intention expressed by President Petru Lucinschi in Sarajevo to adhere to the Stability Pact, etc.);

At the national level: creation of a military potential sufficient for the assurance of military security of the state.

Finally, the political and military aspect of the Doctrine defines certain specific actions for the achievement of the planned political and military objectives, through which the Republic of Moldova:

- will never be the first to start military actions against other countries;
- will not have territorial claims regarding other countries;
- will not accept territorial claims on behalf of other countries;
- will not consider any state as being its enemy;
- will assure its military security without negative impacts to the security of other states;

- will not allow the use of its territory for aggressive actions against other states and the stationing of foreign troops (with the exception of the cases

stipulated by international agreements regarding the stationing of peacekeeping forces;

- will not allow the stationing, transit and storing of the weapons of mass destruction belonging to other states on its territory;
- will not produce, store or purchase weapons of mass destruction;
- will accept only those military activities, weapons and military technologies that do not harm the ecologic equilibrium.

Thus, the Military Doctrine, the section that identifies the priorities, the measures and the actions of the state at the political and military level, is perfectly included in the set of laws and fundamental normative acts that demonstrates the policy of the Republic of Moldova to build a civilized, democratic and non-violent society, to strictly respect its duties according to international law, and to promote a foreign policy based on peace and co-operation.

Analyzing the present problems of military structure and the basic decisions concerning military reform, we face the issue of the rational sufficiency of defense. This problem has a special importance during this current phase of social and economic reforms. The given problem is seen in the process of setting the military's budget, particularly the issues regarding the expenditures to maintain the National Army.

Here begins the determination of the credible capacity of defense, the assessment and the provision of its sufficiency (considering the fact that its components are fundamental in regards to the creation of the military organizational structure of the state and of the Armed Forces), their equipment, its usage, quality, quantity and expense for their maintenance.

In the classic variant, the sufficiency of defense is understood as a state of the Armed Forces that guarantees a defense against potential aggression through defensive actions and, at the same time, does not allow the pursuit of large offensive operations.

As a rule, the sufficiency of defense is examined from a position of balance of the Armed Forces and the potential of another party. At the same time the sufficiency of defense can exist in conditions of inequality of the forces of the parties, such a correlation is seen when the potential aggressor is incapable to overcome the defense positions.

The Military Doctrine determines the fundamental tasks of the National Army:

- defense of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and other vital interests of the country;
- localization and liquidation of armed conflicts, as well as other acts of military violence within the country;
- preservation of state neutrality;

The structure of any army is determined not only by the economical and financial possibilities of the state; it is determined by the defense necessities of the state. It must assure the preparedness of the military to counteract any

possible military threats. Here are the possible threats listed in the Military Doctrine:

- territorial claims by other states;
- attempts of interference in the domestic affairs of the country, the destabilization of the internal political situation;
- stationing of foreign troops on the territory of the country;
- activity of separatist organizations oriented for the undermining of territorial integrity of the republic with the use of armed forces;
- existence of illegal military structures.

Except the first on the list, all of the threats represent bitter realities for us. We should not forget the fact that our country is located in this bloody focus, a „Bermuda Triangle“ of the Balkans-Caucasus-Near East.)

Thus, these factors influence, in a decisive manner the structure of the military: the number, categories of weapons, military combat units, supply units, etc.

Let us begin with one of the most complicated and lingering problems our country is presently facing – the eastern districts. On the territory of Moldova the units of the Limited Group of Russian Troops are stationed, with approximately 2600 soldiers and considerable military potential, as well as the military units and paramilitary organizations of the Tiraspol administration. Presently, these structures include four infantry brigades, a tank battalion, an artillery regiment, other sub-units (including the Cossacks groups and others, totally some 7500 soldiers). As we notice, it is an enormous force that continually increases its combat capacities, which cannot be controlled and influenced by any means by constitutional authorities from Chisinau. Considering these facts, the National Army is viewed as a stabilizing factor and a force of discouragement for the aforementioned military troops.

The status of permanent neutrality stipulates the prohibition of the country to join military blocs and alliances. At the same time, it is known that any state – small or large, has a certain responsibility regarding the maintenance of stability and security, national as well as international, regional, etc. Considering the fact that the military is a fundamental element for the maintenance of stability and security of the country, even bigger is the responsibility of the neutral states for the maintenance of their national military troops for the assurance of their neutrality status.

Switzerland, a neutral country, is in first place internationally in military expenditures per capita (approximately US\$700 annually); Finland, having a population of 5.1 million, has an army of 33,000 soldiers; Sweden with a population of 8.8 million – an army of 63,000 soldiers, etc. All these armies are well organized, equipped, trained, and receive a lot of attention on behalf of the population and the leadership of these countries.

The Republic of Moldova will be internationally recognized as a country with a status of permanent neutrality only when it will be capable to assure its military

defense, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity with its own forces. Those who say that the military is a burden for the society simply do not know the facts.

Example: *Costa Rica, (similar to the Republic of Moldova in territory and population), has not since 1949 boasted its own Armed Forces; its security is guaranteed through a special agreement with the United States of America. However, this does not mean that it does not pay for its security. Annually 0.6 per cent of GDP is invested in the defense field, in essence more than we spend to maintain the military (0.5 per cent of GDP in Moldova).*

We tend to create a modern, well-trained and equipped army with reduced numbers. We need a military that would be able to fulfil its functions, and at the same time would not be too expensive for our country. We cannot doubt the necessity of the army. It is the arm of the state that, together with the political and diplomatic structures, has the task to prevent any type of military confrontation, and in case of the emergence of such a conflict, to maintain the situation at a level that would prevent its escalation into large-scale military actions.

The situation of combat training determines the degree of preparedness of the leadership and the troops for the accomplishment of their missions. In their daily activities, the military units and the institutions of the Ministry of Defense are training for combat operations. This situation provides that the military leadership and troops that are engaged in military training, mobilization and operative tactical activities are ready to accomplish a series of activities based on their training (at a certain level) in the fulfilment of combat missions.

The situation of combat training depends on several factors, of which the main ones are:

- The supply of weapons and military equipment;
- The state of the weapons and machinery;
- Supply of munitions, fuel and other technical and material means (war materials);
- The ability of the chief commander, officers and chief of staff to conduct the troops in the training process and in combat actions;
- Situation of the military leadership of the subordinated troops (sub-units);
- The training of the soldiers for combat actions;
- The knowledge of combat missions by all commanders;
- The ability of transit for the soldiers during different stages of combat.

All these factors are interdependent and the non-observance of either of them leads to the decrease of the capacity (if not a simple impossibility) of the units (sub-units) to accomplish the combat missions.

The National Army as fundamental element of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, in its present structure is designed to assure the military security of the state in existing conditions. The structure, as well as the training system of the National Army, is determined by the existent threats stipulated in the Military Doctrine.

In many armies from the world, only a part of the military units are maintained in their permanent capacity for the accomplishment of combat missions. The other units are kept in a state that assures their training for accomplishment of combat missions in rather long terms, perhaps several days.

In the National Army, the idea to keep a part of the forces in a state that assures their training in rather short terms (several hours) for the accomplishment of combat missions and provides the necessary assistance for the population in case of natural disasters and technical accidents, is practically achieved. The respective provisions establish the units, sub-units and determine the activities that assure their training for the accomplishment of missions. The units and sub-units of the National Army with permanent combat capacities are the forces that will be used first in case of a large-scale domestic conflict or in a situation of conflict at the border.

The Military Doctrine provides that the units and sub-units of the National Army are to be involved in the support of the Border Guards and Gendarmerie for the strengthening the defense of state borders, the protection of the population against violent actions with the use of firearms, in the identification and blockade of the conflict area, the protection and defense of objects of vital importance, as well as in the provision of the necessary support for the structures of civil protection in conditions established by legislation.

Certainly, the National Army will be involved in the support of the Gendarmerie and Border Guards only in the cases when the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Department of Border Guards are not be capable of stabilizing the situation and deal with the conflict with their own forces.

The degree of involvement of the National Army in the containment of domestic conflicts would be well-determined from the legal perspective in such cases: the mission of the military, the mandates of the Ministry of Defense, chief-of-staff, the respective commanders, the restrictions in the actions of sub-units, the relations established with local public institutions, etc.

As a rule, the following are accomplished by the Army in domestic conflicts:

- Delimitation of the conflict area and the annihilation of the military or paramilitary structures equipped with heavy weapons (combat armoured infantry vehicles, artillery units, etc.);
- The protection and defense of objects of major importance (aqueducts, bridges, communication infrastructure, warehouses, etc.);
- Participation, together with the representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in patrolling of the areas where armed (radical) groups could activate, etc.;
- The accomplishment of other missions, including the support to the actions of the Gendarmerie and Border Guards.

It is clear that the National Army cannot be involved with all the available forces (in full composition) in the containment of a domestic conflict when other military threats exist.

The involvement of the National Army with a large part of its forces in a domestic conflict can have the following consequences:

- Involving its forces in the accomplishment of missions specific for the troops and domestic structures, the National Army gradually loses its capacity to respond to some military threats;

- In situations when the army accomplishes mainly the tasks specific for the police structures there is an imminent danger of losing authority within society;

- The use of the resources of the National Army for the actions specific for other structures will lead to the reduction of the capacities of the troops to accomplish specific combat missions (destruction of armoured vehicles, fortified objectives, etc.).

In order to maintain a high combat capacity and to be ready in any conditions to accomplish missions in defense of the country, the National Army can be involved in the containment of an internal conflict, the maintenance of authority among society, the accomplishment of only those missions that cannot be accomplished by other forces, elements of the security system of the country.

Referring to the situations of „emergency," „attack" and „war" it is necessary to mention the following aspects. In case of declaration of a state of „emergency," the National Army can participate in the accomplishment of the tasks oriented to support the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the structures of civil protection. In an emergency, the army must maintain the capacity to counteract any military threats using the units and sub-units with a permanent combat capacity, accomplished according to the standards of its organization in peacetime.

At the declaration of the state of „attack" the National Army will (or may) begin mobilization (the change of military units to combat status, creation of new units, etc.). This situation will be declared at the emergence of a military conflict, whose outbreak could be stopped by the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In such a situation, the units and sub-units with permanent combat capacity will be involved in missions to protect the mobilization of the National Army. The involvement of National Army units in the accomplishment of tasks designed specifically for interior forces will not be possible.

In the declaration of a state of „war," the National Army will uptake with all its forces (including those created through mobilization) combat missions for the defense of the country. Only a part of the forces, namely the battalions for territorial defense, will pursue tasks similar to those entrusted to interior forces (the protection of important objects in the field, combat of small reconnaissance or diversionary groups, assurance in maintaining the restrictions established by the situation of „war," etc.).

Participation of National Army Units in Peacekeeping Operations

This global practice proves that special units for participation in peacekeeping operations are in general not created. Usually units or sub-units from within

the Armed Forces (Army) train in special programmes for participation in peacekeeping operations, in parallel to general combat training (specific to them). These units (sub-units) can be used in the creation of larger national contingents that are accordingly included in multinational deployments (for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or in peacekeeping forces from the security area in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova). These multinational troops could be created not only for a specific mission, but also in advance (for example, the peacekeeping troops of the Balkan countries – Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, etc.).

The cases when neighbouring countries form joint peacekeeping battalions (bipartite) are frequent in international practice. Such battalions have been created in Romania and Hungary, as well as Ukraine and Poland. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have created a tripartite peacekeeping battalion – the so-called Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT). The training and supply of each party of the battalion created by two or three countries is the national responsibility of each country. The command (leadership) of the battalion is comprised on the principle of alternation (one year the command is from one country, chief-of-staff from another and so on). The joint training exercises are also scheduled by alternation – one year in one country, the next in the other.

The participation of the peacekeeping units in real operations is determined by the legislation of the particular country and the use of the forces in a specific operation is determined by the mandate of the peacekeeping forces established by the United Nations or other international organization (i.e. OSCE). The identification of the units (sub-units) for participation in peacekeeping operations does not exclude their involvement, in case of necessity, in actions of defense of their own country.

The size of the annual budget of the Ministry of Defense is approximately equal to the sum of pensions for a single month paid to all the pensioners in the country. In the 1999 state budget for defense expenditures less than 50 per cent of the actual necessary funding was reached. According to the Law on the Budget for 1999, the Ministry of Defense was earmarked 50 million lei. The analysis of dynamics of military expenses in relation to GDP shows a decrease from 0.9% in 1995 down to 0.5% in 1999. In countries with a population number similar to the Republic of Moldova, the expenses for national defense in relation to GDP are: Denmark – 1.8%, Norway – 2.7 %, Lithuania – 3.0%, Armenia 3.6%, Turkmenistan – 4.0 %.

It should be mentioned that if during 1992-1996, the Ministry of Defense was forced to cope with the unsatisfactory indices of maintenance of the army because the stocks of material resources have practically run out. The National Army has existed only due to the reserves of weapons, food products, fuel and lubricants, spare parts and medicines inherited from the former Soviet Army. The equipment that fell under Moldova's jurisdiction was relatively functional. The officers and platoon sergeants continued to use Soviet uniforms. The housing facilities did not require urgent renovation. Presently these reserves are completely

spent and it is necessary to make an assessment of the real size of the budget for the Ministry of Defense.

In order to remain within the limits of the present budget of the National Army, a considerable reduction in the number of soldiers is needed – especially the number of officers and platoon sergeants. In the given situation it is reasonable to ask: „what moral right do we have today to lay off officers with a high level of professionalism who were invited to this country to create the National Army being promised normal life and working conditions?“ A large number of these officers live in unbearable conditions, without a regular wage, without housing and beyond (some, being made redundant, leave the army with a hatred towards the state due to its failure to provide them with a relatively decent life). The redundancy of an officer today will cost the state about 10-12 thousand lei; rehabilitation will cost even more.

Presently, the National Army has a series of garrisons equipped with a large quantity of military machinery. The irrational and massive reductions and redundancies of military personnel in these conditions would mean to give up on these enormous quantities of military equipment, which would ultimately cause large prejudices to the country. By the way, the reduction of the National Army does not imply large economic successes because the maintenance of technical equipment and weapons, purchasing of spare parts, technical support and others is a lot more expensive. The reduction of the Army by a thousand soldiers implies only a 4-5 per cent reduction of direct expenditures in the budget.

Considering the aforementioned aspects, reforms in the National Army can be gradually accomplished in a longer period, doing the best to maintain its combat capacities, officers and military equipment.

The reform within the National Army has already started. The Parliament established the number of personnel of the National Army (8500 soldiers and 2400 civilians). It is planned that the military units will be stationed in five military bases: Bălți, Mărculești, Cahul, Chișinău, and Dănceni.

How much do the brigades of the National Army cost?

(considering the real possibilities of the present military budget)

Air Brigade – 8.5 million lei;

Artillery Brigade – 6.5 million lei;

The other four brigades – approximately 7 million lei each.

The accomplishment of these reforms (restructuring) requires additional budget allocations for the re-deployment of the machinery and its preservation, transfer and reemployment of the military personnel. The sum totals approximately ten million lei. At the same time, it should be noted that the National Army would return to the state the freed military bases with a total value of approximately 20 million lei.

In the assurance of technical and material means, priorities were established for the conclusion of the contracts to deliver army assets.

During 1997-2001 the National Army was completely supplied with equipment produced in the country (except officers' boots supplied (1999) from the United States).

The lack of financial means did not allow us to purchase the necessary amounts of fuel, a fact negatively influencing the quality of combat training for the National Army. Also due to this reason during last winter, there was no coal for the military units, a situation that made us use the strategic stock of the National Army.

Only 25-30 percent of the actual necessities for medical assistance were provided. Out of six million lei for emergencies the medical service in 2000 received only 910,000 lei. The lack of financial resources resulted in an enormous debt – about 23 million lei alongside nine million lei of wage arrears.

The daily rations for a soldier costs 6.1 lei. Presently there are 5800 soldiers serving in the military. Thus, during one year a sum of 13 million lei is needed; however in 2000 the army received only 6 million lei for personnel sustenance.

Since 1999, most of the material goods necessities for the National Army have been purchased in coordination with the National Agency for Public Acquisitions through different contests and tenders. However, due to the fact that the Ministry of Finance does not respect its guarantees of payment for the goods delivered by suppliers, many enterprises refuse to participate in such contests.

One solution for this problem is to considerably reduce the number of contracting partners from several hundreds to tens. Thus, it would be possible to conclude stable contracts for several years with local producers along with conditions to grant them some privileges, preferential credits, VAT exemptions, and so forth. In this case, they could sell their products for credit. Moreover, the Audit Service of the Ministry of Finance could control the conditions of delivery and the prices much easier for only 15-20 contracts.

Today the Ministry of Defense is in a permanent quest to improve the current situation. There is a task to make the maximum use of domestic possibilities, such as fuel, coal, food and construction materials storages.

The technical state of the weapons and military equipment is one of the fundamental criteria that determine the level of combat preparedness of the National Army and of the country in general.

The analysis of the state of armament shows that presently in the National Army more than 50 per cent of the used equipment is morally and technically worn out. A critical situation is noticed in the use and maintenance of the armaments and military equipment in combat trainings, technical support and refurbishment. During 1992-1999, no financial means were made available for the purchasing of new weapons to replace old ones.

Due to the lack of necessary fuels and lubricants, of kits of spare parts, tools and individual and group accessories, the extremely reduced level of the operational tools, all categories of technical support are poorly fulfilled. The renovation

of anti-aircraft capabilities, artillery units, tanks and armoured vehicles is not possible and most of them outlived their usefulness in 1995-1996.

The weapons and military equipment are something valuable for the state and need permanent and careful maintenance. The maintenance of the equipment during 1992-1996 was done using the reserves inherited from the Soviet Army, which has run out.

Military reform, conceived as a reform of an integral structure consisting of three elements of the Armed Forces – the National Army, the Border Guards and the Gendarmerie – has slowed down lately. Basically, the Ministry of Defense was the only structure to undertake a series of measures for the reformation of the National Army, oriented towards the achievement of its primary goals – the reduction of expenses necessary for maintenance and training of the military. The main idea of the reform – reduction of the structures of the Armed Forces that are redundant or performing poorly – has unfortunately been unfulfilled.

For instance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, besides the Gendarmerie troops of about 5000 soldiers, has under its responsibility the police rapid reaction unit, the patrol and security regiment „Scut“ and other police units and sub-units. Obviously, some tasks of these structures are doubled.

Another example is the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Situations where demilitarization is expressed only in the fact that employees of the department structures no longer have to wear their military uniform at work.

Beside these structures, there are rather many subdivisions in the republic which do not contribute to the preservation of the state's military security those their personnel have military ranks.

With regard to the Border Guards, we continue to protect the border between Romania and us and practically do not control to the necessary extent the eastern border – despite the problems of the transporting of contrabands and drugs.

The development of the draft Concept of Military Reform in the Republic of Moldova started in 1997 at the initiative of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In the period that followed, in the „power“ ministries and in the special structures of the government some variants of projects were elaborated and presented to the Supreme Security Council which discussed the draft at its meeting. The project of the Ministry of Defense was chosen as the foundation. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense was named as coordinator in the process of finalising the aforementioned project.

Considering the objections and the proposals espoused by the members of the Supreme Security Council with the regard to the basic project, the working group of the Ministry of Defense in the given term thoroughly analyzed and systematized all the materials received on behalf of the Commission responsible for the elaboration and accomplishment of the Concept, of the „power“ ministries, other ministries and departments, as well as numerous materials received

from abroad at our request – namely from other countries with a permanent neutrality status and neighbouring states. In addition, the finalization and the timely presentation of the project were not possible prior to the adoption of the government decision regarding the Border Guards.

It is worth mentioning that the process of elaborating the concepts regarding the reform of the Armed Forces in highly developed countries (the United States after the failure in Vietnam, France after the withdrawal from Algeria, and others), as well as in the post-communist countries, was a timely process accompanied by more attempts to optimize measures in reforming the military structures of the particular countries in accordance with the dynamic changes that occurred on the international arena and the domestic processes of social and economic transformation (in Russia the military doctrine was elaborated and adopted after six years; in Romania after five years).

The legal importance of the Concept of Military Reform resides in the fact that this was elaborated according to constitutional provisions and, after its approval, will lead to some changes and amendments in the Concept of National Security, as well as in the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova and other legislative and normative acts.

The Concept of Military Reform represents a system of ideas, objectives, directions, principles, missions and mechanisms that form the conceptual base of the improvement of the present system of national defense.

Military reform is conditioned by:

- The inadequacy of the present system of the state's military security;
- The adoption and implementation of the status of the state's permanent neutrality, as well as the promotion of an adequate foreign policy;
- The present geopolitical situation, the necessity of adapting to the new realities, risks, threats and missions;
- The insufficiency of resources and available means, the necessity to adjust the system of military security with present possibilities, and the future economic development of the country;
- The low quality of the Armed Forces and military potential of the country.

The insufficiencies of the present system of the state's military security are consequences of:

- The lack of theoretic principles and practical experience in the field of military organization and management;
- The mistakes made in the process of its constitution and improvement;
- The ignoring of national values, the role and importance of the military structure, the frequent substitution of civic values and patriotism with erroneous pacifist ideas;
- The negative impact of the economic, political, social and psychological crises on the military structure;
- The insufficiency of allocated resources and means.

I would like to mention that the military reform includes not only the reform of the Armed Forces but also other elements, such as the system of military leadership in the state, the system of mobilization, as well as the entire military infrastructure.

The experiences of other states in the accomplishment of military reforms demonstrate that to improve military system of the state several compulsory conditions must be taken into account:

1. The management of military reform by the state.

This condition is determined by the fact that the accomplishment of military reform with efforts exclusive of the defense-related structures is impossible;

2. Assure the scientific foundation for military reform.

3. *The complex nature of military reform* implies the accomplishment of the reform in phases (between 2000 and 2012) according to some special state programmes regarding the restructuring and development of all elements of the national defense system.

4. *Financial support of military reform* – the condition determined by fact that starting a reform without sufficient financial foundation will result in an inevitable destruction of the Armed Forces and of the entire defense system.

In this sense, the fact that most of the countries around the world pay special attention to the sufficient equipment of troops and social protection of military personnel is well known.

Note:

In the present year the average expenses for the maintenance of a soldier are:

a) *In highly developed countries:*

– USA	– \$180,000
– Germany	– \$100,000
– France	– \$83,000

b) *In former socialist countries:*

– Poland	– \$20,000
– Czech Republic	– \$20,000
– Hungary	– \$10,000
– Russia	– \$4000

Romania allocates an average of \$4000 for the maintenance of a soldier. At the same time, after military reform a new defense budget would be approved, which will allow Romania in the nearest future to increase the expenses for the maintenance of a soldier up to \$8000 annually.

c) *The Republic of Moldova* spends approximately \$ 600 annually for the maintenance of a soldier.

In the last few years, being socially unsecured, a considerable number of professional soldiers left military service, a fact that negatively influences the level of combat capacities of the Armed Forces. In this sense, it is necessary to restructure the system of management of human resources, which requires the

elaboration of a program regarding their management from within the Armed Forces to the social protection of military employees, members of their families and in this way increase the prestige of the military service as a specific state service (presently a civilian employee, a specialist within a ministry has a salary equal to that of a company and battalion commander with 100-300 subordinated people and with special responsibilities).

The concept of military reform implies the following principal directions as well as the mechanism for their achievement:

1. Scientific support for national defense.

Presently, national military science is practically non-existent. In order to fill this gap in the new organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense special direction for military strategic research and the Centre of Scientific Research were created with a status of state enterprise that in future will be self-sustainable.

2. *Development and improvement of the legal framework* of the state's military security system has the purpose to adjust legislation governing the military to constitutional provisions, as well as new economic, social and political relations.

3. *Optimization of the management system* in the military sphere and improvement of democratic control over the Armed Forces.

The Concept adopted by the Government stipulates the following modifications and amendments in the given field:

– Establishment of the High Command of the Armed Forces, which includes the Chief-of-Staff of the National Army and his deputies, the Commander of the Gendarmerie and his deputies, the Commander of the Border Guards and his deputies, and their appointment by the President of the Republic of Moldova – the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The definition of the notion of High Command of the Armed Forces and the modification the procedure for appointment of its members will assure the stability and continuity in the activity of military leadership in the country (the minister of defence is not part of the high command of the Armed Forces and as a member of the government is appointed and revoked from the post according to the procedure established for any member of the executive in Article 82 of the Constitution and in the Law Regarding the Government).

– Subordination of the Department of Gendarmerie and Department of the Border Guards (already accomplished) to the government of the Republic of Moldova.

– Creation, with the declaration of a state of „attack" or „war" of:

a) The Supreme Council of Defense of the country and of the county (municipal) councils of defense;

b) General Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces that would undertake the operative leadership of all the elements of the military.

Note: *the experiences of many countries around the world prove the efficiency of these provisions. Thus, in the general military structure of the state, under the auspices of the Armed*

Forces activates: in France – the Military Gendarmerie; in Great Britain and Germany – the territorial troops; Netherlands – civil defense troops and the militia; Greece – Gendarmerie, National Guard, Coast Guard; Turkey – Gendarmerie; Egypt – special troops, Civil Defense; Israel – Border Guard Troops, NOHAL Territorial Defense Troops, Civil Defense Troops; Vietnam –Troops of interior; Algeria – National Gendarmerie, Popular Militia.

4. *The reform of the Armed Forces* forms the fundamental element of military reform.

From the perspective of missions, the Armed Forces are composed of the national Army, which forms their basic element, the Border Guards and the Gendarmerie. The projects stipulate their tasks in peacetime, as well as states of „attack“ or „war.“

In the process of accomplishment of the military reform, the mixed principle of supplementing of the number of personnel of the Armed Forces will be maintained and in the future it is possible to change to the supplementing of permanent combat units (with rapid reaction) exclusively with military personnel hired on contract (a politically and economically justified step). This will be accomplished according to the practice of military organization of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, etc. (According to the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, this principle will be implemented in the Armed Forces of this country). The concept contains the necessary foundation regarding the destination, manner of organization and assurance of territorial defense as a component part of the national defense system.

Reform of the Armed forces will reorganize the combat training of territorial troops and will improve the system of training of military personnel, as well as the special training of public servants with attributions in the field of national defense.

As one of the main tasks of the reform of the Armed forces, the concept stipulated the demilitarization of the structures that do not have attributions to the provision of military security (Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Situations) and a change of their status with special ranks similar to the Police, Department of Penitentiary, Customs Department, etc.

5. Improvement of the mobilization system of the national economy.

The importance of this aspect of military reform is determined by the fact that, despite the radical changes of economic, social and political nature that occurred in society over the last decade, the system of mobilization has not been adapted to the new conditions and is practically not functional.

6. The economic and financial supply of the Armed Forces.

The concept stipulates the re-examination of the principles of financial support for defense according to GDP, with a tendency to adjust to international norms.

7. *Development of international military co-operation* as a favourable factor in the promotion of the military reform oriented to the consolidation of national security (bilateral relations, Partnership for Peace, etc.).

A necessary condition for the development of international military cooperation in strict accordance with the Constitution is the adoption of the Law (Concept) regarding the neutrality status of the Republic of Moldova that provides the legal framework of the activity of the Armed Forces in the given field.

The draft Concept was presented for examination and authorization to the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finances, Economy and Reforms, Ministry of Internal Affairs and to the Service of Information and Security, which approved it and contributed with specific proposals in the completion of the final document.

In concluding this introduction to the issues of Armed Forces reform, we can reach an unpleasant conclusion for us that reflects our bitter reality:

Presently, the reform of the defense system of the republic and particularly of the Armed forces that form its foundation, related to the Border Guards and Gendarmerie are at the level of declarations of intent. The reforms related to the National Army are in the phase of being started but lack financial support.

I believe, in order to accelerate the reform it is necessary to:

1. Immediately adopt the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces in the Parliament at the proposal of the Supreme Security Council;

2. Promote and adopt the draft laws regarding the legal settlement of these spheres of activity of the national defense system that had been left out of the present legal framework, including aspects of participation of Moldovan soldiers in UN peacekeeping operations (battalion 22).

3. Adjust to present realities the contradictory articles from present legislation related to defense;

4. Provide direct financial support (besides the military budget) for the practical fulfilment of military reform objectives. Otherwise, the present favourable premises in the accomplishment of immediate actions of re-deployment and closing of some military units and camps designed to reduce expenses for the maintenance of the National Army will vanish; the idea of reform should not be compromised;

5. Formulate and approve the tasks of the Armed Forces and particularly for each component part;

6. Elaborate the general structure of the Armed Forces and their elements according to their tasks (within the National Army this structure has already been elaborated).

7. Consider the fact that declaring the Border Guards and Gendarmerie as elements of the Armed Forces, we have to acknowledge that in case of military actions, these troops will continue to carry out their specific missions. Considering the real situation of the Border Guards and Gendarmerie and their capacity to mobilize (i.e. the lack of technical and material resources to mobilize) we have to mention that these troops cannot fight against regular troops due to the lack of artillery, antitank, anti-aircraft weapons, engineering sub-units, etc.;

8. Emphasize the maintenance and training of the National Army as a fundamental element in the assurance of the state's military security. Focus efforts

in the maintenance of combat capacity of regular troops and in guaranteed provision of resources for mobilization;

9. Identify the shape of the territorial defense system, based on the specific territory of the locality with the entire infrastructure considering the tactical-strategic importance of the specific territory. It is necessary to build the foundation of territorial defense according to the following principles:

- The territorial defense should be a part of the system of military security of the state compatible with all other elements of this system;

- Unified leadership of the territorial defense under the Chief-of-Staff of the National Army as a superior body of military command;

- Orientation of territorial defense in the protection of the population against violence (including armed) and in different emergency situations;

- Supply the units of territorial defense with soldiers and provide the transportation means, equipment and supplies (fuel, food, etc.) and housing using the reserves situated in the specific territories of their placement (counties, municipalities);

- Create a mechanism of responsibility (mandates, prerogatives, duties) and enforcement of the system of territorial defense by local public institutions;

- Efficient use of the possibilities of available structures in the territory (National Army, Ministries of Interior and National Security, Department of Civil Protection and Emergencies) for the creation of territorial defense;

10. Base the mobilization system of the Armed Forces and national economy on a modern legal foundation, adjusting it to the real economic and financial situation of the country. Accomplish specific measures for the creation and maintenance of state reserves using the main technical-material resources – fuel, food, equipment, spare parts for vehicles – as a centralized source to be used in emergency cases and the making up of the mobilization resources of the Armed Forces.

11. Develop, in the shortest possible term, the concept of military organization of the Republic of Moldova (Armed Forces), as a fundamental document in the development of the (Annual) Plans of military construction, programs for technical endowment of the National Army on middle- (2-3 to five years) and long terms (7-10 years) (for example: a governmental program financed directly by the Executive branch: National Army – 2010).

12. Increase the level of social protection of soldiers, especially the officers and members of their families;

13. Create a reasonable (real) military budget for the year 2002 and to rush the solution of the problem regarding the sale of equipment and weapons surpluses, objects unused by the National Army;

14. Create a special program of familiarization (training) for members of the Government, Parliamentary Commission for State Security and Maintenance of Public Order, representatives of public institutions from municipalities and counties with the programs related to the military security of the state, military organization, mobilization issues, operative strategy and art, etc.

15. Stop the practice of employment in different state institutions of officers sacked from the National Army for discrediting the institution, violation of military discipline and other similar cases. These cases leave a negative mark and demoralize the officer corps of the National Army.

16. Intensify the efforts oriented for the participation of National Army sub-units in peacekeeping operations under UN, OSCE and other international organizations (such as a recent offer on behalf of Ireland to participate with sappers in minesweeping missions from Kosovo), to take specific measures for the complete demilitarization of the security zone stipulated in the agreement between Moldova and Russia from 21 July 1992 (reducing in a consecutive and insistent manner the number of peacekeeping forces and posts in the zone)

I believe that by speeding up of the decision regarding the reformation of all the elements of the Armed Forces we will manage, in shortest term, to define key missions of reform, to accelerate it, and in nearest future to begin the specific accomplishment of the main goal of reform – reduction of the necessary expenses for the maintenance and training of the Armed Forces. Postponing the solution of this problem is inadmissible due to the reason that every lost day brings new expenses for the maintenance of some structures that can be reduced and structurally reformed without causing damages to state security and social stability.

Most of Moldova's soldiers are firmly convinced that the National Army must persevere, fortify and honour the tasks stipulated in the Constitution – the supreme law of the country, and consolidate its capacities as a stabilizing factor and remain a true institution that teaches civic devotion and patriotism for the entire society.

In this sense, we should work together regardless our philosophies and dominating political options, because the major interests of the country are on stake.

OLEG GRAUR,
Colonel (retired), IPP military expert

The armed forces of the Republic of Moldova – an evaluation of the existing capacities, dimensions, and missions

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to make a correct assessment of any state's possibilities to maintain/defend its own sovereignty, it is necessary, first of all, to know the country's capacities, forces and means intended for that objective.

In this report, first of all, the evaluation will cover the military component of the forces and means that are designed to protect the country's sovereignty, especially the National Army of the Republic of Moldova as the basic component of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova (AFRM). Secondly, having fewer details due to its lesser significance, the contribution of the other components in AFRM combat capacities, namely troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Gendarmes), and Border Guards, are to be described.

Knowing a state's military capacities to maintain its sovereignty will give the opportunity to ensure a correct building of the National Army and other components of the AFRM. Knowing a state's military opportunities, as one of the numerous factors meant to maintain the sovereignty, as well as the existing risks and threats, will ensure a correct achievement of internal and external policy.

The overall objective of this work is to estimate the state's defence sufficiency in the current geopolitical conditions.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Napoleon Bonaparte's famous phrase, who stated that the one who does not want to feed his own army will feed another, remains urgent in our days. In order to prevent such a precedent, the precise and clear plan of building the National Army should be worked out. In this respect, the financing necessary to maintain a sufficient combat potential of the Armed Forces should be matched to the country's economic possibilities. It is necessary to keep in mind that the unreasonably high expenses for maintaining the Soviet Union Armed Forces at a

high degree of battle readiness were a major factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet empire.

Unlike other former national republics, which had efficient military units on their territory, in most cases the Republic of Moldova has accepted under its jurisdiction military units in which officers and petty officers have refused to make a pledge to Moldova and to serve in the National Army. For instance, in the air force regiment there were only 18 technical officers and no pilots; in the artillery regiment there were only seven officers.

These military units were absolutely not suitable for our republic from the point of view of applicability, personnel structure, organisational structure, and their location. That situation required not only a reform of the army, just like in other CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent States), but also creation of a National Army from scratch, by using only material and technical capacities of the former military units.

According to the Law on the Armed Forces the military body's goal is to protect the state in case of military aggression, to ensure the inviolability of the country's frontiers and airspace.

The Armed Forces were organized based on the following principles:

- keeping the Armed Forces active, strengthened by conscripts and enlisted personnel;
- preparation of a military reserve based on compulsory military service performed by the country's citizens;
- a unified and centralized management;
- welfare and legal protection assured by the state to the military personnel;
- education of the personnel in the spirit of patriotism, compliance with the law and democratic ideas.

After signing the peace agreement that established the principles of a peaceful settlement of the military conflict in Transnistrian region on July 21, 1992, a new stage has been registered in the development of the military structure, which was caused by the new realities. It was necessary to proceed in a direction meant to optimise the defence system by modernizing its structure, further improvement of combat training, and the provision of troops with all necessary resources. In addition to this, it was necessary to solve problems related to the day – to – day situation, and implementation of obligations related to the affiliation to the European collective security system. Moreover, during the creation of the Armed Forces it was necessary to take into account the country's economic and financial situation. The major objectives were the following: to take actions necessary to improve the efficiency of organisation and structures; optimisation of the troops' effective force; development and implementation of new training techniques, combat operations methodology and combat systems; improving military discipline; and improving housing, material, and medical assistance. In the logistical area, the following tasks were pursued: maintenance of armament, machinery, and

ammunition; their competent redistribution, maintenance, and operation; construction of various military sites, etc.

At the same time it was urgently imperative to develop a complete set of norms; for example, laws, regulations, orders, directives and instructions of both the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as rules and specifications.

In spite of the fact that by the end of 1992 most of the highly-qualified officers of Moldovan origin returned to the country and actively joined the process of creating the National Army, the shortage of staff was nevertheless extremely acute. Great part of the officers, for example, faced language problems, due to insufficient knowledge of the military and technical terminology in Romanian. The majority of the officers continued to have a Soviet military mentality, skills, and attitude to the service, which were incompatible to the new reality. However, in most cases, officers made efforts to meet the requirements imposed by the new situation.

Besides the conflict development between two struggling parties, a modern war includes at least a competition between men (personnel) and means of conducting battle. The aspects of this competition are numerous, but can be grouped in the following basic directions:

1. determinism: man versus equipment, its vision, necessity, and utilisation;
2. duality of the ratio, in the true sense of the word, warrior versus combat equipment;
3. contradiction between a warrior's psychological limits and opportunities to act with modern combat equipment;
4. competition between human and artificial intelligence.

The parity of determinism – man versus equipment – *will always make sense. The man will be a builder of the machinery and in future military conflicts man will be such as the machinery will create him, and the machinery will serve him in combat.*

On a battlefield, a possessive relationship between a warrior and his weapon always existed. A true soldier will never throw his weapon, and the weapon, well-cared and attentively maintained, will never betray him.

In a modern war, this feeling has been preserved, having a new collective sense. Our system, our tank, our aircraft etc., are expressions that have been brought to modern life, expressing only for the experts the unification of human forces and material resources. Out of this aggregate, based mainly on teamwork, training, common work and understanding, it becomes obvious that every individual depends on the team, and the success of a mission – on each and everybody. At the same time, modern military equipment, in spite of a higher impact power capacity, autonomy, operational artificial intelligence is required, due to mission complexities, a high capacity of becoming part of the team and, as a consequence, a second level of aggregation appears – the operative team – system.

In an aggregation phenomenon, collective preparation, a complete and adequate training, capable to create the mutual confidence necessary among team members, as well as the human element and the military equipment, which is used by and serves the team, are of extreme importance. Similarly, the necessity for configuration and reconfiguration of teams should be understood, even in situations caused by battle casualties or inabilities, as a result of disability due to injuries.

From a practical point of view, the Army's problems related to weapons supply, combat equipment, and materials represent some of the most important tasks of the heads of the Defence Ministry. After the end of the military conflict on the left bank of the Dniester River, and due to the evolution of the international situation at that time – particularly, consequences of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation disintegration, break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Yugoslavia war – equipping the Army gained a new significance, which determined the reconsideration of the programs dimensions and the concept revision..

In spite of the fact that in Europe positive steps in various areas of arms control and disarmament have been taken, the development of armaments at a worldwide level continued to pay a special attention to quality. Many neighbouring countries of Moldova have restructured and even increased their military budgets, showing a special interest in restructuring the armed forces by equipping them with new categories of modern military equipment. And all these measures were taken for the purpose of increasing firepower and mobility of their armies. Advanced countries focused particularly on modernisation of their aircrafts and equipment; armoured combat vehicles; and systems of air and antitank defence.

During the drafting of the Army's equipment concept, the following factors have been particularly considered:

- strategic objectives relating to future repelling of possible aggressions against the Republic of Moldova;
- creation of new organisational structures, able to ensure the mobility, independence and increased firepower of combat units;
- the existing situation in equipping the National Army at the moment of its creation and afterwards; level of provisions for brigades and military units, as well as quality of the military equipment inherited from the former Soviet Army;
- provisions of international agreements ratified by Moldova concerning reductions of conventional weapons;
- long-term and middle-term prospects of the forecast evolution of the national economy, formulated by the government of the Republic of Moldova;
- the existing situation and perspective tendencies at a global, continental and regional level in the military equipment area;
- the former military industrial complex's scientific and technical degree and capacities to produce and repair military equipment;
- tendencies and evolution in military expenses at a global level;
- geographical and climate peculiarities of the Republic of Moldova.

By analysing the complexity of the international political situation, the geopolitical situation of the Republic of Moldova at the initial stage, after gaining its independence and in the perspective of the Transdnistrian conflict settlement's particularities, and also the influence of these factors on the National Army equipping, a number of objectives was scheduled for short or long – term.

For the short – term implementing, the following objectives were set:

- equipping all mechanised infantry brigades with armoured combat vehicles. This will allow for the achievement of two important objectives: developing military training as a well-planned and ongoing process and maintaining a high level of mobilisation readiness in peacetime and wartime;

- strengthening troops by equipping them with all necessary types of weapons and ammunitions lacking at the moment. This shortage is due, first of all, to the massive evacuation of armaments and military equipment from Moldova between 1989 and 1991, before Mircea Snegur, the President of the Republic of Moldova issued a decree on the transfer of military units of the former Soviet Army under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova. According to the decree, Moldova obtained pistols, submachine guns, machine guns, carbines with optical sight, grenade launchers, mortars of various calibres, artillery systems; ammunitions for all sorts of weapons in the arsenal of the National Army (7.62mm, 5.45mm and 9mm calibre rounds, grenades, mortar and howitzer shells, rockets for various kind of launchers, bombs, etc.);

- equipping of infantry weaponry, artillery systems, armoured combat vehicles with night-vision and electronic optical targeting devices, in order to maintain the operational ability of subdivisions at night and in unfavourable weather conditions;

- increasing the degree of protection for military personnel from reconnaissance subdivisions of infantry mechanized brigades and the Special Forces Battalion, equipping them with the means of individual protection from bullets and shrapnel (flak jackets, armoured helmets, etc.);

- modernisation of the ammunition of artillery systems through foreign purchase or exchange, including high-precision projectiles;

- increasing capacities for all echelons of forces troops to engage enemy armoured combat vehicles by equipping troops with antitank grenade launchers, antitank guns, and guided antitank rocket systems;

- strengthening air defence capacities of the mechanised infantry troops by re-equipping the military units with short distance air defence missile launchers, since long distance air defence combat does not fit in the tactic and strategic concepts of the National Army;

- increasing the troops manoeuvre capacity by supplying them with necessary means of haulage and transportation;

- re-consideration and re-evaluation of storage and supplies, including the volume and specification of storages and the dispensing of strategic and operative stock, in order to sustain combat levels.

Definition of the short-term goals was determined by the following: the most immediate needs in equipping the National Army with military machines and armaments; the financial and material possibilities which the state could afford allocating to the Army in the next two or three years (affected by the difficult economic situation); most importantly, the existing opportunities for co-operation with foreign partners for Army supplies with advanced military equipment.

For middle and long-term programs some objectives that would ensure prompt qualitative improvement in the future in the area of equipment have been set, having, nevertheless, in mind the economic possibilities. The liquidation of some current deficits was expected to be achieved as a result of the implementation of these objectives. The gradual replacement of some weapons and military equipment by more advanced types will take place, and their quality will be close enough to those available in the advanced countries. At the same time, the intensifying of measures directed to their modernisation and improvement, in order to meet modern requirements and to reduce the personal structure has to be accomplished.

It is well known that troop logistics during war requires the solution of multiple and complex tasks from every specialised part at every echelon. In spite of the fact that all activities are already well-planned and scheduled during peacetime, and measures for economy and territorial preparation for defence provide the material basis for combat actions, it is necessary in peacetime to reconsider and adapt the material maintenance procedures according to modern war requirements, simultaneously creating a uniform controlling, planning and deploying system of logistics.

In wartime, the logistics combat forces in the national defence system depend greatly on the national economy output, which must satisfy both defence and civilian requirements. As a consequence, combat forces maintenance cannot be developed outside of the social and economic environment of the country, which is generally directly involved in defence efforts.

At the first stage, the precise quantities of materials, resources and their locations, distribution schedule, means of transportation, necessary loading personnel, and reception documents are established according to the equipping norms and organisation charts and precise calculations. All these actions should be organised and performed in the shortest term, based on regulations of the State Military Building Concept, which have not been accepted yet without any reservations by the Moldovan parliamentarians of various political colours since 1992; nevertheless, it has been used as a guiding document many times.

3. THE CURRENT STRATEGY – INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the final decade of the 20th century brought significant changes to the international community that were difficult to forecast even for the most experienced analysts. The end of the Cold War period actually marked a remarkable victory of the West, which managed to achieve a series of major objectives without sending mankind into a World War III holocaust. Thus, in just a few months of 1989, the socialist dictatorship was eliminated in all socialist countries, at the beginning of 1991 the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was abolished, and at the second half of the same year, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the former union republics became independent states.

If, in general, these evolutions could be anticipated and welcomed, it seems that the rapid pace with which events occurred surprised even their promoters. As a consequence, the political, social, economic, and military phenomena seemed difficult or even impossible to solve appropriately in a short period of time, without preliminary preparation.

From the military point of view, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and disintegration of the USSR created a situation where the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) lost its main potential opponent, which created the necessity to reconsider the political and military objectives to a new strategic concept. The concept was drafted and adopted in November 1991.

Concerning the newly independent states, which were born as a consequence of the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Federation tried initially to create a permanent common defence system, based on a powerful military-industrial complex and on the Soviet military mechanism. But nationalist and centrifugal tendencies created serious controversies inside the military structures that were inherited from the former union state. All these, as well as evolution of the struggle for power, lead to the dismissal of the Unified General Staff of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Unified Army, a fact that increased uncertainty in the area of defence even more.

Consequently, military experts reacted and drafted the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which generalized and adapted the Soviet military doctrine for the newly created situation, without removing its old basic principles and objectives. In spite of the fact that it concerned the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the existence of The CIS General Staff for Coordination and Military Co-operation, created in December 1993, demonstrated the intention to introduce this doctrine in other CIS countries (at least in the sphere of the basic principles).

On the independence of former Soviet republics, in which Russian troops remained, we can speak only metaphorically. In this direction, political observers estimated that the presence of the 14th Army on the left bank of the Dniester River turned Moldova into „testing area“ for Moscow’s political experiments. The

postponement of the Russian troops' withdrawal from various regions of the former USSR, as a rule, was justified through military personnel welfare problems and the necessity to protect the Russians or the Russian-speaking minority – both cases demonstrating nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Later justification, created by protection of the Russian geopolitical interests, was represented by a peacekeeping role of Russian troops in conflict zones. Transnistria was probably a unique region where all three explanations, more or less, did not have any support so far. The protection of the „Transnistrian people“ in conditions of „threats of extermination“ was only a populist mask for achievement the political objective. The 14th Army assumed this protection.

Another aspect of the complex military situation in the geopolitical space of the former USSR is related to the ammunition warehouses widely spread not only on the territory of the Russian Federation, but also on territories of the other states that became independent after the collapse of the Moscow totalitarian system. The Moscow media estimated, at that time, that such warehouses amounted to hundreds and drew attention on the threat they represented, due to their insufficient protection, which could have had as a result theft of the weapons and ammunitions and also could cause possible explosions with catastrophic consequences to the neighbouring area.

Such a warehouse, a real tinderbox, is located next to Kolbasna village in northern Transnistria, near the border with Ukraine. The depot, which used to supply the Odessa Military District, became increasingly overfilled due to arrival of dozens of trains loaded with ammunitions and rockets withdrawn together with the Soviet Army from the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation. This depot was transferred under the control of the former 14th Army. Anyway, withdrawal of this army, if it does indeed happen, will be finalized in minimum three years. The warehouse protected by old – age security guards, was a real temptation for Transnistrian separatists, as well as for the arm-smuggling mafia. Experts stressed out the Kolbasna depot evacuation would require more than five years. This is explained by the necessity to follow security measures, availability of only one railway access line, and the time consumed for loading five wagons – approximately 24 hours. The situation got even worse due to the presence in the depot of ammunitions produced in 1938-40 (almost 30%) that cannot be transported and should be destroyed on the spot. The Tiraspol leaders violently resisted such a solution, probably not because of the risk to which the environment is exposed by repeated and massive explosions, but because they did not want to lose a source of arms for their military units. The largest part of the rockets and other military equipment and ammunition types held by Transnistrian military units comes from this warehouse. There were also other groups interested in keeping this „tinderbox“ – particularly the arms-smuggling mafia.

There is no doubt, this complex situation was created by a multitude of reasons. One of them was the chaos established during the transition period in some structures of the Russian society and of other states that appeared from

the former USSR. The chaos came, in most cases, with a rapid rise of a destabilising force coming from the conservative opposition, which was influenced by imperial nostalgia. Others originated in what was referred to as „the mafia’s organised crime network on arms and nuclear materials traffic.“

As far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, it is important to note that the decision on creating the National Armed Forces, as well as the process of its building was closely connected to important events occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Analysis of the evolution of the military building process proves that it completely reflects the situation of the society. The main decisions were accepted during the consolidation of the Moldovan state at each individual stage and as a whole process: internal and external military-political situation; vision of the republic’s political elite and leaders on national military interests, the economic situation, etc. All of this was reflected in the building process of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova.

But, on the other hand, the creation of the Armed Forces and of the national defence system occurred without any well-defined concept of national security and long-term military-political strategy, which would be based on systematised and proven analysis, comprehensively developed and closely coordinated to other fundamental interests of the Moldovan state, and having an opportunity for their future improvement. Therefore, decisions concerning only military creation from the very beginning and up to present have been drafted and made exclusively within the framework of the Ministry of Defence on the basis of those visions and concepts that were elaborated and developed there, without any direct participation of other state agencies – not even of those which were authorized by law to do so, meaning it lacks the necessary support for practical implementation of these concepts.

At present, the strategic directions in the creation of the Armed Forces and of the National Army, as its basic institution, have a pattern determined by the state financial possibilities. These possibilities are extremely limited and, consequently, like in the entire economy, all efforts of the Armed Forces leaders of the Republic of Moldova are oriented to the Army’s survival, to maintaining the personnel structure in a reasonably adequate shape (officers and petty officers), as well as to weapons and military equipment maintenance. It is necessary to understand that weapons and military equipment maintenance involves just its maintaining – the prevention of theft or destruction due to negligence of the personnel – without paying attention to its qualitative condition.

It is a well known fact that the business systems, including a free market economy, have to protect themselves through internal and external defence, regardless of their nature. As a consequence, it is necessary for every state to invest financial resources, which finally represent expenses shared by the nation. This is the only way to raise necessary funds for the creation of a state military

potential to maintain its defence system, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

National defence, one of the central strategies and tasks of each and every state, became the most important problem. As well-known economist Adam Smith wrote, it has a greater importance than prosperity.

Expenses for defence issues are provided by the state's financial resources included in the state budget that are allocated to the military budget, which has turned into an important tool for solution of numerous problems that have a direct influence on the national security. Among economic and financial levers used by a market economy state in order to achieve its national defence objectives are taxes, including customs fees, grants, credits, as well as internal loans together with external ones, as the case may be at a given moment. .

In countries with such an economic system, the democratic state is involved in supplying necessary economic and financial resources, because national defence is considered a public interest and all businesses, whether private or public, alongside all its citizens, should contribute to the achievement of the national defence objectives. Ordinary military expenses were and remain topics of extensive discussions, with the purpose to find out whether they are productive.

An erroneous understanding of their nature and, especially of the role of military expenses, their dependency on a country's economic conditions can negatively affect the military potential. Here we are talking about a reduction or, even, liquidation of some strictly necessary funds, which would make possible the maintenance in our country of modern armed forces, appropriate to our geostrategic and geopolitical situation. Moreover, maintaining such modern armed forces is of great importance, due to the recent evolutions and drastic changes in the military capacities of our neighbouring countries.

Certainly, we cannot afford to keep out of sight, not even for one second, the realities that determine us to make military expenses very attentively. They need to be determined in an optimum way, knowing that, as appreciated by a document of the broader international body – the United Nations Organization – they are necessary for the social life of a state and have the role...„to add an immeasurable element to the civil production – the security. In fact, the topic of budgets, the finance adjustment for defence needs, has always been an extraordinary „painful“ topic ever since the first years of the National Army's creation. Every time when the state budget was to be approved, fiery discussions were held at all levels of the state hierarchy. During the last ten years all talk related to military budgets have been bitter. Their bitterness is explained by the fact that each year the military budget has become increasingly insufficient compared to real needs. In 1993-98, the share of military expenditure in Moldova's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been decreased year after year and had insignificant proportions: 0.4-0.7%. As for the the budget of the Ministry of Defence, it is approximately 2-3 % of the state budget. Nevertheless, these sums covered in reality only 40-60% of the real needs.

During the Cold War, the primary function of national defence budgets – the supply of funds necessary for armed forces – gained a political meaning that was reflected in their constant increase or by being established at a high level in the majority of the countries as a consequence of the arms race between the two superpowers.

The military-industrial complexes were developed in this period, when tremendous funds were allotted for the development of some very effective weapon systems; many enterprises worked exclusively for the army, and the best scientists were gathered in the field of military research. The results rose to the undertaken efforts.

The high level of military expenses, combined with the effects of increased activity in research and development has turned the military budget into an important factor in the economy of most of the countries. The armament manufacturing had become a priority for many economies, which survival basically depended on mass armament exports. Arms export brought significant profits to those states producing armaments, the biggest part of them being intended for military expenses.

After the end of the Cold War, defence expenditures have been reduced; however, it is necessary to note that they still remained at a high level. It is obvious that their decrease or increase is in direct correlation to each country's economic power, the geopolitical characteristics of the region where a country is located, and also to the international political climate. The reduction of global military expenses occurred as a result of Russia, the United States and some Western European countries decreasing their military expenses due to various factors.

Because of various reasons, it is difficult to make an exact evaluation of global military expenses, but we will try to list a few of them:

- some states, with a significant amount in the total international military expenses, make public a lesser amount than the actual one; others just fail to officially communicate such expenditures;

- in the majority of the countries, part of expenses intended for defence are allocated and hidden in non-military organisations and structures – industry, science, education, etc. – thus the real level of military expenditures is much lower than the officially announced one;

- the volume of weapons, combat equipment and spare parts accounted for as parts of some external debts or as technical assistance do not figure into the volume of the military expenses announced officially, thus giving the opportunity for an erroneous estimation;

- the volumes of the budgets or expenses allocated for defence differ from one publication to another, depending on the information sources or even on an existent purpose.

Analysing the evolution of global military expenditures between 1987 and 1995, it was ascertained that they had a maximum volume in 1987 – 670.749

billion USD –, which has been reduced ever since, reaching approximately 576 billion USD in 1994..

Countries of the Central and Eastern Europe – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania – have continued after 1989 to reduce their military expenses, mainly due to economic reasons. The military problems that they faced in this period were identical and have affected in some way the expenses intended for defence:

- revision of the national military doctrines;
- restructuring and reorganising the national defence systems;
- dependence on the former USSR regarding supply of spare parts for military equipment on-hand;
- an opportunity to join NATO, which was considered as a unique ally capable of guaranteeing the necessary national security.

The main tasks of these countries were represented by the modernisation of their armed forces' equipment and, in particular, by accomplishing both interoperability and compatibility with NATO. The lack of financial resources in these countries made the purchase of new equipment, produced in the United States or Western Europe, difficult. Attempts to modernise on-hand military equipment were made, and the set of measures for revival of their own military industry was carried out in Poland, Hungary, and Romania.

In spite of the fact that these countries wanted to equip their armies with weapons and military equipment manufactured in the West, the absence of financial resources has resulted in some of them accepting Russian armaments and combat equipment as compensation for Russian debts (Hungary, Bulgaria). In order to raise funds, the majority of the countries undertook efforts to sell military equipment removed from their military's inventory.

Russian military expenses were reduced after 1990, especially due to the economic decline, being in 1993-94 around USD 10 billion (according to the year 1993 exchange rates). The level did grow, reaching USD 17 billion in 1996 (according to the current exchange rate). Being necessary for Russia to finance modern weapon development programs, it undertook efforts to find new funds and was in fact engaged in a renewal of the weapons export.

Basically, the advanced countries, having powerful weapon manufacturing industries, have allocated in the last decade of the past century significant funds to fulfil the research efforts and development project for modern weapon systems for all branches of the armed forces. It makes sense to expect for the coming years a significant increase of the expenses for equipping different military branches with new weapons.

After 1989, the Central and Eastern European countries allotted most of their total military expenses to personnel and technical maintenance, reaching 90 % of the overall military expenses. Amounts allocated to the equipping with modern weapons and military equipment were basically reduced. Nevertheless, some of

these countries found other financing sources (out of budget financing) and managed to modernise a part of their military equipment.

Analysing the given data, as well as the distribution of military expenditures within the budgets, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- the advanced countries allocate significant amounts for the modernisation of equipment of their armed forces, while the transitional countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and the developing countries allocate more than 90 per cent of funds to maintain their armed forces in a functional condition.

- the increase of funds for research in the sphere of defence in highly advanced countries (USA, France) is ascertained;

- some countries have the tendency to accumulate heavy stocks of modern weapons (countries of the Middle East, Southern Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America that are surrounded by countries with highly advanced weapon manufacturing industry) supplied *by the countries interested in selling weapons and military equipment removed from usage* (USA, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia).

- the Superpowers withdrew, at least for now, from the nuclear arms race (the military expenses in this area have fallen) but were intensively engaged in improving conventional weaponry. That means we are in a period of advanced weaponry systems, which allows for a reduction of personnel and mandates the improvement of professionalism of militaries.

Even many years after the Republic of Moldova declared its sovereignty, there are still too many politicians, regardless their political colour, from one extreme to another, who state that, since Moldova aspires to become a neutral country, an army is not necessary at all. However, only politicians who frequently use examples of advanced Western countries, but choosing not to notice the role the military plays – not only as a tool for combat –but as an institution for patriotic education (especially for the youth), would suggest such a thing. Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and other countries with a neutrality status over the decades did not refuse to keep a military.

Unfortunately, in Moldova, some powerful politicians adhered to such abstract pacifist ideas. Nevertheless, others promoted and lobbied for the policy of some insignificant group's interests, as many of them just have not reached a level of understanding of their responsibilities that are incumbent on them, for being at the top level of the authority pyramid. Altogether, they have been trying „to reinvent the bicycle," to prove somehow their incompetence or malevolence. Nevertheless, these „inventors" did not take into consideration the international realities, which have already shown that, regardless the economical, political or any other situation, there are no countries in the world that boast no military. Every country in the world is engaged in its own security activities, even in spite of the fact that most of the states do not have hostile neighbouring countries, do not have intentions to be at war with them, and do not aspire to a possible victory in a potential military conflict. Every country maintains an army as the most important attribute of the state's structure, as a warrant of its indepen-

dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Starting from this, they allocate the necessary funds for maintaining the army, which allow the armed forces to be equipped and act in compliance with the current legislation and regulations. Unfortunately, these elementary rules were completely disregarded in the Republic of Moldova. Due to that fact, at present Moldova has not only the smallest army but also one of the smallest military budgets in the world.

Besides, it is necessary to note that the competent authorities in the majority of the countries of the world are dominated by the tendency to increase the prosperity of its people, who devoted their lives to defend their homeland. For this reason, everywhere in the world, special attention is paid to keeping a reasonable living standard of the military personnel serving under contract, with the purpose to maintain an appropriate level of the armed forces. Special financial benefits are budgeted for them, including food expenses compensations and grants stipulated for the transition from the active service to reserve. All of these are determined by the fact that military personnel always execute their duties in special conditions, frequently even in extreme ones, having to risk their lives, which requires extraordinary psychological and moral efforts, such as permanent and special responsibility for the subordinated personnel and unlimited working hours. Military service specifics are also explained by a frequent execution of the duty service during 24 hours a day: combat service, combat equipment operations, tactical training trips, manoeuvres, and combat training, etc.

These benefits are also explained by the fact that moonlighting work in addition to military service is forbidden to military personnel, which means they do not have any additional sources of income. For this reason, for example, in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and other countries the military personnel received food ration cards, which real value was of 158, 128, 136 and 143 Moldovan lei (according to 1994 exchange rates), versus 35 lei that Moldovan military personnel receive. Between 12 up to 20 monthly salaries were paid on instalments a grant for leaving active service.

In the same states, given as an example in those years, there was constantly a clear tendency to improve the financial benefits for military personnel. In Romania, as well as in many other Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, these tendencies were maintained basically by attempts to achieve NATO standards, including the clauses concerning financial support and civil rights protection for military personnel. In the other CIS countries mentioned above, defence problems and the state security were explained by a responsible attitude, regardless the economical situation existing at that time.

Wages increase and indexing, solution of various welfare problem and other challenges were met not due to reasons that these countries wanted their military personnel to become rich and elites, but started from the fact that under transition conditions the military personnel should not think of where and how to get the money necessary to buy bread or other necessary goods, but to think of how to completely execute the tasks they are assigned to them. Unfortunately, in

Moldova those events were practically absent. Moreover, the tendency is completely opposite – the reduction of financing was recorded.

Certainly, it is impossible to ignore a crisis condition, passed through by the Moldovan economy that has an impact on the resources that can be allotted for the national defence. But, at the same time, it is necessary to consider the objectives pursued by our neighbouring countries in the military sphere, the very restless geopolitical and geostrategic area where we are now and will be for a long term. This particular situation makes us think of possible decisions that would lead to real allocation of more resources to defence as soon as possible, because the created situation requires it.

During 1993-94, due to factors and conditions of a dwindling economy as shown above, other decisions were not made on equipping the army with armaments, military equipment, projectiles and ammunition; rather, some in – kind exchanges (barter) with other states or purchases using off-budget funds occurred, funds collected as a result of selling some surpluses of materials out of the property of the National Army on the external market, which remained outside the inventory or did not have any chance to be used in the future by the Armed Forces.

In the first half of the last decade the elaboration of a new logistics system concept for the National Army began, which was based on modern principles. Its necessity was explained by the extensive and deep process of changes in which our society was involved in its transition to democracy and pursuit of economic reforms. That process was characterized by establishing the legal framework and necessary measures for the Moldovan economic liberalization, having well determined market mechanisms and connecting to economic functions of the state, based on law and natural and direct consequences on the structure, organization, equipment, tasks and preparation of the national military body. These consequences compelled the making of some changes in the Army's maintenance system, the supply with all necessary means for sustenance, training and conducting military actions for the purpose of transforming it into another qualitative state based on logistics. Taking into consideration the sphere it covers, the approach of the logistics concept can be made for the centre level – the National defence logistics system – for large military units level (strategic, operative and tactic logistics) and normal military units level (subdivision logistics).

The National defence logistics system can be determined as a complex of measures and activities developed for peacetime and wartime in a uniform concept and programs: research and development projects, military production, combat forces equipping and maintenance, technical maintenance, communications maintenance, transport, medicine, veterinary, financial, other services necessary for defence efforts. At this level, the system was not yet developed fully and coherently even in 2001, in particular those rules providing for adoption and implementation of a complete set of normative documents. The biggest difficulties are related to the fact that the national logistics system includes central and

local authorities, territorial military bodies, businesses (regardless their ownership status), organisations of various categories, logistics elements from the armed force structures, and also the connections that are established among them.

The Army's logistics is included in the structure of the National Defence Logistics System, which covers a set of extension actions having as a purpose to supply the Army's large military units (brigades), military units and subdivisions with all necessary material means both for conducting combat actions and for everyday activities, regardless the conditions of terrain, season and weather. The Army's logistics system represents a set of forces, territorial military bodies, local authorities, businesses, (regardless their ownership patterns), organization of various categories in the area of units location, and also interrelations that are established among them for troops supply with all goods necessary for everyday and combat activities.

The Army's logistic concept is determined by its components, which are related to: supply with material resources, transportation for the troops' maintenance and evacuation, technical maintenance, sanitary-veterinary maintenance, financing and road maintenance.

Elaboration of the new logistics concept was a real necessity that was determined, on one hand, by the army's requirements and, on the other hand, by changes undergone by the components of this system (for instance: local authorities, businesses and organizations of various categories). This system, with a purpose to guarantee its efficient work, should act towards the modernization of the army's logistics structure. If modernisation of logistics forces is not carried out at all echelons, it will be impossible to achieve the ultimate goal – supply of the army with all necessary goods.

Supply of the army with all categories of military equipment, goods and materials necessary to support training and appropriate conditions for the military personnel in peacetime; the ability to deal with combat actions in wartime is the basic mission of the army's logistics.

In order to maintain appropriate conditions necessary for performing logistics missions, the officials who adopt decisions at all levels of authority should observe a series of basic principles, such as:

- The essential role of logistics in assuring the success of a battle;
- Undertaking certain measures in peacetime, which should be intensified and diversified in the case of war;
- Optimisation of the performance of logistics missions, which should precede the beginning of battle actions;
- Permanently maintaining the co-ordination between the Army's requirements and the national economy possibilities;
- The creation in peacetime of some stocks of military equipment and food, thoroughly established for each echelon, from the bottom line to the national level, which will ensure constant readiness of the logistics system to support military actions at any moment;

– Adaptability of the logistics system that would be provided through its flexible organizational, easy manageable structures, which could adequately react to all changes of a situation that could arise.

Implementation of logistics activities is a matter of a particular complexity and high responsibility; the right to make decisions in logistics belongs to the commanders at all levels, who should have the same responsibility for logistics as for the organization and development of other activities both in peacetime and wartime.

The consolidation of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova was and still is constantly accompanied by a number of problems of a general character, among which one of the most important is the maintenance of the country's stability and security.

The vital aspect of the country's security is the military security, which is understood as guaranteeing the state protection against external and internal military threats through measures and actions that would ensure an opportunity to prevent and resolutely repel any possible armed aggression, or to prevent, localise and eliminate military conflicts of any sort on the borders or inside the country.

The basic measures and actions undertaken and promoted by the Republic of Moldova for maintenance of its own military security are designated and established in the Military Doctrine approved by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on June 6, 1995. This document established the Moldovan state's official visions and priorities in establishing rules and principles of military policy, security policy implementation, techniques for maintaining military-political stability, security in the process of the state building, parity of new forces in the international arena.

Starting from these prerequisites, the Doctrine proclaimed the state's military policy priorities, and also determined the necessary measures designed to maintain military security at the global, regional and national levels. The basis for these priorities is the designation of the Republic of Moldova as a neutral state, elaborated as aspirations of political leaders to create a world without violence, of civilised relations between the states, and of mutual confidence and co-operation.

The solution to similar national security problems is an ordinary rule for any democratic state; it does not contradict the country international obligations to maintain peace and stability, and it follows the rules of international law and the UN Charter. All these points reflect the aspirations of ordinary people and of the state and compose the Doctrine's military-political aspect.

The military-technical aspect determines the Republic of Moldova's military building basis, the character of possible combat actions, and the methods of application of the Armed Forces. It was foreseen that the state military organization would be based on the following principles:

– The presence of a necessary military infrastructure and a permanent army, reduced in number (in the future a planned professional army). The character of

a possible military threat will determine their equipping and combat training. The total will not be too numerous, but at the same time will not be lower than required to organize an effective and adequate defence of the state;

- The availability of mobilisation of reserves for the Armed Forces; ability of the large military units and military units to solve any offensive action within the necessary defence limits;

- The competent arrangement of a territorial defence both in a region and in the entire territory;

- The full and complex use of the state's military organizations – the National Army, Gendarmerie, and Border Guards – in carrying out combat actions under the sole control of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces – the President of the Republic of Moldova;

- The depoliticising of the Armed Forces.

The maintenance of the state's military security, as shown above, represents an effective combination of a military-political component at an external level and a military-technical component at an internal level.

The Military Doctrine's general provisions state that the Doctrine's regulations are determined by the internal and foreign state policy, by the permanent neutrality proclaimed by the Constitution, having an exclusively defensive character, and the following priorities has as the basis:

- in the political area – peace and conflict resolution between the states and prohibition of military confrontations through a collective effort of countries, based on international law principles and norms; the establishment of political, economic and military relations that exclude the violation of the state's sovereignty and independence;

- in the military area – maintenance of the state defence capacity at a level that ensures military security, consolidation of confidence measures, mutually advantageous extension of military co-operation based on the principle of mutual respect of sovereignty, independence and non-interference in other states' internal affairs.

In the Doctrine the basic measures that are to be taken by the state for the purpose of achieving the following priorities at a global, regional, and national level were also stipulated:

- At a global level – participation in activities of the international community on preventing war and armed conflicts and amicable settlement of conflicts; creation of necessary conditions, which, in case of external military threat will ensure the exercise of our republic's right to benefit from assistance from international organizations; active participation in the building of a co-operative international security system;

- At a regional level – establishing friendship bilateral relations with states of the region, which would ensure a high level of mutual trust and transparency in the military sphere;

– At a national level – creating a military potential at a level sufficient for maintaining the state's military security.

And in the final part of the Doctrine, the military-political chapter determines certain concrete actions related to the accomplishment of the proposed military-political measures and technique, according to which the Republic of Moldova:

- Will never initiate military actions against other states;
- Will not present any territorial claims to other states;
- Will not accept any territorial claims presented from any state;
- Does not consider any state as an enemy;
- Provides security for the state without damaging the security of other states;
- Does not admit the use of its territory for any aggressive actions against other states and for quartering foreign armies, except for the cases stipulated by the international agreements concerning the remaining of peacekeeping forces;
- Does not admit holding, transit or storage of any mass destruction weapon that belongs to other states in its territory;
- Does not produce, store or buy any mass destruction weapons in the future;
- Accepts only those types of military activities, armaments, and military technologies that do not damage the ecological balance.

The permanent neutrality status provides for abstention of a country from joining blocks or military alliances. Simultaneously, it is known that each state (either small or big) carries certain responsibilities concerning stability and security both for itself and the wider – international, regional, etc. – community. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the fact that the army is a basic element of the stability and security maintenance process, the responsibility of neutral countries for maintaining their own armies for the purpose of supporting the country's neutrality status becomes more and more significant.

Switzerland, being a neutral country, holds the first place in the world on military expenses per capita (about USD 700 annually). Finland, having a population of 5.1 million people, maintains an army consisting of 33,000 military personnel. Sweden, with a population up to 8.8 million, maintains an army consisting of 63,000 military personnel. All these armies belonging to traditionally neutral states are organized, equipped, prepared and are paid special attention by the population and authorities of these countries.

The situation with the National Army of the Republic of Moldova is completely different. By ignoring the essential problems of the state defence system, the existing situation continues to lead to a degradation of both equipment and human potential and to a gradual destruction of the defence system. These negative tendencies became especially visible with respect to the employment of military personnel. Despite some incidental measures undertaken to stop the exodus of qualified experts from the army, the personnel losses are significant. Speaking about the National Army's officers and petty officers (total number

approximately 2000-2200), about 150-200 individuals leave the Army annually, the biggest number having been registered during the last few years.

The National Army is in real danger to remain without lower and middle level officers if such a tendency is maintained, because annually no more than 70 officers graduate from the „Alexandru cel Bun" Military College – the only military educational institution in Moldova. However, statistics show that after graduation hardly more than half of graduates remain in military units after a one- or two-year term of service. The officer corps coming from civilian colleges and universities, which gives the Army up to 20-30 individuals per year, does not solve the problem. Besides, their quality is a little bit lower, and they serve basically in logistics and technical maintenance units.

The reasons for this situation are well known:

1. The low level of payment. For example, a lieutenant receives a salary no more than 400 lei (less than USD 40) per month, an amount which is far from assuring a decent living standard.. During the preparation of this report the salary of a lieutenant was increased by up to 40-50 %, now reaching about 600 lei (approximately USD 50). However, that is not enough to solve the problem of the officer personnel leaving the Army, particularly younger officers of the military units. For the National Army and other AFRM agencies to preserve their personnel structure (and not its worse part), the payment level for military activities needs to be increased up to the level of bank employees;

2. The „foggy" future prospects for both the Army and officers. So far, the entire question on whether to maintain a military or not has been addressed in public discussion. Some political parties insist there is no necessity for a national army, because, in their opinion, there is no external threat for the republic. Similar opinions do not strengthen confidence of officers, especially of young officers in their future. But from this environment the situation for future commanders and superior commanders could only go up!

3. The shortage of houses. At the end of 1999 in the National Army there were more than 500 military personnel waiting for the distribution of a house, who had the right to receive governmental apartments according to the legislation;

4. Better opportunities to make a career in civilian businesses.

The resolution of the same complex of issues remains another strategic task, just like armaments, military equipment, and ammunition storage. During the existence of the National Army it has been impossible to avoid the plundering of armaments and military equipment due to the personnel failure. The criminal cases on the plunder of material assets and swindles, admitted both by some military units commanders and their subordinates, are well – known. In spite of the fact that they were found guilty and are serving their sentence, the return of material assets to the National Army is obviously impossible. The money resources on these criminal cases are directly written off the state budget, and do not return to the Ministry of Defence. Such a situation undermines not only the

prestige of the military personnel, which is certainly very important, but also the material basis of the National Army.

The technical condition of military equipment and armaments is at the lowest level. The technical promptness rate is not higher than 0.7. The 2Å36 howitzer cannot be used at all in accordance to its design due to the mechanical rubber components being obsolete. The same technical conditions affect the IÒ-12 antitank guns. It would seem that the mechanical rubber components do not make the biggest part of the cost of the guns and consequently do not demand the enormous financial expenses for their replacement. Besides, similar repairs can be executed in the country. Despite this, the Ministry of Defence failed to find resources for the restoration of military equipment, and as a consequence, the National Army's artillery arsenal's technical promptness rate cannot exceed 0.3. The „Uragan" mobile rocket launch system, which cannot be used at all because of the replacement life for the ammunition ended, is even in a more pitiful condition. More than 40% of armoured combat vehicles are out of order.

All current shortcomings are explained only by objective reasons – lack of financial resources for purchasing spare parts and components, as well as for necessary technical maintenance service and repairs.

The implementation of another strategic goal – the participation of the National Army in peacekeeping operations – is also under threat to fail. Strengthening the peacekeeping battalion with armaments and military equipment has not been accomplished yet. Thus, from 11 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, which are in the battalion's organization chart, only five APCs have an operational status; the other six units require advanced repair. Other structures do not have sufficient resources available to maintain the rotation of personnel and military equipment during peacekeeping operations.

For preparing a „fully-fledged" battalion capable of carrying out peacekeeping missions, it is necessary, according to the most modest calculations, to increase funding from two to three million US dollars, to repair and restore military equipment, as well as to equip personnel, to maintain ammunitions, to provide food and POL materials (petrol, oil and lubricants), to provide transportation to the mission location, and to conduct logistics for three months, after which financial resources as reimbursements and payments would be received from the UN. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defence has not such funds.

In spite of the fact that the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law on the Participation of the Republic of Moldova in International Peacekeeping Operations" (#1156-XIV), on July 26, 2000, the Government of the Republic of Moldova did not allot any financial resources in the 2001 budget to implement this law. Doing this, the government condemned to failure the performance of this strategic task. It is unlikely for funds necessary to maintain the peacekeeping battalion to be allotted in the year 2002, especially in light of the change of leaders of the political „Olympus" of the Republic of Moldova.

What could be the consequences of a possible failure to implement the obligations related to preparing the peacekeeping battalion? First, having a state policy directed to the integration of the Republic of Moldova in Europe and its inclusion in the European security process, failure to carry out these obligations will inevitably undermine our country's prestige;

Secondly, the chance to convince the international community's opinion to get involved in applying sanctions and to attract international peacekeeping forces in case of possible aggressive actions taken against the Republic of Moldova will decrease, a fact that will raise the risk of aggressive actions. In order to diminish these negative consequences, it is necessary to increase the Armed Forces' military potential, which requires additional funds and human resources, bigger than those necessary to maintain a peacekeeping battalion, or even a peacekeeping brigade.

Thirdly, separating the National Army from the European military co-operation will result in degradation of the training level of middle and senior officers. It is not a secret that the assistance provided within the framework of the Warsaw Initiative, as well as assistance provided based on bilateral agreements, assure the performance of the officer staff training, including at top level. Besides, the replacement of communications equipment with a more modern one, equipping with modern computers, additional hardware and creation of the base of the Army's advanced control system have been accomplished. Approximately six to seven million US dollars have already been received by the Army as various types of assistance.

And last, but not least, the peacekeeping battalion's involvement in performance of peacekeeping missions under the UN auspices will allow the army to receive approximately 10-13 million US dollars per year as various reimbursements and military personnel salaries. After deducting expenses, about 7-10 million US dollars will remain available, money that could be redirected for reforms in the National Army, in order to solve various welfare problems and to create stocks of materials and others. Besides, these financial resources will indirectly be introduced in the country's financial market, and this will improve the situation of the national economy.

The statement of Carl von Clausewitz that „war is a continuation of policy but by other means" remains valid even today. Similarly, in our country's situation, the state's foreign and military policy have a major mission – maintenance of the state's military security. They should mutually complement each other – where foreign policy fails to solve a problem, the Army should become involved.

This way, ever since 1999, when the peacekeeping battalion was created, the Army had an attempt to make the transition to a new level – namely, the transition from security „consumption" to its „production" and to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, once again, our state's foreign policy lags a little behind in this regard, due to lack of funds, which results in the impossibility to prepare a peacekeeping battalion.

4. THE ARMED FORCES: EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING COMBAT CAPACITIES

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova consist of the following branches: the National Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs' troops – Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the President of the Republic of Moldova, whose working body is the Supreme Security Council, which in peacetime offers advice to the president on defence issues and military policy.

In wartime, the control of the Armed Forces is performed by the President of the Republic of Moldova as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, through the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, which is created on the basis of the Main Headquarters of the National Army. Until now this situation is declarative. The precise scheme of the Main Headquarters' transition into General Headquarters still was not drafted. The moment of the transition of control over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova to the General Headquarters has not been determined; the regular structure of the General Headquarters has not been created. The standard documents, on which basis the transition will be performed, have not been drafted yet. The issues of the rear maintenance (logistics) of the Armed Forces under special circumstances (wartime) have not been determined.

Due to the specific tasks the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops – face in peacetime, they are armed with infantry armaments; combat training is directed to train personnel and military units to perform their specific tasks. At present, preparations to perform infantry combat actions in the Gendarmerie and Border Guard military units are not carried out. However, since 2000 joint staff trainings have been performed, having the purpose to prepare the Gendarmerie and Border Guard chain of command to accomplish tasks they may face in a modern war. However, even if the control bodies are prepared to conduct combat actions, being a part of the structure of the Armed Forces with unique control, the successful accomplishment of defensive operations will be impossible due to lack of experience of the Gendarmerie and Border Guard military units and subdivisions personnel who actually carries out the missions directly in the field. Therefore it is necessary to reconsider the combat training components of the Armed Forces towards training the personnel for infantry terrain combat.

Nevertheless, taking into account the insignificant combat capacities of the Gendarmerie and Border Guards, explained by a complete lack of heavy weapons, the National Army has the greatest contribution in repelling any aggression and in maintaining the state's military security.

Under this aspect, the combat capacities and components of the National Army's military potential will be shown in more detail in this study. The contribution to the military potential of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova (AFRM) brought by the other branches will be presented in the integrated plan.


The tendencies in building, security, training performance and, as a result, the capabilities of all branches of the AFRM to carry out the task to maintain military security are similar; anyway, they are explained by an objective reason – the lack of necessary financial resources of the state.

The Army's Military Potential Components are:

1. The Army's battle composition and numerical structure, personnel and equipment;
2. The status of material stocks;
3. The personnel readiness status to conduct combat actions, which is determined by the level of the personnel combat training and by the personnel's moral;
4. The combat equipment technical status.

An appropriate efficient structure is necessary for a normal functioning of the army, which, in peacetime, provides maintenance for required combat readiness and life-support and, in situations of threat or in wartime, carries out a rapid transition without special changes in structure, assuring the successful performance of combat actions.

4.1 The National Army: Force Structure




It is reasonable to consider that the National Army's structure is efficient in basic terms. However, this structure is impossible to be considered an optimum mechanism, due to the fact that the Ministry of Defence is in charge with supplying the National Army through its Supply Department – the shortage of warehouses in the Supply Department structure creates some difficulties, even beginning from the moment when goods are received from suppliers, up to their transfer to military units for use. Such situations happened already in the past. There are two ways to solve this problem. First, the central warehouses transfer to the Ministry of Defence. In such a case, the Logistics Department of the Main Headquarters would be taken away a part of its functions. personnel who become available as a result of this transfer will have the possibility to put together the efforts of both the Logistics Department and Maintenance Department for resolving the logistics and technical maintenance problems, as well as logistics training of the military units. So far, all the above-mentioned issues were not paid proper attention, due to the daily troops supply needs. The second way is the liquidation of the Supply Department as an unnecessary structure. Unfortunately, the working experience of this structure, its creation background, the absence of precise delimitation of responsibilities among overlapping structures of the Department and the Main Headquarters, shows that this solution should not be ignored. However, this is a topic for another study.

4.2. Numerical structure and its distribution.

The overall army' strength, together with the state's economic capacities, have to be determined also by other factors, namely the existing and predictable risks and threats, the geopolitical situation of the country, foreign and internal policy of the state, etc.

The experience of creating an army of other countries shows that, even in extremely peaceful states with well-advanced economies (and in many cases in developing countries), the overall army's effective force constitutes 0.8-1.2 % of the total population (the internal order maintenance forces and the border guard troops are not included in this number). Starting from this conclusion, the overall effective power number of the National Army should range at about 22-34,000 individuals. Actually, the National Army of the Republic of Moldova consists of 8,500 military personnel and 1,500 civilian personnel, which is more than two times less than the necessary (optimum) number. It is obvious that such a reduced effective strength is explained exclusively by the impossibility to maintain more numerous troops due to the state's economic difficulties and the extremely low efficiency of the national economy.

NA Forces Distribution



Nevertheless, it makes sense to consider that the distribution of the National Army's forces is actually normal. It is distributed as follows: command and control 3 %; combat units 68 %; combat support units 15 %; logistics units 2 %; technical maintenance units 3 %; military educational institutions and others 9 %.

The disadvantage of such a distribution is the low weight of logistics and technical maintenance units, which can result in the Armed Forces failure to assure logistics and technical maintenance in wartime. During the process of creating the National Army's logistics, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Gendarmerie and Border Guard logistics and technical maintenance in wartime will inevitably be a responsibility of the National Army's logistics and maintenance units. This conclusion is based on the reason that such structures do not exist in the Gendarmerie and Border Guard and are not provided in the organisational structure for war-time; also, there are no military units or subdivisions, which could transport supplies from the centre down to a brigade logistics point, or, in case of action in a separate battalion structure, to a battalion logistics point.

Experience of creating an army of different countries (USA, Germany, Estonia) shows that the logistics and technical maintenance units „weight“ ranges from 7-10% and in the US Army, up to 13 % of the total active effective force. The experience in implementing peacekeeping operations in the Balkans also proves the high (up to 17 %) weight of both logistics and technical maintenance units. And if the army is equipped with more precise and complex weapons and equipment, the bigger weight the units ensuring their functioning should have.

A scornful attitude towards this aspect will result in an inevitable failure of logistics issues and, consequently, in a failure to perform the tasks that the AFRM may face in wartime.

4.3. The National Army: Equipment

The equipment of the National Army consists of:

- Armoured combat vehicles (ACV) – 209 units (BTR-80, TAB-71, BMP, BMD);
- Guns / Howitzer – 79 units;
- Mortars – 115 units;
- Mobile Rocket Launcher System „Uragan“ – 12 units;
- Antitank guns – 36 units;
- Antitank guided rocket launchers – 118 units;
- Antitank unguided rocket launchers – 113 units;
- Air defence rocket installations – 3 units;
- Air defence artillery installations – 23 units;
- Portable rocket installations such as „Igla“ and „Strela“ – 66 units;
- Aircraft MiG-29 – 6 units;
- Transport aircraft and helicopters (it is possible to re-equip those helicopters for combat type at low expense).

Most part of the equipment has limited warranty because of its aging. The Army, has even nowadays artillery systems that were manufactured in 1946-49, which need to be replaced with modern versions. Armoured personnel carriers (APC), received on an exchange with the Romanian National Army, are not perfect from the technical point of view, frequently fail, are not convenient and are expensive in operation. These facts are explained by the technological lag of the Romanian industry. It is also necessary to replace these armoured combat vehicles by similar models, but purchased from countries with a high technological level.

The replacement of out-of-date weaponry and military equipment that has low technical operational and combat parameters with more advanced ones will allow for the improvement of the National Army's combat capacity level, without increasing the total number of armaments and military equipment. This is an extremely important aspect, due to the existing restrictions on the combat equipment quantity stipulated by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

4.4. The National Army: Combat Capacities

The National Army's combat potential is the sum of its military units' combat potentials, which, in its turn, consists of the combat capacities of the available weaponry and military.

Every separate weapon combat potential score is a numerical value, which measures the capacity to defeat an adversary (i.e. an enemy's combat equipment or personnel) of a weapon and combat equipment. That measurement is based on several criteria: mobility, survivability, manoeuvrability, capacity of fire attack and firepower – as a function of the ammunition kinetic energy per time-unit. In determining the „combat potential“, the Equipment Potential Capacity Comparisons (EPOCC) Western methodology was applied.

Each military unit's combat potential depends not only on the quantity of weapons and military equipment, but also on its qualitative condition, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) stocks status, condition of ammunitions, spare parts and accessories etc., as well as on the combat training level. Due to that, it is necessary to distinguish types of combat potentials of military units (capacities), and, consequently, the National Army's combat capacities. The measure of each type of combat potential is a corresponding score. These scores are calculated and used for analysis.

The authorized combat potential score (abbreviated, „authorized score,“) means the capacity of the equipment approved for each unit.

The actual combat potential score (actual score) means the capacity of the available equipment. This score can be higher than the authorised combat potential score in a situation of excess of equipment or lower when there is not enough equipment to provide to military units.

The mission capable combat potential score (mission capable score) is obtained by deducting the equipment that is not operational from the actual combat potential score. In an ideal situation, when financing ensures the maintenance of stock of ammunitions and other goods at a level corresponding to requirements of regulations; meeting of combat training requirements, the actual combat potential score is a unique parameter that describes the army's battle power. However, taking into account the given circumstances, the stocks' insufficiency and poor combat training brings a negative contribution to the army's capacity to conduct combat actions. Therefore, we need to provide you with one more definition.

The effective combat potential score (effective score): the actual combat potential score decreased by war reserve shortages of items such as ammunitions and fuel, and by insufficient training. Thus, effective combat potential is that potential which can be used in wartime and which is a unique parameter of an army's fighting capacity.


The calculations show the following parameters of the National Army's combat capacity for 1999:

Authorized Combat Potential Score: 1195.330 points;

Actual Combat Potential Score: 1174.65 points;

Mission Capable Combat Potential Score: 710.449 points;

Effective Combat Potential Score: 301.31 points.



In the chart above, we can see that the mission capable potential score is much lower than the authorized score, representing 25 % of the potential the state expects from the Army. Unfortunately, the mission capable potential score for the entire National Army is lower than the authorized combat potential score for just one average infantry motorized brigade in a peacetime structure, normally trained and supplied with all necessary material resources.

Two questions impose by themselves here – is it rational to keep the National Army in such qualitative and quantitative conditions? What is the reason for such a situation and what steps need to be taken to improve the created situation? These questions are considered below.

The sole reason for the low mission capable score is the insufficient financing of the National Army all along the years of its existence. This causes the consumption of material stocks to support the Army's current needs, losing the skills to control and conduct combat actions, due to insufficient combat training.

4.5. The National Army: Financing

The financing of the National Army all along the years of its existence is characterised by a sharp deficit. Annually, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) receives 2.5-3 times less financial resources than is necessary according to the army's objectives, the approved scheme and the numerical structure.

If in the first years material and technical resources remained from the Soviet Army allowed the National Army to perform most of the combat training actions and the majority of the necessary armament and military equipment preventative tests and repairs, by 1995-96 these possibilities were exhausted. Thus, emergency stocks were used, in order to compensate the lack of financial resources.


For instance, the POL stocks, established by the Minister of Defence's orders, were reduced from 56 % to 1-2 % at present. The condition of the POL stocks is catastrophic at the moment. To address this issue strictly academically, effective combat potential score, shown earlier, should be even lower and come

close to zero. However, influence of the POL stocks' shortfalls on effective combat potential was taken into account only to the extent they influence the advancing of troops on the terrain and the performance of combat actions during the first days of any war. Thus, it was considered in the calculation that, in case of war, the state would find the necessary quantity of POL for conducting the first and subsequent defence operations. The POL stocks in the republic are estimated to 90-300,000 tons, which is sufficient for conducting a defensive war for 2-3 months. However, a law on requisitions has not been drafted yet.

The influence the food-stock shortfalls have on combat capacities, even though less significant is, nevertheless, essential.. The stocks of cold food rations are 11% and hot food rations represent 59% of the established norms. However, similarly in this case, their influence was taken into account partially; it was necessary to depart from the assumption that, in case of war, it will be possible to obtain all necessary food items by using requisitions and state reserves.

Dynamics of the National Army required funds and actual financing for the last six years are shown on the diagram below (in million Moldovan Lei):

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Fully Funded regiments	85,3	186,8	219,8	174,6	167,5	191,3
Actual spending	31,4	64,8	70,6	80,9	62,2	64,9




The insufficient financing has affected the character of the distribution of budgetary funds, which were hardly sufficient for personnel wages and benefits, current supply with food, uniforms, and equipment, and for partial payments for utilities. As a result, at the end of 2000 the National Army had a debt of 32 million lei. Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind that a significant part of the emergency reserves was spent for satisfying the army's current needs.

The character of National Army's financing also shows the attitude of leaders of the Ministry of Defence regarding the problems faced by the former. The leaders solve only current problems, which are on the surface – food, uniforms,

equipment supply, payroll and benefits – issues that, unless solved, can lead to smouldering discontent or even mutiny within the Army. The long-term problems – keeping armaments and military equipment in an operational condition, material stocks, high personnel turnover, appropriate combat co-ordination and personnel training level – have not been solved, or are solved at the lowest level. The resolution of these problems is left to the future generation of the Ministry of Defence’s leaders. The distribution of funds done by the Ministry of Defence in 1998 proves that idea. The following parameters were provided for the basic expense items:


Cost Items	Actual Defense Expenses	Fully Funded Required
Payroll & Benefits	19,2	24,4
Food and Compensation for Food	16,1	23,8
Uniforms & Equipment	3,3	9,4
Current Repairs	2,6	4,6
Major Repairs	0,6	2,9
Medicine & Medicals	0,9	5,9
Housing Administration	11,3	13,8
POL Procurement	1,5	4,2
Technical Maintenance	0,5	12
Weapons Procurement	0,8	51
Other Expenditures	5,5	15,5
Total	62,3	167,5



The distribution of financial resources over the last few years has obviously a discriminatory character as far as the technical maintenance of armaments and military equipment, condition of the material resources stocks, and combat training are concerned – precisely those parameters that bring the basic contribution to the National Army’s military potential. In 1998, only 5% of the defence expenses were directed for maintenance of battle readiness in an appropriate condition, necessary for the country defence. Unfortunately, there is a constant tendency to decrease the amount of these expenditures as follows: in 1999 -1.5%, in 2000- 2.2% (at first sight, in 2000 more money was spent in percentage terms; however, it is necessary to take into account the rate of inflation).

The consequences of such policy implementation regarding financing are obvious: the lay-up of old armaments and military equipment, diminishment of different material stocks, decrease of the combat training level and, as a result, decrease of the National Army military potential and battle readiness.

The NA Budget Distribution



In order to eliminate the negative consequences of the deficit of funding for costly items, which directly influences the National Army’s military potential, it is necessary to increase its amount. There are two possibilities: first, through a considerable increase of the Ministry of Defence budget, which in the next five to seven years is very unlikely, and second, by an internal redistribution of the budget.

The second solution is possible to be applied, but it requires a significant reduction of the numerical structure, selling of a part of the armaments and combat equipment, transition of most of the military units to reduced personnel structures (when only a small number of personnel, necessary to protect military property will remain in the military units) and changing the combat training approach. In this study some ways of building the National Army are considered by taking into account the limited financial and material resources.

4.6. The National Army: Dynamics of Combat Potential


For a better understanding of the tendency of the National Army’s development, it is necessary to show the tendency of the National Army’s combat capacities as a basic battle readiness parameter in the latest years. Departing from the assumption that, under special circumstances, the state finds solutions to obtain the necessary quantity of POL to carry out mobilisation and to conduct the first and subsequent defence operations in an extremely short term, it will be possible to consider that the effective combat potential score is equal to the actual combat potential score. Therefore, from now on, the actual combat potential score (CPS) will be used in our estimation.

So, analyzing the changes and development of combat capacities through the years, we identified a trend that shows the direction in the National Army's development.

The calculations show the following parameters:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Authorized CPS	1788,13	1195,33	1195,33	1195,33	1195,33
Actual CPS	1767,45	1174,65	1174,65	1131,5	1131,5
Mission Capable CPS	930,5	710,449	689,135	665,015	655,045

Changes in Combat Potential Scores of the NA



The trend of the mission capable score has an obviously decreasing character, caused by the aging and insufficiency of armaments and combat equipment, by financing of expenses for technical maintenance of armaments and military equipment (which is about 30 times lower than the necessary amount). Thus, without changing the approach of building the National Army, the National Army will be completely non-functional in the next 7-10 years.


Nevertheless, in order to understand the condition of the National Army's fighting capacity, it is necessary to compare its combat capacities to another army operating with the same technical means.

So, for example, the Authorized Combat Potential Score of the Russian Army, in the European part of Russia, is more than 65,000 points; Ukraine (without the navy) – 38,590 points; Romania (without the navy) – 25,922 points; the Transdnistrian military units – 578.33 points; the Russian Operative Group Troops (ROGT) – 1185.17points.

As it has been shown, the 14th Army's military units were deeply involved in combat actions during the 1991 military conflict. It makes sense to assume that, in case a similar conflict occurs, Russia will assist Transdnistria with manpower, armaments and military equipment. Therefore, it is rational to compare the mili-

tary potential of the National Army to the combined Transdnistrian and ROGT armed forces, which have together 1763, 5 points, almost three times higher than the National Army's military potential.

The Comparison of The Military Potential (MP) of Neighbouring States



However, due to a high probability that the Transdnistrian Armed Forces, together with Russian troops have financial difficulties similar to ours, we could assume that the technical readiness ratio (TRR), at the most optimistic forecasts, is no more than 0.85 points. Therefore, the mission capable combat potential score of the joint armed forces does not exceed 1499. Thus, the force ratio is 1 to 2.29, which allows the assertion that an aggression is unlikely to happen in the near future. Such a balance of forces will not allow either party to initiate an aggression. The only thing necessary to accomplish in this situation is to preserve the existent ratio.

What conclusions can be drawn out of the evaluation of the National Army's status? The conclusions are the following:

- The National Army's status is catastrophic. Unwillingness to take urgent measures to increase funding of the National Army will result in the following consequences: the army, as the state tool of maintaining sovereignty, will turn into a small group of people with faulty weapons available, without a competent and well-trained officer structure, and material stocks. More precisely, the National Army will end its existence as a military body able to conduct battle actions.

- Changes to improve the situation are possible. But they require assistance of the supreme state bodies – the Parliament, the President's Office and the Government – which should be concretized in sufficient financing, as well as in adoption of all the necessary legislation regulating the National Army and the military persons' status and rights. Finally, it is necessary to set precise and clear objectives for the Armed Forces, and to carry out the creation of the National Army according to these objectives. So far, goals of the Armed Forces were not formulated, except for provisions contained in the Constitution of the Republic

of Moldova. The Constitution determines a very broadly defined objective, namely the protection of the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Unfortunately, this way, objectives of large military bodies (for instance, the National Army) are not set; this looks more like an objective for the government and president. The National Army's goals should be precisely set, with the resources indicative for each performance of concrete missions. Thus, the objective should be stated by the President of the Republic of Moldova, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova.

5. THE FUTURE NATIONAL ARMY'S COMBAT CAPACITIES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF ACHIEVING THE MILITARY REFORM AND COMBAT CAPACITIES AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRENT POLICIES

The main objective of the military reform is the establishment of a new quality, effective and flexible system guaranteeing the state's military security, its sovereignty, independence and integrity.

The solution for the main goal is conducted in the following main areas: scientific support of the national defence; drafting and improvement of the legal framework of the state's military security; improvement of the mobilisation system; improvement of the state's defence control system; development of precise management schemes; delimitation of responsibilities of the state control bodies, etc.; the key area being is the Armed Forces reform.

The Armed Forces reform addresses some solutions, such as the optimisation of the Armed Forces structure and the strengthening of military units by armaments, equipment and personnel. In the Military Reform Concept changes in the Armed Forces structure made earlier in 1996 are confirmed. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova include the National Army, the Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops. The National Army, as the most efficient military body, having the greatest battle potential, should be the focal point of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in battle actions. The Gendarmes and Border Guard Troops should carry out auxiliary tasks.

Unfortunately, such structural change does not bring a considerable growth of the combat potential of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, due to the fact that the Gendarmerie and Border Guards combat potentials are extremely insignificant.

The Border Guard Troops, having a numerical structure of 3,444 military personnel, a small number of armoured personnel carriers (five units) and only small arms, have an actual combat potential score equal to 46.29 points. This is the reason why the Border Guards cannot carry out, without additional strengthening with heavy weaponry, tasks to counteract an aggression. Besides, their combat training is not directed towards preparation of military units for conducting infantry combat missions.

The Gendarmerie, having a numerical structure of 4,375 military personnel, insignificant heavy weaponry and armoured personnel carriers quantities (13 BTR-80) has an actual combat potential score equal to 78.2 points and, according to the Military Reform Concept, carries out auxiliary missions. Like the Border Guard Troops, the Gendarmerie personnel are not trained to conduct infantry combat. The heavy weapons shortage, as well as the tasks faced by the Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops allow the assertion that their inclusion in the AFRM structure has little influence upon the AFRM military potential, which will be directly used for conducting defensive operations. And only indirectly will they influence the Armed Forces combat capacities, because the combat units will not distract part of their forces for a routine frontline maintenance, keeping law and order in the region, and annihilation of possible paramilitary and terrorist groups of the enemy. Nevertheless, the total military potential of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova has a score of 779.5 points, thus the ratio of forces with the Transdnistrian Armed Forces plus ROGT forces is of 1 to 1.93. As a summary, the global ratio gives guarantees of protection against an invasion, but certainly not against an armed conflict that already have certain spontaneous occurrence probability, as it happened in 1992.

Thus, the extensive way to increase the military potential of the Armed Forces (more precisely, to increase the numerical structure without essential changes in the approach of combat training and preparation, as well as the necessary heavy weapon and equipment reserves for the Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops) does not result in an appreciable increase in the AFRM's combat capacities. Therefore, the inclusion of the Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops in the Armed Forces structure actually does not increase the country's capacity to guarantee the counteract and repelling of a sudden aggression. Moreover, the mobilisation of the Armed Forces, the mobilisation of the entire country, for the purpose to increase the combat capacities designated to counteract an invasion (a measure that should be carried out under exceptional circumstances) does not result in a considerable increase of the AFRM combat capacities. The absence of armaments and military equipment explains this particular situation. The shortage of resources cancels out all efforts directed towards increasing the AFRM combat potential. So, according to experts' estimations, the personnel mobilization resource of the Republic of Moldova consists of 100-150,000 individuals; by the way, this resource will be reduced, due to the fact that the annual training of professional military personnel will be reduced in time together with the National Army's effective force reduction. However, the state's possibilities to arm and equip the mobilized personnel are limited to about 40-50,000 individuals. Heavy weapons, military equipment, mobile air defence systems for newly formed military units practically do not exist. Certainly, sending unarmed, newly trained military units into combat, unprotected from the air, is nonsense, even a criminal act, because they will be killed in a very short time.

This implies that the basic efforts during the military reform should be directed towards the creation of arms and military equipment stocks necessary for strengthening military units during mobilization. Simultaneously, it is necessary to undertake measures for consolidating the Gendarmerie and the Border Guard units by providing them with heavy weapons and equipment under exceptional circumstances period, a fact that will give these troops the opportunity to use them in defensive infantry operations. This will raise considerably the AFRM's combat capacities in wartime.

Creation of the necessary material stocks requires significant financial resources. The approved Military Reform Concept provides for allocation of about 0.7 % of the state budget for defence purposes in the year 2000, with further increase up to 2.5 % by 2012. However, it is possible already to assert that the respective provision of the Concept is not implemented, and to assume, highly accurately, that it will be not implemented in the future either. The fact that in 2000, when the state budget was of approximately 19 billion Moldovan Lei, less than 65 million lei were allotted for defence, out of 133 million Moldovan Lei, as it had been planned is an argument for this statement. Having an estimated state budget of approximately 21-23 billion lei in 2001, the Ministry of Defence was allotted only 74 million lei, out of the 168-184 million lei planned.

These facts lead to the conclusion that it is useless for us to expect the state to provide financial assistance along the implementation of the military reform. Consequently, the implementation of certain provisions of the Military Reform Concept, especially in those areas where high expenses are required, is in the doubt and, most probably, will not be accomplished.

There is no doubt, in such a situation, the National Army has to rely on its own resources, and to start from the assumption that at least the Ministry of Defence budget will not be decreased and will be kept adjusted to inflation at the level of 2001. This objective, namely keeping the level of financing, is a responsibility of the minister of defence as a member of the government and as officially appointed person in charge with the National Army's material and technical maintenance. Civilian ministers of defence of other states are responsible at least for this issue, in addition to others

Once again, a traditional question appears: what has to be done? Is it necessary to take money for covering the expenses of the military reform, which are more or less precisely provided for the second and third stage of the reform?

In 1999, an army mathematical model was created in the National Army's Main Headquarters, with assistance provided by representatives of the US Department of Defence,. A math model containing real data – the basic model – was produced. Based on this basic model, two versions of structure of the National Army were prepared. The mathematical model allowed the determination of the National Army's real status. It gave the possibility to mathematically accurately determine the requirements of financial and material resources, and to make a forecast of a potential situation of the army, in case the financing approach is not changed.


The overall objective of the drafted scenario for a five-six year period is to increase the mission capable combat potential score, without getting additional resources from the state reserve. According to the scenarios, the financial resources for implementation of measures aimed at increasing the combat potential should be received from the sale of MiG-29 aircrafts. For these calculations the existing legislation was taken into account, which provides that only 30 % of allotted financial resources could be distributed to the Ministry of Defence for technical maintenance, current needs, for purchase of new weaponry and military equipment, and armaments and military equipment modernization. Thus, approximately 9 million USD can be used to implement all measures necessary to increase the National Army's combat potential.

Scenario # 1 assumes that purchase of spare parts for armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and antitank weapons, as well as performance of all necessary repairs and technical services will increase the technical readiness ratio (TRR) up to 0.95-0.96 points within the next three years. The TRR increase will facilitate the increase of the National Army's mission capable combat potential score parameters. The cost of the first scenario is of approximately USD 9 million, and it allows the carrying out of an ACV and equipment restoration program in three years, and an antitank equipment restoration program in two years.


The dynamics of ACV combat capacities, during and after completing the ACV and equipment restoration program, compared to the basic version of combat capacities is shown in the chart.

As it can be seen from the calculations, by 2003, the ACV combat potential will be increased by almost 100 points; that is especially important in the light of the necessity to increase the army's mobility. As for the army's high mobility requirements for a modern war, many studies have been conducted and this became an axiom already. Mobility, for the implementation of rapidly-developing missions, however, is especially important for the elimination of local conflicts. Thus, the high mobility allows the neutralization of a conflict in its initial stage of development.


The Dynamics of the ACV Combat Capacity



Increasing antitank combat capacities is particularly important, due to the fact that the opposing side (with which the conflict occurrence probability is pretty high) has more than 130 battle-ready tanks and more than 250 ACVs available. The comparative analysis of dynamics between the combat potential score of the National Army's antitank equipment during and after the antitank equipment restoration program and the basic scenario shows an increase of the combat potential score by up to 20 points. The comparative curves shown on the diagram lead to the interpretation that, after the completion of the antitank equipment restoration program, their combat potential will be maintained at the level of 1998. This is explained by a residual financing principle that might be used for this program financing, meaning that the financial resources will be used for this program after implementation of the ACV restoration program. The antitank equipment combat potential dynamics is shown on the diagram



The general change in the National Army combat potential, as a consequence of implementing the measures foreseen by scenario # 1, and its comparison to the combat potential, calculated for the basic scenario, are shown in the following chart:




Therefore, the performance of the programs planned by the first scenario allows an increase of the National Army's combat potential of more than 110

points by 2002 compared to the basic scenario. However, it is possible for us to keep the combat potential at this level (748 points), without increasing the Ministry of Defence's budget, only for a 5-7 year period. The only reason is that the financial resources for completing the scheduled maintenance service both for current and medium-term repairs from the Ministry of Defence's budget have not been assured for several years. Such practice will be barely changed for the following ten years and therefore, the scenario of equipment restoration is a single measure bringing a short-term improvement, and cannot maintain the combat potential to a high level for a long period. After implementing the programs in 3-4 years, financial resources need to be allotted for the armaments and military equipment maintenance.

Scenario # 2 assumes the re-equipment of the eight MI-8 transport helicopters into combat versions, and through this, the antitank equipment combat potential will improve. In addition, the design and purchase of antitank, air defence, artillery, ACV simulators, will result in a reduction of expenses for combat training. It will also raise the National Army's combat potential and allow for the redirection of a part of the unused funds for replenishment of material stocks and purchase of armaments and military equipment. Thus, the second scenario envisages implementation of two three-year programs, including the MI-8 helicopter re-equipment program, and the armaments and military equipment simulators design and purchase program.

The dynamics of the National Army's combat capacities, as a result of implementing the measures provided by scenario # 2 compared to the basic scenario and scenario # 1 are shown in the chart.

The second scenario is better, both from the point of view of the combat potential absolute value (it will be raised up to 815 points), and from the army development perspective. If the first scenario envisages financial resources for armaments and military equipment restoration that will for sure increase the combat potential for a given term (5-7 years), the second scenario provides for the investment of funds in long-term programs.



Using the created training basis, the National Army personnel will have a training facility for a long term (between 20 and 30 years). The combat potential will grow also as a result of the increased level of combat training. The first scenario is more applicable in case of invasion or threat of military conflict as an investment of resources for a rapid achievement of the purposes in a short period of time. Such a threat does not exist now, and, consequently, the second scenario is more appropriate.

Scenario # 3 implies the transfer of the focus from creating the National Army on creating a peacekeeping brigade, which would ensure the Republic of Moldova's participation in peacekeeping operations at a battalion level. Inclusion of a peacekeeping battalion in international operations for peace maintenance should be carried out according to the Law on participation of the Republic of Moldova in International Peacekeeping Operations" (1156-XIV) adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on July 26, 2000.

Estimations made by the Ministry of Defence experts show that one peacekeeping battalion is capable to earn up to 15-17 million US dollars per year. Certainly, such estimations are a little bit exaggerated, but, nevertheless, it is quite possible to get funds of up to 10-13 million US dollars; for instance, Ukraine gets annually funds within this range. The Ministry of Defence could raise about 7-10 million US dollars per year, in addition to its budgeted funds, as expenses for strengthening the battalion with equipment, the equipment's repairs and restoration, and for keeping the battalion in an area of a peacekeeping operation. These financial resources would be possible to direct, for the first three years, for implementing the armament and military equipment restoration programs, and for the training basis development, as it was mentioned in scenarios # 1 and # 2. Thus, about four million US dollars would be possible to use annually for maintenance of welfare programs, housing facilities, increase of the National Army's personnel benefits, growth of the military's salary, etc. After three years, it would be possible to begin updating material stocks, and to implement the National Army's re-equipping programs, as provided in the Military Reform Concept. Thus, for the peacekeeping battalion's preparation, at the first stage, and the peacekeeping brigade preparation at the second stage, financial resources are possible to obtain from the sales of the MiG-29 aircrafts.

For this period of time, maintenance of a combat potential at a level ranging between 700 and 800 points is quite enough to deter any potential aggressive actions of the self proclaimed state (Transdnistria).

The first three scenarios presume constant geopolitical conditions. And, as an essential element, the self proclaimed Moldavian Transdnistrian Republic and ROG exist on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The quite close presence of the separatist self-proclaimed state, which tries to get out of control of the Republic of Moldova, and the presence on its territory of the armed forces that are barely considered as being friendly to the Republic of Moldova, compels the

maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova's combat potential at a level ensuring the counteract of any aggression.

Changes in the geopolitical situation, however, are possible and will allow for a reduction of expenses for maintaining the National Army's combat potential. Using these savings will make a possible solution of numerous problems, which have been accumulated because of insufficient defence financing.

Scenario # 4 presumes the ROGT withdrawal from Transdnistria based on political goodwill.

In case of implementing the ROGT withdrawal agreement, the Transdnistrian combat potential will be reduced to 580 points that will allow for the lowering of National Army's combat potential down to 400-500 points. The combat potential's reduction can be achieved through the following steps:

- reduction of all brigades, except for only one complete motorised infantry brigade, a Special Forces Battalion and a peacekeeping unit. In peacetime, reduced brigades will only have personnel for headquarters and protection detachment. Armaments and military equipment should be preserved for a long term. The training centre should be created in the premises of a brigade. Thus, the National Army's numerical structure can be reduced to 6000 individuals. That will cut down expenses for the maintenance of personal structures (without expenses for utilities) by 15-20 million lei per year.

- in order to reduce expenses allotted for combat training in active military units, soldiers should only be allowed to be sent, after passing a basic military training, to the training centre, where the above – mentioned simulators are to be used. Additionally, it is necessary to provide three-month training in the training centre for the personnel of the Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops, where they will be trained for infantry field combat;

- getting rid of the out-of-date weaponry and military equipment, which restoration requires significant expenses, and their subsequent selling. All funds obtained from sales could be directed towards replenishing the material stocks and creating the reserves intended for mobilization of the Armed Forces and conducting the first-wave defence operations; part of the funds could be allotted for maintenance and implementation of the Armed Forces building plan, according to the Military Reform Concept.

The calculations show that, getting rid of the „Uragan" mobile rocket launch system (11 units), as the operational life of these rockets expires in 2001 or earlier, and the MiG-29 aircraft, will result in a lowering of the combat potential down to 530 points. That will ensure the counteract of any aggression or keeping a possible conflict with Transdnistria under control.

Diminishing the obligatory military service term from 18 months to 12 months will automatically increase human mobilization resources by 30%, and, taking in consideration the reduction of the National Army personnel structure down to 6000 individuals, the annually trained number of human mobilization resources will stay at the same level. The scenario of preparing a peacekeeping battalion remains valid. The rotation of battalions should be made once every half a year

from a fully-developed motorised infantry brigade structure. Overall, the savings that will be obtained as a result of the National Army's reduction, sale of out-of-date military equipment (which operation is impossible due to the lack of necessary resources, and, in case of the MiG-29 aircrafts, even due to the lack of trained pilots), and involvement of the National Army in implementing peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices, could provide the Ministry of Defence with additional funds of up to 12-15 million US dollars. At the same time it will become possible to carry out the programs, planned in the scenarios described above, according to the Military Reform Concept.

6. REQUIRED COMBAT CAPACITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE

The state's capacity to conduct war and the combat potential level of the Armed Forces is determined by the geopolitical conditions of the region, the existing risks and probability of occurrence of an armed conflict. At the same time, the state's economic capacity to maintain the Armed Forces should be taken into consideration.

Generally speaking, the geopolitical situation in Moldova's neighbouring region can be described as stable.

Moldova has common borders with friendly countries – Romania and Ukraine – countries that, officially, have no territorial claims on Moldova. There are friendship and co-operation treaties and agreements in different activity areas. All these facts show that any aggressive actions against the Republic of Moldova initiated by these countries are very unlikely in the coming 5-10 years.

However, there are some political circles in Romania that benefit from support among a small part of the population of Moldova, which consider the Republic of Moldova as a part of Romania. In a short period of time, this situation could, sharply worsen, getting even to direct aggression, if some political parties in Romania come to power boasting an objective to annex the Republic of Moldova to Romania.

Nevertheless, the foreign policy practiced at present by Romania (accession to the European Union and NATO, and conditions that make it possible: borders inviolability, absence of territorial claims on other countries, etc.) allows the assertion that the possibility of an aggression initiated by Romania is extremely low, at least until the next elections.

In addition, Moldova is rather unattractive to any aggressor because there are few natural resources on its territory.

In the next 5-10 years, a military threat can only come from the self-proclaimed Transdnistria, which also boasts Russian troops. However, with the coming to power of the Communist Party of Moldova, a possibility of peaceful settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict has appeared.

Nevertheless, the realities are the following: at present, the combat potential of the joint military potential of the Transdnistrian Armed Forces and Russian Operative Group Troops, as mentioned earlier, is of about 1,500 points and the ratio of forces is of 1 to 1.93. Having such a parity of forces, the probability of aggression is insignificant, but still exists. An armed conflict has a certain degree of probability to occur in case of development of an adverse political situation. From the military point of view, such a conflict does not make any sense, because it will not be successful for either party. However, military force can be applied for the resolution of any issues having a popular character.

The war occurrence statistics show that invasion is possible when the ratio of forces reaches at least 1 to 4. For example, the Winter War started by the Soviet Union against Finland in 1939 saw Russian forces exceeding up to seven times the ratio. The attack of the Soviet Union by Germany during Hitler also became possible after the creation of forces exceeding a proportion of 3 /1 in the main attack areas.

So, the ratio of forces at 1:2 guarantees abstention from aggression and provides conditions for peaceful settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict.

7. THE DEFENCE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPB SYSTEM)

Defence planning is a basis for creating balanced armed forces of any country. There is no country in the world, except perhaps for the Third World countries, where national defence, the creation of armed forces does not have precise purposes, objectives and, most importantly, ways and methods of creating an army.

It is possible to categorically assert and to easily prove that such a planning, programming and budgeting system does not exist in the Moldovan Armed Forces.

This situation results in a series of negative consequences, but there is also one „positive“ feature, which made possible the existing situation. That is the „capability“ of the state to finance the army by the remaining principle and, as result, the „possibility“ to allocate large financial assets for solving social and other kind of problems. For leaders of the Ministry of Defence, the existing situation is also profitable. Such an approach of the country’s defence financing takes away a significant part of the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence relating to the following issues: inability to maintain the National Army in proper shape within the framework of the approved numerical and combat structure, low battle readiness, and extremely low material stocks.

Thus, the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) presumes the precisely designated objectives faced by the armed forces, developing programs for the implementation of these objectives; for instance, the Armed Forces cre-

ation programs that can be really implemented, and also, appropriate financing, which is very important to those who conduct these programs.

Once again, it is necessary to note that such a system does not exist in the Republic of Moldova.

The system's planning part should contain the following elements at various levels:

1. The national development strategy, where there should be a section on defence issues, containing the following elements:

a) the geopolitical situation, possible sources of potential crises, external risks and threats;

b) sources of internal instability and risks, as well as solutions;

c) to get the armed forces involved in problem solving related to stability in Europe; possible participation in blocks, alliances; possible participation of armed forces in peacekeeping operations, etc.;

d) the economic situation of the country and the economical capacities of maintenance of the armed forces; also, determined financial resources, which the country can allot to address military issues;

f) and, as a conclusion, general internal and external objectives of the armed forces should be clearly formulated.

Elements of this system should be drafted and issued by the President of the Republic of Moldova, as the head-of-state and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, together with the support of the Government of the Republic of Moldova. *The national strategy*, as a presidential message to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, as one of the possible forms, should be issued with a certain periodicity. The periodicity can be determined by the term of the president, parliamentary elections, or may depend on changes of both external and internal factors. The term should become a topic for a separate research; however, it should be precisely specified in the legislation.

1. Based on objectives set by the president, a Military Strategy or Military Doctrine should be elaborated, to describe the optimum ways and methods for achieving the objectives of the Armed Forces. This should be prepared by the Ministry of Defence in collaboration with the Main Headquarters of the National Army and the support of the headquarters of the Gendarmerie and Border Guards;

2. Based on the National Strategy for Development of the Country,, a Military Strategy (Military Doctrine) for each of the Armed Forces branches, the building-planning document (for example, the National Army building plan) should be drafted. Such a document should determine concrete objectives and purposes, should provide general ways for their solution, the forces' structure and means intended for achieving these objectives, and financial resources (which, for the National Army development, should be allotted by the Main Headquarters). By this, the planning part of the planning, programming and budgeting system comes to an end.

The program part of PPB system assumes an appropriate development of programs for building various branches of troops, departing from the force structure and means determined by the AFRM (or the National Army) building plan. Such programs can be the antitank systems equipping program, the combat training program, the material stocks replenishing program, the communication means re-equipment program, the human reserve training program, etc.

Any program should contain objectives and tasks, all necessary calculations proving its cost-effectiveness, distribution of financial resources for every year of the program implementation.

The appropriate ministries and departments should develop concrete programs for the National Army.

The programs adjustment should be carried out by any body within the Ministry of Defence framework, which has the right to update the programs (but not the MOD – the Military-Finance Department – which should act as a participant in developing the programs). So far, such a body does not exist, but it is very necessary. That is explained by the importance of issues that should be solved by this department.

The financial part of the PPB system presumes endorsement of the calculation accuracy in the appropriate governmental departments, the state budget possibilities and the AFRM current needs adjustment for the next years, as well as the approval of the co-ordinated programs by the Government of the Republic of Moldova. As a final document, it should include the budgets for the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Department of Border Guard Troops for one year.

During the program co-ordination by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the lack of necessary financing will require reconsideration for the AFRM building plan and objectives posed before the Armed Forces. In turn, this could generate a reconsideration of the entire national strategy, both in defence and other areas.

The process comes to an end when the National Strategy in the defence area is coordinated with the state financial possibilities. In other words, the state can demand from the Armed Forces the results for which it is willing to pay.

What are the advantages of the PPB system?

1. Involving the country's supreme authorities in the building process of the Armed Forces;

2. The precise statement of objectives for the Armed Forces and, as a result, the possibility to calculate forces and means necessary for achieving these objectives;

3. Possibility for a correct distribution of defence money among various departments in the best way;

4. Possibility to change tasks faced by AFRM in the absence of the necessary resources for their performance (basically, due to the lack of financial resources),

to search other scenarios to achieve the objectives. For example, through diplomatic channels, or through joining military blocks, etc.;

5. The optimisation of financial expenditures for defence that is especially important, due to the limited financial and material resources.

As disadvantages of this system, it is possible to mention the complexity of the informational flow, which creates the necessity to co-ordinate efforts in various vertical lines of authority that do not assure sufficient objectivity and efficiency of the PPB system.

However, such a system has a future and there is a necessity for its implementation in Moldova.

In this study, we dealt with the analysis of the National Army's status and the basic components of the Armed Forces. The trends of its development and the National Army's building prospects were shown. The value of the Armed Forces military potential was calculated (the mission capable score) sufficient for prevention of military conflict with the so-called Transdnistrian Republic of Moldova. The general directions for creating the planning, programming and budgeting system were given.

VALERIU PROKHNITSKY, **IPP economic expert**

The economic security of a small state. Guidelines for the Republic of Moldova

INTRODUCTION

This study is one of the few researches in the area of economic security conducted in the Republic of Moldova, where, unfortunately, economic security is a fully ignored topic. There are no objective reasons to justify this rather weird situation, given that in several occasions the national economy may have been damaged irreversibly due to both foreign and local factors. Just as in other countries undergoing transition, the significance of this topic can be fully realised only when threats regarding economic security become *fait accompli*. As it is well known, security in general and economic security in particular do not allow for partial or occasional approaches. Economic history proves convincingly that the issue of economic security should not be restricted to academic exercise, but, instead, should be the object of an *ongoing monitoring and management system*.

The concept of economic security is useful as long as it can be directly implemented into practice. However, despite its practical significance, the theoretical side of economic security is far from simple or easy to disregard. Thus, the study of economic security in small countries that are either underdeveloped or undergoing transition to a market economy showed that such countries are characterised by proto-economic systems rather than true national economies. In such countries, their economic interests abroad are not clear enough, the process of gathering primary capital is still ongoing, and the cause-effect system is not yet clearly defined for corporate, political, and economic interests, etc. In many such countries organized crime and corruption are flourishing and public administration bodies are not strong enough to ensure social trust in the ability of the state to warrant that „the rules of the game” will be complied with. Thus, in most of such countries a significant share of economic activity is illicit or even criminal. These sectors can reach up to 50-60% of the declared economy and, by their existence, they generate serious difficulties while analysing economic security. This is just one of the reasons explaining why barriers hampering understanding and ensuring economic security are twice as difficult when the object of

security is not just a small country, but a *small weak* country – and Moldova is a perfect example of such a condition.

This study was not aimed at developing a specific action plan to ensure national economic security, as we consider that this task should be carried out by specialized ministries and departments, jointly with business circles, civil society, as well as economic and political analysts. Besides, this study does not include quantitative indicators of economic security, as the main challenge is *not to calculate real indicators but to estimate optimum acceptable values*. The objectives of this study are:

- *To identify the main issues related to ensuring the economic security of small countries, and to highlight guidelines for the Republic of Moldova;*
- *To identify the specific features regarding economic security of the Republic of Moldova, this way identifying the national economic interests;*
- *The main goal and output of this study is to draft a **framework concept of national economic security**.*

Thus, the goal of this study can be identified in short *„to evaluate and improve the fundamentals of national economic security.“*

The first chapter of this study begins with a mostly theoretical review of the concepts regarding small countries and their security. Furthermore, the author reviewed the internal contradictory aspects of the economic security phenomenon (which seems to be the most complicated dimension of national security) and identified the relationship between economic security and other elements of national security. A number of reasons can be given to support such an approach and the main one is that the economic conditions determine, to a great extent, the general condition of national security. In its turn, economic evolution depends on the political forces that are able to provide for a legal framework needed for ensuring economic security. Finally, the study outlines specific reasons that have conditioned the worsening of the economic crisis in the Republic of Moldova. They have appeared gradually, starting with the former planned economy that was not able to respond promptly to the new challenges of turning an industrial economy into an informatized one, which caused a deep technological, institutional, and structural degradation. Another negative factor was that an inappropriate reform model was used, when, due to the quasi-total liberalisation of prices and of foreign trade, the state withdrew itself from the economy, to a great extent, through the (imposed) privatization of national property and by concentrating privatized property in the hands of a small number of large proprietors. On the other hand, reviewing privatization results does not stand as a viable political option now, as it may lead to the society's disintegration and serious social conflicts.

The second chapter reviews the real economic security condition, given that the establishing of the current economic structure in the Republic of Moldova started after World War II, under a totalitarian political regime. For a relevant analysis, it is important to identify the comparative development level of the

Republic of Moldova and to highlight the main parameters that determine an increased level of sensitivity of this country to current risks. In our opinion, under the conditions when most economic security indicators seem to be deep below their critical values, the Republic of Moldova underwent an unprecedented crisis in contemporary economic history. On the other hand, if we study the official reports of the government and of international financial bodies accredited in the Republic of Moldova, we can see that only a couple of threats were identified: increasing differentiation of the population in the matter of income and property, unbalanced economic development from the viewpoint of the regional criterion, remarkable structural distortion, as well as criminalization of the economy and the establishing of a parallel shadow economy. However, some critical factors of the national economic insecurity were overlooked, namely:

- Errors in foreign economic policies (CIS membership);
- Delays in adjusting to European technical norms and standards;
- Dependence on foreign energy sources;
- Mass emigration of the labour force;
- Decreased technological, military and industrial potential.

In the second chapter the main flaws of the Moldovan economy – decreased intellectual and industrial potential, unilateral dependence on foreign energy providers and the dependence of the economy on foreign funding sources – were also briefly reviewed. The example of the military-industrial complex of the Republic of Moldova is especially relevant, as it was irrationally destroyed since the beginning of economic reforms. Many strategic enterprises that used to be prosperous are either fully decrepit or are to go out of business in the nearest future. When the production of integrated electronic circuits was substituted by the production of cooking bowls and cradles, it was a mistake that led to the loss of technological and – more importantly – human potential and is, by no means, just a sign of Moldova's intentions to preserve peace.

Chapter three studies the exogenous threats against the economic security of the Republic of Moldova. This unstable political-social situation and its impact on economic security are reviewed both in retrospect and in its current manifestation. Besides, the legal framework is reviewed, in order to identify whether it is sufficient or insufficient for ensuring economic security. Furthermore, several issues regarding the Transdnistrian conflict and their impact on economic security are reviewed. At the end, the chapter includes a brief reference note to the regional geo-economic framework and the mistakes in foreign affairs policies that have generated the current condition of external economic security, as well as the review of several trends conditioned by the coming to power of the Communist Party in the Republic of Moldova.

Although this study refers to theoretical aspects of the economic security phenomenon in small countries, they are complemented by comparisons and comments on the specific situation of the Republic of Moldova. We have also tried to include in this study some specific applicable aspects of the security of

the Republic of Moldova as a small country – maybe even the smallest country in the Eastern and Southern Europe. In addition, we attempted to define the main economic interests of the Republic of Moldova. Finally, we included a draft framework concept of the national economic security doctrine of the Republic of Moldova, a concept aimed at protecting national economic interests. We hope that this framework concept would be accepted by the political forces in power and would support the development of an appropriate economic security doctrine that would be able to destroy the barriers that hamper the improvement of living standards in this country that is under an incessant transition and search of its own identity.

1. THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN A SMALL COUNTRY

1.1. A Small Country and Its Security

Despite its frequent use, there is still no plausible unanimity of opinions with respect to the concept of a *small country*. As a generally accepted methodological concept, *small country* appeared as a term in the international relations theory after World War II, upon the disintegration of colonial empires. Thus, the political map of the world included a number of new political entities, and most of them had a small area. The term *small country* was used to describe such countries.

At first, the term implied geographical criteria only (size, population, available natural resources, etc.). Economic development was not used as a criterion to attribute relevant comparative dimensions. They call this a „positivist“ approach. A small country, according to it, is a country located on a small area (compared to the average area of existing countries or some other widely accepted benchmark). [1]

Another indicator of the country's size is the number of inhabitants¹. Simon Kuznets, a Nobel laureate in economics, considered that a country was small if it had less than 10 million inhabitants. If we use this criterion nowadays, over 130 countries may be considered either small or very small, including developed European countries (Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, etc.) and underdeveloped African countries, which are to opposite extremes from the viewpoint of economic and social development and of vulnerability due to internal and external threats against security. If we analyse this criterion, strange conclusions can be drawn. For instance, Nigeria, the African demographic giant (with a total population over 100 million), has a GDP that is slightly higher than that of Norway (GDP of USD

¹ Since the 1960s, the number of inhabitants as a criterion for defining a small country has been often changed. In the early 1960s the limit was set at 15 million, in the 1970s the suggested threshold was of 3 million and during the 1980s and 1990s it amounted to 1.5 million. The reason for such fluctuations is the natural population growth rate, on one hand, and the arising of more and more small countries, on the other.

136 billion in Nigeria and USD 106 billion in Norway, 1999 data), although Norway's population is about 4.5 million.

Peter J Katzenstein, an American researcher, tried to approach the issue of small European countries from two other viewpoints: small size and location at European boundaries. [2] In Katzenstein's opinion, Poland, Belgium, and Spain are small countries. Katzenstein relates the small country status both to physical-geographical size and the geopolitical framework. The location of small countries at the farthest point from the decision-making centre and the resulting inevitable political marginalisation due to its location sets the state, irrespective of its size, in the category of small countries that cannot influence significantly political and economic affairs at a global and even at a regional level. From Katzenstein's point of view, the convergence of the criteria of small population, small area and peripheral location proves that the Republic of Moldova is, perhaps, the smallest country in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is located, according to the statement of a local analyst, „at the periphery of the periphery.”

As the comparison between Norway and Nigeria shows, the exclusive use by the positivists of the physical-geographical criteria to identify small countries is too formalistic and leads to confusion in studying and comparing specific countries. Although the significance of other factors is not denied, they state that „the material size is the factor that is the least changeable pursuant to deliberate efforts of the Governments. Thus, the size sets the limits for what can be achieved and defines the role and international status of a nation with more certainty than any other parameter.” [3] However, the explanation of the role of a nation in international relations by the size of the country only seems somewhat exaggerated. The comparison of Sweden with Japan is relevant to prove our point. Although both countries differ significantly by size (Sweden – 450,000 km², Japan – 372,200 km²), Japan is recognized as a great power, while Sweden is considered a small country. On the other hand, both countries have a huge economic potential and both are able to ensure their security, although their approaches are different. Thus, for the security of a small country, not only the *geographical area* is important, but also the *geographical location*, though not from the viewpoint of its distance from the centre of Europe, as Katzenstein claimed, but from the viewpoint of its importance in achieving strategic interests of some major external players. This comparison points out another important aspect, namely the idea that *a small country is not necessarily a weak country*, although in most cases small countries, including the Republic of Moldova, are weak and very weak countries.

Most positivist studies claim that small countries are mere deficient copies of large countries. [4] However, political weakness in international relations does not necessarily mean that the country is not successful in its foreign economic relations or has an unstable national economy. It is by no means accidental that the Swedish economist Gunnar Myntal, while studying the methods of filling new market segments by companies from small European countries (Sweden, the

Netherlands, Denmark) in some important sectors of the world economy (electronics, food, equipment), considers that these are „great nations.“ [21]

The consolidation of the „Movement of Non-Aligned Countries“ that was mostly comprised of newly independent small countries has given to the notion of *small country* a political-economic dimension as well. Currently, this term describes countries with an insignificant military and economic potential, thus lacking enough ability to assert themselves in international relations. Their security might decrease if they have no „strong friends,“ i.e. if they bear no importance in achieving the political, geopolitical or economic interests of a great power or corporation. From this viewpoint as well, the Republic of Moldova is excellently defined as a small country located, ironically, in the very middle of Europe.

The adherents to the classification of small countries by the level of power are representatives of the political realism that believe power is „the ability to influence other states' decisions.“ [4] Power is intrinsically associated with available human, natural and military resources, land, economic potential, political stability, national cohesion, etc. Such resources are combined differently from one case to another and are joined by their governments' ability and will to govern in an appropriate manner, which as a whole define the power of a state².

Current technological development, the education system and economic growth are the major indicators of a state's power, also the military factor still has an important role to play. Scientists and researchers, mostly Anglo-Americans, use the notion of „small power,“ equivalent to the notion of „small country.“ As Robert Rothstein mentioned, „a small power is the state that acknowledges that it cannot ensure its security by employing its own capacities and has to rely on the support of other countries, institutions, processes, or alliances. The awareness of a small power regarding the insufficiency of its own means must also be acknowledged by the other states involved in international politics.“ [1] Thus, the small power category may comprise of countries that are large from the geographical point of view but are underdeveloped from the socio-economic viewpoint, and vice versa: such countries as Singapore, Hong-Kong, or Estonia that are tiny from the demographical and territorial point of view, have or will have incontestable economic success but will still not be considered big powers. Consequently, this means that, even if there is a relation between geographical dimensions and economic success, it is not obvious and unambiguous, as it might seem. Thus, the type of relation between the size of a country and its security is rather unclear as well.

Starting with the first studies on small states and their security, carried out by the American researchers Annete Fox, Robert Rothstein, and David Vital, one can discern that „small powers (alias states) are something more than just 'lower-case' big powers.“ [3] Despite similarities between small and large countries (institutional-administrative structure, legislative framework, political decision-making

² As Viotti mentioned, „...the power of a country is defined not only by its abilities but also by its will to use them and the acknowledgement of this will by other countries.“ [6]

process, etc.), they differ by their different behaviour and attitude towards similar issues and threats. Given the small size and insignificant natural and human resources, i.e. rather limited economic resources, national security becomes a very important issue for some small states. Ensuring national security depends on combining spatial factors that are relatively stable (location and landscape, natural and human resources, ethnical composition, etc.) with conjuncture and temporal factors (nature, the origins and seriousness of internal and external risks and threats). Given the assumption that a small physical-geographical basis cannot cover the multitude of potential threats (or covers them to a smaller extent than large states do), it is natural that small countries feel much more vulnerable to external threats. However, the economic success of some Eastern Asian countries („the Asian Tigers„) proves that a lack of natural resources does not necessarily mean an inability to ensure economic security. Moreover (to reassure the minds that are not at ease with the idea of Moldova's joining the WTO), we would like to point out that, although it sounds paradoxical at first, the firm emphasis of the „Asian Tigers" onto international trade and finances is a key factor for ensuring their economic security. On the other hand, it is true that most Southern and Eastern Asian countries achieved economic success only after following for some time economic policies focused on the newest neo-interventionist doctrines. However, the golden rule of their reformatory governments was to follow the market rather than fight it.

1.2. Internal Contradictions of Economic Security

Economic security is both a complicated and controversial subject. Its analysis is carried out in several different reference sectors, the main distinction being made among the economic security of the consumers, of the producers (corporate security), of the owners of production factors, and of the state. The national economic security is conditioned by a balanced combination of these four components. On the other hand, in a small country the security of the consumers and of the production factors owners is more important and lucrative than the security of the state and corporate security, as the small country does not have enough capacities to manage them as well.

From the viewpoint of the origin of security factors (variables), one can distinguish internal and external national security. Reference sectors, as well as the internal and external dimensions of economic security can be complementary, but, on the other hand, it is quite often that they are concurrent, especially in post-totalitarian countries that are undergoing transition to a market economy and democracy. Moreover, when it comes to Moldova, the interdependence of these components and dimensions is at least as complex, and their control – at least as difficult as in some large countries. This situation is conditioned by a number of factors:

1. Extremely unfavourable political and social-economic conditions that preceded the transition to a market economy, which is the reason why currently in

the Republic of Moldova the informational and conceptual stagnation of the transition is observed; European society, a part of which we strive to become, will grow in the nearest future into a true informational society, but in the Republic of Moldova still very few people have access to the Internet;

2. Extraordinary penury of financial and economic resources due to the lack of natural resources and of corporate management skills; extensive fiscal evasion and quasi-social approaches towards macroeconomic management employed not so long ago that would probably turn into socialism in the future;

3. Unilateral dependence of Moldovan producers and consumers on Russian and Ukrainian energy sources and raw materials, as well as on foreign markets that allow for selling only a narrow range of uncompetitive goods;

4. The interference of major economic, political and criminal interests (the latter are mostly trans-national), has conditioned high corruption levels, led to the overtaking of control over some key sectors and companies by criminal or corrupt bureaucratic circles, and led to the loss of social and civil trust in the state's ability to warrant consumer and corporate economic security;

5. Underdeveloped civil society that cannot ensure the feedback needed to adjust the economic system to the people's needs, i.e. to the needs that are the *fundamental landmark* for evaluating national economic security.

So far, two main directions of approaching economic security have been identified – the Anglo-American approach and the Asian one. The Anglo-American school claims that the fundamental goal of an economic system is to ensure high living standards for the citizens of the country. The American capitalist system is based on individuals rather than the government or the community. Americans believe that in a true democracy the economy does not have the goal to prepare the country for war, but to meet the needs of the national consumers and producers.

From the Asian viewpoint, economic security means, primarily, increased national economic power abroad. Thus, the state has the right, or even the duty, to control the economic activity that directly influences economic security. This approach is what the American scholars call a „militarised approach to the economy," [7] and history proved repeatedly that such approaches to the economy do lead to wars.³

The European vision about economic security is a rather weird symbiosis of the Anglo-American and the Asian versions. One of the best-implemented models is the Swedish social-oriented economy that, however, is increasingly displaying „fatigue signs." Thus, the contradictions between the two approaches are very subtle and lead to confusion, as a practical synthesis of the two is very difficult. Even the most notorious economists have made mistakes and confusions. For instance, it was Adam Smith who believed that an economy is too complex to

³ As it is well known, the English-German trade conflict at the beginning of the 20th century was one of the main triggers of World War I

be controlled by the government, [8] which was also proven by the collapse of centralised socialist economies (i.e. a thesis in favour of the American vision of economic security). On the other hand, it was also Adam Smith who believed that „sometimes, the protection of the country is much more important than opulence“ (i.e. a thesis in favour of the Asian vision of the security). [9]

Additional difficulties in analysing economic security are caused as well by the incessant academic arguments about the superiority of the economic or political aspect in human existence, social behaviour and the subconscious. These arguments are conditioned by the deep differences between the logic of a politician and that of an economist, as well as between the principles of political and economic philosophy. The political space is radically different from the economic space. The former cannot exist without continuity, without interdictions and control; while the latter is much more dynamic, and major interests are focused on controlling flows and networks and exceeding national borders. [10]

Due to contradictions and confusions in political and economic thinking, the concept of security, in general, and the concept of economic security, in particular, as they were developed so far, repudiates any attempt to develop the analysis within strictly set limits. It is futile, even impossible, to approach the economic dimension of national security apart from the political, military, informational, and other variants of security. Firstly, the borderlines between the security dimensions are very volatile. Secondly, security dimensions determine each other, and sometimes it is extremely difficult to separate factors threatening economic security from the sectors jeopardising political security. Indeed, the quasi-total dependence of the Republic of Moldova on external energy and raw materials sources has determined the agrarian type of economy and a unilateral focus of trade relations, thus jeopardising the ability of the Moldovan state to provide resources and economic goods to producers and consumers. Therefore, it is highly probable that in the case of a military conflict or in the case of the threat of a military conflict, the Republic of Moldova will be totally unable to ensure a viable war economy. Even under the current conditions of peace, the extreme penury of the state does not allow for the establishing of a defensive economy, as well as for restoring and mobilising the military-industrial potential left from the Soviet Empire. Certainly, this vulnerability may be easily used by aggressive and subversive forces interested in diminishing the real political independence of the Republic of Moldova. Another example is the Transdnistrian conflict that has often overstepped the political dimension into the economic one, and Transdnistrian authorities have proven convincingly to the Moldovan government that they have enough tools to influence the economic security of Moldova and turn negotiations to the direction they need.

We cannot refer to economic security, as it was a specific condition, achievable by economic, political, or military means. Such an approach would be false. Even if we wanted very much to, we could not describe exactly – either qualitatively or quantitatively – what we mean by economic security. In Barry Buzan’s

opinion, „the generally accepted idea that economic security is an absolute widely-applied value is no more than an illusion, and following it means to follow a chimera.“ [9] This quality of economic security becomes perceivable at once if we extend it to the level of the capitalist system, based on free initiative and competition. However, we have in mind not only purely capitalist societies but even the countries undergoing transition to a social-oriented market economy, such as the Republic of Moldova. These contradictions are noticeable even in eminently social economies, e.g. Sweden. Furthermore, we will identify the contradiction for each of the four components of economic security – consumers, owners of production factors, producers, and the state, by firstly defining another issue – the contradiction between security and efficiency. It is the perpetual problem of balancing social equity and economic efficiency. Recently, another issue was added that makes it even more difficult for the decision maker, namely the need to minimise the impact of human activities upon the environment. The concept of sustained economic development is defined as the meeting point of these three principles.

As it was mentioned above, uncertainties occur while analysing consumer economic security. Firstly, consumer economic security is often confused with individual social security. Individual social security means everyone’s right to have access to a minimum necessary for biological survival and to benefit from a guaranteed living standard. Article 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova clearly sets forth that „the state must undertake measures to ensure decent living standards for everybody that would secure his health, his and his family’s well-being, including food, clothing, dwelling, healthcare, as well as needed social services.“ Article 126, paragraph (2) sets forth that „the state must ensure more jobs, appropriate conditions for increasing living standards.“ Jobs or a decent minimal income is not expressly guaranteed, as it would mean that the state or employers would have to undertake additional liabilities. On the government’s part, it would mean major interventions in the open market mechanism, in order to create new jobs (thus decreasing economic efficiency) and in order to ensure socially equitable income repartition (thus hampering a person’s right to fully benefit from his own abilities and skills). The main risk of such political intrusions would be „a Soviet-type outcome, where individual social security was gained by overall low living, or a British-type outcome of relative economic decline and increasing difficulties in maintaining overall employment and corresponding growth.“ [9] Maintaining the balance between security, efficiency, and the environment should also be a fundamental issue for the government of the Republic of Moldova.

Another confusion appears while analysing the economic security of the owners of production factors (labour, capital, land, information), when the economic security of the employed (owners of a production factor – labour) is mistakenly confused with social security. Within national economic security, major conflicts of interests occur, for instance, between the interests of the workers

(defending the economic security of the owners of production factors) and the producers' interests (defending corporate interests).

Contradictions still emerge when analysing corporate economic security components. Overall high productivity and the appropriate use of limited resources in an open market are only possible by eliminating businesses that are less able to resist market pressures. Under such conditions the ones who survive are companies that have more flexible organisational structures and management systems, while the companies that cannot adjust are eliminated. The establishing of monopolies, the creation of cartels are just several artificial barriers preventing market access for other corporations. Thus, an open market economy is based on the idea that seems unacceptable at first look, namely the idea of the development instability that admits a certain degree, sometimes a rather high one, of corporate economic security. If we extend this reasoning to the level of international relations, we will come to the wrong conclusion that the economic security of a country is also unattainable. However, we must be aware that there are significant differences between consumer economic security and corporate economic security, on one hand, and the state's economic security, on the other; the most remarkable factor is that the state can adjust their „inner structure“ to the external environment and has constraint measures aimed at ensuring security in case of external or internal threats.

To put it differently, an open market requires increased adjustability from companies that want to keep their positions in the market. Although corporate security is an indispensable part of national economic security, raising corporate interests to the level of absolute priorities of the national economic security policy is unacceptable, as there is yet another aspect characteristic of the economic security – the antagonism between producers' interests and consumers' interests. As producers, companies are interested in maximising their profit, including the creation of monopolies, while the consumers are interested in increasing the utility of the goods and services. This can be achieved only by diversifying consumers' options, and the idea of a monopoly is equivalent with increased consumer prices and the impossibility to choose. It should be mentioned that in the Republic of Moldova numerous cases were registered when corporate interests dominated consumers' interests, as well as the state's interests; one of the most famous cases is the confusing situation during recent years regarding *Franzeļuța*, North and North-West Power Distribution Grids, etc.

These cases can be explained by a phenomenon that often occurs in poor countries and countries undergoing transition, namely the corruption of the public officers in charge of overseeing the compliance with the legal framework concerning free competition by local and foreign producers. Besides, in such a small post-totalitarian country as Moldova the Communist methods of labour rotation within public authorities, state-owned companies, administrative and oversight bodies, the diplomatic corps, political parties, and other such structures were preserved almost intact. The impact of these phenomena upon the national

economic security are obvious. They lead to the fossilisation of the political life, which results in the fact that large producers obtain illegal levers to promote their corporate interests to the prejudice of the individuals' and the state's security interests.

Another dimension of economic security that was not mentioned above but is analysed by several scholars (Buzan, Galtung) is the economic security of the classes. Quite often, discussions on this topic are avoided, as it is contiguous to Marxist economic theory. If we apply this concept to the case of the Republic of Moldova, we also avoid using the notion of „classes" as it is not a social reality. We would rather mention the economic security of elite that is not numerous (bankers, politicians, managers, public officers) and the increased insecurity of the other members of the society, most of them living under the minimum subsistence level. The middle class is underdeveloped and this determines the lack of an element balancing economic security interests and economic efficiency interests.

It would seem that, unlike the consumer and corporate security, the state's economic security should be easier to analyse, as by their nature states are more stable than individuals and businesses. However, in the Republic of Moldova, besides the difficulties caused by the abrupt beginning of the transition to an open market economy one can witness a deep crisis of national identity; thus, the concept of the state's economic security cannot be applied univocally. Therefore, when it comes to the Republic of Moldova, Marx's opinion might be proven true when he stated that the state is nothing else but the tools via which the dominant class (the elite) secures its security and prosperity interests. Besides, while studying the security of the Republic of Moldova as a state we must be fully aware where this state starts and where it ends, i.e. what is the territory that is really under the state's control. As Transdnistria has declared its secession and Gagauz-Yeri its autonomy, the eastern and the south-eastern borders are not controlled by the central government, but by regional elites supported by external forces. Thus, the Republic of Moldova is not only a small country, but also a weak one, split up from the viewpoint that implies specific vulnerabilities.

Studying the state's economic security one can trace parallels between consumer economic security conditions and those of the state. Just as consumer economic security, the state's economic security means, above all, the situation when all conditions needed for survival are ensured. Just as individual consumers do, the state need to ensure their immediate access to the needed resources. When it comes to a small state, such as the Republic of Moldova, the availability of extremely limited local resources need to be compensated by the free access to foreign investments and by opening towards world trade and finances, which need to become a component of the national security concept as disrupted supplies or funding threaten local political stability and well-being. Therefore, one of the priority directions of the external economic policy is to diversify the range of suppliers and creditors, and of the internal economic policy, to reduce weaknesses by establishing internal strategic reserves and a stable, as well as lucrative

financial-banking sector that would support real economic growth. *To identify in the future local alternative energy resources and funding is critical for preserving real political independence.*

The idea that despite instability and imperfections the open market is the best opportunity to increase economic efficiency, social and economic security, as well as innovation and distribution is widely accepted. For this reason, in order to operate more efficiently, the market has to include threats to the less productive economic agents. Therefore, a wide range of economic threats – that are most often purely economic risks – is an integral component of the rules and requirements imposed by the open market. Thus, it is very difficult to set the demarcation line between mere risks and exceptional situations that jeopardise the producers' security – an integral part of national economic security. However, as Buzan states as well, „to invoke too often the national security would simply mean increased governmental interventions in the economy to the extent when the market cannot operate anymore.“

Such interventions would mean that the state gains a status that is altogether different from that of the other economic agents, which would fully compromise the idea of free initiative and private property. The existence of private property implies the existence of a number of economic interests expressed by a variety of particular firms and individuals. For this reason, the open market mechanism leads to the situation when the state's economic interests cannot be defined as explicitly as its political or military interests. For the same reasons, when we talk, for instance, about the need to diversify energy resources suppliers and reduce the dependence on traditional markets, it does not mean that the state must dictate the import-export rules and directions. Most energy resources are imported and most Moldovan products are exported in conformity with contracts concluded directly by private economic agents. Thus, *the state needs only to create the physical infrastructure and the local legal framework, as well as to join external economic structures in such a way as to condition export re-orientation and import diversification.*

Despite all the contradictions we have mentioned above, we still need a working definition of economic security as *the condition when, both locally and externally, there are no economic and financial threats that might undermine the state's possibilities to secure the resources needed for fulfilling its functions, which would compromise the successful operation of the producers, would limit the possibility of paying the owners of production factors, and would jeopardise consumer interest in increasing to the maximum the utility of goods. The main goal of national economic security is to ensure the fundamental conditions for the social and economic development of the country.*

It is also important to define the term *social-economic development*. The term „development“ may be perceived and interpreted differently by the partisans of various political schools and by the followers of various political doctrines. From the economic viewpoint and in the historical meaning of the term, „development“ is understood as the ability of an economy that has been static for some time

or that has undergone a sharp qualitative, quantitative and structural crisis, to regenerate and maintain a yearly GDP growth of at least 5% in real terms. The traditional viewpoint of the economic sciences is that economic policies focused on increasing the share of the industrial and services sectors in the GDP should be developed, while the relative share of agriculture should decrease. Without contesting the priority of a country's industrial development, we believe that the inconsistent application of historical concepts may lead to an irremediable worsening of the situation in agriculture and discredit all efforts focused on the development of rural areas.

Due to the faults of the traditional development theories, the development in the Republic of Moldova should be approached as a multidimensional concept that, besides real economic growth, the decrease of social and regional economic gaps, and the eradication of the penury, would also include major changes in the structure of the economy, in the attitude of the public towards the reforms, in general, and towards some national institutions that, at the level of some European structures, have been mentioned as examples of red tape and archaism. At least three elements – *sustainability, dignity, and freedom*, perpetual values that were sought for during all times, in all societies, by every individual – must form the conceptual basis of economic security.

Sustainability means the ability of a state to provide citizens with all the resources needed for normal living and to overcome the miserable existence that, in the Republic of Moldova, derives from the lack of some elementary conditions – food, clothing, healthcare, security, and the possibility to give and get education. The growth of the per capita income rate, the increased possibility to seek and create new jobs, the eradication of poverty and the reducing of the gaps between individual income levels are the necessary (although not sufficient) conditions for the development and the fulfilment of human potential.

Dignity is everyone's right to be considered and to consider oneself a human being. In most developing countries and most countries undergoing transition the prosperity of the developed countries is considered an outcome of their national dignity. The citizens of the Republic of Moldova need to get a spirit of dignity, so that they are not used as a tool for achieving some individual or party interests and cease to be the objects of social and economic experiments.

Freedom is the fundamental prerequisite for building a healthy indivisible society. The citizens of the Republic of Moldova have equal rights with the citizens of other countries and may require that opportunities be created for living under comparable, if not equal, conditions, in compliance with the standards of developed countries.

The exact definition of the security and a clear concept of development are needed for developing a consistent doctrine on national economic security that was used for drafting the framework concept of national economic security [see Appendix].

1.3. The Relations between Economic Security and Other Aspects of National Security

Due to the new threats that emerged at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, national security concepts have undergone important qualitative changes in Eastern European countries, especially in some small countries from the European part of the former Soviet Union (the Baltic states and, until recently – when the political power was overtaken by the Communists – the Republic of Moldova). An expanded vision on this phenomenon is marked, first of all, by the distinction made between *hard* threats and *soft* threats to national security.

Hard security is the ability of the state to face direct military threats, to retain territorial integrity and the political independence of the country in the case of armed attacks or long-term wars. The Republic of Moldova does not face any hard security threats, as long as the Transdnistrian dispute does not regain its military dimension. In all other respects, the relations with Romania and Ukraine are very good, and the relations with Russia are good enough, and we cannot think of any serious military threats to the national security of the Republic of Moldova.

Soft security is the product of several security components, one of them being economic security. At the interstate and international level, soft security implies trade, political, and cultural relations with neighbouring countries, the monitoring of world economic and ecological environment, etc. In this respect, the threats faced by the Republic of Moldova are much graver.

Stability and economic security are intrinsically linked to the other forms of security. It is rather difficult to identify the cause-effect relationship between the national security components. However, depending on the internal situation and the regional geopolitical condition within national security the following may prevail: military security (Taiwan), political security (Estonia), environmental security (Kuwait), or informational security (Israel, although it seems that the country sets its priority on the military security, it has won the wars it held based on its information and counter-information services). In the Republic of Moldova the economic crisis has reached an unheard-of scale at the level of the European continent. This led to the situation when economic threats prevailed over all other threats, both at the level of public perception and at the level of political course⁴. Any action undermining economic security also undermines the other dimensions of national security. The instability of economic security is a primary symptom for other forms of insecurity (starting with social riots and ending with political disintegration), and these threats, in their turn, increase military risks. On

⁴ Once the Communists came to power, the issue of economic security is complementary to the threat regarding political security; the idea of settling the Transdnistrian dispute by turning Moldova into a federal state is an initiative that will be supported, undoubtedly, by Gagauz-Yeri as well.

the other hand, an open market economy cannot be lucrative without an appropriate legal system without developed capital markets and without a secure banking system. Given that internal political security is one of the fundamental requirements for the appropriate monitoring of economic exchanges and for survival in the world economy, in states that even one of these requirements is not met the national economic security decreases.

The economy is a component of the physical basis of the state that ensures the provision of the needed resources, including those needed to ensure military security, as well as political, environmental, and social security. If we disengage ourselves from philosophical discussions, the level of meeting material needs rather than the ideological beliefs eventually determine the trust of the civil society in state bodies. Paradoxically, it is true even if ultra-liberal policies are adopted, when the state disengages itself from the economy and only oversees that all private economic agents comply with „the rules of the game.“ As polls carried out lately in the Republic of Moldova show, most citizens say that they would be loyal to the state and the political elite if their expectations are met, and they do not mean a European-style economic prosperity, but some basic survival conditions and a guaranteed better future for their children. This trend is common for most Balkan countries and countries located between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In the opinion of most experts, the gravest situations are witnessed in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. In all three states one of the factors that have encouraged internal separatism was instability and economic insecurity. During a recent international conference, [11] the participants from these three countries have shared the common opinion that their country's security priority is an economic one. A Ukrainian delegate mentioned in his report that „for the moment, economic security is more important than military security. Thus, all efforts, including the efforts made in the military industry, should be focused on facing economic challenges.“ At the same conference, the Czech Minister of Defence mentioned that „the security aspirations of most European countries may be divided in two categories: those related to economic security (the access to raw materials, energy, markets, standards of living) and those conditioned by cultural, religious, historical, national, and political causes.“

The relationship between social stability and economic security can be seen especially when it comes to threats against consumer economic security. In the Republic of Moldova this situation was repeatedly shown by the ardent political discussions and the open protests of the vulnerable social categories regarding payment for communal services. In the consumers' opinion, the power and heat tariff rates, as well as gas tariffs are overpriced. Given the penury of the majority of the population, it is natural that the tariff issue led to social instability. Moreover, the people blame the state only, even if in this difficult situation also involved private companies. This situation that has been preserved in the Republic of Moldova already for several years can become a reference example showing how the economic insolvency of the population is reflected in a lower political

trust of the state both by the citizens of the country and foreign suppliers, which explains the tense relations of the Moldovan government with the Russian State Company Gazprom – a monopoly that supplies Moldovan power stations with natural gas.

Regarding the issue of communal service payments there is one more extremely sensitive aspect on which the country's ability to defend itself depends indirectly. As it is known, alongside with pensioners and the unemployed, families of the lower and middle-level military officers are included in the category of the most vulnerable social categories, and the security of the country depends on their loyalty. The meagre payment they get is not enough even for providing their families with food and clothes, let alone paying for communal services.

The level gained during the last couple of decades by the phenomena of environmental degradation has led to the establishing of much stronger relationships between economic security and environmental security. The utility of military forces in ensuring ecological security can be significant, and most basically, it is necessary to ensure the security and health of the population and of the military. Secondly, environmental security impacts positively and directly the national economic security. Thus, environmental security is an integral part of national security, especially in the case of a small country from the geographical viewpoint, when the condition of the environment is conditioned to a great extent by trans-border factors. Therefore, in many countries the possibilities to use the military to ensure the environmental security and prevent natural calamities, including those caused by the degraded environment, are examined. The threats against national security caused by the environment have made many large powers (USA, Canada, France, and Germany) assign new tasks to the military that were not specific for it before, namely:

- To ensure a minimal environmental impact of military actions, manoeuvres, and exercises;
- To ensure appropriate access to ecological resources (land, air, water) in order to fulfil the mission of protecting the country;
- To protect human potential, equipment and the arsenal of the defence ministries in fighting environmental calamities.

These tasks and the monitoring of the potential centres of regional instability under poor environmental conditions require significant funding. One of the major problems for the Republic of Moldova is that, in the future, the tensions in the Black Sea region may increase significantly due to the worsening of the environment condition that will impact the security of countries bordering it. The Black Sea coast, inhabited by tens of millions of people, has become one of the most populated regions in the world. The natural resources of the Black Sea region are running out due to overuse and the lack of any sustained development policies. The sea is used as a refuse dump for the industrial waste carried away into the Dniester, the Dnieper, the Danube, and the Don. The risk and the scale of an environmental catastrophe is so big that one of the experts consider that by the

end of the century the Black Sea might retreat significantly and the original coastline would never be restored. In the long term, it is not excluded that the northwest coastline (where the Republic of Moldova is located) will turn into a semi-desert, which is being confirmed by the long droughts that have impacted agriculture in this region during recent years. For this reason, the improvement or, at least, the conservation of the ecological situation in the Black Sea region should be, alongside economic co-operation, the joint top priority of the countries of the Black Sea region, including the members of the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Co-operation (OCEMN), the Danubian Countries Commission, GUUAM, and others.

As we have mentioned above, the economic security of a nation does not depend only on internal factors, but also on external factors, as they are inevitably included in a regional economic and geopolitical framework that impacts it either positively or negatively. The collapse of the Soviet Union has rekindled several latent political and national conflicts that have led to the worsening of economic situation in the Black Sea region, and that acted as one more factor that has contributed to regional instability. An aggravating historical circumstance was that almost all of the Black Sea regional countries, except for Turkey, were affected at the same time by an economic crisis, as when they started the transition to an open economy they were dependent on the former Soviet markets and production factors. Inflation is rather high compared to other European regions, and a quasi-general economic growth was registered only in 2000. Currently, the GDPs of all Black Sea regional countries undergoing transition are on average two times lower than at the beginning of the economic reforms, and the restoring of the potential production volume may take several more years, or even decades. Modest economic success was not registered until lately. In 1997, for instance, the GDP of the Republic of Moldova increased by 1% in real terms, of Armenia by 2.7%, and of Azerbaijan – 5.8% (especially due to the foreign investors that are very interested in the Caspian oil reserves controlled by Baku). A slightly higher growth rate was registered in 2000. On the other hand, the austere programmes imposed by the IMF resulted in rather grave social and even political crises in this region, and this led to the worsening of the relationships of some riparian countries (Ukraine, Russia) with the IMF, as well as to the worsening of social relationships in some of these countries. The difficulties are both economic and structural. Besides, the first signs of the negative impact of the unequal economic growth that reduce regional security can be noticed already. As an example, Azerbaijan can be quoted, a country which economic and financial power is increasing due to oil extraction, and will be able to get more weapons for its armed forces in the nearest future. It is natural that this leads to uncertainty regarding the security in the region, especially that of Armenia, given the simmering – but yet unsolved conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan.

Naturally, different economic potentials determine, as the table below shows, different military potentials in the Black Sea region. By the insignificant position

it holds, the Republic of Moldova cannot compete with other countries in the region.

Table 1. Defence Expenses of Black Sea Regional Countries, 1999

	Russia	Turkey	Ukraine	Bulgaria	Armenia	Moldova	Greece
Defence Expenses, million USD, 1999	69.537	6856	500	379	75	6.1	4040
Defence Expenses, % of GDP, 1999	8.7	4.3	1.4	2.7	4	1	4.0

Source: [12] and calculations made by the author.

The economic condition of most countries included in this table has improved to some extent since 1997, while Moldova's has worsened significantly. For this reason, in 1998 the funding of the armed forces of the Republic of Moldova was sufficient to cover only up to 37% of the needed expenses! Only 10% of the military budget is used to preserve the defence potential as such at an acceptable level. Over 60% of state budget funds are used to pay personnel and to provide food and food compensations. For the acquisition of weapons only about 1% of the budget was allocated for that purpose, which is totally insufficient to equip the armed forces that have been created only several years ago. If the armed forces will be under-funded for any longer, experts forecast that in ten years at most they will be absolutely unusable for fighting. Given that the Transdnistrian conflict has not fully settled yet and the military potential of the Transdnistrian paramilitary forces, together with the Limited Contingent of the Russian Armed Forces in Transdnistria is about three times the size of the national army, we may conclude that it is not at all improbable that the central government may become politically dependant on the Transdnistrian government rather than vice versa, as it would be natural for a unitary state.

1.4. The Factors that Contributed to the Economic Insecurity of the Republic of Moldova

Due to the small area and the poverty of our country, the deficiencies and problems related to its economic security are more serious than in other countries. However, the factors that favoured the economic crisis and the increased economic insecurity were, in general, similar to those recorded in most small countries, former USSR republics. On the other hand, there are some specific national features that favoured economic insecurity; in some cases, the quick overcoming of the incipient crisis and the avoiding of its turning into a sustained crisis (the Baltic states, especially Estonia), and in other cases, as it happened in the Republic of Moldova, the threatening crisis development rate increased. We have already mentioned that one of the factors was the delay in the processes

of developing information technology and computerisation, which was common for most former Soviet Republics. Other factors were characteristic to the Republic of Moldova only, such as the historical-economic, political-psychological, ethno-demographic, and ethno-psychological ones.

Historical-Economic Factors

Moldova was always treated as a province – under various occupations and, unfortunately, even as a part of the Romanian Kingdom – and this was reflected in the economy of the country. The Turkish and, most of all, the Russian occupation have conditioned a narrow economic specialisation, the excessive expansion of the arable land by deforestation and have conditioned the creation of a rudimentary industry. The numerous changes of the borders have caused the chaotic development of the infrastructure, especially in the south. It has impacted the economy of the country that was undergoing a steep decline until the middle of the 19th century. The old trade routes gradually shifted to the east, to the Ukrainian port of Odessa, and to the southwest, to Bulgarian and Romanian ports. The same shape of the trade routes has been kept up to now and it keeps Moldova from becoming a true conduit between the East and the West, the North and the South. Such opportunities are available to those who have access to the Black Sea. The strategic and geo-economic importance of having access to the Black Sea was also proven by the economic decay of Moldova during the Middle Ages, resulted from Turkey winning over of the towns of Cetatea Alba and Chilia. Certainly, the significance of geographical factors has decreased heavily since technical progress (new types of transportation), but, as the international relations history shows, the access to the sea may be vital for ensuring the economic security of small countries.

Under the Russian government, the Bessarabian province was one of the most agrarian provinces of the Russian Empire. It was partially due to the plain relief, the temperate climate, and the fertile soil, combined with the Tsarist colonisation policy that favoured the excessive expansion of agriculture. On the other hand, the traditional imperialist isolationism and the reticence of the Russian public officers towards the industrial revolution contributed to the establishment of a defective economy that a decade ago still lacked clear external economic objectives. Until the late 1980s the Moldovan economy was still isolated from the internationalisation processes; thus, it is hard to refer to the use of our own positive experience to promote external economic interests, as we lack both the experience and clearly defined economic interests.

As a member of the USSR, Moldova was exposed to intensive economic exploitation and this is the reason why it is facing serious ecological problems. Despite all positive achievements, the socialist-model economy of Moldova could not operate for very long, as it comprised profound internal contradictions and was based on a hypertrophied ideological foundation. An archaic model of foreign economic relations was imposed on the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic;

it was given the role of a raw supplier of agricultural materials, a consumer of industrial products and a structural element of the military-industrial complex. By and large, the Soviet economic system, with its adjacent physical and social structure, was designed in such a way that its political disintegration of the Empire was impossible, and an eventual disintegration would have caused an economic decrease, which would have caused a revival of the re-integration trends at the peripheries of the former empire. The example of the Republic of Moldova illustrates very well this principle of the Soviet economic planning, as within the USSR Moldova was depending both on other markets for the products of its agro-industrial complex and on the regular raw materials supplies for several industrial sectors of military and strategic significance.

The scope of the economic crisis that accompanied the disintegration of the USSR was aggravated in the Republic of Moldova by the mistakes made in the economic and financial policies. First of all, the public lost all the savings deposited in the Moldovan banking system, and the national currency was introduced with some delay, which favoured „inflation import“ from Ukraine – a country that introduced a national currency at an earlier stage.

Political Factors

The current economic deficiencies of the Republic of Moldova are heavily determined by the resistance of the politicians' unconsciousness in orienting the politics towards the investment and production (geo-economic) model of foreign economic relations, the resistance originating from the former centralised political-economic system. It was easy to notice during the Sangheli government, when the reforms initiated by the two previous governments were subdued and priority was given to the former model of priority agrarian development. In fact, the curious phenomenon of rejecting earlier achievements and of rejecting liability for the eventual repercussions of the actions undertaken by former governments was consistently a defining feature of most governments that came to power in Moldova during the last decade. The same stereotypes are followed currently by the Communists who, from political and strategic reasons, and by no means from economic and financial reasons, intend to dissolve the counties and prefectures and return to former administrative-territorial structures.⁵

It is not accidental that the Communists have undertaken a rather vague political course – at first sight – when they came to power, as they concealed a firm geo-economic pro-Russian orientation, dictated by an inferiority complex

⁵ There are two major reasons why the Communists want to restore the old administrative-territorial structure of the country. First, the internal structure of the Communist Party is based on the former district structure. When counties were established, the Communists lost important financial and administrative levers. Secondly, a new administrative-territorial reform also means extraordinary local elections that would benefit the Communists that long for a quick victory, as time is a factor that disfavors them.

concerning economic and political management. In reality, inferiority complexes were always present in the political course and actions undertaken during the last decade, though it was somewhat shadowed by conjunct pro-European traces. In *the Republic of Moldova a firm pro-European political and economic orientation never existed*.

This proves that three major issues stand in the way of ensuring the economic security of the Republic of Moldova. First, the central and local administration does not understand very clearly the economy, in general, and economic security, in particular. Secondly, the opinions expressed by politicians regarding regional economic phenomena and international economic relations are often void of any logical basis and are heavily loaded with ideology. The most striking cases are the „analyses“ of the regional geo-economic framework made by the president and the speaker of the Parliament and the external economic solutions that they recommend.⁶ Thirdly, the external political environment is not appreciated correctly and the economic security of a small country depends heavily on it. The focus on Russia promoted by the current government will be proven wrong, as this country is facing an economic and political separatism that is difficult to hide, and once the external circumstances that condition economic growth (prices for oil, raw materials, weapons) disappear, Moscow will lose the economic lever that is very important for keeping control over the entire territory. Another extremely important factor is the poor awareness of most politicians concerning finance and public administration, and the deeply rooted habit of acting by following the orders of central decision-makers.

Besides, the Republic of Moldova is also a country of varied political preferences, which is proven by the numerous parties and political movements. This caused the disintegration of the Moldovan society by political criteria, which made impossible for the eight former governments to get real opportunities to gain mass social support of the population, in order to implement reforms.

Ethno-Demographical Factors

As history and recent events show, ethno-demographical factors may play a very important role in achieving economic success and ensuring economic security. Poland, Japan, Korea are the most quoted examples of ethnically homogenous countries that achieved economic success during different historical periods. Generally speaking, the more dispersed a country is (by various criteria – ethnical, religious, social, cultural, or ideological), the less are the chances for successful socially acceptable economic and political reforms. If a society is split up ethnically, but is homogenous by social criteria, there are chances for uniting the society by a national idea, such as, for instance, the economic prosperity of the country, the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, etc. However, the Republic

⁶ As one can see from the political speeches of President Voronin, it is necessary that Moldova joins as many regional structures as possible – CIS, EU, Russia-Belarus Union, Euro-Asian Economic Community, etc.

of Moldova is split by several criteria that, on the other hand, it displays a visible correlation between the ethnicity and its economic power.

After World War II, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic has undergone fervent industrialisation following the Stalinist model, which was conditioned by the pragmatic reasoning of the arms race and the ideology of educating a true Moldovan labour class. Communist leaders envisioned the achievement of these goals by increased inter-republican labour mobility, i.e. mostly by transferring to Moldova a Russian population. From 1959 until 1985 the number of Russians inhabiting Moldova increased by 213,000 (173%), which is an absolute record for the Soviet Union. Most immigrants were given jobs and dwelling in urban areas, and urban population grew twice as quick as the rural population. During 1970-1979 the Moldovan population growth rate was two times less than that of the Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians. The share of Moldovans decreased to 64% in 1979. Despite the declared principles of national equity and social federalism, the representatives of other nationalities held the key positions in the political and economic top management. Pursuant to Soviet migrations policies, the share of the Moldovan population in urban areas decreased significantly. In 1989 Moldovans amounted to 42% of the population of Chisinau (the capital city of Moldova), 37% in Balti, 25% in Tighina, and 49% in Cahul. Thus, the Moldovans have had (due to the well known phenomenon of demographic inertia) less business opportunities than the representatives of other nationalities. The representatives of the minorities are not well represented in state administration bodies, but, on the other hand, are very active in business activities and control impressive economic powers, which undoubtedly impacts the national economic security in a negative manner. Businessmen coming from this environment focus mostly on foreign trade and use their capital to establish major Moldovan-Russian joint ventures, thus determining the geographical orientation of foreign economic relations. When it comes to major political and economic issues – starting from the expansion of the European Union and Moldova's joining the Russia-Belarus Union and ending with citizenship and linguistic policies, the minorities tend to identify with the official political course of their historical Motherland.

During the mid-1980s, the managers of the most important plants and factories were Russians and Ukrainians, while Moldovans were represented more in healthcare, culture, education, light industry, social services, and trade. Such an asymmetry of the economic potential has facilitated the division of Moldovan society, however, not so much by ethnical criteria but by political criteria, between the ones who wanted to keep the Communist economic and political system and the ones who chose social change. Notwithstanding the fact that the society's split-up boasted a political origin, the conservative economic and political elite have managed to attribute to it an ethnical dimension, counting mostly on the Russian and Ukrainian population, as well as the Russified population in Transdnistria and the Gagauz inhabiting the southern part of Moldova. Thus, when in Moldovan society transparency (*glasnost*) and restructuring (*perestroika*)

gained ground and it was clear that this would inevitably lead to national revival, these elites have managed to cause strikes at over 150 plants and factories in Moldova to prove the dissatisfaction of the management and of the staff with the economical and political transformations in Moldova.

Pursuant to Communist demographical and social experiments, the Moldovans' possibilities to fully and fairly take part in privatisation in the early 1990s were limited. Although the Moldovans comprise 65% of the population of the Republic of Moldova, they are poorly represented in the „top businesses.“ However, it was not only the events that have taken place during the last couple of decades that conditioned the formation of a psychology characteristic of the Moldovans. A major ethno-psychological characteristic of the Moldovans that was mentioned long ago by Dimitrie Cantemir is their predilection for agriculture and much less for trade and industry, which are the most dynamic and profitable sectors of an economy. The fatalism and some „detached contemplation“ are the two distinct ethno-psychological characteristics that determine a rather low economic potential of a numerically predominant demographical segment.

Certainly, these psychological features are true only at the level of statistics and there are numerous example of individual success of the representatives of the majority population. However, from the hundreds of thousands of Moldovan emigrants that are employed abroad by season or temporarily the majority are Moldovans. Russians and Ukrainians have a more developed trader psychology, they prefer to start business in Moldova rather than go abroad. By and large, Moldovans avoid risks as individuals, while as a group they behave in a more dynamic mare and can be even slightly aggressive.

These preferences denote an inferiority complex characteristic of the Moldovans, which can be observed easily in public transportation, in markets, and in higher education institutions. This complex is also aggravated by the fact that Moldovans, in fact, are a „sub-nation,“ a part of the Romanian nation, which inevitably leads to the duplication of the national identity of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. As a matter of fact, this complex was created during the last couple of decades pursuant to Russia's denationalisation and Russification policies. For this reason, during the Soviet times some „filters“ were created that limited the social mobility of rural inhabitants who were predominantly Moldovan. With some exceptions, graduates of professional schools and college graduates from villages were made come back to the country, [13] which limited their possibilities to get involved in scientific researches, factory and plant production, economic and financial planning, etc. Therefore, even if they comprised over 65% of the total population, Moldovan held only 40% of medium-level and top-level positions in administrative bodies.

Given these specific ethno-demographical features, one can note significant differences between the economic potential controlled by Moldovans and the economic potential controlled by the representatives of other nationalities. These differences, as the experience of other countries shows, may be easily manipu-

lated by interested politicians, which may eventually lead to tense social relationships and poor social security.

2. THE ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

2.1. The Comparative Development Level

Many experts consider globalisation a phenomenon that may impact the economic security of small states to the greatest extent. Though they are partially right, we cannot disregard some incontestable advantages brought around by globalisation. On the other hand, a small state must be developed enough to mitigate the negative impact of the globalisation over its economic security and to find its strategic niche in the world economy. To compare one's capacities and possibilities with those of neighbouring countries is absolutely indispensable for economic security. In addition, there must be enough internal (financial, informational, intellectual) resources gathered, given the high costs implied by ensuring the security against the negative trends of the world economy. Meanwhile, these trends that impact negatively the economic interests of a small country are truly impressive:

- Due to the interference of the financial, technological, informational, legislative-national, ethno-psychological, and other interests and factors, geo-economic interests become a priority in an exceedingly dynamic and aggressive geo-economic space;
- The share of private subjects (trans-national corporations, industrial nuclei, individuals, etc.) in international relations increases, and the share of the public subjects (states) decreases;
- The world economy is a super-integrated compact system that disregards national borders and national interests. Most countries will not be able to act as warrants of national sovereignty and will turn into economic agents with their own geo-economic interests, trying to get a niche in the world economy and „merge“ with trans-national corporations;
- The world economy becomes very dynamic and in time it will also become unpredictable. Globalisation endows the world economy with absolutely new qualitative characteristics that do not equal the national economies „put together“
- The globalisation of human activities has erased the borders between the external and internal activities. It is especially true in the case of the small states. Their internal and external policies have become conditioned. International flows and networks define their future to a much greater extent than the internal ones. Ignoring them may undermine the efforts to set up the national economies and promote strategic interests in a foreign environment. Economic autarchy is no longer sensible for achieving national economic interests.

Without going into much detail, it is almost certain that the Republic of Moldova cannot tackle the challenges of globalisation and it will not be able to in the future either, if significant efforts are not made to stimulate the local market and restore the economic potential using the investment-production geo-economic development model. However, the local market cannot be stimulated any more by custom fees, it needs competitive quality goods and lower production costs. Customs fees will no longer be used, as the agreement on Moldova joining WTO was ratified and this means that some rules and trade liabilities regarding non-discriminatory treatment of local and foreign economic agents must be complied with. On the other hand, the threats can indeed be global, as the US Government has already declared that it will make significant efforts to „open up“ the internal markets of some small countries and ensure the export of American goods, i.e. to provide jobs to Americans.

When it comes to economic security, in general, it is very difficult to effectively compare several countries just by quantitative factors, disregarding the qualitative ones – civilisation, culture, moral and religious values – that cannot be compared or measured directly. However, a comparison is required to better understand the differences between threats, weaknesses, and risks, and an overall picture can be obtained even by comparing the overall human development level that is often correlated to the national economic security.

A parameter that is widely used to identify the economic security level is GDP per capita, a parameter that is relevant enough for some preliminary comparisons. However, even among small countries the income and the development level vary widely – beginning from very poor African countries (e.g., Guinea Bissau with a GDP of USD 150 per capita), relatively poor countries (the Republic of Moldova – the GDP is of about USD 2100 per capita), and ending with relatively rich countries (Brunei – about USD 12,000 per capita).

At first, to identify the economic security of the country we can use, perhaps, another parameter – *the economic and geographical importance* (EGI), defined as the product of GDP (expressed in USD billion) and the area (expressed in km²), divided by the population (expressed in million persons). If we apply this method, the regional rating will read as below:

Table 2. Economic Significance of Some Baltic and Black Sea Region Countries, 1999

Country	Inhabitants (millions)	GDP (USD billions)	Area (thousand km ²)	EGI
Albania	3.314	4.1	28.7	35.5
Armenia	3.465	9.1	29.8	78.26
Azerbaijan	7.767	11.5	86.6	128.22
Belarus	10.445	49.2	207.6	977.87
Bulgaria	8.672	43.2	110.9	552.45

Czech Republic	10.315	106.2	78.8	811.30
Estonia	1.434	12.3	17.4	149.24
Georgia	5.14	6.2	69.7	84.07
Greece	10.605	101.7	131.9	1264.90
Hungary	9.901	72.5	93.0	681.06
Latvia	2.417	14.7	63.7	387.42
Lithuania	3.627	13.3	65.3	239.45
Macedonia	2.119	19.0	25.7	230.44
Moldova	4.476	11.4	33.7	78.30
Poland	38.725	226.7	313.9	1837.84
Romania	22.305	105.7	273.5	1296.07
Russia	150.5	796.0	1707.5	90310.30
Slovakia	5.401	39.0	49.0	353.88
Slovenia	1.943	22.6	20.253	235.57
Turkey	64.050	345.7	779.4	4206.69
Ukraine	50.830	174.6	603.7	2073.70
Yugoslavia	10.675	20.6	102.2	197.22

Source: [14] and the author's calculations

No comments needed. The Republic of Moldova is the last but one in this list. Of all European small countries, few have undergone an economic crisis as „impressive“ as Moldova's during the last decade. The nature of the crisis that stroke the Republic of Moldova in the early 1990's is different from the nature of the latest years, as initially all blame was laid on objective structural factors, while now all the blame for the lamentable situation is mostly placed on the human factor, primarily the ineffective macroeconomic management and unfinished structural reforms.

To describe Moldova's status at the world level when it comes to human development, we may appeal to the study carried out by the Institute for Global Communications.⁷ [15] The study included 191 countries, in order to develop a general development rating. The development level was calculated using a number of indicators, for the period 1996-2000: the number of telephone lines, infant mortality, income per capita, export per capita, the number of TV sets, the number of newspapers, the amount of generated electricity, the consumption of the young and the elderly, life expectancy, literacy level, foreign currency reserves, birth rate, the number of radio sets, urbanisation rate, consumer prices, the import-export ratio. These indicators are also relevant for identifying state and consumer economic security. According to the method used for the study carried out by the Institute for Global Communications, the most developed country in

⁷ We would like to point out that it is one of the few studies that include the most favorable results for the Republic of Moldova, as others state a much lower level of development.

the world is Norway, and the least developed – the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Republic of Moldova hold 96th place, after Ecuador and Libya, and it is followed by Tunisia and South Africa. Of the 21 Eastern European countries, Estonia is the first, while Moldova is the 19th, after Romania and Armenia, and it is followed by Bosnia and Albania. It is remarkable that the top 14 developed countries in the world are small European countries, which confirms once more the idea that a small state does not necessarily mean a poor state.

During the reviewed period, the trend of economic decrease was strongly pronounced. In fact, few are the countries that have registered during 1996-2000 an ongoing positive growth rate: China, Argentina, Norway, Singapore, Kenya, and Slovenia. The Republic of Moldova – alongside such countries as Georgia, Bosnia, Liberia, Cuba, and Madagascar – have registered an opposite trend.

On the other hand, as the study by the Institute for Global Communications shows, a very rich country is not necessarily a country with strong economic or social security. Many rich countries face problems related to a high crime rate environmental problems or just moral and intellectual degradation of the nation. On the other hand, a rich country does not mean a stable country that does not threaten neighbouring countries. For instance, some of the top ten countries with a high level of CO₂ pollution are the USA, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, and the risk is so high that they might damage the environment at the regional level.

2.2. Defining Parameters of Economic Risks

From the economic and political points of view, small countries have common features that determine their vulnerability in facing some risks. Most small countries are extremely sensitive to external events, are undergoing transition to an open market economy, are establishing their own economic system or are trying to conserve some economic crises that are too serious for their governments to manage them. Many of them fully depend on external energy sources, food, raw materials, etc. Also, high corruption levels are characteristic of small underdeveloped countries.

Given all this, it seems sensible that the difficulties related to defining in an elegant academic manner the concept of a small country is overridden by the description of the parameters that define the difficulties these countries are struggling with in fighting for their status in international relations. Thus, the parameters that determine increased risks to the economic security of the small country called the Republic of Moldova are:

- **Geographical isolation.** The Republic of Moldova is landlocked, without direct access to shipping routes (currently the possibility to gain access to the Black Sea through the Danube, the Reni port or at Giurgiulești are being examined). Its internal market is very small for quite a few local producers, and still it is hard to occupy some external niches. The access to the EU market is checked by European protectionist policies, while the Eastern

markets are either very unstable or insolvent. This determines, alongside the relatively low product quality, the poor competitiveness of Moldovan goods. The Republic of Moldova is a classic example of a small vulnerable economy open to the flows of the world economy and dependent on external energy sources and former Soviet markets. Its political independence is conditioned by its economic independence. Therefore, at the foundation of its economic security should be the principle of diversification of trade partners by establishing relations with non-traditional regions, such as Northern Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The easiest way to cover these areas of some geo-economic interest is to use shipping corridors via the Black Sea and those adjacent to the Black Sea. Unfortunately, although maritime shipping is often four or five-fold cheaper than air or road shipping, most Moldovan analysts, politicians, and businessmen display an exaggerated scepticism the possibility of acceding to new markets via the sea. The most accessible way to ship Moldovan goods by the Black Sea is to use Ukrainian ports, in particular, the port of Reni on the Danube, where four international sea corridors meet and where goods can be stored, transferred and shipped. Reni may become a very important shipping and logistic joint for the Republic of Moldova, as it can ship any goods to the CIS, to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea ports, as well as to the Indian Ocean and to the Pacific.

- ***Openness towards the world economy.*** The integration of the world economy by trade liberalisation, by providing increased facilities to foreign investors and by establishing a freely-exchangeable currency and financial regime implies both significant benefits and risks that cannot be disregarded – financial shocks, the control of enterprises that bear strategic importance by foreign corporations, the stoppage of supplies, regional economic blockade, etc. In the case of the Republic of Moldova this was proven in September 1998, when the financial crisis in Russia abruptly decreased Moldovan export to the Russian and Ukrainian markets, as well as in March 2000, when Gazprom stopped the natural gas supply. From this point of view, we must be aware of the extremely difficult situation that was created by Moldova joining the WTO, as the Republic of Moldova will no longer be able to rely on customs fees as a source of collecting revenues for the state budget and to protect the national producers. On the other hand, the extremely cheap labour force would favour the establishing in Moldova of large corporations, which would increase state revenues and would cut down the unemployment rate. However, the taking of control over strategic companies by foreign corporations that act in favour of promoting the political interests of other countries or just increase the risk of the creation of monopolies reduce significantly the attractiveness of this scenario;
- ***Sensitivity regarding ecological catastrophes, unfavourable meteorological phenomena, and other external natural calamities.*** In the case of small countries,

the small territory and the relative homogeneity of the terrain makes it impossible to divide risks by various areas. In the Republic of Moldova it was proven by several severe droughts, landslides and hail that impacted agricultural yields, as well as the icing in November 2000 that destroyed the power grids in the north. However, meteorological casualties are *force-majeure* factors only in predominantly agrarian economies and, in fact, do not impact the activity of small industrial countries or the countries oriented towards international trade, such as Belgium, Singapore, or Estonia.

The increased homogeneity of agricultural products and the diversification of export and industrial products. Due to the small area and scarce resources, small states cannot substitute activities impacted by *force-majeure* events by other activities. Thus, the largest share of Moldovan export is agricultural goods and food (about 62-65% of export), dependent on climatic factors. The second top export category are textiles (14% of export), dependent on raw materials supplies. All other exported industrial goods do not have the needed quality to compete internationally and provide steady inflows of currency. Thus, the access to foreign commodity and capital markets, as well as the timely supply of raw materials, are vital for the survival of the Republic of Moldova as an independent country, and it makes it, on the other hand, even more sensitive to the external factors that are independent from the actions of local economic agents and internal governmental policies.

At the first sight, it might seem that Moldovan agricultural exporters have certain chances – due to low costs, acceptable quality, ecological purity – to access the European market of scarce agricultural goods, i.e. corn, meat, legumes, and soy oil. However, these products are scarce in the regions that are the farthest from the Republic of Moldova and are aimed at by potential competitors (Romania, Poland, and Ukraine);

- ***Overall poverty.*** One can quote quite a few statistical data to prove that poverty is more characteristic of small states than in the large ones, and this is also true for the Republic of Moldova. Overall poverty – both of the state and of a large share of the population – combined with scarce economic resources, make questionable the ability of the state to react promptly to the risks and challenges to its national security. The time and sector dispersion of the income of economic agents is greater in the Republic of Moldova than in the large countries, the standard per capita income deviation rate being larger by 55%. Moreover, the distribution of the profit is very heterogeneous, and the Gini coefficient is about 0.4-0.5. Even if, in the long run, this coefficient decreases, mainly due to the Moldovans working abroad as seasonal workers and assure the largest part of the population's purchasing power, the risk of increased social discrepancy and reduced internal political security is very high in the Republic of Moldova. The increasing number of crimes against private property proves the point;

- **Underdeveloped transport infrastructure.** The railways network in the Republic of Moldova hardly divaricates and has a relatively short length of 1150 km; the length of double railways is only 178 km. The capital city does not have a direct rail connection with the south, except by the town of Tighina, which is controlled by the separatists Transdnistrian authorities. In addition, all the railways that ensure the link with the Russian and Ukrainian markets cut through Transdnistria as well. The sleeper trains are highly decrepit and their shape is characteristic to Soviet standards. Under some conditions it is quite easy to blockade economically the Republic of Moldova and limit its possibilities to appropriately diversify its markets and its raw materials and energy sources suppliers. As an example the events in 1991-92 can be quoted, when Transdnistria blocked the railways and caused huge losses to the Moldovan economy;
- **Limited land and financial resources.** Although the sufficient development of the private sector is characteristic of all the countries undergoing development, in the Republic of Moldova it remains an outstanding phenomenon. However, the public sector also faces significant problems in providing public services and protecting the private sector. The small states are exposed to the negative impact of the globalisation to a greater extent than the large countries and they do not have the institutional capacities and resources to reduce risks, as „*instead of drying up the swamp they hunt crocodiles in it.*” The scarcity of internal resources conditions the appeals to crediting resources of international financial bodies, and increases the dependence of small countries on forces that generate globalisation.

2.3. Flaw # 1: Reduced Intellectual and Technological Potential

The main goal of the economic security policy must be the strengthening of real political independence of the country, which implies ensuring a sufficient manoeuvre space for the free choice of economic partners and a real openness towards the world economy. However, this space cannot be ensured only by declarations of intentions or ubiquitous (or ambiguous) external economic and security policies. Without appropriate human and industrial potential, national economic interests cannot be protected by the armed forces, as these forces are the ones that are first to suffer from the impact of austere budgets and financial constraints. Under the conditions in the Republic of Moldova that the ministers of finance or economy, rather than the minister of defence, have a decisive impact on defence capacities, these dimensions are inherently linked with the economic security of the country.

The end of the Cold War led to the annihilation of the military-industrial complex that employed tens of thousands of Moldovan citizens. Ironically, for them the coming of peace meant losing their jobs. A state that must be, normally,

responsible for the fate of highly qualified labour was more willing to conserve the issue by ignoring it and covering it up rather than to allocate needed funds to retrain the former engineers, scientists, and researchers that used to work in the military industry, in secret research institutes and others. The reintegration of the unemployed workers, most of which were not natives, would have contributed to the establishing of sustained social and ethnic peace. It is estimated that at least 5000-6000 unique specialists left the Republic of Moldova or changed their area of activity.

Besides the degradation of the intellectual potential the human potential, as a production factor, has also degraded. Firstly, it happened due to the mass emigration of the population, especially of the rural inhabitants and the young that were seeking better-paid jobs.⁸ Various sources state different numbers, from tens of thousands up to 600,000 or even more. Most emigrants do not come back to Moldova and contribute to the mechanical decrease of the population. The mass emigration of teachers and doctors (the people on which the intellectual and physical health of the society depend) seeking better-paid jobs may have the most dangerous outcomes for the human potential of the Republic of Moldova.

Besides, during the next three decades the population might decrease by natural ways as well, as the death rate tends to exceed the birth rate. Thus, the population of the country can decrease from 4,350,000 in 2000 to 4,156,000 in 2030. According to a forecast of local experts, during the same period the population structure might change, as the ageing rate might increase from 13.74% in 2000 to 18.55% in 2030. [16] This scenario is based on the hypothesis that the economic recession will not stop and it would inevitably impact the demographical situation as well. Under such conditions, so far the Republic of Moldova still does not have a specific consistent policy for preserving and developing its human and intellectual potential.

The human factor degraded both quantitatively and qualitatively, as human intellectual capacity depends directly on the quality of life. Under the conditions where the average monthly pay covers only a third of the minimum subsistence level it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop multilaterally a human persona. At the peripheries of the Republic of Moldova the horrifying phenomenon of both the intellectual and physical underdevelopment of children that were born in the late 1990s or later can be even observed. It is conditioned most by the nutrition structure that does not cover the minimal physiological subsistence minimum. In the Republic of Moldova, as in other former Soviet countries, the consumer budget includes a very large share on food expenses, though they still are not enough to maintain the physical health of most people. To see the differences between the level of the economic and social development in the European Union and in the Republic of Moldova we can compare the general

⁸ The mass emigration of the young is partially the reason for the recent remarkable political victory of the Communists, who were elected on 25 February 2001 mostly by seniors.

expense structure. In 1998, the people of the Republic of Moldova have split up consumer expenses as follows: about 66% for food, 16% – consumer goods, and 18% – services. During the same year, the population of the European Union used 14% for food, 30% –consumer goods, and 56% –services (including entertainment, family trips, recreation, etc.).

Thus, the expenses for healthcare, medication, education, culture that are of special importance for the development of the intellectual factor in the Republic of Moldova are deep below an optimal level and have a residual character that varies from urban areas to rural areas. The access to education and training has actually increased for children and the young coming from urban areas, while for children in rural areas they still are an inaccessible luxury.

Under these conditions, the long-term trends are discouraging. Currently, in most higher education institutions, the most popular courses are the „prestigious” ones – economics, international relations, law – notwithstanding that the internal market has been over-saturated for the last couple of years. On the other hand, the technical professions and the fundamental sciences on which most of the nation’s technological potentials depend are not popular. It will lead to a situation where the Republic of Moldova will not have specialists for jobs in the traditional sectors, such as the food processing industry, winemaking, textiles, etc.

Another problem related to intellectual potential is that of the military-industrial complex which conversion took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was another flaw of the first independent governments. The budgetary constraints of a hardly heard-of country led inevitably to the decrease of the fighting capacities of the future national army. Conversion could have been a normal successful process if the representatives of the economic, social, and security elites in Moldova and the former Soviet central administration co-ordinated their efforts and came to a joint agreement about dividing the properties and technologies of the military-industrial sector. However, the Moldovan conversion had two specific features. Firstly, military expenses decrease and the military-industrial potential conversion was carried out without any public policies or any well-defined legal framework, without taking into account and trying to alleviate the negative social and economic outcomes. Without mass investment, it will be impossible to restore the former military-industrial potential to be used for civil purposes. Secondly, these changes were made without civil society and the mass media monitoring. In general, the transparency of the armed forces and of the military-economic potential was applied only lately. The three activities that would contribute heavily to preserving the industrial and human potential in the Republic of Moldova are: to allocate funding to modify the product range, to use the funds that can be obtained from the conversion monitored by the local political elite, as well as the efficient re-orientation of direction of scientific research and military technology.

2.4. Flaw # 2: The Dependence on Foreign Energy Resources

The total or partial lack of local energy resources has determined the almost total dependency of the energy security of the Republic of Moldova on external traditional energy sources. There are numerous small states that depend on external energy resources (Slovenia is a famous example), but several critical factors determine the increased sensitivity of the Republic of Moldova to regional energy changes.

First, the Moldovan economy depends on Transdnistrian power producers. Less than a third of the power needed for the normal operation of the economy and for covering consumer demand is generated by the power plants located on the right bank of the Dniester River. The annual power deficit is 700 MW of the needed 1100+ MW. The high dependence on energy limits the opportunities of the Moldovan government to negotiate with the self-proclaimed Transdnistrian authorities. On the other hand, power import from the West is limited as well, as there are only three 110 kV power lines connecting the Republic of Moldova with Romania.

It is true that the energy security issue was caused to a great extent by the disintegration of the USSR, which had a unitary energy system; however, it does not mean that there are no other alternatives than the final re-connection to this system. Still, it is true that the inter-connection of the republican high voltage energy systems and the possibility to cover power deficits within the USSR guaranteed the needed power supply of the Soviet Union. In fact, most former Soviet countries are dependent on Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian energy systems, and the latter two are, in their turn, dependent on Russia. Estonia, for instance, is connected to the north-western part of Russia by seven 330 and 110 kV power lines. Five similar lines connect Latvia with Belarus, and four more 110-750 kV lines connect Belarus with the central region of Russia.

Ukraine is also dependent on the Russian energy system, to an even greater extent than Belarus. On the other hand, through ten high-voltage lines Ukrainian power is supplied to the North Caucasus. Nine 220-750 kV lines that supply Russian power to Central and Eastern Europe cross Ukraine. In parallel, Russian and Ukrainian power is supplied through Transdnistria to the Republic of Moldova (17 110-330 kV transmission lines) and further to Romania (one 400 kV transmission line). Thus, the western region of the former Soviet Union is integrated in a unitary power network. *It may have grave outcomes for the national security of the Republic of Moldova, as it might be the backbone from which an eventual political re-integration of the former Soviet state might start.* On the other hand, it is an advantage that within the European region of the former USSR it is dangerous to reduce the power frequency, for example as a penalty for non-payment, because it may threaten the entire network. Still, power is needed all the time, and the investments needed to build a new power network or an independent one may be made only during

a very long period of time. Being aware of this, some Russian analysts and politicians have repeatedly implied that it is not by random that the power lines connecting Russia with Belarus and Kazakhstan operate better than those connecting it with Ukraine and Moldova, merely because Belarus and Kazakhstan are more committed to Russian interests and policies.

In addition, the Republic of Moldova cannot even secure its energy interests within the country. It was proven by the event at Costesti Power Plant that was, until lately, a part of the state-owned company *Moldtranselectro*. The installed power of the power plant is 16 MW and generates about 80 million kWh yearly. The profitability of the power plant can reach about 600%; moreover, the plant could have been modernised, as was agreed with the Japanese who were ready to give a grant for its refurbishment. As the power plant was state-owned, its refurbishing and modernisation would have ensured the power supply to a part of the northern region of the Republic of Moldova. However, because of the debts of *Moldtranselectro* to a Transdnistrian company, by a court decision the Costesti Power Plant was to be sold to pay the debt. In order to exclude the possibility that such events re-occur, the seizure of state-owned industrial and infrastructure units of strategic importance was forbidden by a government decision, which violates the principle of the equal rights of all economic agents in the face of the law and undermines the rules of an open market economy.

Instead of such actions, it is necessary to implement a national power sector development strategy. The Electricity Act of 20 December 1999 sets forth that the government is in charge of adopting the energy resources development strategy, the interconnections with the power systems of other states and the national energy security. Also, the government promotes the interests of the national power sector abroad. One of the key prerequisites of energy security must be that every consumer has the right to choose freely a power supplier, including foreign suppliers. However, the decision that should have been made by the National Agency for Energy Regulation never was made. The conflict between the Spanish company Union Fenosa and the authorities of Chisinau proves again how important it is that the consumer chooses freely the power supplier.

Thus, the political implications of the power supply security are obvious; the same is true for the Russian gas supply. It is the second critical factor jeopardising the energy security of the Republic of Moldova. Natural gas amounts to about 55-60% of energy resources consumption and it is fully imported from Russia. The risk that the normal supply will be cancelled for political and economic reasons is high. Gazprom is a Russian company that is, in fact, under state control and a very effective tool for promoting Russian geo-economic and political interests. It is important to mention that the issue of Moldova's debt payments to Gazprom or even the risk of stopping the gas supply appears every time when Moldova takes a pro-Western political course that to Russia is equated with an anti-Russian course, or when Russia considers that the interests of the Russian inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova are threatened.

In 1994, after Moldova made the first pro-European declarations and took the first pro-European actions, the Gazprom concluded a new agreement with the Moldovan government, by which gas prices were set at world market level – USD 80 per 1000 m³. Because of the price increase, Moldovan consumers could no longer pay for its consumption and the debt to Gazprom grew abruptly. In 1997 the debt was covered by state securities overtaken by the Russian partners. The establishing of the joint venture SA *Moldovagaz* resulted in Gazprom taking 51% of shares, and the Republic of Moldova lost the chance to control a sector that has vital importance for its economic security. Moreover, 14% of the shares were taken by Transnistria, which participated as well in the establishing of the joint stock corporation.⁹ As Gazprom now holds the controlling stake in *Moldovagaz*, it has now all the information about the operation of the company. It participates in payments collection and in price setting policy, and it also has real tools to hamper the mass access of other suppliers to the Moldovan market. Thus, although another Russian company – Itera – operates in the market and supplies gas at prices lower than Gazprom's USD 60-65, *Moldovagaz* does not buy gas from Itera because Gazprom is the major shareholder of *Moldovagaz*.

Two rounds of negotiations between the Republic of Moldova and Gazprom ended by Gazprom cutting Moldova off from the gas pipeline. The political implications of this situation are still quite ambiguous. On one hand, in a previous Parliament proposals were made to block Russian transit to Europe as a response to the high supply prices. On the other hand, Moldova has no other supply source and it would lose more than it would gain by undertaking such actions. Finally, the situation became totally confused because of Ukraine, which transit rates determine to a great extent the consumer gas price in the Republic of Moldova. Negotiating reasonable prices with Gazprom would mean finding another supplier for the Republic of Moldova, either the Russian Company Itera or, even better, a European company.

The State Creditors Council froze the debt of the consumers to Gazprom at the moment of establishing *Moldovagaz*, but the debt was related to the currency rate fluctuation. Thus, the debt that amounted to MDL 592 million as of 1 January 1999 now amounts to at least MDL 1 billion. It is natural that Gazprom expects that the debts be paid according to the currency exchange rate differences. Gazprom, one of the largest companies of this type in the world, may influence the world gas prices. The management of the company has already declared several times that a gas price increase is required. In some European countries the gas is already being supplied for USD 110 or even more. So far, this issue was not raised in the discussions with the Republic of Moldova. However, it would have been raised if on 25 February 2001 pro-European forces, not the Communists,

⁹ Thus, the Government not only implicitly admits that they have no ability to control the separatists, but also accept as legal the Transnistrian Government.

would have won the elections, as the Communists were sure to encourage Russia's economic and political interests in the Republic of Moldova.

The third critical factor is that practically all transportation lines for energy sources stretch through Ukraine, and Russia's relations with this country are extremely contradictory. Some nationalist political forces in the Ukrainian Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) have repeatedly threatened Russia that they would block its gas transit to Europe. It is widely known that Ukraine uses without authorization transit gas for its needs and the Republic of Moldova is exposed to the exogenous risk of supply checks if Ukrainian-Russian relations worsen. Given the recent political crisis in Ukraine, this is a quite believable scenario. Under such circumstances, we should mention that the Republic of Moldova still does not have any counters that would show the real gas consumption. Still, they are critical for making payments not only according to the data provided by Ukraine.

One of the ways to reduce the energy dependence of the Republic of Moldova on Russian and Ukrainian supplies is to finish the Giurgiulesti oil terminal. Despite all discussions regarding the economic feasibility of this project, it seems that under current conditions it is the most certain way to settle the issue. Besides the economic aspect, the political significance of the terminal may be critical for the economic security of the Republic of Moldova. The halting of the terminal's construction proves the lack of a strategic vision of the Moldovan authorities regarding the energy and economic security of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, for Moldova to benefit from the whole range of oil products it is necessary not only to finish the terminal, but also to build an additional oil refinery. In the case that the Transdnistrian dispute is settled peacefully, another oil terminal similar to the one in Giurgiulesti may be built downstream the on the Dniester.

2.5. Flaw # 3: Financial Dependence on Foreign Creditors

During recent years, the evolution of the financial sector of the Moldovan economy is controversial. Although some favourable currency exchange rate and inflation rate indicators are registered, the real condition of the banking sector and, especially of the securities market has not changed significantly. The financial sector did not impact significantly the economic growth in the real sector of the economy. On one hand, it was conditioned by the restrictive policies promoted by the National Bank of Moldova and the National Securities Commission that discouraged economic growth in the real sector. On the other hand, the rather small number of commercial banks discourages banking activity, as there are no stimuli to reduce banking services costs and for speeding up the response to changes in the market. Thus, interest rates for bank loans – the main banking service that is important for economic growth – is very high, even exorbitant. Moreover, although the EBRD opened credit lines at several commercial banks for which it collects very low interest rates, the banks, in their turn, increase the

interest rates three- to fourfold. Loan accessibility is directly related to the high unemployment rate, the vulnerability of the local producers in foreign markets, the low quality of the investment environment, the insufficient promotion of national exports, etc. Thus, the stability of the financial sector is not yet an indicator of the national economic well-being.

Moreover, under such circumstances, even the government cannot get preferential credits from the local banking system, especially from the National Bank of Moldova. In fact, it is a very important barrier needed to prevent political involvement in banking activities. On the other hand, it is an objective reason why the government, in the mid-1990s started applying more often to cheaper foreign credits, from international financial organisations, the governments of other countries, and private creditors. The foreign debt rate per capita was USD 130 in 1995 and it increased to USD 300 in 1999. A large share of the foreign credits was not used for the purposes that were stated at the beginning or did not even have any declared goal. Therefore, the foreign debt burden became so heavy that during the next decade, 25% of the annual budget will be used to pay off the debts, provided that no other credits are requested. However, another issue is the internal debt, the payment of which may be another reason to apply for more foreign credits (by the end of 1999 the internal debt amounted to MDL 1.7 billion). [22]

The foreign debt amounted to USD 1.12 billion at the beginning of 2001, of which USD 781 million was the public debt managed by the Ministry of Finance, USD 164 million – the debt of the National Bank of Moldova to the International Monetary Fund, and the rest – about USD 173 million – the foreign debt of the private sector. This amount is comparable with the GDP, which amounted in 2000 to about USD 1.3 billion. It should be pointed out that during 2002-03 about USD 200 million must be paid back yearly, or about 80% of the consolidated budget income.

The authorisation of the National Bank of Moldova is not needed to contract a foreign credit. It must only register the crediting relations, check its legal compliance, and monitor the reimbursement. One of the goals of registering credits with the National Bank of Moldova is to limit the possibilities for money laundering. However, we believe that this measure is needed, but not sufficient, because only the local debtor reports all the credits contracted from abroad to the National Bank of Moldova – it has a subjective partial character.

On the other hand, the free contracting of foreign credits is very important for covering the internal investment deficit, especially in the areas of strategic importance, such as telecommunications, which have benefited from 53% of the total private foreign credits. On the other hand, the share of non-productive credits is quite big. Some 8% of private credits are commercial loans, and 7.5% of the private foreign debt was used to buy energy resources. Only 22% of the private debt in 2000 was used to buy fixed assets and for equipment. The private credit geography is quite varied; 37% of all private credits come from the USA.

Good news is that a large share of the private debt – 57% – is long-term (5-10 years). [22]

The major institutional creditor of the Republic of Moldova is the IMF. Undoubtedly, the financial assistance provided by the IMF was very important and useful during recent years. On the other hand, we should mention that the policies applied by the IMF to the Republic of Moldova did not always meet the interests and the social security of the public. Besides, the relations of the Republic of Moldova with the IMF have shown that the latter acts as some Middle Age doctor that used the same treatment for all countries, irrespective of the sources of the economic troubles and the pain felt by the „patient.“ Such treatment in Moldova led to increased interest rates that, as in any other underdeveloped economy, were accompanied by a high unemployment rate. In reality, the austere policy imposed by the IMF did not justify itself and it still has quite severe social outcomes. Moreover, the 1990s have proven that Western-type economic liberalism is no longer an appropriate policy to ensure the well-being of a small country. Currently, in the Republic of Moldova one can notice a full stagflation – the economy is dominated at the same time by unemployment and inflation – which proves wrong again the Philips curve that tried to prove the inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. During 1999-2000 only in a few countries the Philips curve worked, including Tajikistan (the unemployment rate – 2.4% and the inflation rate – 65%) and Kenya (the unemployment rate – 35% and the inflation rate – 1.6%). Most countries have registered either high inflation or unemployment rates (e.g. Yugoslavia) or low inflation and unemployment rates (e.g. South Korea).

3. EXOGENOUS THREATS AGAINST ECONOMIC SECURITY

3.1. The Impact of Social-Political Instability

The year 1989 was the turning point for the economic security of the Republic of Moldova, when the separatist trends in the east and in the south started to appear under the form of strikes, protests, as well as railway and highway blockades. The political separatism could not gain ground without the economic separatism, which reduced the economic security and integrity of the country. Thus, in 1990, the first economic decrease, of about 2%, was recorded. In the same year, the first government of the Republic of Moldova was elected. So far, during the 11 years, there were seven governments in the Republic of Moldova and the GDP decreased by over 60% compared to 1990. It seems that a greater political instability is found only in Italy, where, ever since World War II there were 50 governments. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the natural conclusion brought to us by the political instability accompanies an economic decrease that has almost no precedents in economic history is that either political and individual selfish interests prevailed over national security interests or the Moldovan

political elite is unable to govern this country successfully. In fact, both conclusions seem partially valid.

First, as the experience of the mid-1990s shows, in the Republic of Moldova it is possible to tolerate a situation that is absolutely unacceptable in other states, in which a government ruled the country for over 5 years, with the GDP decreasing by 55%. Besides, during the same period, illicit transactions of significant state property were concluded with the direct support of some top officials. Due to corruption and nepotism that have become a bad habit in the Republic of Moldova, most professionals in economics, law, and other fields prefer to go into private businesses rather than to gain employment in the governmental administration structures. So far the Republic of Moldova had only a few professionals in its governments that were not affiliated to some political party. It is interesting that the Communist Party, which won the parliamentary elections on 25 February, 2001 also could not identify within the party the people that are qualified enough to run a government, although the number of votes they received would oblige them to undertake full political responsibility for establishing a unitary government.

We would also like to mention that almost every change in government was followed by a shift to the left of the internal reformatory message and a pro-Russian orientation of the external message. Thus, the first government chaired by Druc opted for the promotion of a liberal policy and their external political and economic course was clearly pro-Western and pro-Romanian. In a year the Druc Government was substituted by that of Muravschi, which adopted a more moderate policy. In 1991 the most important geopolitical change in the history of the 20th century took place – the disintegration of the USSR. The GDP decreased by over 17%, and the relations with the Transdnistrian authorities grew worse. The Sangheli agro-socialist government, appointed at the middle of 1992, formulated policies that were even more interventionist than those of the previous government, and the external political and economic focus was on „historical partners.“ The year 1992, when an abrupt economic decrease was registered by over 20%, was the year when two major events of special significance for the economic security of the Republic of Moldova took place. Firstly, the armed conflict with Transdnistria started, which disintegrated *de facto* the industrial potential of the country. Transdnistria overtook the control of industrial and infrastructure objects of strategic importance for the economic security of Moldova. Secondly, the share of imports by economic agents (by over 30% during a year) in the trade balance grew, however, not quantitatively but as value pursuant to Russia's adjustment of export prices almost up to the world level. This increase had a very clear geopolitical objective, namely to make the newly independent states adopt a course of moving closer to Russia, through the CIS structures. This policy is followed by the Russians up to now, when in the press – under the Russian Government's control – „analyses“ by Russian experts are published that try to prove how good it is to be a dedicated ally of Russia (i.e. using the example of Belarus).

1994 was the year of the deepest economic decline recorded by the Moldovan economy during the 20th century (certainly, except for the damages caused by the World War II), falling by over 30%. The parliamentary elections were won by the agrarians, who kept the Sangheli government and blocked all reforms oriented towards the development of industry in favour of agriculture. Their choice proved wrong, as droughts annihilated their intentions „to overflow Europe with Moldovan tomatoes and wine.“ During 1995 and 1996 a more stable decrease of the economy was recorded. In fact, these two years were lost for the reforms, as unique opportunities were lost to move closer towards the European Economic Community and win new markets for Moldovan goods. On the other hand, a weird stabilisation of the currency exchange rate was recorded, despite the obvious inflation and the manifest economic stagnation.

The election program of Petru Lucinschi, elected president in January 1996, was based on a national policy that „focused on preserving the national identity and the viable independence of the country.“ It should be mentioned that President Lucinschi managed to preserve the national identity, indeed – in the same amorphous shape as it was when he became president. One of the few successful reforms implemented during the term of President Lucinschi was the territorial-administrative reform. During his presidency Moldova's debts to the international financial bodies grew impressively. Despite substantial funding, the funds were not used to revive and re-launch the viable industries and businesses. For this reason, the Republic of Moldova so far does not yet have internal capacities to pay external debts and to ensure economic growth based on internal resources. The peak of the external debt payments will occur in 2002-03, which will undoubtedly increase the economic and political instability that may become even more severe than it has been.

Given these „accomplishments,“ the impressive political ascension of the Communists seems logical. The people of the Republic of Moldova that have not left to work abroad and participated in the elections showed on 25 February 2001 not their trust in the Communists but their disappointment with the „democrats“ who have compromised democracy through corruption, weird alliances and political schemes, without recording any economic success. In the latest years, the living standards are worsening, nobody is interested in positive macroeconomic trends, as they did not contribute to reducing poverty, and the importance of integration with the European Union is not fully understood by most people.

However, what will be the implications of the Communist ascension for the national economic security? We will not refer to the populist statements, e.g. increases of monthly payments, pension and student fees, price control and total employment. In the short term this can be achieved only by eliminating some free market mechanisms and by partially cancelling the rights of the private property and free enterprise. Also, it might be necessary to review the privatisation results. However, the Communists are not really interested in such changes. First, they might have to face the resistance of some businessmen that have enough power

to fight such despotic actions. Secondly, it is well known that quite a few Moldovan Communists are owners of large companies or control important businesses in the area of tobacco processing, transportation, finance, and building. On the other hand, the Communists might review the privatisation of some companies that are not under their control and block the privatisation of *Moldtelecom* and the Northern Power Distribution Grids. As the latest negotiations with the Russian company Itera show, the Communists are willing to give the power grids as concession rather than to denationalise them.

As the Communists have the power now, we believe that the main threats against the economic security of the Republic of Moldova will come through external economic and political relations. Historically, the Communists are the partisans of Moldova's integration into all CIS economic, military, and political structures. Still, when it comes to the geo-economic and geopolitical interests of its members, the CIS is an extremely heterogeneous body. There is no common economic direction, and this is the reason why within the CIS several regional alliances have emerged, aiming at compensating the economic weakness of the CIS and meeting specific interests. Due to the establishing of such centrifugal alliances and the emerging of new centres of power in the former Soviet area, the CIS may split up in the nearest future and some member countries will join instead narrower regional bodies. The Moldovan Communists must have realised this and in the election campaign they have switched the focus from the final integration in the CIS onto the joining the Russia-Belarus Union and the Eurasian Economic Community.

One of the factors that hamper the creation of an appropriate framework for the economic security of the country is a transparency that should complement the legislative process, which leads us to the conclusion that quite a few times the economic security of the consumers or of the state are put at risk in favour of some narrow corporate or political interests. Non-transparency is one of the principles governing the legislative and political activities of the Communists. Such an example is the mystery accompanying the Law on the Financial-Industrial Groups. At first sight, it seems to be a very good law, a needed law aiming at encouraging investments in the economy and creating a competitive production sector. For this purpose, the law sets forth that the needed conditions will be created for the association of banking capital and the companies in the real sectors of the economy.

Still, what are the premises that have determined the adoption of this law? It seems that everything is clear, as the local producer, cut off from the banking sector through high interest rates, cannot provide the needed investments in the economy. We believe, however, that the law brings about more questions than answers. Its expected impact can become rather political than economic. In the Republic of Moldova there is already a financial-industrial group registered in compliance with the Law on Business and Enterprises of 1995. If the current legal framework allowed for the operation of a financial-industrial group already, it is not

clear why a special law was needed. It would have been easier to amend the Law on Business and Enterprises and the Law on Financial Institutions.

The registration procedure for the financial-industrial groups is very awkward as well. Thus, pursuant to Article 11 of the law, in order to be registered, a group must submit, besides other papers, the so-called organisational project, such as an explanatory note and a technical-economic argumentation of the *timeliness* of establishing the group. Some state authorities must review the project. Still, in compliance with the law, they may reject registration, including on the reason that they consider that the technical-economic argumentation of the project timeliness is not credible enough. In accordance with Article 13 of the same law, the registration of a group cannot be rejected because of the non-timeliness of its establishment.

It is even more interesting that when the registration or rejection decision is made, one of the criteria taken into account by the experts will be „the degree of the project focus on ensuring increased production efficiency by restoring integrationist relations,“ and it is certainly about restoring the integrationist relations in the former Soviet area, because, as it seems, the law was developed in the interest of one enterprise that exports agricultural goods to Belarus and imports agricultural machinery to Moldova. [17]

According to this law, the state will support the financial-industrial groups operating in the key areas of the national economy. Still, a simple question arises from the very nature of the future financial-industrial groups, namely these groups will be combinations of long-term bank loans and the increased technological possibilities of the producers comprising the group; such a structure will already display redoubtable financial strength. What would be the reason for state support other than the desire of the state to take over the control of the main economic areas? This hypothesis is confirmed by one more provision of the law. Article 26 states that the debt to the state of one member of the group may be converted into shares or obligations issued by the group to be transferred to the state. However, meeting state economic security interests shall be ensured, by no means, on the account of corporate economic security, as it may be a warning sign for foreign investors, whose withdrawal can impact negatively the economy of the Republic of Moldova.

It should be mentioned that the law was promoted by the Communists in the previous Parliament, which clearly shows that the doctrine principles do not count when it comes to immediate benefits at the expense of the national economic security. In fact, the Communists should be concerned with the merger of banking and production capitals, as it means the „victory of the retrograde capitalist forces.“ However, the Communist members of the Parliament have decided that the most credible way to use the banking capital in the real economy is the banks' participation in corporate equity.

However, a regulation of the National Bank of Moldova limits the possibilities of the commercial banks to participate in the equity of other corporations, as it

might threaten the banks' liquidity. The Law on Financial-Industrial Groups takes care of this as well, by allowing the National Bank of Moldova to grant privileges to some commercial banks by reducing the mandatory reserve requirements. First of all, it will generate distorted competition on the banking services market. Secondly, given the consistency and the professionalism of the current administration of the National Bank of Moldova in establishing a stable banking system, it might happen that it will be impossible to make new amendments to banking regulations without making changes in the administration of the National Bank of Moldova.

In March 2001 another event took place that does not seem to have a direct connection with everything mentioned above. We are talking about the search conducted at the National Securities Commission and the seizure of some minutes written by the Commission regarding the application of administrative sanctions to participants in the securities market. The search warrant states that the arrest was related to the newly-opened case on some top officers overstepping their authorities while applying administrative sanctions. [17]

Alongside the outcomes of the Law on Financial-Industrial Groups, the event that took place in March 2001 shows that it is possible that soon a campaign of redistributing administrative positions in the institutions overseeing the financial-banking system may start in the Republic of Moldova by appointing people that are loyal to the Communists. If this happens, the Moldovan financial system will be used to fund social and economic activities aimed at meeting the expectations of the electorate that cannot be achieved in any other way but by issuing additional currency and granting preferential credits to the state. From the economic experience of other countries, one can remember well the inflation outcomes of the political manipulation of the financial-banking system.

3.2. Faults in the Legal Framework

The concept of „economic security” is seldom used in the normative acts of the Republic of Moldova. Even in the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova no reference is made to the concept of economic security, except for the fact that „the actions aimed at undermining or eliminating the economic potential” are listed in the series of the main threats against national security, and „the development and settling of state issues that include economic measures [18] aimed at discovering, preventing, and suppressing timely the threats against the national security” is a way to ensure national security. However, the importance of providing appropriate resources is implicitly acknowledged, as the law states, when setting forth the system of ensuring national security, that it „includes the organisational integration of the administration bodies of the military and special-purpose units, funded and provided with materials and equipment within the limits of the available sources of the national economy, of the State and local budgets [...], ensuring the stability of the public authorities and the

protection of the individuals, the society, and the state from internal and external threats." The concept does not include in the list of bodies in charge of national security any ministries or departments from the economic-financial area, although the minister of finance is a member of the Supreme Security Council. In general, it seems that the National Security Concept was written from a too militarised viewpoint regarding security and cannot be considered an efficient legal basis for ensuring national economic security. For this reason, the general provisions of the National Security Concept must be detailed and developed in a National Economic Security Doctrine [see Appendix].

It should be pointed out that, in general, the development of economic security concepts or doctrines is not common practice in developing countries or countries undergoing transition to an open market economy. However, it does not mean that the Republic of Moldova should not develop its economic security legal framework either. Moreover, even in Romania and in Ukraine there are a number of organic laws aimed at ensuring and meeting the national economic interests, such as the interests related to the national economic security.

For instance, not so long ago (January 25, 2001) in Ukraine the Decision on Fighting the Shadow Economy of the National Security and Defence Council that refers directly to the national economic security, came into force. This decision sets forth the main principles especially regarding cash flow in the shadow economy. In compliance with the president's decree, an inter-ministerial committee in charge of national financial security shall be established under the National Security and Defence Council. Also, they shall develop a state strategy on fighting the shadow economy, aiming at limiting the extra-banking cash flows and at developing a national payments system. It is planned to set limits and controls regarding the credits coming from offshore zones and loans exceeding the interest rate in the local market, as well as at developing the tools, including fiscal ones, to oversee businesses that take such credits. During the first half of 2000 the Ukrainian government and the National Bank of Ukraine shall develop proposals on legislative amendments to limit the number of accounts an individual may have at commercial banks and establish the control over trans-border currency and credit card flows. An example that might be followed by the Republic of Moldova is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and the Security Service of Ukraine have received orders to develop a set of actions for fighting the establishing of so-called „phantom companies."

In the same context, we should mention that the Republic of Moldova does not yet have any laws to fight money laundering (the legalisation on money obtained from criminal activities). The establishing of a legislative framework will be an extremely positive sign for the European economic and security bodies that the Republic of Moldova wants to join it. It seems at least strange that the Republic of Moldova, although it joined several international agreements on fighting financial-economic crimes, has no local law to fight them. Moreover, as far as we know, during the last decade several initiatives were launched by the

President's Office and the government to declare, on various occasions, an exception situation in the economy. There is a touch of irony in the fact that, so far, no legislative act of the Republic of Moldova sets forth clearly the measures that must be undertaken in case of exceptional situations declared pursuant serious threats against the national economic security.

Russia adopted back in August 1996 a „State Strategy on Ensuring Economic Security." This act sets forth the goals and objectives of the state economic security policy, describes the main threats to Russia's economic security, and sets forth the parameters and criteria the economy must meet to ensure national economic interests and a sufficient level of the national economic security. In addition, it describes the state mechanisms for ensuring economic security. A number of factors have determined the special attention given to the economic security of Russia, and the most important one is that the ensuring of economic security is a fundamental condition for promoting national interests abroad.

Russia became an outsider of the world economy. One of the main priorities of Russian foreign policy is overcoming this situation. In his address to the Federal Assembly on 13 June 1996 President Yeltsin declared, „it is of strategic importance to develop and adopt an external economic doctrine and a strategic arsenal to implement it, as well as to switch to the geo-economic model of foreign economic relations".

In the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova much attention is paid to trade and economic relations with other countries, which is directly connected to ensuring the national economic security. In fact, some provisions are outdated due to the economic reality of the latest years. Does the Republic of Moldova really have, as the Foreign Policy Concept states, all „needed energy, transport, and telecommunication systems [needed] for the collaboration with European countries?" The Concept sets forth that „in relations with other countries the Republic of Moldova does not accept hegemonic dictate [and] economic constraints policy," committing, on the other hand, not to join political, military, or economic alliances which goal is war planning. „Special attention is paid to the co-operation with Romania to overcome the current unilateral economic dependence of the Republic of Moldova and to integrate it into the European community." On the other hand, the Foreign Policy Concept does not even outline the priority directions of the foreign economic policy, unexpectedly stating that even „the development of the relations with Asian, African, and Latin American countries [...] will consolidate the economic status of our country." Moreover, in the Foreign Policy Concept quite impressive statements were made by setting mutually incompatible objectives and directions for multilateral collaboration. Thus, the concept sets forth that the final aim of collaboration within the CIS is to create a common economic space, while another major objective is the gradual integration with the European Union. [19] From the viewpoint of international law, it is impossible to integrate at the same time into two different economic unions.

As we have already mentioned in Chapter I, the issue of economic security is full of controversy and „undercurrents.“ On of the most awkward issues is the protection of local producers. In November 2000 the Import Goods Substitution Concept was approved, which was aimed at promoting the national potential and at encouraging the sales of local goods and products. [20] As one of the main causes that led to the elimination of the industrial goods from the local market, the concept mentions the inappropriate legislative framework, the insufficient influence the state has on the processes that caused the economic decline, the inability of management and staff to adjust to the new open market relations, the lack of circulating assets and investments, the decline of scientific institutions, the increasing of prices and tariffs for energy resources, communal services, raw materials, and so forth. By January 1, 2001, several ministries and the Academy of Sciences of Moldova were supposed to develop import goods substitution plans, and, as far as we know, this task was never fulfilled.

The objectives of the concept aim both at the individual social security and the corporate economic security. Given that „open market relations [...] impose a significant re-orientation of labour to new jobs, the formation of managerial skills and commercial abilities of company managements [...], the central and local public administration bodies that monitor the operation of the national economy sectors must have administrative and economic-financial levers [...] that will speed up the process.“ Still, the means recommended to achieve this goal are close to the Soviet practices of undertaking some very general and obviously unattainable commitments, such as „the organising and supporting by central and local public administration bodies and other institutions of trainings on topics of interest to various professions and industrial activities that will be a benefit for job-hunters,“ „the gathering by public administration bodies and economic agents of funds needed for re-training and creating new jobs,“ or „the orienting and supporting of economic agents in developing their own services markets, including guarantee and post-guarantee service, as well as distribution networks that, besides ensuring closer access to beneficiaries, will provide new jobs for the unemployed.„

With regard to corporate economic security, the planned actions are not detailed either. State support and encouragement will be provided to companies by promoting fiscal facilities to encourage investments and scientific research; the encouraging of equipment imports to develop the production of goods needed in the local and foreign markets; the protection by tariff and non-tariff methods of the local market from the import of goods similar to those produced in Moldova; conclusion of memorandum agreements by the Council of Creditors with the companies that will participate in the implementation of the Concept in compliance with the Law on Companies Restructuring.

The substitution of import goods is ultimately aimed at reducing the trade balance deficit. However, economic history proves that the economic security of a country cannot be followed by achieving a profitable or balanced trade balance.

The example of Romania during the Ceausescu times is the closest to us. A nation can import more than it exports for centuries even, when its real well-being (measures as the sellable value of goods produced by its local economic factors) grows. On the other hand, it is very important to understand that concept of substituting import goods lays doubts on the orientation of the Republic of Moldova towards the planned integration into the world economy, including joining the WTO.

3.3. The Issue of Internal Political Separatism

The Transdnistria issue is one of the most serious conflicts in the former Soviet area. Besides the impact an eventual re-launching of military actions may have over regional security, comparable to those of Kosovo or Macedonia, to quote a recent example, the current condition of the economic and political relations between the two banks of the Dniester River have serious outcomes for the national economic security.

As it is well known, two thirds of the industrial potential of the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic were concentrated on the left bank of the Dniester, and it is more advantageous for Russia from the ethnic viewpoint. It gave the Transdnistrian separatists significant levers to motivate and provide a foundation for economic separatism in front of the population of Transdnistria. Transdnistria comprises only 16% of the population of Moldova and 11% of its area, but, by the end of the 1980s it produced about one third of the industrial output and 90% of Moldova's electricity. During the first half of 2000, the industrial output of Transdnistria amounted to about 60% if compared to the industrial product of the Republic of Moldova, which makes the Transdnistrians believe that their establishment as a state was completed successfully.

It is true, despite the general economic crisis, the growth rates of the industrial complex on the left bank of the Dniester are much larger than on the right bank. Thus, during the first half of 2000, Transdnistrian industrial output increased in real terms by about 28%, compared to only 2-3% on the right bank. In several industrial sectors of strategic importance in Transdnistria the growth rates were truly impressive: light industrial output increased by 58%, metallurgy – by 51%, machine building and metal processing – by 44%. The share of these sectors in total industrial output is 70%. We should mention that due to metal export from the Metallurgy Plant of Rybnitsa (the annual production potential is about 700,000 tonnes), the Republic of Moldova is the fourth largest steel exporter to the US market. It is curious that the main raw materials suppliers for the steel industry of Transdnistria were Ukraine and Romania. According to the data of the Moldova Customs Department, during January-September 2000, Romania only supplied 2,370,010 tons of scrap metal to Rybnitsa Plant. Poland is another large supplier; though mostly agricultural products and materials – especially sugar and potatoes. If the government of the Republic of Moldova fought at the time the establishing

of these relations, Transnistria nowadays would not feel so comfortable in its relations with the Moldovan government.

The exports of the Republic of Moldova during the first half of 2000 amounted to about USD 220 million, and Transnistria's export – USD 162 million. During the same period the imports of the Republic of Moldova amounted to USD 344 million, while Transnistria's imports – USD 227 million. Transnistria's foreign trade grows at a quicker pace than Moldova's foreign trade. Moreover, Transnistria's exports show a clear trend of increasing quicker than imports, which is not true in the case of the Republic of Moldova.

The appropriate industrial development and energy potential provide unique opportunities that are used very efficiently by the Transnistrian government to blackmail economically and politically the Moldovan government, and it was proven by the repeated cutting-offs of the right bank (including the capital city of Moldova) from the power generated in Transnistria. The Spanish company Union Fenosa buys about 70-75% of the power from Transnistria. Although payment was made mostly in cash, it does not seem that they use the cash to pay their debts for natural gas.

In the mid-1990s the huge debt of the Republic of Moldova to Russia for supplied natural gas was generated by Transnistria, which paid for, on average, 35-45% of their monthly consumption of natural gas. For several years now, Moldova is not accountable for Transnistria's debts, which amounted to about USD 545 million by the end of 2000 (including penalties). However, it does not mean that the security of the Republic of Moldova is better ensured now, as Transnistria, which has an individual programme based on direct payments to Gazprom, gets the needed funds by selling their share of the arsenal of the former 14th Army.

Due to the Transnistrian conflict it is impossible to oversee appropriately the foreign trade of the Republic of Moldova. It might happen so that the Republic of Moldova would not even register such a large trade deficit if all trans-border transactions were duly registered. It is estimated that customs and fiscal evasions carried out through Transnistrian companies amount to 150-200% of the annual budget of the Republic of Moldova. It should be pointed out that the Moldovan government has contributed greatly to this situation, because it goes on tolerating the fact that the Transnistrian authorities still hold the customs responsibilities of the Republic of Moldova, issued to them by the Sangheli government.

Alongside the issue of the customs responsibilities, the Moldovan government has also made other mistakes that have eventually led to the situation where the Transnistrian authorities participate together with the Moldovan government in international treaties and documents, which decreases the international status of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, at the beginning of November 2000 the government of the Republic of Moldova concluded an agreement with RAO EES Rossiya to establish a company exporting power from the Cuciurgan Power Plant to the Balkans through Moldova. It was planned that the Russian

company would hold about 76% of the shares, while Moldova and Transdnistria would hold 12% each. It is natural that to tolerate this situation is equivalent to encouraging the separatist initiatives, including the economic ones.

3.4. The Geo-Economic Framework and the Faults Embedded in Foreign Policies

As it could be understood from this study, a state can be considered small only in comparison with another, i.e. when a power or capacity ratio is established. For instance, from the economic viewpoint Romania is a small country if compared to Russia, but it is a large power if compared to the Republic of Moldova; it is, on the other hand, a little smaller than Ukraine and comparable to Bulgaria. It is not the size of a country that counts but the nature of its relations. Moreover, even two small countries can be unequal to each other. This situation is also illustrated by the fact the Republic of Moldova (it has an area of 33,800 km² and a population of 4.35 million people) is inferior to Estonia (45,200 km², 1.45 million inhabitants). From the point of view of area and population these countries compensate each other. If we analyse the distance from a large power – Russia, in this case – the Republic of Moldova has even more advantages than Estonia that is a neighbour to Russia at its south-eastern border. Despite this, the prompt response of Estonia to the pressures of its giant neighbour cannot be compared to that of the Republic of Moldova, a country that does not even control its own territory as stated by the Constitution. These weaknesses were greatly determined by the errors made in foreign policy during the last decade and the ones being made right now by the Communist government, and we mean here, first of all, the intention to join the Russia-Belarus Union. The Communist leaders have declared repeatedly that Moldova's joining of the Russia-Belarus Union will be a foreign policy priority. They claim that it will bring great benefits, as Moldova will get Russian gas at low prices and Moldovan goods will be more competitive due to the elimination of all customs barriers.

It is obvious how unsubstantial these election promises are. Firstly, the gas price is not determined only by the Russian supplier's policy, but also by the transit taxes set by Ukraine. Secondly, Moldova has no common borders with Russia or Belarus. It cannot be a part of their trade and customs union if the access to these markets is made complicated by Ukraine. Thus, the Russia-Belarus-Moldova union cannot be viable if our eastern neighbour does not join it. The Ukrainians are aware that in the case of the Russia-Belarus Union, it is more a military and political union and much less an economic one. In its turn, Ukraine signed international documents, including those with NATO countries, which makes it difficult for it to join such a union.

One of the goals of the Russia-Belarus Union is (sic) „military collaboration and the preserving of a high battle capacity." Article 7 of the Treaty states that the Union may be joined by states that can *fully* undertake the commitments

resulting from the Union Treaty and statutes. Thus, as Moldova has a status of permanent neutrality, it cannot join this union. Besides, how legal can be an international treaty signed by President Lukashenka of Belarus, whose presidency expired long ago and who keeps power due to the totalitarian regime that he has established?

Still, the economic union of two countries with different economic policies seems weird. Once Lukashenka won the elections in 1994, he launched the idea of market socialism and has enforced administrative prices and currency exchange rate control. They have created mechanism of state intervention in the management of private companies. A business was the object of numerous pressures of the local and central governments. The arbitrary amendments of the legal framework, prohibition of foreign investments, as well as the retroactive application of laws have led to the establishment of an extremely unfavourable investment environment. The trade deficit of Belarus is caused mostly by its economic isolation and its dependence on Russia that receives, just as in the case of our country, over 50% of its export. Despite the fact that it benefits from preferential prices that are much lower than world prices Belarusian consumers have huge debts to Russian gas, equipment, and oil suppliers.

On the other hand, the Russian course towards an open market economy seems irreversible. Russia is a self-sufficient economy, based on the raw materials and energy resources export to Europe. Ukraine is so far the only country crossed by the main Russian gas pipelines and, thus, it benefits economically and politically. Due to Ukraine's geographical location, Russia will negotiate the issue of priority transit with Ukraine, as Moldova is not very important for Russia. On the other hand, Belarus is important for Russia, but also more as a transit partner rather than as a market.

Although it might seem that it has to benefit from the elimination of the trade barriers, in reality Belarus is not able to protect its local market. In Moldova's case, it is even less probable, as its industry is less developed than those in Belarus. The Russian producers have had better productivity than those of those in Belarus for a long time, even in the areas where they initially had advantages, such as machines, furniture, and dairy production.

Although during the negotiations regarding the Union, Belarus insisted on keeping its sovereignty and independence, Russia seems to be willing to offer Belarus a status, at best, similar to that of Tatarstan. It is interesting to point out that Mintimer Shaimiev, the re-elected president of Tatarstan, asked himself „how can one talk about common economic space and currency, while, on the other hand, each country keeps its political sovereignty?" Given these guidelines followed by Russia, what status might Moldova have in the Russia-Belarus Union?

In fact, the union of the two Slavic states may cause deep geopolitical changes and less economic changes in the former Soviet area. To establish a true common economic space a common currency and a currency-issuing centre must be adopted, as well as common fiscal and customs policies. Although negotia-

tions have been held for the last five years, no serious results were obtained in these areas. It is true that recently the agreement about the currency was achieved. As of 2005 the Russian rouble will be the currency of the Union, and as of 2008 a common currency will be introduced. However, the issues arisen by the adopting of a common currency are so grave that they can impact the internal cohesion of the Union. In particular, it is not clear how the central banks of the two countries will interact and what city will be the currency-issuing centre. Also, it is not clear how they will combine the Russian restrictive monetary policy and the inflationist crediting monetary policy of Belarus by their central bank. Much concern is also caused by the specific modality of establishing the common currency, as Belarus has required Russia to grant credits of several hundreds of million of US dollars to stabilise their economy in case of a quick shift to the common currency. If we remember that until 2008 in each country – Belarus, Moldova and Russia – two Presidential elections must take place that might be won by nationalist or pro-European candidates, the scenario of the Union's disintegration and Moldova's and Belarus' orientation to the European Union cannot be disregarded.

It is interesting though that on 31 March 2001, Vladimir Darbinian, the Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, has declared that a priority of his party if it comes to power will be to join the Russia-Belarus Union. The Ukrainian Communists made similar statements. The unanimity of the Communists makes one believe that this is one of the first steps towards the reintegration of what the Russian post –Soviet chauvinists call „the celebrated union of the sister nations that have shared for centuries the same history." The integration in to this Union will show that Moldova does not really want to integrate into European structures and is going to develop alliances with the countries that violate human rights and where there is no right to express one's opinion freely.

CONCLUSIONS

The Economic Interests of the Republic of Moldova

As we have shown in this study, the economic security concept has a specific historical and geographical content. It is impossible to structure and analyse it without this well-defined context. Given the extremely complicated realities in this area, potential threats to the economic security of the Republic of Moldova, their emergency, their internal relations, the possibilities and specific methods of fighting them, and so on, can be identified only if we understand very well the specific internal and regional environment established under the influence of historical and political factors. As we have mentioned in Chapter I, irrespective of the specific character of the national economic security phenomenon, it is always linked to the economic development trends at the regional and international levels, as well as to a specific geo-economic and geopolitical framework.

However, the content of economic security is also determined by national and state interests, thus it cannot be freed from a certain ideological implication. On the other hand, we should avoid referring this concept to the corporate interests of some social category's or the political elite's interests. In addition, we cannot disregard the power balance established in the Republic of Moldova since the Communist Party came to power. This very political change may undermine all economic reform efforts undertaken during recent years and, even if the Communists never come to power again, the „heritage" they leave behind will give headaches to Moldovan strategists for a long time.

For this reason, identifying the long-term economic interests of a country that are included in a credible foreign policy concept or in a viable economic security doctrine is both important and complicated. Unlike the geopolitical interests expressed by the institutions involved in foreign politics and international political affairs, economic interests are more diffuse and are harder to envision and understand [see also point 1.2].

In an open market capitalist economy the state cannot be the bearer of national economic interests, because the state does not involve itself in the economy, in compliance with the declared liberal approach to the economic system. For such states, their foreign politics also include the national economic interests expressed by a global message. A typical example of this approach is given by the USA. This approach is not widely used by the small states, except for a few countries, including Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

In corporatist open market economies, large companies and trans-national corporations are the ones that determine the national economic interests, although often they have nothing to do with the true national interests and are conditioned by the currency exchange rate discrepancy, interest loans, and oil prices. The best example is Japan. Small corporatist countries are Taiwan and Singapore.

Finally, in a social-oriented open market economy the national economic interests are formed based on social interests that, in order to avoid the misbalance of the national economic and political systems, it must be an acceptable compromise of individual interests. It is the case with Sweden and Germany, and, by the Constitution, it should be Moldova's case as well. However, Moldovan reality is quite the opposite. Although the individual was supposed to be the central figure of all economic reforms during transition, it was, in reality, an unfitting variable in the equation.

It is true that Soviet heritage (the Transdnistrian dispute, the degradation of the industrial potential, the loss of the traditional markets, the lack of viable armed forces), requires a quick economic development of the country and the obtaining of sufficient capacities to manage crises that threaten the national economic security. Still, we have to be aware that quick economic development means, in fact, adopting a Polish-type „shock therapy." However, given the quite painful social consequences of such a therapy, it was recommended to apply it

at the very beginning of the transition, to cut short its negative outcomes, and it does not work quite as effectively if applied after a decade of seeking the right economic reforms. Given these statements, we will describe below the economic interests that we consider of major priority for the Republic of Moldova.

Economic Interest No. 1: the Development of the Human Factor

By formally undertaking the task of developing the economy, the Moldovan pseudo-reformers have lost the battle. Wrong input data gives wrong outcomes. In the case of such a poor country as the Republic of Moldova, the meaning of the economic development concept is completely different from one accepted in the Anglo-Saxon economic literature that has unfortunately influenced the economic visions in the Republic of Moldova. The economic development in the Republic of Moldova should aim, first of all, at the development and full realisation of the human potential. Still, it needs investments – sometimes in large amounts – in the human dimension.

The several hundreds of thousands of Moldovans working by season or permanently abroad could have been the backbone of the social-economic development of the Republic of Moldova and must be referred to in the National Economic Security Doctrine [see Appendix].

Thus, the main economic interest of the Republic of Moldova must be to create the internal conditions needed for improving human potential and for developing it fully and multilaterally within the national economy. Special attention must be paid to scientists, young professionals and the teaching staff, i.e. the people on whom the formation of an optimum intellectual and technical-scientific potential depends for bringing the country up to European standards of living.

Economic Interest No. 2: Building an External Image Favourable for Developing an Investment Environment

In one of the EBRD reports issued in 1998, the economy of the Republic of Moldova was qualified as having „relatively liberal“ foreign trade. On the other hand, in the latest report of the US Department of Commerce (November 2000) a more unpleasant estimation is made: the economy of the Republic of Moldova cannot be considered a viable open market economy. The estimate of such an institution can have a negative impact that will be much more damaging to the economic image and the investment environment than other factors, no matter how objective they are compared to the American analytical estimate.

Due to these negative external perceptions, although the current legal framework is quite good, foreign investments are not enough to cover the internal investment deficit. It is explained, beside other factors, by the fact that the registration or issuing of permits is non-transparent and bureaucratised. The Law on Foreign Investments sets forth that foreign investments are allowed in all areas, provided that the security of the state is not threatened, anti-monopoly legislation is not violated, as well as the health of the population, the environ-

ment, the social order, and ethical norms are not threatened.¹⁰ These provisions are very general and allow for wide equivocal interpretations. On the other hand, the law guarantees the unlimited rights for capital transfer abroad, including the transfer of the profit once the fiscal payments are made. However, this led to the situation in which most foreign investments come from local investors through offshore zones. To fight the practice of getting foreign currency out of the country illegally it will be necessary to review this article of the law.

Thus, one of Moldova's interests should be to justify the image and positive expectations from the early 1990s and to create a favourable investment environment adjusted to European standards. One of the most important actions must be the maximum simplification of registration procedures, the cutting down of red tape and warranting of the political intangibility of the investors, both through legal provisions and real examples.

Economic Interest No. 3: Cutting Do wn the Share of the Shado v Economy

As local and foreign centres of economic and strategic sciences state, the level of the shadow and criminal economic activities can be estimated at about 50-60% of the official GDP of the Republic of Moldova. This phenomenon is widely known and its full „uprooting“ is impossible. Still, the share of the shadow economy in the economy of the Republic of Moldova is quite unusual and it is favoured by several factors. Firstly, due to the archaic departmental control system and the resulting possibilities to corrupt public officers, most Moldovan companies fail to keep strict accounting records or have double accounting systems. Secondly, the statistics record-keeping used in the Republic of Moldova is close to being outdated, and is absolutely non-transparent and dedicated to the socialist practice of half-secretive operation; the public is cut off from relevant information, which limits the possibilities of an appropriate social response to social and economic changes. Thirdly, the foreign trade relations system, alongside the customs registration of import and export is not enough to fight customs evasion. Fourthly, in the Republic of Moldova VAT collection is used by destination, while in Russia, Moldova's main trade partner, VAT is collected at the source, which again favours customs and fiscal evasions. All this plus the „Transdnistria“ factor provide „unique“ opportunities for carrying out illegal business and avoiding the fiscal framework. It is estimated that in the shadow and criminal economy, potential income sources amounting to about 70-80% of the annual state budget of the Republic of Moldova are used.

The third economic interest of the Republic of Moldova must be to reduce the scale of the shadow economy, in order to involve unused funds and to ensure corporate economic security.

¹⁰ Foreigners are forbidden to buy agricultural land. By and large, this may be considered fair, given social and political intricacies that would be raised by giving the right to own land freely.

Economic Interest No. 4: the Correction of Structural Misbalances and the Adoption of a Geo-Economic Model for Foreign Relations

To meet this economic interest, the Republic of Moldova should make significant structural changes in the economy „inherited“ from Soviet times. Despite some positive accomplishments, the socialist Moldovan economy could not operate for very long, as it had deep internal contradictions and was based on an overdeveloped ideological basis. Two thirds of the industrial potential was concentrated on the left bank of Dniester, which was to Moscow’s advantage due to ethnic composition of the population. The Soviet government made Moldova follow an archaic model of foreign economic relations, i.e. to act as an agricultural raw materials supplier, as a consumer of industrial goods and as a structural element of the military-industrial complex. The retention of this supplier-consumer model will not allow for the meeting of the other three economic interests, because in this case the Republic of Moldova will not fit in the neo-economic informational paradigm of the global development of human society.

In fact, within the Soviet Union, Moldova had no true foreign relations, as only 5% of the Moldovan goods were sold abroad and all trade flows were approved and overseen by Moscow in a mandatory fashion. In other words, although it seems paradoxical at the first sight, Moldova was a part of the world economy without being its functional element. The current economic weaknesses of the country, as well as the resistance of the political rulers regarding the orientation towards the investment-productive (geo-economic) model are rooted in the former centralised economic system.

A very important element of this model should be the orientation towards developing an industry independent from the climate, based on local raw materials or towards developing sectors that use fewer raw materials and require investment in the development, research, and the human potential. It will allow us to rehabilitate and use the intellectual potential that is not yet fully annihilated – the engineers, programmers, researchers in fundamental and applied sciences. Besides, the international services sector – financial, shipping, tourism – may open, if approached appropriately, new prospects for developing and promoting a favourable external image of Moldova.

The economic potential indicators for Moldova can be used as benchmarks for the geo-economic model. Such indicators include the production volume for 1988, the year of maximal growth, after which a steady decline started and has been going on for over a decade already. Certainly, the reference data for 1988 are not accurate enough as potential benchmarks, as things were different then; the main differences were that markets and state subventions were provided. However, this method can provide an overall picture of the production capacities.

Moldova had a developed an agro-industrial complex: in 1988 it supplied 3.4% of the sugar produced in the USSR, 4.5% of sunflower oil, 6% of vegetables, 10% of canned fruit and vegetables, 16% of natural juices, 27% of grapes, and 40% of processed tobacco, while it covered only 0.15% of the territory and included

only 1.5% of the population. [20] During an average day the following was produced: 46 million kWh of electricity, 5 million conventional jars of canned goods 426 refrigerators, 300 tons of sunflower oil, 1000 tons of granulated sugar. The annual production potential of the construction materials industry is just as impressive: cement – 2,500,000 tons, concrete blocks and other concrete goods – 2,200,000 tons, stucco – 110,000 tons, bricks – 254 million conventional pieces, construction rock – 460 million conventional pieces, and linoleum – four million m². It should be mentioned that we described only the industries using local raw materials, but in the future – as it was said above – other industries should be promoted, especially the phytotechny, microelectronics, and the pharmaceuticals.

Thus, the fourth economic interest of the Republic of Moldova should be the elimination of structural misbalances and the switch to the investment-production model of foreign economic relations.

Economic Interest No. 5: Market Diversification by Occupying Strategic Niches in the Baltic and Black Sea Regional Markets

The Republic of Moldova has important economic relations with the countries in the region between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, further on referred to as the Baltic and Black Sea Region. This region is a *zone of special geo-economic interest* for the Republic of Moldova, and its main partners are *Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey*. Moldova should co-operate with them in implementing specific projects on developing the transport infrastructure and the telecommunications networks.

This region includes Austria, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Thus, the Republic of Moldova could play an important role in the transit between the east and the west, the north and the south. The importance of this region will also grow at the European level once the EU expands, Russia and Ukraine (eventually) develop, and the main shipping lines for Caspian hydrocarbons are launched.

Six of Moldova's main trade partners belong to the Baltic and Black Sea Region: Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey and Greece. The other four trade partners do not belong to this region: Germany, the USA, Italy and France. Thus, the sustained development of Moldova's foreign economic relations depends to a great extent on the evolutions in this region and on the access to these markets. Given the inexorable character of the spatial factors and the rather slow development of the transportation network and telecommunications, this situation will change very slowly. The current weaknesses of the Republic of Moldova in foreign trade come from its inability to manage appropriately its economic relations with potential partners. The development of relations with Baltic and Black Sea Region countries may have a crucial importance for the pro-European objectives of the Republic of Moldova, as it is still not ready to become a trusted

partner of the Western countries. In their turn, the countries in this region must be interested in co-operating with the Republic of Moldova, whose political and territorial independence is very important for the stability and security in the Baltic and Black Sea Region.

A factor that will influence the economic evolution of the countries in this region is Turkey's development. Although Turkey's GDP per capita is quite low, the Turkish economy is ranked 16th in the world and it is expected that during the next decade Turkey will be one of the top-ten world economies. Therefore, one of the main directions of Moldova's foreign politics should be to establish closer economic and political relations with Turkey. No tension can exist between the Republic of Moldova and Turkey, as the Gagauz issue seems to have been settled for good. On the other hand, relations with Turkey must be bilateral or must be established via the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Co-operation (OCEMN), avoiding the establishment of military-political strategic regional alliances. Still, we cannot know to what extent the Moldovan embassies in the region are ready to contribute to the promotion of the national economic interests, the interests of Moldovan investors, exporters, and producers.

Thus, occupying the strategic niches in Baltic and Black Sea Region markets is another economic interest of the Republic of Moldova. The main partners of the Republic of Moldova must be Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey – due to the geographical proximity and the absorption potential for Moldovan goods.

Economic Interest No. 6: Import of Standards and Technology and the Establishing of Strategic Relations with EU Members

Given Moldova's declared aspirations to join the European Union, EU members should be for Moldova its main partners that comprise the *priority geo-economic interest zone*. In strategic terms, given the European market potential and the technological development of EU producers, this zone will be the main market for Moldovan goods. For this reason, it is of vital strategic importance for future generations to establish strategic partnership relations with the European Union, which will allow for the diversifying of the markets for Moldovan goods, will contribute to eliminating structural misbalances in the Moldovan economy and will facilitate the integration and equitable participation of Moldova in obtaining the world output and in dividing the world income.

Thus, for identifying strategic niches that will allow Moldova to participate more equitably in creating and dividing the output and the income in the world economy, it is necessary to establish strategic partnership relations with the countries in the priority geo-economic interest zone.

Economic Interest No. 7: Overcoming the Energy Dependence

The Republic of Moldova is almost fully (95%) dependent on the import of energy resources, especially Russian gas and oil and Ukrainian coal. This almost unilateral dependence cannot be explained by the lack of other offers in the regional market. They extract quite good quality oil in Romania. Moreover, once

the Giurgiulesti terminal is built we will be able to import oil directly from Persian Gulf countries. However, for this we need to finish the terminal (only 50-60% of the work has been done) and equip it with an additional oil refinery.

Besides Ukrainian coal, high quality coal can be bought from Poland – the Upper and Lower Silesia coalfields – and from the Czech Republic – the Ostrava-Karviná coalfields. In the long term, the issue of providing Moldova with gas can be solved by connecting with the system that will link suppliers in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan with their consumers in Western Europe. The importance of this connection will be huge, as the Central Asian reserves are estimated at about 15-20 trillion m³. In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan there are large gas reserves that will be liquefied and shipped by sea to Europe; Moldovan industrial consumers might use it as well. Also, the European Union is examining the possibility to revive the ancient „Silk Road“ – the Euro-Asian shipping route through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea that will ensure the link of the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean. The central portion of this corridor is extremely important for shipping hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea and from Central Asia to Western Europe. It will be combined shipping, a part will be shipped through the route: the Caspian Sea – the River Volga – the Volga-Don Canal – the River Don – the Sea of Azov – the Black Sea – the Danube-Black Sea Canal – the River Danube – the Danube-Main-Rhine Canal. The strategic and economic importance of this route will be overwhelming and all possibilities of Moldova’s involvement in this project should be examined.

Although the Republic of Moldova is located at the periphery of sea shipping routes, access to the Black Sea through the Danube and the Dniester may be very important for meeting its needs. By gaining access to the sea, the Republic of Moldova might join the future projects on shipping Caspian hydrocarbons via the Georgia-Ukraine route that is two times shorter than the routes via Russia or Turkey. Once the oil terminals in Odessa and Giurgiulesti are finished the Republic of Moldova will be able to reduce significantly its oil deficit and it might be extremely favourable for its political independence and economic security.

A specific characteristic of our industry (as a matter of fact, it is true for most former Soviet states) is the high rate of energy use and the obsolescence and depreciation of the fixed assets (at some plants and factories the installations are over 40(!) years old). On average, technologies are outdated by 10-15 years. For this reason, special priority should be given to the new sectors that require little energy (biochemistry, electronics, high precision and high quality measurement equipment production), as the competitive advantages are supported by the import of appropriate technologies.

The total energy dependence is one of the most serious vulnerabilities of the Republic of Moldova. In order to avoid being overtaken by forces interested in undermining Moldova’s economic and political security, it is necessary to diversify suppliers, which indirectly implies getting access to the Black Sea. It will also allow Moldova to participate in strategic projects on shipping and using Caspian hydro-

carbons. Besides, the reducing of industrial energy use in Moldova will contribute additionally to ensuring energy security and to reducing the total dependence of the economy on foreign suppliers.

Economic Interest No. 8: The Restoring of the Economic Integrity of the Republic of Moldova

If we analyse the regional structure of the economy of the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic we can draw the conclusion that the fragmentation of the industrial potential pursuant to the Transdnistrian separation is another factor that impacts negatively on national economic security. During Soviet times, in the region on the left bank of the Dniester strategic investments were made, while the human potential concentrated there was predominantly of Russian origin, immigrants from other regions of the Soviet Empire. The Metallurgic Combined Works in Rybnitsa and the Heating and Power Plant in Cuciurgan are the most famous examples. In the Transdnistrian region of the Moldovan Republic, which comprises of 12% of its area and 17% of the population, about 30% of the industrial production were manufactured in 1990, namely: 88% of power, 73% of metal pipes and pipe components, 53% of footwear, 52% of cement, 44% of light industrial goods, 43% of electrical small-power engines, 41% of canned goods, 35% of sunflower oil, 31% of knitwear. Certain categories of industrial goods were produced only in Transdnistria, such as roofing slate, large electrical machines, high-voltage power transformers, technological equipment and machinery for foundry works, car trailers, laminated goods, bottles, electrical wire and cables, steel, cotton and silk fibres. [8, 24]

To settle the Transdnistrian conflict is of vital importance for the re-integration of the economic potential of the Republic of Moldova. A risk to be avoided is the „Transdnistrianisation“ of the Republic of Moldova, i.e. the overtaking of the political, legal, conceptual and administrative models adjacent to economic activities; unfortunately, the current government seems tempted to do so.

APPENDIX

The National Economic Security Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova (Conceptual Framework)

General Principles:

The National Economic Security Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova is the official concept on the principles, scope, and specific objectives regarding the ensuring of national economic security, as well as on the risks and threats against the national economic security.

By carrying out active political-administrative and political-economic functions, the state is the main subject of the national economic security. As such, the state undertakes the obligation to develop and promote appropriate policies to achieve the goals and objectives regarding the national economic security. Objects of economic security are the state, the consumers, the owners of production units, and the producers operating in all sectors of the national economy (industry, agriculture, services).

The Economic Security Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova was developed in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and completes the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova. To ensure national economic security, all national normative acts and all international agreements to be joined by the Republic of Moldova must comply with the following principles:

- The joining of agreements, treaties, multilateral and bilateral international structures and organisations must not compromise or hamper the integration of the Republic of Moldova in the economic, political, and security structures of the European Union;

- Observance of the rights to private property and free individual initiative is a fundamental factor for the proper functioning of the national economic system and for building a truly democratic society;

- The preserving and development of the human potential is the primary condition for restoring economic potential, to ensure economic growth and for the planned participation of the Republic of Moldova in international relations and the world economy processes;

- The consumers' free choice of goods producers, services providers, work deliverers, and intermediaries is of major importance for maximising consumer utility;

- The owners of production factors have the right to receive appropriate payment for letting others use their production factors in economic activity and no state or private organisation can limit this right through its activity;

- The establishing of state monopoly and granting commercial monopoly over some types of activities of categories of goods, services, and works will be made only based on the principle of maximising the social economic impact;

- The reducing of the unilateral dependence of local producers on foreign suppliers of raw materials, energy, technologies, know-how, and funds, as well as the diversifying of markets for local products are the factors that are essential for ensuring the economic security of the state and of the producers, and for strengthening the real political independence of the Republic of Moldova;

- All governmental economic policies shall be adjusted in conformity with the principle of attaining structural, quantitative, and qualitative misbalances observed between the economic and social development levels in the regions and in the centre of the country, as well as between the living standards in rural and urban environments;

- The Republic of Moldova will participate in international economic relations not only as a consumer, but also as a supplier of economic security; by fighting money laundering, transboundary organised crime, corruption, fiscal and customs evasions, and the shadow economy, the Republic of Moldova will prove its firm decision to become a regional stability factor.

The economic security of the Republic of Moldova is closely linked with the world and the regional economic condition, with the internal and external political conjuncture, with the geo-political framework, and with the relations with other states. To protect its interests regarding the economic security, the Republic of Moldova will keep friendly relations with all countries. In the long run (3-5 years), in order to achieve national economic interests, special importance is given to the economic co-operation of Moldova with the Baltic and Black Sea Region countries (Austria, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) that are included in the area considered as of special geo-economic interest for Moldova. The government and the National Bank of Moldova will develop short-term and

middle-term economic policies and proposals oriented to supporting local exporters whose activity is carried out or is related to the areas of priority geo-economic interest. On the other hand, given the pro-European orientation of the Republic of Moldova, EU members are included in the area of its priority geo-economic interest. The government and the National Bank of Moldova will develop long-term proposals and policies oriented on supporting local exporters whose activity is carried out or is related to this area of priority geo-economic interest.

The Economic Security Doctrine will be the reference source for:

- Defining and promoting all economic policies;
- Defining the proposals on improving the legal, methodological, technical-scientific, and organisational framework of economic security;
- Developing specific programs regarding the areas of interest for various ministries, departments, and state institutions for ensuring economic security.

The Doctrine scope and objectives:

The scope of the Economic Security Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova is to continually secure the national economic interests. To achieve and to protect these interests equals with ensuring national economic security and is a required condition for a sustainable social-economic development of the country.

To achieve the scope of this Doctrine it is necessary to achieve, as well as continually adjust, the following objectives:

- The conceptual development, assessment, and monitoring of some relevant indicators that would characterise the optimum acceptable real condition of economic security and of the economic system in various sectors and areas that would illustrate the level of ensuring the security interests for each of the four objects of national economic security – the consumers, the owners of production factors, the producers, and the state;
- The identifying, monitoring, overseeing, and ongoing diminishment of the vulnerabilities of the national economic system, of the structural misbalances and discrepancies at the level of the economic development of the country and average European standards;
- The identifying, monitoring, overseeing, and ongoing diminishment of the main threats and risks, as well their sources, both internal and external, that can undermine national economic security;
- Besides starting some operational or sector activities, it is necessary to develop and implement global (national) economic strategies and policies to diminish the vulnerabilities, to fight risks, threats, and their sources;
- Analysis of the conflict relations that might occur between security objects, the contradictory interests they might have, as well as making proposals and offer policy options to diminish and settle these difficulties.

The Contents of Economic Security:

Security and stability are the two main requirements for achieving a sustainable economic development of the Republic of Moldova. By security we define the condition of a system where the integrity of links between its elements and the possibility of sustained development under the conditions of unfavourable internal and external environments is ensured. Stability means the reliability and resistance of the vertical and horizontal relations, as well as the ability to resist and adjust to external and external efforts and pressures.

By and large, by the national economic security of the Republic of Moldova we mean the situation when there are no internal or external barriers for achieving the national

economic interests. For national economic security it is important that citizens, private companies, and civil society understand and support the national economic interests, as well as the economic, financial, fiscal, banking, monetary, trade, investment, and other policies. On the other hand, promotion by the empowered institutions of rational effective policies or models for using available economic resources must not violate the principles of free initiative and competition, private property intangibility and inalienability, and does not mean the involvement of the state in the areas where the market mechanisms can operate more efficiently without any governmental interventions.

In a narrow sense, national economic security is ensured when there are no economic, financial, or commercial threats that might undermine the capacities of the state to ensure the resources needed for carrying out its functions, which may compromise the development of a proper economic activity by the producers, which would limit the possibilities of the owners of production factors to use and get appropriate payment for their usage, and which would jeopardise consumer interests in maximising the utility.

Thus, national economic security is ensured by four major areas and one can say that there are four major types of economic security: consumer economic security, producer economic security, production units' owner economic security, and state economic security. The balancing of these interests, as well as the positive relations between the four areas is vital for ensuring the integrity and the efficiency of the national economic system.

The Components of Economic Security:

– Consumer economic security means the ability to use freely consumer rights, according to the legal provisions of the Republic of Moldova regarding the protection of consumer rights and international legal acts to which the Republic of Moldova is a party. Ensuring the opportunities for increasing its utility is one of the main conditions of consumer economic security as objects of national economic security;

– Producer economic security comprises the ensuring of conditions necessary for operating stability at every stage of production. On the other hand, producer economic insecurity should not be confused with the objective economic risks inherent to the economic activity. Guaranteeing the access to economic, financial, informational, and other resources needed for a free development of production and the inalienable rights for maximising profit are the basic conditions for producer economic security as part of the national economic security.

– Production units' owner economic security means the free use and disposal of the owned units. In addition, the owners of production units have the right for the appropriate payment for transferring the rights to use the units during economic activity. One of the basic criteria that determine the payment for production units is their productivity, the risks they are exposed to, and their degree of involvement in the economic activity;

– State security means ensuring the resources needed for carrying out its political, economic, social, and other functions according to the Constitution and other normative acts. Avoiding external and internal economic, financial, energy and food blockades is the basic condition for ensuring a state economic security. When ensuring its economic security, the state will not threaten the economic security of the consumers, the owners of production units, and the producers.

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities of the Economic System and of the National Economic Security:

The operation of the national economic system during the transition to an open market economy takes place under the conditions of an acute structural and conceptual crisis and can be characterised by the following major weaknesses and vulnerabilities:

- Because the components of the national economy (the capital market, the stock exchange, the agricultural and commodity exchanges, the regional chambers of industry and trade, the informational networks) are either underdeveloped or do not exist at all, the mass privatisation of state-owned property was not followed by the expected economic growth and by an increased profitability and labour productivity;

- The state financial-fiscal policy, which includes immediate budgetary-fiscal objectives, lacks a strategic basis that would stimulate the economic activities of local producers, and thus it is one of the major factors that contributes to the sustained annual budgetary deficits, to the deeply-rooted practices of fiscal evasion, and to the strengthening of the shadow economy;

- Despite the total dependence of the national economy on external energy resources and raw materials, so far no viable governmental policies have been developed to reduce the energy- and material-consuming character of the national economy, as well as to identify and mobilise some alternative non-traditional energy sources;

- The crisis of local producers is deepened by the inconsistent promotion of an ultra-liberal policy regarding foreign goods of dubious quality that overflow the local market at dumping prices, by the lack of some technical standards for the quality and reliability of imported goods, and by the mass corruption of some state bodies in charge of overseeing trans-border trade and economic flows;

- Due to the lack of policies required for strengthening an appropriate investment environment and for promoting the external image of the country, the investment activity displays a much slower evolution than it might have been expected, and it continues to decrease under the influence of some non-economic factors (organized crime, corruption, political interests, protection taxes, red tape, the lack of credible contractual traditions) that impact the operation of private companies;

- The lack of an investment-productive (geo-economic) model in foreign economic relations determines the lack of real opportunities for local producers to participate freely in world commodity, currency, and financial flows and determine the full dependence of the national economy on weather and geographical factors;

- Due to the inappropriate use of foreign economic and financial support, the Republic of Moldova is undergoing a deep external solvency crisis that can turn into full insolvency if there is no sustained economic growth;

- The break of the links between producers and researchers concerned with technological development has caused the obsolescence of the technologies used in the national economy, the low competitiveness of Moldovan goods or the reduced use of the comparative advantages of the Republic of Moldova in international economic relations.

These conceptual and structural weaknesses have the worst impact on the national economic security and they increase the existing risks and the threats.

Risks and Threats against Economic Security

The main risks, to which the economic system of the Republic of Moldova is exposed, by origin and expression, can be divided into external and internal.

The main internal risks are:

- Maximum degradation of the national human and intellectual potential – a determining factor of economic power and development;
- Inappropriate and illicit use of state funds by top managers in their own interest or for criminal purposes;
- The establishing of state or private non-natural monopolies in areas of vital or strategic importance and the market division by concluding agreements and establishing illegal cartels;
- The loss of comparative strategic advantages and turning the country into an agricultural raw materials and cheap labour supplier;
- The re-launching of the inflationist spiral, the depreciation of the national currency, and the entering of the country into long-term stagflation;
- The turning of the economy into a subsistence economy pursuant to the full dependence on uncontrollable exogenous factors (droughts, ecological degradation of the land, catastrophic meteorological phenomena);
- The final shift of capital to the shadow and illicit economy pursuant to fiscal and social policies that are inappropriate for the development of the legal productive sector;
- The criminalising and politicising of the financial-banking system.

The main external risks are:

- The inability to pay foreign debts, the financial isolation of the Republic of Moldova and the checking of foreign financial, economic, and technical support;
- The mass substitution of national goods with low quality foreign goods sold at dumping prices;
- Attracting and involving directly companies and banks in the Republic of Moldova in international money laundering, illicit traffic and transboundary economic-financial crime rackets;
- The worsening or the destruction of the financial-banking system pursuant to regional and world economic and financial crises;
- Limited export and sales opportunities for Moldovan goods due to the precarious economic condition of the primary trade partners of the Republic of Moldova;
- The unilateral control and subversive use of national resources and economic and infrastructure units by a foreign country or by foreign corporations.

The main threats against the national economic security of the Republic of Moldova are:

- The actions aimed at preventing the integration of the Republic of Moldova in the European Union;
- The financial and economic blockade imposed on by international and regional organisations or by other countries;
- The internal separatism that impacts or may impact the national economy's integrity;
- The actions aimed at undermining the capacities of providing appropriately the economic system with energy resources;
- The activities that may cause an increased unilateral economic dependence of the Republic of Moldova on certain countries or markets.

Preventing the Threats and Fighting the Risks to Economic Security

The state provides a clear competent legal framework that is needed for carrying out economic activities, for having a stable examinable banking system, an effective appropriate

crediting system, and an investment environment favourable for placing local and foreign investments. On the other hand, the appropriate monitoring of the country's payment and trade balances is ensured, aiming at fighting the possibilities for the unilateral control and subversive use of national resources by a foreign country or by foreign corporations. The government undertakes the needed measures to conserve power, creates the necessary reserves for crises and diversify the import sources of power and energy resources. To ensure economic growth, the state will encourage the establishing of joint ventures and joint stock companies with foreign capital. The Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Bank of Moldova will develop an action programme in the case of an economic blockade or economic sanctions imposed by other countries. The government is in charge of undertaking needed measures to fight smuggling, corruption, money laundering, and other financial-economic crimes, and will draft a law on the exceptional condition of the economic system.

National Economic Interests:

The national economic interests are the main goals of local and foreign economy, and the political and economic independence of the Republic of Moldova depends on achieving them, as well as the plenary multilateral development of the human being and the ensuring of future generations with the resources needed for their development under the conditions of a society undergoing globalisation. Ensuring the national economic interests is the ultimate goal of all economic security policies.

The main national economic interests of the Republic of Moldova are:

- To use appropriately the national human and intellectual potential;
- To build an external image favourable for the development of the investment environment;
- To reduce the share of the shadow economy;
- To correct the structural distortions of the national economy;
- To implement the geo-economic (investment-productive) model in international economic relations;
- To diversify the markets by gaining strategic niches in the markets included in the area of special geo-economic interest;
- To establish strategic economic partnership relations with the countries of the European Union;
- To overcome the unilateral energy dependence;
- To restore the economic integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

The State Implementation Policy Regarding Economic Security:

According to the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova and the National Economic Security Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova, all ministries, departments, and other governmental structures must develop specific annual proposals for their areas of competence to ensure national economic security and take into account the provisions of the National Economic Security Doctrine in all their action plans.

To monitor and ensure national economic security, under the Supreme Economic Council under the President of the Republic of Moldova shall be established the Crisis Management and Economic Security Committee with nine members. The Parliament, the government, the National Bank and the Academy of Sciences will appoint two committee members each, and the President of the Republic of Moldova will appoint the Committee's chairman. The Committee members are appointed for a three-year term, and their appoint-

ments can be later confirmed. The Crisis Management and Economic Security Committee is in charge of achieving the national economic security objectives, of annually evaluating and adjusting the National Economic Security Doctrine, and of developing a specific action plan on monitoring and ensuring national economic security.

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Democratic Control over the Military Sphere
in Moldova

INTRODUCTION

In countries with long-standing and deep-rooted democratic traditions, the exercise of control over their armed forces has become so inherently a part of day-to-day practical work and activities of democratically elected authorities that it is taken for granted. The objective needed to ensure this kind of oversight in a multiparty political system stems not only from the nature of democracy as such, but also from the essence of the armed forces which may, under certain circumstances come to pose a threat not only for the democratic system but also for society as a whole. This problem is particularly relevant to countries in the post-Soviet space, in particular those newly-independent states which have, owing to their totalitarian past, absolutely no experience and track record of civilized interaction between the army and democratically elected and established bodies of power.

During the communist regime, political control over the military in the former Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp did exist and was ensured by the dominant role of the communist party in the state, and by the identification of the communist party with the army, which was deemed the „armed wing“ of the former. On the other hand, the military enjoyed exclusive rights and authority in the field of military policy making and armed forces development, including defense budgeting, an arrangement that fully ruled out any public influence over the state of affairs in the army in particular and over national security policy in general. The army’s monopoly on power and information, as well as the complete prevention of society from participating in the shaping and practical implementing of defense policy in any form, resulted in a situation where the armed forces turned into a *state within a state*. This seclusion of the military spelled out not only the absence of guarantees of security and of non-interference of the army in the internal affairs of society, but also real prerequisites for a military coup like the abortive takeover in August 1991, which led to the final break-up of the former USSR.

The declaration of former Soviet republics to be sovereign nations and their subsequent withdrawal from the Union paved the way for their efforts to forge their own attributes of statehood for themselves, but also generated a host of problems in the military and defence fields. The successful resolution of the latter is of key significance not only to these countries' actual independence, but also to the nature of their social and political systems following the so-called period of transition from the post-totalitarian past to real democracy. The creation by these countries of their own armed forces and the maintenance of effective democratic control over the latter's activities is one of the overriding issues. Under the circumstances of economic and social crises and domestic instability, accompanying radical changes in most post-totalitarian societies, the army could play the role of a stabilizing force and a guarantor of law and order.

The army could become an element of stability on condition that it is not isolated from society. Society, in its turn, has the duty to assure the conditions necessary for the military to occupy a worthy place in the structure of national priorities and values, and to not seek to take up dominant positions in the establishment or exert undue influence on the course of political developments in the country. The allegiance of the armed forces to the democratically elected legislature and lawful government represents a decisive prerequisite condition for the nation's steady progress as an open society and democracy.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMY

A decade ago in Central and Eastern Europe, the democratically elected governments of the newly independent states could claim political supremacy over their armed forces without a political interregnum. At that time neither civilians, politicians, decision makers nor the military thought about the establishment of new working relations, having very rudimentary knowledge and total lack of any experience regarding how the armed forces should function in the new conditions. Their limited experience had not prepared them for work in parliamentary democracies. Establishing the fundamental rules for civil-military relations was among the first things on the agenda of Central and East European governments. It was done with constitutions and through fundamental laws. In retrospect, it could be said with little exceptions there were inexperienced legislators in many countries that made laws that are no longer appropriate and should be reconsidered. On the one hand, legislation has been ambiguous that retained some important elements from the old system has hampered decision-making and had a negative impact on the military's functionality at the systemic level. On the other hand, in most countries the legal arrangements have worked at least adequately, and civil-military relations have not irreversibly entered some destructive contradictions.

Inevitably the patterns of civil-military relations across Central and Eastern Europe have become more complex, more varied and more difficult to assess.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have made substantial progress in establishing democratic models of civil-military relations. Most reforms of the security sector in these former Visegrad group countries, of which other states have yet to complete, no longer concern them – especially after they became NATO members. However, much of what the three new members did before they were admitted offers experience that affords close study.

The Baltic States and Slovenia have made progress in establishing national armed forces with democratic, civilian control at their core. The Baltic States are somewhat a special case. The Soviet Army was withdrawn from their territory, and they have built their armed forces from the ground up. Nonetheless, most of the problems, which are still considered actual in civil-military relations and security sector reform, appear in the Baltics, although on a smaller scale.

Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are generally perceived to be moving in the correct direction but lagging behind the first three new NATO members. In Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, the armed forces remain involved in domestic politics. Some authoritarian governments are served by the military or have a weaker hold over the military. These countries cannot be excluded from consideration, but they stand closer to the old relationship model of civil-military relations. Nonetheless, the imprint of their „socialist past“ is still deep in all of the area and, for most of them so is their „Warsaw Pact“ heritage.

During the Cold War, Central European governments did not have their own national security strategies. The Soviet Union decided what security was and imposed with it the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact. The militaries of Central and Eastern Europe were conversant with how the Soviet military conducted planning with its *voyennaya doktrina* (military doctrine) but had limited participation in it. In the newly sovereign countries, civilians and the military, having established new working relations also had to develop democratic national security strategies (or „national security concepts“ as they usually are called).

The present-day democratic approach to strategy was elaborated during the Cold War as a method of identifying and dealing with threats and risks. The West developed national security concepts, which tacitly assumes that the security of the nation includes defence but is not based only on military strength. Basically it is an attempt to achieve balance between economic, social, and military power. It also recognizes the overwhelming need to consult the people and the need to take into account the attitude of neighbouring states. A national security concept is not imposed as the Soviet military doctrine was imposed.

The new concepts in Central and East European states encompass political, economic, and foreign policy considerations and present to the public the rationale for democratically-directed security strategies. The process of developing the concepts shows *how appropriately civilians and the military have arranged their new positions of responsibility in principle and how effectively their relationship works with the practical aspects of security reform.*

The majority of governments have accepted the Western view that national strategies are political as well as military in nature and that the civilians decide what belongs in a security concept – although the military should be consulted for advice. Senior military commanders have handed over some of their responsibilities, once the prerogatives of the soldier, to civilian authorities, chiefly the Ministry of Defence. Cabinets have formulated the concepts as public documents, while parliaments have debated and accepted them. At this stage, the process of developing and accepting national security strategies in Central Europe is not very different from what takes place in the democratic West. However, security is not widely debated by „the concerned public“ and, therefore, it has not yet entered the realm of „public policy“ fully.

Western states have had years of experience in analysing and describing their security needs. Because each country develops and documents its security strategy according to established political customs, there is no Western template, no blueprint to import. The country's strategic environment, its relationship to international organisations, its foreign policy and its economic capabilities form an essential core, and in this regard the concepts are not different from those of Western states.

The „fundamental statements“ affirm civilian supremacy over the military, sometimes as summaries of constitutions and other laws that have established a new political framework. Thus they restate the main points on how civilians and the military have allocated their respective responsibilities: on the one side, the powers and responsibilities of president, prime ministers, defence minister, cabinet, parliament; on the other, the top military brass, such as and the commanders and chiefs of staff. They outline the peacetime guidance of the military, development of a defence policy, and a wartime operational control and the development and control of defence policy.

Democratic control of the armed forces, a properly structured relationship between civilians and the military, between those who have power through the ballot box and those who have power because they have arms, is one of the democracy's pillars. In societies with long democratic experiences the conviction that the democratic control over the military involves three distinct but closely related elements is shared: 1) the non-involvement of the military in domestic politics; 2) democratic control of defence policy; and 3) democratic control of foreign policy.

The Western arrangement of democratic control is structurally sound and flexible. Originating at a time when relations between politicians and soldiers were relatively simple, it was adapted to complicated contemporary international and domestic demands. Internationally, civilians and the military have to respond to requirements emanating from alliances like NATO. Domestically, planning has become so complex that governments have come to rely on experienced civil service staff at and on „security experts“ – a unique breed that permeates public policy institutes and similar organisations.

There also is the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 and others like the Partnership for Peace. A country that hopes to join NATO has to observe definite rules of behaviour in its domestic policy and in its relations with its neighbours. Democracies have civilian control of the military. A country's decision to join NATO must be founded on the economic necessity to reform and sustain its armed forces and, here, recommendations relating to the preparations of the defence area with a view to adhesion interfere States that have ethnic disputes and conflicting territorial claims must settle their disagreements peacefully. If there are minority problems, these must be solved.

Fulfilling these conditions does not guarantee membership, but failing to live up to some would result in the country's removal from the list of applicants. Candidates for future admission have to make the same reforms in politics, economy, and security sector that the three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic made – but before they actually find out whether or when they would become members.

The relationship between democracy and the military is of vital importance to Moldova as the country strives to firmly re-establish democratic traditions while seeking at the same time to safeguard them. During the Soviet period, Moldova was forced to live under an authoritarian regime backed up by the organs of the state and by the military. The relationship between democracy and the military was then adversarial. Since 1991 Moldova has re-established its independence as a democratic republic and has taken significant steps to re-establish its military. Today the relationship between democracy and the military is rather positive but is not a dynamic one. It represents a major challenge to the society as Moldovans build new defence structures that the state needs to work harmoniously alongside other democratic civilian institutions.

NEW STATE AND ARMY

Both in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, against the background of a powerful groundswell of ethnic self-awareness in Moldova, the army was regarded as a principal attribute of the emergent new statehood, and the major participants in political developments at the time had no doubt about the need for Moldova to build its own army. When deciding to found their own armed forces after the failure of the Moscow coup in August 1991 and the subsequent proclamation of Moldova's independence as a sovereign state, its then-ruling forces proceeded not so much in dealing with an outside threat of an armed incursion, but a desire to fulfil the following tasks.

Firstly, they wanted a national army in order to protect the newly won sovereignty against possible encroachments from the central Soviet government and to avert large-scale actions aiming to destabilise the internal situation in Moldova. The existence on its territory of a substantial military contingent, in particular, the

stump of the 14th Army, which was not subordinate to the Moldovan leadership, was perceived by Moldova, in the absence of political mechanisms to eliminate a potential military interference in its internal affairs, as a major and permanent military threat. *Secondly*, the mounting of separatist sentiments on the left bank of the Dniester River in Moldova and the raising of paramilitary secessionist units of the so-called Dniester Moldovan Republic compelled the Moldovan leadership to launch its own armed forces capable of ensuring the country's territorial integrity within its generally recognized frontiers.

From the very beginning of building a military in the Republic of Moldova, one priority was to create a legitimate basis, legal regulations, and political arrangements not only to govern the activities of armed forces and their commanding structures, but also to rule out any use in particular of the armed forces and security and law enforcement structures in any form to meddle in the country's internal affairs. With those forces that had assumed power having no experience in constructing a democratic society, the complicated issues of exercising democratic control over the armed forces were not infrequently reduced to ensuring their political management through the appointment of representatives of ruling groups and coalitions into key positions.

On the other hand, attempts by the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party to have recourse to armed force to suppress national liberation movements in individual former Soviet constituent republics at the final phase of *perestroika*, and the adverse consequences to the army itself of its direct subordination to the Communist Party and high degree of political indoctrination made the Moldovan leadership radically review the concept for security and mechanisms for its implementation amid political pluralism and the nascent multiparty system. The consistent reforming of the armed forces, national security services, and law enforcement agencies became a top priority for the new authorities.

At the beginning of September 1991, then Moldovan President, Mircea Snegur, issued a decree to establish Moldova's own armed forces by nationalizing military property, armaments, and military hardware found on Moldova's territory at the time of its proclamation of independence. This was followed by the legislative confirmation of the independence of the defence, interior, and national security ministries, as well as the armed units under them, from Moscow. Following the re-subordination of the „power ministries” to Moldovan authorities, another urgent need was to democratise the military, security services, and law enforcement in line with the new, democratic realities.

This presupposed tackling the following overriding tasks: the drafting and early enactment of new legislation regulating the activities of the „power ministries” and governmental authorities to ensure national defence, domestic stability, and security; broader political control over the „power ministries” and their armed units through the direct involvement of legislators in the making of budgets for and in the implementation of personnel policy in the armed forces; a ban on political activities by military servicemen; and mandated retirement of military

serviceman elected to serve on a legislative agency at any level. Other key tasks included the continued reforming of the armed forces with a subsequent changeover to recruitment on a contractual basis, the bringing of their structure into line with a defensive military doctrine and the principle of defence sufficiency, alternative service arrangements, and social benefits for servicemen.

The very first draft of the Concept for the Creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, developed by the nation's first defence ministry – the State Department for Military Issues – and submitted to the national parliament and government for consideration in the spring of 1991, provided for „the practical realization of the principle of supremacy of the political leadership over the Republic's Armed Forces and the exercise of efficient control by the state and society over the Defence Ministry's activities with the simultaneous recognition of the need to rid the armed forces of any political parties." Organizationally, the higher military command structure was to consist of three tiers – political, administrative, and military – with the respective limits of authority and responsibilities defined for each proceeding from the need not only to separate them, but also to ensure their smooth networking. Under the Concept, the President was to be the commander-in-chief in charge of the Armed Forces. As such, he would be empowered, should there appear a real danger of war, to alert the Armed Forces, order reservists to be mobilised, and enlist troops under the Interior Ministry and the National Security Ministry in defensive activities. The President exercises general governance over the Armed Forces through the Defence Ministry and with the assistance of the Supreme Security Council and the Supreme Military Council of the Republic of Moldova.

Military-administrative guidance over the Armed Forces was, in accordance with the Concept, a prerogative for the Defence Ministry whose responsibilities would include organising, directing, and coordinating all activities aiming to ensure national defence. Military leadership over the Armed Forces was within the competence of the Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces and the chief-of-staff accountable directly to the Defence Minister.

Following the proclamation of independence and the execution of appropriate agreements with other FSU countries, which regulated exchanges of military servicemen between them, thousands of military officers began to return home. They came to constitute the core of personnel who exercised decisive influence on the nature and thrust of building Moldova's military at the initial juncture in the country's independent development. The armed conflict with paramilitary units of secessionists from the so-called Dniester Moldovan Republic, who in the early spring of 1992 embarked on an organised dismantling of lawful bodies of power on the left bank of the Dniester, relegated efforts to implement the Concept for creating Moldova's armed forces to the background.

At the beginning of 1992 with the appointment of Ion Costas, a career general, as Defence Minister, the nascent Moldovan army began to be cultivated to resemble its Soviet counterpart with its rigidly centralized military-administrative

management structure and direct subordination to the defence minister and chief executive. The new military command put forward its own idea for organizing the country's armed forces by proposing that all „power ministries“ be merged into a single agency subordinate to the Defence Minister. General Costas, however, had little time to translate his vision of the new Moldovan army into life, as by the middle of 1992 he was dismissed for obvious setbacks in the military standoff with the Dniester separatists.

Pavel Creanga, a retired Soviet general who was put in charge of the Defence Ministry after the end of the armed conflict on the Dniester, did not advocate any radical schemes like the previous plan to strengthen and consolidate the Armed Forces by taking over other ministries and agencies, and limited himself to making use of his own experience accumulated during the long years of service in the Soviet Army. Between 1992-96, the Moldovan army and Defence Ministry were repeatedly rocked by all manner of scandals erupting over revelations of corruption among senior officers, discharges of undesirables, and the involvement of higher commanders in political struggles in the run up to the 1996 presidential election. Notwithstanding periodic conflicts in and outside the army and the departure of numerous – and far from the worse – officers for civil undertakings, the Defence Ministry was able to create small, but operational Armed Forces consisting of 9,000 men, which were later dubbed „the mini-Soviet Army.“ In addition to the National Army, the Moldovan Armed Forces consisted of a „carabinieri“ corps (Interior Ministry), units of the Civil Defence Department, and frontier guards (Intelience and Information Service).

Petru Lucinschi, who was elected the President of Moldova in December 1996 and who, as such, became its commander-in-chief in accordance with the national Constitution, issued one of his first decrees to appoint a civilian, former Moldovan ambassador to Moscow Valeriu Pasat, as defence minister. The follow-up statement by the head of state regarding the need to reform the army has ushered in preparations for military reform. According the declarations made by the president to the press the tighter democratic control over the Armed Forces by society should be a primary goal of this aspect of state activities. Another aspect of the military reform that has become clear consisted in the reduction of the military personnel and of the military equipment and armament.

In February 1999 the Moldovan Supreme Security Council at its meeting discussed problems related to a new Concept for the Reform of Armed Forces. It should be noted that Defence Ministry professionals and experts drew up the blueprint independently from the presidential staff. That approach to the development of underlying principles and guidelines for military reform did not prove conducive to improvements in relations between the purely civilian team of the President's aides led by his adviser on military issues, on one hand, and the professional military from the Defence Ministry on the other. But the elements of competition and the existence of alternative views on the problems under consideration told favourably on the quality of plans proposed for reforming the army.

The Supreme Security Council opted for the Defence Ministry's plan. As proposed by President Lucinschi, the Armed Forces would be reduced by a thousand men during 1999. This news, regrettably, has been the only piece of information related to the subject that has been reported by the mass media. The arguments used to substantiate the chosen concept and guideposts for the impending military reform remain a „military secret“ for the vast majority of society. The final draft of the document currently being developed by the Moldovan Defence Ministry is to be presented to the Supreme Security Council within two months.

Over the years of independence, Moldovan society has gained some experience in democratising the military. This is true, most notably, of efforts to ensure „transparency“ and public openness about national defence planning and military budgeting, and continuous oversight over activities of the military, security services, and law enforcement on the part of democratically elected authorities. The specific conditions of the ongoing transition from the totalitarian past to a democratic and open society directly affect controls and management over the Armed Forces. The want of democratic traditions, and the fostering of a new army, out of necessity, from those structures and personnel inherited from the communist past highlight the challenging nature of related problems and the special place held by military reform in the context of general democratic changes initiated in the Moldovan society.

PARLIAMENT, EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES, AND ARMY

Even at the initial stage in state-building and the separation of powers within the system of governance in Moldova, the awareness of the need for a democratically elected legislative to monitor the activities of executive authorities in the military sphere contributed to the issuance of appropriate legislative acts and the establishment of corresponding structures and mechanisms. In March 1992, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a package of laws related directly to the military, namely: Law on the Armed Forces, Law on Defence, Law on Military Duty and Military Service of Citizens of the Republic of Moldova, and Law on Social and Legal Protection for Military Servicemen and Their Family Members, and for Individuals Undergoing Military Training.

These statutes, as insignificantly amended, have continued in effect to this day. Parliament's powers in controlling the Armed Forces are defined most explicitly. Article 4 of the Law on the Armed Forces says: „The highest-level leadership over the Armed Forces shall be exercised by Parliament, by the President of the Republic of Moldova who shall simultaneously be the commander-in-chief of its Armed Forces, and by the government within their respective limits of authority as determined by legislation.“

The Law on Defence“ sets forth more detailed provisions regarding these powers and the role of the national legislature in defence policymaking and in the

military sphere in general. Article 4 of this Law provides, for example: „The Parliament shall be responsible for ensuring national defence, shall work out military policy guidelines, and shall carry out legislative regulation in the fields of armed forces development and defence. The Parliament shall approve: a Military Doctrine and Concept for the Armed Forces Development; the principal structure of the Armed Forces; the amount of government budget allocations for defence needs; guidelines for Moldova’s military co-operation with other countries; and those decrees issued by the President of the Republic of Moldova which concern mobilisation, demobilisation, and the declaration of war. The Parliament shall decide: to declare martial law in the event of outside military aggression and make peace after the end of hostilities; to declare and end war; to use the Armed Forces where necessary to perform obligations arising under international commitments to maintain peace and security; to declare mobilisation and demobilisation, both partial and general; and to award military ranks to the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.„

The same law gives extensive powers and rights to the chief executive – the head of state – who is personally responsible for the nation’s defence capabilities, and for the combat readiness of its Armed Forces. The principle of dividing powers among authorities in the military sphere has found reflection also in the right granted to the president to submit fundamental documents dealing with a military doctrine, guidelines for armed forces development, and defence budgeting to the Parliament for consideration. Lawmakers have the final word on these documents. The presidential powers to declare war or martial law come into effect only after the corresponding edicts have been approved by the Parliament. In the event of a military intrusion from outside, the chief executive is to take all necessary measures to counteract the act of aggression, keeping the legislature promptly informed of such steps as they are taken. The Defence Minister is appointed and dismissed by the President upon a motion from the Prime Minister. Without the latter’s consent, the commander-in-chief may not reshuffle the country’s military-administrative leadership. This distribution of functions and powers between legislative authorities and the head of state should pre-empt the monopoly right of the President or Parliament to make decisions and control the army, especially at times of what are seen from the military standpoint as crises.

Under the existing legislation, the government is competent to decide, for the most part, issues pertaining to logistical support for the Armed Forces, and to the provision of conditions for the normal functioning of the army and other armed units, for accumulation of mobilisation resources, and for the preparation of reserves. Executive authorities are involved in the elaboration of proposals concerning military budget estimates for specific time periods, in the manufacture and procurement of military equipment and armaments, and in the training of professionals and specialists for army needs, draw up contingency plans to shunt the national economy to wartime production tracks, and provide social safety nets for military servicemen, their family members, and individuals undergoing

military training and retraining. The government is also responsible for the discharge of obligations emanating from Moldova's international treaties and agreements on collective security and joint defence. The main tool for state management in the military field, the Defence Ministry, exercises direct command over National Army units, and bears the full brunt of responsibility for their combat readiness and fighting efficiency.

The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, passed by the incumbent Parliament in July 1994, does not contain any detailed list of rights and powers held by legislative and executive authorities in national security and defence policy and decision making, in the formulation and implementation of a military doctrine, and in defence budgeting. Article 108 of the Constitution is formulated as follows: „(1) The Armed Forces shall be subordinate exclusively to the people's will in order to ensure sovereignty, independence, unity, territorial integrity, and constitutional democracy. (2) The national defence system structure shall be determined by an organic law.” The Constitution also includes several more detailed provisions related to the military field, whereby legislative authorities may only declare war, martial law, and mobilisation.

The current legal basis still attests the existence of two fundamentally different approaches to organizing the top military leadership, which were in evidence in Moldova also at the initial stage of its efforts to fashion its own armed forces. In 1991, the Moldovan Department for Military Issues, considering the objective necessity of bringing the relevant structures into line with the nature of activities maintained by governmental institutions within a multiparty system and guided by the need to diminish the army's dependence from short-lived political considerations and from political party power struggles to the largest possible degree, insisted on the practical implementation of the principle of supremacy of the political leadership in controlling the armed forces and on the introduction of a three-tier (political, administrative, and military) system for managing them.

Subsequently, the replacement of the military command and the increased clout of former Soviet generals resulted in the administrative and military tiers of the system fusing into one and concentrating in the Defence Ministry. Nevertheless, the Law on the Armed Forces still has its Article 5 mandating in plain words that: „Military guidance over the Armed Forces shall be exercised by the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The General Staff of the Armed Forces shall be directly responsible for the preparation of units for warfare in order to defend the Republic.” The same Article then enumerates the duties and functions of the General Staff, which naturally follow from the designated purpose of this purely military tier of the army management system.

In the middle of 1998, when the civilian defence minister came to differ with the chief of the General Staff on the scope of the latter's powers, one of the weightier arguments marshalled by the chief of the General Staff to make his case was that legislatively enshrined list of functions assigned to this military structure. The chief of the General Staff was right in raising that argument regarding these

duties and prerogatives then far in excess of the limits of authority worthy of being vested in one of the Defence Ministry departments, to which they are presently confined as part of the strictly pyramidal system for army management. However correct the chief of the General Staff was in arguing for a clearer separation of management tiers, this did not prevent the defence minister from firing the this dynamic strategist of the top military leadership.

The Law on Defence also provides for the establishment and operation of the Supreme Security Council (SSC), an advisory agency under the President, which acts in accordance with the relevant regulations as approved by the head of state. The primary mission of the SSC is to provide assistance in the development and practical realization of guidelines for armed forces development and in ensuring national security. Not having any real powers and ways to exercise its influence on the army, on the Interior Ministry, or on the National Security Ministry, the SSC Secretariat, when monitoring and verifying the state of affairs in the given field for and on behalf of the head of state by preparing various issues within the competence of the President, including personnel matters, for discussion at SSC meetings, makes a direct impact on the passing of these or other decisions in the military sphere, which are related to the functioning of the „power ministries“ and armed units subordinate to them.

It is the SSC Secretariat that has been instructed to develop and propose an alternative plan for military reform. Late last February SSC members gave preference, upon discussing several competing concepts for reforming the Armed Forces, to the blueprint that was prepared by the Defence Ministry. Despite the latter circumstance, the healthy competition manifest during work on different versions of the concept helped overcome the narrow, departmental approach to the difficult problems of military reform, which are of significance to the whole nation. As it later turned out, however, this has not resulted in a rapprochement between the positions of the SSC and the Defence Ministry, which continue to see things differently on a number of issues.

Bodies set up by legislative authorities with a view to supervising executive authorities' actions in the military sphere include, in the first place, the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Military Issues and State Security. Its responsibilities and authority include powers to monitor and oversee national security and defence policies, defence budgeting, and the procurement and sales of armaments and military hardware. From time to time, other standing parliamentary committees, in particular, the Legal Committee, are also involved in related activities, if need be. In the event of a crisis, the national legislature may form special committees to deal with military issues.

„Government Hour“ hearings, held by the Parliament every Thursday before its full-scale sessions to grill cabinet members, to which top officials from the „power ministries“ are also invited periodically or when necessary or interesting, are a fairly effective tool for continuous control over the activities of the army and its management structures. The defence minister and other ranking members of the

Defence Ministry have been questioned by the legislature on: peace-making operations by National Army units in the security zone on the Dniester; in connection with the adoption of measures to ensure the military's non-interference in political processes ahead of the presidential election in 1996; in order to elucidate the circumstances of the sell-off of a large consignment of arms and military equipment abroad, including 21 MIG-29 fighters purchased by the US government; and as part of a probe into illegal practices by the Defence Ministry's commercial firm, as a result of which the ministry has lost its monopoly right to export surplus military hardware and armaments and to purchase military property exclusively through its own entities. Official queries and appropriate follow-up actions represent yet another common means used by lawmakers to obtain required information and exert direct influence on processes under way in the military sphere.

It is not standard practice in Moldova currently for the President, head of government, or „power ministers“ to regularly report back to legislative authorities on military and defence issues or on specific aspects of ensuring national security. In 1990-92, during the armed conflict with separatists from the so-called Dniester Moldovan Republic, such reporting by ministries and agencies to members of the Parliament was routine, making it possible to keep legislators continuously posted on current developments and to issue corresponding decisions and resolutions. After the conflict had passed its climax, however, such status reports began to be delivered only when a substantial pretext presented itself for this kind of accounting.

The above system and arrangements for parliamentary control, however, have their limitations owing to the peculiarities of the initial stage in the formation of the multiparty political system. The experience of the past few years of efforts to build a representative democracy in Moldova, just as in other FSU countries, for that matter, reveals an apparent trend where factional and narrow corporative interests show visibly in the activities of political parties and organizations represented on higher legislative agencies, which, as a rule, are apt to sacrifice common interests to biased partisan preoccupations. The posturing of an MP depends not so much on the political program of his party or movement as on the current political situation, short-term considerations, and the professional training qualifications and competence of the particular legislator, member of a specific permanent parliamentary committee or commission. An activist stand taken up by a lawmaker in everyday life and politics, and his ability to surmount factional and corporative barriers when approaching problems of interest and significance to the entire nation, which comprise the activities of the Armed Forces, defence provisions, and national security arrangements, can positively impact the making of these or other decisions. This kind of approach to the above problems, alas, remains an exception rather than the rule.

The Moldovan Parliament's operating experience over the past few years has testified to the prevalence of a different, and not the most constructive, approach to lawmaking and to the regulation of activities by society, its individual

members and the state, in the military sphere. Even if legislators' aides and support staff of specific parliamentary commissions include competent experts and military professionals of the new mould, which *per se* is a rarity nowadays, it is the law-makers that have final say and the latter is not always sound. This is one reason why Moldovan MPs do not have any clear interest in the Armed Forces, military reform, and the real conditions in which the army has to operate.

This also explains the ease demonstrated by the first two democratically elected national legislatures in declaring Moldova to be a demilitarised zone and neutral country in oblivion or conscious disregard of the simple fact that neutrality, as a notion and the entirety of relations with the outside world, is related to a state of war, whether „hot“ or „cold.“ Demilitarisation, for its part, does not signify across-the-board disarmament and the destruction of all military stockpiles. None of Parliament's caucuses has, as a rule, bothered to provide any serious substantiation for this stand, or arguments to defend vigorously pacifist attitudes taken to military and army issues.

Pro-NATO or pro-CIS arguments or sympathies of these or other political parties and groups are not particularly relevant in this context, as the matter at issue is purely domestic business: the creation of the Armed Forces in a newly independent state on the basis of an objective assessment of existing and potential threats which the particular society can counter with its own defence potential, and the exercise of democratic control over the armed forces both by civil society and by ruling political forces.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ARMY

In order to evaluate the actual possibilities and operating efficiency of institutions and organisations in civil society in controlling the military, it is important to identify the distinctive features of the establishment of such institutions in the post-communist period. Any totalitarian regime eager to maintain its power seeks to virtually destroy, as quickly as possible, all horizontal links existing within the given community and to subordinate all the strictly demarcated pyramidal structures of the party-state oligarchy, which arbitrarily regulate and practically control the entire life and activity of individuals and their associations from top to bottom. Precisely, these non-vertical bonds among people, independent from the state, constitute in their entirety the civil society, which should serve as a kind of protective screen protecting its members in their relations with the authorities and with the state as a whole and which completely disappears under the terms of a bureaucracy-ridden totalitarian system

Following the complete collapse of the old regime, mass national liberation movements in former Soviet republics, which had opposed the omnipotence of the central government over general democratic programs and slogans, turned before long into political parties and grassroots political organizations, and joined

actively in power struggles. In Moldova, it is the most active part of the population that became involved in political activities. In the meantime, the need to build a civil society was not realized at all for a long time, and its role in democratic changes was and has remained insignificant. Subjective reasons contributing to this included the atrophied sense of civic responsibility and initiative, the absence (lack) of experience and traditions in the self-management of individuals in upholding their interests inherited from the previous system, and the proclivity of the majority of people to exaggerate the role and significance of the state in the life of the community as a whole and individually.

New-wave politicians, not to mention representatives of the old national *nomenklatura* and experienced *apparatchiks* who have managed to keep afloat and even get into leading positions in politics, have realized fairly quickly the need to take the Armed Forces under political control. Social and economic instability and the resulting political instability prompted the ruling circle to treat processes under way in the army, security services, and law-enforcement agencies with special attention, and to control them by appointing tried-and-tested career military officers or civilians to fill key positions. Quite frequently, such qualities as personal devotion and dependability are preferred over professionalism, organizing abilities, and other commendable properties of other candidates during appointments to high offices in these structures.

The limited and indirect influence of the public on the military sphere is exercised through the instrumentality of activities maintained by a small number of non-governmental organizations among which only the Moldovan Euro-Atlantic Centre is purposely engaged in research related to the establishment of the country's national security system, prospects for its participation in multilateral systems for collective and joint security, ways to upgrade the armed forces and other „power structures" and to bring them into line with democratic standards and principles. Indirectly, the same subjects are studied by the *Viitorul* Foundation and the *Perspectiva* National and International Research Centre, which pay special attention to Moldova's foreign policies and to analyses of the international situation at the sub-regional and continental levels.

Most other non-governmental organizations, of which more than 1000 are presently registered in Moldova and, in the vast majority of cases, have been established by members of academic and university circles, cultural professionals, and students, are concerned with matters close to their specific range of interests. Since the state, as a rule, is not interested in and, quite often, is not capable of assisting and supporting nascent structures of a civil society, access to and the possibility of receiving financial and other backing in unfolding their activities as part of international programs is of great help to such organizations in finding their own feet and bearings. Environmental protection, general democratic processes, culture, education, and other humanitarian issues are of priority importance from this standpoint.

The Moldovan Pacifists Organization, which was organized more than eight years ago and which played a positive role in helping to bring about alternative service in the country in the spring of 1991, champions the dismantling of the military and the nation's complete demilitarisation without putting forward any compelling arguments to support this position. Several veterans' organizations, two associations of participants in the armed conflict on the Dniester, and the Afghan war veterans' alliance mostly focus on issues of providing social protection to their members and representing their interests in relations with authorities.

Moldova does not have an independent institute for defence and strategic studies, nor does it have a departmental analytical centre dealing with military and defence policy issues. Individual researchers from the academic community, rallying nowadays round the *Arena Politicii* monthly, periodically has published articles on this subject, but their research does not have a systemic nature and this periodical has been closed because of financial reasons two years ago. The Moldovan media does not, as a rule, show any keen interest in military and defence subjects. The range of issues connected with this sphere and representing a certain interest to the press, as well as to the radio and television, is not too extensive. It is mostly limited to the coverage of reshuffles in the leadership of „power ministries" and subordinate armed units, visits by foreign official military delegations to Moldova, and foreign trips by Moldovan military commanders, commentary on purchases and sales of major batches of armaments and military hardware, on-site reports from military exercises with Moldovan participation as part of the Partnership for Peace programme, and features on peacekeeping services in the security zone on the Dniester.

The print press, as well as the electronic media, offers virtually no comments and reviews on basic aspects of defence policy, the national military doctrine, military budget making, and the use of funds made available to meet defence needs. The almost complete lack of information about the progress of work on a new concept for military reform, which has lasted for nearly one year now, is a vivid example of the existing level of public openness about those military issues, which are potentially of a high interest to the public at large. Reports about the sale of 21 MIG-29 fighters to the US government only surfaced in the press after the aircraft had already left Moldova. This theme has been repeatedly raised in the Moldovan press over recent years and public interest in the commercial transaction has remained at a fairly high level. Paradoxically enough, lawmakers also learnt about the final sale of the fighters from the media rather than from the Defence Ministry officials.

POLITICS AND THE ARMY

At present, due to difficult economic and social conditions, military issues do not represent a priority for most political parties and grassroots political organi-

zations maintaining a high profile on Moldova's political scene. As the multi-party political system gradually came into existence and new democratic bodies of power grew stronger, the attitude towards the Armed Forces changed; Moldova's Popular Front, the (principal) main mass organization opposed to the communist regime and the political force which played the decisive role in ensuring democracy and Moldovan sovereignty in the late '80s and the early '90s, came forward with the idea of making the country into a demilitarised zone and a neutral state. Since the Front has from the very beginning proceeded from the temporary nature of Moldovan statehood which, it believes, should only serve as a transitional phase *en route* to a merger with neighbouring Romania, this status made it possible to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Moldovan territory within the shortest period of time, and explain why it is not necessary for the country to raise its own armed forces. As the correlation of forces on Moldova's political arena changed, especially with the shift of power in February 1994 to the Agrarian Democratic Party, the policy pursued in the military field also underwent changes.

After proclaiming the Republic of Moldova to be neutral and institutionalising this provision in the national Constitution, the ruling agrarian-socialist coalition spoke out for preserving the Armed Forces as an objectively required attribute of Moldovan statehood. The approval of the country's military doctrine by the Parliament in June 1995 was consistent with this attitude to the army, and consolidated the defensive thrust of its development and the enhancement of the nation's military potential. The adopted doctrine lists the main military threats, to which the repelling is what the Moldovan Armed Forces must be competent and are required to do, includes: territorial claims by other countries; attempts of interfering in domestic affairs and destabilising the internal political situation in the country; the deployment of foreign military units on Moldovan territory; subversive activities by splinter organizations aiming to partition the nation's territorial integrity; and the formation of illegal armed units.

Matters related to ensuring national security, including with the use of the Armed Forces, are covered to some extent in policy-making documents of the leading Moldovan political parties. In terms of their attitude towards military issues, these parties and grassroots political organizations can be divided into the following three categories: the first comprises those desiring to consolidate the Moldovan statehood, and view the army not only as its indispensable attribute but also as a real force capable of fending off existing and potential military threats and of ensuring domestic stability in the country. This position is held by the ruling Agrarian Democratic Party, pro-presidential parties and organizations, primarily the movement For Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, before its split off in the Democratic Party and the rest, and the United Social Democratic Party. The second category groups those political organizations regarding the army as nothing more than a means of gradual integration into the common European security system, while, as a rule, rejecting the possibility of Moldova fulfilling

military tasks by making use of its own military. The right-wing parties share this posture in general. The third category is represented by those parties, organisations, and movements which reject the need to maintain Moldova's own armed forces by reason of populist slogans (the use of defence budget resources to meet social needs) or manifestly pro-Russian or pro-Soviet aspirations (the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the *Unitatia* [Unity] movement).

According to the findings of several opinion polls conducted immediately before the commencement of a campaign to elect a new Parliament in 1998, most Moldovan nationals rate military issues, in terms of their significance and interest, among the secondary important issues, while prioritising such problems as timely wage and pension disbursements, medical services, efforts to combat unemployment, price hikes on prime necessities, cuts in real income, the minimum consumer's food money etc. Political parties and organizations participating in general elections are forced, to a certain extent, to take their cue from the pattern of values and expectations of the electorate. This is why both during the run-up to elections and during the polling itself, military issues did not make an important topic addressed in political discussions. Generally, these matters are only addressed in the context of the possible focus of the army or government budget allocations for military needs, with populist parties promising to use the funds to satisfy social needs and develop science and education. As the financial requirements of the army and the Defence Ministry over the recent years have been supplied only partially, the demands assumed by pacifist-minded political groups have been involuntarily met, thus blunting the sharpness of the problem.

Under applicable legislation, military servicemen are entitled to participate in elections at any level, but may not go into or become involved in politics in any form during their service in the Armed Forces. When taking part in an election race, a military serviceman is given time off from the military service. If elected, he must quit the Armed Forces.

From the very beginning of its participation in the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) and also following the Parliament's ratification of the agreement on the country's membership in the CIS in 1994, Moldova has refrained from signing any documents related to military co-operation and the creation of common security structures as part of the community. Notwithstanding this and in accordance with understandings on data exchanges between member countries, Moldova has sent a package of documents concerning its legislation, as well as information regarding its military doctrine and defence policy concept, to the Military Co-operation Headquarters. Moldovan MPs have regularly participated in the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. If the fact that the number and contents of laws governing the military sphere have not undergone any perceptible changes over the past seven years is any indication, model regulations and other forms of joint work within the framework of this inter-parliamentary structure do not make a direct impact on Moldovan lawmaking in the given field.

Moldova has participated in international exchanges of information through OSCE channels, and has been visited by international inspector teams, in accordance with the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe, who made sure that Moldova honours its relevant obligations. After signing the framework document of the Partnership for Peace Program in 1995, Moldova has been closely involved in activities undertaken by participating nations jointly with NATO. Information officially provided by Moldova via international channels is accessible to legislators only if they require access to such data. But the general public is told virtually nothing about the contents of such information.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

The exercise of effective democratic control by the society over the armed forces is a fundamental principle which observance can enable newly-independent nations to use their armies, security services, and law enforcement agencies in strict compliance with their constitutionally designated purposes, and to forestall their arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of the respective countries. The deployment of the military and the use of force exclusively in compliance with the applicable legislation and under the direction of democratically elected leaders and lawfully appointed commanders are only possible topics that would contribute to the compliance with this principle.

The experience gained in this field by the Western democracies indicates that there are no uniform approaches to the accomplishment of these goals and to ensuring that the army occupies an appropriate place in society. The ways and means of securing this kind of control over armed forces are different, and depend on the historical development paths traversed by the respective nations and on the existence and strength of democratic traditions, legislation on the military sphere, and the constitution system in place in a particular country.

US Congressman Charlie Rose, when leading a delegation of his colleagues to the North Atlantic Assembly, wrote that, within most nations, the democratic political control is ensured by a combination of lawmaking, organisation, and approaches; despite this, however, there is no a unique scheme and one can only speak of a number of underlying principles such as: clearly set legislative and constitutional frameworks, a civilian defence minister making sure that the military is subordinate to the incumbent government, competent civilians available to jointly work with the military in defining defence requirements and to come to terms on defence policies and budgets, an obvious distinction made between civilians and the military when it comes to their professional responsibilities, and effective parliamentary control and oversight.

In Moldova, just as in most of the FSU countries with a limited democratic experience of development, which are building their national armed forces from the scratch, it still is too early to speak of any full-value democratic control over

the military. Until a fully-fledged and efficient civil society is restored and there appears a truly free media in Moldova, it will be premature to speak of any civilian control over the army. Efforts should rather be concentrated on ensuring effective political control on the part of democratically elected legislative authorities over the military sphere, with a gradual expansion of the role played by institutions and organizations of the civil society in this field. Proceeding from these considerations, the powers and functions of lawmakers in the exercise of supervision over the Armed Forces, and the enhancement of their role in this process are of extreme significance.

Generally speaking, the Parliament's competence may be defined as including the following tasks: (a) to ensure the complete accountability of the military to the democratically elected national legislature; (b) to exert effective influence on military and defence policy making and armed forces development; (c) to ensure transparency in military policy drafting and implementation and defence budgeting; and (d) to ensure that the military and society as a whole keep a permanent contact.

In Moldova, the Parliament should make full use of its legislatively defined powers to directly influence decision making on defence issues, through active work in the respective standing committees. Even where the Parliament cannot, for some reason, play the leading role in making such decisions, it is in a position to influence this process by preparing relevant reports and holding special hearings.

The country's supreme legislature should also assure the government's accountability in defence policy issues through MPs' close involvement in the planning and approval of governmental expenditures to meet defence needs. Currently, the Defence Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the government play the main role in this kind of planning, while the lawmakers are satisfied with their role of an endorser with the right of veto. A military budget, representing an encapsulated expression of the army's needs and main directions in the armed forces development, enables legislators to influence this aspect of the state's activities by approving these or other expenses items.

Models and practices of oversight over the military sphere turn, of course, on national specifics, the actual separation of different branches of government, and the constitutional powers of the Parliament, the Cabinet, and the presidential staff. Regardless the mechanisms and extent of participation of the legislative authorities in the military sphere, the effectiveness of the political control definitely hinges on the extent to which legislators are informed and competent. While agreeing to the politicians' leading role, the military are entitled to require that those civilians who are involved in decision-making in the military sphere take a responsible approach in performing their duties. Constructive relations between the three main components of democratic political control – the military, the civilians, and MPs – depend primarily on the latter competence, professionalism, and ability to subordinate corporate interests to national interests.

There is no doubt that such a control over the military should not boil down to just making legislation on the military sphere and issuing regulations governing the activities of military entities and the army development. It is a process in which lawmakers have, due to the very nature of the democratic reform, to play the leading role in shaping defence policies and in ensuring a truly democratic political control.

Finally, one of the basic conditions for an effective democratic oversight over the army is the co-operation between legislative and executive authorities, between the Parliament and the Government, between the corresponding parliamentary committees or commissions and the Defence Ministry. The inevitable tensions in the relations among different branches of the government and governmental agencies, due to the parliamentary control, could become, if both sides adopted a competent attitude, a source of creative and responsible addressing of this task, which is a top priority in the context of democratic changes.

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Putin's Near Abroad Policy after September 11

INTRODUCTION

Prior to September 11 Russia's desire to be viewed as an equal partner to the West, expressed in the new Foreign Policy Concept, was patently unrealistic due to its systemic politico-economic weaknesses, and dependence on Western aid and technology.¹ Furthermore, the West perceives Russia as weak and ravaged, using the country's „process of transition" for largely ignoring Russian interests.² President Bush's promotion of National Missile Defense (NMD) and the scrapping of the ABM Treaty further signaled the weakness of Russia's power relative to the US and suggested that „their mutual ties will remain competitive for some time", with co-operation „well nigh impossible in the not-to-distant future" on the issue of tackling trans-national terrorism.³

The events of September 11 have been described variously as a watershed in international relations, a systemic shock to the international system, with Colin Powell stating that it marked, finally, the real end of the Cold War, whilst Richard Holbrooke attributed to it the ending of the post-Cold War era. A key feature of all interpretations of September 11 to World Order paradigms has been its significance in finally and irrevocably integrating Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security.⁴ The war against global terror has been interpreted variously as prompting, providing the pretext or acting as the catalyst for initiating a fundamental strategic realignment of Russian foreign and security policy, anchoring Russia firmly with the West. For some analysts, such realignment is self-evident as Russia plays a critical

¹ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000, <http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm>

² For example, „How Far Can the West Afford to Ignore Russia?" *Conflict Studies Research Center*, Occasional Briefing, July 1999, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/ob69-cjd.htm>

³ M. Ehsan Ahrari, Iran, China, and Russia: The Emerging Anti-US Nexus, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 453-466.

⁴ For a discussion of the significance of September 11, see Viewpoints, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 499-509.

role in the „coalition of the willing" and the joint cooperation in the war against international terrorism, and a warming of Russia – NATO relations, with the expectation that Russia will not oppose Baltic-NATO integration. However, other analysts – particularly those within the Russian Federation, argue that September 11 has not produced a fundamental realignment, but rather the illusion of such a policy. They note that changes in policy are cosmetic, easily reversible and as such September 11 provides a weak foundation for an enduring strategic realignment and partnership.

Has Russia initiated the process of transforming the nature of its relationship with the Euro-Atlantic security order? Or is its current policy Potemkin-like and illusory, projecting a façade that disguises a fundamentally anti-Western Great Power Russian foreign policy? Or rather, has September 11 clarified in the minds of the Russian security elite a foreign and security policy that is characterized by its coherence and the deep rooted acceptance of a pragmatic Russian strategic interest. If so, it would follow that such an interest must be promoted and protected but is not amenable to the simplistic either/or, Slavic/Western, European/Eurasian binary oppositions that dominate traditional interpretations of the Federation.

In order to explore this question, this article charts the impact of September 11 on Russia's foreign and security policy towards the Baltic states and Central Asia. Russia's Baltic policy provides a direct litmus test for Russia's attitude and approach to the fast evolving Euro-Atlantic security order, particularly the issue of NATO enlargement to Russian borders. Russia's approach to Central Asia indicates the extent to which its current co-operative policy is driven by a momentary co-incidence of interest within its traditional sphere of influence or a deep seated and fundamental change in attitude to international security in Eurasia.

Russian State Interests: who are we and what is our path?

The identity of Russian state interests as understood by its power elite has been constantly evolving since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The post-Soviet new Russian state had to re-define its role in the international community in line with its transformed political-ideological, socio-economic and military power. Such a redefinition foundered on the enduring and unresolved question of Russian identity: „who are we and what is our path?" In the early 1990s these interests were poorly defined, reflecting the psychological disorientation of sudden collapse, and the unpredictability that characterized the contemporary security environment.

An illustration of the ambivalence and ambiguity at the heart of Russian foreign and security policy-making has been the dramatic swings and transformations within that policy. Under Kozyrev in the early 1990s Russian foreign policy was orientated towards the West; Russia perceived the West as its principal ideological and political ally, the main source of aid for urgently needed reforms, and

as a model of development.⁵ However, by the mid-1990s such an Atlanticist policy had been replaced by Eurasianist perspectives and paths for Russian modernization – in Primakov’s words: „the special path for Russia.“ Russian policy change was driven by endogenous factors: primarily by its defeat at halting NATO „expansion“ eastwards: „a permanent seed of mistrust, controversy and deadlocks on a broad range of international issues.“⁶ The adoption of an Eurasianist policy raised the fear that Russia’s isolation from the European security system would become consolidated. Such a fear was exacerbated by the election of president Bush and his determination to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty and promote NMD.⁷

Russia’s Eurasianist stance was most clearly demonstrated by its policy towards Central Asia.⁸ Within this region – the heart of Eurasia – Russian long-term interests appear to center on a number of objectives that secure Moscow’s influence over the region. First of all, Moscow desires to maintain political and economic stability in the region and prevent the escalation of inter-state and internal conflicts. The preservation of the various contacts between Russia and the newly independent Central Asian states prevents the creation of a political vacuum that could be filled by forces hostile to Russia. Secondly, Russia is eager to safeguard its economic interests in Central Asia. The region’s industrial and agricultural potential remains an important element of Russian economy. In particular, Kazakhstan is an important commercial partner to Russia, not only because significant ex-Soviet defense industrial and nuclear weapons testing facilities are placed on its territory, but also because of its vast petrol reserves. Thirdly, Russia desires to prevent the spread of the Islamic extremism that potentially endangers Russian security. Fourthly, Moscow wishes to prevent the disruption of communication lines crossing Russia, and access to new transport routes and to oil and gas pipelines oriented to the Far Abroad. In particular, Russia is interested in having access to transport routes through Central Asia to the world market, as well as to retain control over the supply of metals and raw materials from the region. Finally, Moscow desires to ensure the security of the Russian population living in the region. After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the ethnic Russian population in Central Asia was some nine million, or 19.8 percent of the total population. In 1994 some 250,000 Russians left Kazakhstan, the Russian

⁵ Yevgeniy Bazhanov, „Russian Foreign and Security Policy in its Global Dimension“, in Kurt Spillmann and Andreas Wenger, *Russia’s Place in Europe: a Security Debate*, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Bern 1999

⁶ Alexey Arbatov, „Bad For Russia, Bad for the World“, Global Beat, March 3, 1998, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/arbato030398.htm> For a negative assessment of Russo-EU relations in this period, see: Igor Leshoukov, *Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration*, Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C 26, 1998, p.12

⁷ Pavel Podvig, „A History of the ABM Treaty in Russia“, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Policy Memo Series*, 109, Ponars, 2000, p.2

⁸ Meens Singh Roy, „Russia and Central Asia: Problems and Prospects“, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXV, No.3, June 2001

emigration peaking in 1995, and decreasing in the following years, although still remaining fairly high. The new laws on citizenship adopted in newly Central Asian states did not discriminate against the non-indigenous population, offering the possibility of becoming nationalized citizens to all those already resident in the country. However, Russian population felt marginalized, fearing that they have no future in Central Asia.

Although Russia's Baltic policy was heavily influenced by the detritus of empire and the legacy of Sovietization in the early 1990s, by the end of the decade it was largely shaped and was molded by the nature of the relationship between Russia and a fast evolving European and Euro-Atlantic security order.⁹ Although the Euro-Atlantic security order, particularly the issue of NATO enlargement was critical to Russian attitudes to Baltic independence and sovereignty, the points of contention between Russia and the Baltic States reflected the Central Asia agenda: diaspora, energy, sphere of influence, military withdrawals and border ratification. By the late 1990s, particularly with the impact of the systemic shock of August 1998, Russia's Baltic policy was prepared to concentrate much more on geo-economic rather than geopolitical issues. Russia's EU policy began to develop a more substantive profile following the elaboration of the EU's Northern Dimension, and Common Strategy for Russia.¹⁰ By 2001 it was clear that President Putin's attitude towards NATO enlargement was softening. Even before September 11, for example, Putin stated in Helsinki that although Baltic integration into NATO would not increase stability in the Baltic region, such a decision was the sovereign right of any state within the region. Thus, on the eve of September 11 there was a distinct warming in Russo-Baltic relations and as greater willingness for constructive dialogue than at any time since independence in 1991.

Russia's responses to September 11

Russian leaders immediately reacted on the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., President Putin calling an emergency meeting of the power structures 45 minutes after the first hit on the World Trade Center.¹¹ Within a very short time, preventive measures were taken by the ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs, as well as the security apparatus. Security at Russia's nuclear facilities was tightened and flights to USA cancelled. The press spokesman of the Air and Air Defense Forces announced that all flights above Moscow and St. Petersburg were cancelled.¹² Furthermore, air defense forces and combat ships on

⁹ Graeme P. Herd, Russia's Baltic Policy After the Meltdown, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 197-212.

¹⁰ David Gowan, *How the EU Can Help Russia*, (Centre for European Reform, December 2000), pp. 48.

¹¹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Moscow, September 12, 2001. Most references to Russian media sources are taken from the BBC Monitoring Global Newslines (FSU Political and FSU Economic) on-line service

¹² ITAR-TASS, September 11, 2001

the Kola Peninsula, as well as the ground troops in the area, part of the Leningrad Military District, were put on highest alert. The nuclear-powered cruiser 'Petr Velikiy' and the anti-submarine warfare ship „Admiral Chabanenko" were not given permission to return to their base after coming off-watch from the Kursk salvage operation. The following days further measures were taken around Russia.¹³

President Putin was the first leader to condemn the terrorist attacks, pointing out that Russia understood the tragedy of the USA well, being itself a victim of terrorism „this pest of the 21st century".¹⁴ On September 11 and 12 Putin had two telephone conversations with President Bush, discussing the methods and interaction with regard to combating international terrorism.¹⁵ The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs issued his statement a day after the attacks, calling both USA and Russia „to draw lessons from the tragedy in America".¹⁶

On September 12, the Russian State Duma held an emergency meeting of the Duma Council and adopted a statement conveying their condolences to the US citizen and condemning international terrorism.¹⁷ A week later the Duma approved the Resolution on Combating International Terrorism drafted by the lower house committees on international affairs, defense and security. This document contains a proposal for coming forth with an initiative for the creation of an international anti-terrorist centre and a world fund of assistance to the victims of international terrorism. The Duma deputies proposed to the parliaments of the world to work out and sign at the top state level an international convention on fighting terrorism, as well as ensuring its prompt ratification. This convention should include a universal definition of the international terrorism and specific obligations of the signatory states to prevent terrorist acts on national and global scale, as well as to punish their organizers and executors. Furthermore, the Resolution contains the recommendations to the government to take special control over the allocation of funds for the reinforcement of the state border of the Russian Federation, increasing the supplies of troops, agencies and forces engaged in protection of the state border.¹⁸

With the regard to the future of the ABM Treaty, Moscow believes that it would be able to achieve a compromise with the U.S. government in the course of intensive negotiations. Commenting on Russia's position regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty and the possibilities of making a compromise with the USA on this issue President Putin said that „We have a certain platform on which we could reach an agreement on offensive weapons and we could find a common perspective regarding the defensive systems", pointing out that Russia's position on this issue „is rather flexible".¹⁹

¹³ All security organizations in Russia were put on highest alert

¹⁴ ORT, Moscow, September 11, 2001

¹⁵ *Interfax*, September 12, 2001

¹⁶ ITAR-TASS, September 12, 2001

¹⁷ *Russia TV*, September 12, 2001

¹⁸ ITAR-TASS, September 20, 2001

¹⁹ President Putin in an interview with ABC, reproduced by Russian NTV, November 8, 2001

September 11 and Central Asia

The parameters of Russia's interaction with the United States in the military operation in Afghanistan were outlined in the statement of President Putin on September 24, 2001. In particular, Russia will promote active international co-operation between intelligence services, open the air space over Russia for flights by planes carrying humanitarian cargoes into the region, as well as take part in international search and rescue operations. Moscow's vast experience in fighting domestic terrorism, as well as in developing an anti-terrorist program in the CIS could indeed be a useful instrument for closer co-operation with the NATO. On the defence meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels on September 26, 2001, Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Ivanov pointed out that „today...we acknowledge that we must strengthen co-operation as much as possible in this area of combating international terrorism“.²⁰

Despite Russia's support for the U.S. calls for a united front against international terrorism, Moscow appeared to be cautious about the threat of unfavourable geopolitical re-division in Central Asia as a result of the U.S. operation in Afghanistan, in particular of losing its influence within the region. Russia's desire to maintain such influence was clearly expressed on the 11th meeting of the Council of the Chiefs of Security Bodies and Secret Services of the CIS states that took place in the beginning of October in Dushanbe.²¹ In fact, the Dushanbe meeting was called to preclude independent actions by Moscow's Central Asian allies à l'Uzbekistan that has not only provided its air space for U.S. planes, but also offered facilities of its military infrastructure for the troops of the anti-terrorist coalition. In particular, the installation of American radar's and other military equipment on Uzbek territory disrupts the common air defence system of the CIS countries reduced Russia's defence capability and provided a source of concern for Moscow. More importantly, Russia wanted to persuade the Central Asian leaders to act strictly in concert with Moscow in the U.S.-led operation. However, Moscow did not confine its actions to controlling the actions of its allies in the region and established an operational group of Russia's Defence Ministry in Dushanbe that comprises officers of the Defence Ministry, the General Staff and the Emergency Situations Ministry with the task to collect and analyse information on the military and political situation in the region.

Furthermore, the Moscow visit by the Defence Minister of Iran is also viewed as one of the Moscow's energetic activities of maintaining Russia's positions in Central Asia. More importantly, the signature of an agreement on military co-operation with Iran indicates that the Russian leadership intends to continue to protect its own interests in Central Asia, despite its rapprochement with the West.

²⁰ Gilmore, „U.S., NATO, Russia Partner in Terrorism Fight“

²¹ Nikolai Ulyanov, „Kremlin is not going to lose influence on Central Asia“, *The Russian Observer*, <http://www.russianobserver.com/foreign/relations/2001/10/02/1002036251.html>

Iran is one of the strongest geopolitical players in the region, and Russia's influence on it could present a trump card in the hands of President Putin in the game with the West when a new world order is being established.

Thus, two main conclusions can be drawn from Russia's actions. First of all, Moscow's present policy towards central Asia seems to suggest that despite its closer alliance with the West and its willingness to take a new role in the international community, Russia does not intend to give up its interests in Central Asia. However, Putin's failure to exercise an extended control over the foreign policies of the former Soviet republics shows that Russia has to re-think its policy towards the newly independent Central Asian states. Secondly, Russia's co-operation with the West greatly depends of the ability of the latter to make this co-operation attractive for the Russian government.

The question of the post-war political set-up in Afghanistan is directly connected with Russian policy and security considerations in the region, and will certainly have an impact on the relations between Russia and the United States. On the Meeting between Presidents Putin and Bush in Shanghai on October 22, no agreement was achieved between Russia and the US concerning the model of the future Afghan government. The USA suggests to form a new Afghan government with participation of the moderate Taliban members (Taliban-lite) who represent the Afghan majority the Pashtun, arguing that a government formed only by the Northern Alliance that represent the interests of the national minorities the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras would generate new tensions within Afghanistan. However, Russia is against the presence of the Taliban in the new government, pointing out that „the Taliban has compromised itself by cooperating with international terrorist organizations“.²² Moreover, Russia wants to see a centralized system of government with provinces enjoying only a measure of sovereignty, whereas Washington would like to see the northern provinces to be granted maximum autonomy. The reason for Russian desire to see Afghanistan as a centralized state is the fear that the possible tensions in the autonomous northern provinces of Afghanistan could give the USA a good reason to stay in the region.

However, President Putin appears to have difficulties to persuade all interest groups within Russia of the advantages of his new approach towards the United States. In particular, the military in Russia appears to be concerned about the sudden change in Russia's foreign defense policy that ceases to regard the U.S. as an enemy. Russian military experts consider it unlikely that the U.S. military would leave Central Asia after the anti-terrorist action in Afghanistan has been completed, and are concerned about its impact on Russian security and position

²² Surprisingly, Yevgeniy Primakov, a deputy of the Russian Duma appears to suggest that Taliban might well participate in the new Afghan government and point out that „there will be no stability in this country [Afghanistan] and in the Central Asian region, unless a coalition government is set up in Afghanistan which will control the whole territory of this country“; *Izvestia*, October 23, 2001

in the region. At the meeting of the top military command of the armed forces President Putin made two important points concerning his new policy towards the U.S. First, that Russia is not going to have nuclear war with the USA, and therefore does need a minimum of nuclear weapons. Second, the main threat to the country comes not from the West, not from NATO, but from the South. At the same time, Putin stressed out the importance of having a modern, well-equipped army, which means that the money that was used to create nuclear weapons would be used to strengthen general-purpose forces. This tactic shows two important features. The first one is that Putin attempts to achieve support from different political groups by promising them concessions, such as the army reform for the military sector. Second, that Putin places the state interest above those of the different interest groups within the country. This element appears to be new in the Russian politics, and surely will have a long-term effect on the domestic policies. However, there are other groups within Russia that are not pleased with Russian foreign policy, and the question remains to what extent the Russian President will be able to get support from these groups.

September 11 and Baltic Policy:

September 11 appears to have had a profound impact on Russia-Baltic relations, as it has re-engaged the USA and reintegrated it more firmly in the Euro-Atlantic security order. In the USA in particular, three transformations in foreign and security policy are believed to have taken place. Firstly, that the US has shifted decisively from a unilateralist foreign policy towards multilateralism, not least a creation of the coalition of the willing to fight against global terror. Secondly, that the crisis – in the language of the Freedom Consolidation Act – „reaffirmed the need for the Alliance to move decisively forward with the agenda of enlargement“.²³ At a meeting of the heads of states of NATO applicant countries in Sofia on 5 October 2001 Lord Robertson emphasised that September 11 would not slow down NATO enlargement. Thirdly, and most prominently articulated by Secretary Powell, the crisis had created a strategic realignment, the opportunity for new outreach to Russia and had softened Russia’s longstanding opposition to NATO enlargement into the Baltic States.

President Putin himself appeared to indicate at a meeting with Lord Robertson on 2 October that he would not invest political capital to oppose NATO integration of the Baltic states if NATO became primarily a political organisation. Curiously enough, some in Russia even called for the country joining NATO, and linking Russia’s military assistance to the U.S. with article five of the NATO Charter.²⁴ Similarly, Yevgeniy Primakov, the former Russian Prime Minister, does not rule

²³ „Helms and Lieberman Introduce Bipartisan Freedom Consolidation Act“ - NEDB, Thursday 25 October 2001.

²⁴ For example, the speech of Vice Speaker of the Duma Irina Khakamada, Vesti.ru, September 24, 2001

out the possibility of qualitative changes in the relations between Moscow and NATO, and even Russia's entrance in NATO if „this organization becomes more and more political, if it loses the coloring it has now“.²⁵

The Rhetoric of Realignment?

Despite Putin's co-operation with the West in the „war against global terror“, many Russian analysts have disputed such a positive assessment of Russia's transformed attitude towards NATO enlargement in particular and the West in general. Some argued that Russia's co-operation was limited to allowing the US to achieve Russia's Northern Alliance policy. September 11 provided a temporary coincidence of interest, but co-operation was in fact limited and the „watershed“ of September 11 was simply akin to détente in the Soviet period, in that it was easily reversible.²⁶ It provided justification for the „anti-terrorist operation“ in Chechnya and gained western support for Russian entry into the World Trade Organization. The war in Afghanistan and the war against global terrorism were thus considered a fragile basis for building an enduring strategic relationship.

Still a further line of argumentation was highlighted suggesting that the rapprochement was temporary – namely, Russia's desire to extract political payment for co-operation, a geo-political quid pro quo for entering the coalition of the willing rather than exploiting anti-Americanism in the Moslem world. The Institute of USA and Canada Studies Director Sergei Rogov argued: „Here the situation regarding the accession of the Baltic states is much worse. And I do not rule out the possibility of variants, especially if the Americans further bog down in Afghanistan, such a demonstrative act vis a vis Russia by incorporating the Baltic countries into NATO to be protected from Russia, while we are helping them to fight a common enemy in Afghanistan – may be reviewed.“²⁷ *Politika Foundation* President Vyacheslav Nikonov also observed that Russia was, objectively, already contributing more to the USA than any of the NATO allies, except the UK, in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, despite the threats this poses to Russian internal security. Russia is defending the security of the West and this poses the question: what is more important for the US, for the West and for Europe: strategic co-operation with Russia or NATO „expansion“ into Lithuania?²⁸ Aleksei Arbatov, Vice Chairman of the state *Duma* Committee for Defense has stated: „If NATO expands, despite Russia's objections and without taking into account its interests, this will hamper our interaction in the fight against international terrorism.“²⁹ Indeed, a paradox emerged in that the longer the war contin-

²⁵ AVN *Military News Agency Website*, Moscow, October 3, 2001

²⁶ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, 24 October 2001

²⁷ NEDB, Friday 26 October, 2001: Remarks by USA and Canada Studies Institute Director Sergei Rogov.

²⁸ NEDB, Friday 26 October, 2001: Remarks by *Politika Foundation* President Vyacheslav Nikonov.

²⁹ NEDB, 5 October 2001.

ued the more time was available to institutionalize a NATO-Russia relationship based on joint action in collective security type operations, but the more dependent NATO became on Russian support and the more US presence in CIS states antagonized the Russian military-security elite in Russia. In a sense, for some within the Russian elite, September 11 strengthens rather than weakens the logic of their opposition to NATO enlargement.

Konstantin Preobrazhensky noted ingrained Anti-Americanism within the Russian elite, whilst Andrei Ryabov and Andrei Nikolaev warned of the dangers of Putin moving too far ahead of the mainstream „orthodox“ objectives of his national security apparatus and political power base. Here the danger of Putin being perceived as a Gorbachev-type figure of the late 1980s was raised; the Gorbachev syndrome of being feted abroad but hated at home ultimately precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Conclusions: the underlying reality of realignment

The organizing principle for Russian foreign policy is not predicated on the question „is Russia East or West, Eurasian or Atlanticist“, but which alignment best serves Russia’s interests. These interests are defined by President Putin, his national security apparatus and political support base at the apex of the „power vertical“ in the Russian Federation. It appears clear that prior to September 11 President Putin had instigated a „correlation of forces“ type analysis of the opportunities, constraints and dynamics facing Russia in the new century; a pragmatic and strategic re-evaluation of Russia’s future role within the international system.

Prior to September 11 Putin had explored the multi-polar alternatives to the domination of the international system by the US. His trips to North Korea, Cuba and China had convinced him that these states did not provide viable models of development or templates of modernization for the Russian Federation. Russian attempts to use National Missile Defence instrumentally to drive a wedge between European NATO members and the US also proved fruitless – the disengagement of the US from the evolving European security system would not be affected by Russian pressure or diplomacy.

His evocative and stark warnings that Russia was in danger of falling from second world to developing state status caught the attention of analysts when placed in a comparative context. In 1999 Prime Minister Putin had argued that by 2015 Russian GDP might equal that of Guangdong province in China, allowing economists to note that China’s total GDP currently equals that of Japan (2001) and will equal the USA’s by 2010. As President he then noted that even with 8% GDP growth year on year for the next 15 years, Putin noted, Russia would only equal the GDP per capita income of Portugal in the year 2001 (\$12,200). These comparisons only served to highlight the extent to which Russia had been marginalized from the global economy in the 1990s and underscore the fact that Russia no-longer had the economic power base to project a Great Power military-security based foreign policy. Putin appreciated the systemic impact of population

dynamics on Russian internal security and international standing, arguing that Russia was in danger of becoming a „drifting nation“ as the demographic decline began to bite. As US Secretary Powell noted at a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee on 25 October: „it is clear that President Putin understands that Russia’s future primarily lies to the West. That’s the source of technology, it’s the source of capital, it’s the source of debt relief, it’s the source of security.“³⁰

The events of September 11 have allowed President Putin to engineer Russia’s decisive strategic reorientation westwards and he is now attempting to bring the Federation with him. He is likely to do this by constantly reminding his power elite of the gulf between stated policy and the financial, military or institutional capacity to fulfil that policy and corrosive correlation between stated policy preference and the ability of the state to fulfil that policy. An analysis in greater detail of changes to Russia’s Central Asia and Baltic policy helps to delimit the extent to which Russia is now willing to put the rhetoric of strategic realignment above the reality of particular interests. To the extent that Russia is now cutting its foreign policy cloth to suit its pocket, it appears to be playing a stronger suit than NATO. Despite Lord Robertson’s assertion that NATO’s collective security role is „relevant“ in the new century, it is clear that the war in Afghanistan is pursued through a US-led „coalition of the willing“, rather than NATO. The US has conducted the operation in a unilateral manner, without recourse to the cumbersome defence committees and bureaucratic decision-making structure of NATO and the gulf between NATO’s strategic concept and the reality of its present inaction is all the more stark. Has Russia realigned with the West, or the West with Russia?

³⁰ NEDB, Thursday 25 October 2001.

Materials of the International
Conference, July 20-21,
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

*Strategic Assessment of the National Security and
Defence of the Republic of Moldova*

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**Dr. VICTOR GAICIUC,
Brigadier General, The Minister of Defense
of the Republic of Moldova**

The speech given in the international conference

Please allow me to welcome you in this conference room of the United Nations Development Program and thank the organizers of this forum, which will contribute to the discussion and formulation of consultations in the field of security.

The topic of this conference, *Strategic Assessment of National Security and Defense of the Republic of Moldova*, has nowadays a significant importance for the consolidation of the security of our state, as well as for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

I believe that a large-scale mediation of this topic will contribute to a better understanding of the problems in this field, a more adequate acknowledgement of the current security environment, to the resolution of existing problems and prevention of threats that could occur in the future.

The quest for and edification of a new security model for the 21st century is the most complex and stringent challenge the entire European community is facing at present. On one hand, the cooperation and integration processes, more and more intense, substitute largely the antagonisms of the past. On the other hand, we witness many failures. Under such circumstances, it is important for us to be able to face the new challenges, risks and threats against security and stability.

It is difficult to predict the future in such a broad and complex field as the one of security and defense.

Having a special importance for each European country, the process of creation and implementation of national security strategies has a vital significance for the states in transition.

The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new states in this region intensified the confrontations of ethnic, religious, political and territorial nature. These generated such phenomena as separatism, nationalism, extremism, which resulted in emergence of hotbed of conflict in this area.

These phenomena also affected the Republic of Moldova and are reflected in a major crisis materialized in the Transnistrian conflict, still unsolved so far.

Moldova has become a full object of international law, has historical roots and friendship relations with the neighboring countries and the international community and does not consider any state as its enemy. It is a country that defends and accomplishes its national interests in an appropriate manner.

In this context, a major issue for our society is the revision of the security strategy, as well as of the entire defense system and the system of national security.

One cannot doubt the fact that the economic stability and prosperity, as well as attraction of foreign strategic investments depend directly on the general security environment, the security of those investments, on territorial integrity and solution of the Transnistrian conflict, on the quality and efficiency of the national security system.

Regarding the main objectives related to the addressed topic, we could state that the main goal of the military policy of the Republic of Moldova in the assuring the military security of the state is the prevention of wars and armed conflicts through means of international law.

The military policy of the Republic of Moldova is based on the following principles:

– *In the political sphere*: Peaceful resolution of controversies occurred among states and exclusion of military confrontations through collective efforts of the countries, starting from the international law principles and norms, establishment of political, economic and military relationships that exclude threats against sovereignty and independence of the state.

– *In the military sphere*: maintenance of a defense capacity of the state at a level that would assure its military security, strengthening of credibility measures, expansion of mutually advantageous military collaboration based on principles of observance of the sovereignty, independence and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

In order to achieve these priorities at the global, regional and national level, Moldova accomplishes:

– *at the global level* – participation in the activities of the global community concerning prevention of wars and armed conflicts and peaceful resolution of

litigious issues, creation of conditions which, in case of an external military threat, will assure the right of the Republic to assistance from international organizations; active participation in the development of a unique international system of collective security;

- *at the regional level* – establishment of bilateral and multilateral friendship relations with the countries in the region that will assure a higher level of mutual confidence and transparency in the military field, as well as mutual assistance in case of threats against collective security;

- *at the national level* – creation of a military potential sufficient for assuring the military security of the state.

Thus, the priorities, measures and actions of the state in the political and military field include the tendency to fully comply with the duties in strict accordance with the international law, to promote a policy of peace and collaboration at the external level in the system of visions and fundamental documents that identify the tendency of the Republic of Moldova to build a civilized democratic and nonviolent society.

Finally, I would like to wish the participants in this important forum a lot of success and efficiency in the common work of monitoring, analysis and development of an objective vision related to the consolidation of the security of our state, as well as the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

Thank you.

VALENTIN BENIUC,
Associate Professor, Director of the International
Relations and Diplomatic Studies Academy

National Security Dimension and the
Consolidation of the Moldovan State

Approaching the subject of national security, representatives of the academic and political community, experts and consultants in the field, often emphasize only the military aspect, especially taking into consideration the presence of military troops of the Russian Federation in the Eastern districts of Moldova. We consider that at present, the economic, political, socio-psychological and informational security problems dominate over the problems of military security, which will be definitely solved. Consolidation of the state, which eminently implies the strengthening of its security, categorically requires the solution of a series of problems that have become active destabilizing factors, significantly diminishing the efforts undertaken for state consolidation. We are talking about the restructuring of the enormous external debts, revival of the national economy, completion of political institutionalization of the country, including its territorial integrity; solution of the socio-psychological problems, considering the fact that we continue to educate the younger generation in the spirit of alienation from the state and its interests, of intransigence regarding cultural, historical and linguistic peculiarities.

For the younger generation the notions of motherland, patriotism are vaguely defined or do not mean nothing. It is necessary to concentrate our efforts in the eradication of poverty, corruption and criminality and , last but not least, in building an efficient system of education, competition-based recruitment and job placement of personnel and, if you wish, on the degree of availability to honestly serve the country. All programs, practical activities, political, economic and educational concepts, achievements in diverse areas of individual and social activities, all types of interests - individual or group interests- are further to be knowingly directed towards the consolidation of the state. Otherwise, we risk to be further considered an ephemeral and virtual entity. It is clear that at the moment the Republic of Moldova is classified, primarily, as a region facing a lot of political, economical and civilization problems, which outburst will definitely have an im-

pact on the entire European space, and only afterwards considered as a strategic partner. In order to be treated as a serious, promising partner, we should improve the situation in our country. If we are to eloquently demonstrate this hypothesis, we will notice that the surrounding people take seriously an aggressive, sick, hungry and naked man only as long as there is a fear to be aggressed, contaminated or robbed. It is advisable to get to know ourselves better, to be diagnosed in the most serious manner, including with the help of foreign experts and to bring ourselves in order. Otherwise, we will be treated as a problem-country instead of a partner-state.

This set of problems however does not exhaust the tough characteristics of the situation in Moldova. In order to address at least a bit this complex characteristic, we will briefly discuss the essence of the „identity-security” dimension in Moldova’s reality, as well as its foreign policy - the efficiency aspect. Undoubtedly, the state plays the major role in solving the security problems. We cannot speak about national security in the absence of the state, and the latter cannot be taken into consideration if it does not assure its security, based primarily on the imperious desire of the population and of the centers of power to maintain this statehood. Doubting a state sovereignty and its existence, means nothing else but undermining its national security. In this sense, we have to admit the necessity of a „balance of power” system, a unique, rationalized power, the power of the state within certain limits, which represents the main player in international relations. Within a system based on the „balance of power”, the state, within its boundaries, has the sovereign power in relation with members of the society and with the society as a whole. The existence of the state is based on these basic conditions and universal principles.

The will for state consolidation implies the necessity of accepting these new conditions and principles; otherwise, we will be in permanent contradiction with the reality. In addition, we should acknowledge that the state is not only the guarantor of the citizens’ security, but also embodies their identity as political community, consciously and voluntarily formed.

Identity represents the unanimous vote given to the state, to its competences and credentials. It reflects the capability of a community to defend itself, and to sacrifice itself deliberately in the struggle for existence. The absence of these features or their weak expression denotes the absence or bad structuring of this identity. In the Republic of Moldova, community identity is undermined by virtue of the historical past, as well as by the methodical and destructive influence particularly of the political factors and rightwing intellectuals. None of the political actors, economic agents and cultural communities of the world will recognize our entity or identity if we continue to ignore the Moldovan ethnicity, our history, and continuity of development. Identity, regardless its nature, represents not only self-determination of an entity as a political community, but also its external recognition. According to Sincleiter, identity also refers to the quality of member-state of the international community. Under political-ideological aspect, identity also

represents a pretext and sometimes a serious motivation for integration with the European Community, also concerned about the security of identities. In this context, the relation between identity and security is not the expression of an invented dialectics, or of a simple binomial of political categories, but an indisputable reality.

Another complex problem related to consolidation of the state and its security is the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova, which is meant to involve the country in efficient and multiple relations with the foreign countries. In spite of the serious diplomatic efforts made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova for the promotion of the state on the international arena, the image of Moldova and of the Moldovan people becomes more and more altered, helped in this way by the nature of a law of connections between domestic and foreign policies. (Nu inteleg ce-a vrut sa spuna aici.) In this context, the efficiency of the international relations of Moldova is to be accomplished through the improvement of the domestic situation, as well as through diplomatic ingenuity shown by the specific ministries and institutions qualified to take action in international relations. The personnel involved in this process must show a high level of professionalism and true patriotism. The selection of personnel based on these two fundamental qualities, supplemented by adequate financial support, will bring an end to Moldova's currently promoted „begging diplomacy”.

Reality, however, proves that Moldova continues to remain in a stand – by position, incapable to determine clearly the geo-strategic orientation option. On one hand, it is strongly anchored in the historical traditions, in the relationships with the East, particularly with Russia - the Transnistrian conflict and the hope for its settlement with the help of Russia, tying it even more to this decisional sector. In addition, Moldova's economic relations with the East are more clearly defined, easier to conceive and to achieve from the structural perspective of these relations, as well as through the psycho-cultural and linguistic aspect. Moreover, we are not willing to open ourselves to other countries, being afraid that they will get to know us differently from how we wish to be known. We are afraid that they find about us truths that we do not want to unveil. On the other hand, under the pressure of the global political, economical, geographic realities of certain internal and external decision factors, we attempt to launch ourselves in a process, which is difficult to conceive, but also to accomplish – to approach Europe, which itself undergoes a complicated and multidimensional process of political and economic integration. The limited capacity of the Government of the Republic of Moldova to conceive the order of things and to efficiently rule the country, erroneously leads to mechanical implementation of the programs indicated by the European institutions, without taking into consideration the peculiarity of the transitional period and often by disregarding the national interest. Unfortunately, the practice of European integration, especially the economic integration, is already compromised. Thirdly, the East as well as the West is disoriented with respect to the real potential of formation and consolidation of the

Moldovan state. The political messages coming from the Moldovan political groups or from certain native political leaders, as well as those declared by the political groups from Russia and Romania, make this perspective diffuse and unclear. The world countries that have recognized our country, the international organizations that have accepted our membership, but, more importantly, the world public opinion, are not able to understand why the political actors from Moldova, who strive to take the power and the political leadership of the country, are not convinced about the future of the Moldovan state; moreover, they act consciously and unconsciously towards its dissolution. State security and, implicitly, its consolidation depend on the issues of communicational space of the Republic of Moldova. Poor development of mass-media, especially of the national television, excessive commercialization of the national communicational space, as well as the low quality of the broadcast programs and of the publications lacking independence, facilitate the insistent and frequently aggressive penetration of foreign media agents in the communication market of the Republic of Moldova. The country's informational space is segmented in areas of financial and ideological interests, which do not have anything in common with the state interest and with the formation of a public opinion favorable to the state's security. Considering this, we do not plead for an informational re-isolation of Moldova, an impossible and even absurd thing. It is necessary to match the state interests with the structure and functionality of the media relations. The high professional level of the journalists and the principle of observance of the norms of national security provide a basis in this process. Thus, political, economic and cultural traditionalism; the incapability of the Moldovan Government to rule the country according to its national interests; the activity performed by political groups and by local political leaders, as well as by the foreign ones in the direction of undermining the process of state consolidation; poor structuring of identity; the state's foreign policy based on the „begging diplomacy“, as well as the informational vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova lead to the occurrence of a set of problems that directly relate to the state security of the.

**JACK PETRI,
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Defense planning: civilian and military
cooperation

Essay prepared for the „International Workshop
on Democratic Control of Armed Forces
and Security Sector Reform in Moldova,“
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INTRODUCTION

While it is generally agreed that in most NATO countries, there are effective practices of democratic control of defense policy in place, they are not necessarily formally established practices, based on constitutions or laws. They are more likely to be of an informal nature. It must be admitted that for all of our countries, democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) is, ultimately, an ongoing process; it is not something that is ever really completed. I believe it is also generally agreed that for Partner countries, it is better, in this area, not to follow our example of a general lack of formal practices, but rather, to lay out in their legislation, and policy-making apparatus, more formal roles and responsibilities of the players in the national security and defense business. It is quite clear that there is no Western model for civil-military relations (CMR). But at the same time the search goes on for Western standards for effective CMR. Other than in some thoughtful academic works, I have yet to see an official MOD produced set of standards for CMR from any of the NATO countries, with the possible exception of the 3 newest members. Further, I see no inclination or necessity on the part of the 16 NATO countries to formally codify sets of standards. When we look closely into the MODs of countries where CMR works relatively well, understanding that tension is a permanent characteristic of CMR, even in the best of circumstances, we find that success is due to practices, norms, and procedures that have evolved over time, and are now more or less institutionalized. As we get down to the level at which civilian and military staff officers conduct the business

of defense and the armed forces, and which I, for my own convenience, refer to as the 'operational level of CMR,' we can see what some of those practices are.

I'll talk about the difficulty of establishing control over defense planning in the absence of essential management tools; or, in other words, in the absence of a defense planning system. When we speak of control, not only are we talking about aspects such as civilian personnel in key positions in the MODs, and parliamentary oversight, and an effective public debate on issues of national security and defense, but also we want to be talking about the accountability of both civilian and military personnel in the MODs and GSs. Without formal management systems, there is no effective accountability – which by the way is one of the reasons why it takes so long for these systems to really come alive – there is not always a great rush to be accountable.

I'll also be talking about these systems as a medium in which attitudes can be changed in the context of CMR.

First, some discussion of types of systems necessary to support missions assigned to armed forces, and what happens when they are absent, or not enforced, then relating the systems to civil-military cooperation (in many instances there is not even mil to mil cooperation).

And how oversight of defense planning really doesn't work until these systems are in place, and I am speaking of oversight from all levels. If, for example, the GS doesn't effectively employ formal systems for determining requirements, or projecting expenditures, or for how money may be spent, and tracking expenditures, they will not have adequate data for their leaders to use to address the many questions associated with budgeting. And this works its way through the MOD, and up to the parliament, where the tough questions about where the money is going and why, and what the priorities are, and why, need to be asked (and adequately answered), and the need for parliamentarians to be able to draw upon more than just the MODs and GSs for their information. And we need to address the fallacious and counterproductive assumption that good CMR means that civilians tell the military what to do and how to do it, and the military does it.

For the purpose of this essay I'll be referring to the General Staff (GS) as inclusive of the military service headquarters'.

Defense Planning Systems

When we speak of democratic control of defense policy, we are generally referring to control and oversight of the development of policy. More specifically, and importantly, we are referring, usually by implication rather than directly, to not only the development of policy, but also development of the management systems and programs that flow from policy; in effect, the policy tools. And even further, we assume, often incorrectly, that the policies almost automatically result in effective management systems, and that they will actually be implemented in the intended spirit of the policies. Just as strategic documents (National Security Strategies, White Papers, etc.), stating that defense planning and budgeting will

be transparent often do not result in such transparency, policies directing effective budgeting, realistic force structures, rational acquisition systems, or force readiness, often do not reach their goals. One of the primary reasons for this is the lack of the management systems and/or a failure to properly implement or enforce the systems where they exist.

I would like to present a few examples of the systems I am talking about. I think that it is important for our colleagues that are in the transition process to be exposed to these systems, because this is another necessary kind of interoperability. Until similar systems are in place, there will be limited effective interoperability between Partner states and NATO, which is important if that is a nation's goal. It is also of importance for those of us that are working to assist the transition effort. We should know how vital it is for the defense and armed forces establishments to have these kinds of management systems in place, what **doesn't** happen in their absence, and how they serve as a medium for CMR at the operational level. We also have to know that as parliamentarians become better equipped in their oversight responsibilities, defense and the military will find it difficult to respond to increasingly more detailed inquiries, without the solid data these systems provide.

For example, a formal system of requirements determination is one of the fundamental planning systems in any Western armed forces. Force restructuring and modernization really cannot be effective in the absence of a formal means of determining and prioritizing needs. In the next few minutes, it is not my intention to give a lesson on force planning, a key subsidiary of defense planning, but rather to give something of an overview of critical systems that we do not often find effectively operating in nations in transition.

Requirements determination determines existing deficiencies in doctrine, organization, materiel, personnel and training in the current force's ability to successfully execute its missions, and the analysis and identification of alternative means to improve force capability.

This is accomplished through analyses of groups of similar battlefield systems, such as tank killing systems, or air defense systems, command & control, or intelligence systems. The objective is to determine deficiencies, shortcomings, opportunities (such as new technologies that may be used to enhance current systems), and to determine current and future needs that must be satisfied in order to perform missions derived from National Security Strategies. (A critical, and rather common conflict is often evident in this area, whereby the missions are assigned, and the budgets are inadequate to achieve mission capability or readiness, however, this interesting discussion is beyond the scope of my essay, though it certainly bears further attention.)

The analysis of these battlefield systems or mission areas considers such elements as the threat (this requires a realistic threat analysis), review of concepts and doctrine for validity, lessons learned (both our own and others), vulnerabilities, missions, input from major commanders, and technology. Simulations are

widely used in the West as a very useful tool in such a process. The analysis tells us what the needs are. The environment, threat, technology, as well as senior leaders and commanders, are in a constant state of change, which forces military planners to analyze current and future force capabilities, on a virtually continuous basis, and in a methodical way.

When requirements are determined to be in the areas of doctrine, training, leader development or other areas that are mostly the domain of the military, the action is passed to the appropriate GS agency for development. When the requirement is for materiel, either new or to improve current systems, the requirement enters into an acquisition decision-making process. The requirement decision enters an analysis and evaluation phase, involving both MOD and GS planners and leaders, which may result in a decision to create a funding element within the budget. Funding allows programs to be initiated, impacting force modernization.

The acquisition decision system provides the framework to identify and prioritize resources and the management processes necessary to execute senior leadership decisions within resource constraints. The system also provides the structure and information necessary to ensure that decisions faithfully execute national policies and guidance.

Developing experience in such analyses is important; for it provides the insights necessary to improve force capability based a rational process, a process that can be clearly articulated to support the conclusions.

Without systems like this in place the validity of proposed changes or acquisitions are difficult to prioritize and justify, the input to the budget process is flawed, and accountability comes into question.

Budget systems of a cyclical nature, that provide for near to long term planning, and contain programs for major groups on which the budget will be expended, make up a key element of the foundation of any defense planning system. Even for small countries, defense budgeting is a complicated business. It is less complicated for those nations in which the process remains very centralized. In such circumstances, the process is also less effective, less accountable, and certainly less transparent. Without the active involvement of MODs in the budget process, effective oversight is hobbled, or exists in name only. Without the informed input from the GSs, such as formally determined and prioritized requirements, with their justification, a budget system overly centralized at the MOD level will not be effective.

Although hierarchical, defense budgeting has to be a shared effort between MOD and GS. GS planners perform analyses on an ongoing basis, so that new data is constantly entering the system for consideration and analysis, producing recommendations for decision-makers. But this cannot be accomplished in isolation. The system works properly only when there is an interactive relationship between MOD and GS. Interactive cannot be defined as the presentation of uncoordinated decisions from one party to the other, regardless of the direction.

Interactive must be defined as the collaborative effort of defense and GS staff officers, civilian and military. Interactive staff work allows for the MOD planners to be aware of the development of military requirements, as data is analyzed and recommendations are made. MOD planners are then better able to ensure that these developments are in accordance with national security strategies, defense guidance, and budgetary goals and objectives. And it also gives them the opportunity to raise questions and provide MOD level input during the process. Pretty basic one would say, correctly, but also very much lacking in most transition countries.

Even these few paragraphs may be more than you ever wanted to know about Requirements Determination and budgeting, but I think it is important to have an understanding of why these systems are so essential.

They provide more than the rationale for force restructuring or force modernization; they also provide a medium in which we can build more effective CMR. When they are not in place or not enforced, there is a strong likelihood that the wrong requirements may be identified for funding. We have seen over the past 10 years continuous examples of Partner nations funding NATO related activities or purchases, only to find later that due in large part to the absence of formal systems like those I have just described, the funding was misplaced, or that sufficient funding was not available to support the activities they have signed up for, or materiel they have committed to purchase. There are certainly instances where the military have agreed at the outset that the goals can be reached, without having conducted the necessary analysis to support this, but it is also the case where the civilian leadership makes commitments, at times for strictly political purposes, that are beyond the ability of the military to meet. Inevitably, such outcomes lead to a search for the guilty, and increased conflict in CMR, not to mention the unanswered questions about the costs involved in membership in PfP and NATO.

Oversight

My colleague from the DCAF center has raised several issues requiring attention in the parliamentary area. Under the rubric of parliamentary oversight of defense planning and CMR, I would like to take a few minutes to connect some of the parts of this complicated equation.

With increased attention on democratic control of armed forces, and the relationships between civilians and military over the past few years, discussions surrounding the role of parliaments are becoming more practical; but the challenge for parliamentarians of identifying what needs to be known, and how to find out, remains.

The challenge regarding parliamentary oversight of defense and armed forces rests on both, or more specifically on all 3 of the parties: parliaments, MODs, and the GSs. First, those in parliaments responsible for matters concerning defense and the armed forces face a steep learning curve vis-à-vis their oversight respon-

sibilities. Parliamentarians and their staffers must be educated. But in the crush of politics in most countries in transition, the focus on learning about defense and the armed forces is not always a high priority.

What is it in MOD and GS planning that needs approval of parliaments? Quite simply, anything that requires money, the nature, or effectiveness of how planning is done, force capabilities and readiness, and more subtly, the vast area of personnel, from recruiting, through how they are cared for and managed, to retirement. Money is needed for weapons systems, training facilities, operations and maintenance, personnel, and other major categories. Who answers the questions about requirements – only the military? Are more, or new tanks needed? Would it be possible to refit the tanks in the current inventory for less money and still meet the mission needs? What are the life cycle costs of refit versus new tanks? That question may reveal that in the long term, the refitted tank may cost much more in upkeep (maintenance). So it's important to know what the right questions are, and to be able to obtain responses from sources other than the military. In the main, parliaments are looking at budget execution in the context of readiness, for virtually everything the military does orients on readiness, readiness to perform missions deriving from national security strategies.

Experts in MODs and GSs can be of great assistance in the education process of parliamentarians, not only through the formal process of parliamentary committees calling them for formal sessions, but also in the informal process where the defense and military experts are able to interact with parliamentarians and their staffers away from committee rooms, where some of the most important learning occurs, on the part of both groups. But in many countries this kind of a process is not sanctioned by the MODs or GSs, or not demanded by the parliaments, for a number of reasons, the great majority of which are flawed. If the process of democratization continues, parliaments will ultimately learn how to ask the hard questions. The result of a lack of effort on the part of the defense or military establishment to really assist parliaments will cause parliamentarians to take much longer to learn their jobs, and relations between them and the MODs and/or military suffer in the process. So they both lose, at least initially. In the longer term, the MODs or GSs lose the most, in credibility as well as support for their programs.

One of the major benefits for the defense and military leadership in developing a healthy interaction with their parliaments is that it allows them to become informed of developing areas of concerns of parliamentarians and take proactive steps to respond to these concerns.

Formal and informal means of interaction between the defense, or military, and parliaments are accomplished in a variety of successful ways in most NATO nations. There are a number of ways that military experts can contribute to the education of parliamentarians, but in order for this to happen, the parliaments normally have to request it, and the MODs/GSs comply. In many countries there is too little of both.

Even in the best of circumstances, getting answers from the MODs and GSs, alone, is not sufficient. Experts outside of the strict defense and military community must be involved in order to provide outside analyses to parliaments. That is why it is so important for academicians, research organizations and other NGOs, as well as the media, to be involved in a civilian community of defense and military experts. They not only provide alternative views, and with maturity the ability to generate expert data, but also contribute to the education of society on these issues. Initially, the military is very reluctant to have outsiders enter what has been their very exclusive domain, but in time, this outside community becomes diversified, with elements that support, as well as criticize aspects of defense planning.

Finally, as I discussed above, in the absence of formal defense management systems, neither the military nor their civilian counterparts in the MODs will have sufficient tools to build the data necessary to justify their planning, budget and other priorities to parliaments.

COOPERATION

Problems in cooperation between the defense and military establishment and parliaments are usually only part of a more pervasive problem, a lack of cooperation within and between MODs and GSs. Without effective management systems in place that require a continuous flow of analyzed, and coordinated information, and feedback, information is not properly used, and decisions are often flawed. (Any manager or leader knows well how easy it is to make a bad decision, if the available information is flawed.) And it is not that there is an intention on the part of the military to avoid doing their job better; it's just that when there was so little accountability – in the sense we use it in a democracy – the very centralized methods of decision making, a lack of the principle of delegating authority, a tradition of concealing rather than sharing information, or classifying information beyond all reason, were not challenged, because the decisions were not challenged. Finding ways of getting people to work with one other is not, perhaps, the stuff of esoteric discussion, but it is most certainly a major, and fundamental problem to be solved.

Many MODs in transition are not only dealing with this legacy, but the related phenomenon that even when presented with information by one group, a receiving group may elect to do nothing with it. To illustrate, some time ago I was asked by a friend of some years, who was working in a Partner nation MOD, to assist in a high visibility force-downsizing project. I was provided with a draft concept of some 30 pages and asked if it would be possible to review it and comment, by the next day – the document had just been translated. I provided him with several pages of detailed comments and recommendations. In his response he mentioned an incident that he described as common practice. In a meeting with

GS representatives a week earlier, after going over the details of the concept – which the GS personnel had been given almost 2 weeks prior to the meeting – there were almost no comments, and no recommendations at all. Most interesting is that the lion’s share of work on this project would have to be accomplished by the GS.

I spoke with a colleague in the GS, who had been at the meeting, and asked about this lack of involvement. He told me that the position of the GS was that when they were directed by the MOD to implement, they would determine the best way to do so, and therefore there was no need to „waste time“ on the development of the MOD concept.

In defense of the GS, I was also aware of several instances where they had submitted recommendations to the MOD, only to have them ignored. I would like to be able to tell you that these are isolated examples, but they are not.

The results of dysfunctional practices such as this are a failure to develop both policy and plans based on the integrated best thinking of staff officers (regardless of civil or military), and, often, an actual subversion of implementation, resulting in the original and valid goals not being achieved efficiently, and sometimes not at all.

There is a great need to find ways to bring the staffs of MODs and GSs to work between and within their organizations.

I believe that this divisive practice has been below the effective focus of nearly all of the assistance efforts I have seen, not to mention MOD and GS leadership in most transition countries, and has been allowed to continue, and even deteriorate in many countries, for too long. While I understand a reasonable degree of reluctance on the part of NATO to get too deeply into the inner workings of a Partner state, we have to realize that without some leveraged assistance somewhere from the West, many of the countries in transition will not, of their own accord, take this problem on in a serious way.

SUMMARY

In this brief essay, I have focused on defense planning and how the lack of good management systems hobbles the process. I hope I have provided some useful insights into why such systems are so important in the relationships involving MODs/GSs and parliaments, and why it is necessary for parliamentarians to learn about the tools the military requires to be effective managers, and to develop multiple sources of information. Finally, it was my intent to raise the awareness of the real challenge we face in getting civilians and military alike to effectively cooperate with one another in the transition nations, and the role effective management systems can play in fostering improved CMR in defense planning.

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Some factors of the national security
of Moldova and Ukraine: similarities and
differences

The two countries referred to, representing newly established states having arisen as a result of the collapse of the multinational Soviet Empire, share with other former republics of the USSR a number of burdens inherited from their past that threaten their very existence as independent states. To list briefly these negative factors: the economic and social crisis consequent of totally planned, prescribed and state-regulated industrial and agricultural production; the incompetent and easily corruptible leadership, of whom a vast majority were cultivated by the totalitarian communist regime or belonged to the former *nomenklatura*; and disappointed, frustrated, and embittered ordinary people, who often feel some form of nostalgia for the paternalistic role of the state fully responsible for their destiny.

Despite these similarities, each of these countries, just like unhappy families, has its own grievances, sufferings and fears, usually rooted in their historical and recent history. As to the Republic of Moldova, a special place among the latter seems to be occupied by the still acute trauma of bloody conflicts, resulting not only in human and material losses and a displaced population, but also in a particular „post-conflict” public mood unfavorable for decisive steps towards democracy and European integration. As for Ukraine, it has escaped from the often predicted civic war between its western and eastern parts, as well as forceful military attempts to curb separatist movements in Crimea, thus making further developments towards national consolidation less painful – at least theoretically.

Negative factors influencing the fate of post-Soviet states seem to be inevitable for a transition period, especially taking into account the unprecedented cruelty and scale of mass repressions that left entire nations as conquered territories drained of blood or severely devastated. Therefore, one of the main problems faced by the NIS in terms of their national security, apart from more conventional considerations about military, economic, social, and ecological threats, may consist in those undermined human and spiritual resources which are the necessary prerequisite for national rebirth and ensuring further progress towards modern European statehood.

This problem is closely related to the lack of a general „national idea“ – which is widely discussed both in Moldova and Ukraine – something capable to unite the people of those countries in their striving to join the family of well-established European states. In other words, deep internal divides split the societies along the lines of self-identity. In Ukraine, the long-lasting dominance of at first Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Empire resulted in heavy assimilation and Russification of the population, especially in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. Combined with the strong positions of the Communist Party in these regions, which uses skillfully the hardships of the transition period to compromise the very idea of national independence, the mood of the public tends to oppose „Western“ values as something alien and unacceptable, to suspect European and Euro-Atlantic structures and organizations of vicious plans to transform post-Soviet countries into their new exploited colonies, and to regard NATO – for Central European states, the most reliable and desirable prospect against military aggressions – as being the aggressor itself. Inherent in such a paradigm is a trend to join Russia or establish some „Union of Slavonic nations“ which would actually mean the end of Ukrainian independence.

The problem of self-identity in Moldova seems to be an issue too delicate for an outsider to touch, hence it could only be mentioned that the painful split between a separate „Moldovan“ and a common Romanian identity may contribute to internal instability, and thus should be handled with extreme care and caution in order to avoid aggravation of public discontent. Perhaps, the general notion of the prevalence of free self-identity and mutual tolerance might be accepted before more crucial solutions can be found in the future. The lack of such badly-needed tolerance might be illustrated by the case of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which is subordinated to the Bucharest Patriarchate. Successive Moldovan governments refused to register it, claiming that to do so would be to interfere in the internal affairs of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. Its complaint, submitted to the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg was followed by the decision about the admissibility of this case and fixed date of its hearing on 2 October, 2002. A positive verdict of this higher European legal authority, or even better, the compliance with the recommendation of some domestic amicable settlement, would result in a serious step forward towards religious tolerance and at the same time, may diminish a religious factor of influence of the former imperial power over Moldovan Christian believers. Here again, the similarity can be easily observed with the religious situation in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow Patriarchate often plays a role of a politicized force threatening the national security of Ukraine. Recent events related to the visit to Ukraine of Pope John Paul II are a striking illustration of this.

The lack of a united identity often described in terms of a political nation, namely a coherent entity of people considering themselves as citizens of the same country dear to all of them – majority and minorities alike, irrespectively of

their ethnic origin, social status, or religious beliefs – is often perceived as a primary threat to national security. Does it mean that any kind of national or territorial autonomy versus a unified, consolidated unitary state, could – or should – be perceived as a threat to national security? By no means should the answer be in the positive. Whereas national/territorial autonomy is a well-known, fully justified, and in many cases, successful solution for solving modern problems concerning national minorities, in some particular cases, especially during the transition period following the dismantling of multinational empires, certain artificially created autonomies have nothing to do with actual minority rights and mechanisms for their protection. They represent instead the result of successful political manipulation by former imperial rulers, aimed at preserving their influence or even attempting to restore their dominance over former subject. Looking from Ukraine, the self-proclaimed Transdnistrian Republic is a striking illustration of such a situation, presenting by its overt separatist trends thus representing a direct threat to the national security of Moldova. The relief from such a threat might be directly linked to the concrete terms and completeness of the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the territory of Transdnistria. In this context, support provided by the international community for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova is of outmost importance. In particular, a resolution approved by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Commission on Political and Security Affairs on 8 July 2000 should be noted; it stated, *inter alia*, that Russian troops must be withdrawn from the Transdnistrian breakaway region „gradually but completely" by 2002. Therefore, at this point it is a matter of political will of the Moldovan government to observe the timetable of this process.

Here we see a situation quite similar to that concerning the Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol but which presence extends economic, ecological, ideological and political influence over the entire Crimea, threatening to make this autonomous republic an actual outpost of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Potential ethno-political conflict in Crimea instigated by the military and political elite of the neighboring country, though, fortunately not yet reaching the „point of no return," remains one of the most serious threats to the national security of Ukraine. Moreover, taking into account the Crimean Tatar factor, continuing attempts and pressure to make Crimea as „Russian" as possible may represent a real danger not only for Ukraine and its immediate neighbors, and not only for the Black Sea and Caspian region, but for all Europe.

In contrast to the so-called Transdnistrian Republic of Moldova and Autonomous Republic of Crimea – the latter formally legalized but nevertheless remaining a rather odd part of otherwise unitary Ukraine – such a unit of autonomy for the Gagauz does not seem to contradict international law and common practice, thus as a legal solution of the Gagauz problem should not be considered as a threat against the national security of Moldova. Current troubles and difficulties relating, *inter alia*, to implicit or explicit support and sympathy provided by the Gagauz leaders to the rebel separatist Transdnistria, might be, let us hope, of a

temporary nature, and gradually disappear in due course, as the Soviet and post-Soviet generations are replaced by differently minded and oriented people. The latter, having been conscious of their own distinct ethno-cultural identity, might well be fully loyal to their state, recognizing and respecting such an identity. Similarly, if such an awkward structure as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea would be shaped as the national/territorial autonomy of its main indigenous population – the Crimean Tatar people – that would not mean a growing threat to sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine but, quite the opposite, its growing maturity as a democratic state able to provide effective protection to the indigenous people living in the Ukrainian territory not having a kindred state elsewhere.

Moreover, there is a certain similarity in both cases to use such a chance for strengthening the national security of Moldova and Ukraine precisely due to the existence of these particular minorities in their respective territories that are potentially of essential help in establishing closer links of partnership with Turkey. Such a partnership would be an indispensable contribution to the diversification of energy sources (oil and gas supplies) and for diminishing the energy dependence from the Russian sources which current monopoly creates one of the serious threats against national security and also serves as an obstacle to complying with standards established for countries of the European Union.

Therefore, a change of mentality in several spheres, concerning, in particular, internal policy towards minorities and indigenous peoples, is badly needed both in Moldova and Ukraine. Regrettably, the current situation is characterized by the strength of left-wing politicians, who managed to gain such a conclusive victory during the recent parliamentary elections in Moldova, and also continue to hold a strong position in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Being far apart from genuine social democrats in the European vein, they embody the striving for the restoration of the old regime, together with a more immediate threat of bringing both our countries closer to the Russian Federation. And the worst scenario would mean dragging them into the notorious Russian-Belarusian Union. That would mean not only a failure of modern statehood and the end of all hopes for European integration, but also the inevitable internal crisis as far as civil war. Respectively, all steps and measures counterbalancing this dangerous tendency must be welcomed and intensified.

One of the possible directions on this path would be strengthening regional cooperation, in particular within the GUUAM framework. The recent summit of the heads of the GUUAM countries, which took place – after several politically motivated delays – in Yalta, brought about the long-awaited institutionalization of this previously informal association, its transformation into an international organization, and the paving of the foundation for further successful co-operative efforts to jointly overcome numerous difficulties faced by all member states. Further developments and success in implementing the adopted agreements would depend not only from the leaders of the states and official bodies; too much would depend on the emerging civil societies of the newly independent states,

and on their awareness and willingness to support „from below“ the initiatives developed and proposed from above. And unfortunately, actual knowledge about GUUAM and its prospects both in Moldova and Ukraine seem rather poor, far from what is needed for the success of the whole enterprise. Working together, NGOs, mass media, independent experts and other actors would be able to make a remarkable contribution, thus strengthening common civic movements aimed eventually in making these countries full-fledged members of the European community of nations.

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Comparative study of national security:
The cases of Transnistria and North Korea.
What kind of obstacles lay in the way towards
negotiation?

INTRODUCTION:

Settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict is the main problem for Moldova's national security. After the Snegur-Yeltsin agreement for a cease-fire in July 1992, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Transdnistria (PMR) all sat down at the negotiating table but could not easily find concrete ways for a settlement. President Vladimir Voronin negotiated with (PMR „President“) Smirnov about this settlement a two – month term to define the status of Transdnistria inside Moldova. However, this effort also does not progress well. Voronin insists that Moldova has to remain integral as a sovereign state and the status of Transdnistria must not violate the current Moldovan Constitution. On the contrary, Smirnov opposes this status and maintains that Moldova has to be controlled by two (or three) equivalent entities, Moldova, Transdnistria (and Gagauzia). This disagreement in status is an obstacle in the progress of negotiations. We expect that Smirnov, for the time being, will not be willing to change his unyielding attitude to negotiation. In addition, a withdrawal problem is also the main area of concern for Moldova's national security. In Transdnistria, there remains significant unknown weaponry and armament not only in the hands of the Transdnistrian army but also of the former Russian 14th Army. Unfortunately, the withdrawal process of the former Russian 14th Army remains too slow to be finalized by 2002, as it was decided in the OSCE Istanbul Summit. Smirnov insists on the right of control of the former Russian 14th Army and finds OSCE document as illegal. Finally, Smirnov prepares for the next presidential election, and we expect that it could be a possibility to forge a stronger authoritarianism (dictatorship). If so, it will be more difficult for them to reach a peaceful compromise. Because, generally speaking, an authoritarian structure or dictatorship keeps an unyielding attitude to negotiations. A democratic dialogue will be difficult under such circumstances.

On the other hand, we can find some authoritarian governments and dictatorships supported by paramilitary forces within the Far East, including Japan.

From the Japanese national security viewpoint, we cannot ignore the existence of the North Korea, which has developed a missile system to attack the entire Japan, the possibility of developing a nuclear weapon, possibilities of taking Japanese citizens as hostages, and so on. However, a peace treaty has never been concluded between the two countries, leaving few chances to negotiate these problems. After 1992, negotiation between North Korea and Japan started with the Kim Il Sung government, but we cannot see any progress so far. In the recent 10th round of negotiations in 2001, the former Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Kouno and the North Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Pak signed a statement that simply provided: „we try to continue negotiations.“ They did not discuss any specific incident concerning missiles and national security problems.

As a participant from Japan, I would like to compare the case of the Japanese national security in relation with North Korea to that of Moldova and Transdnistria, and make clear the obstacles in negotiation. The main goal of my presentation is to describe, by this comparison, the reasons why it is difficult to negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea and to propose a way to resolve these problems. In my method, I will explain first the basic data and background of the geopolitical locations of North Korea and Transdnistria. And then I will shift to the similarities between Transdnistria and North Korea under the military aspect. From these similarities, I would like finally to make clear the reasons of lack of progress in negotiations.

Background – Geopolitical Location:

Main Actors in Negotiations

- *Korean Peninsula*

During Cold War (USSR, USA, China, Japan) —→ Present (USA, China, Japan)

Under geopolitical aspect, Korea is surrounded by USA, Russia, China, and Japan.

- *Moldova*

1989-1991(USSR) —→ 1992-(Russia, Ukraine, OSCE)

Moldova is located within the Russian sphere of influence

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) is located in the Far East, proximately 40 degrees latitude and 125 degrees east longitude. This territory is about four times larger than Moldova. After the rule of the Japanese Empire, Korea split into North Korea, which is based on communism, and South Korea, which is based on liberal democracy. In 1948, North Korea declared its independence as a sovereign state. In 1950, a war caused by ideological differences between North Korea, supported by China and the USSR, and South Korea, by the USA, broke out. Although after a few years they concluded a cease-fire agreement, most of them believe that „war has not ended.“ Sometimes we can see provocative actions from North Korea. In Transdnistria the conflict between the Popular Front government and the Transdnistrian regional government broke out in 1992. The Transdnistrian movement was strongly supported by the Russian Federation, mainly Russian nationalists in wartime to deter Moldovan

nationalism. Moldova was not directly supported by any foreign country. Compared to the Moldovan situation, the Korean War became a big international war as the Chinese and American forces officially interfered. On the contrary, in the Transdnistrian conflict, Russia or Ukraine might have interfered in this conflict, but I cannot call it precisely an international war. Firstly, Moldova is located in the Russian sphere of strong influence. Due to this Russian sphere, it is difficult for other foreign countries to interfere in its policy. Especially after the Soviet Union split, western countries were afraid to interfere in the Russian policy in the former Soviet space, such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya. Secondly, this root of conflict was created during the Soviet period. Of course, the main Transdnistrian conflict happened after the independence, but small conflicts had happened between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

North Korea is what we call a communist and socialist state, which is based on a dictatorship. Even though they call themselves the „Democratic“ People’s Republic of Korea, this „Democratic“ structure is far from the Japanese or American style. Kim Jong Il, leader of DPRK, holds authority in every area. In addition, his family and relatives occupy the key positions in administration and government. Ordinary people citizens are influenced by strong propaganda, which preaches the legality of this structure. It is inclined to populism. This structure is similar to the Ceausescu dictatorship in Romania. On the contrary, we cannot name Transdnistria (PMR) as a communist state because many capitalists exist there. Private companies operate in the Transdnistrian economy. In 1989-91, Smirnov said that he intended to maintain communist and socialist structures against the Moldovan capitalist class, and was scheduled to join with the USSR. However, after the split of the Soviet Union he changed his mind on his previous intentions. He stated that they would find a way: „It is neither a communist state nor a capitalist one“. From the political viewpoint, this structure is similar to a dictatorship that is based on a communist structure, with structures such as the Supreme Soviet, KGB and others remains.

About 99% of the inhabitants of North Korea are Korean, the population being almost homogeneous. Compared to Moldova, where various ethnic groups exist, and we cannot find ethnical congruence. Ethnic Russian accounts for 13% of the population in Moldova, and 24% in Transdnistria. Russians are a „minority“, according to statistical data, but they have a strong influence in the Moldovan policy and economy; so, we cannot call them a „weak minority.“

Comparison between the Cases of Transdnistria and North Korea:

Viewpoint for Comparison (under a military aspect)

1. Huge Military Strength
2. Dictatorship
3. Military Manufacturing Capacity

For comparison, I must define the framework under which I will analyze the situation between Transdnistria and Moldova and the one between North Korea and Japan. In this chapter I will chose three standpoints regarding the national security. First, let us look at military power. Transdnistria and North Korea both hold significant military power. The Transdnistrian army was founded in 1989. This army's effective force is of about 4,500 soldiers, consisting of units of Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of State Security. In emergency situations, this army can be expanded up to 25,000 people. If we compare this number to the entire population in Transdnistria, about 700,000, we can see that many inhabitants are engaged in the army. It is said that 40% of the population in Tighina (Bender) and Tiraspol are directly and indirectly linked to the army, including retired serviceperson, who value the importance of maintaining the military. In addition, in Transdnistria there are about 1,000 Cossacks and 2,500 members of the former Russian 14th Army. At the same time, Moldova's National Army consists of 82,000 soldiers (population 3.7 million). According to this estimation, the power balance ratio between Moldova and Transdnistria might be 2.2:10 if Cossack and Russian troops were to participate in the War.¹ In North Korea about six million ready soldiers are stationed in military bases. If we add 350,000 persons in the military service, the total effective force reaches about one million. Compared to a population of 21 million, this amount is too big. One million soldiers equal a rank of the 5th position in world. DPRK spends 25-33% of its GDP to maintain its armed forces. Japan has a self-defense military, which consists of the army, navy and air force. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the retention of armed forces. This self-defense army cannot act outside Japan. The Japanese government spends less than 3% of GDP to maintain it.

Secondly, the Transdnistrian government and North Korea were mainly controlled by authoritarianism (dictatorship). Igor Smirnov, who came to Moldova in 1987, was elected as a PMR president in 1991. After five years, which is the term of a presidential mandate, he was elected again. However, nobody knows if this election was practiced in a „usual“ democratic way. According to the Transdnistrian presidential system, its holder has strong powers. This system is easy to turn into a dictatorship. In reality, Smirnov changed the constitution from a two-term limit for president to unlimited. Now he prepares for the 3rd presidential election. If he wins again, he is expected to gain more power in every area. A dictatorship system can easily control the armed forces to protect him. North Korea is based on a dictatorship. Kim Jong Il took office as leader of DPRK after the death of his father in 1995. At the same time, he became a general of North Korean army. His family and relatives occupy important positions. It is expected that his direct descendant will succeed him in his position. This structure behind the army gives them an uncompromising attitude at the international negotiation tables. From

¹ Moldavskiye Vedomosti, 2, 16 May 2001.

what we saw in Hitler's Germany or Franco's Spain, we know that there is no peaceful dictatorship.

Thirdly, they have more potential to make weapons; the capacity of Transdnistria exceeds that of Moldova, and North Korea's exceeds Japan's. During the Soviet period two-thirds of the industry of the MSSR were concentrated in Transdnistria despite the fact that it only boasted 15% of the whole population. This industry consists of steel, agriculture light manufacturing, automotives, and so on. After the conflict, some factories produced light arms, Kalashnikov rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, and rocket launchers. It is possible that some of them have been exported to Abkhazia, Chechnya, and the former Yugoslavian states. North Korea has much potential to develop a missile system and nuclear weapons. In 1998 it conducted a missile test on pretext of a satellite launch. This missile fell in the Pacific Ocean at 60 km far from the Japanese coast, flying over the Japanese territory. This incident proved that the missile system in North Korea progressed quickly. This type of missiles, named the No-Dong, has already been placed in active service. North Korea has developed a missile that has longer range, capable of reaching all of Japan and even parts of the United States. In addition, we fear that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons. Some investigators assess that North Korea has yet to completely develop it but possess two or three prototypes. After negotiation between the US government and DPRK, the experimental tests officially stopped. As a reward, the Japanese government and South Korea invested for the construction of a light water reactor.

Taking these aspects into account, we must hurry to construct a mutual system under international law on the national security standpoint despite not having good relations. In Transdnistria, after the Snegur-Yeltsin agreement, we cannot notice any progress in a mutual structure. As far as North Korea and Japan are concerned, we do not have any diplomatic relations since the former independence in 1948. Why is it difficult to negotiate with them?

Obstacles in Negotiations:

Why is It Difficult to Negotiate with Them?

1. Dictatorship
2. Unyielding Attitude in International Meetings
3. Lack of an Open Information Exchange

What kind of obstacles stand in the way of negotiations? I will name three main obstacles. First, as mentioned above, dictatorship is a main obstacle for the progress of negotiations. This structure becomes an obstacle in methods of democratic settlement.

Secondly, missions hold unyielding positions during international meetings. This point is closely related to the first. In an OSCE meeting in 2000, Alexander Karaman and Valeriy Litskai of the PMR mission, left the room because, they explained, they were infuriated by the attitude of the Moldovan mission. Not only

in this incident but also in other cases, missions and leaders sometimes boycott international meetings. Some researchers were concerned that negotiations might not progress unless missions participate in these discussions. Negotiations between North Korea and Japan started in 1992. After a suspension between 1993 and 1997, negotiations restarted. During meetings, the North Korean side continued to insist on an apology and compensation for World War II. They do not specify in what way and to what extent the Japanese government has to compensate damages. Most of the time during meetings they ended discussing this topic and negotiations could not progress any further. This unyielding attitude is the main obstacle. Transdnistria does not have an international legal standards The OSCE has been trying to instate these standards in the space of the former USSR. An international legal framework will facilitate negotiations.

Finally, I will mention the lack of an open information exchange among nations. In PMR only Transdnistrian newspapers *Pridoniestorbie*, *Dniestrovskaya Pravda* and so on are published. And they have just a few television companies and radio stations. It does not carry and broadcast Chisinau newspapers and mass media. Now president Voronin negotiates for the publication of Chisinau newspapers in PMR. Compared to the situation between Japan and North Korea, inhabitants in Transdnistria have the possibility to listen to Chisinau radio and TV programs. The Chisinau information channel is not closed in reality. In North Korea there is no free broadcast system. Usually, inhabitants do not have much information from outside. Due to the lack of information, they might not have a comparative standpoint. Although the nation starved because of drought, flood and crop failure, we cannot identify any riots or protests inside. This situation will not allow for a reform movement from below.

These three points mainly obstruct smooth negotiations.

CONCLUSION:

In this text, I explained the differences and resemblances under the aspect of national security and obstacles in negotiations. Of course, this comparison is difficult because the case of Moldova and Transdnistria is drastically different from the case of Japan and North Korea in every way. I can say this comparison is kind of trial to think these problems not as regional but as international problems. President Voronin mentioned that he wanted to deal with the Transdnistrian conflict as an internal problem. He hopes that this problem will not become an international one. However, it is too late because foreign mediators – the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and others – have already taken part in the negotiations concerning Transdnistria. Time cannot go back to the past, we have to ponder this problem with foreign mediators

North Korea is a recognized country, recognized by China and Russia, although not a member of the UN. Thus, it is difficult to be compelled to participate in international negotiations. The official position might be a major obstacle

to the progress negotiations. Transdnistria is not a recognized state, except by Abkhazia. If Transdnistria gains recognition, this settlement will go off into the distance.

Basic Data about North Korea (DPRK):

1. Geography and People

Area: 120,540 sq km

Comparative Area: about four times larger than Moldova

Natural Resources: coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnetite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, flourspar, hydropower

Population: 21,234,387 (July 1998 est.)

Life Expectancy at Birth: (total population) 51.32 years

Ethnic Groups: Korean, racially homogeneous

2. Government and Economy

Country Name: (conventional long form) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Government Type: communist state; one-man dictatorship

Independence: 9 September 1948, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Economy: North Korea is based on a socialist economy, with more than 90% of the economy in public hands. Economic growth during the period 1984-88 averaged 2%-3% under the former leader, Kim Il Sung, but its output declined by an average of 4%-5% during 1989-97. Nowadays we can notice an economic decline in North Korea because they had strong economical and technological links with the former USSR, and these links have been severed since the break-up of the USSR. Heavy industry is based on military equipment. According to a 1998 estimation, North Korea spends 25%-33% of its budget on the military. Despite the expansion of irrigation and the use of fertilizers, North Korea is not yet self-sufficient in food production. In addition, a shortage of arable land, several years of poor harvests, systemic inefficiencies, a cumbersome distribution system, and extensive floods in 1995-96 followed by a severe drought in 1997 have resulted in increasingly serious food shortage. After this disaster, the UN, Japan, South Korea, and United States donated food supplies to a large extent, but this shortage has not yet been resolved. After the incident of the test launch missile, this supply was temporarily stopped. Although this shortage continues up to now, DPRK focuses on investing in and expanding its own army. Under the economic and political aspect, North Korea is far from South Korea.

GDP: purchasing power parity—\$21.8 billion (1997 est.)

GDP (Real Growth Rate): -3.7% (1997 est.)

3. Military

Military Branches: Korean People's Army (Army, Navy, Air Force), Civil Security Forces

Military Manpower (Military Age): 18 years of age
Military Manpower Availability: males age 15-49: 585,363 (1999 est.)
Military Manpower Fit for Military Service: males: 352,776 (1999 est.)
Military Manpower Reaching Military Age Annually: males: 178,931 (1999 est.)
Military Expenditures (Actual): \$22.66 billion (1999 est.)
Military Expenditures (Percent of GDP): 25%- 33 % (1998 est.)

4. NoDong-1

	NoDong-1
Date of Development	1993?
Date of Disposition of Missile	1995
Length	15.5 (m)
Diameter	1.3 (m)
Weight	21,000 (kg)
Warhead	Unknown, nuclear?
Guidance System	inertia
Propulsive Force	single
Shooting Range	1000 (km)

5. TaepoDong-1 / -2 (IRBM – Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile)

	TeapoDong-1	TeapoDong-2
Date of Development	1993?	1994?
Date of Disposition of Missile	2000	2004-06
Length	25.0 (m)	32.0 (m)
Diameter	1.3 (m)	2.4 (m)
Weight	27,000 (kg)	60,000 (kg)
Warhead	Unknown, nuclear?	Unknown, nuclear?
Guidance system	inertia	inertia
Propulsive force	two-step	two-step
Shooting range	2000 (km)	3500-6000 (km)

Note: The *Nodong-1*, *Teapodong-1*, and *TeapoDong-2* missiles were produced after the Scud missiles' model that was produced in the former USSR. It is possible to carry nuclear weapon. The US government gave them the name of the places identified by a reconnaissance satellite. *Nodong* is located in north of DPRK and along the Japan Sea. *Teapodong* is about 25km far from *Nodong*. In mid-1980s North Korea developed Scud B and C missiles with a range of 300-500km. This range is enough to reach all of South Korea, but not enough for Japan, a range reached with later development. After 1993, it started to construct a missile launch base in *Nodong* and *Teapodong*. *Nodong-1* missiles, with a range of 1000 km were developed in 1993. This type is capable of reaching South Korea and a part of Japan. Apparently, the *TaepoDong-1* missile was developed in 1994 with a range of 2000-

4500 km. It is possible to attack the entire South Korea, Japan and Guam. In 1995 they launched *Teapodong-1* under the pretext of launching a satellite; the missile fell in the Pacific Ocean at 60 km from the Japanese coast. Nobody was injured by this accident. *Teapodong-1*, we suspect, was developed to reach the range of the entire Japan. *Teapodong-2* is possible to reach a part of Alaska. Of course, their ultimate goal is to develop missiles to reach the entire United States. The US government negotiated with the DPRK about a launch test ban and, officially, the DPRK did not continue the testing program. According to their official statement, they do not have any intention to test long-range missile during negotiations. However, some investigators suspect that the DPRK exports *Teapodong-1* missiles through an unofficial route via Iran and other countries and offer building technique. In turn, they receive experimental data of possibilities of testing missiles after launches in Iran.

NICOLETA MUNTEANU, IPP conflict management expert

Conflicts in Moldova and the Outside World. Comparative Study

INTRODUCTION

Moldova is one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union with around 4.5 million inhabitants of different nationalities and a surface area of 33,700 square kilometres. The independence movements in Moldova emerged in 1989, which resulted in the proclamation and recognition of Moldova as a sovereign state in 1991. The international community perceived Moldova, in terms of adopting democratic reforms, as one of the most successful ex-Soviet republics. Nowadays, the democratisation process is undermined and threatened, and according to the last elections, non-democrats are officially ruling the country. Moldova is perceived by Swedish International Development Agency as the poorest country in Europe, but also as a failed state. One of the reasons of the country's failure is also due to its two domestic conflicts in Gagauzia and Transdniestria. Both conflicts at the moment of emergence had some similar features: they took place at the same time, in the same region and country, with more or less similar initial causes/reasons but with different outcomes. Why did the conflicts take different forms? Why is one of the regions still considered to have a high potentiality of future conflicts? Is it because of the actions of various actors involved, demands of the conflicting parties, the different methods of conflict prevention used, or maybe the international community's role or its absence affected the outcomes? The prevention measures reduced the violence in the Transdniestrian conflict, but why these actions could not or did not fully solve the Transdniestrian conflict, its effects being seen even today after more than nine years of cease-fire?

Both ethnic conflicts are a part of the 21 armed conflicts resulting from the Soviet Union. The absence of ethnic conflicts in Moldova prior to 1989 distinguishes the Transdniestrian and Gagauz from other conflicts, such as the ones in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya. Both cases showed that they started as a response to a „nationalist agenda" promoted by Moldova, and as every conflict, successive response of each party involved amounted to an escalation (Transdniestria) or a diminution of the conflict (Gagauzia). The perception of a

threat over their identity, the mobilisation of forces by parties involved in confronting the perceived threat, lack of time and knowledge for a lucid answer not just prepared the ground for the conflicts but intensified them. What the Moldovans perceived as „patriotism“ was considered as „nationalism“¹ by the non-Moldovans. Democratisation, the pattern that Moldova chose after 1989, on the other hand, does not exclude national unity.

Both conflicts were likely to occur. Moldova, by taking the path of independence and democratisation suddenly and not gradually, created favourable grounds for generating ethnic tensions due to a lack of historical legacy as a democratic society, disorganised institutional arrangements, and economic weakness. Besides, the Moldovan legislative and executive bodies were too weak to keep the different ethnicities out of military clashes, and were hardly able to ensure the security of individuals. Concerning the character of conflicts, the Gagauz conflict may be considered ethnic in nature, while the Transdniestrian was rather political and ideological, with a struggle of different groups and parties for power. The importance of the violent conflict that erupted in Transdniestria is that it produced a „dizzying array of new political arrangements“ that changed the geopolitical environment, and is associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Defining Armed Conflicts

To define the conflicts in Moldova I have used several terms such as intra-state, ethnic, and minor armed conflicts. According to Brown, an intra-state conflict is an „ethnic conflict“ which is not necessarily „ethnic in character.“ This is a conflict arising between two or more ethnic communities on matters concerning politics, economy, society, culture or territory.² The ethnic conflicts range from involving little or no violence to „full-scale military hostilities“ and before they are defined as conflicts, they start as domestic disputes sometimes emerging into interstate conflicts when outside powers become involved.³ In scientific literature they are also known as domestic conflicts.

Tishkov defines ethnic conflict as „any form of civic clash within or across state boundaries when, at least, one of the warring parties is mobilised and

¹ The purpose of the paper was neither to define nor to explain whether or not this was a nationalistic movement. More on nationalism can be found in Anthony Smith, „The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,“ Jack Snyder, „Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State“, Pierre Hassner, „Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order“ in Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, 1993). About aspects of nationalism in Moldovan conflicts consult O'Loughlin, Kolossov and Tchepalyga „National Construction, Territorial Separatism and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic“ in *The Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* (V.H. Winston & Son, 1998, 39, No. 6).

² Anthony Smith defined ethnic communities and its characteristics in „The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism“ in Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, 1993).

³ Michael Brown, „Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts“ in Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, 1993), pg. 4.

organised along ethnic lines or on behalf of a certain ethnic group."⁴ According to him, the ethnic conflicts in the space of the former Soviet Union can be classified in (1) long-term violent conflicts; (2) short-term violent clashes, with disorganised primary parties and mass violence; and (3) non-violent conflicts with ethnic, political and religions confrontations or tensions.

A violent conflict is „an armed conflict which implies a contested incompatibility" over government (or political power) and/or territory (power over land) between at least two parties.⁵ The parties, or actors involved can be a state/government that holds the legitimate rights in the country, and non-state parties, in opposition to the government. Non-state parties can be political parties, movements, any organizations or alliances of opposition that „announced a name for their group and use armed forces."⁶ The outcomes of conflict can be peaceful reconciliation, peaceful separation, or war⁷ with refugees, arms and soldiers and civilian death. Based on this definition, conflicts range from low-intensity to major armed conflicts.

The ethnic conflicts depend on the choices adopted by the belligerent parties in opposition to the state. This influences not only the ethnic policy of the region, but also the settlement techniques of the conflicts:

I. „cultural revivalism" is the interest of a minority group without statehood or with limited experience as a sovereign state to rebuild their identity through the „re-adoption" of cultural and historical values;

⁴ Ruslan Nozdreakov uses Tishkov's definition in his Masters Thesis "The Policy of the Russian Federal Government Towards the Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Caucasus," (Uppsala University, 2000).

⁵ Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Solenberg "Armed Conflicts, 1989-99" in *States in Armed Conflicts* 1999, Report 55 (Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, 2000) pp. 20- 22.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ According to the definitions presented by Brown (1993), ethnic reconciliation would mean a peaceful resolution of the existing ethnical issues, posing few problems for outside powers, through negotiations that may also involve constitutional arrangements, which would "address specific concerns and grievances" without any violence. An example of such ethnic reconciliation is the granting of more autonomy to the Catalans, Galicians and Basques in Spain, or autonomy to the Quebec province in Canada. Ethnic separation ("velvet divorce") is an agreement of living apart of the existing parties. A major role is played again by the international community, or outside powers that shall make the right decisions at the right time for violent conflicts to not erupt. Examples of such peaceful separation are the break-up of the Soviet Union, or the division of Czechoslovakia into separate independent republics. Ethnic wars are the violent ethnic disputes between the antagonistic ethnic groups who "are not able to agree on new constitutional arrangements or a peaceful separation." The demands of the rebellions might vary from case to case from seceding and/or establishing independent states, creation of independent states within a confederation, an independent political entity within a federal state, or just more political, cultural, or administrative autonomy within the existing state. If the international status quo is unchanged, or if there are no direct effects on the international community, then it is likely that it will not interfere into the domestic affairs of the country.

2. „political autonomy“ is specific to more organised ethnicities, supported by a majority living in a neighbouring country, fighting mainly for more political rights;

3. „territorial self-determinism“ is specific for a larger ethnic group, living on compact territories in a large majority fighting for the independence of this territory or for a more independent status as a part of federation or confederation;

4. „separatism“ has the characteristic for „ethnically and compact populations, usually with some history or statehood, who openly oppose the inclusion in the existing federal or unitary state;“

5. „irredentism“ is a separatist action towards unification to a neighbouring country either as a separate administrative unit or an autonomous region.⁸

Wallensteen and Solenberg define three types of armed conflicts. Transdnjestria is listed as a minor armed conflict, while Gagauzia is not listed at all. According to them, a minor armed conflict is a conflict where „the number of battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict is below 1,000.“ This type of conflict is different from an intermediate armed conflict, „with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 in a particular year“ or war or with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during a particular year. The last two in these categories can fit into the category of major armed conflict that implies the use of armed force between the military agencies of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organised armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year with the issue concerning the control over government and/or territory. Major armed conflicts constitute the larger majority of conflicts; two-thirds of the armed conflicts recorded in 1998.

The conflict in Transdnjestria had a bigger impact in the international literature of peace and conflict studies compared to the conflict in Gagauzia, and was listed in the States of Armed Conflicts published in SIPRI Annual Book of 2000. The same publication states that, between 1998 and 1999, there have been 110 armed conflicts in 73 locations around the world. Out of them, 37 were active in 28 places in 1999. Only in 1992 and 1993 the incidence of intensive conflict was higher. The number of wars doubled in 1998, after a marked decrease that had also started in 1992. Most wars took place in Africa.

According to the same source, seven conflicts were interstate conflicts. New armed conflicts emerged in 1999 in Russia (Daghestan) and Ethiopia (Oromiya). Four conflicts re-escalated in: Russia (Chechnya), Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines and Ethiopia (Somalia). Only six conflicts listed in 1998 were not longer active: United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Egypt, Cambodia, Tajikistan, Lesotho, and Indonesia (East Timor). Most of the conflicts were intrastate, like the ones in Moldova. Foreign interventions were recorded in Congo and Yugoslavia. It is also very interesting to note that a peace agreement was the least common type

⁸ Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: a Guide to Nationality Politics, Organisations and Parties* (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, M.E. Sharpe, 1995) pp. xxii-xxiii.

of conflict termination in 1989-99.⁹ A deficiency of this publication is that it does not analyze the causes of escalation, re-escalation or termination of conflicts.

Introducing Conflict Prevention Theory

As studies show, the difficulty of reaching a peaceful reconciliation or separation is proven by the fact that only 20 per cent out of all conflicts terminated in peace agreements, while 60 per cent still continue to be active.¹⁰ Peter Wallensteen would argue that some conflicts do not develop to a higher level of intensity for reasons such as limited resources of parties, low support, or ways „preventive actions of the internal and external actors“ are used.¹¹

These preventative actions are the preventative interventions that constitute the basis for preventative diplomacy. Thus, preventative diplomacy is a set of „constructive actions undertaken to avoid potential threats, use of diffusion of armed force by parties in a political dispute.“¹² Preventative diplomacy helps, if properly applied, to overcome present and/or potential conflicts, ensuring security through „proactive, co-operative, long-term“ approaches. There are two situations covered by preventative diplomacy:

1. Political disputes that might lead to their escalation into conflicts with use of armed forces;
2. Already existing conflicts that might develop into higher intensity ones.

In the first case the preventative diplomacy measures focus on reducing the tensions so they do not escalate into conflicts, while in the second case the preventative actions focus on decreasing the violence in the already ensuing armed conflicts with the objective of ending them. Margaretha af Ugglas identifies four situations when the preventative diplomacy measures should be used:

1. To prevent disputes from arising between parties;
2. To prevent disputes from developing into conflicts;
3. To eliminate conflicts when they occur;
4. To contain and limit the spread of those conflicts not amenable to swift elimination.¹³

There is not a unique recipe for preventative diplomacy. Preventative measures vary on a case-to-case basis, depending on the incompatibility, time frame,

⁹ From the website <http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/MajorArmedConflicts.html>, a report of all armed conflicts is published by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, further published in the SIPRI Annual Book in 1988

¹⁰ Wallensteen and Solenberg (2000), pg. 12.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Peter Wallensteen, „Preventive security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts“ in Peter Wallensteen, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Records and Future Challenges* (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998) pg. 11.

¹³ Margaretha af Ugglas, „Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy“ in *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994) pg. 12.

parties involved, etc. Still, guidelines incorporated in the typology of conflict prevention are established and can be undertaken and used accordingly. The two types of conflict prevention are: *structural conflict prevention* (SCP) and *direct conflict prevention* (DCP).

The table* below shows the differences between them:

	SCP	DCP
Results	in the long-run	in the short-run
Aims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to establish constructive future relationships among the groups in conflict • to build a „better society“ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to avoid and manage if already created an immediate conflict • to stop violence and killing
Issues addressed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • democracy, good governance • international norms, tribunals • expansion of networks and organisations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflict early warning systems • a nearing particular crisis
Approach	structural	operational

* Peter Wallensteen

A moderation of a conflict is to create very good conditions to preventing serious tensions from developing into real conflicts. Or, as Eliason states, „war should not be fought, war should be averted.“¹⁴ De Nevers suggests that a good solution undertaken by the local government is the creation of a good political environment, by structuring the „electoral system of the state so that most political parties and mainstream politicians cannot perceive a political advantage in adopting extremist positions on ethnic issues.“¹⁵ Also, in a case when ethnic tensions have already started and become violent, there is not too much that can be done until the conflicts spent themselves, exception being the windows of opportunities that politicians might use for promoting a favourable political climate of moderation and negotiation.¹⁶ However, this can happen only when the parties in conflict are weak and/or when they understand that further violence will worsen their existing positions. Thus, the parties in conflict may use extreme policies, from denying the ethnicity in conflict (by extermination, expulsion or forced migration) to the set-up of federal arrangements (federation or confederation) by partitioning the state and changing its existing boundaries. Democratic

¹⁴ Jan Eliason and Robert Rydberg, „Preventive Action and Preventive Diplomacy“ in Wallensteen (1998). pg. 39.

¹⁵ Renee de Nevers, „Democratization and Ethnic Conflicts“ in *Ethnic Conflicts and International Security* (Princeton University Press, 1993) pg. 63.

¹⁶ *ibid*, pp.61-76.

countries promote the negotiation tools that would engage in dialogue all relevant groups able to solve the conflicts, including the ethnic leadership.

Brown would probably argue that since civilian slaughter is not tolerated and it is „morally diminishing" when the civilians are attacked not just indiscriminately but deliberately and systematically, the international community has a moral obligation and a legal right to intervene with this being a violation of international norms and behaviour.¹⁷ The importance of suppressing a war became a priority for the UN, while the „UN Charter imposes an obligation on Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means."¹⁸ Generally „it is always better for the international community to be present in however limited capacity and in whatever form, than not to be in place at all."¹⁹

The conflict prevention theory relies on rules/techniques to be followed that have been established as a consequence of successes or failures of previous conflicts. These techniques are listed in the Appendix as positive and negative lessons. The other key factors to successful preventive diplomacy have been defined by Margaretha af Ugglas. They are:

- The degree of political support from the parties concerned;
- The prudent selection of political and diplomatic instruments to be applied;
- The careful balance between public and quiet diplomacy;
- The adoption of a long-term approach;
- The extent of co-operation with other international organisations.²⁰

Some discourse analysis

What explains the different outcomes of the two conflicts? As we have seen, the causes of the conflicts were the same and the level of the country's democratisation at their emergence stage was in both cases the same. However, the size and powers of various actors/parties in conflict, the ethnic communities of the previous regime and their role in the decision-making process, the presence or absence of the external direct or indirect actors and the level of their involvement into the conflicts further determined whether the conflict prevention measures could have been mitigating or exacerbating the ethnic tensions. The settlement depends greatly not only on the action of the central government, but also on the choices of the ethnic leadership and the involvement of international community and neighbouring countries. The preventative measures employed played an important role but management/monitoring techniques of the conflict

¹⁷ Brown (Princeton) pg. 17.

¹⁸ Eliasson and Rydberg (1998) pg. 39.

¹⁹ Peter Wallensteen, "Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts" in Wallensteen (1998) pg. 31.

²⁰ Af Ugglas (1994) pp.13-14.

played a much more significant role. The preventative diplomacy applied mostly by Moldova was rather to stop the conflict from escalating into a major one, but not to prevent a tension from becoming a conflict. However there are lessons that could be learned from this in terms of both conflict prevention and management measures²¹.

The two cases showed that the preventative measures in settling conflicts should be different, regardless their similarities. While preventative diplomacy aims at conflict resolution – that is, to end a conflict – it is most likely that not all conflicts end as planned. For better results, prevention diplomacy incorporates conflict management techniques, meaning that these two aspects should not exclude each other. The approach presented by Wallensteen on preventative diplomacy as a series of techniques and effective measures based on negative and positive lessons is very theoretical. Efficient conflict prevention measures require the potential conflict to be detected in time. However, as it was proven, it is not easy to detect and predict the escalation of conflicts. Besides, each tension requires special attention and needs to be examined carefully and prevented before it becomes a conflict. If the conflict has already started, then preventative diplomacy is weak against an escalated war.

In terms of preventative measures used by the pro-democratic and anti-Communist Moldova in 1989-1992, some attempts in preventing and further settling the conflicts succeeded. Unfortunately, during early stages of the conflict Moldova hardly accepted any type of compromises, including coalition-building that would have contributed to the non-alienation of minorities from the democratic mainstream of the country. Its resentment, antipathy and ignorance towards Russian and Gagauz minorities were largely linked to the former domination of the Russian minority and affiliation of both minorities to the Communist Party. Instead of creating a foundation for co-operation and settlement of the disputes, the opposition forces intensified them, which lead to armed conflicts. One of the major mistakes of the Moldovan government is that at the early stage it addressed only the political wishes of the majority of population and only some time later the wishes of the minorities, with the consequence being minorities ended up taking extremist positions. The leadership in opposition to the Communist Party did not include the leaders of the ethnic groups. After all, the leaders of the ethnic groups were extremists rather than moderates. Moderation in this contest would mean support for negotiated settlements within the democratisation process, but also serves an avoidance of hostility vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. As a preventive technique, the Moldovan government could have used mass-media tools in calling for civil responsibility.

In preventing its conflicts Moldova used both structural and direct conflict prevention strategies with long and short-term results. We cannot say that they did not work, but they would have been more effective if used at the right

²¹ See Appendix I for the list of positive and negative lessons

moment. If the settlement of the Gagauz conflict can be considered more as a result of bilateral discussions and negotiations than the Transdniestrian conflict, which is a modern one, and, consequently, was difficult to evaluate and predict; this is why it should be examined through the prism of the actions of all relevant internal and external parties. Both Gagauzia and Transdniestria have been granted autonomy. In both cases the willingness to grant regional autonomy led to a decrease in violence. Moldova was more concerned with keeping its integrity than in secession.

From the other perspective, the international community required a gradual peaceful settlement rather than the use of drastic measures. Moldova thus could not confront this situation, especially since it depended largely on credits from the World Bank and IMF. It is not a secret that while negotiating a credit with Moldova, these international financial organisations often set various so-called „democratic“ conditions; thus, Moldova was not able to use any type of economic or political sanctions against the Transdniestrian rebels.

Also due for criticism is the intervention of the international community in certain situations, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction. Even if they were not used in any of these cases, a higher chance of them being used was in Transdniestria. This territory was open to any illegal operations, which meant no control over weapons, either chemical or nuclear. From another perspective, the Cossacks from Ukraine and the illegal traffic of weapons of mass destruction from Ukraine should also not be excluded. Gagauzia did not pose any threat from this perspective due to its close ties with Turkey. The Turkish government would not be interested in undermining its reputation with the international community by supplying Gagauzia with any kind of weapons.

If we analyse the empirical data and dynamics of the two conflicts, the international community became involved only much later, and the international „authorities“ were not even present at the time the conflicts escalated. There were already enough political forecasts before 1989, after the Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* that these would lead to some ethnic tensions in the already weakening Soviet Union; however, the international community chose to ignore this fact and took the „non-intervention“ approach. The argument of the international community that „it was not ready“ is not relevant. How could the international intervention otherwise be explained in the Baltic states? There can be only two explanations: either that the cases were not considered of a great importance and of any interest for the international community, or that these regions are under the Russian sphere of influence and the international community has no interest in interfering in its so-called „domestic issues.“ The international community could have considered Moldova as a good possibility for the West to penetrate and weaken the Russian empire, however this was probably not the case, since until December 1989 Romania, Moldova's neighbouring country, was still under the Ceausescu regime and it was unlikely that Western society could penetrate Russian domains by passing over another communist country. This was

possible only in 1990, but Moldova was too small and uninteresting for the international community, which changed its focus from the former Soviet Union area towards Romania and other Central and Eastern European states.

The Transdniestrian conflict received more support than the Gagauz one from international organizations. The CSCE/OSCE played a major role in settling the conflict, though not in preventing it – which is its main task, although this should be attributed to the Russian troops attacks on the civilian population. Since the case of Gagauzia did not really involve massive military aggressions on the civilian population (if we do not consider the occasional violent clashes between the Moldovans and Gagauz living on that territory), the international community did not consider its involvement necessary in the respective case.

It is important to note the different outcomes because of the involvement or non-involvement approach of the kindred countries. Russia strongly interfered in Transdniestria, where the Russian ethnic minorities were residing. Its intervention in Gagauzia was much lower and used only for distracting attention and weakening purposes of Moldova on the Transdniestrian case. If the high involvement of the kindred country, Russia, in one case was detrimental, the low involvement of Turkey, in another case, was beneficial. So it depended largely on the policy the kindred country adopts.

The ethnic leaderships played an important role, not so much in preventing the conflicts but in managing them. However, one does not have to expect too many positive reactions from the belligerent anti-democratic parties. Transdniestrian leaders, still receiving large support from Russia for their hostile anti-government actions and being strongly reinforced by it, continue to request secession up to the present. Besides, the Transdniestrian territory where the military operations took place is larger than the territory of Gagauzia, both in terms of inhabitants and size. It is more economically autonomous and viable, as well as better equipped militarily. The choices of ethnical leaders whether to pursue a cease-fire or not largely depends on these factors also.

As a **conclusion**, taking into consideration the theoretical framework, I shall mention that the preventative diplomacy measures should be revised and modified. It is important not just to prevent but also to monitor and manage the situation, whether there is a conflict or not. As it was seen, the consequences of the conflicts have been disastrous, weakening the economic performance, decreasing social and living standards of population, and contributing to the rise of poverty and corruption in the regions of conflict as well as in the entire country. The political and economic stagnation led to a weak rule of law and a weak civil society, low education and income, inaccessibility to health care and other services provided, altogether placing the country at the bottom part of the list of the poorest countries in Europe. The three state formations, lacking a border on the east, made it easy for criminality to develop, thus increasing illegal operations and the shadow economy. It is obvious that the local ethnic leadership, as well as the Moldovan administration lack the skills and the mechanisms

to prevent the conflicts as well as to manage and maybe resolve them; however there is no excuse that the role of the international community is so low. The role of the OSCE as a conflict prevention organisation as well as of other organisations should increase in such armed conflicts, since they can endanger the situation not only in the region but also all over Europe.

APPENDIX

14 Negative and Positive Lessons of Preventative Diplomacy

Negative:

1. Avoid making a case a precedent, otherwise action in one case may tie the international community in another, similar conflict later.
2. Avoid „mission creep“: stick to a set goal, do not change it unnecessarily.
3. Make any larger action clearly confined in time, no „for-ever missions“ and elections is a good ending point.
4. Make sure that there is financial basis secured for any larger operation before acting.
5. In case of a peace operation, make sure there is a „unified command.“
6. Focus whenever possible on humanitarian assistance for larger operations, preferably through NGOs and keep direct conflict prevention to a separate political process.
7. Whenever possible use other organizations than the UN.

Positive:

1. Act as early as possible, preferably even before a triggering event has taken place.
2. Act swiftly, with knowledge and purposefulness.
3. Use diplomatic means and rewards at the early stage of a conflict, reserve other means for later stages.
4. Have the support of regionally strong actors, but do not necessarily act through them.
5. Reward the local leaders that display moderation, avoid rewarding the others.
6. Use the established institutions, although they may be questionable.
7. Select situations and times where success can be expected for preventative diplomacy instruments, find other means for other situations.

OCTAVIAN SOFRANSKY, **European Centre in Moldova, Chairman**

Moldovenisation: search for national identity or an explosive political compromise

The intention of the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin to rewrite the country's history books provoked a wave of public discontent and disapproval. The governing Communist Party saw the currently taught, „History of Romanians" inappropriate for Moldovan pupils and announced that „it is time to learn the history of our state and of the land where we live," as Mishin, the ethnic Russian vice-chairman of the Parliament was quoted as saying. The rewriting of history was entrusted to Vladimir Taranov, a fervent promoter of the theory of a Moldovan ethnic nation, vehemently contested by opponents as a Stalinist identity engineering project.

As long as the Communists hold a constitutional majority in the Parliament, won in the February 2001 elections, they can, in principle, enact any legislation they want without the consent of the opposition. However, this identity politics matter is likely to meet harsh opposition and even unrest if it is implemented in an authoritarian manner, a method which the Communists master best.

There are two visions of history in Moldova. According to Russian and Soviet historians, to which school Taranov belongs, „Moldovan ethnicity" evolved as a mix of Latin and Slavic „blood" and „culture", while „Moldovan statehood" flourished only under Soviet authority. The other view that prevailed after 1991 proclamation of independence, is that Moldovans belong to the ethno-cultural group of Romanians, while the establishment of Soviet Moldova in 1940 by Stalin was nothing else but the expansion of the Russian Empire; in addition, the imposing of the Cyrillic alphabet and Moldovan „ethnic identity" was violent and inappropriate. According to the first view, Bessarabia (as the region was known before the war) was „occupied" by Romania after the Russian revolution and „liberated" by the Red Army in 1940; at the same time, the other school of thinking sees the Soviet Union as the „occupant" of the Eastern Romania and the Republic of Moldova as „the second Romanian state."

Today, Moldovenization is promoted by the Communists in their bid to strengthen Moldovan statehood and a sense of common identity. However, nowadays

Moldovan Communists have no clear cultural or ethnic orientation. Although the „father of Moldovan nation“ was Stalin, who created the Autonomous Moldovan Republic in 1924, it is Lenin’s statue that they promise to re-erect in the main square of Chisinau. Although Stefan cel Mare, a medieval king of Moldova, looks up from every Moldovan banknote, none of the Communist leaders of the country took part in his anniversary celebration last week [date?] Aici trebuie concretizata data. On one hand, Moldovan Communists shout their intention to make Russian the second official language in the country, proving that for them that Moldove-nization goes hand in hand with Russification. On the other hand, Moldovan Communists are exhibiting a strange corporate nationalism while none but one member of the new cabinet they elected represents an ethnic minority.

A group of Soviet historians that built their career on inventing and then promoting Moldovan identity are ready to serve the regime, also counting on the good fees from the would-be publications. The priests of Moldovan nationhood have not passed away with the „end of that history“ but gathered their effort and published in 1997 the „History of the Republic of Moldova From Ancient Times to Today“ under the editorship of Shornicov, an ethnic Russian member of Parliament. Rejected as inappropriate by the political and cultural establishment at the time, now with the monopolization of power in Moldova by the orthodox Communists, the danger of imposing a Stalinist history on school pupils becomes imminent.

Amazingly, one of leading pressure groups for renouncing the „history of Romanians“ is the Council of Russian Communities in Moldova. Indeed, the Russians, which account for 13% of country’s population alongside Ukrainians and other ethnic groups do not find representation within the „History of Romanians“ and claim that it is hostile to Russia, to which they have strong emotional ties. There are numerous attempts to forge a common front against the „danger of Romanization“ of the would-be „ethnic Slavs“ that should bend together the Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Russian minorities, through common identity projects such as the creation of a „Slavic University“ and organization of days of „Slavic Culture.“

A common characteristic of the Moldovenist pressure groups is a hidden or an open Romano phobia, largely inherited from the Soviet authoritarian regime. In search for „the other,“ Soviet propaganda painted Romanian bourgeoisie into the enemy of Soviet Moldovans, an ideology that provoked inhibition among Moldovan Romanians and hate among Russians and other ethnic groups. Currently hate speech and discrediting continues to be commonplace in the media such as „Glasul Moldovei,“ „Saptamana,“ or the Russian language „Kisinevskie Novosti“ or „Nezavisimaya Moldova“ newspapers. At large, the Moldovenists have succeeded in securing in 1994 within the constitution the name „Moldovan“ for the official language, although the school curriculum calls it Romanian.

The danger of abusive Moldovenization is pointed out by the opposition political parties. Dumitru Diacov, the chairman of the centrist Democratic Party

said: „It is not so much changing the title of the book that is at stake, for here a judicious compromise might be reached right on the surface, as that we are running the risk of having one-sided, dogmatic interpretation of the dramatic history of our people,” while Iurie Rosca, the leader of most prominent pro-Romanian party said: „the Communists had no right to alter the language, history and culture of a nation, because they were elected only for cheap bread and salami.” He promised to ask the parliamentary majority to officially deny plans of re-writing the history book and „to drop any attempts against the language and history of Romanians.”

Over five hundred history teachers gathered in early July at a national conference and condemned the attempts of the Communist party to usurp the truth also menacing a countrywide strike against teaching an ideologized history to pupils. „The replacement of the national history book with one of Moldova’s history, contrarily to all scientific principles, will seriously harm the education process and will challenge the population’s distrust in the competence of specialists in the field,” said Anatol Petrenco, chairman of the Associations of Historians of Moldova.

As an immediate response to Voronin’s initiative, over a hundred students and teachers manifested in downtown Chisinau, carrying national flags and banners chanting „Our History is Romanian History!” Also, two weeks later, Moldovan students in Bucharest shouted the same slogans in front of the Moldovan embassy there.

Asked to comment on the possibility of changing school subjects, a 15 year-old student, Ion Plamadeala told me he does not see the difference, while his mother Tamara, 36, said: „how much longer can the history be shifted up and down? I do not believe the Communists will succeed in imposing a new history.” She thinks the reform will disorient the pupils completely, as it did with the older generation, suddenly treating all historical events upside-down. Concerning the opportunity to teach a „History of Moldova” she said, „it could exist as a complementary part, since Moldova exists as independent state.” Today approximately one-third of Moldovans consider themselves ethnic Romanians and this proportion grows, while the majority, according to the polls, considers the spoken language Romanian.

The Communist Minister of Education Ilie Vancea told the media that there are no plans so far to reverse the curricula; however the experts at the Ministry are dealing with the drafting of an appendix for the history book of Romanians, which would include data on the history of the national minorities on Moldova’s territory.

The general feeling in Moldova is that the likelihood of an imminent imposition of a totalitarian history is low, but real. The civic groups and political parties are raising pre-emptive awareness and concern, and the eventuality that Communists will be able to engage the various actors into a nationwide dialogue on historical reconciliation seem equal to none due to their totalitarian past and

populist present. However, should Voronin enact authoritatively a new history of Moldova, this would necessarily polarize the Moldovan electorate, strengthen the fragmented opposition, and undoubtedly provoke social unrest that might lead to early parliamentary elections.

CONCLUSION

Moldovenization is a new government policy of „state building“ focused on removing the history of Romanians and the term „Romanian language“ from school curricula and replacing them with Moldovan. This policy is extremely similar to the Soviet policy of creating the Soviet Moldovan nation and building walls towards Romania and is supported by the same people – local Communists. The new policy faces two counter-reactions. First is the opposition of pro-Romanian parties that see this policy abusive and anti-liberal. The second is the contradiction between the need to develop a modern civic (non-ethnic) Moldovan identity to integrate Moldovan citizenry into one community and the desire of Communists to strengthen a Moldovan ethnic identity group to „legitimize“ in their eyes Moldovan statehood. My concluding question is, why should the contemporary history of the Republic of Moldova need be incompatible with the cultural and political history of Romanians and why are the Communists deciding so?

NICU POPESCU, IPP diplomatic expert

Scenarios of NATO Extension and the Membership Action Plan Members

The collapse of communism in the Central and Eastern Europe created a world of new aspirations, opportunities and threats. The last decade of the 20th century witnessed radical changes in the European architecture that manifested in some former Warsaw pact members as a desire to accede to the Euro-Atlantic security institutions.

For the last decade, NATO has transformed itself into an institution with more collective security functions. It defines security in more-inclusive terms, since the security of NATO members is closely linked with the security of non-members in Europe. NATO is giving implicit security guarantees to its „close partners“. The degree of this implicit NATO guarantee varies with the level of interdependence established with NATO countries through membership in the EU, as well as with geography and the likelihood of future NATO membership. The level of this implicit security guarantees is related to particular countries membership in other European political and security entities, some of which act somehow within the NATO framework. One of them, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is a consultative body set up as a forum for deliberations on security issues in Europe and the former Soviet space; another, Partnership for Peace (PfP), is a military cooperation program between NATO and non-NATO countries. The membership in EAPC and PfP is similar to the membership of the OSCE, which is the most inclusive organization devoted to European security. The third and the closest to NATO is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) entity.

NATO has identified nine countries as being on track to membership through its Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP countries are: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Croatia has recently applied officially for membership and joined the group of applicants, known today as the „Vilnius 10“. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, former Warsaw Pact members, joined the Alliance in 1999, following the invitation to enter the NATO issued in the 1997 Madrid summit. For all the applicants, NATO has established

pre-conditions for consideration of new-members, almost all of which involve internal democratic reforms rather than military considerations. The MAP countries have been singled out by NATO as important to NATO and capable of full integration at some future point.

THE SITUATION IN THE 9 MAP STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR EFFORTS TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE IS AS FOLLOWS:

Slovenia – the most qualified and attractive candidate for membership from NATO's strategic perspective. The costs of the Slovene integration will be virtually nil, and the benefits will be potentially significant in view of NATO's focus on the Balkans. There are no reasons why this country could not join NATO after 2002, would it be from the political, economical or military point of view. Consequently, it is the most likely future NATO member.

Slovakia – although it had some internal problems at the beginning of '90s, now, it is moving successfully to NATO and the EU. Situated between NATO members, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, Slovakia seems to be indispensable to the next round of NATO extension, thanks to its geographical position, and to its successful reforms as well. Its army is relatively larger and more modern than Slovenia's. The cost of its integration will be low.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the three controversial candidates for NATO. Their advanced stage in meeting NATO's criteria is offset by the strategic implications of their accession, caused by Russia's opposition to the acceptance of the three Baltic States in NATO.

Romania and Bulgaria's strategic attractiveness is offset by their inability to meet NATO criteria. Their role during the Kosovo crisis has convinced the West of their reliability and of their importance to the stability in South-Eastern Europe. Romania and Bulgaria are likely to bring considerable military heft and size to NATO. But the problem lies in the poor result of economic and military reforms.

Macedonia and Albania – are the least advanced in meeting NATO criteria. Moreover, because of serious hard and soft security problems, the two countries cannot be treated as real NATO candidates even in the mid-term. These two countries are the only MAP members not being on the track of EU membership.

SCENARIOS OF NATO EXTENSION

At the Washington summit in 1999, the Western leaders promised to the NATO applicants that in 2002, at the Prague NATO Summit, a new extension round will be announced.

NATO has not yet taken a decision upon which of the potential new members it would welcome and when. The Alliance faces an intense internal debate

between now and November 2002, when the Prague Summit will take place. At Prague, formal invitations to join NATO are likely to be issued. However, the second round of NATO extension is lacking the historic symbolism of NATO's acceptance of its first former Warsaw Pact members.

During this debate over the enlargement, some of the possible scenarios have already emerged. The first and the less probable one is the so-called <Big-bang> extension. The idea of issuing simultaneous NATO invitations to all the aspirant countries does not seem to be taken into consideration by NATO policy-makers, although it has a certain support in the establishment of certain Western countries. Due to the fact that the internal situation of Macedonia is aggravating, and general instability in the Balkans arising again, FYROM and Albania are not seen in the West as potential NATO members for the nearest future.

A second scenario of extension would be the most modest one, and it is called the „Slo-Slo“ plan. Its name comes from „Slovenia-Slovakia“. The „Slo-Slo“ scenario is advocated by some Europeans who fear that Russia's alienation would be an excessive price for NATO extension. If realized, this „minimalist“ plan will lead to growing frustration among the East-Europeans. While reticence towards extension is growing in the EU, the accomplishment of the „Slo-Slo“ scenario may be too high in terms of security, for a united Europe. A double refusal or delay, from NATO and the EU, for countries like Romania and/or Bulgaria, may have negative consequences for the security architecture of the continent and may lead to the preservation of the „nationalized“ defense in the „unintegrated“ area of Europe.

The third scenario is advanced by some Euro-integrationists, and it may be a good example of efforts to transform the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) into one of the pillars of the European security environment, which would be, more or less, an *alternative to* NATO. The central idea of the suggestion is the necessity of coming to a possible trade-off: admit Romania and Bulgaria, which will not be ready for the EU for many years, to NATO to stabilize the Balkans; and offer the Baltics quick EU membership with an implicit security guarantee. This plan suggests that the EU feels confident about offering itself as a worthy alternative to NATO. It comes from the EU plan to create by 2003 a rapid-reaction force that can act apart from the Alliance, and is the result of the development of the CSDP.

There are serious arguments in favor of this plan. First, the Big Three (UK, France, Germany) believe that the price of Baltic States membership would be too high in terms of the likely setback in relations with Russia. Secondly, most Europeans believe that the greatest risks to their security lie in the Balkans, not in Russia, and the South-Eastern Europe is the region which needs the stabilizing effect of NATO extension. This position favors Romania and Bulgaria, as the biggest NATO aspirants and countries with an important stabilizing effect in the region. As long as the Balkans remain politically precarious and militarily volatile, Romania and Bulgaria are seen as important security-providers in the region.

Ironically, the Baltics are readier to join NATO, but the Southern Europe needs NATO more.

A possible, fourth, scenario is *the „realistic Big Bang extension“*, which means inviting all the applicants, except for Albania and Macedonia, to join NATO in 2002. If the decision of extension „from the Baltic to the Black Sea“ is not taken by the West, the Baltic States on one hand, and Romania and Bulgaria on the other hand, are likely to enter a fierce competition in their efforts to join NATO.

Romania and Bulgaria will emphasize their geographical advantages, size and necessity to accede to at least one Western structure (NATO), while their EU membership is not likely to happen in this decade. They will remind of their unequivocally pro-Western position during the Kosovo crisis, even if they had to suffer serious economic damage. Furthermore, the two countries will suggest that their full NATO membership will contribute to the stabilization of the whole South-Eastern Europe. However, to join NATO, Romania's and Bulgaria's role of security-providers should be reinforced with successful military reforms and good economic background.

The situation is different for the Baltic States. From the economic and military point of view, they are closer to NATO standards, but the political price of accepting them in NATO is very high, which makes especially the Europeans to doubt whether they can pay such a price for the acceptance of the three Baltic States.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are considered as security consumers, rather than security-providers. However the Baltic States have boosters in some Nordic NATO members and, most important, in the USA. Still, there is a long way to the unanimity upon this issue. The basic arguments of the so-called „Baltoskeptics“ are:

- The entry of the Baltic trio would hurt NATO's relations with Russia, because the latter would feel threatened and offended by such a move.
- The Baltic States' location and size might make them „indefensible“ in a crunch.
- Why not entrust the Baltic States' security to the EU, or instruct the Baltics to follow the Finland's and Sweden's neutrality models?

As a response, the Baltic States invoke the post-Cold War principle that „every country has an inherent right to choose its security arrangements and allies“. Moreover, some claim that the Balts are good security-providers, as they will boost the allied air-defense and monitoring capabilities for the avoidance of a conflict. Another argument is that the Balts have considerably progressed in meeting qualification goals. Furthermore, the „back-door“ security guarantees from the EU are not very credible, because the EU's own defense organization will take a long time to develop fully. And finally, they claim that EU membership is not a substitute for NATO.

But some of the Balts' arguments will not value too much as the three Baltic States often treat each other as rivals rather than partners on their way to NATO.

Lithuania and Estonia believe that they have greater chances to enter NATO in 2002 if treated individually. Estonia meets the political, economic and military criteria. But its small military size limits its contribution to NATO, and it is still below the NATO „floor“ level in indicators of the quality of armed forces.

Lithuania and Latvia are not far beyond, with some shortfalls in meeting the economic criteria. However their main shortcomings are in the military realm, with constraints in the quality of their military forces.

The basic idea of the intra-Baltic rivalry lies in Lithuania's belief that its geographical position is the main strategic argument in favor of its acceptance. The Lithuania's policy-makers think that accepting only Lithuania to NATO would be a good way to avoid a too negative reaction from Russia, and at the same time, to increase NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea region.

Following the military criteria, the most significant problem faced by the MAP states is modernization of their army. One of the problems is the domination of ground forces, and the low-quality of air forces. Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia and Albania are in the process of building their armed forces, and they currently cannot ensure their own security and sovereignty. Consequently, they are likely to become security-consumers. In the case of the three Baltic States, this security-consumption will be even higher because of the specificity of the Baltic Sea region-I mean the presence of the Kaliningrad region of Russia, and the neutrality of Sweden and Finland, which makes the three Baltic States potentially „indefensible“. Romania and Bulgaria's strategic attractiveness is offset by their inability to meet NATO criteria. The countries are important to stability in South-Eastern Europe, but the economic cost of their acceptance may be too high. Slovenia and Slovakia are indisputably the favorites of this second round of NATO extension, while Macedonia and Albania are indisputably the outsiders of the 2002 extension.

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Volunteer reserve forces:
a contribution to defence in a democracy*

INTRODUCTION

Moldovan society and the Moldovan army remain in a confused and confusing state: a state, as the vogue term puts it, of transition. Moldova has certainly abandoned the totalitarian, one-party political system of the Soviet period, but has it achieved a genuine, viable, stable and lasting democracy? The so-called command administrative economic system, in which everything was centrally planned and controlled, has clearly now been replaced by a form of market economy which for some, perhaps many, however, (especially the elderly and vulnerable) still provides only a standard of living that is worse than last year, better than next! Above all, however, Moldova has striven to shift from a monolithic, totalitarian, one-party model of the armed forces, and the associated views on civil-military relations, to genuine democratic, civilian control of the military, and the broadly-based democratic security community associated with it, that is, to what we might think of as defense in a democracy.

This is where the notion of the volunteer reserve serviceman or woman becomes relevant in the framework of Partnership for Peace within a new Europe and in the context of the new Euro-Atlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok that is now being built. The volunteer reservist clearly plays an important role in the military establishments of western democratic countries and functions as a key link between the military and civil society at large. He/she is, so to speak, one of the elements in the military, which enables us to say that we organize defense in line with democratic principles. It introduces the idea of voluntary reserve service - an unknown notion in the communist era - into the new military establishments of Central and Eastern Europe.

* The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defense.

Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Army & Society

The primary function of the army is to preserve the external security of the state. Armies are organized, equipped and trained either to deter conflict, or to fight effectively against an enemy, if they are needed. Given the very nature of armies and their fighting tasks, there are, potentially at least, three characteristic implications for the military and society.

1. The risk of military *coup d'état*, of government take-over by the military, of military intervention in government, or of effective threats to do so: because of the army's monopoly, or near monopoly, of armed force, because it possesses the weapons and the skills to use them, there is always a possibility for the army to abuse its privileged position and seek to take over society altogether.

2. The risk that the army becomes alienated from, or within, society, that the military becomes a separate structure within society in a negative sense: the highly regimented character of military life may lead to a pathologically narrow-minded view of the world and man's place in it. Armies, it has been said, are 'total' institutions, like prisons, lunatic asylums and monasteries, and there is a barrier between the army and the external world. Typically, the army will train in areas far away from the civilian population. The dictates of military secrecy, very properly, erect barriers too. The army may come to see itself, and to be seen by civilians, as an alien institution whose traditions, interests and goals are disturbingly and dangerously different from those of society as a whole. The army may become, as happened famously in Germany for a while *ein Staat im Staate* (a state within a state).

3. The special responsibility that society, and ultimately the government, has for members of the armed forces who work to an „unlimited“ contract in the sense that it is an occupational hazard for them to be required, under orders, to endanger and even lose their lives. The fact that soldiers operate under this unlimited liability means that the political leadership, and society as a whole, incur an exceptional duty of care towards servicemen and women.

A sensitive understanding of the two risks and the special responsibility outlined above is essential for healthy relations between the military and society. Indeed, as Michael Quinlan put it in an address to the NATO Defense College a year or so ago: „The central challenge for democratic systems, and the one which fundamentally distinguishes managing defense from managing, say, social welfare or the road construction programme, is...how to reconcile all these special pressures – how to maximize the security value of our armed forces at the same time as we minimize the risk of coercive misuse, of social alienation and perhaps of lives needlessly lost.“

The democratic „control“, or, better, „management“ or „direction“ of defense is essentially a two-way process, between civil society and the military on the one hand, and the military and civil society on the other. It is, of course, inherent within the concept of democratic government that national armed forces are

subordinated to the duly elected political leadership of the state, that there exists a clearly defined, legal constitutional framework within which the military hierarchy is responsible to the government through a civilian minister of defense, and that there be effective control and accountability by parliament. This is a part, at least, of what is meant by the „primacy“ of the civil power. But the civilian authorities must not regard the military, as it were, as dangerous wild beasts who must be tamed and „controlled“, but must rather see to it that soldiers have a genuine understanding of the principle of the primacy of the civil power and the importance of civilian management of defense. A very considerable educational effort is made in this direction in NATO armies, and the Germans, in particular, made special efforts in this field of „Innere Führung“ when the *Bundeswehr* was created after World War II.

Equally, it is highly unlikely that a good army, (i.e. an effective fighting force) will be created, or an army that feels comfortable and at ease within society, unless the citizenry at large, and this, in a democracy, means the voters, have a sympathetic understanding of military aims and values, and are aware of what makes an army tick. The military must mount an „educational“ effort of sorts, engage in public relations and public information exercises, to „keep the army in the public eye“ as one such British activity of this kind was known.

Democratic Control Breaks Down: An Example from Moldova

On 15 March 1996, President Snegur, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, issued a decree removing Defense Minister Creanga from his post after accusing him of incompetence in combating the theft of army property and wasting money. There followed a period of acute political crisis when Parliament described the defense minister's dismissal as unconstitutional and the Constitutional Court ruled against the presidential decree. Despite the appeal by an overwhelming majority of army officers from the Ministry of Defense Staff and Chişinău garrison urging that Creanga „cannot further head the Defense Ministry,“ the former defense minister was reinstated in his post, though he said he intended soon to resign. Civil-military relations continued to fester throughout 1996 with President Snegur threatening to take „direct control of the army“ and accusing Creanga of „mutiny“ while the recently reinstated defense minister protested in an open letter in a government newspaper that he was the victim of a smear campaign because of his refusal to allow the army to be dragged into politics.

As a foreign observer of Moldovan affairs sitting in London, some of the details in my brief account of this matter are almost certainly wrong. Nonetheless, I venture to suggest that the Creanga affair pointed alarmingly to the fragility of the machinery for effective political control of the armed forces and threw into relief the power struggle between the head of state and the prime minister in the run-up to the presidential elections of November 1996.

Volunteer Reserve Forces

Adam Michnik, the Polish dissident during the communist era, and later a deputy in the *Sejm*, was once asked whether the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the victory of democracy over totalitarianism. „No,” said Michnik, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a victory of freedom over dictatorship. He went on to add, democracy means the institutionalization of freedom and „that is still a long way off.”

Volunteer Reserve Forces are one example of the way in which freedom can be institutionalized. It is in this sense that Volunteer Forces contribute to and so embody the idea of defense in a democracy.

What is a Volunteer Reservist?

He or she is a civilian who volunteers as a part-time soldier, a citizen, not a professional soldier, i.e. he/she is a citizen soldier. The late NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, once said: „The simple truth is that security is a concept which does not recognize artificial divisions between civilian and military responsibilities – security is the business of all of us, citizens, soldiers and citizen soldiers.”

In the United Kingdom the Regular Army is dependent on the so-called Territorial Army – TA – (the army element of the national Volunteer Reserve Forces) to complete the Order of Battle. The likelihood of using the TA in circumstances less than full mobilization is now much greater than during the Cold War. To carry out Britain’s defense responsibilities, the Army needs the TA. In Britain, the TA and the Regular Army share:

- their military ethos;
- the same command structure;
- doctrine and tactics;
- the Regimental system;
- similar equipment and training.

Why volunteer? First because there is the challenge of doing another kind of job. As a civilian, one meets a variety of people – civilians and soldiers – in many circumstances. The enormous sense of comradeship is built on a sense of service. In recognition of this commitment the volunteer receives rates of pay in line with the regular forces for each day he or she trains. An additional cash incentive is paid for the completion of an annual minimum training period.

The volunteer is a member of the Volunteer as opposed to the Regular Reserve made up of ex-regulars. Each has a statutory period of reserve service and that after having completed their full- time service. The volunteer makes a significant contribution to the national defense capability. Most important, in time of war or crisis, the reserves provide vital manpower alongside the regular forces. In short, the reserves complete the Order of Battle. More than 800 volunteer reservists served in the Gulf, for example, and the TA makes up some 20% of British troops in Bosnia.

In the best sense of the word, volunteers are cheap. During the Cold War it was reckoned that the Territorial Army cost about 3% of the British Army vote yet provided about 25% of the mobilization Order of Battle. On average the TA soldier costs only one-seventh that of a regular soldier to maintain.

Defense in A Democracy

Defense in a democracy clearly includes Government direction of military activity, Parliament's oversight of both government and the military, and a free press/media which tells voters about competing political, social, economic and defense alternatives: an emancipated media is a necessary condition for the democratic management of defense.

In Moldova (as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) there is an especial need for civilians to be knowledgeable about the military. This must include journalists, Ministry of Defense civil servants, academics in universities, members of think tanks, and non-government organizations (NGOs). Less well known, but of similar importance, are the civilians who, in NATO nations, are members of the NGO known as the CIOR (*Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve* – Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers).

Some years ago, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, asked CIOR to find ways in which they could play a major role in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process. He saw the influence of members of Volunteer Reserve Forces as critical in bridging the civilian/military divide in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

In April 1996, the Polish Ministry of Defense and CIOR held a PfP seminar in Warsaw entitled „Armed Forces and Society – The Importance of Reserve Associations and their Role within the PfP Context.” The aim of the seminar was to inform Polish authorities and associations about the position of CIOR and reserve associations in NATO countries and to encourage the foundation of a Polish tri-service, democratic reserve association that could cope with the CIOR constitution. A CIOR task force to assist was established. Partnership for Peace was the theme of the British Presidency of CIOR in 1996/98.

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General at the time commented: „If anything, the Alliance is becoming increasingly dependent on reservists, both in terms of capabilities as regular forces are being reduced and in terms of public backing for our security objectives as the issues facing NATO are becoming broader and in some ways more complex.”

One of the most striking features of communist military culture was that military matters were held to be the exclusive preserve of the military. To some extent, post-communist military society still remains a society that is closed to civilians and which resents and resists civilian interference. The lack in Moldova (as in other Central and Eastern European countries) of civilian knowledge, competence and experience in defense issues still influences civil servants, legislators, the media and the public.

But it does not matter how good in theory the democratic structures for control of the military are if there continue to be few competent civilians to man the Ministry of Defense and few civilians who can talk to the military on equal terms. The new members of the legislatures must have a real understanding of the army's justifiable needs. That has to be followed by effective means of educating the voter in military matters. On the whole, these remain serious problems in most Central and Eastern European countries, including Moldova.

In western democracies it makes sense to speak of a defense and security community. This is supposed to be – and usually is – a vibrant community composed not only of military officers, but also of civilians of various professions and interests. Volunteer reservists are key members of that community.

The volunteer plays an important part in representing the military in civil society and in acting as an invaluable link between the government, the armed forces and the wider community. He could, and perhaps should, take up that key function in Moldova?

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A marathon with obstacles: mass-media
and the itinerary of European integration

First, there was the aspiration. An aspiration to westernisation, which was rather vague and general than consistent.. Stimulated by the initiation of fundamental changes in the society that occurred in late 80's -early 90's, this aspiration generated the discovery of the truth that democratic principles and observance of human rights are as natural to the post-communist countries as they are to the West, and also the replacement of older values with values proper to the „society of consumption". Thus, the new directions of development of the post-communist society have imposed themselves with a spectacular velocity, while the Western model of democracy and market economy achieved the status of desired goal. This meant that the orientation towards the Western universal paradigms would represent from that moment on the vector of movement towards overcoming the crisis and abolition of the Soviet regime. The motivation that served as a base for this improvement of mentality could be formulated as easy and eloquent as: „a huge supermarket is always better than a huge barn"¹. In this opening towards the West, from which derived expressly a Western apology, the society, for years dominated by a harsh economic reality, was largely deprived from the access to a large range of consumption goods, has seen a real encounter with the Panacea, a remedy against all the evils inherited from the totalitarian past. The representations about the Western lifestyle, defamed for years by the communist propaganda in an absolute and maximally aggressive way, endured, with the beginning of the transition period, a relevant metamorphosis, obtaining a fetish allure. The general atmosphere, if we evoke the meetings with tens of thousands of participants, had pronounced nuances of euphoria, of spontaneous confidence that it was sufficient to adopt a fair legislation and to liberalize the economy, in order to have, integrally and categorically, a standard of living adjusted

¹ Fisichella Domenico. Știința politică. Probleme, concepte, teorii (Political Science. Problems, Concepts, Theories). – Chișinău: the State University of Moldova, 2000, p. 292.

to the standards of the society of consumption. Implantation of this atmosphere, expression of an uncurbed aspiration for change – an entertaining slogan of the emerging political class which dimmed the former nomenclature, – was encouraged by mass – media or, more precisely, by its majority.

In reality, the itinerary covered by the Republic of Moldova during the last decade proved to be more sinuous than we believed at the beginning of the great changes. The inefficiency of the governments of the last decade conditioned, towards the beginning of the year 2001, a specific interpretation of the new/old dichotomy: during the parliamentary elections of February 25 2001, the vast majority of the electorate, refusing the old and wishing to affirm the new, sooner chose something that implicitly relates to the nostalgia of past– the new „old“ Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova. To mention in this context is the fact that the most successful publicity campaign for the promotion of the idea of European integration has been accomplished during the last years by the newspaper „Mesagerul“ („the Messenger“), publication of Party of Democratic Forces; however, at the last elections this party did not obtain the electoral support necessary to enter the Parliament.

Considering the fact that the new configuration of political forces from the Republic of Moldova has been accomplished through democratic elections (it is known that one of the cardinal principles of democracy, as the Italian political scientist Domenico Fisichella declares, is the fact that the political adversary „has the guaranteed possibility to manifest the disagreement and to oppose, but, in addition to this, the adversary is allowed to accede to power in a peaceful way, replacing the very holder of this power.“²), the largest share in the present political situation has the answer to „the question addressed to democracy, as judiciously remarked by the French author Jean-Francois Revel, – if the art to be elected has any connection with the ability to govern“³. The particular necessity to demonstrate the capacity to overcome crisis in the Republic of Moldova, to meet the expectations of the electorate has dictated to the new government, despite the temptation, tacitly or openly manifested, in electoral slogans, to overlap the pro-western and the pro-eastern orientations, the priority of promotion of a „pragmatic“ line, consisting of the collaboration with the international organizations, the continuation of diplomatic efforts in order not to allow the isolation and marginalization of the country. The present Moldovan foreign policy, having all the features of a „duplicitous“ policy, however, includes among its successes, for example, the fact of adherence of the Republic of Moldova to the Stability Pact for the South-Eastern Europe.

² Campana Domenico. Il voto corre sul filo: democrazia diretta, democrazia in diretta. – Roma: Seat, 1994, p. XXXI.

³ Revel Jean-Francois. Revirimentul democrației(The Reversal of Democracy) – Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995, p. 367.; Moldova, Romania, Ukraine: Integration in the European Structures. – Chișinău: Perspectiva.

In fact, Moldova's „European race”, is not new. Actually, the Moldova's European vocation is everlasting and constant⁴, in the present conditions the primordial objective being shaped as adherence to the European Union⁵. Consequently, considering the content of a large part of recent messages of mass media from the republic, we would not exaggerate if we ascertained that „integration” has become the slogan of the day. Even the communist press includes among the titles of its publications something like „Europe that we elect”⁶. However, the opposition press does not stop to taunt on the „European option” of the communists, which is often reduced to numerous trips of Moldovan parliamentary delegations to the Western countries: „They (the communists – V.M.) are actively preoccupied with interstate tourism, even subscribed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the insupportable NATO, the result of these trips is however null, except huge budget expenses ... They travel abroad, get informed and upon their return, continue to blow their communist horn...”⁷.

The landscape of realities, especially the one offered by the mass media appears to be rather inconsistent as a whole. All these emphasize the imperative of attentive interrogation of the phenomenal framework of development, the necessity to examine the way these elements of rupture with the past tend to manifest in the background of affirmation of new elements. It is obvious that the latter cannot appear in a spectacular manner and in a fast rhythm, but are inserted in the preexistent structure, modifying it, and the determination of an adequate contemporary development model has, as the experiences of the recent years prove, a sinuous way ahead, vacillating between stereotypes of thoughts and revelations, between certain prejudices and proving arguments.

Presently there are multiple factors, which being combined represent a serious obstacle in the way of the Republic of Moldova towards European integration. And by that we mean, primarily, the existence of some statistical data that place the discussion of the approached aspects of the given problem in a context influenced by a series of tough truths. Globally, this context might be defined using the words of a counselor from the American administration who noted: „I do not consider an exaggeration if I say that the global fight against poverty and for environment protection, acceptable for future generations – this is the problem to be discussed – presently is almost lost... Out of the six billions of the world population, five billions live in developing countries or countries which were formerly under communist rule (Ignatio Ramonet, editor-in-chief of the journal „Le

⁴ See. Moraru Victor. *Repere italiene (Italian Landmarks)* Chişinău: the State University of Moldova, 1998.

⁵ See, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine: *Integration in the European Structures*. – Chişinău: *Perspectiva*, 2000.

⁶ See, *Comunistul Newsletter*, June 15, 2001, , p. 7.

⁷ Чубашенко Дмитрий. Недоразумение. Неизменные коммунисты в изменившемся мире // *Молдавские Ведомости*, 2001, 16 июня.

Monde Diplomatique", states even more directly: „Out of the six billions of the planet's population, five billions live in poverty"⁸ – V. M.). Five billions of these persons spend for the living less than two dollars a day. More than one billion earn less than one dollar a day. Poverty continues to be a destabilizing factor, many countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America (we are compelled to add Europe as well, – V.M.) are less able to confront it, and this generates numerous masses of desperate people who will try to emigrate to Western Europe and to the United States"⁹.

In fact, one thing that presently preoccupies the political class and the Moldovan media elite is also how to enter Europe, meaning a European integration, but using a more decent way. This is why we are justified to question ourselves on the ability of the political class and of mass media to promote a reasonable and efficient policy of integration, and implicitly of national and international security.

Reporting the figures evoked in the local context, we have the possibility to ascertain that the concern expressed by the western experts is absolutely applicable in the case of the Republic of Moldova where, according to the last estimations, the average salary amounts to 36 dollars a month, and the poverty problem was announced by the president of the country from the tribune of the Parliamentarian Assembly of the European Council (along with the problem of the eastern territories of the Republic of Moldova and the corruption problem) as one of the problems, „which being unsolved makes the consolidation of the Moldovan state impossible, in accordance with the European standards and values"¹⁰.

If we try to „look from aside", as previously expressed by one of the representatives of the international organization in Chisinau, but still valid today, the Republic of Moldova passes from one crisis to another, of a political, economic or social character, particularly because of the „lack of clarity in the promotion of the integration policy" and the absence of „a national consensus"¹¹.

It is absolutely obvious that the task of accomplishing any clarifications and of the activity directed towards the achievement of a national consensus is the responsibility of mass media. It must contribute to the identification of problems, to the search, through extensive public debate, for acceptable solutions. Of course, this is an idealized option. In reality, however, mass media approaching daily events, each from its own perspective, often related to personal or represented political interests, contributes to the perpetuation of general confusion. In fact, these media know just two ways to discuss the problems – from the

⁸ Ramonet Ignacio. Enfances fracassees (Distroyed Childhoods) // Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1998, p. 1.

⁹ Gardner R. N. L'economia mondiale alla soglia del terzo millennio (The World Economy at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium)// Antologia nuova, October – December 1999, p.53.

¹⁰ Независимая Молдова (Nezavisimaia Moldova), July 28, 2001.

¹¹ See, Flux Newspaper, October 8, 1999.

perspective of the Kalashnikov machine-gun, or from the perspective of the absolutely pink, angelic colors. If we, however, accept the metaphor of mass media as a mirror of the reality, we do not have the right to get upset on the mirror, if we see in it something that does not please us. Of course if the mirror is not distorted.

The role of mass media in the society is important, but it cannot be decisive in solution of the problems of political character, including the problem of European integration. The journalist community recognizes the enormous complexity of this problem. Penetration of the complexity, however, as shown in mass media publications, is postponed. Respectively, the press, radio and TV broadcasts often profile a confuse perception of its multiple aspects, a superficial treatment derived from the insufficient knowledge of the real situations. Often schemes and clichés, familiar to the readers, radio listeners and TV viewers are used. The journalists do not get rid of these schemes; on the contrary, they adjust, maintain and perpetuate them.

In most of the cases, the dilemma „to unveil the essence of the phenomenon” and „to show its spectacular element” is resolved in favor of the second option. To cover the issue of European integration in mass media means to speak at the level of „diverse fact”. Besides such preponderantly rhetorical subjects, we need analytic materials, investigation journalism. The preconceived opinion however prevails, for example: integration is good – non-integration is bad. Never, or rarely, one attempts to bring arguments, to listen to the arguments of the opposite side, if they exist. The principle „*audiatur et altera pars*” seems to be unfamiliar to our press. Then the vision of reality appears impoverished, the abundant lamentations overwhelm and enthrone a „begging philosophy”.

Thus, the main problem of mass media resides not in the fact that it does not approach the integration issue, but in the fact that this theme is approached practically and exclusively as a strictly political issue, while the media implies a very specific approach. A series of reportages recently published in „Jurnal de Chisinau” („the Journal of Chisinau”) may represent a more successful pleading for integration compared to the wordy digressions of many publications. From the efficiency perspective, news about walnuts import from Moldova to the Western Europe published on July 20 in the Chisinau supplement of the newspaper „**Комсомольская правда**” may have more results than much news, including figures about society degradation. The articles related to human destiny, for example, will always be more interesting to the public, will have a greater persuasive potential. Unfortunately, such materials rarely appear on the pages of mass media, and those that do are distinctive through the legerity and superficiality of approach. It is necessary to identify the problems, to clarify their dimension and their real share, to reveal the primordial aspects, suggesting practical answers.

We cannot expect the political forces or the mass media to promote a univoque and uniform massage. The fact that unites them is the same uncertainty regarding the major problems from the society. Thus, mass media approaches

confusingly the serious problem of massive exodus of an important part of the Moldovan population. Unfortunately, the lamentations prevail („Moldova remains without people as during the war”¹²), while the dissection of the phenomenon, the elaboration in the multiple composite aspects refers, probably, to the future. The political forces do not show a clear attitude towards this problem, while the social differentiation and political fragmentation threaten with the exodus of more and more compatriots (also voters).

A duplicitous attitude towards such a situation may be also seen in the actions of the power (or their avoidance). In any case, the extension of the migration phenomenon implies for the political forces, as well as for mass media, the necessity to monitor attentively the population mobility and to participate actively in the canalization of this mobility to a channel adequate to time exigencies. Exactly this thing fails to happen or happens very rarely.

The role of the mass media in achievement of a social consensus is unanimously recognized. However, such a consensus is impossible in the conditions of territorial disintegration of the republic. Or, the procrastination of solution the Transnistrian dispute implicitly conditions the postponement of a total integration of the Republic of Moldova with the community of European countries. In the same time, we cannot neglect the fact that mass media somehow contributed to the emergence of social destabilizing effects, stimulating the destructive impulses. Indeed, we could not deny that mass media served as a destabilizing factor, when, for example, the editor in chief of the Writers Union publication approached very seriously the problem of the Russian origin of the spouses of some political leaders, presenting it as a matter of principle, and the National Radio, during the peak moments of the conflict, was broadcasting soldier songs recorded in the trenches on Dniester banks, containing lyrics like „for one of ours dead we will kill ten Russians”. It is obvious that in this case we cannot speak about the conciliatory efficiency of mass media. Indeed, with mass media intervention, the atrocious drama of the interethnic conflicts is transformed, as shown by the Romanian researcher Grigore Georgiu, in a „media show”, having the possibility to vector the messages in favor of one party, to accuse the adverse party. The negative portrait of an ethnic community, made up from expressive details and from politically oriented information, in a way insensible to the majority of the receptors...leads to a deformed interpretation of the conflict, to the formation of an attitude that does not favor the respective community, no matter how reasonable are its aspirations for the fight”¹³.

The problem of interethnic conflicts emerges as a reference point, capable to explain the present situation and the vector of ulterior movement of the diverse state entities from the post-communist area. Anyway, in this region the

¹² Flux Newspaper, September 20, 2000.

¹³ Georgiu Grigore. *Filosofia culturii* (Philosophy of Culture). – Bucharest: SNSPA, 2001, p. 179.

warning of Juan Linz, formulated a couple of years ago has confirmed: „In the near future we will have difficult or highly conflicting democracies”¹⁴.

The informational war, inherent to a conflict situation (the fact that it was and still is a true war is proven by the fierce media attacks, the appearance on the pages of multiple publications in Tiraspol and Moscow of a campaign of disparagement of the policy promoted by the Republic Moldova) may be won only in the case when an effective and persuasive informational flow is assured. An intense information activity is necessary in order to impose, make known the personal point of view over the falsified information.

This might be facilitated through special publications having the goal to promote the image of the Republic of Moldova in the world, a digest of the republican press (translated in different languages). These actions will normally subscribe to the efforts necessary for the integration of the Republic of Moldova with the international community. We cannot be careless about the image of the country in the world; the consequences in this direction might be fatal. Lacking a strategy for mass media activity, coordination, within acceptable limits, of the informational activity represents as well a barrier in the way to the desired integration¹⁵.

The development of the complicated situations in the post-communist countries arouses the interest, but also awakes certain anxieties, generating inconsistent opinions among politicians and experts. In the conditions of a crisis economy, the efforts for society stabilization cannot yet counterbalance the destructive tendencies of the transitional period. In any case, it is absolutely clear: we need a common effort, as „a society’s success is neither the result of state actions nor of the best government, but of the unified effort of the whole society”¹⁶.

The marathon for European integration goes on in the case of the Republic of Moldova. In this context, the successful overcoming of the obstacles of this race depends undoubtedly on the mass media.

¹⁴ Linz Juan. La transizione alla democrazia (Transition to Democracy) // *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo*, 1990, No. 2-3, p. 16.

¹⁵ For further details, see.: Moraru Victor. Logica intrinsecă a paradoxului (The Intrinsic Logic of Paradox) // *Moldova Suverană*, April 29, 1992; Moraru Victor. Avem restanțe la capitolul informație (We Are Behind with Information) // *Sfatul Țării*, May 15, 1992.

¹⁶ Linz Juan. Op. cit.

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