

ETHNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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Authors: *Doru Petruți, Ala Roșca, Tamara Cărăuș, Vitalie Catană, Mihail Guzun, Vasile Cantarji, Natalia Cojocaru, Loretta Handrabura*

Editors in chief: *dr. Arcadie Barbăroșie, dr. Viorel Cibotaru*

Consultant: *Mircea Kivu (România)*

Translation into English: Stefan Rusu, Simona Cibotaru, Elena Cartoleanu

Editing: Simona Cibotaru (Pork Universeting, USA)

The authors' exclusive opinions, that were covered in these studies do not necessarily reflect the position of the sponsor institution.

Lecturer: Lucia Ciocan

Cover: Mihai Bacinschi

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FOREWORD

The present collection of research papers, focusing on the analysis of the current ethnic situation in Moldova was a natural follow up of the researches developed between 2000 and 2006 by the Institute of Public Policy in the field of transformations and reforms in Moldovan society.

Most of the countries can be presently characterized through cultural diversity. According to the recent estimations, in the 180 independent countries of the world there are 600 spoken languages and 5000 ethnic groups. Only in a small number of countries, citizens speak the same language or belong to the same ethno-national group. The diversity generates a set of important and controversial issues. The minorities and majorities more and more often disagree on the rights related to language, regional autonomy, political representation, education curricula, territorial claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols, national anthem, music, dances and political holidays. From the human development perspective, finding answers to this issue, that are justifiable from the moral and viable, and from the political standpoint, is the greatest challenge of the current democratic governments, including Moldova, which passes through an interminable period of transition.

After the national liberation movement, adaptation of various European criteria, laws and standards, radical transformations in the political, economic and spiritual life, as well as modification and intensification of migration processes, the ethnopolitical, ethnocultural and ethnogeographical picture of Moldova experienced essential changes. Several of these changes were outlined and analyzed in a series of studies and researches. The recent multi-disciplinary studies, the studies in the field of public policies developed within the programs of the Institute for Public Policy, as well as the results of the „Public Opinion Barometer“ illustrate new evolutions of the national identity issue and attitudes regarding the general values of modern society. The experience of organizing and administering surveys in 2000-2006, within the „Public Opinion Barometer“ program, shows interesting and conclusive data about the real picture of the current ethnic

composition and the attitudes of respondents. These results suggested the need for a thorough interdisciplinary study of the ethnopolitical and demographical situation in our country, as well as a set of surveys focused on ethnic issues and policies.

Thus, we would like to thank our project partners, the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc. from Chisinau and Mircea Kivu, international consultant, the authors of research papers, as well as the representatives of mass media who reflected the events within this project and who informed constantly the public opinion about the experts' conclusions and recommendations.

Arcadie Barbarosie, PhD

Viorel Cibotaru, PhD

AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS REFLECTED IN THE ETHNOBAROMETER

Doru Petruți

The recent history after the 90's, if we relate ourselves to Eastern Europe, has shown the importance of understanding the motivations, attitudes and options of ethnic groups. The lack of such knowledge, generally, resulted in underestimation or overestimation of potential sources of tension, both approaches being as harmful. The failure to understand or the partial understanding of certain realities, referring to interethnic phenomena, lead to conflicts such as the one from Tirgu Mures (Romania) or the war in Yugoslavia, and these are just a couple of examples.

This research program (generically called *Ethnobarometer. Interethnic Relations in Moldova*) was produced by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc Chisinau at the request of the Institute of Public Policies with the financial support of Soros Foundation-Moldova, and provides additional information about the nature of interethnic relations in Moldova. The research intended to offer scientifically fundamented data about the present ethnic situation in Moldova, the dynamics of representations and stereotypes of different ethnic groups, the knowledge and impact of public policies in the field of ethnic minorities in Moldova. The six-month research (September 2004-February 2005) started with a Delphi Study of people from different social sectors (political, academic, nongovernmental, local authorities, media). The Delphi study was exploratory in nature and its objective was to collect the necessary information for the development of working tools for a quantitative research; to identify the important issues on the Moldovan public agenda; the topics, which have generated or generate controversies/conflicts; the most important positive and negative attributes describing the ethnic groups; the representations defining the national identity from different perspectives; the perceptions and attitudes towards the political sector, as well as the practical policies in Moldova; and the relevant opinion leaders or reference groups that could influence the relationships between different ethnic groups from Moldova. All of these topics were included in the questionnaires used for the survey.

Taking into consideration the share of ethnic groups within the Moldovan population, for the quantitative stage the study investigated 2550 persons from five representative samples: S1 – Moldovans/Romanians (822); S2 – Russians (412); S3 – Ukrainians (413); S4 – Gagauz (472); and S5 – Bulgarians (431). The measured indicators can be grouped into the following topics:

- General interethnic climate;
- Identity – self-identification;
- Social capital (trust, social distance, participation);
- Representations – stereotypes;
- State and minorities;
- Perception of minority-related legislation;
- Public agenda (political, economic, social);
- Political options and orientation;
- Communication with people belonging to other ethnic groups;
- Native language and nationality, mutual knowledge of language;
- Sociodemographic data

Significant Issues and Concerns

The present research is an attempt to analyze the ethnic situation in Moldova. Thus, it bears a rather descriptive and explanatory character. For many analyzed aspects, we resorted to a sociodemographic classification by gender, age, education, residential area, etc. The sociodemographic characteristics represent one of the most important determinants of social action, regardless of the application field; therefore, the analysis of the sociodemographic structure and its influence upon the behavior have been considered a mandatory stage in our approach. Obviously, analysts will interpret the results of this research before they draw conclusions on the approached topics.

The survey comprised a subset of questions particularly related to the public agenda, political orientations (doctrinary), perceptions regarding the political class and its role in the improvement of the interethnic relations, intention to vote for one party or another. We will also try to analyze the situation from the perspective of public agenda perception, in close connection with the perception of political environment.

The current concerns, known in the Anglo-Saxon literature as „issues“, influence largely the vote. The voter's interest or concern about different personal or general issues (unemployment, crime level, corruption, education, etc.), directs the vote to those political parties or candidates who are able to tackle these issues in the most adequate manner.

The respondents were asked to estimate the severity of the following issues of national interest: unemployment, terrorism/violence/guerilla wars, low salaries, violation of human rights, health condition, environmental issues, corruption, crime level/insecurity, drug trafficking, armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts/tensions, lack of rule of law, lack of press freedom, drug abuse, trafficking in women, relations with the Transnistrian region.

For a better understanding of the respondents' options from the perspective of priority given to the above-mentioned issues, we analyzed the common variation of the 16 issues¹ through the factorial analysis². In our case, we identified three significant factors

¹ I will read a list of issues that our country is currently facing with. Please tell me if you consider each issue crucial, severe or not too serious.

² The factorial analysis allows to outline some „latent variables“ (factors) that determine the common variance of some measurable variables. In our case, this is the extent the respondents consider a certain issue important. By definition, the outlined factors are independent from one another.

(explaining 55 percent of the total variation of the 16 issues included in the analysis). The following table reflects the matrix of the correlation coefficients³ between each statement and factor:

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Trafficking in women	0,737	0,075	0,236
Relations with the Transnistrian region	0,675	0,112	0,148
Drug abuse	0,673	0,290	0,086
Corruption	0,599	0,095	0,372
Drug trafficking	0,559	0,404	0,100
Environmental issues	0,551	0,346	0,213
Crime level/insecurity	0,525	0,306	0,290
Ethnic conflicts/tensions	0,209	0,796	-0,031
Armed conflicts	0,199	0,787	0,029
Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	0,005	0,697	0,309
Lack of press freedom	0,369	0,639	0,004
Lack of rule of law	0,484	0,531	0,124
Violation of human rights	0,304	0,455	0,438
Low salaries	0,143	-0,023	0,813
Unemployment	0,192	0,057	0,768
Health condition	0,339	0,212	0,572

The factorial analysis outlines three main factors, which explain the variation of answers: *Society Factor* (F1), *Conflict Factor* (F2) and *Poverty Factor* (F3). Depending on the affirmations (variables) with which they correlate more, these three factors, can be characterized as follows:

- **Factor 1 - Society Factor**
 - Trafficking in women
 - Relations with the Transnistrian region
 - Drug abuse
 - Corruption
 - Drug trafficking
 - Environmental issues
 - Crime level/insecurity
- **Factor 2 - Conflict Factor**
 - Ethnic conflicts/tensions
 - Armed conflicts
 - Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars
 - Lack of press freedom

³ The coefficients vary between -1 and +1. The closer the absolute value is to 1, the stronger is the connection between this factor and the measured variable. A value close to 0 indicates the absence of a connection between the variable and the factor. The negative values indicate a negative correlation (the factor determines the disagreement with the statement). The coefficients were calculated through Varimax method.

- Lack of rule of law
- Violation of human rights

▪ **Factor 3 - Poverty Factor**

- Low salaries
- Unemployment
- Health condition

Each of these factors has a variable importance for each individual, giving it a specific importance. An individual can be influenced in his/her perceptions and attitudes by one factor, more factors (equally or differently) or by none.


Through the *cluster analysis*,⁴ we determined the existence of five types (classes, segments) of respondents from the sample. They differ by the relevance of the three factors (expressed through average values of the factorial scores):

Segment	Respondents' share within the sample	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3	
1	19.2%	weak rejection	-0,348	strong rejection	-0,745	strong rejection	-0,945
2	7.1%	strong attraction	1,297	weak attraction	0,239	strong rejection	-1,144
3	20.1%	strong attraction	0,955	strong rejection	-0,861	strong attraction	0,738
4	35.9%	neutral	-0,028	strong attraction	0,940	neutral	-0,176
5	17.7%	strong rejection	-1,164	weak rejection	-0,217	strong attraction	1,001

Classification of segments

Segment 1: „Our problems are not too serious“ – 19.2%

- This is the segment, considering that Moldova's problems are not very serious: the social problems (corruption, drug abuse/drug trafficking, environmental issues, etc.) or conflicts (armed, ethnic, lack of press freedom, human rights etc.) are not




⁴ *The cluster analysis* groups the individuals in exclusive categories depending on the resemblance of the answers to a set of questions (in our case it is the agreement or disagreement with the ten statements). We used the K-means method, with tens of iterations.

considered to be serious, while poverty (unemployment, low salaries, health condition) represents a phenomenon which requires, however, more attention⁵;

- This segment is specific to the individuals with higher education, people living in urban areas and Russians;


Segment 2: „The problems are very serious in the absence of a rule of law“ - 7.1%

- This is the segment of respondents, which considers the social problems (especially trafficking in human beings, relations with the Transnistrian region), very critical. The social problems are followed by conflicts (especially armed and ethnic conflicts, the absence of rule of law), while poverty (unemployment, low salaries, health condition) is considered less serious than the above-mentioned phenomena;
- This segment is specific to individuals living in urban areas, Moldovans and Russians;



Segment 3: „Corruption and poverty“ - 20.1%

- This is the segment of people who consider that social problems (particularly trafficking in persons, corruption, relations with the Transnistrian region) and the problems generated by poverty are very critical.
- Violations of laws and human rights are issues that need to be addressed. The issue of potential armed and ethnic conflicts or tensions is less perceived by this segment;




⁵ The values that are significantly higher than the total per sample, are circled.

- This is specific to people living in rural areas, people with secondary education, and Moldovans;

Segment 4: „If our rights are not respected, we will fight for them“ – 35.9%

- This is the segment of people who consider that human rights are not respected and that this is a major issue; conflicts (ethnic or eventual armed confrontations, even terrorism) are perceived as highly possible.
- This is specific to people living in urban areas, Gagauz and Bulgarians;




Segment 5: „Poverty is everywhere“ – 17.7%

- This is the segment perceiving poverty and unemployment as crucial problems;
- This segment is specific to people living in rural areas, people with general and vocational education, Ukrainians and Gagauz;

Thus, we can also notice in the following table (Table 1), that throughout the sample, poverty is perceived as being the most serious problem in Moldova; the society is also concerned with high crime level, corruption, trafficking in women, an unsatisfactory relationship with Transnistrian region (issues generically grouped under Society)

The violations of rights, whether mass media or human rights in general, the potential ethnic conflicts, armed confrontations or even terrorist threats are considered to be issues that have reached the limit to become also serious. The order of these factors is not preserved for all population segments, in other words, the priority of issues does not coincide with the order of priority at the national level.



		Segment					Total Sample
		1	2	3	4	5	
POVERTY Factor	Low salaries	2,1	2,1	2,9	2,4	2,9	2,5
	Unemployment	2,0	2,2	2,9	2,5	2,8	2,5
	Health condition	1,9	2,2	2,6	2,4	2,4	2,3
	Total factor:	2,0	2,2	2,8	2,4	2,7	2,4
SOCIETY Factor	Trafficking in women	2,0	2,8	2,8	2,3	1,9	2,3
	Relations with Transnistria	2,0	2,7	2,7	2,3	1,8	2,2
	Drug abuse	1,9	2,6	2,4	2,3	1,8	2,1
	Corruption	2,0	2,6	2,8	2,4	2,1	2,3
	Drug trafficking	1,8	2,5	2,3	2,3	1,8	2,1
	Environmental issues	1,8	2,5	2,4	2,4	1,9	2,1
	Crime level/insecurity	1,8	2,5	2,5	2,3	2,0	2,2
	Total factor:	1,9	2,6	2,5	2,3	1,9	2,2
CONFLICTS Factor	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	1,3	2,2	1,5	2,3	1,6	1,8
	Armed conflicts	1,3	2,2	1,5	2,4	1,6	1,8
	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	1,4	1,8	1,7	2,4	1,9	1,9
	Lack of rule of law	1,7	2,4	2,2	2,4	1,7	2,1
	Lack of press freedom	1,5	2,3	1,8	2,3	1,5	1,9
	Violation of human rights	1,7	2,1	2,3	2,4	2,1	2,1
	Total factor:	1,5	2,2	1,8	2,3	1,8	1,9

Table 1. The average values for the following question: „I will read you a list of issues our country is facing with. For each issue, I would like to ask you to tell me if you consider it crucial (3 points), serious (2 points), or not too serious (1 point).

We deal with a different perception of daily realities, which differs depending on the level of education, residence area and ethnic background. We notice *two worlds*: a *rural world*, which perceives poverty and unemployment as crucial (85 percent of the households live below decent conditions); and an *urban world* preoccupied mostly with the respect of human rights, rule of law and includes a significant segment of people who consider that the problems are not as bad as they seem. Thirty percent of these can afford to live a decent life. Another clear differentiation can be noticed in the perceptions at the ethnic level:

- Moldovans are mostly preoccupied with issues included in the *Society* category (trafficking in persons, corruption, settlement of the Transnistrian issue) and issues related to *Poverty*;
- Russians form an ethnic group with the highest share of people who consider that the situation is not very serious;
- Gagauz and Bulgarians complain about violation of rights. They also represent the segment of people who believe that there is a high potential of conflicts, therefore, this issue should receive maximal attention;
- Ukrainians and Gagauz have the highest share in the number of population that perceives the issues of poverty and unemployment as extremely serious.

A different perception of the daily realities, which noticeable varies depending on the ethnic background, is the first sign confirming the central hypothesis of our work.

A brief analysis of the living standards, income, and occupations reveals again the differences between ethnic groups: Russians and Bulgarians are the ones who declare that they manage to save or even buy more expensive things. Incomes over 1,000 Lei are more frequent among them. Moldovans and Ukrainians dominate the other extreme

		Sample					Total Sample
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	
Are you presently employed?	Yes	33%	35%	27%	32%	39%	33%
	No	67%	65%	73%	68%	61%	67%
What is your household income?	Under 400 Lei	39%	24%	40%	30%	24%	32%
	401-1000 lei	30%	31%	33%	40%	42%	35%
	Over 1000 lei	14%	25%	16%	11%	24%	17%
	Don't know/No answer	17%	21%	12%	19%	10%	16%
How do you estimate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	40%	33%	41%	46%	34%	39%
	Money is enough only for food....	43%	39%	39%	37%	42%	40%
	We have money for food and clothes, we can even save some money.	14%	21%	18%	15%	21%	17%
	We can afford to buy more expensive things...	3%	6%	2%	1%	3%	3%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%

The values that are significantly higher than the total per sample are highlighted

Interethnic Climate

In order to provide more details about the analysis of perceptions regarding the evolution of interethnic relations, the respondents were asked to make a qualitative assessment of these relations at different times in the history of the Republic of Moldova.

Ethnic group	Sample									
	Moldovans		Russians		Ukrainians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Moldovans			30%	27%	24%	28%	31%	18%	29%	18%
Russians	28%	35%			15%	8%	29%	4%	28%	6%
Ukrainians	23%	19%	20%	9%			24%	7%	25%	7%
Gagauz	16%	17%	14%	7%	6%	6%			27%	9%
Bulgarians	14%	15%	15%	6%	5%	4%	23%	5%		

Table 2. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from Moldova better or worse than 15 years ago? „+“ – percentage for answers *much better* and *somewhat better*; „-“ – percentage for answers *much worse* and *somewhat worse*.

Ethnic group	Sample									
	Moldovans		Russians		Ukrainians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Moldovans			28%	24%	21%	13%	28%	15%	30%	12%
Russians	26%	28%			14%	6%	24%	6%	30%	4%
Ukrainians	20%	14%	18%	9%			19%	6%	26%	4%
Gagauz	13%	17%	11%	8%	4%	5%			27%	8%
Bulgarians	13%	11%	12%	7%	4%	4%	19%	6%		

Table 3. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from Moldova better or worse than 5 years ago? „+“ – percentage for answers *much better* and *somewhat better*; „-“ – percentage for answers *much worse* and *somewhat worse*.

Ethnic group	Sample									
	Moldovans		Russians		Ukrainians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Moldovans			22%	21%	19%	10%	29%	12%	28%	9%
Russians	21%	24%			13%	6%	25%	5%	28%	4%
Ukrainians	17%	14%	14%	9%			21%	6%	23%	5%
Gagauz	13%	13%	8%	8%	4%	4%			27%	6%
Bulgarians	12%	8%	10%	7%	4%	3%	19%	6%		

Table 4. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from Moldova better or worse than last year? „+“ – percentage for answers *much better* and *somewhat better*; „-“ – percentage for answers *much worse* and *somewhat worse*.

- Only among Moldovans the dominant opinion of their relations with Russians is that these were better 15 years ago. However, Moldovans do not have a dominant opinion regarding their relations with other ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians). In other words, there is no significant difference between the shares of those who consider that the relations with other ethnic groups are better or worse, regardless if they consider the period before the independence or a more recent time;
- The relationship between Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Moldovans is rather perceived as improving, however it has a specific: Next to the relationship with Moldovans we find significant shares of those who consider that this relationship was better before the nineties;
- The relationships between Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians are generally perceived as obviously improving.
- Bulgarians are more convinced that the interethnic climate that exists between them and other ethnic groups is continuously improving. In their opinion, there are no major differences between them regardless of the period. Almost 30%

believe that the relationships with other ethnic groups are better or much better than 15 years ago, 5 years ago or last year, while the share of those, who believe that the relations are worse, is much smaller. One should mention that the relationship with Moldovans was regarded by one in five Bulgarians as much better than before the independence of Moldova.

State and minorities

This section investigates the perception of the role of state: both the role of the external national homeland towards its ethnonational kin (Russia for the Russians living in Moldova, Moldova for Moldovans living in other countries, etc.), and the role of the nationalizing state.

	The role of state											
	Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Turkey		Bulgaria		Romania	
	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree	Totally agree+ rather agree	Rather do not agree+totally disagree
support [...] students studying abroad	92%	3%	87%	6%	86%	6%	77%	10%	80%	8%	90%	3%
support [...] businesses abroad	75%	13%	78%	13%	78%	12%	70%	16%	72%	14%	85%	5%
support [...] cultural organizations abroad	81%	8%	78%	14%	77%	14%	68%	18%	71%	17%	82%	8%

Table 5. Perception of the roles of different states (results from *Moldovans* sample) The brackets [...] should be filled in with ethnic groups related with the associated state e.g. Russia's role is to „support Russian students...“, Ukraine's role is to „support Ukrainian students...“, etc.

When evaluating the role of the external national homeland in similar situations, Moldovans are consistent, regarding the roles of Russia, Ukraine and Romania. However, they tend to be inconsistent when speaking about the role of Turkey or Bulgaria in supporting the Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova. One can notice differences particularly regarding the support that the Moldovan state should offer to Moldovan students studying abroad, and acceptance of Turkey and Bulgaria's support of Gagauz and Bulgarian students. In other words, Moldovans do not recognize and do not accept in the same manner the prerogatives of Turkey and Bulgaria towards their ethnonational kin living in Moldova, especially when the support of students or cultural organizations is involved.

This is explained by a lower trust in these ethnic groups, which generates a desire for a larger social distance from these groups (see results from *Social Capital* chapter). In addition, the Gagauz autonomy and their desire to separate have affected the trust and tolerance of Moldovans towards this group, especially when the Transnistrian conflict risks resulting in another separation. The same inconsistency of appreciations is found among Russians and Ukrainians, when these refer to the support offered by Turkey and Bulgaria to their ethnonational kin living in Moldova.

	Sample									
	Moldovans		Russians		Ukrainians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	too many rights	too few rights	too many rights	too few rights	too many rights	too few rights	too many rights	too few rights	too many rights	too few rights
a. Russians have...	22%	4%	5%	20%	6%	11%	9%	7%	9%	14%
a. Ukrainians have...	11%	6%	3%	19%	1%	16%	3%	9%	3%	17%
b. Gagauz have...	10%	7%	3%	19%	2%	10%	6%	15%	10%	13%
a. Bulgarians have...	7%	6%	2%	20%	2%	11%	3%	9%	2%	22%
b. Romanians have...	6%	10%	13%	10%	6%	7%	6%	3%	9%	8%

Table 6. Perception of legislation on minorities. How do you appreciate the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?

One of the most debated issues when speaking about minorities is related to their rights, especially the sufficiency or insufficiency of these rights. Of course, in our case we deal with a subjective understanding of the terms „sufficient“ and „insufficient“, the meanings assigned by the majority or minorities are probably different, based on personal experiences“. However, the tendency is clear and can be easily observed in Table 6. Moldovans (as majority population) consider Russians as being the ethnic group benefiting from most privileges, while the differences for the rest of the ethnic groups are minimal. The minority ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians) believe that they are deprived from some rights that they are entitled to.

Identity and otherness

The way people identify themselves depends on the way they act and relate to the others. The perceptions and practices of individuals are structured according to the way they identify themselves. We identify ourselves with a certain culture (language, traditions, customs, specific ways of doing things, etc.), with a certain collective history, as well as with a certain potential for mobilization when ethnic/national issues are concerned.

The term *identity* is difficult to grasp and to conceptualize in measurable indicators. Concerning nationalism and interethnic relations, one reached a consensus on the interpretation of ethnicity and ethnic identity by applying a constructivist approach; Thomas Eriksen⁶ stresses that „ethnicity appears and becomes relevant in and through social situations and interactions, and the way people react to these situations“. Identification also means appeal to certain categories of representations and descriptions.

The opposition is considered a universal mechanism in the process of identification: one individual or group identifies itself in opposition to other individuals or groups; very often one tends to attribute positive features to his/her ethnic group in opposition to the other groups (which are assigned with the opposite negative features). We will analyze the data from the *Ethnobarometer* survey in accordance with this theoretical framework, looking at some aspects of self-identification and hetero-identification. We will examine the existence of a different potential in the way one defines one's own identity and the identity of other ethnic groups. The starting premise is that the logic of their definition is different in case of the ethnic groups covered by us. On the other hand, we aim to detect the similarities and differences between hetero-identification and self-definition for each ethnic group, as well as the similarities and differences regarding the fundamentals in the definition of our own identity and the identity of other ethnic groups.

	SELF-DEFINITION	HETERO-DEFINITION
Moldovans define	...the identity fundamentals of Moldovans	...the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups
Russians defines	...the identity fundamentals of Russians	...the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups
Ukrainians define	...the identity fundamentals of Ukrainians	...the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups
Gagauz define	...the identity fundamentals of Gagauz	...the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups
Bulgarians define	...the identity fundamentals of Bulgarians	...the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups

Table 7. Analysis scheme of identity definition

The perspective adopted by this research is constructivist: the identity is formed based on certain social processes; it changes and reforms itself through the means of social relations. The social structure determines the social processes involved in the emergence and preservation of identity. The causality between identities and social structure is circular, thus, identities can influence the social structure. Alternatively, the specific social structures generate certain types of identity, which are relatively stable and whose stability level is determined socially.

⁶ Eriksen, T. H. (1993), *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*, London, Pluto Press.

We will undertake a brief discussion on a functional conceptual couple and specifically **identity-otherness**, the mandatory task for the approach of the present research. The identity, the capacity of an object to be itself, can be understood only in relation with the otherness, explicitly in relation with the assumption that an external reality of the analyzed object exists, a relation which is different from the internal reality attributed to the object. The theory of social identity outlines briefly the relation between the individual and collective identity, and this relation is built up on a difference, contrast development and emphasis on an otherness.⁷ Social identity is the psychological structure that links the individual with the group and accepts categorial processes and behaviors: that part of the concept of oneself (Mead's „I“, 1934), which derives from the conscience of affiliation with one or more social groups or categories⁸. The distinction between the self-perception, as a single individual, and the self-perception as a pattern belonging to a category, could explain the different psychological functioning at individual and group level.

In order to understand the mechanisms of self- and hetero-definition, it is necessary to understand the relationships between the identity and self-identification, between otherness and hetero-definition, accordingly.

- a) The differences between the in-group and the out-group are established mainly based on mechanisms of opposition or polar organization of information;
- b) Self- and hetero-identification are linked to a series of psychological rules and constants related to the attribution processes;

Attribution is ‘rendering a judgment, inferring something, an intuition, a quality, a feeling of one’s own condition or the condition of an individual starting from an object, a disposition, position in space, a gesture, a state of mind’⁹. In other words, the attribution is nothing else than the process of emergence of a causality for explaining the events and processes around us. It has a significant explanatory function, being the individuals’ causal interpretation of the social world. In 1972, Schopler and Layton emphasized on the scholars’ tendency to relate the internal causes to success (accordingly, own skills and own qualities) and external causes to failures (accordingly, students’ indiscipline, their incapacity of studying). Beyond the fact that this became a classic example, quoted by the social psychologists, when talking about attribution processes, we should keep in mind that when we relate ourselves to success - we make internal attributions for in-group and external attributions for out-group. We find, thus, the following arguments: we owe our success to our qualities and ourselves, while the failure is the work of *the others*. This way, we try to maintain a relatively high self-esteem, relating our successes to internal causes and our failures to external causes. We emphasized this example in

⁷ Lorenzi-Cioldi, F.-Doise, W., (1997), „Identitate socială și identitate personală“, citat în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri, Iași: Polirom, p. 53.

⁸ Capozza, Dora, Volpato, Chiara, (1997), „Relații intergrupuri: perspective clasice și contemporane“, citat în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri, Iași: Polirom, p. 22.

⁹ Moscovici, S., (1972), *L’homme en interaction: machine a repondre ou machine a inferer*, în Moscovici, S. (ed.) *Introduction a la psychologie sociale* (vol. 2), Paris: Larousse, p. 60.

order to distinguish the bipolar logic where the self- and hetero-definitions emerge. By projecting the mechanisms of affiliation to ethnic groups, we can identify the *ethnocentrism* as the main error of attribution.

The term *ethnocentrism*, introduced by Summer in 1906, means „*bias* in favor of in-group, a phenomenon where the members of a group favor the peers within their group (showing them positive attitudes and assigning positive stereotypes), at the expense of the individuals belonging to different group of affiliation“¹⁰.

We will use the theory of social identity developed by Tajfel as a starting point in the conceptualization of identity, underlining several key-elements that will support our analysis:

- Internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity is one of the principles of *in-group*¹¹ and *out-group* structure. The tendency is to perceive the out-group more homogeneously due to proximity and visibility reasons. The studies showed that the minorities perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being more homogeneous¹².
- Another key-element is the representations of differences in status among the groups. The groups with a higher status tend to perceive in a more homogeneous and general manner than the group with a lower status.
- An important distinction we must make in our research is the distinction between **primordialists/ericksonian**s and **interactionists/optionalists**.¹³ The primordialists conceptualize the identity as an objective and unalterable gift, a substantial and structural element of genetic nature, while the interactionists view it as something developed in interaction with others, therefore it can be changed and restructured.

We start from the hypothesis that there are potentially different reasons for the way in which the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians define their own identity and the identity of other ethnic groups. Therefore, we will try to see if there are elements that could lead to substantial differentiations among the ways in which the above-mentioned ethnic groups relate to their identity.

The first typology we will use is the *hard* definition versus *soft* definition.

a) The *hard* definition includes sets of criteria of „objective gift“ type, more precisely,

¹⁰ Dechamps, J.C.-Beauvois, J.L., (1997), „Atribuire intergrupuri“, în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri, Iași: Polirom, p. 53.

¹¹ In-group=group of affiliation, the group with which the individual affiliates based on resemblance and inclusion reasons.

¹² Mullen B.-Hu, L., (1989), „Perceptions of In-group and Out-group Variability: A Meta-Analytic Integration“, Basic and Applied Psychology, 10, pp.233-253, citat în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri, Iași: Polirom, p. 22.

¹³ Gleason, P., (1983), „Identifying Identity: A semantic Hystory“, citat în Soreanu, Raluca, (2005), „Auto-definire și heterodefinire a românilor și maghiarilor“, în Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relațiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 68.

criteria that are independent from the individual's will, like parents belonging to a certain ethnic group. Next to this, in the answer grid, we can find criteria such as **territorial** (be born in Moldova, Russia etc.), **linguistic** (speak Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, etc as native language or speak Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian in the family) and **legal** (hold Moldovan, Russian etc. citizenship)

- b) The fundamentals of the *soft definition* are found at the intersection of the cultural sphere and subjective revaluation of symbols and practices (to honor the national symbols, particularly the flag, to feel a culture as one's own, to respect the traditions of a culture, to feel Moldovan, Russian etc.).

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Total
a. Must have Moldovan parents	36%	10%	5%	51%
b. Must speak Moldovan/Romanian in the family	19%	20%	9%	48%
c. Must respect Moldovan traditions	8%	16%	12%	36%
d. Must feel Moldovan	8%	11%	11%	30%
e. Must perceive Moldovan culture as his/her own culture	3%	10%	10%	23%
f. Must perceive Romanian culture as his/her own culture ¹	2%	3%	3%	9%
g. Must respect the Moldovan national flag	1%	3%	5%	9%
h. Must live in Moldova	5%	6%	14%	26%
i. Must be a native Moldovan/Romanian speaker	5%	7%	9%	21%
j. Must have Moldovan citizenship	4%	8%	9%	21%
k. Must be born in Moldova	7%	4%	8%	18%

Table 8. Self-identification *Moldovans*¹⁴

	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. Must have Moldovan parents	45%	40%	48%	55%
b. Must speak Moldovan/Romanian in their family	33%	25%	32%	35%
c. Must respect Moldovan traditions	31%	30%	27%	34%
d. Must feel Moldovan	37%	29%	29%	36%
e. Must perceive Moldovan culture as his/her own culture	31%	26%	20%	27%
f. Must perceive Romanian culture as their own culture	6%	5%	11%	11%
g. Must honor the Moldovan National flag	9%	6%	11%	12%
h. Must live in Moldova	27%	21%	26%	24%
i. Must be a native Moldovan/Romanian speaker	29%	35%	25%	25%
j. Must have Moldovan citizenship	16%	13%	18%	13%
k. Must be born in Moldova	12%	10%	6%	9%

Table 9. Hetero identification *Moldovans*¹⁵

¹⁴ The Moldovans define the Moldovan ethnic group. The question from the survey reads: „In your opinion, which are the three most important things that give a person the right to be considered a MOLDOVAN? The respondents were asked to provide maximum three options. The difference to 100 percent for each column represents the unanswered questions. Same requirements were applied to other ethnic groups.

¹⁵ The other ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians) define the fundamentals for the identification of the Moldovan ethnic group.

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Total
a. Must have Russian parents	34%	6%	6%	46%
b. Must speak Russian in the family	14%	13%	11%	38%
c. Must respect Russian traditions	9%	12%	9%	31%
d. Must feel Russian	13%	18%	11%	42%
e. Must perceive Russian culture as his/her own culture	8%	12%	9%	29%
f. Must honor the Russian national flag	1%	5%	4%	10%
g. Must live in Russia	4%	7%	8%	19%
h. Must be a native speaker of Russian language	7%	12%	15%	34%
i. Must have Russian citizenship	2%	4%	8%	14%
j. Must be born in Russia	5%	5%	8%	18%

Table 10. Self-identification *Russians*

	Moldovans	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. Must have Russian parents	48%	44%	47%	51%
b. Must speak Russian in the family	38%	27%	33%	37%
c. Must respect Russian traditions	32%	30%	27%	34%
d. Must feel Russian	26%	29%	24%	36%
e. Must perceive Russian culture as own culture	21%	25%	23%	30%
f. Must honor the Russian national flag	10%	8%	9%	12%
g. Must live in Russia	21%	12%	19%	21%
h. Must be a native speaker of Russian language	26%	37%	33%	32%
i. Must have Russian citizenship	23%	15%	18%	19%
j. Must be born in Russia	23%	12%	14%	10%

Table 11. Hetero-identification *Russians*

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Total
a. Must have Ukrainian parents	33%	11%	7%	48%
b. Must speak Ukrainian in the family	10%	15%	7%	29%
c. Must respect Ukrainian traditions	7%	10%	15%	29%
d. Must feel Ukrainian	11%	16%	13%	37%
e. Must perceive Ukrainian culture as own culture	6%	10%	12%	25%
f. Must honor the Ukrainian National flag	1%	3%	3%	6%
g. Must live in Ukraine	4%	4%	5%	12%
h. Must be a native speaker of Ukrainian	20%	9%	14%	40%
i. Must have Ukrainian citizenship	2%	4%	8%	13%
j. Must be born in Ukraine	3%	3%	7%	12%

Table 12. Self-identification *Ukrainians*

	Moldovans	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. Must have Ukrainian parents	49%	47%	49%	53%
b. Must speak Ukrainian in the family	37%	34%	31%	39%
c. Must respect Ukrainian traditions	32%	32%	29%	32%
d. Must feel Ukrainian	27%	37%	24%	38%
e. Must perceive Ukrainian culture as his/her own culture	22%	27%	22%	30%
f. Must honor the Ukrainian National flag	9%	10%	10%	13%
g. Must live in Ukraine	20%	20%	18%	18%
h. Must be a native Ukrainian speaker	24%	28%	34%	30%
i. Must have Ukrainian citizenship	22%	13%	15%	15%
j. Must be born in Ukraine	20%	16%	13%	10%

Table 13. Hetero identification *Ukrainians*

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Total
a. Must have Gagauz parents	40%	9%	7%	56%
b. Must speak Gagauz in the family	13%	16%	8%	38%
c. Must respect Gagauz traditions	9%	9%	15%	33%
d. Must feel Gagauz	9%	13%	9%	31%
e. Must perceive Gagauz culture as his/her own culture	3%	11%	11%	25%
f. Must honor the Gagauz National flag	2%	7%	5%	14%
g. Must live in the Gagauz region	7%	11%	14%	32%
h. Must be a native Gagauz speaker	6%	11%	14%	31%
i. Must be born in the Gagauz region	3%	6%	6%	16%

Table 14. Self-identification *Gagauz*

	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Bulgarians
a. Must have Gagauz parents	48%	47%	39%	55%
b. Must speak Gagauz in the family	37%	33%	21%	41%
c. Must respect Gagauz traditions	35%	29%	22%	35%
d. Must feel Gagauz	26%	34%	25%	36%
e. Must perceive Gagauz culture as his/her own culture	23%	30%	23%	29%
f. Must honor the Gagauz national flag	9%	8%	8%	18%
g. Must live in the Gagauz region	27%	33%	24%	27%
h. Must be a native Gagauz speaker	24%	27%	32%	27%
i. Must be born in the Gagauz region	22%	17%	14%	10%

Table 15. Hetero identification *Gagauz*

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Total
a. Must have Bulgarian parents	45%	7%	6%	59%
b. Must speak Bulgarian language in the family	18%	22%	7%	46%
c. Must respect Bulgarian traditions	9%	10%	17%	36%
d. Must feel Bulgarian	12%	13%	13%	38%
e. Must perceive Bulgarian culture as its own culture	3%	13%	16%	31%
f. Must honor the Bulgarian national flag	0%	7%	6%	13%
g. Must live in Bulgaria	2%	5%	3%	10%
h. Must be a native Bulgarian speaker	2%	13%	17%	32%
i. Must have Bulgarian citizenship	2%	4%	6%	12%
j. Must be born in Bulgaria	3%	1%	3%	6%

Table 16. Self-identification *Bulgarians*

	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz
a. Must have Bulgarian parents	49%	48%	36%	49%
b. Must speak Bulgarian language in the family	38%	34%	22%	32%
c. Must respect Bulgarian traditions	34%	29%	24%	33%
d. Must feel Bulgarian	26%	36%	25%	25%
e. Must perceive Bulgarian culture as his/her own culture	22%	29%	22%	21%
f. Must honor the Bulgarian national flag	8%	8%	7%	11%
g. Must live in Bulgaria	15%	14%	10%	17%
h. Must be a native Bulgarian speaker	24%	32%	35%	30%
i. Must have Bulgarian citizenship	18%	13%	11%	14%
j. Must be born in Bulgaria	19%	15%	13%	13%

Table 17. Hetero-identification *Bulgarians*

Tables 8-17 show that the members of the five ethnic groups mainly choose the *hard* criteria for the definition of their identity. These, in fact, refer to objective conditions, which do not depend on the individual decision or subjectivity, particularly the blood relations and language. This „hard“ core mentioned by the participants in the research is followed by the „soft“ criteria in the hierarchy of self-definition criteria. At this time one can notice a first differentiation between the ethnic groups: while the Moldovans choose the traditions as identification element, the other ethnic groups choose a vaguer and more general element included in the statement „I feel Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian“.

The identity is seen mainly in terms that emphasize the kinship and the language criterion, and then subjective elements become valued. The Moldovans express their affiliation with a culture by respecting the traditions, while the rest of the ethnic groups have the tendency to choose a vaguer and more general criterion, which is the one to

„feel Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz or Bulgarian“. This proves that for the rest of the ethnic groups, their cultural identity and the links with a certain culture are vague.

One can notice a tendency of using the same definition pattern for all ethnic groups, both for their own identity and for the identity of other ethnic groups. The scheme from below tries to synthesize these patterns, showing small nuances and differences:

Ethnic group	Main elements used in self-identification	Main elements used in hetero-identification	Specific elements
Moldovans	Blood relations Language spoken in the family Respecting traditions	Blood relations Language spoken in the family Respecting traditions	x
Russians	Blood relations Language spoken in the family To feel Russian	Blood relations Language spoken in the family To feel Russian, Bulgarian	-hetero-identification for Gagauz: To live in Gagauzia region
Ukrainians	Blood relations Mother tongue To feel Ukrainian	Blood relations Mother tongue	-hetero-identification for Moldovans: Respecting traditions
Gagauz	Blood relations Language spoken in the family	Blood relations Language spoken in the family	-hetero-identification for Russians and Ukrainians: Mother tongue -hetero-identification for Bulgarians: Respecting traditions
Bulgarians	Blood relations Language spoken in the family To feel Bulgarian	Blood relations Language spoken in the family To feel Russian, Bulgarian	-hetero-identification for Russians, Ukrainians and Gagauz: Respecting traditions -hetero-identification for Russians: Mother tongue

Table 18. Elements used for self and hetero-identification.

We can assert that there are no major differences in reasoning one's own identity and the identity of other groups. Thus, *hard* criteria are used. Regarding the *soft* criteria, the only nuance which can be noticed is the selection by Moldovans self- and hetero-identification element, the criteria of respecting traditions, while the tendency for other ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians) is to choose a more general criterion, the one to feel Moldovan, Russian, etc. The conformity of the definition models refutes a hypothesis of the present research or, to be more precise, its confirmation that could be only partial and related to two cultural elements, used for identification. The theoretical expectation was that the ethnic groups develop different models of reasoning their iden-

tity and the identity of other groups. This agreement could be interpreted as an openness of the ethnic groups from Moldova towards inclusion practices, with mechanisms for generation and justification of identity, perceived in a (relatively) similar manner.

Another classification relates to identity alternatives such as **civic identity**, defined in relation with the state structure (and which implies a legal-formal affiliation), **ethnic identity**, which implies a kind of cultural affiliation, and the **alternative identity**, particularly local and regional (CIS, Europe).

Concerning self-identification based on civic, ethnic/national and local/regional dimensions, the answers to the question, „Which of the following statements describe best your identity?“ were the following¹⁶.

Identity	Moldovans/ Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Moldovan/Russian/Ukrainian/ Gagauz/Bulgarian	81%	58%	71%	81%	79%
Romanian	14%	-	-	-	-
Resident of this locality	32%	36%	42%	43%	34%
Citizen of Moldova	57%	68%	64%	46%	55%
CIS Resident	3%	12%	12%	14%	15%
European	6%	7%	3%	6%	10%
Eastern European	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
Don't know/No answer	7%	18%	8%	9%	7%

We can see again a valuation of ethnic identity, with the exception of Russians who chose rather a civic identity. It is surprising that Moldovans did not choose more often the territorial elements (to be born in Moldova, to live in Moldova) or the legal-formal elements (to have Moldovan citizenship), which shows an identity that is not *fixed* in a clearly determined space. The young nature of the Moldovan state and the Transnistrian conflict sustains the above-mentioned statements.

For comparison, we present you the data of the 2002 Barometer of Ethnic Relations in Romania¹⁷, which shows that Romanians often perceive their identity in very different terms. The Romanians particularly focus on civic identity (to be Romanian is... to be born in Romania (64 percent), to have Romanian citizenship (37 percent) combined with elements of ethnic identity of linguistic nature (to be Romanian is to ...be a native Romanian speaker (42 percent).

The mixed strategy, which combines a local territorial identity with larger spaces (Europe, Eastern Europe, CIS) was not chosen by many respondents. However, one can easily notice the tendency of other ethnic groups to lean towards CIS space rather than Europe. Considering their background and the geographic position of the country, Bulgarians tend to equal these two identity options (CIS/Europe). It is worth mentioning that

¹⁶ The respondents had the opportunity to provide maximum two answers.

¹⁷ Conducted by Metro Media Transilvania, Cluj-Napoca.

the lowest share among the ethnic groups, that chose to identify with CIS Space, is represented by Moldovans (3%). However, the share of other ethnic groups that identified themselves in a similar manner varies between 12 and 15 percent, which means that the chances that these groups develop a supra-national identity are directed towards CIS, rather than European or Eastern European space.

As a final remark, regarding this chapter of identity, we could outline the existence of certain automatisms, answers that can also show an insufficiently shaped image, regarding other groups. Ukrainians, for example, tend to perceive the identity of other groups through the prism of parents and mother tongue- this is the order for all their hetero-identifications of other ethnic groups. This could be a sign of „transfers“ from the model of identification applied to their own group, to others, transfers that could be in fact based on the non-recognition of the other.

Native language and nationality. Mutual knowledge of language

As we emphasized in the previous chapter, most of ethnic groups from Moldova define their ethnic affiliation through native language (or the language spoken in the family).

The tendency, as we can notice in table 19, is to preserve the native language; in other words, there is congruence between nationality and declared native language. We want to emphasize that a significant percentage of people from other ethnic groups, except for the Moldovans, declare their native language as Russian, even though they belong to a different ethnic group.

Ethnic group	Declared mother tongue				
	Romanian	Russian	Ukrainian	Gagauz	Bulgarian
Moldovans	98%	2%	1%	-	-
Russians	9%	94%	3%	1%	-
Ukrainians	4%	25%	82%	-	-
Gagauz	-	14%	-	97%	1%
Bulgarians	7%	22%	1%	2%	92%

Table 19. Nationality and declared native language (respondents were given the possibility to offer more answers to the question about their native language).

Probably, the percentage of Moldovans declaring Russian as their native language would have been higher several years ago, when Russian was the official language. The results registered after the analysis of the answers to the questions backed these affirmations. According to them, 7 percent of Moldovans speak Russian more frequently than Romanian in their family; one in five Moldovans considers that there should be two official languages (these are usually persons aged 30-44, who have not completed their high school education) and approximately 85 percent of Moldovans manage to make themselves understood when speaking Russian.

Ethnic group	Language																	
	Moldovan			Romanian			Russian			Ukrainian			Gagauz			Bulgarian		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Moldovans	91%	5%	2%	56%	32%	7%	27%	35%	24%	2%	4%	13%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Russians	12%	20%	23%	7%	14%	20%	98%	1%	0%	16%	11%	20%	2%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Ukrainians	11%	19%	26%	7%	15%	20%	80%	14%	4%	89%	5%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Gagauz	1%	2%	18%	1%	2%	11%	60%	29%	8%	1%	2%	8%	97%	0%	1%	1%	1%	5%
Bulgarians	12%	14%	19%	10%	11%	10%	67%	23%	8%	4%	2%	12%	8%	3%	4%	89%	6%	2%

Table 20. „How well do you speak...?“ where 1 = „Speak perfectly“, 2= „Speak very good, though with an accent‘ and 3= „I manage to be understood in most of the situations“.

Thus, we can talk about congruence between nationality and declared native language but, on the other hand, this fact is doubled by a natural consequence of the recent history: only 45 years ago, Russian was the state official language.

Ethnic group	Language																	
	Moldovan			Romanian			Russian			Ukrainian			Gagauz			Bulgarian		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Moldovans	98%	0%	0%	95%	1%	1%	86%	11%	2%	19%	42%	37%	1%	7%	89%	1%	7%	88%
Russians	55%	37%	5%	41%	36%	14%	99%	0%	0%	47%	35%	15%	3%	13%	75%	2%	18%	73%
Ukrainians	56%	38%	4%	42%	32%	15%	98%	1%	0%	98%	2%	0%	0%	7%	78%	0%	8%	77%
Gagauz	21%	45%	33%	14%	34%	50%	97%	2%	1%	11%	31%	57%	98%	1%	1%	7%	27%	64%
Bulgarians	45%	40%	14%	31%	33%	30%	98%	1%	0%	18%	44%	36%	15%	33%	50%	97%	2%	1%

Table 21. „How well do you speak...?“ 1) „I am fluent in it“, 2) „I have the minimal knowledge“ and 3) „I do not know the language“.

If we take into account a typology that distinguishes between language competence,¹⁸ which facilitates active communication, and a minimal level of knowledge¹⁹, which offers the subjects the opportunity to exchange a minimal amount of information in that particular language, we get the following image at national level. We saw that language (native or spoken in the family) is an essential factor in defining the identity of an ethnic group; it can be regarded as a factor of oppression, intolerance, and rejection of others. Perhaps, this partly explains the hostility towards Russians, who are seen as an obstacle, because Russian language is more spoken than Romanian is in daily life, media, and relations with other people, orientation through communication towards a certain value level, towards one culture or another. We should also notice that Romanian and Moldovan are perceived as two different languages, regardless of the ethnic group we relate to, perceptions regarding the ability of speaking one language or another being different.

Stereotypes and Social Distance

When approaching interethnic relations, it is important to understand how the groups perceive otherness, stereotypes and the influence of these stereotypes on behavior and attitudes towards others. The stereotypes are based on previous discussions about identity and otherness. Walter Lippmann made an analogy between „the images from the mind“ and the term *stereotype*, which has existed since 1798, and, which was associated at that time with the mould in which lead was poured. Generally, stereotypes have a large emotional charge. They originate within society and offer the opportunity to explain the nature of the relationships between groups and nations. The definition accepted by most of the authors would be the one that represents the stereotypes as an „aggregate of shared convictions about personal characteristics, personality features, as well as a behavior specific to a group of people“²⁰.

A person belonging to a specific category (gender, ethnic background) bears the qualities associated with that particular category. When our perceptions and memories refer to complex or confusing situations or realities, we resort to stereotypes to compensate for the elements that are missing from our social judgments. The *Psychological Encyclopedia*²¹ lists the factors that determine this process:

- a. Quality of information processing;
- b. Quantity

¹⁸ The adequate knowledge of language will cumulate the percentage of the answers 1) „I speak the language fluently“, 2) „I speak the language but I have an accent“ și 3) „I can make myself understood in most situations“.

¹⁹ The minimal level of language knowledge will include the percentages of the following answers: 4) In some situations I make myself understood but with difficulty“ and 5) „I know only a couple of words“

²⁰ Leyens, J.-Ph.-Yzerbyt V.Y.-Schadron, G., (1994), „Stereotypes and Social Cognition“, London: Sage, quoted in Leyens, J.-Ph.-Yzerbyt V.Y.-Schadron, G., (1997), „Stereotipuri și judecată socială“, in Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri, Iași: Polirom, p. 98.

²¹ Chelcea, S. și Iluț, P. (coord.), Enciclopedie de psihosociologie. București, Editura Economică, 2003, p.345.

- c. Classification (favoring your own group (in-group), and depreciating the group you do not belong to (out-group));
- d. Extend of involvement of the social observer;
- e. Cognitive solicitation of the information processor;
- f. Need for structure and coherence;
- g. Affective emotional state (positive state facilitates the use of stereotypes, if the accuracy is not pressing);
- h. Affective source:
 - i. Illusion of correlation or the competition between two incentives;
 - j. Pre-existent mental schemes;
 - k. Self-achievement prophecy or meeting the expectations;

The psychosocial perspective on the inter-group behavior is based on the mutual social perceptions, regardless that they are the product of a direct experience (contact groups) or the result of prejudices, ideologies or information transmitted through inter-generational communication. Does our affiliation to a certain group have an impact on our behavior towards other groups? Can our affiliation to a certain ethnic group generate predictable orientations for the members of another group?

In order to avoid conceptual confusions and interchangeable use of terms, we will make some delimitation between stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Prejudice is the act through which we „judge in advance“ or base ourselves on „an opinion taken for granted“. It implies a negative, depreciating judgment, based sometimes (and partly) on positive assumptions. It refers to objects (material, symbolical, social), groups or persons characterized from sociodemographic or cultural point of view, by a specific, very often minority feature. The stages of the analysis will include *affective plan* (evaluations generated by prejudices: disdain, rejection, denial, hatred, love, etc.), *cognitive plan* (the world seen through prejudices, based first on stereotypes and categorizations) and *behavioral plan* (the space of practices and actions which should derive directly or indirectly from prejudice). Alternatively, discrimination represents a negative behavior on behalf of an out-group towards prejudiced individuals.

In order to be able to identify the representations through which the ethnic groups from Moldova define themselves, we started from the analysis of the qualities attributed by each individual group to their own group, and to other groups. Thus, we analyzed the way in which the respondents belonging to a certain ethnic group characterized the in-group and out-group.

The respondents of the quantitative research were asked the following: „This is a list with different features. Please find three positive and three negative features that would describe best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova.“ Respondents were given a list of qualities and were asked to choose the ones defining their own ethnic group, as well as other groups. The list in fact included pairs of positive and negative features (e.g. hard working (+)/lazy (-), united (+)/divided (-) etc.).

In-group representations²²

	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Decent	22%	26%	27%	27%	21%
Kind-hearted	27%	32%	26%	24%	25%
Hearty	23%	26%	23%	21%	17%
Independent	8%	18%	7%	9%	9%
Civilized	5%	17%	5%	9%	6%
Educated	13%	18%	10%	18%	17%
Resourceful	12%	14%	10%	10%	14%
Joyful	28%	21%	24%	17%	15%
Clean	7%	5%	4%	9%	12%
Religious	18%	7%	13%	13%	10%
United	4%	10%	5%	8%	11%
Honest	6%	9%	13%	12%	14%
Modest	5%	4%	7%	9%	13%
Hard-working	57%	15%	50%	32%	41%
Intelligent	2%	12%	6%	7%	9%
Hospitable	41%	8%	14%	7%	7%
None	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 22. Positive features

	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Selfish	14%	10%	11%	10%	10%
Aggressive	10%	17%	9%	9%	4%
Apathetic	15%	13%	7%	9%	12%
Obedient	30%	13%	14%	6%	17%
Backward	11%	4%	10%	5%	11%
Uneducated	9%	11%	9%	8%	10%
Careless	18%	12%	16%	8%	11%
Sad	11%	7%	14%	4%	10%
Dirty	4%	5%	6%	6%	10%
Superstitious	7%	7%	20%	5%	11%
Divided	19%	7%	11%	8%	18%
Thieves	13%	3%	5%	6%	5%
Vainglorious	6%	7%	6%	5%	11%
Lazy	3%	13%	9%	4%	4%
Stupid	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%
Hostile	3%	2%	2%	4%	1%
None	14%	17%	19%	12%	10%

Table 23. Negative features

- We notice two qualities chosen by Moldovans to describe themselves that clearly stand out: Hard-working (57 percent) and hospitable (41 percent). We also should mention that Moldovans are considered to be the most joyful and religious group. Surprisingly, Moldovans have the most negative representations of their **own group** and Russians; much less negative features are selected for the rest of ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians). Moldovans consider themselves *obedient*, *neglectful* and *divided*. All other ethnic groups, except the Gagauz, perceive themselves as obedient and this is a major if not the main shortcoming attributed to itself by each ethnic group.
- It is interesting to emphasize that Russians share disparate opinions concerning positive and negative representations. On one hand, they consider themselves kind-hearted (32 percent) and on the other hand, aggression is perceived as their

²² In-group=own group representations

main shortcoming (17 percent). They also consider themselves hearty and decent, getting the highest scores for features like *independent*, *civilized* and *educated*. At the same time, they consider themselves the laziest ethnic group;

- Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians have a common representation, being characterized by three features: *diligence*, the fact that they are *decent*, *kind* and *hearty*. This is close to the way Moldovans perceive themselves, the latter considering themselves more *hospitable*. Ukrainians consider themselves the most superstitious; Bulgarians (like Moldovans) think they are divided, while the Gagauz do not have any negative outstanding stereotype.
- We should not forget the joy, as the national characteristic which earns a significant score in every ethnic group.

There are two types of differences concerning hetero-image: a type that contains differences between self-image and hetero-image (i.e. the way we see ourselves, our affiliation group and how other people see us) and a type related to the existence of a disagreement, representations that are not common for a single ethnic group (Russians, for example, are not regarded the same way as other ethnic groups). Although the table in Annex B is relatively difficult to read because of data volume, we will try to provide some explanations about the differences mentioned above.

- Moldovans have stated previously that they perceive themselves being hard working and hospitable, their diligence registering significant scores; others consider Moldovans rather kind-hearted, joyful, and Gagauz people see Moldovans as hearty and decent.

There is a major difference between Moldovans' share who perceive themselves as hard-working (57 percent) and the Gagauz and Bulgarians' share who think the same about Moldovans (20 percent and 29 percent, accordingly). Similar to the case of positive representations, there is a consensus of the groups regarding Moldovans' obedience: Moldovans perceive themselves as obedient and are generally viewed as such. Others add to Moldovans' negative image with features such as: being backward and aggressive (Russians' opinion), superstitious (Ukrainians), backward and uneducated (Bulgarians);

- Russians consider themselves as kind-hearted, decent and hearty. If Gagauz and Bulgarians agree that Russians are kind-hearted and Ukrainians see them as decent, then Moldovans have a different image of Russians, considering them rather resourceful, united and independent. Joy is the only characteristic of Russians that is agreed by all the other groups. There is an agreement concerning Russians' shortcomings, namely the aggression, a feature that is accepted even by Russians. It is necessary to notice one thing related to the attributed aggression: it is certain that other ethnic groups perceive Russians' with feature such as: high aggression, but Russians feel the same aggression from other ethnic groups. Russians and

Moldovans register the highest score for aggression: Russians perceive conflict more intensely (31 percent consider Moldovans aggressive), while Moldovans think that aggression comes from Russians. Besides aggression, Russians' negative image is completed with attributes such as: being neglectful (Ukrainians and Bulgarians' opinion), uneducated, apathetic and selfish (Gagauz and Bulgarians' opinion).

- Ukrainians perceive themselves as hard working, decent and kind-hearted. Other ethnic groups consider them, first, joyful, then hard working (Moldovans' opinion), kind-hearted and hearty (Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians' opinion). Also, in the case of Ukrainians, there is no agreement concerning self-identification and hetero-identification related to their negative image. If Ukrainians consider themselves superstitious and obedient, Russians and Moldovans perceive them as aggressive and selfish, Moldovans and Bulgarians – apathetic, Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians – neglectful, Bulgarians – vainglorious.
- Gagauz and Bulgarians consider themselves hard working, decent and kind-hearted. There is not sufficiently shaped image of these ethnic groups among Moldovans, meaning that the contacts with other ethnic groups are rather low. However, territorial concentration of Gagauz and Bulgarians in the southern part of the country limits these contacts and leads to a lack of communication and information about who these people are and how they live. Russians think that Gagauz and Bulgarians are hard working and united, and Ukrainians add qualities: religious and independent. Ukrainians have the most negative representation about the Gagauz and Bulgarians, considering that Gagauz are aggressive and uneducated, and Bulgarians - neglectful and vainglorious.

Social Capital

„The other one is doing better!“

Another interesting topic related to social representations is the forms of capital possessed by ethnic groups. The survey within Ethnobarometer has included several simplified forms of capital:

- Economic capital, measured by the following question: „Which of the following groups from Moldova are the richest?“
- Political capital, measured by „Which of the following groups from Moldova have the biggest influence?“
- Symbolic capital, measured by „Which of the following groups from Moldova are the most respected?“
- Social capital, measured through the level of trust and social networks developed, especially, through voluntary associations.

	Richest					Most politically influential					Most respected				
	Sample					Sample					Sample				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Moldovans	43%	50%	33%	36%	43%	50%	57%	40%	35%	55%	50%	50%	31%	31%	45%
Russians	60%	42%	37%	30%	29%	57%	40%	33%	35%	34%	44%	48%	31%	25%	20%
Ukrainians	11%	7%	9%	5%	6%	9%	4%	6%	5%	5%	8%	3%	11%	2%	7%
Gagauz	5%	4%	5%	14%	18%	4%	5%	4%	11%	14%	2%	4%	1%	18%	8%
Bulgarians	4%	7%	3%	6%	15%	3%	3%	2%	3%	8%	3%	3%	2%	5%	18%
Romanians	7%	4%	2%	1%	2%	8%	10%	5%	3%	5%	10%	3%	3%	4%	5%
Other	3%	3%	1%	1%	5%	0%	2%	0%	0%	2%	1%	3%	0%	0%	1%
Don't know/ No answer	67%	82%	110%	107%	83%	69%	79%	110%	108%	77%	82%	86%	121%	115%	86%

Table 24. Perception of the richest, most politically influential and most respected groups in Moldova

The analysis conclusions from the above table are suggestive and linked to the previous results. *Two poles* of power are outlined: the first group is represented by Moldovans and Russians, perceived as having material resources (wealth), largest political influence, and being the most respected; the second group is represented by Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians, perceived as the most disadvantaged, and marginalized from this perspective. Moldovans are perceived by all other ethnic groups as the richest, and most politically influential. Moldovans are tempted to give the political and economic power to Russians. „The other has more privileges, the other does better“, seems to be the rule that most of ethnic groups follow. The existence of a dispute between these two ethnic groups (Moldovans and Russians) for holding different types of capital is outlined by the given scores, which have relatively close values.

In the context of the present research, the concept of social capital is related to the level of general trust and the share of members from the networks founded on voluntary association. Further, we will be interested in the relationships that emerge between the elements of social capital and the characteristics associated to *tolerance* and *interethnic cooperation*. In order to be able to explain better the nature of interethnic relations in Moldova, we will try to answer the following questions: which are the dimensions of association? Can we talk about a participative political culture (the main element in the consolidation and functioning of a democracy)? Does the social capital influence the daily interethnic relations and does it also have an effect on the attitudes towards the symbolic issues that emerge in intercommunity relations? Putnam's studies showed the link established between social capital and good democratic functioning: societies characterized by large, numerous and overlapping social networks are the most favorable for the development of values such as mutual respect, tolerance, civil cooperation and commitment.²³ We are interested in the role of social capital as a favorable factor for the development of common values, such as ethnic tolerance, respect and interethnic cooperation.

²³ Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social și relații etnice. Toleranță, încredere și cooperare în comunități multietnice“, în Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relațiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 143.

According to Dietlind Stolle, the social capital is, „a societal good which links people and allows them to pursue their common objectives more efficiently²⁴. For Francis Fukuyama, the social capital is ‘a set of informal values shared by the members of a group which allows them to collaborate among them. If the members of the group get to expect that the behavior of the others is confident and honest, they will start trusting each other²⁵’. Robert Putnam synthesizes the effects of social capital in the following directions: trust, reciprocity is beneficial for the whole society and can be revaluated privately as well as publicly, in the community interest; beneficial effects on democratic functioning; effects on the level of civic participation and exercise of control over governance. Putnam even resorts to a generalization, which uses social capital to explain the institutional performance, stating that the (Italian) regions characterized by lack of trust and social fragmentation are performing less at institutional level.

The level of affiliation to any organization is very low, between 5 and 11 percent, regardless of the ethnic group taken into consideration. Concerning trust, Russians have nearly the same trust in Moldovans as in the other members of their own ethnic group. We cannot say the same thing about Moldovans, whose level of trust in other ethnic groups is very low, with the exception of the Romanian group, from reasons that are easy to imagine.

	Sample				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
People from Moldova	58%	69%	75%	66%	68%
Moldovans from Moldova	63%	71%	73%	65%	70%
Russians from Moldova	36%	78%	75%	76%	77%
Ukrainians from Moldova	31%	70%	80%	67%	68%
Gagauz from Moldova	18%	56%	43%	78%	63%
Bulgarians from Moldova	21%	58%	45%	67%	81%
Romanians from Moldova	42%	52%	44%	38%	47%

Table 25. „How much do you trust...?“ Percents for „Very much“ and „Much“

Surprisingly, *Moldovans* represent the group with the lowest level of trust in the members of their own ethnic group. The young people (18-29) have the lowest level of trust in the members of their own ethnic group and every other person has „little“ or „very little“ trust in Moldovans. As we analyze the following age groups, the level of trust grows, reaching 81% among persons over 60 (*much* and *very much* trust). The relationship between education and trust level in Moldovans is reverse proportional: the higher the level of education, the lower the trust (among persons with higher education, 59 percent

²⁴ Stolle, D., (2000) „Social Capital – A New Research Agenda? Toward an Attitudinal Approach“, work presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop, Copenhagen, quoted in Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social și relații etnice. Toleranță, încredere și cooperare în comunități multietnice“, in Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relațiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 139.

²⁵ Fukuyama, F., (2003) „Marea Ruptură. Natura umană și refacerea ordinii sociale“, București: Humanitas, p.23, quoted in Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social și relații etnice. Toleranță, încredere și cooperare în comunități multietnice“, in Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relațiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 143.

show *much* or *very much* trust, among persons with secondary education the value is 73 percent). Students have the lowest level of trust in Moldovans, and only one third of them (32 percent) trust the Moldovans. There is also a predominant lack of trust in Moldovans in urban areas.

		Ethnic group					
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Age	18 -29 years	50%	30%	21%	13%	16%	38%
	30 -44 years	57%	32%	27%	16%	19%	36%
	45 -59 years	61%	36%	34%	18%	21%	41%
	60 and above	78%	46%	38%	23%	26%	51%
Education	Incomplete secondary education	71%	40%	33%	19%	23%	44%
	General or vocational school	61%	36%	29%	16%	19%	37%
	High-School, Post high school	58%	35%	32%	13%	15%	43%
	Higher education	55%	33%	30%	26%	27%	52%
Occupation	Employed	58%	30%	29%	16%	19%	42%
	Student	32%	32%	12%	2%	7%	32%
	Retired	77%	46%	38%	23%	27%	50%
	Housewife	61%	29%	26%	15%	19%	37%
	Unemployed	57%	35%	29%	17%	20%	36%
Residence area	Urban	51%	35%	28%	18%	19%	38%
	Rural	69%	38%	32%	18%	22%	45%
TOTAL		63%	36%	31%	18%	21%	42%

Table 26. Share of people with *much* and *very much* trust (result from Moldovan sample). The categories with the lowest level of trust are highlighted.

We find a slightly different pattern of trust among Moldovans, when they relate themselves to other ethnic groups. Young people and students show a low level of trust; higher education is associated with a higher level of trust for Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians, while the residence environment is no longer a factor that influences the level of trust, except when the Moldovans relate to Romanians, urban areas being associated with a lower level of trust. We should also emphasize that the values for Moldovans' trust in other ethnic groups are rather low. In this aspect, the treatment of other ethnic groups is differentiated: Moldovans show more trust towards Russians and Ukrainians, and very little trust towards the Gagauz and Bulgarians.

In tables 27-28, we can notice that the Russian-Ukrainian group shows a lower level of trust among young people, students and people living in urban areas. The level of trust is higher for Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians and lower for Gagauz and Bulgarians. The Gagauz-Bulgarian group maintains a relatively uniform level of trust in other ethnic groups, values which are approaching the level of trust in the members of their own ethnic group. Young people, students and people living in urban areas are the categories with less trust, but, compared to the Moldovans, Russians or Ukrainians' evaluations, a higher education level, in the case of Gagauz and Bulgarians, is associated with a lower level of trust.

		Ethnic group					
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Age	18 -29 years	58%	74%	65%	45%	45%	42%
	30 -44 years	67%	72%	62%	51%	56%	49%
	45 -59 years	70%	77%	70%	54%	56%	51%
	60 and over	80%	84%	78%	64%	66%	58%
Education	Incomplete secondary education	75%	83%	75%	59%	61%	47%
	General or vocational school	69%	78%	68%	54%	57%	53%
	High school, post high school	65%	76%	67%	47%	49%	41%
	Higher education	73%	75%	70%	54%	57%	54%
Occupation	Employed	70%	76%	70%	54%	58%	55%
	Student	46%	82%	64%	43%	43%	36%
	Retired	78%	82%	76%	63%	63%	56%
	Housewife	75%	75%	71%	54%	64%	50%
	Unemployed	60%	69%	56%	47%	47%	42%
Residence area	Urban	69%	76%	70%	56%	59%	52%
	Rural	78%	87%	73%	52%	54%	52%
TOTAL		71%	78%	70%	55%	58%	52%

Table 27. Share of people with *much* and *very much* trust (result from Russians sample). The categories with the lowest level of trust are highlighted

		Ethnic group					
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Age	18 -29 years	60%	64%	64%	22%	27%	24%
	30 -44 years	70%	72%	76%	40%	40%	37%
	45 -59 years	74%	77%	82%	45%	45%	49%
	60 and over	78%	79%	83%	50%	50%	49%
Education	Incomplete secondary education	80%	80%	83%	49%	52%	52%
	General or vocational school	68%	73%	76%	36%	36%	35%
	High School, Post High school	78%	81%	89%	46%	46%	51%
	Higher education	72%	72%	78%	54%	50%	50%
Occupation	Employed	71%	71%	75%	45%	46%	44%
	Student	80%	80%	100%	0%	0%	20%
	Retired	78%	78%	83%	48%	48%	48%
	Housewife	52%	68%	60%	24%	32%	36%
	Unemployed	69%	75%	80%	39%	38%	34%
Residence area	Urban	62%	62%	66%	38%	39%	36%
	Rural	82%	87%	90%	49%	48%	51%
TOTAL		73%	76%	79%	44%	44%	44%

Table 28. Share of people with *much* and *very much* trust (result from Ukrainian sample)

		Ethnic group					
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Age	18 -29 years	45%	56%	48%	66%	41%	32%
	30 -44 years	59%	73%	60%	72%	63%	28%
	45 -59 years	68%	78%	71%	82%	73%	36%
	60 and over	75%	83%	79%	83%	77%	51%
Education	Incomplete secondary education	74%	83%	80%	85%	77%	47%
	General or vocational school	60%	74%	63%	77%	65%	33%
	High School, post High school	48%	52%	52%	57%	52%	35%
	Higher education	59%	63%	56%	66%	54%	34%
Occupation	Employed	68%	79%	72%	80%	72%	37%
	Student	58%	58%	42%	67%	58%	50%
	Retired	73%	83%	78%	83%	78%	49%
	Housewife	63%	70%	58%	72%	56%	33%
	Unemployed	49%	65%	51%	71%	51%	27%
Residence area	Urban	58%	65%	59%	66%	57%	48%
	Rural	67%	80%	71%	83%	72%	34%
TOTAL		64%	75%	67%	78%	67%	38%

Table 29. Share of people with *much* and *very much* trust (result from Gagauz sample)

		Ethnic group					
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Age	18 -29 years	55%	61%	48%	42%	73%	31%
	30 -44 years	66%	74%	66%	59%	75%	44%
	45 -59 years	71%	78%	71%	67%	82%	48%
	60 and over	80%	85%	76%	72%	89%	56%
Education	Incomplete secondary education	80%	85%	73%	65%	90%	49%
	General or vocational school	71%	76%	69%	67%	82%	48%
	High school, post high school	66%	66%	56%	56%	72%	44%
	Higher education	57%	70%	62%	50%	72%	39%
Occupation	Employed	66%	74%	68%	62%	77%	45%
	Student	44%	44%	61%	22%	72%	17%
	Retired	79%	83%	74%	70%	88%	58%
	Housewife	65%	74%	70%	65%	74%	61%
	Unemployed	71%	78%	62%	64%	82%	39%
Residence area	Urban	54%	68%	60%	42%	75%	41%
	Rural	77%	80%	71%	73%	84%	49%
TOTAL		70%	76%	68%	63%	81%	47%

Table 30. Share of people with *much* and *very much* trust (result from Bulgarians sample)

The intensity and availability of getting in contact with others, demonstration of openness, and the possibility of closeness with others, say a lot about the daily life in multiethnic communities. Beyond the ambivalence of trust-tolerance relationship (also outlined by other researchers), there is a meaningful correlation between two variables (as we can notice in table 15 and tables from annexes A), which means that an intervention, for example, on trust level would determine a higher degree of tolerance and of accepting the other.

Tolerance, seen as ‘an agreement of living together or act with people who are very different than you, but also as an understanding of those who act differently than you, based on other believes or life styles’²⁶, can be perceived as an integrated characteristic in the social capital or as a correlated one. We will further observe the relationship between social capital and other indicators of interethnic relations.

	Trust in...				
	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
	N=775	N=734	N=631	N=629	N=721
a. Live in Moldova	0,242**	0,287**	0,306**	0,291**	0,203**
b. Live in your locality	0,259**	0,297**	0,306**	0,291**	0,212**
d. Be your neighbor	0,245**	0,287**	0,307**	0,311**	0,141**
d. Be your friend	0,242**	0,283**	0,302**	0,316**	0,145**
b. Be part of your family	0,209**	0,260**	0,278**	0,282**	0,155**

Table 31. The values of Pearson’s coefficient²⁷ for the correlation between trust and social distance (*Moldovans* sample)

Social Distance

Social distance is the effect of stereotypes on the behavior. The individuals or social groups outstrip other groups through taking stands, certain behaviors, attitudes etc. The scale used in Ethnobarometer derives from social distance scale developed by Emory S. Bogardus, the oldest attitude scale. He defined social scale as „the degree of understanding and affection persons feel for one another”²⁸. Starting with the subjects’ attitudes and using the scale from the questionnaire, one can build and calculate a series of

²⁶ Sandu, D., (2003), „Sociabilitate în spațiul dezvoltării. Încredere, toleranță și rețele sociale”, Iași: Editura Polirom, p. 22.
** Significant for $p < 0,01$.

N=number of cases taken in consideration when computing the coefficients.

²⁷ The Pearson correlation coefficient *R* is a measuring unit for the association between variables. The values of this correlation coefficient vary between -1 and +1. + or - shows the direction of the relationship.

²⁸ Bogardus, Emory S., (1933), A social distance scale. *Sociology and Social Research*, XVII, 265-271, quoted in Chelcea, S., (2004), *Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative și calitative*, București: Editura Economică, p. 359.

parameters, which would express mathematically the extent to which one accepts otherness. We will calculate these parameters by adapting the calculation formula to the scale used in the above-mentioned survey²⁹:

1. The social distance index (SDI) represents the number of possible rejected social contacts. The lower the value of SDI (less contact possibilities were refused), the more reduced the social distance towards the relevant group members.

Please specify what your reaction would be if the persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova:	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
b. lived in your locality	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
c. were your neighbors	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
d. were your friends	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
e. were part of your family	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2

Table 32. Scale used in the *Ethnobarometer* survey.

In our case, the mark „5“ will be given to those who chose „disagree“ to all five questions (would live in Moldova, would live in your locality etc.), mark „4“ will be attributed to those who chose four „disagreements“ and one „agreement“ etc. Thus, the maximum value of SDI is five and signifies a deeply negative attitude. The lowest mark expresses a largely positive attitude towards the discussed ethnic group.

Ethnic group	SDI					SCI				
	Sample					Sample				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Moldovans		0,17	0,24	0,42	0,42		4,83	4,76	4,58	4,58
Russians	1,11		0,23	0,44	0,48	3,89		4,77	4,56	4,52
Ukrainians	1,26	0,23		0,51	0,57	3,74	4,77		4,49	4,43
Gagauz	1,74	0,84	1,34		0,88	3,26	4,16	3,66		4,12
Bulgarians	1,54	0,75	1,36	0,55		3,46	4,25	3,64	4,45	
Romanians	0,70	0,87	1,39	0,97	1,16	4,30	4,13	3,61	4,03	3,84

Table 33. Values of social distance index (SDI) and social contacts index (SCI)

²⁹ For technical details, see Chelcea, S., (2004), *Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative și calitative*, București: Editura Economică, p. 359-364


2. Social contacts index (SCI) also shows the openness towards other ethnic groups through a number of accepted social contacts. This index is reverse proportional to the social distance index. Maximum value shows a largely positive attitude and minimum value 0 shows a highly negative attitude.

Three thresholds of tolerance emerge and revive the discussion regarding the idea of disputes, competition among the three ethnic groups, which we represent as „Moldovan group (MG)“, „Russian-Ukrainian group (RUG)“, and „Gagauz-Bulgarian group (GBG)“.

1. High level of tolerance, which, however, shows a *distance* between *us* (MG and RUG) and *others* (GBG). It is characteristic to RUG and has a high level of tolerance towards MG (SDI between 0.17 – 0.24), a high level of tolerance within the group (SDI=0.23 for Russians, as well as for Ukrainians) and a low level of tolerance towards GBG. If SDI for Russians varies between 0.75 and 0.84, in the case of Bulgarians and Gagauz, then Ukrainians want a larger distance from previously mentioned ethnic groups, SDI reaching, in this case, the value of 1.34 for Gagauz and 1.36 for Bulgarians.

2. Average tolerance, specific to GBG. It has a relatively similar level of tolerance towards MG and RUG. In this context, it is necessary to note one thing: Bulgarians show the lowest level of tolerance towards Gagauz, i.e. towards the ethnic group they mostly interact with. It is known that there are communities in the southern part of Moldova where these two ethnic groups represent the majority or, at least, numerically are important minorities. This is a sign that their coexistence has some problems and the Bulgarians are the ones who want a larger distance.

3. Low level of tolerance, specific to MG. The difference between indexes is significant, Russians being a highly tolerated ethnic group. The highest rejection degree is for Gagauz (SDI=1.74! the highest value).



Graphic representation of the social distances for different ethnic groups from Moldova. The distances represent the SDI calculated for each group.

		Ethnic group				
		Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	
Age	18 -29 years	-	-	-	-	o Level of tolerance which does not differ significantly from the value registered for the whole sample
	30 -44 years	+	0	0	0	
	45 -59 years	0	0	0	+	
	60 and over	0	0	0	0	
Civil status	Married	0	0	0	0	+ Level of tolerance significantly higher then the value registered for the whole sample
	Divorced	0	0	0	0	
	Widow(er)	0	0	0	0	
	Single	-	-	-	-	
Occupation	Employed	0	0	0	0	- Level of tolerance significantly lower then the value registered for the whole sample
	Student	0	-	0	-	
	Retired	0	0	0	0	
	Housewife	0	0	0	0	
	Unemployed	0	0	0	0	
Residence area	Urban	+	0	0	0	
	Rural	-	0	0	0	

Table 34. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (*Moldovans* sample)

		Ethnic group			
		Moldovans	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Age	18 -29 years	-	-	-	-
	30 -44 years	0	0	0	+
	45 -59 years	0	0	0	0
	60 and over	0	0	+	0
Education	Incomplete secondary education	0	0	0	0
	General or vocational school	0	0	0	0
	High school, post high school	0	0	0	0
	Higher education	+	0	0	0
Civil status	Married	0	0	0	0
	Divorced	0	0	0	+
	Widow(er)	0	0	0	0
	Single	-	0	0	0
Occupation	Employed	0	0	0	0
	Student	-	-	0	0
	Retired	0	0	0	0
	Housewife	0	0	0	0
	Unemployed	0	0	0	0

Table 35. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (*Russians* sample)

		Ethnic group			
		Moldovans	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Age	18 -29 years	-	0	0	0
	30 -44 years	0	0	0	0
	45 -59 years	+	0	0	0
	60 and over	0	0	0	0
Civil status	Married	0	0	0	0
	Divorced	0	+	0	0
	Widow(er)	+	0	0	0
	Single	-	0	0	0
Occupation	Employed	+	0	0	0
	Student	0	0	0	0
	Retired	0	0	0	0
	Housewife	0	0	0	0
	Unemployed	0	0	0	0
Residence area	Urban	+	0	+	+
	Rural	-	0	-	-

Table 36. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (*Ukrainians* sample)

		Ethnic group			
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Bulgarians
Age	18 -29 years	0	0	0	0
	30 -44 years	0	0	0	0
	45 -59 years	0	0	0	+
	60 and over	0	0	0	0
Occupation	Employed	+	+	+	0
	Student	0	0	-	0
	Retired	0	0	0	0
	Housewife	0	+	+	0
	Unemployed	-	-	-	0
Residence area	Urban	+	-	0	-
	Rural	0	0	0	+

Table 37. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (*Gagauz* sample)

		Ethnic group			
		Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz
Education	Incomplete secondary education	0	0	0	0
	General or vocational school	0	-	-	0
	High school, post high school	-	+	+	0
	Higher education	0	+	+	0
Occupation	Employed	0	+	0	0
	Student	0	+	+	+
	Retired	0	0	0	0
	Housewife	0	0	0	-
	Unemployed	0	-	-	0
Residence area	Urban	-	-	0	-
	Rural	+	+	0	+

Table 38. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (*Bulgarians* sample)

Generally, we can find a significantly lower level of tolerance among young people (18-29 yrs), among students (except the students of Bulgarian background), among single people and people living in rural areas (with the exception of Gagauz and Bulgarians, who are tempted to associate with a lower level of tolerance rather than with the urban level).

Analyzing the data from table 39, we consider that Moldovans have perceived to a larger extent a possible threat on behalf of other ethnic groups. Approximately 1 out of 4 Moldovans believes that Russians represent a major source of threat both for the country and Moldovans as an ethnic group. 15 percent perceive this threat as being highly possible, considering that Russians could become a threat for their families or even a personal threat.

Since recent history shows us a relationship with the Gagauz and the fact that they already enjoy autonomy, the Gagauz are perceived as another possible threat, however, this time the threat is related to the country and to the majority of ethnic group (Moldovans), and less to the family.

Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians feel more secure from this perspective. The potential threat perceived by these groups is significantly lower than in the case of Moldovans: around 5 percent at personal or family level, and about 8 percent believe that other ethnic groups could become a threat for the country or for them as an ethnic group.

	Think of the following ethnic groups from Moldova. Do you think they could become a threat in the future?			
	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. for the country	27%	13%	15%	9%
b. for Moldovans	26%	11%	12%	7%
c. for you or your family	15%	7%	6%	4%

Table 39. Answers from the *Moldovans* sample for the question: Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, is it possible that they will become a threat? (Percents are accumulated for the answers „Definitely“ and „somewhat“)

The question, regarding the way respondents perceive the relationships among ethnic groups, is directly linked with this item. This time, the same share of Russians and Moldovans (12 %) agree that there are conflict relationships between them. The first explanation for this is the lack of mutual trust, the low levels of trust, being associated with the negative perceptions of the relationships with other ethnic groups. Here is just one example: Almost 80 percent of Moldovans who consider that the relationships between them and Russians are conflicting, have very little trust in them.

Ethnic group	Sample				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. Moldovans		12%	5%	4%	6%
b. Russians	12%		1%	3%	2%
c. Ukrainians	7%	4%		3%	1%
d. Gagauz	10%	5%	2%		4%
e. Bulgarians	6%	5%	2%	3%	

Table 40. Results for the question: Which of the following expressions, which explain the relationships between different ethnic groups in Moldova, seem to express the reality more accurately? Do the relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] express cooperation, conflict or reciprocal ignorance? (The percentage represents the answers for „Conflict relations“)

When asked about the nature of the same relationships, but this time at local level, the conflict aspects seem to be less emphasized. This entitles us to assert that conflict image is, in fact, *built* and *maintained* by events and phenomena outside the community, outside of an area where one is supposed to interact with other ethnic groups.

Conclusions

The data analyzed above has showed that the main „problem“ of the existent inter-ethnic relations in Moldova, is the fact that ethnic groups perceive differently the main problems, which are taken into consideration, when approaching mutual relations: from daily problems to topics related to the claims of each minority group, conflicts, identity related aspects, self-identification, stereotypical representations, level of tolerance and trust. In all these cases, the ethnic groups from Moldova think, perceive and behave differently towards each other.

The equation is complex and rooted in a historical context, where Russia is still considered by many people as the ‘big brother’. Russians are perceived as leaders, *masters*, and are associated with a strong component of aggression generated by Russia’s influence. This influence was felt in many aspects: a certain economic dependence on resources and commercial relations; geopolitical situation, which often confronts Moldova’s interests with Russia’s more or less radical positions, the eternal Transnistrian conflict, mass media with information more or less taken over from eastern channels etc.

All of these facts, combined with the natural identity search of Moldova as a young country (14 years of independence), lack of that ‘power idea’ of Moldovans, that could

channel and unleash unimaginable energies, make us witness, at least at the perception level, an interesting switch of roles between Moldovans and this informal group of leaders or *masters*. Moldovans, though numerically, representing a majority, could be considered a minority by the ways they perceive certain situations.

However, the data also show a lack of communication, an intended isolation from the other, a rather low availability of acceptance, tolerance of the other. Surprisingly, the lowest levels of tolerance and trust are found not among the ethnic minority groups but among Moldovans, who are least inclined to tolerate and accept others. In addition, Moldovans have the lowest tolerance towards Gagauz and Bulgarians, especially among young people. Resulting from categories, which include occupation, with the lowest scores, the school and university students are least inclined to accept others, a sign that a series of measures should start in the classrooms.

In addition, we should not ignore the gap between rural and urban areas, manifested mainly by different levels of income, resources, unbalanced ethnic and demographic structure, rather different aspirations and perceptions.

Despite academic debates, the lack of serious public debates on ethnicity fuels the tendency of latent association of these subjects with the Transnistrian conflict and the sad events from the nineties. I believe it is necessary to give up on some of these tacit associations and discuss these aspects at a different level. One should promote the European values, which encourage diversity, tolerance, preservation and manifestation of identity, acceptance of diversity, democracy, etc. Regardless if Moldova materializes its wish to become a member of the European Union, it seems that soon these values will be waiting for us at the border with Romania and there will be no space for half measures. How possible is it that these values cross the border and are accepted unanimously and imposed by the European norms? When can we talk openly about these things at an academic level? These issues represent a normal direction and I hope that Moldova will follow this direction and hopefully reach its destination.

The Transnistrian conflict is more of a political issue and not an interethnic one (as falsely believed). There is no ethnic conflict or even a conflict between Russians and Moldovans. The identity however will not disappear; it cannot be erased or forgotten just because we do not talk about it. We can add new valences to it. The territorial concentration of Gagauz and Bulgarians, the „closed“ communities and those „Russian“ or Ukrainian villages are phenomena that do not encourage the interethnic communication. I believe there is a tacit agreement among people. Unfortunately, I do not think this is the way that will lead us to communication and collaboration.

Maybe one way to solve this issue would be to develop some policies and programs in order to open up these communities, so they could become accessible to others, I do not think we can talk about a genuine mutual knowledge among the ethnic groups from Moldova. Therefore, in many aspects their perceptions, representations of the *other* vary so much.

ANNEX A

	Trust in...				
	Moldovans	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
	N=405	N=397	N=346	N=352	N=358
a. Live in Moldova	-	0,189**	0,242**	0,172**	0,212**
b. b. Live in your locality	0,110*	0,135**	0,296**	0,224**	0,289**
c. d. Be your neighbor	0,130**	0,108*	0,285**	0,270**	0,317**
d. Be your friend	0,212**	-	0,257**	0,241**	0,324**
e. Be part of your family	0,196**	0,133**	0,179**	0,170**	0,278**

Table 41. The values of Pearson's coefficient³⁰ for the correlation between trust and social distance (*Russians* sample)

	Trust in...				
	Moldovans	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
	N=319	N=413	N=413	N=413	N=413
a. a. Live in Moldova	-	-	0,213**	0,141*	0,290**
b. b. Live in your locality	0,255**	-	0,148*	-	0,211**
c. Be your neighbor	0,319**	-	-	-	0,223**
d. Be your friend	0,337**	-	-	-	0,251**
e. Be part of your family	0,105*	-	-	-	0,135*

Table 42. The values of Pearson's coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance (*Ukrainians* sample)

	Trust in...				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Bulgarians	Romanians
	N=452	N=455	N=447	N=439	N=337
a. a. Live in Moldova	-	-	-	-	0,149**
b. b. Live in your locality	-	-	-	-	0,218**
c. Be your neighbor	0,096*	-	-	0,173**	0,213**
d. Be your friend	0,372**	0,175**	0,372**	0,269**	0,341**
e. Be part of your family	0,244**	0,158**	0,234**	0,243**	0,366**

Table 43. The values of Pearson's coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance (*Gagauz* sample)

³⁰ Pearson (R) coefficient of correlation = measurement of association between two variables. The values of this coefficient of correlation vary between -1 and 1. The sign of correlation implies the direction of association.

N = number of cases considered in the calculation of coefficients.

	Trust in...				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Romanians
	N=416	N=418	N=399	N=412	N=339
a. Live in Moldova	0,227**	-	-	0,151**	0,244**
b. Live in your locality	0,275**	-	-	0,275**	0,220**
c. Be your neighbor	0,258**	-	-	0,293**	0,166**
d. Be your friend	0,185**	-	0,132**	0,290**	0,252**
e. Be part of your family	0,255**	0,141**	0,147**	0,263**	0,301**

Table 44. The values of Pearson's coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance (*Bulgarians* sample)

ANNEX B

Out-group representations – Positive features

	Moldovans perceived by Russians	Russians perceived by Moldovans	Moldovans perceived by Ukrainians	Ukrainians perceived by Moldovans	Moldovans perceived by Gagauz	Gagauz perceived by Moldovans	Moldovans perceived by Bulgarians	Bulgarians perceived by Moldovans	Russians perceived by Ukrainians	Ukrainians perceived by Russians	Russians perceived by Gagauz	Gagauz perceived by Russians	Russians perceived by Bulgarians	Bulgarians perceived by Ukrainians	Ukrainians perceived by Gagauz	Gagauz perceived by Ukrainians	Bulgarians perceived by Ukrainians	Ukrainians perceived by Gagauz	Gagauz perceived by Bulgarians	Bulgarians perceived by Gagauz
Decent	25%	13%	34%	12%	24%	4%	17%	5%	21%	10%	22%	10%	14%	9%	15%	9%	12%	7%	11%	12%
Kind-hearted	42%	8%	40%	10%	29%	3%	27%	4%	17%	26%	25%	9%	28%	13%	19%	8%	12%	12%	11%	17%
Hearty	27%	9%	20%	10%	23%	4%	24%	4%	28%	22%	17%	10%	23%	10%	18%	15%	19%	11%	15%	14%
Independent	7%	24%	4%	12%	13%	6%	17%	3%	19%	13%	12%	9%	17%	7%	12%	17%	13%	17%	14%	10%
Civilized	7%	12%	6%	7%	11%	4%	11%	4%	14%	7%	15%	4%	16%	5%	11%	9%	9%	9%	10%	9%
Educated	9%	11%	11%	9%	17%	3%	13%	4%	12%	10%	15%	5%	16%	6%	14%	11%	12%	11%	9%	12%
Resourceful	6%	26%	5%	12%	9%	8%	11%	5%	20%	18%	11%	11%	16%	7%	10%	15%	11%	13%	17%	10%
Joyful	29%	24%	29%	19%	19%	6%	30%	5%	27%	27%	27%	9%	25%	9%	20%	16%	23%	14%	11%	14%
Clean	5%	6%	5%	5%	10%	3%	8%	4%	6%	7%	5%	9%	8%	6%	7%	10%	10%	10%	10%	7%
Religious	15%	9%	17%	9%	14%	6%	16%	6%	8%	11%	10%	11%	9%	9%	15%	19%	12%	15%	17%	12%
United	3%	25%	3%	14%	6%	9%	8%	9%	20%	9%	9%	12%	11%	12%	9%	15%	13%	18%	26%	11%
Honest	9%	5%	9%	4%	5%	3%	7%	2%	10%	6%	10%	6%	12%	7%	7%	16%	12%	12%	11%	11%
Modest	7%	4%	6%	8%	6%	4%	10%	5%	2%	8%	8%	5%	7%	6%	7%	11%	10%	10%	8%	8%
Hard-working	43%	6%	56%	16%	20%	8%	29%	9%	8%	19%	9%	12%	10%	16%	13%	16%	15%	17%	31%	20%
Intelligent	1%	8%	2%	5%	2%	3%	4%	3%	11%	7%	9%	3%	12%	4%	6%	6%	8%	8%	5%	9%
Hospitable	9%	11%	11%	11%	5%	4%	8%	6%	11%	13%	2%	8%	10%	6%	6%	10%	9%	11%	6%	5%
None	0%	7%	1%	7%	1%	10%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	3%	0%	4%	1%	3%	1%	1%

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: THE MOLDOVAN CASE

By Ala Rosca

The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems is not new. It could be found on the agenda of the 17th century and particularly after the end of the Cold War and emergence of newly independent ex-soviet and ex-socialist states.³¹ The complexity of the issue calls for the determination of a theoretical and methodological basis for approaching the issues of democracy, democratization, and interethnic relations. The issue of democratic consolidation is complex and multiaspectual, and it is approached by several authors from the perspective of the present requirements. The approaches related to democratic theory include works, where citizens' opinions and participation are central. Carole Pateman's work, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (1970), has set a great part of the agenda of the contemporary participatory democratic theory. The work rearticulates the role of active discussion, citizens' participation in decision-making and the means of democratic participation, which include in addition to the state, the social institutions where people's actions are directly involved.³² The theoretical framework for the present research is determined by the works of J. Shumpeter³³, R. Dahl³⁴, which, among other parameters, include *public competition* and *political participation* in the notion of democracy.

The phenomenon of democratization implies a study of the transition phase processes, or „*democratic transition*“³⁵, resorting sometimes to generalizations, which require determination of common *indices*.

The correlation between democratization and interethnic processes is also thoroughly studied, the researchers having formulated a hypothesis that the *democratic consolidation will be easier in places where the national identity is well-developed*, referring to the condition related to the *completion of state formation*.³⁶ Researchers came to the conclusion that the chances for democratic consolidation in a multinational and multicultural society increase due to *policies* that grant full and equal citizenship and provide all citizens with a common „shelter“ regarding the individual rights mandated and applied by the state.³⁷

³¹ Huntington S. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, 1991, p.9.

³² Pateman, C. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. 1970

³³ Shumpeter J. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. 2-nd ed. New York, 1947, p 269.

³⁴ Dahl R.A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven. 1971.

³⁵ O'Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986; Lasswell H.D. *The future of the comparative method*, *Comparative Politics*, 1968, p.3-18; Juan J.Linz, Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

³⁶ Whitehead L. *Politica comparată: studii despre democratizare*. Manual de Știință Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321.

³⁷ Linz Juan J., Stepan Alfred, *Drumul spre o democrație consolidată. Cum se consolidează democrația*. Polirom, 2004, p.61.

Starting from these theoretical assumptions, in this work we will analyze some aspects of democratization and interethnic processes, and namely:

- What is the influence of the democratization process on interethnic relations? Is democratization in a multinational society possible?
- What are the conditions that make the democratization process in post-totalitarian multinational states successful?
- The democratization of the society, participation/affiliation with political parties, and civic identity formation.
- Can multiethnic societies achieve stability compatible with the values of liberal societies?

The analysis will be carried out based on the results of the Ethnobarometer survey, organized by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys (IMAS) at the request of the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in December 2004-January 2005 on ethnic samples, that included 822 Moldovans/Romanians, 431 Bulgarians, 472 Gagauz, 412 Russians, and 413 Ukrainians.

Democratization Concept and Societies in Transition

The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic issues is not new. It was on the agenda during the French Revolution from the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century with the national liberation revolutions from Europe and Latin America. The next phase of national liberation movements began with the anticolonial fight of the peoples from Asia and Africa at the turn of the 19-20th centuries, and after the end of the World War II, with the fall of the imperialist colonial system. The „third wave of democratization“, which at the beginning of the seventies embraced the countries with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (military dictatorships and juntas in Southern Europe in the 1970s; military dictatorships in Latin America, single-party regimes in Eastern Europe and countries of the former USSR, and the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1980s (beginning of the 1990s), brought back the issue on the agenda.³⁸

The present problems result from modern realities of the globalization process: the change of emphases in the security system after the collapse of the socialist system and the end of the Cold War; the present crisis of the nation-state in the conditions of the increasing role of transnational movements and institutions. In this situation, it is necessary to update the scientific terms, which now have to reflect the new realities. We will start by defining the notions of democracy and democratization.

In order to determine the meaning of the term „democratization“, we need to establish the essence of the key term from which it derives. The term *democracy*, which in the history of political thought is conceived as a form of government, derives from Greek philosophers. The modern use of this term by social scientists began during the revolutions from Eastern Europe and North America at the end of the 18th – beginning

³⁸ Huntington S. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, 1991.

of 19th centuries. The French revolution, in the Modern Era, raised the issue of democracy and marked the beginning of an era of national movements, in the present meaning of these notions.

Towards the middle of the 20th century, social scientists' debates outlined three major approaches. As a form of government, democracy was defined as government's sources of power, government's goals, and procedures for forming a government. Meanwhile, many political scientists paid attention to the problems that emerged in case of idealization, the ambiguity and inaccuracy of the use of term *democracy*, both as source of power and as government's goal.

One of the mostly used definitions of *democracy* in the contemporary political science belongs to J. Shumpeter³⁹ and is revealed in his work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942). He defines democracy based on „the democratic method“, which he understands as an institutional organization, where certain people receive power in a competition over the votes of the population that form this society. After the World War II, most political scientists were adopting this particular approach as scientific term, considered a procedural approach.⁴⁰ Towards 1970s, most theoreticians started making a distinction between the rational, utopist and idealist approaches of *democracy* and the procedural approach, considered unanimously more scientific.

In order to outline the parameters that can be efficient in scientific research, a special interest raise the discussions held in the view of understanding the nature of democratic values and institutions, especially the specific nature of their functioning in different countries and societies in transition. Accepted by social and political sciences, the determination of democracy through elections represents a *narrow* definition of democracy. Democracy in a wider sense implies freedom, equality, efficient citizens' control over the government, accountability of the government towards citizens, transparency and honesty of political decisions, equality in political participation and access to power. In this context, as stated by S. Huntington,⁴¹ the problems related to the understanding of democracy emerge as a source and purpose of power. The „narrow“ definition of democracy is considered more concrete, and from this perspective the organization of elections represents the essence of democracy, the inevitable *sine qua non*.

As constitutive principles of the „realist democracy“, one of the renowned authors of the democratic theory, R. Dahl⁴², mentioned the *public competition* and *political participation*, implying that democracy includes the provision of civil and political rights, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, existence of organizations necessary for the free competition-based elections. Thus, certain indices/indicators have been introduced in the scientific usage and their use in the sociological and

³⁹ Shumpeter J. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. 2-nd ed. New York, 1947, p. 269

⁴⁰ Huntington S. *The Modest Meaning of Democracy // Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* / R.A. Pastor (ed.) New York, 1989, p.11-18; Kirkpatrick J. *Democratic Elections, Democratic Government and Democratic Theory // Democracy at the Polls* / D. Butler, H. Penniman, A. Ranney (ed.) Washington, 1981, p.325-348

⁴¹ Huntington S. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, 1991

⁴² Dahl R.A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, 1971

political studies make it easier to determine how democratic a system is, to analyze the dynamics of development, and to compare the systems.

The terms *democracy* and *democratization* correlate as *state* and *process*. *Democratization is the process of transition to a democratic form of government.*⁴³ As scientists note, the process of democratization is complex and could last for a long time. The authors analyzing and explaining „democratization“ must realize that this is an ongoing and dynamic process, and must consider the theoretic concepts and the real political processes from different countries. Laswell stated that „in order to be able to discover the main similarities and differences that must be studied, the full context must be permanently scanned. [and] the observation techniques must be multiple“. ⁴⁴

The traditional approach of the democratization processes includes the requirements to limit or minimize the ideological and institutional discordances of the old regime, the autonomy from old powers, mobilization of the civil society, creation of a stable system of political parties.⁴⁵ The new definitions of the consolidation concept also determine the consideration of the cultural realities, traditional culture from a given country. In this case it is necessary to reform the administrative-territorial structures, to develop the party system and different sociopolitical movements, corporatism, etc. One considers the international parameters of democratization, which could have a significant influence in some cases, as seen in the recent experiences of Georgia and Ukraine. As the researchers mention, countries that chose democratization do not necessarily follow the liberal model, democratization can be achieved in different ways and forms. In the context of democratization problems, one sees the need to determine the real meaning of the democratic consolidation processes. There is a need to institutionalize new democratic forms and structures, as well as increase their legitimacies.

In the spotlight of researchers studying democratization are the issues of the dynamics from the transition period processes or, according to the formulation proposed by Ph. Schmitter, the „*democratic transition*“, which includes the period of political development from one political regime to another.⁴⁶ The analysts believe that the rules of the game are not strictly defined, and the political relations are not clearly determined in this period. The rules of the political game are not only flexible and changeable, but also contested by the groups seeking power. Political leaders become involved in political confrontations not just for the achievement of their interests, or the interests of those whom they pretend to represent, they also tend to determine the rules of the political life, establish the political procedures for the organization of elections. These rules will determine who will get the power.⁴⁷

⁴³ Huntington S. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, 1991, p.9.

⁴⁴ Lasswell H.D. *The future of the comparative method*, *Comparative Politics*, 1968, p.3-18

⁴⁵ O'Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986, p.73

⁴⁶ O'Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*

While analyzing and evaluating the dynamic democratization processes, the multitude of causes and interdependencies, researchers also distinguish some generalizations, which we will refer to in more detail. Reviewing the works on comparative politics, and referring to comparative literature about democratization, Laurence Whitehead mentions the following aspects that could serve as a basis for prediction: 1) two of the most certain ways to disintegrate an authoritarian coalition, with opening the way to a possible democratic transition, are a succession crisis and the defeat in an external military conflict; 2) chances for democratization in any country will be materially affected by the results of similar processes from the dominant state at regional level; 3) democratic consolidation will be easier in the societies where state formation is complete (i.e. the borders are secure and the national identity is well-developed), as opposed to the societies where state-building and democratization have to be accomplished simultaneously.⁴⁸

Working with these generalizations, we can deduct several explanations. First, at the international level the regional aspect has an important political, economic and social influence on external as well as internal processes in different states from the region. In this case, one of the factors that influence the democratization processes, namely, *the influence at regional and international level*, is determinant.

Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between democratization and interethnic processes. Laurence Whitehead believes *that the process of democracy consolidation is easier in the societies where the national identity is well developed*.⁴⁹ In this case, one can assume that it is the national consolidation and national identity of the majority group that will be involved in the process of democratization in the society. However, another problem of the societies in transition in multinational states, that emerge in the process of democratization, is the issue of interethnic relations.

Looking at the conditions of democratization in the countries of the former Soviet Union, authors try to compare these realities with apparently similar situations.⁵⁰ However, what David Laitin calls „competitive-assimilation game“ in the case of the working class from Catalonia, could be inconclusive in specific situations from the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union.⁵¹ The use of the „competitive-assimilation game“ in these countries may be inadequate.

In this context, problems emerge regarding the relationship between the state and representatives of different nations, living together in a multinational and multicultural

⁴⁸ Whitehead L. *Politica comparată: studii despre democratizare*. Manual de Știință Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321

⁴⁹ It is important to add that Laurence Whitehead also refers to the condition for democratization related to the completion of state formation, which will refer to further in this work.

⁵⁰ Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996

⁵¹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, analyzing the situation of the working-class Spanish immigrants from Catalonia, which was dynamic from the cultural and economic perspective, come to the conclusion that it is in the interest of these immigrants to be assimilated so that their chances in the new environment improve. The situation of Russians from Central Asia is different. In 1989, in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan, Russians made up 59 percent of the population while the Kazakh, the title nation, represented only 22.5 percent. Less than one percent of Russians spoke Kazakh. In Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, the percentages were almost identical.

state. If we are to examine democracy as a set of principles, then the process of democratization can be defined as an attempt of the society to proceed to the implementation stage of these principles. Thus, one of the main principles of democracy is the principle of citizenship, which presumes citizens' legislative equality.

This means *the right of the individuals* to be equal and *the duty* of the authorities to be both accountable and accessible for the members of the political community.⁵²

The realization of this principle assigns equally all citizens the *duty* to respect the legitimacy of adopted decisions, and the *right* to act based on the authority received from citizens (or apply coercion, if necessary) in order to implement efficiently the proposed goals, but also to protect the society from threats.

In this case, the issue is related to the attitude of the state towards the representatives of different nationalities, policies adopted by state, granting citizenship and provision of citizens' rights and access to political and social life.

Analyzing the conditions of democracy consolidation in multicultural states, the researchers made an assumption, according to which, democracy should not be consolidated in multinational states: It is impossible for a nation-state to emerge voluntarily in a process of „competitive assimilation“, when there is a large number of „immigrants“ and majority nationalities. Investigations bring Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan to the conclusion that the higher the percentage of population born in a given state, or established there without considering themselves foreigners and subsequently were denied their citizenship of that particular state (thus affecting their living opportunities), the lesser the chances that this country will consolidate its democracy.⁵³ They formulate the conclusion as follows: the chances for democracy consolidation in a multinational and multicultural society grow due to *policies* granting full and equal citizenship, and providing all citizens with a common „shelter“ for the individual rights mandated and applied by the state.

Thus, the least conflicting solution for multinational, multicultural states and societies is to combine the collective rights of nationalities or minorities with the individual rights fully protected by state.⁵⁴ One argues in favor of the idea that a certain notion of group rights is necessary. This term would define certain types of individual rights and improve the universal norms concerning the rights raising controversies among scrupulous lawyers attached to the tradition of political liberalism, who oppose any definition of collective rights.

These conclusions are also confirmed by the statistics (see Annex 1, table 1): analyzing the current level of development and stability of democracy in 114 countries, the American researcher Robert Dahl came to the conclusion that in the countries with less diversity, 58 percent reflects a high level of democracy (poliarchy), while in the countries with a pronounced diversity this percentage equals 13.⁵⁵

⁵² O'Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986

⁵³ Linz Juan J., Stepan Alfred, Drumul spre o democrație consolidată. Cum se consolidează democrația. Polirom, 2004, p.61

⁵⁴ Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.165-217, Kymlicka Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.107-130

⁵⁵ Даль Р. Введение в теорию демократии / Пер. с англ. – Санкт-Петербург: „Алетейя“, 1998, с.19

These results confirm again that the diversity, as such, is not an obstacle in the way of democratization, and that the core of the problems is the essence of this diversity. The character and the orientation of those connections, which emerge between the social and ethnic groups, and their correlation with the state, represent a special importance.

The social and political changes at the end of the 1980's have changed the balance of powers between the ethnic groups from Moldova. The correlation of forces between the minority and the majority ethnic groups has changed. The Moldovans are no longer the minority ethnic group within the USSR, no longer a population threatened from the cultural perspective, living at the periphery of the great empire. The Moldovans became the majority group in an independent state, having the power to change the political and cultural trends of the soviet period.

The political changes as well as the demographic realities from Moldova were imposing the adoption of a policy in the field of interethnic relations. In 1990's, Moldovans made up the majority in rural areas, while the main cities (Chisinau, Blati, Tiraspol and Bender, were multinational. Moldovans made up 80.2 percent of the rural population and only 46.3 percent of the urban population; they represented an absolute majority in most of the raions (districts), but not in important cities.⁵⁶

At the beginning of the democratization of the country, two different trends in the field of interethnic relations emerged: 1) the panromanian project – arguing and cultivating the Romanian identity among the majority ethnic group and the reunification with Romania; 2) a policy in the field of multinational interethnic relations oriented towards the consolidation of the Moldovan national identity. These trends are kept until present time, fact confirmed by the results of the investigations of the experts within the Ethnobarometer.

The adoption in 1989 of the laws regarding the language, the introduction of the Latin alphabet and the declaration of the state language on August 31, 1989 was followed by voting the law regarding the use of languages, which guaranteed bilingualism. These laws were highly appreciated by the European commissions as being democratic and guaranteeing „a real bilingualism“.

The Law on citizenship, adopted in 1991 (article 2) stipulates that the citizens of Moldova are the persons who were permanently residing on the territory of Moldova at the moment of sovereignty proclamation. The adoption of the „zero variant“ in this case has allowed solving the problem of citizen affiliation of the representatives of national minorities who were residing in the country.

The Moldovan Constitution from 1994 referred to the „people of the Republic of Moldova“ and not to a specific ethnic group as recipient of state sovereignty.

The controversial Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of the persons belonging to national minorities, and the legal status of their organizations of 2001 stipulates the rights to native language, culture, religion, education, organization, connection with the historical homeland, and ensures the rights of the minorities to be represented in the executive structures and courts, army and law enforcement bodies.

⁵⁶ Итоги всесоюзной переписи населения 1989 года. Minneapolis, Minn., East View Publication, 1993, 7, II, p.524-535

Similarly, the EU-Moldova Action Plan recommended for implementation by Brussels during the VII reunion of the Council for Cooperation Moldova-European Union (2005), committed the Moldovan authorities:

- To guarantee efficient protection of the rights of national minorities;
- To react adequately to the conclusions and recommendations of the structures and experts regarding the framework convention on the protection of national minorities;
- To develop and implement legislation regarding the exclusion of discrimination, and legislation which guarantees the rights of minorities in accordance with the European Standards;⁵⁷

Thus, the state *policies* accepted in Moldova regarding the provision of a full and equal citizenship, and provision of a common „shelter“ to all citizens regarding the individual rights have created a real premise for the democratization of the society.

Democratization in Post-totalitarian Multinational Countries

The democratic principles, which provide for free elections, and which would enjoy authority, the exercise of monopoly of the legitimate power by the elected officials, an efficient legal protection of the rights of citizens cannot be accomplished if there is no state. The democracy cannot exist without a state.

As we have noted before, Laurence Whitehead mentioned that the democratic consolidation will be easier in societies where the state formation is completed (i.e. the borders are secure and the national identity is well formed), than in societies where the emergence of state and democratization is accomplished simultaneously.⁵⁸ Thus, the democratization processes will be facilitated in conditions where the national identity is well-established. Firstly, we will resort to the definition of national identity, to see later what is the correlation between the national and civic identity, and what are the imperatives in this sense for Moldova.

The national identity determines the individual to answer the sacramental question: Who am I? In this context, one has to determine who else is included in the term „We“ and to discover the limits of this group, that is who „They“ are. Thus, for millions of people the national identity is an objective reality and is not subject to reflection. It is formed during the process of socializing of the individual and understanding the national identity, and thus becomes one of the first forms of socialization of the individual.

Nowadays, as stated by C. Calhoun, „the identity is mainly understood as national identity“.⁵⁹ In the political terminology and sometimes in the scientific terminology, the terms *national identity* and *ethnic identity* are used as synonyms, and the reason to that is because „*nation*“ and „*ethnic group*“ are basic categories for the national classification.

⁵⁷ See: Moldova Suverană, February 25, 2005

⁵⁸ Whitehead L. Politică comparată: studii despre democratizare. Manual de Știință Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321

⁵⁹ Calhoun C. Nationalism and Contradictions of Modernity// Berkley Journal of Sociology. 1997-1998 Vol.42. issue 1, p.1

The definition of national identity in the scientific literature from the former USSR and Western countries has different traditions. In the former USSR has predominated the concept that the nation is formed mainly by the domination of ethnic and cultural factors: similarity of language, traditions, customs, religion, etc. The national identity was considered an ethnic identity. The ethnic background is determined by the act of birth and was introduced in the passport of the citizens: since 1930's in the passports was introduced the famous entry 5: nationality. In the case of mixed families, the parents or the individual when reaching maturity, were choosing the ethnic identity.

According to tradition, the national identity in the Western world is conceived and often perceived as political, state identity and never as ethno-linguistic identity.

The scientists say, „The nation shows the relationship between the state (real or aspired) and the citizens that form a pretended unity. The image of a community (if not biological then cultural) is spread at the state level. However, the ethnic identity does not imply a dimension at the state level“.⁶⁰ In the context of studying globalization and modernization, the spread of the idea that there will be a substitution of ethnic identity with the national one is not grounded. The *ethnic identity* and the *national identity* coexist as two forms of group identity: the cultural and language similarity is important for ethnic identity, while the political and state similarity is important for the national identity. In a modern state, there should be a unitary community, but this does not necessarily mean that all citizens belong to a specific ethnic community. The national identity can be, and often is, perceived as state identity. The existence of these two forms of identity proves the existence of the most essential forms of social identity of the individuals – ethnic and state identity. Each of them represents a multidimensional reality and the rapport between them is characterized through complex, interdependent relationships and occasionally mutual exclusion.

The experience of national relations in the former USSR is analyzed today from different perspectives. We will refer to those aspects that explain the emergence of national identity. As mentioned, in the former USSR the national identity emerged primarily from the ethnic identity. Meanwhile, considerable efforts were made in order to build the „soviet people“ and its affiliation with the Soviet Union.⁶¹ The Soviet identity emerged from a double identity: from the ethnic/national identity, and at the same time, from a new cultural identity based on the historical perspective of „communism building“. In this context, the new identity also pretended to be a state identity but proved to be fragile, unstable and did not resist long after the collapse of the USSR. The authors also explain the paradox of the Soviet government: On one hand, they were suppressing the national feelings, but meanwhile, they were institutionalizing territorial-national units as cultural and social categories.⁶² Thus, the *soviet identity* was rather *ideological* and based not on

⁶⁰ Коротеева В.В. Теории национализма в зарубежных социальных науках. М., 1999, p. 93

⁶¹ Castells M. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Vol.2. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.1977

⁶² Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996, p.17-18

a modern definition of nation and state, but created artificially based on an imperial ideology.⁶³ At the same time, this was a *closed* and highly *politicized* identity.⁶⁴ Being politicized, the ideological conscience linked to the soviet citizens' concept of the world was *ethnocentric* and oriented towards a closed concept, manifesting itself under the form of „avoidance of freedom“. The national conscience in the soviet times was not oriented towards universal values, was not opened towards liberalization.

The specific nature of the national conscience of the soviet period has manifested itself differently at the level of different social groups and, at the same time, in different regions of the Soviet Union, each region having a specific national conscience. For example, the scientists who analyzed the realities from Estonian communities sustain that in this former Soviet republic has persisted the identity of *resistance*, according to Castells classification,⁶⁵ which was rejecting the state soviet identity and insisting on ethnic identity.⁶⁶

At the same time, there were also common features, characteristic to all citizens of the USSR. The spreading in the entire society of the phenomenon of *double conscience* was determined by the character of official ideology, which was authoritarian and intolerant towards other points of view, especially towards the perspective of national identification. The phenomenon of „double conscience“ was leading to the formalization of social behavior cases of the individual, and any acts of manifestation of the individual's attitude towards different values and principles that were promoted by the official ideology. In addition, there was a ritualization of these strict acts and needs of citizens to demonstrate their implacable belief in the communist ideals.

„The double conscience“ can be also found in sovereign Moldova, both at the level of mass conscience and at the level of mentality of national movements' leaders. As a value category, Moldovian citizens do not consider the state important and do not trust its institutions, regardless of their ethnic background. Thus, the results of sociological studies developed by the Institute of Public Policy within the Public Opinion Barometer program in 1998-2005 prove that the attitude of citizens towards the state remains unchanged over the years. Only approximately 50 percent of respondents have „much trust“ and „some trust“ in the state institutions: government, parliament, army, law-enforcement (see annex 2, table 2).⁶⁷ In this context, the following fact becomes interesting: Moldovan citizens have the highest level of trust (approximately 80 percent) in the Church, which

⁶³ Hosking G., Can Russia Become a Nation-State? Nations and Nationalism, 1998; 4, p.449-462; McDaniel T., T. The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1996; Rowley D.G Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia. Nations and Nationalism. 2000. 1, p. 23-42

⁶⁴ Визитей Н. Национальная идея и проблема гражданской идентичности. – Unitatea poporului Republicii Moldova și problema identității etnice. Materialele conferinței din 4-5 mai 1999. Chișinău 2000, p. 25-58.

⁶⁵ Castells M. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Vol.2. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.1977

⁶⁶ Vihalemm T. Theoretical Perspectives on the Formation of the New Civic Identity in Estonia. The Challenge of the Russian Minority. Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia. Tallinn. 2002, p. 168

⁶⁷ We need to explain the rating regarding the trust in the President, which, according to the same survey is over 50 percent. This is largely due to Vladimir Voronin's personality that is consistent with the masses and their expectations.

was eliminated from the social and political life in the former Soviet Union. During the period of transition and insecurity, when citizens lost their trust in state institutions and state social insurance, they found spiritual support in other non-state institutions, such as Church. It should be mentioned for comparison that the level of trust in state institutions is higher in countries with democratic traditions, for example in the United States.

The mass conscience cannot be changed rapidly therefore, national ideas persisted in the post-totalitarian period and were largely predetermined by Soviet times. The national idea was conceived as a center for shaping the new mentality, which was emerging during the democratization of post-soviet countries and was at the same time an important factor of this movement. But the essence, content, spiritual-practical and political-ideological forms of this idea in the conditions of Moldova proved to be a direct continuation of the Soviet traditions. At the beginning of restructuring period, the national idea was emerging for many inhabitants of the country as a supreme ideological value and this idea mattered as much as the idea of socialism in Soviet times. This idea became supreme in the society, gained many supporters and was intensely promoted by national leaders. The ease, on which the defenders of „socialist ideals“ from Soviet period resorted to the promotion of national ideas during the restructuring period, can be considered as a solid argument in supporting the thesis that there is a continuity and an internal identity of these phenomena. Researchers also point out the „closed nature“⁶⁸ of mass conscience during the social cataclysms; therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in closed version, more precisely, in the ethno-cultural form. As in the Soviet period, mass conscience was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values, it was leading to deadlock, being also one of the causes for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The openness resulted then in a chaos and the value-based orientations were lost. People developed a reaction of self-preservation, which lead maybe instinctively to withdrawal and isolation in a closed world vision that lead to an ethnocentric ideology. As a result, the closed form of conscience was transformed into another.

The society became divided, and this split coincides with ethnic and linguistic differences, leading to a situation when the national groups oppose each other. The ethnic groups, being in fact very heterogeneous by social structure, join in responsibility according to the national principle in order to become opponents of another ethnic group. During Perestroika, the national revival ideas were usually followed by the ideal of *sovereign national state based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, socially-oriented market economy, and civil society*. These were the principles introduced in the Constitutions adopted in post-Soviet countries. However, in the opinion of majority of the population these principles had a formal character. The formalism of the Soviet period, the double conscience and the lack of trust in state structures were preserved during Perestroika. These were supplemented by a lack of trust in the new principles, which were unknown to the population. Together they led to the formation of a *skeptical conscience*.

⁶⁸ Визитей Н. Национальная идея и проблема гражданской идентичности. – Unitatea poporului Republicii Moldova și problema identității etnice. Materialele conferinței din 4-5 mai 1999. Chișinău, 2000, p. 36

The Etnobarometer results prove that the opinions regarding the perception of politics and democratization were divided in two large categories. The Delphi study results confirm two different ideological and normative perspectives:

- The first perspective regards the independence from 1991 in a double aspect: as a moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit and as a beginning of democratization of the political regime. The return to the Latin script, declaration of Romanian language as a state language, symbolic recovery of the relationship between the two banks of Prut River are related to the newly created historical reality. The free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, adherence of Moldova to the main international institutions (the UN, CoE, and OSCE), and orientation of Moldova's foreign policy towards the EU are the main achievements that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The breakout of the Transnistrian war is regarded as an attempt of Russia to maintain its influence in the region.
- The second perspective defines the period of independence as moment of emergence of a new nation – the Moldovans, a nation with a specific history and identity including a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz etc.). For this, it is necessary to have at least two state languages – Moldovan and Russian. From this perspective, the newly created democratic institutions did not prove their advantages. The multiparty system and political instability linked to the fight for power of different political parties impeded the achievement of good and unitary governance, ultimately leading to the division and impoverishment of the society, weakening the state authority, launching ungrounded and conflicting slogans during the elections in order to gain political capital. At the same time, Moldova did too little to affirm itself as a partner who has an important word to say within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war broke out because of the Romanianization policy adopted by Chisinau at the beginning of 1990s and because of misunderstandings regarding the use of state languages.

According to Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups took different ideological stands. The representatives of the majority ethnic group, Moldovans, militate for democratization and perceive independence as national revival. The investigation participants belonging to national minorities perceive independence as an occasion for the emergence of a new nation and existence of a multiethnic mixture.

Several positions could be identified regarding the **attitude towards the Moldovan state**:

1. The national-optimists: Most of the participants said they were proud of the country where they were born and living, calling it their Motherland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and epithets (see Annex 3).
2. The *unionist perspective*: The opinions regarding the perception of Moldova's independence are divided. Some participants salute the creation of the independent state believing in its future. Other participants conceive the country as a component

of a larger political entity, whether part of Romania or, more rarely, the Russian Federation. These feelings of coalition with a larger political unit represent another confirmation for consciousness leftovers from Soviet period, where the traditional affiliation to a more influential political community and the inability to exercise independently the political functions was customary.

3. This gap is getting wider in a weak country whose territory is fragmented by a separatist conflict, whose history is extremely short and turbulent and whose identity is insecure. (see annex 4). Meanwhile, the participants are concerned about the future of this country, worried about the economic decline, and they see Moldova hanging over an abyss because of poverty and its political inconsistency.

Thus, in the perception of some survey participants, Moldova is a weak state that has not managed to create and consolidate its formal state institutions.

The way the ethnic groups perceive themselves and are perceived in relation with the state can be characterized differently. The way the Moldovans perceive themselves as citizens of the Republic of Moldova can be also deduced from their position regarding the following statement: *I am proud that I was born in Moldova...* About 86 percent of Moldovan respondents agree totally or partially with this statement and only 11 percent of respondents are not proud of being citizens of Moldova. The following statement, which shows that Moldovan citizenship makes their life easier, was approved by 32 percent of Moldovan respondents (see annex 5). Only a few Moldovans (11 percent) feel ashamed of being citizens of Moldova, and 19 percent claim that it makes their life harder. In this case, the representatives of the main ethnic group have a more critical attitude about their country, feel a higher responsibility and are more demanding with regards to the events (see Annex 6). Some Moldovans consider that being citizen of Moldova implies an unformed ethnic identity, extreme poverty or, ultimately, emigration (see Annex 7).

Some representatives of national minorities believe that they belong to a beautiful country where they are pleased to live, they believe in their future and consider that, regardless their ethnic background, they are all citizens of one country. The participants belonging to ethnic minorities living in Moldova also express opinions regarding the need for understanding civic identity and state affiliation (see Annex 8). Nonetheless, some people avoided answering the questions related to this topic (see Annex 9). Although Russians are perceived as being different and having a special status compared to other ethnic groups, the way Moldovans see Russians as citizens of Moldova was treated distinctly. Russians are viewed by many Moldovan survey participants as the ethnic group which has had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethnic groups and which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage: They are arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners or as conquerors (see Annex 10).

Many participants believe that the Gagauz minority perceives Moldova as their own motherland and that the autonomy granted to this minority was a good solution (see Annex 11). When speaking about the assistance provided by the neighboring states to different ethnic groups from the country, one can notice a concern regarding the future

development of the state and regarding preservation of national identity, and a rather suspicious attitude towards the assistance of these countries to different ethnic groups. Some participants view with suspicion the assistance provided by the neighboring countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up of universities, radio and television stations, newspapers, etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority or by Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority, etc.). The greatest suspicions are raised by the Romanian assistance to Moldovans and Turkish assistance to the Gagauz. Romania's case seems more special, and the ethnic minorities view the involvement of this state in supporting some cultural initiatives with suspicion. There are fears that, for example, a TV channel in Moldova funded by Romania could try to influence the opinions in favor of Romanian interests, which are strange to Moldova. The aid granted by Turkey to the Gagauz is also regarded with suspicion by some respondents. This help could separate even more the Gagauz minority from Moldova.

At the same time, there are opinions regarding the best solution, which would be that each state should solve its problems alone and funding of schools, universities, and television channels should be the responsibility of the government of the particular country.

Among **the most important political events**, the respondents list those related to the emergence of the new state, such as the declaration of independence (1991) after the collapse of the Soviet Union and adoption of the Moldovan Constitution in 1994. All survey participants, regardless of their ethnic background, consider these political events the most important. The granting of certain rights to national minorities, development of the poverty reduction strategy by the Government with the approval of international financial institutions were listed as the most important of the recent political events.

The political events related both to domestic and foreign policy are appreciated differently by the ethnic groups. Some issues are viewed only from the perspective adopted by the survey participants. Thus, the advocates of democratization, national revival and return to the Romanian spirit noted the success of the Ilascu Case at ECHR, negotiation of the EU-Moldova action plan, the corruption that exists at all administrative levels, unification of the leftist forces within a single political party, Democratic Moldova Bloc, violation of democratic freedoms by the communist government (since 2001), especially freedom of the press.

The advocates of the perspective of Moldovans as a separate nation noted the aspects emphasizing and amplifying the Moldovanism, i.e. the inauguration of the monument of Stefan cel Mare (the Great), renovation of Capriana Monastery. Looking at things from this perspective, Moldova's economy and politics stabilized in the last years, governmental policies were directed towards ordinary people, and services offered to citizens by state improved, Government elaborated social development and youth strategies.

Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, **some controversial issues** on the country's political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could place different ethnic groups in controversial or even conflicting positions. The different opinions regarding the Transnistrian conflict and the possible solutions put the representatives of different ethnic

groups in conflicting positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified by the participants in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary state, federal state; strategic orientation of Moldova's foreign policy: EU or CIS; topics related to the national identity (Romanians or Moldovans, history, state official language, the threat of Romanianization), threat of losing the Moldovan statehood either through unification with Romania or its dissolution through federalization or as a consequence of the pressures on behalf of the Russian Federation. This set of issues with a high potential for conflict generally identified by the participants is perfectly overlapping in the first part of the survey with the set of issues identified by the participants as having a potential of causing interethnic conflicts.

In the second part of the survey, many participants considered the conflicting potential of all these topics, except for the Transnistrian issue, which had smaller conflict potential compared with the results of the Delphi study. This event could be explained in the following way: in a more detailed analysis, the participants presented a more realistic evaluation of the situation in the country, the conflict potential of these issues being lower.

During democratization period, one of the main problems the societies are facing with is the *stabilization of the formal institutions*. Thus, during the transition period, Moldova adopted several laws and took certain measures in regulating interethnic relations. In 1991, Moldova adopted the *Law on citizenship*,⁶⁹ considered one of the most liberal in Eastern Europe. The law granted Moldovan citizenship to all persons living in the country at the time of declaration of the country's sovereignty (June 23, 1990), regardless of their ethnic background, language, length of residence in the country or other criteria. For conducting historical research and studying interethnic relations, the government created the State Department for National Relations and the Institute for Interethnic Relation within the Academy of Sciences. According to the survey results, the attitude of the respondents matches the attitude of the Delphi study participants. Concerning these governmental structures, the participants' opinions split in two different categories:

- On the one side, those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations - the most frequently mentioned activities of these institutions being the organization of festivals and multiethnic cultural shows;
- On the other side, those who consider that these structures are completely inefficient, their activities being unsatisfactory for solving the main problems (see Annex12).

In addition to the structures that are more or less dependent on the state (Department for Interethnic Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences), the groups or persons influencing (more in a negative way) the interethnic relations in Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or political parties.

⁶⁹ Legea cetățeniei Republicii Moldova (Law on citizenship of the Republic of Moldova). 1991

Democratization of Society, Political Parties and Emergence of Multiple Identity

The traditional approach of democratization includes the requirements for limiting or reducing to the minimum the ideological and institutional noncompliance of the old regime, autonomy from old powers, mobilization of civil society, and *creation of a stable system of political parties*.⁷⁰ The new details about the consolidation concept imply a consideration of the cultural realities and traditional culture from the particular country. In this case, it is recommended to reform the administrative-territorial structures, develop the party system, different social-political movements, and the corporatism.

The democratic transformations imply also the reformation of the political system within the society, including the establishment of a multiparty system. The political parties have the mission to concentrate and represent citizens' interests. The political parties have to crystallize the aspirations of individuals with the same tendencies and shape the positions from which population will have to choose during the elections.

Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for a multiparty system in transition countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very popular. The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova show that the political parties are the least popular among social organizations of the country. Over the years the surveys showed that less than 30 percent of respondents trusted political parties (The minimum (11 percent) was registered in 2001 and the maximum (28 percent) was registered in 2004-2005. This result is lower than the result registered for trade unions (14 -36 percent) nongovernmental organizations (20-36 percent) and much lower than the one for mass media (47-62 percent) (see Annex 2, Table 2).

The level of trust for political parties is the lowest if compared to other institutions and organizations from the country. The skeptical attitude towards political parties is dictated by the Soviet legacy and the times of denial of social and political life. This explains why the political parties find it difficult to affirm themselves in society. People believe that political parties represent the influential groups of power controlled by the elites, whose purpose is to manipulate the public opinion. There are no considerable differences between political parties and there is little interest in citizens on behalf of them. Some people believe that political platforms of different parties are quite similar and see no need for the existence of more parties. The Public Opinion Barometer from April 2002 also outlined this aspect of citizens' attitude towards political parties.⁷¹ The political parties are not deeply rooted in society, are unstable and sometimes provisional, and this explains largely the citizens' attitude towards political parties. In societies in

⁷⁰ O'Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986, p.73

⁷¹ The 2002 Public Opinion Barometer survey also implied the determination of attitudes towards political parties and included two statements: 1.) Do you think that it would be better if there was only one party in Moldova or 2) Do you think that it would be better if there were several parties in Moldova. More than half of the respondents (69 percent) support the idea of a single party in Moldova and only 22 percent support the multiparty system

transition, the rule of law is not established and political life is managed poorly, allowing the parties to commit abuses of authority and achieve their profit-driven trivial goals. In the conditions of a poor society, citizens are tempted to blame political parties for the poverty. The political parties are unevenly weak compared to the level of literacy of the population, a fact with a direct negative impact on the political sphere from the country.

According to the Ethnobarometer studies, the political parties are often listed among the organizations or institutions influencing interethnic relations (see Annex 15). For political parties contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations, the representatives of different ethnic groups listed the Communist Party from Moldova: 6 percent of Moldovans and Bulgarians, 15 percent of Ukrainians and 17 percent of Russians. One percent of the Gagauz also listed the mayor's offices. The respondents also mentioned other parties: Christian Democratic Party (2 percent of Moldovans), „Our Moldova“ Bloc (2 percent of Ukrainians and 8 percent of Russians), and Social Democratic Party (2 percent of Ukrainians and 5 percent of Russians). For organizations the respondents mentioned United Nations (1 percent of Moldovans), schools (1 percent of Gagauz), Parliament (1 percent of Gagauz), Ministry of Culture (3 percent of Bulgarians), and the House of Nationalities (2 percent of Bulgarians).

The Christian Democratic Party was listed exclusively among the organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova: 5 percent of Moldovans, 1 percent of Gagauz, 16 percent of Ukrainians, 20 percent of Russians and 8 percent of Bulgarians. The Communist Party was listed by 2 percent of Moldovans, Agrarian Party by 2 percent of Ukrainians and „Democratic Moldova“ Bloc by 4 percent of Russians. The respondents also mentioned the customs (3 percent of Bulgarians) and Parliament (2 percent of Bulgarians).

The listed personalities from Moldova contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations are mainly political and public opinion leaders: The President of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, is on top of the list being mentioned by 15 percent of Moldovans and Gagauz, 23 percent of Bulgarians, 31 percent of Russians and 39 percent of Ukrainians (See Annex 16) The Prime Minister Tarlev holds the second position being listed by 6 percent of Moldovans, 8 percent of Ukrainians, 10 percent of Russians and 7 percent of Bulgarians.

For personalities contributing to the worsening of the interethnic relations in Moldova, the representatives of different ethnic groups nominated unanimously Iurie Rosca, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party: 11 percent of Moldovans, 27 percent of Ukrainians, 36 percent of Russians, 6 percent of Gagauz and 19 percent of Bulgarians.

Since the period of national revival, the ethnopolitical situation in Moldova has been an example of polarization of interethnic and intercultural contradictions. The national idea or the idea of defending the national interests can become the methodology for political consolidation. The ethnic groups cannot emerge as independent subjects in the political sphere because their actions do not bear a formal character of a group. Their interests are represented by the ethnic elites that get involved in the political struggle for power, in other words they become subjects of political struggle.

Presently, one can see the contradiction between the government on one side, and the ideological orientation of the political elites, on the other side. Any ideology is a project of the future society. The complexity of the ideas that represent the interests of the *ethnos* are systematized by the politicians in a set of norms, values, directions which allow for an influence on the *ethnos* or on each individual, and allow winning the political space. Thus, ideology justifies the government's actions and represents a means for political struggle. The interests of the group are subordinated to the common idea, which directs the group in a certain direction for the achievement of the goal.

The political leader presenting the interests of his or her group interprets them, turns them into an ideology, and subordinates them to his or her interests. The politicization of the ethnic factor occurs, which signifies a real transformation of the ethnic factor into a tool of political struggle. The political conflicts then become ethnic conflicts.

Rothschild J. believes that politicizing the ethnic element means:

1. To give individuals the possibility of understanding the role of politics in the preservation of ethnocultural values and vice versa;
2. To stimulate their attention towards this connection;
3. To mobilize people in forming ethnic groups with a collective self-conscience;
4. To direct them in the sphere of political activities, based on this understanding and collective self-conscience;⁷²

In the case of ethnopolitical conflicts, we can outline some common aspects characterized by set goals and ideology. In many cases, the conflicts start with an approach and discussion on the national language issue, and these particular conflicts changed from closed into opened conflicts. This sphere had a large mobilizing force because it resorted to all people of this ethnic group. Then the claims were generally entering the political sphere and were extending over the state. Consequently, one got the territorial claims, which implies conflicts regarding the resources of the relevant ethnic group. At this stage, one frequently invoked the historic past, certain events and traditions from the past. Moreover, both parties start using vast historical and archeological materials, which then come to justify the claims put forth by both parties.

The congruence of the national claims with the struggle of political elites for power represents a reality of the transition period. The trends that follow in this situation can be different: in some cases, the importance of the ethnic factor grows and is then used in the political struggle. One must also consider these consequences generated by the worsening of the living standards of the population, massive migrations that could generate a tension in the interethnic relations.

Preoccupied with the national identity, the ethnic groups will continue to be an object of manipulation of the formal and informal elites during the political struggle for the division of power positions. Although there is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria.

⁷² Rothschild J. *Etnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*. NY 1981, p.9

In the case of politicization of national issues, one focuses the attention on the „main“ identity and on the need to choose from mutually exclusive identities. In this case, politicization represents an essential stimulus for the „nationalism“, which represents a politicized national idea.

When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the *multiple identities*, which represent the changing reality and which are build on the social basis of individual's identities. The human capacity for *complementary and multiple identity*, besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that makes democracy in multinational states possible.⁷³ The emergence of *political* and *civic* identities is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation.

We can distinguish several approaches of the concept of *civic identity*. One of them however can be considered the basic approach, which considers the political citizenship as the central point from which all other dimensions derive. For Barber, *the civic identity represents the genuine affiliation to political community, which, despite the distinctive identity references, unites everybody through common preoccupations affecting everyone.*⁷⁴

Most authors outline that the concept of citizenship is getting wider within a general social change: transition from modern to post-modern societies David Miller conceives citizenship as practiced in several ways: Right of association, civil right to a relative freedom, the social right to a minimal standard of living ensured by the welfare state and a post modern warrant of access the communication technologies.⁷⁵ Bryan Turner defines citizenship as a set of practices in a civil society.⁷⁶

We agree with the larger concept according to which, the civic identity embraces the feeling of the individual to be included in the social contract, the conscience of being a member of a certain social group, one of the many groups from the political community. Derek Heater explains that the community and political affiliations are not mutually exclusive at the individual level.⁷⁷ He argues that such a situation could lead to the emergence of a multiple identity: A person can be simultaneously a member of a state (through citizenship) and a member of civil society. The civic conscience is supposed to be assured by the daily process of negotiation between different groups. It is more of a process than a final destination.

We can assert that the political identity, backed up by the right to participate and exercise political power, and the *civic identity*, as a feeling of belonging to a state and society, are mutually stimulating. The determinist correlation and the feeling of devotion towards a state, the common interest of all members of the society can have multiple sources with a different impact in varied contexts.

⁷³ Linz J., Stepan A., Drumul spre o democrație consolidată. – Cum se consolidează democrația. Polirom, 2004, p.51-68

⁷⁴ Quoted by: Page, M. Pluralistic Citizenship: A Reference for Citizenship Education. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 29 (2), 1997, p.22-32

⁷⁵ Miller, D. Differentiated Citizenship. Paper for the International Conference „Cultural Plurality in Estonia: Policies and Solutions“, Tallinn, 1999

⁷⁶ Turner B. S. Citizenship and Social Theory. London: Sage, 1993

⁷⁷ Heater, D. What is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999

Thus, the empirical analysis suggests that the civic identity can be based on the state or local identity, implying rights and duties, economic interest, perceptions about common goals and a common future.

Based on this understanding of the term of civic identity, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of determination of national identity, and establishing the clear lines between „us“ and „them“, adherence to democratic values, and nurturing the hope for the future. A common pattern for all citizens of Moldova can be also the aspiration towards democratization of the society, orientation towards European integration, which is currently supported by a significant part of the population.⁷⁸ Largely, the emergence of civic identity is determined by the orientation towards the modernization of the society, a phenomenon conditioned by the inclusion in the contemporary global processes.⁷⁹

Conclusions and Recommendations

The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems has been on the agenda since the French Revolution, experiencing a new impulse with the „third wave of democratization“, which in 1970s overwhelmed the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

Analyzing the definitions of the term *democracy* in the present political science, we notice that one of the most used definition includes, in addition to the traditional approach, the *public competition* and *political participation*, thus implying that democracy includes civil and political rights, freedom of expression, press, freedom of assembly, existence of organizations necessary for free competition-based elections. The relationship between the terms *democracy* and *democratization* is similar to the relationship between a *state* and a *process*. *Through democracy, one understands the process of transition towards a democratic form of government*. In the spotlight of researchers studying the issue of democratization, are the issues of the dynamics of transition period processes, of the „*democratic transition*“ including the period of political development between two regimes.

⁷⁸ In the case of the majority ethnic group, 62 percent of respondents believe that we should integrate with the European Union and only 14 percent of people state that Moldova should remain in the Commonwealth of Independent States. About 7 percent of respondents think that we should not be part of any alliances. However, most of the Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents stated that Moldova should remain in CIS. Thus 41 percent of Russians believe that Moldova should not quit CIS, 38 percent believe that it should integrate with the EU, and 6 percent think that Moldova should not be part of any alliance. About 49 percent of Ukrainians plead for CIS, 21 percent – the EU, and 3 percent of Ukrainians think that it should not be party of any alliance. About 24 percent do not know what the most adequate external policy of Moldova should be. The Gagauz believe that Moldova should stay within CIS, 48 percent; only 18 percent believe that we should integrate with the EU, 8 percent plead for neither alliance and 19 percent of the Gagauz are undetermined. The Bulgarians' options are 36 percent for CIS, 36 percent for the integration with the EU, 7 percent favor a neutral state, and 19 percent of Bulgarians are undetermined. In the case of the Bulgarians we have a balance between those who opt for the CIS and those who would chose the European Union.

⁷⁹ Kymlicka Will, (ed.) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Kymlicka Will, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989; Kymlicka Will, Norman Wayne, *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, Oxford University Press, 2000; Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Oxford University Press, 2001; Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 2001

Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between democratization and inter-ethnic processes and to the condition that the chances of democratic consolidation in a multi-national and multicultural society grow due to *policies* applied by the state. The adopting of the laws on language, citizenship, Moldovan Constitution and other laws guaranteed a full and equal citizenship and a common „shelter“ for all citizens regarding individual rights.

The analysis of ethnic and national identity in the Soviet period allows us to draw the conclusion that the „soviet identity“ which also claimed to be a state identity, was rather *ideological, closed, politicized and ethnocentric*. The phenomenon of *double conscience* spread and persisted at the beginning of the Perestroika, the attitudes towards state institutions and the state being as low. At the same time, the level of trust in nongovernmental institutions, such as the Church, is high. Concerning mass conscience, the situation cannot be changed rapidly, that is why national ideas persisted in the posttotalitarian period and were largely predetermined by the Soviet legacy. At the beginning of Perestroika, the national idea was regarded by many people from the country as a supreme ideological value and this idea mattered as much as the idea of socialism in the Soviet period. Pointing at these aspects, the researchers also mention the *closed character*³⁸ of mass conscience during social cataclysms and, therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in closed version, more precisely, in the ethnocultural form. Like in Soviet times, the mass conscience was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values; it was leading to deadlock, being also one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the closed form of the conscience has changed.

According to the Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups took different ideological stands. The Moldovans advocate democratization and perceive independence as national revival. The survey participants belonging to national minorities perceive independence as an opportunity for the consolidation of a new nation and existence of poliethnic mixture. We identified several attitudes of the representatives of different ethnic groups regarding Moldova as a state. In addition, the ethnic groups provide different appreciations regarding the political events from the country related to domestic as well as external policy. Some issues are viewed only from the perspective adopted by the survey participants.

Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, **some controversial issues** on the country's political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could place different ethnic groups in controversial or even conflicting positions. The different opinions regarding the Transnistrian conflict and the possible solutions put the representatives of different ethnic groups in conflicting positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified by the participants in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary state, federal state; strategic orientation of Moldova's foreign policy: EU or CIS; topics related to the national identity, threat of losing the Moldovan statehood. This set of issues with a high potential for conflict generally identified by the participants is perfectly overlapping in the first part of the survey with the set of issues identified by the participants as having a potential of causing interethnic conflicts.

During democratization, one of the main problems the societies are facing with is the stabilization of the formal institutions. Thus, during the transition period, Moldova adopted

several laws and took certain measures in regulating interethnic relations. In addition to the structures that more or less dependent on the state (Department for Interethnic Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences), the groups or persons influencing (mostly in a negative way) the interethnic relations in Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or political parties.

Democratic transformations also imply the reformation of political system from the respective societies, including the establishment of multiparty system. Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for multiparty system in transition countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very popular. The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova indicate show that political parties have the lowest popularity among social organizations from country.

Although there is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria.

When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the *multiple identities*, which represent the changing reality and which are build on the social basis of individual's identities. The human capacity for *complementary and multiple identity*, besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that makes democracy in multinational states possible, and the emergence of *political* and *civic* identities is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation.

Based on this, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of determination of national identity and establishing the clear lines between „us“ and „them“, adherence to democratic values and nurturing the hope for the future. As a common pattern for the citizens of Moldova could serve the aspiration towards democratization, modernization and social progress.

Based on the research, our recommendations are:

- Civil society sector: accept the education in minority languages and the existence of media in these languages;
- Political society sector: legislation for open citizenship that would grant equal and full citizenship and a guarantee a common „shelter“ for all the citizens concerning their individual rights;
- Rule of law: provide a a full range of traditions, practices and institutions for all national minorities;
- State bureaucracy: guarantee the access of different minorities to state services provided in their languages.
- Economic society: guarantee the access of all ethnic groups to economic resources.

If the ultimate goal is democracy building and consolidation, the quality of democratic governance of political elites must be central. A successful democratization strategy requires less majoritarian and more consensual policies in each of these fields. This can be guaranteed by modernizing the society, changing the mentality of population as well as political leaders and determining the democratic values as unique and irreversible.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. Table 1. Formal and liberal democracies*

Year	Formal democracies	Liberal democracies	Total
1990	76 (46.1%)	65 (39.4)	165
1991	91 (49.7%)	76 (41.5)	183
1992	99 (53.9%)	75 (40.3)	186
1993	108 (56.8%)	72 (37.9)	190
1994	114 (59.7%)	76 (39.8)	191
1995	117 (61.3%)	76 (39.8)	191
2000	120 (62.5%)	86 (44.8)	192

Source: Freedom House//www.freedomhouse.org

Annex 2. Table 2. Level of trust in different institutions and organizations („Very much trust“/ „Some trust“) (in %)

	Feb. 2001	Nov. 2001	Mar. 2002	Nov. 2002	Apr. 2003	Nov. 2003	May. 2004	Nov. 2004	Feb. 2005
Government	19	36	48	46	45	40	40	47	49
Parliament	10	30	39	40	39	36	35	45	46
President	15	58	65	63	63	57	50	56	61
Judiciary	26	29	33	30	31	30	27	31	41
Army	38	45	48	50	44	40	42	46	52
Church	77	79	80	78	78	71	75	79	80
Mayor's Office	33	44	56	52	47	52	47	54	55
Political parties	11	15	21	16	19	24	18	28	28
Banks	*	26	23	22	33	31	27	38	37
Police	23	31	34	32	31	30	24	29	38
Mass-media	53	58	48	52	54	57	47	62	61
NGOs	*	22	26	20	28	29	23	36	34
Trade Unions	14	17	24	20	24	28	20	36	29

Annex 3. Answers of respondents who showed a national-optimist attitude towards the Moldovan state.

„(Moldova) reminds me of a vine leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will notice how much it resembles the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily is missing“; M7;

„Back when I was in school, it was associated with a grape“; M17;

„I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova. When we were part of the USSR, I served in the army in the

Far East and when I was asked where I was from, I was telling them that I was from Moldova. They were surprised to hear that there are Bulgarians in Moldova. When I was asked „how is it over there“; I was answering them that Moldova is a flourishing country with many orchards, vineyards, grain fields and everything you wish“; M21;

„Its people, its land, its traditions. When we say Moldova, we see vineyards and blooming orchards, a good wine, vegetables, fruits and hard working people. This is the meaning of Moldova for us“ M24.

Annex 4. Answers of respondents who showed a skeptical attitude towards Moldovan state.

„Poor country“, M4; „Poor people“, M9;

„The country I live in. A poor country which has not yet determined itself where to go – towards East or West“, M11;

„Country full of miserable people, without future, who cannot clearly articulate what they want“, M12;

„Moldova is rather a territory than a country because it does not control a part of its territory (Transnistria)“, M13.

Annex 5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The fact that I was born in Moldova 1) makes me proud, and 2) makes my life easier (in %), (cumulative answers for the two statements).

	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
Moldovans	74	44	58	14	8
Ukrainians	31	44	57	15	54
Russians	42	46	43	20	49
Gagauz	52	60	51	15	20
Bulgarians	49	54	55	19	24

Annex 6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The fact that I was born in Moldova 1) gives me a feeling of shame and 2) makes my life harder (in %), (cumulative answers for the two statements).

	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
Moldovans	7	23	63	95	13
Ukrainians	2	12	67	58	61
Russians	4	14	54	79	50
Gagauz	4	27	51	92	27
Bulgarians	5	33	52	83	26

Annex 7. Answers of Moldovans to the question „What does it mean to you to be a citizen of Moldova“.

„It means to have little opportunities for existence, it means to want to leave the country and look for a job abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your identity“; M5;

„To strive to survive in a village by farming, in a town by doing retail business or to create an ideal to

leave the country and find a job abroad. To be Romanian and live in Moldova means to wait until the President comes up with another anti-Romanian initiative so that you can then react accordingly“; M12;

„Probably it means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled acts of the state authorities; it means to exercise with great risks you civic and constitutional rights. It means to be unable to live a decent life from the incomes generated by local businesses but only from the income generated by foreign enterprises, businesses and non-commercial institutions. Despite this to be a happy, which probably helps Moldovans to keep away from depression“; M12;

„It means to think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any other country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. Many of them feel humans, I do not know why. Even though they work hard, they get paid for that and feel useful. Here they don't feel that“. F10

Annex 8. The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive Moldovan citizenship:

„I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people because we live in such a wonderful country, we have the chance to admire all that and live a decent life“; M7;

„It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me happy?“ M15.

Annex 9. The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive Moldovan citizenship:

„It is difficult for me to give an answer to this question. I think Moldovans should answer this question“; M26

„I like very much the idea popular in America „there are no nations, there are only Americans“. Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country you live in, you have to love it and do something for it.“; M14.

Annex 10. The way Moldovans think of Russians from Moldova.

„(Russians) are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much more favorable. Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region. They should learn our language, culture and traditions. They should integrate and become true citizens“; F1;

„For Russians it is a problem because they do not identify themselves with this country because it is a young state and it's normal not to identify yourself with a country that never existed“; M2;

„To continue to behave as if you are the nation that dominates this country. To promote your interest hoping that Russia's policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian policy“; M12.

Annex 11. For the Gagauz ethnic group living in Moldova, the participants formulated the following idea: Gagauz feel at home in Moldova.

„They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as their motherland, have the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cultural perspective“; F1;

„For the Gagauz that live here, this is also their motherland“; F25;

*„For Gagauz I think this is great. *The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they have managed to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for development“.* F8*

Annex 12. *„All these [institutions] are formal and only create a good impression –exhibits, folk festivals, etc. However, nobody cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go much beyond these cultural dimensions. The leaders of these organizations are always the same. They sit at different cultural manifestations but don't do anything real“; M27’;*

Annex 13. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? People should support their country even if things are not quite easy

	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't know/ No answer
Moldovans	80	14	3	1	2
Ukrainians	75	22	1	0	2
Russians	85	11	1	0	2
Gagauz	70	19	4	1	5
Bulgarians	60	26	10	2	1

Annex 14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than the citizen of any other country

	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
Moldovans	39	28	15	8	9
Ukrainians	25	30	23	6	15
Russians	29	31	19	9	12
Gagauz	23	29	25	12	11
Bulgarians	26	25	30	12	6

Annex 15. How afraid are you of the disintegration of Moldovan state? (in %)

	Very much	Quite much	Quite a little	At all	Don't know	No answer
Moldovans	23	29	14	14	12	8
Ukrainians	7	22	20	14	24	13
Russians	10	29	13	23	11	14
Gagauz	5	22	18	24	20	11
Bulgarians	5	19	26	26	20	5

Annex 16. Answers to question „Which organizations, institutions etc. improve and which worsen the relations between the ethnic groups living in Moldova?“ (in %)

	Moldovans		Ukrainians		Russians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
		%		%		%		%		%
Organizations which contribute to the improvement of the relations between ethnicities in Moldova	Communist Party	6	Communist Party	15	Communist Party	17	Mayor's Office	1	Communist Party	6
	Christian-Democratic Party	2	Democratic Moldova Alliance	2	Democratic Moldova Alliance	8	Schools	1	Ministry of Culture	3
	United Nations	1	Social-Democratic Party	2	Social-Democratic Party	5	Parliament	1	House of Nationalities	2
Organizations which contribute to the worsening of the relations between ethnic groups from Moldova	Christian-Democratic Party	5	Christian-Democratic Party	16	Christian-Democratic Party	20	Christian-Democratic Party	1	Christian-Democratic Party	8
	Communist Party	2	Agrarian Party	2	Agrarian Party	5			Customs	3
			Moldovan state structures	1	Democratic Moldova Alliance	4			Parliament	2

Annex 17. Answers „How do the political parties influence the interethnic relations“? (in %)

	Moldovans				Ukrainians				Russians				Gagauz				Bulgarians			
	Improve the relationships	Neutral	Worsen the relationships	Don't know/no answer	Improve the relationships	Neutral	Worsen the relationships	Don't know/no answer	Improve the relationships	Neutral	Worsen the relationships	Don't know/no answer	Improve the relationships	Neutral	Worsen the relationships	Don't know/no answer	Improve the relationships	Neutral	Worsen the relationships	Don't know/no answer
Communist Party	35	17	16	32	50	14	4	33	54	14	7	26	29	19	10	41	46	27	8	19
Christian Democratic Party	13	18	26	43	2	13	38	46	2	13	49	36	5	22	19	54	4	35	30	30
Democratic Moldova Bloc	12	26	6	56	2	22	8	67	8	28	13	51	6	22	11	61	9	40	14	37
Agrarian Party	3	27	7	63	4	21	7	68	3	30	11	55	5	20	11	64	7	41	9	43
Social Democratic Party	5	27	6	63	2	21	6	71	4	29	10	57	4	19	12	66	5	38	12	45
Socialist Party	3	23	7	67	2	20	6	72	3	30	10	58	4	19	11	66	4	38	11	47

Annex 18. Answers to question, „What personalities contribute to the improvement and what personalities contribute to the worsening of the relations between the ethnic groups in Moldova?“ (in %)

	Moldovans		Ukrainians		Russians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
		%		%		%		%		%
Personalities contributing to the improvement of the interethnic relations in Moldova	Voronin V.	15	Voronin V.	39	Voronin V.	31	Voronin V.	15	Voronin V.	23
	Tarlev V.	6	Tarlev V.	8	Tarlev V.	10	Tarlev V.	5	Tarlev V.	7
	Roşca I.	6	Ostapciuc E.	4	Urechean S.	6	Tabunşic	5	Snegur M.	5
Personalities contributing to the worsening of the interethnic relations in Moldova	Roşca I.	11	Roşca I.	27	Roşca I.	36	Roşca I.	6	Roşca I.	19
	Voronin V.	4	Cubreacov V.	3	Cubreacov V.	9	Urechean S.	1	Druc M.	6
	Ostapciuc E.	2	Snegur M.	2	Urechean S.	5	Braghiş D.	1	Braghiş D.	4

THE ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE RESOLUTION OF INTERETHNIC PROBLEMS IN MOLDOVA

Tamara Caraus

The Dialectic Relation between Emergence of Nation-State and Integration of Ethnonational Minorities

Multiculturalism and Liberal Nationalism

The theoretical framework, in which we will aim to analyze the resolution of inter-ethnic problems in Moldova, is the liberal pluralism, as argued from the perspective of liberal political theory and philosophy, and on which public policies regarding ethnical and national minorities, adopted at the international level, are based. Authors like Will Kymlicka,⁸⁰ Yael Tamir,⁸¹ Charles Taylor,⁸² David Miller,⁸³ Joseph Raz,⁸⁴ Margaret Moore⁸⁵ and others have contributed to the completion of a new approach of ethnocultural diversity, which advocates for public recognition of diversity. This theoretical approach is quite recent, since the first works were published in the 1990s. During the 20th century, ethnicity and national diversity were considered in the political theory as marginal and disappearing with the full modernization of states. Although various sociological and anthropological approaches of the ethnicity phenomena existed in the 1960s, there have been no approaches regarding the rights of ethnic and national minorities.

The classic liberal political theory considers that the state must be neutral regarding the ethnocultural identity of its citizens, and indifferent regarding the capacity of ethnocultural groups to reproduce, and last in time. Ethnicity was considered as something related to the private sphere, and the state had no interference with this area, as long as

⁸⁰ Kymlicka Will, (ed.) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Kymlicka Will, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989; Kymlicka Will, Norman Wayne, *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, Oxford University Press, 2000; Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Oxford University Press, 2001; Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 2001.

⁸¹ Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1993, Yael Tamir, „Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism“, in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour, *Rethinking Nationalism*, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 22, 1996.

⁸² Taylor Charles, „What is wrong with negative liberty?“ in *Philosophy and Human science*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 CUP, 1985; Taylor Charles, in Amy Gutmann, (ed.) *Multiculturalism*, Princeton University Press, 1994, Charles Taylor, „Nationalism and Modernity“ in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.

⁸³ Miller David, *Citizenship and National Identity*, Polity Press, 2000; Miller David, *On Nationality*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.

⁸⁴ Raz Joseph, *Ethics in the Public Domain, Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; Raz Joseph, *The Morality of Freedom*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.

⁸⁵ Moore Margaret, (ed.), *National Self Determination*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

somebody's private sphere did not affect the rights of other citizens. The neutrality of the state regarding ethnicity formed the basis of an older distinction between „civic nations“ and „ethnic nations“, between a „civic nationalism“ and „ethnic nationalism“, or „good nationalism“ and „bad nationalism“.⁸⁶ Thus, the ethnic nations would consider that their goal is to guarantee the perpetuation of a certain culture and identity through the state. On the other hand, civic nations are neutral regarding the ethnocultural identity of citizens, and define the affiliation with the nation-state only through the respect for the democratic principles and human rights.

According to the above-mentioned authors, the idea of state neutrality regarding the ethnic identity of citizens proved to be a myth, a false idea from the historical, as well as conceptual perspectives. Especially because historically the implementation of liberal democratic principles in Europe occurred simultaneously with the emergence of nation states.⁸⁷ However, the liberal political theory of Locke, Kant, Mill and later Popper, Rawls, Dworkin did not provide any explanation in this sense.

The most widely used example of „civic nation“, the United States of America, proves that there is no state ethnic neutrality. First of all, in the U.S. there is a legal requirement that all children must learn English in schools. In addition, there is a legal requirement that the immigrants up to the age of 50 must learn English in order to receive the American citizenship. Any employment with the local administration or any other government requires the candidates to be fluent in English. This thing is also mandatory in the governmental institutions of each state of the federation.

In the opinion of Will Kymlicka, ethnocultural neutrality is a myth. According to the traditional liberal concept, the state must guarantee fundamental individual rights regardless of the ethnic background, because these rights are universal, and the ethnic identity is something that can be expressed only in private life.⁸⁸ However, Kymlicka says, the rights of minorities cannot be subordinated to the category of human rights. The traditional individual rights do not contain answers to the following questions: What language should be recognized in the Parliaments, what should be the language of bureaucracy, judicial courts, etc.? The right for free expression does not tell us what the adequate linguistic policy is. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees all people the right for free expression, but does not say anything about the language used for the exercise of this right. In addition, the right to vote does not say anything about the political boundaries, where this right can be exercised.⁸⁹ There is no separation between state and ethnicity, like in the case of separation between state and religion: „The state must and can replace the religious oath in courts with the secular oath, but it cannot replace English with another language“.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Distinction made by authors such as Ernest Renan in „What is a Nation?“, in Bhabha, Homi K., (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, or by Karl Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the foundations of nationality*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953.

⁸⁷ Colley Linda, *Britons: Forging the Nations, 1707-1837*, London, 1992; Greenfeld Liah, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge. Mass. Harvard University Press, 1992; Weber Eugen, *From Peasants to Frenchmen, The Modernization of Rural France*, Chatto & Windus, 1977.

⁸⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.3.

⁸⁹ Will Kymlicka, *ibid.* p.5.

⁹⁰ Will Kymlicka, *ibid.* p.111

The public use of language in education, justice, government army, etc. has a vital importance for the perpetuation of an ethnic group. On the other hand, a state would not be viable if it did not guarantee the existence of a minimum common language in the public sphere. Any liberal democracy tends to create a common space. It would be impossible to use the language of each ethnic group to the same extent in the public space. It seems that there is a legitimate public interest in promoting a common language in public institutions. All governments must use at least one language in order to carry out its activities and communicate with the population. Preferring an official language, the state gives privilege to those who already speak the language chosen by the state. While the majority uses the common good, which is the language for different individual options, members of the minority cultures are coerced to invest in learning the official language. Only after they learn the language, they can talk about freely expressed individual options.

The idea of ethnocultural neutrality is abandoned by some theoreticians of liberalism. Moreover, both the needs of the nation-state and ethnocultural justice receive new theoretical foundations, known as liberal pluralism, liberal multiculturalism, liberal nationalism, depending on the authors who developed almost simultaneously similar theories.⁹¹ Of course, not all political theoreticians adopt these theoretical premises. Multiculturalism has its critics, and the idea of cosmopolitanism also continues to be supported at the theoretical level as a worthy political ideal.⁹²

Regardless the theoretical position of the authors in the present work, we believe that liberal pluralism is a functional model for the analysis of the relationship between the state, ethnicity and national minorities. Particularly, because of the premises and approaches of liberal pluralism, that have shaped the international provisions and legislations regarding this matter. The liberal pluralism takes into account both terms of the problem - nation-state and ethnic identity - as having an equal theoretical dignity. For the advocates of national liberalism, the nation-state is no longer a prejudice. They have proved that the nation-state and some of its tools serve for the achievement of important and legitimate democratic purposes. For example, the modern economy requires an educated and mobile labor force; therefore, the standard public education in a common language was regarded as essential for the citizens to have real opportunities.

Diversity and Ethnocultural Justice

However, when using these needed tools, such as a standardized common language, the state can create injustice for minorities or the so-called interethnic problems. The injustices are different for different ethnocultural groups. In this regard, relevant is the distinction between ethnic group and national minority.

⁹¹ The author Yael Tamir uses the term „liberal nationalism“ in Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1993; the term „liberal multiculturalism“ is used by Joseph Raz in „Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective“, in Raz Joseph, *Ethics in the Public Domain, Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. In a more recent work, Will Kymlicka calls his approach „liberal pluralism“, see W. Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Oxford University Press, 2001;

⁹² Buchanan, „What is so special about nation?“ in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour, *Rethinking Nationalism*, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 22; Brighouse Harry, „Against nationalism“ in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour, *ibid*; Levy Jacob, *The Multiculturalism of Fear*, Oxford University Press, 200; Jones Charles, *Global Justice, Defending Cosmopolitanism*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Will Kymlicka distinguishes two basic patterns of cultural diversity. A source of diversity represents the incorporation into a state of cultures that were previously self-determined, and linked to a certain territory. These incorporated cultures are called *national minorities*, and their characteristic feature is that they continue to claim different forms of self-government. The second pattern of diversity is individual or family migration. These form groups or *ethnic minorities*, which are usually integrated with the society where they settle.⁹³ If diversity emerges from immigration, then the provision of linguistic and cultural rights to the individuals is not necessary. It is implied that the individuals made a free choice when they decided to leave their country, and their cultural rights are guaranteed somewhere else, unlike the national minorities, who are not supported by another country or homeland that would guarantee the perpetuation of their culture.⁹⁴

Currently, all democratic states use the tools of nation-states being at the same time coerced by the claims of ethnic and national minorities. The minorities that feel threatened claim and receive different rights. According to Kymlicka, „what we see in the real world of liberal democracies is a complex dialectic of emergence of nation-state (the state claims and sets conditions to minorities) and the rights of minorities (minorities have claims)“.⁹⁵ Let us see more in-depth how is this dialect reflected.

Tools for Creation of Nation-State

In order to create a framework where all people have equal chances and opportunities, the state resorts to several tools, as proved by the real existence of the states, tools that are currently analyzed also by the liberal political theory. Thus, the most important tools for the creation of nation-state are: language legislation, education policies, centralization of power, state symbols, citizenship, national holidays, national mass media, military service, etc. As we mentioned above, these tools generate a certain injustice for the ethnic and national minorities from a state, and the approach, called liberal multiculturalism, has the very purpose of creating justice by providing rights, compensating for the ethnocultural injustice.

Types of Ethnocultural Rights

Different authors, in an avalanche of works published in the last decade, resorted to the definition and classification of the types of rights of ethnocultural groups.⁹⁶ These are: a) exemption of the minority group from the provision of the laws prosecuting similar practices in the majority group (e.g. use of certain drugs during religious rituals by the

⁹³ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, OPU; 1995, p.10 – 15.

⁹⁴ Depending on these patterns, one can make a distinction between the multinational and multiethnic states: the multinational state is the one including national minorities, i.e. groups which previously were independent, for example USA, Canada, Switzerland; the multiethnic states are generally formed through immigration.

⁹⁵ W. Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?* Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 49.

⁹⁶ Waldron Jeremy, *Liberal Rights*, Collected Papers, 1981-1991, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Kymlicka Will, (ed.) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Dworkin Ronald, „Rights as Trumps“, in J. Waldron, (ed.) *Theories of Rights*, Oxford University Press, 1994, Joppke Christian, Lukes Steven, (eds), *Multicultural Question*, Oxford University Press, 1999, Reaume Denise, „The Group Rights to Linguistic Security: Whose Right, What Duties?“, in Judith Baker, (ed.), *Group Rights*, University of Toronto Press, 1994; Wellman Carl, *The Proliferation of Rights, Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric*, Westview Press, 1999.

American Indians; hunting laws in the case of the American indigenous population, education system in the case of Amish, etc.); b) affirmative action or assistance for the activities that in the case of the majority groups are unassisted (funding of ethnic associations, etc); c) self-government for ethnic, cultural and national minorities – territorial autonomy, federalization, special public policies (e.g. Puerto Rico); d) external rules limiting the freedom of non-members for the purpose of protecting a group (e.g. restrictions on the use of English in Quebec); e) acceptance of internal rules for the behavior of the group members fortified by expulsion and excommunication (e.g. disinheritance of children who marry someone outside the group); f) recognition of the traditional legal code within the dominant legal system; g) representation in government; recognition of symbolic claims of groups (national holidays, history education, etc).

Will Kymlicka, in his work *Multicultural Citizenship*, distinguishes three types of fundamental ethnocultural rights: right to self determination, multiethnic rights, representation rights – a rather functional distinction which can become a reference for understanding the claims of ethnic/national groups from different regions. We can generally consider that the types of ethnocultural rights represent at the same time the standard claims of ethnic groups and national minorities. Obviously, there are many controversies regarding the rights of a group, which are provocative from a theoretical perspective, however, the purpose of this work is not the theoretical reflection of the group rights. We will mention that some theoreticians have signaled two causes that fuel the conflict regarding the rights of a group. Firstly, it is the fact that one cannot talk about a fixed group identity: often the claims of a group or nation – territory, borders, past, language – can be also claimed by another group. Secondly, the biggest concern is the fact that the group can have rights against its members,⁹⁷ and then the liberal multiculturalism and national liberalism cancel their fundamental premise, i.e. the liberal idea: unconditional respect for the individual and inviolability of the person.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this work we will accept the statement „ethnocultural rights of a group“ as being non-problematic, and the granting of rights to ethnic and national groups as a necessary element in the emergence of any nation-state. We can probably say „in the emergence of any state“ and exclude the word „national“, because for now there has not been any state that did not have the attributes of a nation-state, neither at the theoretical level, nor at the level of real political life. There is no state that would not need a standardized and homogenous language in order to be functional from the economic, political and social perspectives. Moreover, in the conditions of ethnocultural diversity, selection and spreading of one language is already an injustice, but a necessary one, we could say. Despite the „need“, this injustice does not have to remain uncompensated. From these reasons, ethnocultural rights and the emergence of nation-state must be viewed and understood as being always in a mutual relationship. If we only see the claims of

⁹⁷ Hartney Michael, Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights, in Kymlicka Will, (ed.) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.202-227 Kukathas Chnadron, Are There any Cultural Rights? In Kymlicka Will, (ed.), op. cit.; Waldron Jeremy, „Rights in Conflict“, in Waldron Jeremy, *Liberal Rights*, Collected Papers, 1981-1991 Cambridge University Press, 1993.

minorities, such as a special status or privileges, we do not understand the essential data of the problem: these claims represent a reaction to the emergence of the nation-state. Thus the claims must be understood as a response to the requirements of the state.⁹⁸

In order to keep the meaning of mutual relationship, we must ask ourselves what does exactly legitimize the state in imposing the minorities a national language, education systems, citizenship tests. As argued by the theoreticians of liberal nationalism, the are legitimate objectives that are valid when imposing these measures: equality of chances and opportunities, etc.

The dialectic relationship does not imply a subordination of minorities by the state, followed by a series of claims on behalf of minorities (even though it happened in this chronological order), on the contrary, one always has to pursue a balance. The state tools and policies will be just and libertarian, only if they are accompanied by satisfaction of the rights of national minorities. In their turn, the excessive claims on behalf of national minorities can destroy this fragile balance between the policies of the nation-state and the minority rights.

Dialectic of Emergence of Nation-State and Claims of Ethnonational Groups in the Case of Moldova

The Specific Nature of Emergence of Nation-State in Moldova

The Moldovan case seems to confirm the dialectic model between emergence of nation-state and claims of ethnic minorities. This occurrence is obvious, especially, when we find that these two phenomena happened concurrently. Unlike western democracies, where the nation-state emerged first – the 19th century, and the first half of the 20th century – and only in the last decades of the 20 century one took into consideration the rights of minorities due to the wave of multicultural movements. In Moldova, chronologically these two phenomena took place at the same time. The building of rule of law in Moldova occurred simultaneously with granting of special rights to minorities, rights claimed in the name of fundamental human rights: for example, the declaration of the official language occurred simultaneously with the development of the law on the functioning of languages in Moldova; the adoption of the Constitution already provides for a status of Gagauz-Yeri, a special status for the left-bank districts (Transnistria), and multiethnic and representation rights for ethnocultural groups.

National Minority vs. Ethnic group

As we know, none of the approaches of this problem gives us a clear and unique definition of national minority: neither at the level of international relations theory, official acts of the UN, OSCE, CoE, nor in the theoretical approaches of the political philosophy and

⁹⁸ There are more complex cases than this model with two variables: the multinational states, multinational federations, etc. E.g. Quebec region of Canada.

political theory. The national, as well as the international legislation stipulates that each person chooses to affiliate with an ethnic or national minority. For example, the *Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of persons belonging to the national minorities and the legal status of their organizations*, article 2, stipulates that „any person belonging to a national minority has the right to choose freely to belong to that particular minority or not.”⁹⁹

However, for the sake of the present work we will preserve the distinction between the two patterns of forming ethnocultural diversity mentioned by Kymlicka: incorporation of the pre-existent groups on a certain territory into the nation-state, and immigration.

According to historians, ethnic diversity was formed by two large waves of immigration in Moldova: immediately after 1812, and immediately after 1945.¹⁰⁰ In 1812 Bessarabia was scarcely populated. According to the cited sources, the Russian government attracted Russian and Ukrainian colonists by granting them privileges and land. In 1812, fearing Turkish reprisals, the Gagauz settled here. Another population growth was due to a spontaneous influx of Jews and serfs from the Tsarist Empire, allured by the favorable conditions from Bessarabia. In half a century, the population in Bessarabia tripled. A second wave that enhanced the ethnic diversity took place after 1945, when representatives of different ethnic groups, which were already part of the „Soviet people“, could settle wherever they wanted on the territory of the Soviet Union. However, it is considered that most of those who settled here after 1945 were Russians, who came to civilize the region, representatives of this ethnic group were settling for this purpose in different regions of the USSR, that were considered less developed. Given these diversity patterns, we can see the nature of ethnocultural diversity in Moldova, we see what is predominating: ethnic groups or national minorities.

a. *Russians* when they settled in Moldova, as well as in other soviet republics, they were neither considered emigrants nor minority. They settled within the borders of their homeland. We should mention that the whole world recognized the borders of the USSR as legitimate and legal. Moreover, in accordance with the international law, they could move wherever they wanted within their country, i.e. they had the right to settle anywhere within the Soviet state. However, this settlement has features of emigration. Consequently, we can say that the Russians from Moldova are only an ethnic group or ethnic minority because representatives of this group have settled here via emigration.

b. *The Gagauz* ethnic group, national minority or the „Gagauz people“? There was a legislative discussion in Moldova regarding the term „Gagauz people“: the preamble of the Law regarding TAU Gagauz Yeri used the term „Gagauz people“ which generated controversies. The „use in the preamble of the Law on the special legal status of Gagauzia of the term „Gagauz people“ and the subsequent development in paragraph 4 [...] harms the sovereignty of the unitary state Republic of Moldova,

⁹⁹ The Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of people belonging to national minorities and the legal status of their organizations, no. 382-XV from 19.07.2001;

¹⁰⁰ Wilhelmus Petrus Van Meurs, *Chestiunea Basarabiei în istoriografia comunistă*, trad. I. Stanciu, ARC, Chişinău, 1996, cap. „Politica naţionalităţilor“, pp.129-171; şi Charles King, *Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală*, Editura ARC, Chişinău, 2002

and is unconstitutional [...]. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova recognizes the unity of the people from Republic of Moldova, which cannot be divided in more peoples, therefore, the use of the term Gagauz people is already a privilege¹⁰¹. A justification for using the term was provided in article 1, paragraph 4, regarding the right to external self-determination of the TAU Gagauz Yeri: „In the case of a change in the status of Moldova as independent state, the Gagauz people have the right to external self-determination“.¹⁰² The answer provided in accordance with the political and legal framework of Moldova is the following: „The case of Gagauzia needs to be correlated with the obligation of the states, regarding the protection of human rights. The right to self-determination is considered an individual right. Otherwise, in strict legal logic any collective right or freedom is an individual right or a freedom, but can be only exercised through association“.¹⁰³ The individual autonomy is considered as a foundation, both for democracy and for the right to self-determination, achieved through plebiscite.¹⁰⁴

Although settled on this territory as a result of emigration, the Gagauz could in fact be a national minority, not because they were incorporated in the state that emerged here, but because nowhere in the world there is a larger Gagauz community. Their situation is unique: a population of Turkic origin with a Christian orthodox religion. The Gagauz from Moldova represent the largest Gagauz community in the world, without a *homeland*, even though Turkey is the linguistic „motherland“ of the Gagauz, it is not their „religious motherland“. This justifies the Gagauz autonomy as a special right that cannot be granted to other ethnocultural groups from Moldova.

c. Ukrainians and Bulgarians: In this case, we can probably say that we have ethnic groups formed by former emigrants who, of course, neither consider themselves emigrants, nor represent a national minority. The privileges they enjoy are related to the assurance of conditions for the preservation of their culture, language and traditions. In other words they enjoy the so-called multiethnic rights and not political rights as in the case of the Gagauz.

d. Other groups: The Roma community is called „non-territorial minority“ or „translational minority“ because it is spread in many countries without having a „homeland“. However, the representatives of this ethnic group, as the representatives of the Jewish ethnic group from Moldova, were not included in the Ethnobarometer

¹⁰¹ Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of the Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law no. 344-XII from 1994 regarding the legal status of Gagauzia no. 35 from 21.12.95.

¹⁰² The notification of a group of parliamentarians and the whole discussion resulted in a Decision of the Constitutional Court, which states that the „right of the Gagauz to self-governance would not reduce the content and the action of Moldovan sovereignty“, because the article is applied only in the case of change of status of Moldova as an independent country. Currently such conditions do not exist; therefore it does not mean that they reduce the content and the area of Moldovan sovereignty. This effect will not occur even in the case if Moldova loses its independence, because in this case the sovereignty will not exist either. It also does not conflict with the international treaties that guarantee the right to self-determination of people. The Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri) no. 344-XIII from 23.12.94 Monitorul Oficial al R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996.

¹⁰³ Decision of the Constitutional Court, *ibid*

¹⁰⁴ Decision of the Constitutional Court, *ibid*

survey, which is the basis of this study, probably because they are numerically insignificant groups. From this reason, there is no important need to categorize them in any way for the purpose of this study.

Tools for the Creation of Nation-State in Moldova

According to the dialectic described above, we first present the tools used by Moldova in the attempt to emerge as a nation-state, and then the claims of the ethnic groups and national minorities.

These „tools“ are in fact events that occurred in chronological order, and formed the recent history of the Republic of Moldova.

- Introduction of the Latin script and declaration of official language on August 31, 1989
- The adoption of the tricolor flag on April 27, 1990
- Introduction of the History of Romanians and Romanian literature in the education curricula in September 1990
- Adoption of the national anthem „Desteapta-te Romane“ on May 23, 1990
- Adoption of a new name for the country on May 23, 1991
- Declaration of sovereignty on June 23, 1991
- Declaration of independence on August 27, 1991
- Readoption of the Romanian geographic names – 1990-1991
- Adoption of the Constitution in July 1994
- Declaration of Moldovan as the official language in July 1994
- Adoption of a new anthem „Limba Noastra“ - 1995

Claims of Ethnic and National Minorities Satisfied by the Moldovan State

The introduction of the official language in Moldova instituted the real „bilingualism“ provided by the status of the Russian language as „language of interethnic communication“: „Russian is used on the territory of the country together with Moldovan as a language of communication between nations, fact that assures a real national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism“ (The Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the functioning of languages spoken on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, no. 3465XI from 01.09.89, article 3)

- The right to self-governance. This right is accomplished through the Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) no. 344XIII from 23.12.94, Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova no. 34/51 from 14011995, which stipulates: „Giving priority to human rights, understanding the need for combining general human interests with the national ones, reiterating the equality of rights of all citizens [...] the Parliament adopts the present Law“. (Preamble); „Gagauz Yeri is an autonomous territorial unit (TAU) with a special status, which is a form of self-determination of the Gagauz, being a part of the Republic of Moldova“ (article 1. 1)

ATU Gagauz Yeri realizes its self-governance through the following local political structures:

Legislative Assembly: „The popular assembly invested with the right to adopt normative acts, within the limits of its competence, elected for 4 years“, (article 7)

President: „the Governor (Bashkan) is the supreme official person of Gagauzia, elected by universal vote with the condition to speak the Gagauz language“. (article 14. 1).

The executive body: „The permanent executive body of Gagauzia is the Executive Committee formed by the Popular Assembly at the first seating for the period of its mandate. (article 16). Also, the TAU Gagauz Yeri has three official languages: „The official languages of Gagauzia are Moldovan, Gagauz and Russian“. (article 3)

In addition, according to the Moldovan Constitution, the right to self-governance can be potentially extended over other localities: „The localities from the right bank of Nistru River can be granted special forms and conditions for autonomy in accordance with the status adopted through organic laws“ (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova art 111, paragraph 1).

- Multiethnic rights and representation rights. These rights are provided in the *Law of Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and legal status of their organizations*, nr. 382XV from 19.07.2001. According to this law, the fundamental multiethnic rights include the right to native language, culture, religion, education, organizations, links with historical homeland etc. The rights of representation are designed to prevent the discrimination of ethnic groups in official policy: „The persons belonging to national minorities have the right to an approximately proportional representation in the structures of executive power, judicial power at all levels, army, legal institutions“ (article 24). The body responsible for the promotion of state policy in the field of interethnic relations is the *Department for Interethnic Relations*, also the *Coordination Council* composed of leaders of ethno-cultural associations, *Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and Ethnic Minorities* and the *House of Nationalities*.
- Moldova has ratified several international acts regarding the protection of national minorities:
 1. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, developed by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and proposed to the CoE member states, ratified on October 22, 1996;
 2. Charter for Protection of Regional and Minority Languages, developed by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human rights and proposed to the CoE member states, in the process of ratification;¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ In the discussions with the representatives of the Council of Europe about the „possibilities for the accession of Moldova to the European Charter of Languages“ it was mentioned that this act should refer first of all to the protection of Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian languages. The status of communication language, or language of interethnic communication granted to the Russian language in Moldova is original, and does not fall under this Charter, as the Charter does not provide the protection of official languages. The European charter of regional and minority languages stipulates that when the number of persons speaking a minority language is „significant“, the refusal of a state to guarantee public services in this language would seem unreasonable and therefore discriminatory. Thus, the guarantee of language rights depends on the number of people who speak the language. The Charter excludes explicitly the languages of immigrants. The states that aim to ratify must specify what languages they want to cover within this Charter. The causes for the delay of ratification of the Charter by Moldova could be related to the challenge caused by the the decision about the languages that the Charter will be applied to.

- Plurality of citizenships. The Moldovan citizenship type implies civic and political participation, based only on the rationality law and human rights, regardless of the ethnic background: „Moldovan citizenship establishes a permanent legal-political connection between a physical person and the Moldovan state, that generates mutual rights and duties between the state and the individual“. (The Law on Moldovan Citizenship no.1024XIV from 02.06.2000, article 3.1.). In most theoretical and normative discussions about citizenship, this type of citizenship and this kind of political framework are considered democratic and correct. Meanwhile, the Moldovan citizens are and may become citizens of Romania, Russia, Ukraine, countries that grant citizenship based on ethnic criteria. This citizenship is often based on ethnocultural affection and identity. Multiple citizenship was accepted in 2002 by amending the Law on Citizenship adopted at the beginning of 1990s. The new law introduced a whole chapter, chapter IV, and 3 articles (24, 25, 26), which provide for and regulate the multiple citizenship.
- Symbolic rights. We consider that Moldova recognizes a series of symbolic rights of ethnic and national minorities, such as, for example, the right to identity: „The state recognizes and guarantees the right to identity of persons from different nationalities“. (Constitution of Moldova, Article 10, Unity of People and Right to Identity, paragraph 2). This right to identity should not degenerate in privileges: that is why it is necessary to specify that the protection measures, undertaken by state for the preservation, development and expression of identity of persons of other ethnic backgrounds should comply with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, in relation with other citizens of the state“.¹⁰⁶

Symbolic rights are also instituted and guaranteed through other legislative acts. We can say that there is a symbolic dimension emphasized in the Moldovan legislation, regarding ethnic minorities, dimension that has a legislative-declarative character. The legislative-declarative aspect is illustrated by the articles from the Moldovan Constitution, such as the article about the above-mentioned right to identity, but also by other articles, regarding „Moldovan people“. „The state recognizes that this territory is populated only by one nation – the Moldovan people“ (Constitution of Moldova, article 10, paragraph 1.2.). The „Moldovan people“ includes „Moldovans and citizens of other ethnic backgrounds“ (preamble of the Constitution).¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz—Yeri). 344-XIII from 23.12.94 Monitorul Oficial al R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996

¹⁰⁷ The definition given to the „people“ in a decision of the Constitutional Court of Moldova: „People – superior form of human community which cannot be confused with other collectivities – isare not an exclusively ethnic or biologic phenomenon. It is a complex reality and at the same time the product of a lengthy historical process, based on the community of ethnic origin, language, culture, religion, psychology, life, traditions and ideals, but especially the historical past and the desire to stay together of those who lived together on a territory“ - is a conglomerate of visions about the people: anthropological, ethnonational but also political and civic. This definition seems to contain a conglomerate of perspectives: sociological, anthropological, political theory, a conglomerate that tries to justify the very nation of „Moldovan people“. Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz—Yeri). 344-XIII from 23.12.94 Monitorul Oficial al R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996

Another illustration of legislative-declarative aspect is the controversial *Law regarding the Concept of State National Policy of Republic of Moldova*, no. 546XV from 19.12.2003.¹⁰⁸ According to the authors, this law was necessary for the „consolidation of country’s sovereignty and independence“ and for the „creation of favorable conditions for free development of all ethnic and linguistic communities, and for their integration with the people of Moldova“. The law abounds in expressions such as „development of correct traditional interethnic relations“, „consolidation and improvement of principles of multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism and multilingualism in the process of consolidation of the Moldovan people“ etc., without specifying the meaning of most of the used concepts.

However, despite the incoherence and contradictions, the legislative-declarative aspect identified the country’s desire to consolidate itself as a nation-state, as well as to integrate in harmony the ethnic and national minorities. The concomitance of these phenomena allows us to assert that the Moldovan state tried to form through the dialectics between the construction of the nation-state and institution of ethnocultural justice. This is obvious from the legislative, as well as from empirical perspective, i.e. granting real rights to minorities through organic laws that more or less function.

We will not adopt any important perspective/judgment regarding the actions and measures undertaken by the Moldovan state in this direction. The purpose of this work is not to make a critical analysis from the normative perspective of state measures undertaken for establishing ethnocultural justice. The normative perspective is replaced with the perspective of the citizens of Moldova expressed by the respondents participating in the Ethnobarometer national opinion survey. The survey included representatives of the majority ethnic group and representatives of four minority ethnic groups: Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians.

Further, we will try to see how the representatives of majority and minority ethnic groups from Moldova perceive these attempts of the state. In other words, in the third part of this work we intend to analyze if these perceptions vary by ethnicity, if citizens perceived these attempts of building equilibrium or, on the contrary, they consider the state policies as being deficient.

Citizens’ Perceptions and Attitudes Towards State Policies of Integration of National and Ethnic Minorities

The Perception of State’s Role in the Integration of Ethnic Minorities

Out of 67 questions included in the questionnaire, several refer exactly to the issue analyzed in our study. Question 32 from survey form is „crucial“ in this sense, because it generally includes all state actions towards minorities, listed in the theoretical framework outlined above. We will reproduce the question in order to have a clear picture of the issues discussed in this chapter.

¹⁰⁸ www.parlament.md/download/laws

„To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

Moldova should...“

- a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries
- b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers;
- c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers;
- d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers;
- e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers;
- f. support Moldovan businesses abroad;
- g. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad;
- h. support cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova;
- i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group;
- j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group;
- k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group;
- l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group;
- m. organize cultural events which would be attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova;
- n. grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents a majority.

The options for the answer are „totally agree“, „rather agree“, „disagree“, „completely disagree“ and „don't know/no answer“.

This question requests, in a concentrated manner, the opinion of ethnic minority and majority representatives regarding the listed statements. The specific nature of the question is that it does not refer to actions that have already been undertaken by Moldova or actions that should be undertaken immediately. The formulation „should“ does not require any previous knowledge of the actions that have already been undertaken by the state. Unlike other relevant questions, for the analysis of the relationship between the Moldovan state and ethnic minorities, this question requires the respondents' opinion.

The question is rather complex and includes several aspects that require clarification. Thus, the statements *a*, *f* and *g* included in the question refer to the actions of Moldova, as a historic homeland, directed towards the Moldovans from abroad. Statements *b*, *c*, *d*, *e* relate to the educational and linguistic policies, that a state should implement for its national and ethnic minorities, policies that are part of the recognition of cultural rights. Points *i*, *j*, *k*, and *l* refer to a more abstract aspect – the state contribution to the development of the identity of different ethnic groups. We can say that this is the most abstract and most challenging part of the question, because identity does not develop separately. It is developed as a consequence of educational and linguistic policies and provision of ethnocultural rights. Thus, if the respondents agree with education in minority languages and do not agree with development of the identity of different ethnic groups, as in the case of analyzed questionnaires, then the answers are quite confusing and are opened to many speculations and interpretations. **Q32 m** refers to the organization of cultural events with the participation of different ethnic groups, activity which received the agreement of all the respondents, as we can see further on. However, **Q32 n** refers to an aspect of minority rights, which proves to be the most controversial for the respondents: the idea of territorial autonomy.

One can say that the answers to this question are somewhat representative for the answers to the rest of the questions regarding integration of ethnic minorities, integration meaning the settlement of interethnic problems.

Firstly, the answers „Totally agree“ and „Somewhat agree“ are predominant. The cases when the number of disagreements equals the number of agreements are rare; moreover, rare are the cases of answers when disagreements predominate. With the lack of diversity of answers one can say that we resort to an analysis of „minor differences“.

- The number of disagreements regarding state minority-related policies is higher among the respondents representing the ethnic majority. About 50 percent of Moldovan respondents agree that the Moldovan state provides an opportunity for children and teenagers of other ethnicities to pursue an education in their native language, the other 50 percent are divided among „disagreements“ and „don't know/no answer“ options. Disagreements also predominate in the answers to the question if the state should help develop the identities of the four minority ethnic groups included in the research. The sum of „disagree“ and „totally disagree“ answers is 10-15 percent larger than the sum of „totally agree“ and „rather agree“ answers.
- The idea of territorial autonomy is the most controversial action undertaken by the state. There is a visible disagreement among the respondents who identify themselves as Moldovans (25 percent - „disagree“ and 29 percent „totally disagree“) regarding granting a larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majority. Russian respondents accept the idea of autonomy granted to these districts: 33 percent „totally agree“, 26 percent „rather agree“, the disagreements represent only 24 percent of answers and 17 percent chose „don't know/no answer“. There is a small reticence regarding this idea among Ukrainians: 26 percent do not believe that autonomy is necessary, but the number of those who welcome it is much larger (26 percent „totally agree“ and 28 percent „rather agree“). The answers are similar in the case of the Gagauz respondents, although we would expect more specific answers, given the fact that this ethnic group has had a real experience of territorial autonomy for over a decade. 17 percent of these „do not know/do not answer“, 20 percent „disagree“ and 4 percent „totally disagree“, while the rest of the respondents accept the idea. The fact that the answers of the Gagauz are grouped in a similar way as the answers of the Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic groups raises the question whether the Gagauz perceive the legal framework offered by TAU Gagauz Yeri as a real experience or just a formality with no concrete effects. In the case of Bulgarians, the number of people who agree with the idea of autonomy (47 percent) is not much higher than the number of people who do not accept the idea (40 percent). The survey forms do not suggest a motivation for such a distribution of answers. Also, the answers to the other questions are not grouped in a similar way that would allow asserting that the respondents of this ethnic group count more on the reasonability and rationality of democratic principles, and do not plead for the organization of political life based on ethnic and affective bonds.

- The most innocent aspect of interethnic relations proves to be the organization of cultural events with the participation of different ethnicities. These particular cultural events are associated by most of the respondents with the folk and food festivals.
- Among the respondents belonging to Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian ethnicities, the number of „don't know/no answer“ choices regarding the actions the state should undertake for the solution of interethnic conflicts is rather large. This proves that these three ethnic groups are not aware of the problems they encounter.
- It can be noticed a slight opposition of Bulgarian and Gagauz ethnic groups towards the actions the state should undertake for the integration of their ethnic group and for the development of their ethnic identity. 17 percent of Gagauz and 21 percent of Bulgarians do not agree that the state should guarantee the children of their group (Gagauz or Bulgarian) the opportunity to pursue an education in their native language. Among these respondents, about 20 percent do not agree that state should contribute to the development of identity of ethnic groups from Moldova, including the identity of their own group.
- All respondents accept the actions Moldova should undertake, as historic homeland, for Moldovans abroad – pupils, students, enterprises. As we will see from the answers to the other questions, this acceptance is doubled by the request for action on behalf of other historic homelands towards the ethnic minorities from Moldova.
- Educational and linguistic policies – education in minority language–generate unconditional agreements among the ethnic minorities and a little disagreement among the ethnic majority.

The Respondents' Perception of Language Policies in Moldova

In this chapter, we will analyze the respondents' attitudes towards the linguistic policies of the state. We will cover three main aspects: the official language, bilingualism and the use of minority languages in public sphere. The questions from the survey forms, which provide us with material for analysis are, questions Q41, Q61, Q64, Q65, Q66. It should be mentioned that we do not take into account the correctness of the terms „Moldovan language“ or „Romanian language“. We use both terms as presented in the questionnaires.

a. State language and bilingualism

- Only the majority ethnic group opts for one state language – the Moldovan language (77 percent) or Romanian language (25 percent), the other minority ethnic groups support the idea of two or even three official languages. There are, of course, representatives of majority, who support the idea of two state languages and representatives of minority, who support the idea of only one state language, but their number is insignificant.
- The Russians choose two state languages – Moldovan and Russian. The other ethnic groups, indicate, as a rule, three state languages: Moldovan, Russian and the language of their own ethnic group. 70 percent of Russian respondents assert that there should be two official languages and only 16 percent choose one state lan-

guage, and 9 percent consider the idea of three state languages plausible. Among Ukrainian respondents, 16 percent consider that one state language is sufficient, 63 percent think that it is necessary to have two state languages, and 13 percent plead for three official languages. The three languages should be: Moldovan (93 percent), Russian (76 percent), and Ukrainian (17 percent). Among Gagauz respondents, 50 percent opt for 2 state languages; 21 percent – more than 2, and 16 percent – only one state language. The Gagauz language should be official according to only 27 percent of respondents, Moldovan/Romanian – for 92 percent and Russian – for 83 percent. Similarly, most of the Bulgarian ethnics who participated in the survey (64%) plead for two state languages, 23 percent – for one, and 10% – for more official languages. As in the other cases, the first two official languages are Moldovan (93%), Russian (75%), and the third language is Bulgarian (8%).

- The possibility of existence of two official languages leads to a real challenge, which was noted for the first time by the authors of the questionnaires. If there should be two or three official languages, then the following question becomes logical: Which languages should be official and Who should know these languages. In other words, who should know Moldovan/Romanian, who should know Russian and who should speak the languages of national minorities. The answers are rather predictable. Thus, 85 percent of Moldovan respondents (73% „totally agree“, 12% „somewhat agree“) believe that all residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian language. Only 26 percent of Moldovans consider that all residents of Moldova should know Russian (10% „totally agree“, 16% „somewhat agree“), and 36 percent of respondents do not agree with this, while 25% neither oppose nor advocate for another official language. Only in this case we have a clear option for the language that should be spoken by the residents of Moldova. In the case of the other ethnic groups who participated in the survey, the number of those, considering that all residents of the country should know Moldovan/Romanian equals usually the number of those, who believe that the residents should know Russian (average of 60 percent).¹⁰⁹ Only among the Gagauz respondents, the number of those considering that all residents should know Russian exceeds (by 6%) the number of those

¹⁰⁹ *Russian ethnic group:* Q64 i: „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“ - 47%- totally agree, 24% rather agree, 11% neither agree nor disagree, 7% rather disagree, 6% totally disagree. „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“ -33%- totally agree, 31% rather agree, 15% neither agree nor disagree, 8% rather disagree, 7% totally disagree.

Ukrainian ethnic group: Q64i „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“ -43%- totally agree, 25% rather agree, 14% neither agree nor disagree, 7% rather disagree, 6% totally disagree.

Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“ -37%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 16% neither agree nor disagree, 8% rather disagree, 5% totally disagree, 5% don't know/no answer.

Gagauz ethnic group: Q64i „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“ -27 %- totally agree, 29% rather agree, 14 % neither agree nor disagree, 14% rather disagree, 9% totally disagree.

Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“ -33%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 11% neither agree nor disagree, 11% rather disagree, 9% totally disagree.

Bulgarian ethnic group: Q 64 i : „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“ -37%- totally agree, 24% rather agree, 12% neither agree nor disagree, 13% rather disagree, 7% totally disagree, 3% don't know/no answer

Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“ -25%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 27% neither agree nor disagree, 26% rather disagree, 16% totally disagree.

considering that everyone living in Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian. In the case of Bulgarian respondents, the number of those considering that every resident should know Moldovan/Romanian is a bit higher (also by 6%) than the number of those who believe all that residents should know Russian. These little gaps do not eliminate the option of the ethnic groups to set put Moldovan/Romanian and Russian languages on one linguistic scale. (This balance is rather related to the intention and is not real since the answers to the questions about the languages they speak and understand - Q59, Q60, and Q51 – prove that they do not know these two languages. There is no single question that would ask the respondents what is needed in their opinion to know both languages by all residents or ask them to state what language needs to be spoken and where. Probably the assumption generating this answer is the idea of the „real and harmonious bilingualism“ used in Moldovan legislation and which, as proven by these answers, entered the perception (conscience) of the minorities.

- In parallel with the regulations about *Who should speak the language* and *Which language* there is a suspicion, that the representatives of a certain ethnic group know a certain language, but avoid speaking it. Question Q64 (e. f. g. h.) is structured according to some sort of principle of equivalence: thus the representatives of each ethnic groups participating in the survey are asked if they believe that the representatives of other ethnic groups, included in the research, know the language of their ethnic group, but avoid speaking it. The answers are more relevant in the case of the majority group and the Russian group. Thus, there is unanimity in the answers of the majority group representatives: they agree that, „many Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians in Moldova know Romanian/Moldovan but avoid speaking it“.

The Russians disagree that „many Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians know Russian but avoid speaking it“, i.e. most of the answers are grouped in the categories „totally disagree“, „disagree“ and „neither agree nor disagree“. It seems that the Russians understand that other ethnic groups know and speak Russian, and do not express any suspicion in this sense. However, the opinions of the Russian respondents are divided when this statement refers to the majority group, i.e. „many Moldovans know Russian but avoid speaking it“ (Q64 e.). Thus, 16 percent „totally agree“, 21 percent „somewhat agree“, 20 percent „neither agree nor disagree“, 11 percent „rather disagree“, and 24 percent „totally disagree“.

In the case of Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian groups, the answers „neither agree, nor disagree“, followed by „don't know“ and sometimes „rather disagree“ are predominant. It seems that this question put the respondents of these three groups before an insecure situation: they indeed had no reason to say that the representatives of other ethnic groups know the language of their group, but avoid speaking it. Probably such a suspicion would be exaggerated in the case of the Gagauz respondents who, due to the legal framework of the TAU Gagauz Yeri, have the right to use the Gagauz in political sphere but seem to

know little this language. Thus, it is impossible to explain why an outside observer, when contacting with the public space of Gagauz Yeri, notices the use of only one language out of those provided in the special status of the region, and namely Russian.

b. The use of minority languages in public sphere

There is only one question regarding the possible linguistic policies to which most of the respondents, regardless of ethnic background, offer similar answers. This question asks for opinions of respondents regarding the statement „In regions where the Ukrainians/Gagauz/Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulgarian.“ (Q 64 k, l, m). The respondents either reject this possibility („disagree“), or remain indifferent („neither agree nor disagree“). In fact, these answers do not indicate a lack of tolerance, refusal of harmonious and mutual integration with the people of Moldova (as stipulated in the above-mentioned legal acts), but are rather an indicator of reasonability. If respondents believe that all residents must know at least one language and more of them consider that the residents should know even two languages, then the knowledge of a third language spoken only in a region probably seems too costly in terms of time, resources and effort.

Respondents' Perception of Education Policies of Moldova Regarding Ethnic and National Minorities

For the most part, education policies represent an integral part of the linguistic policies and imply the right of the representatives of ethnic and national minorities to study in their native language. In the same context, the questionnaire lists the right to establish educational institutions in the minority languages, particularly with the assistance of the historical homelands. The analysis performed in this subchapter refers to the answer provided for questions Q 32 b, c, d, e; questions Q 33–37 a., and question Q 41 a. b..

- The educational policies do not generate large disagreements. Both the respondents of the majority and the minority groups „agreed“ or „somewhat agreed“ that the state should guarantee the opportunity to pursue an education in Russian/Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulgarian languages for the children and teenagers of Russian/Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulgarian backgrounds.
- In the case of Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians, the number of those who „totally agree“ that Moldova should create conditions for education in Russian is larger than the number of those who „totally agree“ that the state should create conditions for education in the language of their own ethnic group. For example, 50 percent of Ukrainians „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee the education in Russian, and only 46 percent „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee education in Ukrainian. Among the Bulgarian respondents, 52 percent „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee the education in Russian, and only 43 percent „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee education in Bulgarian.
- The majority and minority groups also unanimously accept the support of the education by the historical homelands. Generally, the number of unconditional agreements is larger, in case of their own historical homeland, than the historical

homelands of other groups. For example, 70 percent of Russian respondents „totally agree“ that Russia should support students of Russian background studying in Moldova, and the number of those who support unconditionally the similar actions of Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania is smaller (62, 53, 53, and 55). The Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian ethnic groups usually support Russia's actions for sustaining the education in Russian language as much as they support their own historical homeland. For example, 55 percent of the Ukrainian respondents support unconditionally the actions of Russia in supporting the education for children of Russian background, 56 percent support Ukraine's actions, 48 percent support Turkey and 49 percent support Bulgaria.

- Mutual learning of languages. The purpose of question 41 a. and b. is to test the respondents' knowledge of the official language. The respondents were asked if they agree with the following statements: „Moldovan children should learn the minority languages in schools“ (41 a) and „children of other ethnic backgrounds should learn Moldovan/Romanian in schools“ (41b). Although the question was formulated for a different purpose, we will attribute it this motivation. It seems that the questions are mutually compensating, and suggest a necessary and natural situation: mutual learning of languages. I.e. children of other ethnic backgrounds study Moldovan/Romanian in schools while Moldovan children study the minority languages. This situation can be also regarded as a sign of mutual respect and successful integration with the multicultural and multiethnic Moldova. What are the respondents' opinions regarding this possible idyllic picture of interethnic relations? In the case of the ethnic majority, most of the respondents agreed that the children of other minorities should learn Moldovan/Romanian, and do not quite agree that the Moldovan children should learn the minority languages: at least the number of those who agree equals the number of those who disagree.

In the case of Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians, the number of those who think that all Moldovan children should learn the minority languages is 20 percent lower than the number of those who agree that Moldovan should be studied by the children of other ethnic backgrounds (an average of 70 and 90 percent). However, the answer „agree“ is predominant. In the case of the Gagauz, the answers are similar for both options: learning of Moldovan/Romanian by the minority children and learning of the minority languages by the Moldovans (76 percent).

The answers to this question do not correspond with the answers to a similar question – Q64 k, l, m – which asks the respondents' opinions regarding the compulsoriness to know the language of an ethnic group that represents majority in a particular district/area, and which is mostly disagreed by the respondents. Probably the explanation of the discordance is reflected in the age. It is possible that the respondents believe that it is normal that all children of the majority group learn the languages of the minority groups, but it seems to them rather unreasonable that all residents (i.e. adults like them) to learn and speak the language of a minority group.

Respondents' Perception of Cultural Rights Provided by Moldova

The cultural rights referred to in the questionnaires include the freedom of assembly based on ethnic principles, conditions for the preservation and development of cultural heritage, and specific traditions, access to and the use of mass media. These aspects are covered in questions Q24, Q32 m, Q33-37 c, and Q41. As we noted in the analysis of the answers to question Q32 about the role of the state in the integration of minorities, cultural rights represent the most „innocent“ aspect of policies for the integration of minorities. This does not mean that the other aspects would be more „blameworthy“, they just generate more controversies and disagreements.

- All respondents agree that the cultural events with the participation of different ethnic groups living in Moldova should be organized. However, up to now, only at most 30 percent of the respondents have participated in such events/festivals, and approximately 70 percent of the respondents have never taken part in such activities. It is probably the only question with equal number of responses (percent), regardless of the ethnic background (Q24).
- The freedom of association by ethnic principles is accepted/recognized by all respondents, regardless of ethnicity (Q41e). The respondents accept both Moldova's actions to support the ethnocultural organizations, and the actions of historical homelands (Q33-Q37c).
- The access to mass media of the representatives of ethnic groups is perceived by the survey under two aspects – coverage of activities organized by people of different ethnic backgrounds in Moldovan media and the broadcast of programs in different minority languages on Teleradio Moldova (national broadcaster). No group of respondents manifested reservations regarding these measures.

We could say that the promotion of conditions facilitating the preservation, development of cultural heritage and traditions is a unanimously accepted measure. Respondents perceive these measures as separate from other measures designed to protect the minorities. These actions tend to be understood in the „folk“ way. Similarly, the freedom of assembly, association, and expression tend to be cleansed by the civic dimension, and are not conceived as an integrative measure but rather as a routine action.

Respondent's Perception of State Policies of Non-Discrimination and Promotion of Equality

Among the results pursued by the policies for the protection, and integration of ethnic and national minorities are non-discrimination, promotion of effective equality regardless of ethnicity, and equal participation of minorities in economic, cultural and social life of Moldova. Four of the questions included in the questionnaires (Q31, Q38, and Q40) regard the perception of these effects by the respondents. The answers are highly contrasting with the almost wonderful image created by the answers to the questions from previous sub-chapters.

Question 31 asks the respondents to build a hierarchy of the ethnic groups based on three criteria: „the richest“, the „most politically influential“, and the „most respected“.

Although the answers are invariable, it is interesting, however, to see how the hierarchy is built by each ethnic group and where each ethnic group places itself in this hierarchy.

- 60 percent of Moldovans consider that Russians are the richest, 39 percent (first choice) and 21 percent (second choice), followed by their own group. Russians receive 57 percent of answers for „the most politically influential), 32 percent (first choice) and 25 percent (second choice), followed by Moldovans, who receive 50 percent, 33 percent (first choice) and 17 percent (second choice). On the other hand, Moldovans consider themselves the most respected group, 37 percent (first choice) and 13 percent (second choice), followed by Russians, 19 percent (first choice) and 25 percent (second choice). The other four ethnic groups receive the maximum of 6 percent for each of these three categories.
- The Russian respondents place the Moldovans and Russians on the first two places. Russians think of themselves as being on top, although they place Moldovans several percent higher everywhere, thus, the Moldovans are on the top of the hierarchy in all three categories. Fifty percent of Russians (37% and 13%) consider that Moldovans are the richest, and 42 percent (15% and 27%) consider that Russians are the richest. 57 percent of Russians (49% and 8%) affirm that Moldovans are the most politically influential group, while according to 49 percent (10% and 39%) Russians have the most political influence. Regarding the respect, opinions are rather equally divided, 50 percent (41% and 9%) consider that Moldovans are the most respected and 48 percent (15% and 33%) state that Russians are the most respected. We can notice that Russians feel that they are relatively lacking political influence, but not wealth and respect. The respondents of Russian background grant the three ethnic groups an insignificant number of points at all three mentioned categories.
- The Ukrainians also consider that the most politically influential, the wealthiest and the most respected are Moldovans and Russians. Moldovans would be „the wealthiest“ in the opinion of 35 percent of Ukrainians (24% and 9%), Russians – in the opinion of 37 percent (22% and 15%). Moldovans gather most of the answers for being the „most politically influential“ – 40 percent (31% and 9%) and Russians hold this position in the opinion of 33% of the respondents (13% and 20%). On the other side, Russians and Moldovans hold an equal position regarding the respect they enjoy – 31 percent (26%, 5%, 11% and 20%). The other three groups – Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians - are rich, influential and respected only in the opinion of 1-3% of respondents.
- We must note that in the case of Gagauz respondents, only 50 percent chose to rank the groups based on the proposed criteria, the other half of respondents opted for „don't know/No answer“ option. Those who answered the question placed Moldovans and Russians on key positions: The richest: Moldovans 36 percent (26% and 10%), Russians 30% (15% and 15%); the most influential: Moldovans 35 percent (28% and 7%), Russians 35 percent (15% and 20%); the most respected: Moldovans 31 percent (19% and 12%), and Russians 25% (13% and 12%). However, we notice a novelty here: 18 percent of Gagauz respondents (10% and 8%) consider that the Gagauz are the most respected.

- The answers of the respondents who identified themselves as Bulgarians are also rather varied here, as in the case of the Gagauz, the number of „Don't know/No answer“ option is rather high. For example, „the richest“ would be the Moldovans in the opinion of 43 percent, Russians – among 29 percent, while 38 percent opted for „Don't know/No answer“ option. Moldovans get the highest scores for all these criteria. Thus, 55 percent consider Moldovans as the most influential, Russians having only 34 percent of the options (9% and 25%). In addition, Moldovans are the most respected according to 45 percent (34% and 11%), and Russians only in the opinion of 30 percent (15% and 15%) of respondents. Also, 14 percent give the political influence to Gagauz (1% and 13%), and 18 percent (6 and 12%) attribute the highest respect to their own group, i.e. to the Bulgarian ethnic group.

These answers prove a rather discriminatory hierarchy. The two ethnic groups, the majority and the minority, are perceived as having privileged positions to what regards the well-being, political influence and respect. These perceptions tend to become more objective due to the fact that not only the other groups perceive them as such, but also the groups consider themselves as being privileged. Consequently, we can assert the existence of economic and social hierarchies, which do not represent indicators of equality and nondiscrimination on ethnic background. The logical question is whether this situation is an effect of the legal framework or has a different nature. In order to clarify this aspect, we will not leave the methodology of the present study. We will try to see if the answers of the respondents to other questions shed light on this actual inequality.

The question Q38 from the questionnaire asks the respondents to assess the Moldovan laws regarding minority rights. We must mention that it does not say if the respondents ever had an opportunity to learn these laws or solely assessed the actual situation as being the consequence of application of minority-related laws. Unlike the question Q31 analyzed above, where we can say there was a „picture of major differences“, here one returns to the situation characteristic for most of the questions included in the survey form: „the minor differences“ in answers. Thus, most respondents (average of 60%), regardless of their ethnic background, answered that all ethnic minorities have „sufficient rights“. The number of answers included in the category „too many rights“ or „not enough rights“ is relatively low, therefore, their significance drops.

From the perspective of „minor differences“, we can say that each minority ethnic group considers itself as misjudged, i.e. believes that it does not have enough rights. For example, 20 percent of Russians believe that they do not have enough rights, 16 percent of Ukrainians, and 15 percent of Gagauz think their own groups are misjudged and 22 percent of Bulgarians believe that they are the most misjudged. Moldovans, as the majority, are not included in the structure of the question, and 10 percent of them consider that the most misjudged are the Romanians living in Moldova.

Similarly, from the perspective of minor differences, one can notice that each group points to another group as having too many rights. According to Moldovans (22%), this group would be Russians, and in the opinion of 13 percent of Russian, the Romanians have too many rights. Ukrainians (6%) think that both Russians and Romanians have too many rights. Gagauz consider that Russians are privileged, while Bulgarians think

same of the Gagauz. However, we must ask ourselves how relevant these indices are when over 60 percent of respondents, regardless of the ethnicity, believe that all ethnic groups enjoy sufficient rights.

The perspective of minor differences of variation in the answers to the question regarding the minority legislation is not compatible with the perspective of major differences in the answers to the question Q31, where the ethnic groups of Moldovans and Russians outrun clearly the other groups as being „the richest“, „the most influential“, and the „most respected“. Consequently, one can say that this discriminatory hierarchy is not the effect of legislation but has a different nature. The most plausible supposition is that the sources of inequality are rather historical than legal.

Questions Q39-Q40 from the survey forms ask the opinion of respondents about the importance of nationality in employment and successful business. An average of 60 percent of respondents, regardless the background of the groups, both who answer the questions, and who are being evaluated, choose the option „sufficient chances/opportunities“. The rest of the answers lead again to the situation of „minor differences“, where the following typical answers are outlined: 1. Each ethnic group considers that it has the fewest chances/opportunities. 2. In the structure of questions were included both the Moldovans as majority ethnic group, and the Romanian group, as a separate minority group. The respondents belonging to the Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian groups believe that most of the chances/opportunities in employment and successful business have the Moldovans – an average of 20 percent – followed by Romanians, which also are considered advantaged. 3. From the perspective of minor differences, we must remark that Moldovans believe that Russians have too many chances/opportunities, and that Romanians have the fewest opportunities, followed by Bulgarians, Gagauz and Ukrainians.

Does this grouping of answers of the four minority ethnic groups' representatives reflect an objective and truthful situation? What would be the cause of such a grouping of answers, especially on the second typical answer: Do Moldovans and Romanians have too many opportunities? The survey forms do not ask for clarifications of this aspect, however, we can suppose that what gives this impression to the ethnic minorities is the need to know the official language, even though this condition is diminished by the existence of a language for interethnic communication.

Respondents' Perception of Freedom of Ethnic Groups in Moldova to Establish Cross-Border Contacts

In this subchapter, we will focus on the perception of the respondents regarding the freedom of ethnic groups from Moldova to establish international and cross-border contacts, which primarily implies the freedom to have relationships with the historical homelands and hold the citizenship of other countries.

The research of these perceptions offers important indices about the success of integration of ethnic and national minorities with the state, because the loyalty and excessive orientation of minorities towards their historical homelands is considered a weak indicator of their integration with the country where they reside.

For the purposes of this subchapter, we will refer to the questions that ask the opinions of the respondents about being a citizen of Moldova, about the actions of historical homelands, and about the external orientation and future of Moldova – D11, Q13, Q52, Q53, Q55, Q33-37.

a. Citizenship

- Most respondents, regardless of ethnic background, declare that they have only one citizenship: Moldovans – 98 %, Russians – 97%, Ukrainians – 98%, Gagauz – 99%, and Bulgarians – 96%. Only one or two percent choose „I don't know/don't answer“, which allows us to say that these would hold more citizenships, with the exception of those 1-2 percent whose situation is unqualified.
- Question Q13 offers the respondents a list of attributes and asks them to specify the ones they identify with. Among these are ethnic affiliations (Moldovan, Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian), resident of this locality, citizen of Moldovan, CIS resident, European, East-European. All groups give priority to ethnic identity, i.e. affiliation to an ethnic group followed by the Moldovan citizenship. 70 percent of Moldovan/Romanian respondents choose ethnic identity followed by the citizenship. Only 15 percent of Moldovans/Romanians – or representatives of majority ethnic group – consider themselves first of all Moldovan citizens. Among Russians, 46 percent consider themselves Russians, followed by 31 percent who consider themselves citizens of Moldova. 59 percent of Ukrainians consider themselves Ukrainians and only 20 percent consider themselves, first of all, citizens of Moldova. 66 percent of Gagauz also give priority to their ethnic identity followed by 17 percent who put citizenship on the first place. 62 percent of Bulgarians think that they are first of all Bulgarians, and only 18 percent identify themselves, first of all, as Moldovan citizens. As we can see, the difference between the number of those who give priority to their ethnic group, and the number of those who identify themselves with the Moldovan citizenship is rather big. Only in the case of Russians, this difference is smaller. Russians have the largest number of people who identify themselves, first of all, as Moldovan citizens. It is obvious that ethnic identity based on affective relations is stronger than the citizenship, which is based on rational principles of respecting rights and liberties, and assuming citizen responsibilities.

b. *Relations with historic homelands*

- Predominance of ethnic identification could be considered an indicator of a relationship with historic homelands, loyalty towards historic homelands in the detriment of loyalty towards the Moldovan state. There is no clear evidence of a relationship between ethnic identification and loyalty towards countries of origin/historic homelands. The answers to question Q14 – Q19 confirm that the relationship is optional. The first most important things mentioned in all the cases, when answering the question „What are the three most important things to be considered Moldovan/Russian/Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulgarian/Romanian?“ were: to have parents of relevant background, to speak the language, to respect the traditions of that particular group, to feel part of that group. The fact of living in Moldova/Russia/Ukraine/TAU GagauzYeri/Romania was considered secondary/minor.

- However, living in Moldova and feeling part of an ethnic group seems to be more likely if the historic homelands have their contribution to this. Questions referring to the Russian/Ukrainian/Turkish/Bulgarian/Romanian actions on the territory of Moldova showed that all the respondents consider that these actions are very necessary. For example, Q33-Q37 refer to a series of actions of historic homelands (Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania), including:
 - Supporting students and pupils of the respective ethnicity who study in Moldova;
 - Supporting the businesses belonging to persons of the respective ethnicity;
 - Supporting the cultural organizations of the respective ethnicity from Moldova;
 - Developing the identity of the respective ethnic group in Moldova.

Most of the answers reflect the options „totally agree“ and „rather agree“. The most unconditioned agreements are represented by the historic homeland of the respondent group, i.e. 70 percent Russians „totally agree“ with Russia’s actions in Moldova, and only 60 percent „totally agree“ with the actions undertaken by Ukraine.

c. External orientation

- The answers to question Q52, which refer to the external orientation of the country, suggest that the ethnic groups seem to have a stronger connection with a certain space – the CIS, than with a certain country that can be considered historical homeland. The vast majority of Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents declared that the external orientation of Moldovan should be „maintenance of CIS presence“. Thus, 41 percent of Russians think that Moldova should remain within CIS, 38 percent believe that Moldova should join the EU, and 6% plead for neutrality. 49 percent of Ukrainians believe that Moldova should remain within CIS, 21 percent plead for EU and 3 percent advocate neutrality. 24 percent do not know what is the best external orientation for Moldova. According to 48 percent of Gagauz, Moldova should „remain within CIS“ and only 18 percent are in favor of EU integration, while 8 are neutral and 19% do not know what the answer is. 36 percent of Bulgarians plead for CIS, 36 percent for the EU, 19 percent do not know, and 7% plead for neutrality. As we can see, in the case of Bulgarian group there is an equality, or an (almost) equal division of the opinions of those who opt for EU and those who advocate for CIS.

In the case of the majority group, 62 percent believe that Moldova should join the EU, and only 14 percent state that the country should stay within CIS, while 7% believe that Moldova should not be in any of these structures.

The majority and the Russian ethnic groups, unlike other ethnic groups, express a certain concern regarding a possible failure of Moldova as a state (Q53): 43 and 44 percent accordingly. The majority group has most of the fears: 30 percent of respondents are concerned about an armed conflict, although the majority (57%) does not have this fear. Those who fear believe that this conflict will happen likely between Moldova and the Transnistrian Region (82%) or between Moldova and Russia (9%).

The number of Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents who are concerned about the failure of the state does not exceed 25% within each group. More reduced is the

possibility for an armed conflict - only 10-15% express such a fear, and those who do express this fear indicate Transnistria and Romania as aggressors.

Perception of Survey Participants vs. Perception of Delphi Study Participants

The organization of the nationwide Ethnobarometer survey was preceded by a research among experts (opinion leaders, representatives of civil society and mass media) using the Delphi method, in order to identify the basic categories and indicators for the survey. Given this situation, we do not think it is relevant to analyze the perceptions of the experts separately because we do not have two separate researches but rather a research composed of two phases.

Are the results of the survey different from the perceptions of the experts? Considering that the perceptions of the experts have set the framework and, probably, the limits for the expressed opinions of the survey participants, what can we say about the perceptions of these two groups of respondents? The aspects that can be mentioned in this context refer to the similarities and differences in the answers of the two groups of research participants.

Similarities

- Identification of a privileged ethnic group. Both groups of respondents have identified the existence of a privileged ethnic group: the Russian ethnic group. According to the answers from the survey form, Russians would be at the same level with the ethnic majority in the categories of the richest, most politically influential and most respected. The participants to the Delphi study also state the reasons that lead to the privileged status of the Russian ethnic group: the status during soviet times, preservation of economic positions, etc.
- The minorities believe that the ethnic majority has more advantages, firstly because of the number and secondly because the language of the majority is the official language of Moldova. In their opinion, at the beginning of 1990s this situation facilitated the replacement of other ethnic groups from administration and state apparatus with Moldovans.
- The participants in the national survey prove a lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities. These three groups had most of the „don't know/ no answer“ choices for many questions, especially for those asking to describe and choose features for this group. In addition, some Delphi study participants consider that the Gagauz and Bulgarians are the most disadvantaged group because they live in a very poor rural area.
- Both categories of respondents manifested a suspicion regarding the assistance offered by the neighboring countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, etc.) The biggest suspicions among minorities are raised by the Romanian assistance to Moldovans and Turkish

assistance to Gagauz. For the ethnic majority, suspicious are the activities of the Russian minority financed by Russia.

- The foreign policy options are also similar in both researches. Moldovans plead for a pro-European orientation while the ethnic minorities favor a foreign policy oriented towards the CIS.
- The legislation related to national minorities is considered by both groups of respondents as being sufficiently advanced and compliant with the international legislation. From the legislation perspective, all citizens of Moldova have sufficient rights, chances and opportunities.
- After an integral reading of both the results of the national survey and the results of the Delphi study, we can notice a outranking of the interethnic issues by the economic issues, which, according to the respondents, are more stringent and pressing.

Differences

- Read and analyzed from the perspective of the dilemma of the state's role in resolution of interethnic problems in Moldova, the results of the Ethnobarometer survey show a picture which can be called „picture of minor differences“. Generally, most answers (over 50%) are grouped in one of the options (agreement or disagreement). Most respondents have the same perceptions regarding the interethnic relations referred to in the questions. Only after finding this consensus, the researcher can analyze the small differences in the attitudes and opinions. In the Delphi study there is a more trenchant and numerically equal differentiation between the two types of attitudes of the experts/opinion leaders. For example those who look with suspicion at Gagauz Yeri and those who believe that the Gagauz autonomy was a good solution; those who believe that the relationship between ethnic groups are cordial and those who say that these relationships do not exist at all, etc.
- The experts/opinion leaders formulate clearly the link between the interethnic problems and the problems of emergence of the Moldovan nation-state. For example, the link between the integration of minorities and the identity-related confusion of the majority ethnic group (Moldovans or Romanians? Romanian or Moldovan language?). Such a link is not visible in the answers of the survey participants for whom the identity of the majority ethnic group does not seem to be a problem. Nevertheless, this aspect was not explicitly or implicitly formulated, especially that Romanians were included as a separate ethnic group, even separate from the majority group.

Conclusions

In the present study, we referred to the theoretic framework of the liberal multiculturalism and pluralism since this is the most relevant approach of the ethnocultural diversity existent in the political theory. This approach is capable to offer the functional tools for the understanding and analysis of the relationship between the state and ethnic/national minorities from different geographical contexts. From the perspective of the liberal multiculturalism and pluralism, the settlement of the interethnic problems is not

a separate function, added to the state, but the very process through which the state is founded and exists. Certainly, this process is rather complex and maybe challenging because it implies at the same time the protection of ethnocultural diversity and integration of ethnic and national minorities.

Although in this study the ethnonational issues from Moldova were conceived and systematized from the above-mentioned theoretical perspective, the success and the extent of the settlement of these problems is not evaluated mainly from a theoretical perspective. The extent of resolution of interethnic issues is provided by the perception of the respondents who participated in the research of the actions of the state meant to solve these issues. Of course, the respondents' perceptions are committed to an evaluation from the above-mentioned theoretical and normative perspective: for example, we cannot avoid the question if a certain perception of the respondents involved in the study is determined by the adherence to the rational principles of the rule of law or by the affective affiliation to an ethnic group. Often, in the analysis of the perceptions carried out in Chapter III of the study, these two levels of assessment overlap. Moreover, the other aspects of the relationship between Moldova and ethnonational minorities will be identified in the materials provided by the empirical research and maybe analyzed in a different work. For example, analyzing the results of the research, we can ask ourselves how Moldova can protect the ethnocultural diversity without crystallizing and worsening the differences or how Moldova can support the ethnic diversity without leading towards the articulation of political options based on ethnic background.

However, in a „final“ perspective, which inevitably combines the opinions of respondents and the normative perspective, we can say the following about the actions undertaken by Moldova in order to solve the interethnic issues:

- The respondents perceive the existence of a privileged ethnic group – the Russian ethnic minority. The privilege has two sources: historical – inheritance of the privileged status from the soviet times – and legal: existence in the Moldovan legislation of provisions about Russian language as a language for interethnic communication. Unlike the participants of the Delphi study, the survey forms do not reflect any feeling of injustice regarding this privilege. The privilege is simply visible and is not necessarily perceived as an injustice, especially that more respondents agree that the „historical homeland“, Russia, should support the Russian minority living in Moldova, even larger than the number of those who agree unconditionally that their own historical homelands (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey) should support their own ethnic group.
- We notice a mutual ignorance among the Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian ethnic groups, primarily because of the large number of „don't know/no answer“ choices to the questions that directly relate to these groups. The ignorance could be explained partially by their inclusion by the majority in the notion of „Russian-speaking population“, and even the representatives themselves affiliate with this group. However, survey forms do not ask the respondents to choose to identify with the „Russian speaking population“ or an ethnic group.

- The experience of territorial autonomy TAU Gagauz Yeri does not generate different attitudes and perceptions for the members of this particular group. The Gagauz respondents do not offer perceptions differently from other ethnic minorities who did not benefit from this experience, i.e. they do not have different attitudes or perceptions regarding their historical homelands, external orientation of Moldova, linguistic policies, etc. There is no directly plausible explanation of this phenomenon: We can suppose either that this right does not generate specific experiences, or that the legal provisions are not fully applied.
- According to respondents' answers, there is a linguistic confusion in Moldova. The confusion exists both at the level of perceptions – the massive option for two official languages- and at the legislative level: existence of an official language and a language for interethnic communication. These confusions generate other confusions – who should speak the language and which language; and suspicions – some know a certain language but avoid speaking it.
- The atmosphere from the picture outlined by the results of the survey is rather cordial: minorities seem tolerant and open, fact that does not concord with the attitudes expressed by the leaders of the ethnic organizations in different political events from Moldova. Often, what the majority considers as a benefit, it is seen as a threat by the minorities and vice versa. „Today when there is hope for a solution of the most painful problems of our society, the forces that want to obstruct this process became active again“. „All principles of tolerance were violated. [...] Civil society that we are all building is being threatened“, „the flag of the European Union cannot wave over those who defy the principles of European democracy“. (Excerpts from the letter of the Coordinating Council of Ethnocultural Organizations within the Department of Interethnic Relations of the Moldovan Government addressed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Higher Commissioner of the OSCE for Minority Issues during the anticommunist protests from January-April 2002 in Chisinau.
- The existence of the phenomenon „motherland“ is rather pronounced in both the survey results and the results of Delphi study. This phenomenon is not so spread in the Western European countries, and is not approached in a special way in the political theories of liberal pluralism or multiculturalism. It is a challenge for these theories to assimilate this phenomenon, and recommend an adequate political framework for the situation when minorities claim rights and freedoms in one state, but are rather loyal to their historical homelands or country of their origin. Both the survey and the Delphi study results include multiple references to the actions of the historical homelands in Moldova. Even though these indices are not direct proofs that there is a lack of loyalty of minorities and „collaboration“ with their „homeland“, these are not indices of successful integration of the ethnic minorities with Moldova.

The listed conclusions are less positive and rather show trends in the solution of the issues of ethnic minorities and their integration in Moldova. Among more positive

aspects that would show effective measures undertaken by the state in this direction we can mention: legislation compliant with the international standards, linguistic legislation, tolerance and cordiality visible in the results of the survey, etc. However, these positive aspects are more problematic than the negative aspects because, as shown in the results of the research, the actual situation is not always determined by the legislation compliant to the standards.

Recommendations

It is natural to make recommendations for the possible actions of the state for a more efficient resolution of interethnic problems depending on the conclusions. In addition, in accordance with the standards for such study, the recommendations should be of two types: recommendations for public policies and recommendations for the improvement of the relevant legislation. Both types of recommendations are quite difficult in this case, if not impossible, because the researchers risk losing their neutrality and be accused of impartiality. For example, the attempt to think of a solution for the improvement of the situation made both by the experts and respondents, and namely the existence of a privileged group, as a cause the Russian, will immediately lead to grave accusations for the authors of these recommendations, even though these will be made from a human rights perspective, and starting from the premises of liberal political theory. Similarly, the proposals that would refer to the reduction of linguistic confusion, outlined in the analysis of the survey forms, the number of official languages, who should speak these languages, and the elimination of the suspicion such as „some know the language but refuse speaking it“, would generate the same accusations of being biased.

Another challenge in the attempt to make recommendations is the fact that the real interethnic situation is not always an effect of the legal framework, but has other historical and sociological explanations. Let us take for example the existence of the „real bilingualism“ assured by the status of Russian as a language for interethnic communication, as provided in the Law of the Republic of Moldova about the functioning of languages. This original status granted to the language of an ethnic minority creates the impression that the sphere of interethnic communication should be separated from the sphere of official language, as if the ethnic groups communicate differently, in different places or about other things than those necessary to be communicated in the official language. Also, from the logical perspective, this status multiplies the injustices and disadvantages for the members of other ethnic groups. If it was proved that the idea of an official language is absolutely necessary for the existence and functioning of a state, (because only in this way the state can standardize the educational system and economy, and can assure the equality of opportunities, as well as the mobility in the economic, but also cultural and social spheres) then the existence of two languages means that some ethnic groups are disadvantaged twice. The first time - because they have to invest efforts and time to learn the official language, and the second time - because they have to invest the same type of resources in order to learn the language of interethnic communication.

Thus, the Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian ethnic groups from Moldova are disadvantaged, because in order to participate in the social life they have to learn two tools (i.e. two languages that are not their native), unlike the majority and the Russian ethnic groups, who need to learn only one additional tool. However, if for the elimination of these disadvantages one would recommend to cancel the status of Russian as a language for interethnic communication, this fact, even though correct from the perspective of the liberal political theory and from the logical perspective, would provoke a possible massive protest of the „disadvantaged“ minorities. The explanation of the protest is historical – the compulsoriness of knowledge of Russian in the Soviet times, fact that lead to the situation that the adult population did not perceive the knowledge of the language for interethnic communication as an additional effort or as a disadvantage. However, if this status of language of communication is not eliminated in the following years, the new generation will feel disadvantaged.

The compulsoriness of knowledge of two languages by all citizens of Moldova doubles the efforts of the state to guarantee the knowledge of two languages for their use in the public sphere. The expenses from the public money are also doubled. The historical argument that everybody knows the language of interethnic communications is not appropriate because the natural speakers of Russian will be replaced biologically by others who are not natural speakers. For this, the state will have to spend considerable resources to assure all citizens with a double instrument used in the public space, although by its nature the public space must be as reasonable, functional and accessible as possible. (Of course, for their private sphere, individuals can learn as many languages as they want from the esthetic, euphonic, personal reasons). However, if the new generations are also „natural“ speakers of the language of interethnic communication, then the liberal political theory can no longer be a theoretical framework for the analysis, and understanding the emergence of Moldova as a state and of the ways Moldova guarantees ethnocultural justice.

As we can see, the researchers of interethnic problems in Moldova face considerable challenges when they have to formulate recommendations for public policies, and legislative initiatives to improve a certain aspect. To what regards the example of linguistic confusion mentioned above, we cannot recommend adding a new clause to the existent legal framework on national and ethnic minorities. On the contrary, from the perspective of the liberal political theory, we can argue the elimination of some clauses and improvement of the functionality of this framework. However, this is a less ordinary and even a risky recommendation.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MOLDOVA

(*Vitalie Catana*)

The results of the Delphi study show that the problems related to citizenship and identity in Moldova are determined by several factors, and require a complex approach. First, these problems occur because the space between Prut and Nistru rivers has never experienced a real national or territorial autonomy. Second, there is an addition of ingredients specific for a territory, which has been extensively under the occupation of an empire. These ingredients are materialized in the effects of denationalization and colonization policies, encouragement of migration, etc. applied for the destruction of identity of the population living in this area.

With independence and beginning of consolidation of Moldova's statehood, all these aspects revealed the challenges an entity can meet, when confronted with the necessity to build the institutions required for an efficient administration.

Given the fact that the Moldovan statehood is a new and original creation, there was a need to explain the use of the state formation approach, and to obtain citizens' loyalty and support. In Moldova, the challenges became visible both in the behavior of public authorities, and in the reaction of Moldovan elites and citizens. Since there is an absence of a traditional governance and administration, the authorities were placed before the need in order to form citizens' loyalty towards the created entity.

In the accomplishment of this approach, public authorities and elites had to choose between two options that can be defined as *identity* and *citizenship*. Without exception, governments that followed have preferred the identity concept as a tool for the formation of the relationships between the state and citizens. The institution of citizenship was almost totally ignored, and has functioned only when it became inevitable, in situations when the citizenship becomes necessary in order to organize activities such as exercising the right to vote, public employment, issuance of identification documents, etc. The institution of citizenship was not invoked too often in its full meaning and rapports.

Identity Model in Moldova

Depending on the case, the definition of individuals and communities' identity takes place in its relationship with other individuals and communities. When the „clash“ with others occurs, individuals either live the experience of confirming their own identity, if this identity has been already formed, or live the sentiment of discovering that they are

different, if the identity has not been yet formed. At that moment, the individuals begin to acknowledge the elements that make them different. Consequently, the identity is not only an abstract and susceptible concept applied to communities, but also a category made of elements perceived by the individuals in their relationship with the society. This means that the identity has two dimensions. One of them defines the community as a sum of individuals, and the other defines the community in relation with the individual. The relationship between the concept of identity and the individual contains, in its turn, two aspects. On one hand, they regard the objective criteria, which are applicable in the definition of community, serving the individuals as reference points in the approach of self-determination, and, on the other hand, the subjective criterion, which implies the attitude of individuals towards their own identity.

In societies with formed identity, the identity issue is relatively simple. The individual has nothing else to do but adopt an identity from the available options. In the case of newly emerged countries that have not experienced in the past a period of formation, like Moldova, the problem of state and citizens' identity represent ones of the major issues in the consolidation of state and its institutions. It seems that most citizens of Moldova can be included in the second assumption, regarding the level of emancipation, i.e. of discovering that they are different from other people, and have not reached the level of definition of their own identity. In its turn, the state identity is generally determined by the sum of citizens and communities' identities. In the societies where the communities have different identities, there is a competition in the determination and affirmation of state identity. It is also the case of Moldova, where such debates focused on the issues regarding the identity of the largest community and the identity of the state, the issue of official language, and the name of the official language of Moldova.

In Moldova, the application of an identity model began with the identification of the majority community and its mobilization in the effort of society building. One resorted to the notion of *Moldovan people*, which generated negative reactions and which failed because of the undefined content. This notion generated confusions because the term *Moldovan people* has a dual meaning. It defines the largest community, which is delimited from the territorial perspective by this term, and defines the totality of citizens of Moldova, because the name of the country derives from the name of the largest community. The confusion generates problems related to the appropriation of identity, determined by the citizenship and by the ethnic background. For example, Russians define their identity in opposition with the term *Moldovan people*, even though they are included in it as citizens of Moldova.

The conclusions of the study reveal a confused perception of the respondents from a different perspective. The chapter on national identity shows that „the opinions regarding the principles of defining national identity can be divided in two large categories: (1) those who conceive this national identity only in the framework of a common history, a common memory and common people:

„It is a conscience of affiliation to a certain community where the members have something in common: cultural and historic background, common memory, common aspirations, and plans for the future“; F1.

„It is what makes you identify with a nation, feel part of the nation. Generally, the nation is defined by meeting a set of criteria and attributes: language, culture, race, traditions, etc. and by understanding the affiliation or loyalty to these attributes“; M5

„The national identity is the defining element of a person belonging to a certain ethnic group. It is a notion that consolidates an ethnic group and gives it the aspect of nation. It is a community of people speaking the same language, having the same traditions, customs, deriving from the same blood and having a common history“; M6.

Moreover (2), individualists who consider that self-identification is an issue related to the freedom of individuals to join a group or the values they believe in:

„I define it as an individual option. Even though for a long time it has been declared that the national identity is taken for granted, that you are born with it and that you cannot deny it, I believe that it is an individual option. The individuals can leave, can learn a different language, or, even as in our case, can stay, can speak the same language, but consider themselves Romanians or Moldovans. Therefore, it is an individual option, it is a political option, and it is a socially formed option. There is nothing in-born here, there is nothing for granted, there is nothing. It is something minor that an individual can choose, give up, or ignore“; F10.

„This moment of self-identification represents something very personal. How do you perceive yourself? By culture, by your way of thinking... In my opinion, in this case it is not even about being a local. Another thing is that there should not be a forced, imposed identification. There is such a notion – „assimilation“. Assimilation represents the possibility of the representative of a nation to change the ethnic background, while in another ethnic environment. This is exactly the issue of mixed marriages. Now, we do not have nationality specified in our passports, however it existed before. At that time, people deriving from mixed marriages, a Moldovan and a Ukrainian parent for example, had to determine who they were: Moldovans or Ukrainians. You could not choose „Moldo-Ukrainian“, you had to determine your identity, but it was voluntary. The voluntary assimilation occurs everywhere, and, generally does not generate rejection, as it is the case of forced assimilation. I believe that the issue of self-identification is rather serious for us, especially in relation with the title nation, and can be problematic for other ethnic groups. Maybe it is just a personal problem“, M7.

In fact, the two options derive from the elements of identity, which are not contradictory, but complementary, and which are found together in the definition of identity. Thus, the spoken language, common history and culture, represent objective elements of the definition of community, and the individual has the right to adopt or reject the particular identity, which is the subjective element of identity.

Thus, Recommendation no. 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe dated February 1, 1993, shows in article 1 the elements applicable when defining the national minorities: a. they live on the territory of a state and are its citizens; b. they maintain long-term, strong and permanent connections with that state; c. they display distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic features; d. they are sufficiently representative even though they are less numerous than the rest of the population, or population of a certain region of that state; e. they are driven by the desire to preserve their common identity, including culture, traditions, religion and language. Items a., b., c., and d. establish the objective elements of identity and item e. refers to the subjective element.

The inconsistency of attitudes represents nothing more than the reflection of the terminological and conceptual confusion of the Moldovan society regarding the identity. They also represent the reflection of the two ideological perspectives regarding appropriation of identity, made up of those who perceive the independence as a national revival and democratization, and those who comprehend the independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new nation.

Risks of Application the Identity Model

It seems that choosing an identity, pretended to be ethnic, as a reference in the consolidation of the country, represented a replacement for the institution of citizenship, which had the purpose to set pressure on citizens, exempting the public authorities of the duties that appear in their relationship with the citizens and state. Thus, the application of identity model requires an effort on behalf of the citizen to adopt the identity, and the state becomes a referee, while the citizenship-based relationship between the individual and state is defined through mutual rights and duties. The role of the state, generally, is to guarantee respect of human rights, functionality of democratic institutions in providing better governance, efficient public administration, and equitable justice. The fragility of state institutions has determined the option, which excludes their confrontation with the discomfort related to undertaking responsibilities. In other words, the public authorities wanted to obtain the loyalty of citizens, while avoiding honoring their own duties and eventual risks in their relationship with citizens.

However, the option for the implementation of a contested identity, as a reference for the formation of the relationships between the state and citizens, also implies certain risks.

Identity Model Generates Competition

Firstly, the identity issue in Moldova currently represents an object of competition, whose finality is both the positions of the communities and the position of individuals in the political, social, economic, and cultural systems. In other words, the identity issue

is included in the logic of competition for the quality of the dominant group among communities from Moldova. The survey results show that both Russians and Moldovans characterize the existing relationships between the two communities as being worse than 15 years ago. In the study, the attitude of Moldovans towards Russians is formulated in the following way: *„Russians are viewed by many of the Moldovan participants as the ethnic group which had had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethnic groups, and which had not given up the idea of maintaining this advantage: they are arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners without even trying to adapt to the local values, culture, and traditions“*. The study also shows that both Moldovans and Russians view one another in dominant positions to what regards the economic and political power in Moldova. This perception represents the reflection of a struggle for primacy, and serves as a motivation and justification of the attitude towards the opposite community. Thus, the Russians, as viewed by Moldovans, *„dominate the country from the economic perspective, they represent a frustrated community that lost the privileges of the Soviet times, realizing that now, they are just a minority in an independent country. They have the mentality of the „besieged“. They are aggressive and consider that the best way of defense is offence“* (annex 2).

In their turn, Russians accuse the fact that Moldovans represent an overwhelming majority, and claim models that would preserve the existent relationships. Their perception regarding Moldovans is included in this understanding of relationships. The study mentions that *„the positive features assigned to Moldovans represent, unlike the ones assigned to Russians or Ukrainians, rather defensive qualities – inaction rather than dynamic features.“* Thus, *„the positive representation of Moldovans describes them as joyful, hospitable people, good singers and good dancers. On the other hand they are kind, peaceful, patient, sympathetic, respectful, decent, hardworking, and openhearted.“* It is worth insisting on these findings, because they are not just listed, but also cultivated through the models promoted by the Moldovan elites.

The qualities implying mobility and action are different for Moldovans. We find that *„the negative representation related to Moldovans characterizes them as less educated, less urbanized, unstable (inconsistent, coward, undecided, flexible), easier to deceive compared to other groups, sometimes humble. They are disoriented and do not know with whom or with what to identify. Are not competitive when they have to compete with other ethnic groups, the other groups are faster.“*

In the case of Romanians, they are assigned features that prove the intention to see them eliminated from the competition. They *„want to expel the Russian speaking population from the country, they want unification with Romania at any price“* and, in the perception of some respondents, *„are liars, extremists, fascists, they prosecuted Gypsies during the World War II, they were worse than the Nazis“*. We can easily notice that these features assigned to Romanians are nothing but clichés extensively cultivated in Moldova.

In conclusion, we can assert that the application of identity model generates competition between communities, which can ultimately constitute a source of conflict.

Identity Model Leads to the Establishment of Consociational Models

There is another risk: the use of identity model leads to emergence of consociational models, i.e. organization of the society through division. Generally, consociational models are the models with conditions for the mobilization of communities and formation of conflict attitudes. The study shows that the preferences of communities are different in almost all areas. We can also notice in the study, that the attitudes of communities towards each other are formed based on clichés rather than daily experiences. The mutually assigned features refer to the characteristics that form the image of community and not individuals.

The conclusions univocally confirm the existence of new consociational relationships among the communities from Moldova. To quote from the study, *„What we can say from the first glance at the resulted information is the fact that different ethnic groups barely communicate amongst each other. The problems and aspects related to an ethnic group are less visible for the other group“*. In addition, *„the ethnic groups from Moldova are largely structured in enclaves, having rather few common values, few exchanges and little communication among them. The perception of a divided society exists among all respondents. Thus, „in the opinion of some participants, there are no ethnic conflicts in Moldova; however there is very little communication among them, the Moldovans, and other minorities from Moldova, living in practically different worlds.“* Meanwhile, *„another opinion adopts the idea of inexistence of relationships among ethnic groups. There is neither conflict nor consensus between the minorities and the Moldovan majority because each ethnic group lives in a completely different world.“*

This perception is supported by the distribution of answers. The respondents' options correspond almost totally to their affiliation with the ethnic communities from Moldova.

Firstly, the different ideological positions expressed by the participants overlapped with the ethnic cleavage: *„on one side, the Moldovans (NR+D), and on the other side, the respondents belonging to ethnic minorities (NN). The positioning in one of these two perspectives will have consequences on the entire discussion, determining the options of the respondents regarding politics, history, economy, etc. Even though the expressed options do not totally match the two ideological models mentioned below, the differences in the opinions of the respondents are large enough to determine their positioning on one side or the other.*

The participants' opinions are largely situated between these two extremes, having more nuances, being more complex and sometimes less consistent than the ones outlined here. However, the opinions contrast to the extent of their inclusion on one ideological position or another. The two different ideological opinions have affected greatly all answers for the rest of the discussed topics.“

The existence of this division is reflected also through the different attitudes regarding *„the domestic and foreign policy issues (orientation towards the EU, CIS, or Romania)“*, which *„can place the ethnic groups on conflicting positions“* (see also annex 1).

This division is visible also in the perception towards the economic situation of the country: „*the issues related to the national economy, visible only from the NR+D perspective, are: lack of competition on the market or failure of market economy, the difficulties, often insurmountable, of the private businesses (this issue is sometimes perceived from the NN perspective!), lack of investments, scandals related to the state interference with the economy, as well as corruption.*

The economic issues perceived only from NN perspective are: economic stabilization, creation of a socially-oriented market economy, economic growth.“

The political options of community representatives also correspond to the typology of consociational relationships. The study finds that „*there are political issues that are visible only from one of the positions. Thus, the winning of Ilașcu's case at the European Court for Human Rights, negotiation of an action plan for European integration, the union of rightist forces in a single political party - Democratic Moldova Bloc, corruption extended at all administrative levels, violation of certain democratic freedoms, especially the freedom of press during the communist governance, are issues viewed more from the perspective of NR+D.*“ It is the position of a category that wants to change the present political situation.

„*On the other hand, according to the second perspective, NN, in the last 5 years Moldova experienced a stabilization of economy, politics, and the governmental policies were oriented towards ordinary people, state services rendered to the citizens improved.*“ This is an attitude showing that the members of Russian minority feel more comfortable in the present system because they can mobilize more economic, political, and cultural resources. It is confirmed, that those who are content with their position, tend to show the positive events: „*Other political issues viewed as important by the participants (only from NN perspective) were the inauguration of the Stefan cel Mare (The Great) monument, renovation of Capriana Monastery, elaboration by the government of strategies for social, youth, tourism development, the wine festival organized with the involvement of the President.*“

Identity Model Leads to Discriminatory Standards

The approach of loyalty formation through the implementation of *Moldovan* identity implies the use of wrong premises, and leads consequently to the situation when the state applies different standards to its citizens, and requires different levels of loyalty from them. Thus, the people defining themselves as *Romanians* are accused of disloyalty because they refuse to adopt an identity promoted by the officials, and decline to consider themselves *Moldovans* from the ethnic point of view. Meanwhile, it is considered natural when the *Moldovan* citizens of Russian background manifest a higher loyalty towards their homeland. Thus, citizens with equal rights and duties are required different levels of loyalty.

The results of the study show that this situation is perceived by most of the respondents. Let us quote a representative reaction of one of the respondents: „*To be Romanian*

and live in Moldova means to wait until the President comes up with another anti-Romanian initiative so that you can then react accordingly“; M12.

One the other hand, as the results show, when asked as Moldovans, from the perspective of their affiliation with the Moldovan citizenship, the Russians invoke the ethnic identity in order to refuse to answer. The Moldovan respondents perceive the situation. Some accept it, motivating that Russians belong to a distinct culture and civilization, in fact to an abstract entity because they perceive it as separate from the Russian state, and others reject it, accusing the Russians of being oriented towards a foreign state.

Consequently, an aspect of identity model in the case of Moldova is the use of different standards to citizens of the country. Thus, when the state requests the loyalty of *Moldovans*, the representatives of minorities believe it is not the case to react because they represent different ethnic groups. This is the consequence of the confusion between the contents of the term *Moldovan people* as a notion defining both a community of people and the citizenship of a person. As a rule, the representatives of national minorities interpret the term in the most favorable meaning, i.e. in the sense that makes them feel less obliged or get special rights, depending on the situation.

Another face of the application of different standards to the same category of persons, defined through the content of citizenship, represents the attitude of the authorities, which shows the intention to use discriminatory means of coercion to determine the adoption of identity by the representatives of the majority community. In this way, the state is incompliant with the provisions of international norms, which stipulate that the adoption of identity represents a person's right to individual option.

Therefore, the source of discrimination appears from misunderstanding the need for definition of identity of the Republic of Moldova as a state, need for appropriation of this identity by the citizens of the country, and its relationship with the right of individuals to define their own ethnic identity.

Identity Model Requires an Effort for Adopting Identity

A risk for Moldovan statehood is determined by the evolution of identity in the case of the majority community. The present largest community is at the beginning of the process of identity formation and definition. The attempt to impose an identity, which by content is poor in values, plus the existence of fragile public institutions, contains the risk of an identity crisis with unpredictable consequences, which can occur when bearers of the dominant identity acknowledge the inferiority of their identity. Since the adoption of identity is closely connected with the level of mobility of a person, this thing will happen eventually, with the increase of mobility of Moldovan citizens. In this sense, the study shows that „most of the Moldovan respondents believe that being a citizen of Moldova implies an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration.“ Not by accident, according to the conclusions of the study, the

Moldovans, although representing the largest community, have a behavior characteristic to minorities. Possibly, when related to the members of their own community, Moldovans can react negatively to the invitation regarding the adoption of state-implemented identity.

One of the conclusions of the study shows that there are several assumptions about the evolution of that particular identity. According to this conclusion „Romanians are perceived by Moldovans rather as examples worth following, since they are more civilized, preserve better their traditions, culture and language, and define clearly their group identity.“ According to the survey, the Moldovans treated Romanians with more trust than the rest of communities, and the social distance between „Moldovans“ and Romanians“ was the lowest. It is also important that Romanians are perceived as being more attached to the European principles and values, and speak correct Romanian (annex 2). The negative features assigned to Romanians are reflections of clichés and stereotypes, and not the result of the experiences of respondents. Thus, *„Romanians want unification with Romania, at any price, they want to get rid of the Russian-speaking population, the slogan „baggage – railway station – Russia“ is in their opinion very actual, they want unification. On the other hand, Romanians are Gypsies, poor, liars, extremists, fascists, inconsistent, undecided, flexible, and coward. Although more and more people prefer to recognize their national affiliation (especially the younger generation), they still have the problem of self-identification. They are trickier than Moldovans, there are differences between Romanians from Romania and those living in Moldova – the latter are pathetic in their attempt to prove their identity. Romanians are also hesitant, flexible, intelligent, energetic, arrogant, radical, frustrated, people who yell and then think of the consequences of their words. However, they move faster and are on the right track, they represent the local population“* (Annex 2).

The growth of mobility, living and education standards, and opportunities for movement and communication, can determine another direction of evolution of identity that can be easily predicted.

The way the minorities formulate their positions shows that they are interested in this evolution, even though it would seem that the issues related to the identity of the majority population is an internal matter of its members. The leaders of ethnic minorities, particularly Russian and Gagauz, foreign political leaders, etc. participate actively in the debates and the identity model, which will be pursued by the majority community from Moldova, became an object of competition. Often the minorities, through public declarations of certain political leaders (e.g. Valentin Krilov, Briceni TV, 13.10.2005), have opted for formalization of an identity through a referendum, in contrast with the attitude of those who consider themselves Romanians, and with a part of Moldovans who opt for the right of individual option regarding their own identity. In the opinion of referendum supporters, an eventual formalization of the identity of the majority, by using the term *Moldovan people* would stop the growth of the number of those who declare themselves Romanians.

A superficial analysis shows that imposing the identity of *Moldovan people*, isolated from the civilization, shaped by the Romanian language, which is in opposition to it, is a handicap for those who adopt this identity because in the competition of civilizations, an eventual Moldovan civilization would be inferior to a more elevated civilization, such as the Russian. The representatives of minorities desire this situation since it allows them to maintain with less effort the dominant positions they held in the Soviet period, and is the expression of an image of reality in which these people feel more comfortable. They want this position materialized.

The cultural superiority of Russians is noted and accepted by other communities: „*The Russians are considered honest, hearty, always ready to sacrifice for their friends and at the same time merciless with the enemies. They belong to a large culture (unlike other ethnic groups from the country), to a large and respectable people, and are aware of this fact. They brought their culture, freedom, and development to Moldova*“.

The attitude of minorities is felt by Moldovans and is noted in the study through the following statement: „*many of the negative features that describe Russians represent features related to aggressiveness and domination (occupants, colonists, arrogant, quarrelsome, dominating, suffering from the „big brother“ syndrome, imperialists, etc.)*“ In this context, Ukrainians are also „represented negatively“ since they are the „younger brother of this big brother“ and are people who get what they want regardless of the means and consequences.

In conclusions of the study we notice that according to the representatives of minorities „in the case of Romanians and Gypsies, the negative features are more visible compared to the positive features, or that „*in the negative representation, Moldovans are considered inferior to Romanians, Russians and Ukrainians, being a rather rural, backward, and less educated population*“.

The logics of competition explains why although the „*Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians and Jews are viewed as educated, intellectual, and professional people*“ (i.e. people recognize essential qualities for the definition of identity) compared to Moldovans who received worse features. We see an attitude of rejection towards the Romanians who „*are perceived by the minorities more as foreigners and more dangerous, and more intolerant than Moldovans*“.

The results of the survey confirm that the representatives of Russian community prefer to compete with Moldovans considering them inferior in education, qualities, and skills. At the same time, the descriptions attributed to Romanians show that the attitude of Russian community towards them is based not on individual qualities, but on affective perception, which is determined by a hypothetical danger maintained through these clichés.

It is obvious that Moldovans' option for the identity defined by the term „Romanian“ is regarded as a discomfort, because it matters in the confrontation for domination among communities.

Identity Model Implies an Ideological Component

Another important risk is determined by the existence of an ideological component related to the notion of *Moldovan people*, because this notion was created in the Soviet

period. Ideology implies a conflicting relation and contributes to the maintenance of conflicting relationships in the society. In a different context, it is expected that with the disappearance of the effects of the soviet period, the debates regarding the identity issue will have a different content.

The reasons for this division are the disturbed relationships formed in the soviet period. The main misbalance in the relationships between communities from Moldova is caused by the fact that the soviet regime created a category, which was qualified by the minority doctrine as „minority class“. In the soviet politics, this „minority class“ included not only the representatives of the Russian ethnic group, and had the role to assimilate nations and create a soviet identity. This „minority class“ represented the standard for those who hoped to achieve what we call „success in life“- career, material wellbeing, social status etc. The prestige of belonging to the „minority class“ was supported by multiple privileges. With the implementation of democratic reforms and market economy, the state annulled the privileges and imposed the principle of free competition, which consequently created „victims“ among the previously privileged people.

The former „privileged“ category did not hesitate to speculate about the ethnic cleavage and sensibilities of the national minorities from Moldova, in order to preserve their privileged positions. Here is a revealing and symptomatic quote from the Russian-language newspaper *Vremea (Time)*, which is representative for the Russian community from Moldova: „*More important for the Russian-speakers is the problem of their „elimination“ not only from the government bodies, but also from the job market. Since the economic activity is carried out in the official language, large masses of Russian-speaking specialists left their jobs. Since then, you can often see intellectual women selling potatoes on the markets, reading, for example, the magazine „Novyi Mir“ (The New World).* The category called „minority class“ believes that physical work, especially farming, must represent the prerogative of Moldovans, while leadership and elevated intellectual activities must be accomplished exclusively by the privileged category. This prejudice is based on the wrong idea that in Moldova, the ethnic communities have been specialized traditionally in certain skills; therefore the Russian speaking minority interprets the emancipation of Romanian speakers as a deviation from the normal situation.

According to the results of the study, the features assigned to Moldovans sustain this approach. Thus, „*the Moldovans are hardworking, diligent, joyful, hospitable, good singers and dancers, sympathetic, funny, have a good sense of humor, speak a broken Romanian, do not have serious education, definitely are not intellectual and if they are, then only the first generation. They are one of a kind. Moldovans are good only for farming, they are craving for everything that comes, especially, from east and less from what comes from west, they criticize themselves, do not have an ethnic or territorial identity, they are backward, peasants, Romanians from historical Moldova or Odessa region. They can be blonde, thrifty, calm, but they do not have a good education and are ill bred. On the other hand, Moldovans are inconsistent, indecisive, flexible, coward but also respectful, decent, hardworking, but poor. They do not calculate their efforts, they are troublemakers, illiterate, and they do not*

keep their promises. They are sometimes tragically pathetic, lazy, generous, puzzled, patient, obedient, docile, „blockhead“, silly, easy to deceive, confused, do not know what to identify with, unorganized, are not united, distraught, friendly, humble, coward, people on whose back one can get rich, subservient, envious.

We notice that these qualities are not only the reflection of reality perception, but also a desideratum some of the respondents want to achieve. From this perspective, Moldovan respondents formulate their reaction asserting that being a Russian in Moldova means, *„to continue to behave like a nation that dominates in this country“.*

The conclusions of the study show that *„Moldovans perceive Russians as being different and having a separate status compared to other ethnic groups.“* Russians are viewed by many Moldovan participants as the ethnic group, which had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethnic groups, and which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage.

In these circumstances, the ethnic cleavage generally overlaps with the ideological cleavage, fact ascertained in the research through the following statement *„the opinions regarding almost all discussed subjects lie on a continuum that has at its extreme two completely different ideological positions.“* The results outline two major trends. The first trend considers that democratization generated the conditions for national revival. Therefore, according to the study *„The first perspective (independence as national revival + democratization – NR+D) represents a position that regards the 1991 independence in a double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit, on the one hand, the beginning of democratization of the political regime. In the first perspective, the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic recovery of the relationship between the two banks of Prut River, are natural things related to the newly created historical reality. In the second stance, free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the main international institutions, such as the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE, orientation of foreign policy towards the European Union are the main gains that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The outbreak of the Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia's attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The settlement of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.“*

The second trend believes that democratization led to the loss social and economic privileged positions, as well as the position of their ethnic community. That is why these people are reluctant regarding the national aspirations of the first trend, as well as regarding the democratic values. *„The second perspective (independence as opportunity for emergence of a new nation – NN) is situated at the other end, and represents a position defining the independence as a moment of emergence for a new nation: Moldovans represent a nation with a separate identity and history, which initially implied multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc. For this reason, there is a need for at least two official languages – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by everyone). The newly created democratic institutions have not proven their advantages. The multiparty*

system and political anxieties related to the struggle for power of different political parties did not contribute to the achievement of good and unitary governance; lead to the division and impoverishment of society, weakening of state authority, launching of unfounded conflicting slogans during elections with the purpose of obtaining political capital etc. At the same time, Moldova did not do too much in order to affirm itself as a partner having an important word to say in the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war broke out because of the Romanianization policy adopted by Chisinau at the beginning of 1990s, and misunderstandings regarding the use of official languages. Federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible way to solve the conflict.“

Identity Model Serves as Basis for Wrong Premises in the Development of State Policies

The logical construction, resulting from the application of identity model formed the basis for the development of state policies by public authorities. In foreign policy, for example, the neighboring state, Romania, was regarded in many instances as hostile to Moldova's interests. It was invoked that as the dangers for Moldovan citizens' identity come from Romania, this country represents a danger for the Moldovan statehood. It was obvious, and the subsequent evolutions proved that it was a wrong conclusion, because the premises were wrong. The change of priorities, imposed by the imperatives of the reality, showed that the dangers for Moldovan national security come from other regions and not from Romania.

The identity model can be found at the origin of the perception described in the research: „Some participants view with suspicion the assistance provided by the neighboring countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio and television stations, newspapers, etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority, or by Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority, etc.) The biggest suspicions are raised by the Romanian assistance to Moldovans and Turkish assistance to Gagauz“.

Citizenship

As we showed, in their relationship with citizens, Moldovan authorities understood that they should stress the efforts for creating the loyalty towards the newly created entity. The conclusions formulated in the research regarding the relationships between state and citizens represent an evaluation basis of loyalty level. Therefore, the most adequate approach, while analyzing the conclusions of the research, is to evaluate the loyalty of Moldovan citizens. The definition of citizenship helps us in this sense, because it provides us with the content of the relationships that need to exist between the state and its citizens.

The manuals of constitutional law define citizenship as the quality of individual that expresses the permanent social-economic, political and legal relations between the

individual and the state, proving its affiliation to the state and offering the individual the opportunity to be the holder of all rights and duties stipulated in the Constitution, and state laws.

From this statement results that citizenship implies legal and political relations between the state and citizens, which are translated into mutual rights and duties. In this sense, it is adequate to recall the provisions of articles 55 and 56 from Moldovan Constitution, which refer to the „*rights and duties*“ and „*loyalty towards the country*“. Article 55, paragraph (1) stipulates that „every citizen has duties towards the state and society, deriving directly from the guaranteed rights and freedoms“ and paragraph (2) stipulates that „respect for legal rights and interests, dignity of other citizens is mandatory“. Article 56, paragraph (1) stipulates that „loyalty towards the country is sacred“ and paragraph (2) provides that „citizens entrusted with public functions, as well as the military, are under the responsibility to fulfill faithfully their duties and, in given situations, shall also take the oath as requested by law“.

Affiliation of persons with an entity does not result from the quality of citizen as such. This quality represents only the premise for the relationship between individuals and the state. At the same time, loyalty is not an abstract notion that could be imposed by a propagandistic demarche or by law.

Formation of loyalty and appropriation of identity is closely related to the attitude of individuals towards state institutions, their community environment, life quality, and hope for the future. The environment where individuals perform their daily activities by connecting to a system of relations with people around them, determines the analysis of one's own identity and identity of people forming the community. Thus, loyalty and appropriation of identity have an important component, given by the evaluation of community members and the relationships with them. The membership and relationships defined by education level, posture, and behavior determine the attitude, and the extent to which individuals appropriate the identity of their community.

Therefore, the state that wants to form the loyalty of its citizens has to apply at least the diligence test, because the individuals' attitude is also shaped by one's own experiences in relation with state institutions.

The state duties revealed by the respondents' answers and interesting for us are the following: to guarantee human rights and efficient functioning of democratic institutions, good governance, efficient public administration and fair justice, standards that offer a decent life and an adequate community environment.

The perceptions expressed by the respondents, concerning the listed areas crystallize the elements based on which we can estimate the degree of loyalty of Moldovan citizens.

Moldovans' Representations of State and Perception of Citizenship

From the very beginning, we notice two major trends regarding the general attitude of Moldovan citizens towards their state. The first category is represented by the national-

optimists, and includes most of the participants who declare that they are „proud of the country where they were born and live, calling it their homeland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and epithets“. These participants say, „(Moldova) reminds me of a leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will notice how much it resembles the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily are missing“, M7; „When I was in school, it was associated with a grape“, M17; „I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova“. *In the Soviet Union, I served in the army in the Far East, and when I was asked about my country, and when I told them that I was from Moldova, they were surprised to learn that there were Bulgarians living in Moldova. When I was asked about Moldova, I was answering them that Moldova is a flourishing country with many orchards, vineyards, grain fields and everything you wish*“, M21; „Its people, its land, its traditions. *When we say 'Moldova' we suddenly see vineyards and blooming orchards, a good wine, vegetables, fruits and hardworking people. This is the meaning of Moldova for us*“, M24.

We notice that this category formulates its attitude towards Moldovan state, referring to the elements that form an entity, which we can identify with the notion of *Motherland*. The notion of *Motherland* and concept of *state* define, however, distinct entities. Terms as „vineyards“, „orchards“, „hardworking people“, can be associated with the *Motherland*, but have nothing to do with the state. Consequently, even though this attitude represents a form of loyalty, it is not conclusive because the notion of *Motherland* can be also identified in the absence of state, without the individual facing challenges in manifesting its feelings.

The attitude reveals the capability of Moldovan citizens to define the content of their relationships with the state.

Thus, those who form the „unionist perspective“, i.e. „people who consider that the present country is a part of a larger political entity“ and that Moldova is nothing else than „*The second Romanian state*“ (M6), will not contest the attitude of the first category, but they show a clear attitude towards the Moldovan state.

The „skeptics“ category includes „*people who assume that Moldova hangs over an abyss because of poverty, economic decline, as well as political inconsistency. This abyss opens in front of a weak state, with a territory fragmented by Transnistrian conflict, with an extremely short and fretful history and an uncertain identity*“. They use the following qualifiers: „*Poor country*“, M4; „*Poverty*“, M9; „*Country where I live. A poor country which has not yet determined itself where to go – towards east or west*“, M11; „*Moldova is sooner a territory than a country, because it does not control a part of its territory (Transnistria)*“, M3;

The „skeptics“ understand more clearly the meaning of state than the national-optimists do, but they also define the state only through the prism of phenomena they perceive directly.

It can be concluded that most of the Moldovans do not have a clear representation of what state means and, consequently, they are not capable to make an assessment based

on which they could form their attitude towards the state. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the loyalty level of Moldovans towards the state from this perspective because there is no representation of the object of loyalty.

The confusion appears when we learn the answers showing the way Moldovans perceive themselves as Moldovan citizens. We see that „*most of the Moldovan respondents*“, i.e. the majority that includes those from the first category of national optimists, „*consider that being a citizen of Moldova implies an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration*“.

The survey shows that Moldovans have a more adequate representation of citizenship when explaining what this quality implies: „*Probably it means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled acts of the state authorities; it means to exercise with great risks your civic and constitutional rights. It means to be unable to live a decent life from the incomes generated by local businesses. but only from the income generated by foreign enterprises, businesses and non-commercial institutions. Despite this, to be a happy person, probably helps Moldovans to keep away from depression*“, M12;

The fact that Moldovans do not have the representation of what is called state and the way they define affiliation to Moldovan citizenship reflects the defensive position in relations with the state. All the invoked elements represent only phenomena learned from one's own experience.

There are two different approaches concerning the institutions. Thus, the perceptions regarding justice and human rights are formulated based on the appreciation, according to which Moldovan citizenship means, „*exercising with high risks your civic and constitutional rights*“. The way justice works is very important, because it is the only branch of power that people have access to, by formulating requests, and materializing relations in perceptible effects for citizens. Consequently, the way these requests are fulfilled forms the people's perception concerning attitude of the state towards its citizens.

Public administration is appreciated through the statement that being a citizen „*probably means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled acts of the state authorities*“.

The political environment is also seen in grey colors, the citizens' political rights being violated: „*once we also experienced perestroika: multiparty system. Now we arrived at where we started, the majority of the population pleads for one party. We do not have a truly independent newspaper. Human rights and freedoms are limited*“, F1. „*Exercise of citizens' rights and liberties was restricted, for example, freedom of expression, and there were abuses against the opposition, the ruling party tried to split certain organizations, media, trade unions etc.*“, M9. „*The system is unstable from the political point of view. In 2000, for example, Moldova became parliamentary republic de jure, but de facto, it is a presidential republic: Presently the President controls the legislative, executive, and judicial branches*“, M3.

The quality of governance is evaluated through expressions concerning the perfor-

mance of central administration: „A poor country which has not yet determined itself where to go – towards east or west“, M11; „Moldova is sooner a territory than a country because it does not control a part of its territory (Transnistria)“, M3. The prerogative of governance is to establish the „direction“ and „perspectives“, and the lack of horizons is the failure of governance. The opinion expressed by respondents does not leave space for interpretation: „Social problems come first: there is no work, jobs and funds, and the results are: poverty, disorientation, because there is no clear way of Government activities“, M28. Government is also responsible that „Statistics show economic stability but the situation is deplorable: lack of competition, high prices, low salaries, unemployment, and massive emigration. (...) Current issues: corruption at all levels, lack of competition, of market economy, impossibility to initiate a business, lack of processing infrastructure in agriculture, deficiencies in education and social assistance“, F1.

The NN category brings „reproaches to former governments for the undertaken reforms („thoughtless“ privatization, administrative decentralization etc.)“, and NR+D category brings „reproaches to the present governance for the tendency to centralize and limit the democratic freedoms“.

The positive evaluation of governance comes from NN category and regards the fields that actually are not conclusive. when describing the quality of life. The Government is praised for the „political and economic stability, orientation of state policies towards common people, improvement of services for citizens, elaboration of strategies for social, youth, and tourism development, stabilization of national currency, payment of salaries and pensions without delays“.

Reference to life standards in the society represents an important element in the individual's values and influences the process of identity adoption. Thus, the Moldovan citizenship means, „to strive. to survive in a village by farming, in a town by practicing retail business, or to create an ideal to leave the country and find a job abroad“. It also means to „think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any other country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. Many of them feel humans, I don't know why. Even though they work hard, they are paid for that and feel useful. Here they don't feel that“. F10

Massive labor migration, usually illegal, is perceived by respondents as one of the most important events and, as a rule, is associated with patriotism, i.e. with the citizens' loyalty level.

The attitude towards the group members determines the level of identity adopted by an individual. It is based on values that show the level of civilization, education, posture, and behavior of community members, etc. The attitude regarding the community environment and members is appreciated by the statement: to be a Moldovan „means to have little opportunities for existence, it means to seek to leave the country and look for a job abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your identity“. M5; We only have to assess to what extent individuals will want to identify themselves with a „country of miserable people, without future, who cannot clearly articulate what they want“, M12.

Minorities' Representations of the State and Perception of Citizenship

State representation of a category of persons belonging to ethnic minorities is similar to that shown by the national-optimist Moldovans. Thus, „*some representatives belonging to national minorities believe that they belong to a beautiful country where they are pleased to live; they believe in their future*“. It is similar to formulating an attitude without understanding the definition of state, and elements they have to use in the evaluation of performance of state authorities. Like the case of Moldovans, it is a representation, which is available when the entity referred to would not constitute a state, a representation referring to geographic features of Moldova. Moldovans' perception about the way Russian minority relates to the Moldovan state is illustrated in the following statement: „*(Russians) are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much more favorable. Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region*“, F1.

The attitude of a category of minorities is eloquent for the situation from Moldova: As shown in one of the conclusions, „*other representatives belonging to national minorities avoided to answer this question*“. The refusal to formulate an answer could also mean the denial of Moldovan statehood by some minority groups. It seems that this is the attitude that generates the lack of trust between majority and minority groups, and represents the source of existing rivalry among the main communities.

Therefore, many Moldovan participants view Russians as „*colonists, the ethnic group which had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of other ethnic groups, and which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage. They are arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners, without trying to adapt to the local values, culture, and traditions. They are drunkards, greedy, unpredictable, brought the Russian communism and imperialism*“.

It seems that the minority groups have a clearly shaped representation regarding the citizenship, the research showing that they „*consider regardless of their ethnic background, they are all citizens of one country*“. They synthesize their vision on affiliation in the following way: „*I like very much the popular idea in America – there are no nations, there are only Americans. Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country you live in, you have to love it and do something for it.*“, M14.

This way of defining one's position appears rather in the situations when the minority groups wish to reduce Moldovans' numeric domination from the ethnic perspective. In other situations, minority representatives always invoke the ethnic identity, when they are asked to identify themselves. In this context, the case of the organization *Spiritual Council of Muslims* from Moldova is eloquent. Its leader was invoking in court the authority of Kazan Mufti (Russia) in supporting registration of the organization. In other words, the religious identity is the one that legitimizes in its vision the request for registration, and not the citizenship of Moldova.

The unconditional granting of Moldovan citizenship to all people residing on the territory of Moldova at the moment of declaration of independence, exonerated them from the effort to understand the meaning of citizenship. They dissociate from the issue of identification as a citizen: „*It is difficult for me to give an answer to this question. I think Moldovans should answer this question*“, M26

The answers of some Moldovans show that they consider this situation an error. The Moldovans assert that Russians „*continue to behave as foreigners or as conquerors*“. Thus, the attitude of minority groups is noted by the majority group and their reaction is formulated through the conclusion that Russians „*should learn our culture and traditions, integrate and become true citizens*“, F1.

The research shows that Gagauz community from Moldova formulated two attitudes. The former outlines the fact that the Gagauz perceive Moldova as their homeland and are accepted: „*They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as their motherland, have the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cultural perspective*“, F1; „*Moldova is the motherland for the Gagauz living here*“, F25; „*For Gagauz I think this is great. The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they have managed to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for development*“. F8 There is an element in the evaluation of the Gagauz, which differentiates them from Russian minority, i.e. they are not formed from emigrants and are mostly seen as a local population. This element legitimates the right of Gagauz to have „many rights“ and „to develop“. The aversion is probably eliminated due to the fact that Gagauz minority do not present a threat to the minority in the social, economic and political competition, as in the case of Russians. The qualifiers attributed to Gagauz by Moldovans show that the latter describe them as people who do not have the potential for serious competition. Moreover, they live isolated on the territory defined through Gagauz autonomy, and are appreciated more than the Russians for the fact that they identify with the territory where they live.

The second attitude is determined by the risks of pronounced identity and isolation of Gagauz compared to the other communities. The Gagauz minority is treated with mistrust because of the help and support it receives from Turkey. Respondents belonging to other groups assert that being Gagauz means „*to identify more and more with Turkey, to wait for its help and investments, and to listen to the advice and suggestions from outside, remaining, at the same time, a separate group*“, M5. They accuse the Gagauz of lack of loyalty towards Moldovan state and point out the reason of this: „*In the last years, more and more Gagauz and Bulgarians leave, and establish in Turkey and Bulgaria, accordingly, because of Moldova's social economic problems. They are allured by the higher living standards and common cultural affinities, especially that there are certain tempting offers from Turkey, scholarships, etc.*

This exodus of Gagauz demonstrates us that they are not too attached to Moldova. The feeling of affiliation to Moldova is not so developed because they, however, succeeded in forming the political formation of Gagauz-Yeri and I believe that they perceive themselves

rather as citizens of this autonomous political unit within Moldova“; M6.

The way other ethnic groups, besides those mentioned, perceive themselves as Moldovan citizens, is not different from that of national-optimist Moldovans. These individuals „believe in the future of this country and think that they live in a beautiful country, they enjoy living here, and all must be citizens of this country“. Their attitude is generalized in the following statement: „I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people because we live in such a wonderful country, we have the chance to admire all that and live a decent life“; M7; „It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me happy?“ M15. This category considers less important how the state structure will look, more important is their individual comfort determined by the level of wellbeing. The motivation for this attitude is explained by the fact that these individuals are not involved in the competition for the configuration of Moldovan state.

Issues of Identity of Moldovan State

The issue of Moldovan state configuration is also one of the issues related to the competition among the main communities from Moldova and, consequently, an element of identity appropriation. In other words, if the state takes the shape desired by the community, its member will become loyal to the state or, otherwise, they will refuse to recognize the state, creating a parallel space where they feel comfortable. The minority participants' refusal to express their attitude towards Moldovan state is explained by this way of understanding things. The answer to the survey questions regarding some issues confirms this approach.

Attitudes Regarding Political Configuration of the State

The results outline two major trends defined through the elements presented in the study based on two attitudes. „*First perspective (independence as national revival + democratization - NR+D) represents a position that views the 1991 independence from a double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit, on the one hand, and as a beginning of democratization of political regime, on the other hand. In the first perspective, return to Latin alphabet, and declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic recovery of relations between the two banks of Prut River are natural things concerning the newly created historical reality. In the second perspective, free elections, multi-party system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the main international institutions, such as the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE, orientation of foreign policy towards the European Union are the main gains that contributed to the democratization of political regime. The breakout of the Transnistrian war is reviewed as Russia's attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The settlement of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.*“

The first trend includes those who wish to see a Moldovan state characterized by the following features: a) a democratic state; b) free elections and multiparty system; c) foreign policy oriented towards West excluding Russian influence; d) unitary state; e) national values based on identity defined by the term „Romanian“ and Romanian language as official language; g) Transnistrian conflict is caused by Russia.

These elements constitute a subject for debate among communities and influence the loyalty to the Moldovan state.

The attitude towards democracy is explained by the facts that with the implementation of democratic institutions, the Moldovans' return to their national values, and elimination of a discriminatory situation was possible. Naturally, the Russians' reaction towards democratic institutions is determined by the fact that they lost the privileged situation, and see Moldovans' emancipation as a threat for their dominant position, invoking the threat for their own identity as a pretext.

The attitude towards free elections and political parties is determined by the nature of relations the latter form, relations where the Russian identity, despite its reduced numeric ratio, is not found. The proof is the 2005 elections, after which the segment of population oriented towards Russia does not have representatives who could promote their political options. The expressed opinions show that the Russian minority prefers a political system that would guarantee the possibility to determine the agenda of Moldovan policy. This is a consociational system (through division) and can be materialized through the federalization of Moldova. This explains the attitude towards the Transnistrian conflict and the solutions to it.

The Transnistrian issue is one of the conflicting topics of the study: *„Even though many respondents consider that the conflict is rather political than ethnic, the issue can oppose the positions of Moldovan ethnics to those of Russians/Russian speaking communities. The former would be more inclined to the return to the unitary state and would agree with the politics of Chisinau, the latter would side with the separatist regime from Tiraspol. From the perspective of Russian ethnics/Russian speaking communities, the Moldovans could be accused of intolerance - regarding the official language or guaranteeing autonomy to Transnistrian territory, a reason for Transnistria's separation from Moldova.“*

The attitude towards the Transnistrian issue is relevant from the perspective of identity and policy towards Russian Federation. To quote from the study: *„The issue related to the configuration of the Moldovan state is closely linked to the other two conflicting issues: war in Transnistria and national identity. The opinions of Moldovan ethnics could contradict those of Russian ethnics, or those of other Russian speaking ethnic groups. The Moldovan ethnics could be on the side of the present formula regarding state organization, while the Russian-speaking ethnics could be on the side of a federal state. Moreover, the minority groups could be afraid of the majority's intentions to unite Moldova with Romania in the future, while the majority group could be afraid that federalization could lead to the growth of Russian Federation influence in Moldova. and very strong Russian control over some states of the federation, even to the disintegration of the Moldovan state“.*

The foreign policy orientation is also determined by the communities' representations of the state. The study shows the options differently. Thus, *„the Moldovans might favor a pro-European orientation, while the ethnic minorities would aspire for a foreign policy oriented towards the CIS states“*. One should note, *„There is an assumption that the Russian ethnics support Russia's policy regardless of the issue. If Moscow and Chisinau would ever be on divergent positions, the Russian ethnics would automatically disagree with Moldovans. The assumption is justified if we consider the fact that the tendency is maintained also in more specialized issues, such as the federalization of Moldova proposed by Kozak plan. Two attitudes emerge from here: „on the one hand, those who think that this plan was a good option for Moldova, as long as it would solve the Transnistrian conflict; on the other hand, those who consider that this plan would threaten the Moldovan unitary state, maybe even its independence“*.

The Moldovans perceive this „assumption“ and find its explanation in the following fact: *„for Russians it is a real problem because they do not to identify with this state, because it was recently formed and it is normal not to identify with a state that never existed“* (M2), and being a Russian ethnic in Moldova means *„to promote your interests hoping that Russia's policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian policy“* (M12). Thus, the assumption seems to be confirmed, especially that we notice that only the issues that are not related to competition among communities are considered non-conflicting. To quote from the study: *„The themes identified by the participants as having potential to produce a general consensus among people living in Moldova, could be those that propose social and economic goals of general interest: concentration of all groups on the economic development, help in case of natural disasters, consolidation of the Moldovan state“*.

Considerations Regarding the Identity of Moldova from Ethnocultural Perspective

Debates regarding national identity, language issue, affiliation, and history etc. referred in the study, are not related only to the identity of communities and configuration of the Moldovan state, but also the nature of identity of Moldovan citizens as a sum of individuals. The conclusions of the study show that *„the Moldovans could be dissatisfied by the following situation: fear of political identification with Romania and conflicts that this situation could generate“*. Another problem is that they *„are refused“* or they *„refuse to assume a Romanian cultural identity“* and *„this artifice leads to an internal disequilibrium of the ethnic group and to extreme fragility of Moldovan identity“*. *„On the other hand, ethnic minorities influence this way the self-relation of the majority group. The adoption of Romanian identity by Moldovans could make them feel excluded as ethnic group, but also as citizens of the same state. How long can they declare themselves Moldovans of Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic background? („We are all Moldovans“), how will they call themselves if Moldovans become Romanians overnight? Moreover, there would always be a fear that once they become Romanians, the Moldovans would also like to unite with Romania“*.

From the above-mentioned statements, we can conclude, „in both cases (minorities, majority) there are identification barriers that are difficult to overcome. Both situations (of majority and of minorities) contribute to the stability of the created vicious circle.“

The attitude of minorities represents the result of confusion related to the definition of identity in Moldova. One of the answers through which the minority representatives express their attitude towards Moldovans, as a community, shows that they represent „the majority population or the title nation, their name has a geographic connotation and is not an ethnonym.“ The „Moldovans“, as a concept, represent „*a nation with a separate identity and history which implied initially a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc.)*“. This definition of Moldovans does not exclude those who consider themselves Romanians from the ethnic point of view. It results that when the minorities deny the Moldovans, as community members, the possibility to consider themselves Romanians, they admit the possibility of violation of identity right.

In reality, the confusion appears from the „mixture“ of the two traditional concepts concerning nation definition in the case of Moldova. According to one of the concepts, nation is defined based on the ethnic community of individuals (German Volk, theory attributed to Herder). Thus, according to this theory, the German nation also includes the Germans living outside the borders of Germany. The second concept defines the nation through the affiliation to a political community also called „civic nation“, French nation being considered a representative model. Affiliation to a nation is determined by citizenship and the black natives from Africa, for example, can be also called French.

In Moldova, the term defining a territorial community called „Moldovan people“ was applied to identify the totality of citizens of the country, as well as in defining the community of ethnic majority.

The distortions appear when the Moldovans who claim their Romanian identity in the ethnic sense are reproached, that they refuse this way the quality of Moldovan in political sense. In other words, the quality of Romanian ethnic is contested and treated in opposition to the Moldovan citizenship.

Another problem caused by the confusion in defining the concept of nation is the refusal of minorities to define themselves as Moldovan citizens and to assume the content of this quality.

The challenge related to the definition of minorities in the case the Moldovans become Romanians overnight is false, because the name of the state will most likely not change and they will continue to be Moldovans according to the political definition of the term. In reality, the fears are connected to the eventual unification of Moldova with Romania, if the identity changes. This fear is based on political orders and the problem of self-identification is a cover or a pretext, depending on the case.

The speculations, including the idea to make Russian a second official language and to promote the notion of „Russian speaking population“, are part of a larger effort concerning the determination of the character of the Moldovan state from the ethnocultural perspective. Moldova is a young state whose identity has not been well shaped yet. The respondents share the same perception: „*the new Moldovan state is perceived as young,*

unconsolidated, lacking a well-shaped national identity, which experienced instability of the strategic foreign policy option, exposed to the threats of institutional erosion or the dissolution of state authority.“

The fact that Moldova has an ethnic majority of 78 percent, will determine the future state identity based on the identity of this majority. As the survey shows, not all people, at least those who define the Moldovan nation as a multiethnic mixture, agree with this situation. The ethnic minorities cannot have an impact in shaping the identity of Moldova, because their ratio when related to the majority is insignificant. The situation would be different if a consociational model is instituted through federalization is recognized. The efforts of a 22 percent minority group would be more efficient and the weight of claims directed against the 78 percent majority would be higher.

Based on the logical construction, developed on the basis of these speculative notions, some try to define Moldova as a multicultural or multinational state. The quantitative criterion is always invoked in supporting this desideratum, different figures are used, and the notion of „Russian speaking population“ has the purpose to serve as an argument. This approach avoids a rigorous qualitative analysis, and one should remember that the international norms exclude the quantitative criterion. given the multitude of situations and their complexities in each case. The international documents stipulate only the elements that oblige to perform the analyses, only by applying qualitative criteria.

Such analysis was performed by W. Kymlicka, whose demarche to specify the term of multiculturalism was determined by the need to avoid „terminological confusions“ based frequently on „political interests“. The words „terminological confusion“ and „political interest“ used in the same context sound familiar if we take into consideration the conclusions of the study and that is why we should follow the arguments of Kymlicka.

We will quote a passage: „A state can be considered multicultural if its citizens belong to more nations (in the case of multinational state) or are immigrants who came from other countries (situation when the state is considered multiethnic). This represents an important component of personal identity, public life, and political identity from that particular country“. In this context, culture is an „attribute“ of a nation or of a people that represents „an intergenerational community, more or less complete from the institutional point of view, occupying a certain territory in a traditional way (which is considered native land) and being characterized by its own language and common history“. The native land is the place where the community is formed, not the birthplace of people who form the community. According to this concept, Moldova is not a multinational but a multiethnic state, and this fact draws different consequences where the claims for declaring Russian the official language, and the recognition of the term „Russian speaking population“ is ungrounded.

MOLDOVAN LEGISLATION ON NATIONAL ISSUES AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

Vitalie Catană

Perceptions Regarding the Legislation in the Field of National Issues and Interethnic Relations

A general overview of Moldovan legislation on national issues and interethnic relations shows that it corresponds to the international standards, with the remark that some observations and clarifications are needed in the case of the Law, regarding the Concept of National Policy.

The quality of legislation is tested in most cases by analyzing the quality of the relationship between the majority and minority communities. The respondents' perception determined by the study is adequate: *„Most participants believe that Moldova had a balanced policy towards national minorities, adjusting its legislation to the requirements of international bodies and managing to avoid excesses“*.

Obviously, this perception is partly due to the knowledge of the standards and content of this legislation, but also because many people assess the interethnic relations outside the legal provisions, analyzing it by referring the legislation to specific situations or political activities. We find from the study that *„if from the legislative point of view the situation can be considered satisfactory, there are aspects that make certain ethnic groups advantaged compared to others. The opinions about this are divided“*.

The finding gives us a clue about the source of the confusions regarding interethnic relations. Thus, the following aspects cause the distortion in the perception concerning respect for ethnic minorities' rights in Moldova:

- a) Some minority participants perceive the numeric advantage as a fact, which produces unacceptable effects, displaying a negative attitude: *„There are opinions according to which Moldovans are advantaged due to their number (they represent the majority) and the fact that the official language is their native language. This situation facilitated, in the beginning of 1990s, the replacement of other ethnic groups from administration and state structures with Moldovans“*.

The mentioned perception is in unison with the assumptions accepted in the doctrine, according to which the numeric superiority represents an advantage that leads to the natural expulsion of minorities and, consequently, balanced measures are needed in this situation. However, the measures claimed by the ethnic minorities in Moldova are in contradiction with the international standards. According to public declarations, the ethnic minorities claim consociational mechanisms for guaranteeing certain positions, such as shares in administration, official status to the Russian language, recognition of a certain

category called „Russian speaking population“, etc. Minorities claim protection through regulation of collective rights, invoking frequently that the threshold for granting special rights for minorities established by international standards, is 20 percent.

We have to mention, that in accordance with the relevant provisions of the international law, the balance measures represent an exception, and are adopted after the evaluation of the need for their enforcement, and after setting exact limits of these measures. At the same time, the measures are addressed to individuals, i.e. the subjects of rights are the individuals and not the communities, since collective rights are not recognized.

b) For some participants, the distortions represent reflection of competition and rejection of domination of another community. The study finds that *„according to another set of opinions, the Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other ethnic groups, even though they represent the majority. This is possible due to the advantages of the Russian speaking ethnic groups, especially the Russians and Ukrainians, at the beginning of 1990s. These minorities lived mainly in urban areas, compared to the Moldovans who were rather a rural population, they were more educated and had representatives in central economic and political positions. If, politically, the situation was in favor of Moldovans by introducing the use of Moldovan language in administration and organizing free elections, then, economically, Russian minority, next to Ukrainian one, dominate the country. Moreover, if Moldovan became the language of politics and administration, then Russian is the language of economy“.*

Competition is a field of interethnic relations where even speculations find their place. An example is V. Klimenco, one of the political leaders of Russian community, who once declared that there are only 5 Russian libraries in Moldova, which is not enough in relation to the percentage of minorities (35 percent), this figure including Russians and other ethnic communities. In reality, 80 percent of the books from Moldovan libraries are in Russian.

The perception of legislation in the light of social imbalances generates the tendency to solve them by legal means, and this is how certain opinions on the imperfection of legislation appear. This attitude refers, especially, to small ethnic minorities: *„There are also opinions that perceive Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Romanians as disadvantaged minorities. This happens because Gagauz and Bulgarians are minorities that live mostly in rural areas, very poor regions from the south of Moldova. Gypsies represent an ethnic group that adheres with difficulty to the social norms and values of the majority, and little things have been done for their integration.*

This approach becomes significant especially when some participants appreciate the relations by comparing the northern area of Moldova, which is considered more developed, to the southern region, which is considered backward. Thus, *„Some participants assert that the things in this field were left at the formal level of „content-empty“ legislation, and no follow-up policies were implemented to stimulate interethnic communication or collaboration, to reduce the gaps between north and south (areas with different ethnic configuration), or to establish common goals for the majority and ethnic minorities.“*

It is obvious that there are gaps in Moldovan legislation regarding interethnic relations, this fact implying an examination and elaboration of exact recommendations for

eliminating the deficiencies. As we find in the study, „*In none of the situations where participants indicated the advantage of an ethnic group over the other, were offered examples of policies oriented towards improvement of these situations*“.

At the same time „*Many participants consider that the autonomy given to Gagauz was a good solution, and that the representatives of this minority now perceive Moldova as their motherland.*“

c) Ignorance of regulations and international standards regarding the protection of minorities represents a source of confusions. Thus, political leaders of the Russian community assert that integration of Moldova with the Euro-Atlantic structures will lead to the violation of minority rights. These leaders confuse, whether deliberately, or because of ignorance, the failure to fulfill the political desideratum subject to the rigors of political democracy, with the violation of a minority right. It is necessary to mention that in Moldova, there are no legal precedents of violation of the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities. It is also interesting that not a single claim has been filed in court on this matter.

The state has its role in the preservation of this situation because it ignored the relationship with the citizens, based on citizenship institution, and left outside the debate on legal norms that establish the relationships between the nationals, including those regarding the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities.

The perception of the role of state institutions is described in the work in the way the participants view the contribution of the governmental structures. „*On one side, there are those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, the most frequently listed activity of these is the organization of multiethnic cultural events and festivals; on the other side, there are people believing that these structures are totally inefficient, and their activity does not manage to solve the actual problems.*“

The survey participants understand perfectly that the artistic and cultural activities are not sufficient to build an adequate interethnic climate: „*All these [institutions] are formal, and exist only to create the impression –exhibits, folk festivals, etc. However, nobody cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go much beyond these cultural dimensions. The leaders of these organizations are always the same. They participate at different cultural manifestations, but don't do anything real*“, M27.

Considerations Regarding the Terms Used in Moldovan Legislation

Even though the Moldovan legal framework is adequate, especially because it does not have to address special situations such as policies defined as *Affirmative action*, i.e. policies and measures for positive discrimination, in some normative acts, we find adequate solutions for conflicts.

Such a law is the controversial Concept of National State Policy adopted by the Parliament. The problems emerged by the launch and adoption of this Concept add to the list

of problems emerged from the debates regarding the terms „state language“ or „official language, „second mother tongue“, „language of interethnic communication“ and the problems related to the status of the Russian language in Moldova. These debates were normally placed in the context of the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities and in the case of the Concept, the one that invoked the need for guaranteeing interethnic peace. During the debates on this issue, one invoked precise figures, which would crystallize certain definitions and would establish the base for certain special rights for the ethnic minorities. For example, by stating that if a minority represents 20 percent of the total population, it has to benefit from special rights, or if the majority represents less than two thirds of the population of the state, the state would be considered multinational as opposed to mononational, with the relevant consequences. The conclusions formulated, based on these figures, do not have any support in the international documents, are invented and find their answer in the content of the Resolution of the UN General Assembly no. 217 C(III) from 10.12.1948. This is in the „Declaration on the fate of minorities“, which states the following: „it is difficult to adopt a uniform solution of this complex and delicate question which has special aspects in each State in which it arises“. There have been no changes to the mentioned approach since then.

Term „Language of Interethnic Communication“

In the *Concept*, the Russian language is called „the language of interethnic communication“, i.e. a different language than the official one. In the survey, this issue is reflected under the aspect of introduction of mandatory Russian language classes in the Romanian language schools. Two options were expressed regarding this issue: „*according to the advocates of this measure, the history of Moldovans is totally different from the history of Romanians, and must be studied separately; Russian is necessary for Moldovans so that they can communicate with the representatives of other ethnic groups, the bilingualism being a national pride. According to those opposing this measure, the new history course is a political phony and has no connections with the historical truth. Russian is not more important than other languages of international circulation as long as Moldovan continues to be the official language.*“

We have to show that the communication language represents an element of the right of individuals to identity, and the right to choose the communication language. The international provisions and state practices do not recognize the notion of „language of interethnic communication“. The states can impose the mandatory knowledge of the official language in order to facilitate the communication with its citizens, and in order to have an efficient administration. However, imposing the language of a national minority as the language of interethnic communication is discriminatory for both the people belonging to the majority and the people belonging to other ethnic minorities, because they are subject to an unequal and inferior treatment. Article 20 of the Framework Convention, regarding the protection of national minorities provides that the protection of the rights of people belonging to national minorities should be realized in compliance with the respect for the rights of other people.

A „communication language“ does not have a meaning: If a language does not meet the requirement that would allow it to claim the status of official language, for the same reasons it cannot be imposed as a language of interethnic communication. Moreover, the reasons for which a language is declared official determines the acceptance of this language as a language of communication between the ethnic groups.

The draft of the *Concept* contained a provision, which luckily was excluded in the final version, which attempted to accredit the idea that the term „official language“ and „state language“ have different meanings, and define different concepts. In reality, there are no differences between these notions, and the legislative practices of the states confirm this fact. The Constitution of Spain, article 3, stipulates, „Castilian is the official language of Spain“. In fact, the term „official language“ is used more frequently than the term „state language“ used in the Constitution of Moldova. Therefore, the establishment of Russian as official language would equal the declaration of a second state language in Moldova.

More important is the fact that the Concept included some unconstitutional provisions. The provision regarding the penalties and dissolution of political parties and nongovernmental organizations, whose activities do not comply with the Concept, violates the rights of people to identity and its public manifestation, as well as the right of people to opinion, the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These stipulations can end up with a case in the European Court for Human Rights, based on complaints against the Republic of Moldova filed by its citizens.

Concept of Official Language

„More important for the Russian-speakers is the issue of their „elimination“, not only from the government bodies, but also from the job market. Since the economic activity has been carried out in the state language, large masses of Russian-speaking specialists left their jobs. Since then, you can often see intellectual women selling potatoes on the market reading, for example, the magazine „Novyi Mir“ (The New World).“

From this quotation, and implicitly from the results of the survey, we can notice that the state language is an institution that can cause social effects, and at the same time can be an instrument for the protection of ethnic minorities. It is true that the state language can be an institution with significant social effects, but not in the sense described in the quotation, but in the sense that it can contribute to social integration policies recommended by the international regulations. The state language is not an instrument for the protection of ethnic minorities; therefore, it is useful to show the real nature of this institution.

In 1789-1790, when French was becoming the official language in France, one thought that this approach had the purpose of „transforming the language into an important and mandatory mark of affiliation to a nation, as a sign of a genuine civism“. The goal of this action was to impose a more evolved, unique and standardized language in the „service of the nation-state“ and its institutions. Language had to become an element for the integration with the political body and an element of social success. In 1793, French became

mandatory and unique language in primary education. The standardized language contributed essentially to the public education system and „educating the people is to make it appreciate the good work of the government“, as stated in an official document dating from 1861.

The international provisions developed in the second half of the twentieth century show a special preoccupation for the linguistic rights of the people belonging to national minorities, in the sense of elimination of discriminatory policies promoted against them.

Meanwhile, these norms encourage the integration policies of the states, and the knowledge of the state languages by the persons belonging to national minorities, as element of integration. As long as the integration policy is not transformed into a „policy of linguistic terrorism and grammatical hegemony“, and is accomplished with the respect of human rights, the advantages of knowing the official language by the national minorities are incontestable. The learning of the official language represents the premise of the social unity and a factor of „social cohesion and integration“. This is the interpretation of the provisions of the Framework Convention, for the protection of the national minorities. Article 14(3) of the Framework Convention stipulates that the possibility of learning the minority language or receive an education in this language cannot „affect the learning of the official language or education in this language“. According to the text from item 66 of the commentary on the Framework convention, „...the obligations of the parties regarding the use of minority languages do not affect in any way the status of the official language(s) of the country“.

Even though it has lost some of the initial meanings, the institution of official language kept the most important meaning, and therefore the international documents allow the states to institute official languages and impose the mandatory knowledge of these.

The official language continues to be the language of public authorities, the language in which the state exercises its authority. This fact is determined by the need to organize an efficient administration of public affairs by the state authorities, communication in this sense having a major role. The mandatory character of the official language is not discrimination, because it does not oblige the people to communicate among them in this language. Moreover, as long as a person is not interested in the public affairs, it is fine not to know the official language or know the language superficially.

However, the lack of knowledge of state language, as reflected in the survey, generates division of the large ethnic communities, but also of the small ones, as the Gagauz minority. Most participants mention that the ethnic groups from Moldova barely communicate amongst them. The finding is backed by the opinion expressed by one of the respondents: *„People from Moldova live in parallel worlds. For example, a Russian radio station always broadcasts the weather forecast for Moscow, but I am not interested in that. If I want to hear the weather forecast for Bucharest, I tune my radio to ProFM or KissFM, because I studied in Bucharest for 4 years. Probably there are people who studied in Moscow. Therefore, we have parallel worlds that do not intersect linguistically; they do not interconnect at all. Probably this exists in other countries but our case is more tragic“.* F10 (see annex 2)

The Issue of Russian Language Status in Moldova

The survey results show that there are two options regarding the state language. The first option is that „*the return to the Latin script and declaration of Romanian as the state language are normal things related to the newly created historical reality*. The second option includes the idea that Moldovans are „*a nation with a separate identity and history, which initially implied multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc.) For this reason, there is a need for at least two official languages – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by everyone)*).

The insistently promoted idea of declaring Russian as the second state language in Moldova raises the issue of the foundation for this status. The advocates of granting official status to Russian brought in support of their approach the most important argument that: „Many countries of the world (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain, Israel, Canada, India, etc.) have two or more official languages. Why should we be different? We want to join the European Union. There is no reason to prove that the second official language in Moldova should be Russian (and not French)“, („*Vremea*“ newspaper).

There are not that many countries in the example, considering that there are more than 200 countries in the world, and that Spain has one official language (Castilian) and not two. (Article 3, Constitution of Spain). India introduced recently a moratorium on the use of English in order to protect the local identity.

The official language is the language of the country, the language used by the state to exercise its authority. This fact is determined by the need to organize an efficient administration of public affairs by the state authorities, communication in this sense having a major role. Granting the official status to a language does not guarantee the protection of the linguistic rights of the people, including individuals belonging to ethnic minorities. The international documents draw a clear line between the issue of protecting and exercising linguistic rights of minorities, and the language used to exercise the state authority, i.e. the official language. There is no concept, and there has never existed a concept based on which one could grant the status of official language to language spoken by a minority in order to protect and preserve the identity of that particular ethnic group.

According to the Framework Convention on the protection of minority rights, article 14(3), the opportunity to learn the minority language and receive an education in this language cannot „affect the learning of the official language or the teaching in this language“. Paragraph 66 of the commentary on the Framework convention provides that, „...the duties of the parties regarding the use of minority languages should not affect in any way the status of the official language(s) of the country“.

The official languages are not granted the status of official based on a priori rules, which would take into consideration the quantitative or qualitative criteria, but are the result of lengthy and complex evolutions. The mononational or multinational character of a state does not influence the number of state languages, and never the sole element that an ethnic minority is present in a state has constituted the basis for giving the official

status to the language spoken by this minority. Most unitary states and very many federal states have one official language, even though they have important minority groups. It is considered that it is optimal for a state to have just one official language. On one hand, it is because the state can exercise more efficiently its authority (less expenses, employees, time management and logistical efforts, etc.), and on the other hand, the social integration policies of these states have a higher and wider support. Because of historical evolutions of the states, most of them have one official language. However, there are states with two or more official languages. Generally, these states are divided in two groups. One group is represented by states like Switzerland, Canada, where two or more official languages were established by its component entities, the subjects of the federation, as equal parties of the state. From this perspective, the official languages are meant to describe the character of the state: federal or unitary. Therefore, as a rule, two or more official languages exist in federal states. Each entity of the federal state tries to impose its language as official language, as an element defining its identity. The same thing happened in the case of Switzerland. Official languages were established by the Cantons as equal parties of the Swiss federal state. The direct consequence is that if the status of official language is withdrawn for any of these languages, this fact could be interpreted as denunciation of the act of constitution of the federal state, and could serve as a reason for withdrawal from the federation. Not accidentally, the states demonstrating a certain sensibility regarding the issue of their national or territorial unity have one official language. Moldova can be included in the list of the unitary states preoccupied with preserving this unity, like France, Spain, for example. However, it is difficult to find similarities between Moldova and Switzerland or Belgium.

Another group of countries with two or more official languages is represented by the former colonial states, which experienced the „lingua franca“, or the language with the purpose of bringing civilization to these countries, providing its citizens with an access to the values of modern civilization. Russians did not have such a purpose in Moldova. The local population between Prut and Nistru River has always known, and experienced the advanced values and institutions, that are specific for the historical stages, experienced through its own language or the languages from this family, especially through French. The Russian language had the purpose of eliminating the use, and replacing the language spoken by the Romanians from Bessarabia. It was used as a propaganda tool for the imperial communist authorities, or as L. R. Higonnet said, „linguistic terrorism“, against the Romanian language.

Regarding granting the status of official language, we have to remember the following: if the official language is the language used by the state and public authorities, any aspect related to this issue represents a subject of public interest and must be subject to public debates. There is no doubt that a decision to grant official status to a language should be the result of a consensus expressed explicitly. If this consensus does not exist, then a basic principle of democracy should be applied, the one that establishes the majority rule in the adoption of decisions of general interest.

In this context, we have to mention that the claim for granting Russian the official status, formulated by some people of Gagauz background, based on the rights of people belonging to national minorities is not legitimate. One of the defining elements of the national minorities is stipulated in article 1(e) of the PACE 1201. The recommendation is that these are „motivated by the preoccupation for preservation of their common identity, including culture, traditions, religion or their language“. Russian is not an element of the Gagauz identity, therefore, preoccupation for granting official status to Russian. and the right for the use of Russian by the Gagauz does not have a legitimate foundation, and the state is not obliged to offer guarantees in this sense. Obviously, the Gagauz can speak any language they want, including Russian, but they cannot force other people to speak the language they want.

Term „Russian Speaking Population“

The term „Russian-speaking population“ is frequently used concerning a pretended category that would include all individuals who are not native Romanian speakers. Through this act, one pursues to give content to a category created with the obvious intention of creating a distinct entity, which would legitimize the claims of those who speculate with this notion. This is one of the reasons why the Moldovans assert, according to the survey, that Russians do not want to give up their dominant position, and that the rights of several ethnic minorities are violated.

The notion „Russian-speaking population“ defines all persons who know and speak Russian. These can be Moldovans, French, Germans, Latvians, etc. It does not describe an entity that could form the object of legal regulations, and cannot constitute support for the eventual special rights of persons that are part of it, such as the right to identity.

As it is mentioned in item 43 of Commentary regarding the Framework Convention, referring to the report on the meeting at experts' level in Geneva, „not every ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious difference leads necessarily to the creation of a national minority“. Moreover, the fact that people affiliated to different nationalities speak Russian cannot constitute the basis of a distinct ethnicity.

In order for a community to be defined as a distinct minority entity, it should correspond to the following conditions: (1) the characteristics of persons who are affiliated to it should correspond to the objective criteria contained in the definitions of national minorities from international documents, and (2) these persons should declare explicitly their affiliation to the minority.

First, according to the Regulations 1134 and 1202 of PACE, a minority should be well defined. The linguistic criterion is not the only one that should be applied. An English language speaker is Anglophone, but not necessarily British. It is necessary not to have other relevant elements, which would exclude the individuals from the respective minority, and would affiliate them to other minorities. The relevant element that excludes an individual from the category called „Russian speaking population“ is affiliation to another

national minority, for example the Jewish one, which corresponds to the criteria listed in the definition of national minorities. Common native language, culture, religion, history, and conscience of affiliation are the priority criteria compared to the criterion of speaking Russian language.

Secondly, affiliation to a minority is an act and free option of an individual. The acceptance and the use of an inappropriate notion, such as „Russian speaking population“, would violate article 20 of framework Convention, which stipulates that „during the exercise of the rights and freedoms deriving from the principles of the present Framework Convention, any person belonging to a national minority will respect the national legislation and the rights of others, especially people belonging to the majority or other national minorities“. The main right of the people belonging to national minorities is the right to identity. The term „Russian-speaking population“ used to refer to the people that are not of Russian ethnic background is discriminatory, and violates the right to identity of the ethnic minorities.

Aside from the fact that under these aspects the concept of national policy does not correspond to the doctrine requirements, and is in contradiction with the provisions of international law, the concept is also deficient from the perspective of the potential practical effects.

Analyzing democracies in many countries, A. Lijphart concluded that the level of social division in most countries varies depending on the number and the size of ethnic groups. „For example, a country with two ethnic groups representing 90 and 10 percent accordingly, is less divided than a country with two equally sized ethnic groups. Applying this formula to the Moldovan case, we will find that the level of social division is higher if we consider a ratio of 78 to 22 percent between communities than in the case of a ratio of 78, 9, and 8 percent accordingly. Therefore, the risk of emergence of conflicts in the first case is higher.

In conclusion, the adoption of the national policy concept corroborated with the promotion of the idea of granting official status to Russian language by mobilizing, and consolidating a pretended Russian-speaking community of 22 percent is contrary to the goal declared in the concept, which is establishment of a lasting interethnic peace in Moldova. In fact, before the adoption of the concept there was no interethnic conflict requiring an intervention of the kind described above. The existence of the debates does not mean the existence of a severe conflict, and the best solution would be the absence of a concept as opposed to the existence of an inadequate concept. Time has proven the uselessness of the Concept because it was totally ignored, and did not generate either positive or negative effects.

In this context, it is adequate to quote the remark from the study regarding the perception of interethnic relations in Moldova according to which „most of the respondents believe that these relationships are not tense, moreover, they are considered even cordial.“ *In their opinions, each ethnic group taken separately is tolerant, respects and understands the position of the other ethnic groups with whom they share the territory“.*

Recommendations

1. „The democratic societies have integrated through common citizenship, which, until now, was national (the author uses the term referring to the state). The solidarity among people emerges because they form a „community of citizens“. Otherwise, in the name of what and how would they be ready to undertake the eventual personal risks in order to defend it? The defense, more than citizenship, is not necessarily national, however, the will to defend and consolidate the collective values should exist at the national or European level. Throughout history, the political entities that have not managed to consolidate their own values and have not mobilized themselves for their defense, had tragic destinies even with the arms in their hands (Dominique Schnapper, Christian Bachelier în „Ce este cetățenia?“, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2001).

The authorities of Moldova are to shape their relationships with the citizens based on the institute of citizenship, and not by imposing an identity. When there are no genuine values deriving from a tradition of statehood, the citizens of Moldova can extract their motivations from the resources offered only by the „solidarity of citizens' communities“.

The creation of an adequate relationship between the state and its citizens forms an attitude called in the doctrine „constitutional patriotism“ which, in its turn, underlies the loyalty and the national identity in its civic definition. As shown, it is a difficult approach, but it is the only one for Moldova, that can guarantee a sustainable social consolidation.

2. The state must withdraw from the debate regarding the identity in Moldova. If the state promotes an identity, it is put in the position to answer to the requirements legitimated by the identities of its citizens. The evaluation of the legitimacy of the claims based on identity is impossible, because there have not been developed any standards in this sense, and it is difficult to guarantee the equality of the ethnic communities. In order to eliminate the risks of application of discriminatory standards, the state must answer only the claims referring to the guaranteeing of the human rights, which are subsequently related by the citizenship of the person.

In this context, the idea of a referendum regarding the identity of Moldovans is in contradiction with the provisions of the international provisions, which stipulate that any person has the right to choose freely his or her identity, and the right to identity also implies the freedom to give up on this identity. The international regulations establish that the rights of ethnic communities relate to the rights of individuals and not collectivities. The legal recognition of the ethnic features ultimately violates the individual freedom, and meanwhile formalizes the consociational models of social organization, which eliminates integration and bears the risks of generating ethnic conflicts.

3. It is necessary to reduce the role of parties and political leaders in the problem of interethnic relations. The ideological component determines the political actors to feel obligated to involve in the debates on identity-related issues. The survey

shows that these problems are perceived as being rather a political privilege than regulations of the legal provisions. According to the study, „*Groups or people perceived as having the influence (mostly negative) upon the interethnic relations in Moldova are almost exclusively political figures or parties*“.

The outlined perception is that the sources for interethnic conflicts can originate not only from within the ethnic communities, but also from outside of these communities, more precisely from the political realm. Even the initiatives to grant the official status to the Russian language, and its introduction as a mandatory subject in schools did not cause clashes between communities. The protests were directed strictly towards the ones who came up with these initiatives, and the debates reached high levels of tensions especially between parties and political figures.

The Transnistrian conflict is also considered a political and not an interethnic conflict. According to the study, „*many participants believe that the Transnistrian conflict is not of interethnic nature but sooner a political one*“.

4. The state should avoid the models favoring competition between communities.

The survey results show that in Moldova one can talk about a competition between communities with a latent confrontation existing among them. A conflict, however, can become imminent only due to political interferences and speculations of the stakeholders, as it is happening in the case of the Transnistrian region. The closed character of the communication process correlated with the dispersion of the ethnic minorities throughout Moldova creates a special situation. It is determined by the fact that the ethnic minorities are not concentrated on certain territories, and this reduces the capacities for the mobilization, which would increase the threat of conflicts and chances for their emergence. This situation allows us to anticipate that the distribution of minorities in enclaves will not last for long, and will stop as soon as a communication is established. This assumption seems more realistic especially after announcing the results of the 2005 National Census, which reflects that there has been an increase in the numeric ratio between majority and minority from 65%/35% to 78%/22%. It is expected that the reduction of the number of minorities from 35 down to 22 percent will determine the reduction of the capacities for the mobilization against the majority community. Because the closed character of the communication process was largely due to the lack of intentions of the ethnic minorities from Moldova to adapt, it is expected that with the reduction of their number, their efforts for integration will increase.

The issue of definition of national identity, with all its characteristic elements (language, history, state configuration, options for foreign policies) stays open and is a problem that will continue to generate controversies in the future, in the opinion of the survey participants.

5. The new Moldovan state is perceived as „young, unconsolidated, lacking a well-shaped national identity, which experienced the instability of the strategic foreign policy option, exposed to the threats of institutional erosion or the dissolution of state authority.“

The perception about the state institution influences the affiliation with an entity. Therefore, the state is obliged at least to show the intention to undertake measures for the improvement of the quality of governance, life standards of its citizens and improvement of the community environment as factors that form the important elements of identity. The state has the obligation to formulate the social standards, and assure the conditions for their achievement. The state also has the direct obligation to guarantee the efficiency of the public administration (both central and local), the efficiency of justice and protection for human rights.

The survey shows the deficiencies that are perceived by the respondents as being important, and which can ultimately become a threat for the Moldovan statehood. One can see that the democratic institutions are fragile, and the good governance is vitiated by the corruption. The level of corruption in justice is also very high, and the citizens face serious challenges in defending their rights.

The most important events perceived by survey participants are massive labor migration of labor, usually illegal, and the extreme poverty of the ordinary people.

The citizens do not want a necessarily rapid resolution of the economic and social problems, but rather a horizon, which would offer them a hope for the future. In the long run, the lack of hope for a better future can determine the option of the citizens for alternatives which can be already found in the picture of identities in Moldova, and are confirmed by the results of the study: the option for the affiliation specifically with the Romanian and Russian communities from Moldova.

6. The survey results show that the identity of the minorities excludes the loyalty towards the Republic of Moldova. Even today, some people show loyalty to a state other than the citizenship they hold or the state where they live. „For Russians it is a problem because they do not identify themselves with this country because it is a young state, and it's normal not to identify yourself with a country that never existed“, M2;

The approach of building a new political entity, such as the Republic of Moldova, is overlapping with the creation of a new identity, and consequently, the efforts of the authorities of forming a loyalty based on the new and undefined identity only lead to tensions between communities. A state with cultural identity conflicts must separate the ethnic identity from the political identity, and the political identity can only be build through citizenship.

The unconditional granting of Moldovan citizenship to all people residing on the territory of Moldova at the moment of declaration of independence, regarded by many participants as a mistake, eliminated the need to adopt the content of the quality of citizen. Therefore, the state has to explain the content of the relationship between state and citizens, and must explain that the political loyalty is not contradictory to the ethnic loyalty of the citizens.

The Moldovan authorities do not have another solution because the „reflection regarding the inevitable evolution of the forms and content of citizenship is a fundamental finding. We do not have a better idea to make the people, who by definition are different and unequal, live together by respecting the dignity as the fundamental value of a democratic society. The citizenship is based, in fact, on the idea that living aside all differences

and inequalities, everybody is equal as dignity, and must be treated equally from the legal and political perspective. The specific individuals have historical references, different religious beliefs, are unequal from the economic and social points of view. The transcendence of the particularities of any kind through the idea of citizenship is today the only basis for the political organization capable to determine the people to live together by respecting each other's dignity. The discussion regarding the specific forms for the organization of this principle in the society is the most passionate and the most justified. Maybe because the regimes based on citizenship have managed to resist victoriously the two projects of the 20th century, whose purpose was to destroy them, Nazism and Communism, and because the freedom and the desire to be equal respond to a natural aspiration, innate to all people. (Dominique Schnapper, Christian Bachelier în „Ce este cetățenia?“, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2001).

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POLITICAL LIFE, ECONOMIC REALITY AND SOCIETY IN THE PERCEPTION OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES FROM MOLDOVA

Mihail Guzun

Threats of Ethic Tensions for Human Development

The satisfaction of the claims regarding recognition and equality of different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, as mentioned in a study regarding the identity policy in the world – 2004 Human Development Report, developed at the request of the United Nations Development Program, represents one of the major problems affecting international stability and human development in the 21st century. Presently, there are over 5,000 ethnic groups living in those approximately 200 countries existing in the world. In two out of three countries, the report says, there is at least one significant ethnic or religious group representing more than 10 percent of the population. One seventh of the world's population, approximately 900 millions, is facing some form of discrimination due to their ethnic identity, race or religion (1).

In the practice of many countries and multicultural communities we will find different strategic approaches to the issues of national policy, cultural freedom, national identity – from bilingual education and plans of affirmative action to different new systems of proportional representation and federalism. The right of all individuals to preserve ethnic, linguistic and religious identity is promoted and the protection of these identities is the only sustainable approach in different societies. We witness a challenge caused by the economic globalization and its success can become questionable if the cultural freedoms are not protected and respected.

The protection of minorities has become a true ideology generating relevant social movements. New concepts and assumptions have been launched which can be easily noticed in the specialized works. These include:

- *Special status* (minorities in relation with majority);
- *Specific treatment* (protection of minorities in relation with the majority);
- *Normative derogations* in favor of the disfavored groups;
- *Positive discrimination*, practiced with legitimate appearances (in education, professional training, etc)

The policy regarding ethnic minorities enjoys a significant approach. In Finland, Ireland and Canada, the *linguistic duality* is officially recognized. Spain has four official languages. The cultural and linguistic rights are mutually recognized in Germany and Denmark. There are even *derogations* from the effective legislation in the favor of minorities, especially „small minorities“. In fact, the party of Danish minority from Germany usually does not acquire 5% of the votes during elections; nevertheless it is represented

in the German parliament. In Romania, due to the positive discrimination, each of those 11 ethnic minorities have at least one parliamentary representative in the legislative forum of the country, although neither of them gain sufficient votes to be represented in the parliament. Many countries have an impressive number of *official languages*. South Africa recognizes 11 official languages, India – 15 languages out of the 1652 languages registered and used in this country; Senegal admits 6 international languages, Nigeria recognizes three out of 400 registered languages, etc. (2).

The ethnic „tremors“ have generated in different regions of the Earth phenomena that questioned what was considered not long ago solved for good. We are witnessing processes that occur in multiple regions of the old continent, one of them being the ethnic unrests in France at the end of 2005, which overturn many of the theoretical constructions and recommendations formulated in many agreements and findings of prestigious international forums. The spectacular growth of the shares of ethnic minorities in relation with the title nations registered in the last decades of 20th century in most of developed countries (3), appearance of real opportunities after the fall of the Iron Curtain for many ethnic communities from the ex-soviet countries, generated multiple axiological transfigurations in the realm of the national phenomenon. Not all countries were capable to react quickly and adequately to the occurred transformations, though. Moreover, each country faced certain problems whose solutions greatly depended upon the will and capabilities of these countries. We will refer to a conclusive example in this respect. At the beginning of June 2005, during an international forum in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), it was ascertained that the ethnic Bulgarians risk becoming a minority in their own country by 2050. By this year, Turkish and Roma will count 3.5 million, while the number of ethnic Bulgarians will decrease to 6 million (4). This situation is generated by the demographic crisis but can determine multiple problems whose solution cannot be postponed. Evidently, no matter how significant the involvement of international institutions in the settlement of potential conflicts is, the mobilization and use of internal resources will play a decisive role.

The danger of ethnic tensions, the threat of exclusion exists and generates a political activism built on the mobilization of ethnic, religious, and cultural resources. Almost all ex-soviet countries, countries of the former socialist bloc and others, have sources of tension of interethnic relations generating, in their turn, conflicts between states. These conflicts are manifested by diplomatic tensions (Poland/Belarus), economic blackmail (Russia/Moldova), direct military conflicts (Azerbaijan/Armenia), and smoldering conflicts (Uzbekistan/Kyrgyzstan), etc.

The route marked by the *new challenges* from the realm of national phenomenon did not bypass Moldova. The young state confronted with problems of this kind immediately after the proclamation of independence, because the promotion of democratic principles inevitably opened for the „excluded groups“ from the former soviet empire more political space and more forms for manifesting protest against the historical injustices promoted tacitly until that moment. Transition from one form of social-political organization to

another, the escape from the „ideological“ chains of totalitarianism stimulated the process of national policy reconstruction, emphasizing an essential aspect for the Moldovan population, that of previously repressed and distorted national identity. The re-problemization of national phenomenon was accompanied by multiple conflicts and misunderstandings and turned into a „national issue“. During many years, it constituted one of the main objectives of scientific approaches but also one of the favorite themes of political discourse in Moldova. The political debates on national issue, particularly national identity, incited to the maximum the public opinion and became a permanent subject of multiple public manifestations but also a favorite topic for the mass media. This issue was included in the agenda of parties and social-political organizations, this fact placing those involved in discussions concerning the national phenomenon on antagonist positions. After many years of controversial and provocative discussions, the implementation of national policy acquires in 2003 the status of law, the national policy being declared priority in the Government and public authorities' activity (5). Nevertheless, we should notice that the mentioned document has not managed to temper the opponent spirits in understanding the ways of building the interethnic relations. Some politicians continue, like before, to accuse their opponents of conservatism, communist and totalitarian nostalgias, others blame the undemocratic attitudes, human rights violations, nationalistic and hegemonic tendencies.

Obviously, the status of „ex-soviet country“ left its marks on the fate of young Moldovan state that had neither democratic culture nor political experience in solving correctly the problems of national, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities *inherited* from the past. At the confluence of 1980s – 1990s, two large threats existed that could affect the evolution of interethnic relations. On one hand, the coexistent ethnic minorities could have been disadvantaged as there was the urge for recreating the national identity of majority ethnic group. On the other hand, the complexity of the problem of national minorities in Moldova, as well as in the entire ex-soviet space, resides in the fact that the revival of the national identity of the Moldovan/Romanian majority, coincided in time with the revival of the national identity of minorities, with the exception of Russians. Hence, the multitude of real challenges, especially artificial, linked to the desire of some people or unwillingness of others that Moldovan/Romanian majority regain the conscience of its genuine identity (6).

Ethnic Groups in Moldova – Between Past in Present Tense and Present in Future Tense

The answers to the questions included in the survey „Ethnobarometer in Moldova“, the data of the Delphi study whose purpose was to identify the perception of politics and policies promoted in Moldova in the field of interethnic relations and their manifestation

in practice, attitude towards the evolution and situation from the economic and social sector, pointed out that those who represent today the „multicultural and multilingual people of Moldova“, as stipulated in the *Concept of Moldovan National Policy*, adopted by Moldovan Parliament in December 2003, are still at the crossroad of two *hopes-realities*, both generated by the act of constitution of Moldova as a sovereign and independent state. One is marked by national revival, the natural recovery of national identity, beginning of democratization of the political system. One of the possible arguments for this kind of attitude can be found in the answers of Delphi study respondents (the advocates of this perspective can be called supporters of the „second Romanian state“), who justified their option by returning to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, establishment of relations between the two banks of Prut river based on common values and traditions, affirmation of multiparty system and pluralism of opinions, accession of Moldova to the main international institutions and orientation of the country towards western democratic values. The second option is related to obtaining a real opportunity for building a distinct Moldovan nation, therefore the attempts to democratize the political sphere in general and political structures in particular, generated rather a larger insecurity. From the information gathered in Delphi study, this attitude is based on the fact that the Moldovans have a specific history and identity and, given the multiethnic nature of Moldovan people, it is necessary to institute at least two official languages – Moldovan and Russian, and the institutional transformations from the power sector and the efforts to base the political life on the platform of multiparty system and pluralism of opinion diminished the activities of governmental structures regarding the consolidation of society on the idea of statehood, affirmation and stability of Moldova within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The conflict between the two banks of Nistru River was appreciated as a consequence of „Romanianization“ policy promoted at the beginning of 1990s, and the federalization of Moldova as one of the possible solutions for the Transnistrian conflict.

We can conclude that in the face of current challenges, a considerable part of the society still remains marked by the nostalgia for the past. The answers to the second question of the survey form, where respondents were asked to assess the situation of the current interethnic relations compared to 15 years ago, offer us sufficient reasons to assert that fixation on the *past memories* is noticed among all interviewed ethnic communities, especially in the case of the representatives of ethnic minorities (see figure 1). According to 31 percent of Gagauz, 30 percent of Russians, 29 percent of Bulgarians and 24 percent of Ukrainians, the relations with the Moldovans were „much better“ or „somewhat better“ before the independence.

In our opinion, the nostalgia for the past does not necessarily mean that those people who still share it hope for a possible revival of what was once called Soviet Union. It reveals rather a reaction to the events that followed after the emergence on the world map of a new state – Moldova.




Figure 1. Relations between the Moldovans and other ethnic groups in present and 15 years ago

The perception of political and economic events groups the participants of the Delphi study in too large categories. Those who consider that the declaration of independence after the collapse of Soviet Union gave an impulse to the emergence of a „second Romanian state“, emphasize the „success of Ilascu case at the ECHR“, „negotiation of the EU-Moldova action plan“, „restriction of democratic freedoms“, „lack of competition on the market/failure of market economy“, „massive state interference with the economy“. The active supporters of „new nation building“ mentioned the „orientation of state policies towards ordinary people“, „political and economic stability“, „elaboration of social, youth and tourism development strategies“, „economic stabilization“, „creation of socially-oriented market economy“, „economic growth“.

The assessment of the social events, places all around the two major issues for the society: „massive migration of labor force, often illegal“, and „extreme poverty of ordinary people“.

On the top of the list of Moldova’s problems, considered **crucial** by the respondents of the Ethnobarometer, four were nominated by the representatives of all ethnic groups. These are: **low salaries, unemployment, corruption** and **health condition** (see table 1).

The representatives of all ethnic groups manifest joint concern towards the events related to the proximate existence. In addition, 70 percent of Russians and Ukrainians, 68 percent of Bulgarians, 54 percent of Moldovans and 63 percent of Gagauz believe that „the wellbeing of each individual depends especially on the state“. Thus, the hope in solving the problems of the Moldovan society is related to a more efficient support of state structures, which should manifest itself through the „control over the prices of basic goods“, „creation of jobs for all citizens“, „introduction of harsher punishments in order to reduce the crime level“. The „relations with Transnistria“ is what detaches the

Moldovans from the ethnic minorities, since they consider these relations more important for the country's fate.

No.	Issue	Moldovans	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
1.	Unemployment	2	1-2	2	2	1
2.	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	14	13	14-15-16	11	14-15
3.	Low salaries	1	1-2	1	1	2
4.	Violation of human rights	10-11-12	9-10	10	8-9	7-8
5.	Housing issue	10-11-12	11-12	6	12-13	11-12
6.	Health condition	4	3-4	4-5	3	4-5
7.	Environmental issues	10-11-12	5-6	7	6-7	7-8
8.	Corruption	6	3-4	4-5	3	4-5
9.	Crime level/insecurity	7	8	8	4	10
10.	Drug trafficking	8-9	11-12	12	12	11
11.	Armed conflicts	15-16	15	14-15-16	15-16-17	17
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	17	16-17	14-15-16	15-16-17	13-13
13.	Lack of rule of law	13	14	13	10	6
14.	Lack of press freedom	15-16	16-17	17	15-16-17	12-13
15.	Drug abuse	8-9	7	11	13-14	15-16
16.	Trafficking in women	5	5-6	4-5	8-9	4-5
17.	Relations with Transnistria	3	9-10	9	6-7	9

Table 1. The hierarchical position of Moldova's problems, considered crucial

The Communist Party enjoyed the highest credibility at the moment of this survey, proved by the answers to the question „If Parliamentary elections were to take place this Sunday“. The readiness to vote for this Party was expressed by 54 percent of Ukrainians, 46 percent of Russians, 41 percent of Bulgarians, 37 percent of Gagauz and 30 percent of Moldovans. We learned that most of the Communist Party supporters represent representatives of ethnic minorities, the Moldovans demonstrating more reluctant towards this party. The Communist Party greatly outruns the second political formation, „Moldova Democrata Electoral Bloc“, for which only 7 percent of Bulgarians, 5 percent of Russians and Gagauz and 2 percent of Ukrainians were ready to vote. The Moldovans' votes for the second party were equally divided: 10 percent for Moldova Democrata Electoral Bloc and 10 percent for the Christian-Democratic Party (PPCD).

Moreover, the majority ethnic group is in opposition to the national minorities in the assessment of the country's geostrategic direction. The majority of Moldovans, as seen in table 2, conceive Moldova integrated with European Union, while most of the representatives of Gagauz, Ukrainian and Russian minorities are oriented towards the Commonwealth of independent States.

Ethnic group	Integrate with the European Union	Remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Moldovans	62%	14%
Russians	38%	41%
Ukrainians	21%	48%
Gagauz	18%	48%
Bulgarians	36%	35%

Table 2. Orientation of the country: Europe of CIS?

Media Communication in the Opinions of Ethnobarometer Respondents

Even though the „lack of press freedom“ is not, according to the opinion of Ethnobarometer respondents, of major importance (see table 1), the Gagauz seemed to be the most concerned by the „lack of press freedom“, 53 percent of them considering it a *severe* problem. The less affected were the Ukrainians, only 37 percent of them considering that the role of media institutions in the realization of national policy is major and cannot be ignored. Media represents a perfect instrument capable to favor other ways of existence and thinking, other spiritual and cultural universes, thus assuring a better understanding and collaboration among the coexistent ethnic communities. The most active in favor of the above-mentioned purpose were the representatives of the Russian ethnic group, 91 percent of which „totally agreed“ or „somewhat agreed“, while the Moldovans were the most reluctant in this perspective. Only 41 percent of the respondents expressed unconditional agreement regarding the broadcast of radio and TV programs about the life of the ethnic groups. The Moldovans were again the most reserved about radio and TV programs in the languages of ethnic minorities (table 5).

Ethnic group	Crucial	Severe	Not too serious
Gagauz	15%	53%	15%
Russians	11%	50%	26%
Moldovans	14%	43%	26%
Bulgarians	21%	38%	27%
Ukrainians	7%	37%	34%

Table 3. Problems Moldova: Lack of press freedom

It is confusing that a considerable part of the Gagauz ethnics (16–17 percent) and Bulgarians (17 percent) express their total or partial disagreement regarding radio and TV of programs about life of minorities, as well as programs in the languages of minorities. We suppose that this is actually a reaction to the present quality of the programs about

ethnic minorities. We also wonder: to what extent the message delivered through these programs is conceived as an opening or a window to the cultural world of the relevant ethnic community? Namely, are they an expression of spiritual enrichment or, on the contrary, they represent nothing but a pretext for withdrawal in the inner world, a threat factor?!

Ethnic group	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
Moldovans	41%	37%	10%	3%	8%
Russians	67%	24%	4%	1%	4%
Ukrainians	61%	30%	3%	0%	6%
Gagauz	50%	26%	12%	5%	7%
Bulgarians	60%	22%	13%	4%	2%

Table 4. Agreement/disagreement regarding radio or TV programs about the life of minorities from Moldova

All media institutions from the country have the mission to promote values and objectives that are common the whole society, emphasizing, evidently, the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious specifics of all ethnic communities. The motto „through diversity towards unity“ would be the most appropriate in the precise and brief formulation of this mission. Although we are different, we represent one people, and although we are one people, we are all different. Obviously, we do not attempt to diminish the importance of the knowledge of oneself, which is a dominant tendency in the pages of many publications of ethnic minorities, but the press can be concerned not only about the differences but also the similarities, which gets into an area of convergence with the provisions of article 10 of the Moldovan Constitution: (1) The national unity of the Republic of Moldova constitutes the foundation of the State. The Republic of Moldova is the common and indivisible motherland of all its citizens.

Ethnic group	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
Moldovans	34%	31%	16%	9%	9%
Russians	65%	23%	7%	1%	3%
Ukrainians	60%	29%	4%	0%	6%
Gagauz	53%	25%	12%	4%	6%
Bulgarians	58%	23%	13%	4%	1%

Table 5. Agreement/disagreement about the programs of the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian)

Following the articles focusing on national issues published by the Moldovan press, we can easily convince ourselves that many fragments of these articles „betray“ some symptoms of a situation that upsets the society and determines media to adopt a position. It is exactly the case to remember Eminescu's words that „it is not the origin that makes

a people strong, but its work, done with the hands or with the minds“ and „one does not become a national writer by repeating the words homeland, freedom, glory, nation in every written work, on the other hand, one can never even mention these words and, still, be a national writer“ (7).

In discussing interethnic relations, including the issue of national minorities, our press shows the presence of certain unproductive tendencies, such as the lack of consistency and obvious discrepancy, the exaggerated amplitude of perspectives in the media's approach and treatment of the national phenomenon. This situation is largely fueled by the obvious or veiled bias of the media in favor of certain parties and sociopolitical movements, in other words, by the excessively politicized media sector, often determining the content of the newspaper articles and promoting the ignorance of the scientific truth.

The very complexity of the national phenomenon demands a lot of judgment, correct attitude and, last but not least, tolerance on behalf of those preoccupied with the evolution of the national policy and its consequences in Moldova. In the message of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the occasion of the International Day of Tolerance (16 November, 2002) was mentioned that **tolerance is an active and positive commitment of human diversity and, therefore, is a fundamental principle of democracy in our multiethnic and multicultural societies** (8).

Central to all tolerance promotion efforts is the **dialogue** between individuals, cultures and civilizations. Without a continuous and efficient dialogue, the social cohesion is threatened.

Moldova – a State of National Minorities?

A subject of many polemics, called *absurd* by the author of a newspaper article, is the question: Who are we: Moldovans or Romanians? Perhaps the results of Ethnobarometer disappointed some individuals and encouraged the other: 95 percent of representatives of the majority identify themselves as *Moldovans* and only 5 percent consider themselves *Romanians*. The importance of this problem lies, in our opinion, not only in the name of the ethnonym (Romanian or Moldovan) used in the self-identification of the representatives of the majority group, but also in the fact that the declared identity (Moldovan) is placed in opposition with the objective identity (Romanian) and vice versa, and those who declare themselves Romanians/Moldovans have a feeling of personal threat. However, more severe is the fact that this situation is not only tolerated but also stimulated, directly or indirectly, by the official state authorities. We refer to the incapacity of the public authorities from Moldova to approach objectively and constructively the national issues. This incapacity or the lack of will to know the truth has its own motivations. Our goal was not to list all these motivations, we will limit ourselves only to one aspect, which generated and continues to fuel the disagreements from this area, namely **the ignorance of scientific truth, the lack of a solid conceptual basis** that would serve as *reference points, or solutions* for the multiple problems related to the improvement of interethnic

relations. These things are discussed for many years without coming to any agreement, one argues about issues that represent axiomatic truths in the world of advanced democracies. Here I refer to the correct name of the majority ethnic group and the official language of the country. The ignorance of scientific truth leads to regrettable confusions. Thus, the *Concept of National Policy of Moldova* includes the following passage: „Moldovans, the founding nationality of the state, together with the representatives of other ethnic groups, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, Romanians (?), Byelorussians, Gypsies (Roma), Poles and others, constitute the Moldovan people, Moldova being their common motherland.“ In our vision, namely this „official“ understanding and interpretation of certain fundamental notions by the public structures, which is different from the one found in the recommendations of the scientific community, explains the cause of many controversial answers to the questions from the Ethnobarometer survey, including those from Delphi study.

What are the other ethnic groups besides the majority group? Ethnic group? Ethnic minority or national minority? Different terms, in fact referring to the same group of individuals, were put into use at the level of state structures (Parliament, Government), as well as at the level of doctrinary discussions. The clearance of the Constitutional draft, signed by 52 scientists of the Moldovan Science Academy, published in the newspaper „Moldova Suverana“ on June 2, 1993, stipulated that there were no national minorities in Moldova but ethnic groups, characterizing them as „a group which separates from the main historical entity and emigrates and settles on the ethnic and historical territory of another people.“ The Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews were identified as ethnic groups who in different historical periods and under different circumstances, detached from the main ethnic *realm*, establishing on the Romanian territory between Prut and Nistru rivers.

If at the crossroads of 1980s and 1990s and in the first years of independence the notions *national group* or *ethnic group* were used more frequently, then gradually priority was given to the term *ethnic minority*. For example, if in the decision of the Government of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic „Regarding the basic functions, structure and Regulation of The State Department for National Issues of MASSR“ from April 25, 1991, we can find notions like *non-local population*, *national communities*, *national groups*, in the Decision of Moldovan Government „Regarding the adoption of Regulations and Structure of the Department for National Relations“ from July 27, 1994, we see terms like *ethnocultural formations* and *ethnic minorities* (9). However, it is worth mentioning that even today, judging from the normative acts and documents, there is no clear image regarding the terms used for ethnic communities in the subdivisions of public authorities. It is the case to point out that in the circles of researchers preoccupied with the national issues, the terms *ethnic minorities* and *national minority* are not used as absolute synonyms. It is considered that most ethnic groups are a consequence of global migration (like the Armenians from Romania and Turks from Germany), while the national communities are a consequence of border changes and not emigration or immigration processes.

The distinction between national minorities and ethnic minorities is also made by some researchers depending on the existence or inexistence of a state where the members of the relevant ethnicity form the majority. However, we believe that the authorities should start with the idea that, from the point of view of protection of specific rights, the international legislation does not make a distinction between the two categories, thus an eventual difference should not exist in the national legislation. In fact, this could also serve as a starting point in solving the issues of national minorities. Thus, according to the *Law on citizenship*, adopted in 1991 (article 2), citizens of Moldova are the persons who were permanently residing on the territory of Moldova at the moment of proclamation of the sovereignty. The adoption of the „zero variant“ in this case allowed solving *without problems* the issue of citizen affiliation of the representatives of national minorities who were residing in the country.

In January 1945, the United Nations Subcommittee responsible for the protection of minorities declared that a definition of the term „minority“ should rely on the following basis:

- a) the term „minority“ includes non-dominant groups of a population which possess and wish to preserve their ethnic, religious and linguistic traditions;
- b) these minorities should include a sufficient number of individuals in order to be able to develop their characteristics;
- c) the members of these minorities should prove their loyalty towards the state they belong to.

Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova „regarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and the legal status of their organizations“, stipulates that „persons belonging to national minorities are considered the individuals who are residing on the territory of Moldova, are Moldovan citizens, have ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious particularities that distinguish them from the majority of the population - the Moldovans - and consider themselves of a different ethnic background“. After a closer examination, in the „Moldovan version“ the notion of national minority has a slightly different nuance and meaning from the one mentioned in the plan of activity of the United Nations Subcommittee.

National Idea as Factor of Social Consolidation

A solution that could lead to the stabilization of interethnic relations is the development of a national idea, meaning a totality of ideals and social, political and spiritual values that would contribute to the consolidation of the society, would confer stability to its development and aspirations in achieving its specific goals. As noted by Anthony D. Smith, „in liberal and democratic states, the goal of a system of mass national education was not that much to homogenize the population, but more to unify it around some common values, symbols, myths and memories allowing the minorities to preserve their symbols, memories, myths and values and trying to adapt or include them within a larger

public culture and its national mythology. The increasingly stronger claims of these ethnic and religious minorities and rejection of cultural suppression in liberal societies did not lead to the abandonment of national loyalty or civic education. Instead, the most economically advanced societies attempted to promote, tacitly or openly, multiple ethno-religious cultures through the mass education system, using the ideal of „multiculturalism“ and the resulted cultural diversity in order to increase the quality of a more synthetic „national identity“ (10). It would seem that there is nothing simpler than finding this edifying idea, which would contribute through its attractiveness and vitality to the consolidation and mobilization of the Moldovan „multicultural“ and „multilingual“ society in achieving a common objective.

Presently, the state authorities promote insistently two ideas that, actually, have the same target: the idea of affiliation to the Moldovan people and the idea of Moldovan statehood. The „Concept of National Policy of the Republic of Moldova“ stipulates that one of the tasks of the national policy „in the political and legal sectors“ is „**the affirmation of a system of national values based on the awareness of citizens of our country that they are belong to the Moldovan people**“. And in the letter addressed to the writer Ion Druta by the President of Moldova, and published in the newspaper „Moldova Suverana“ from January 22, 2002, we find the following lines: „... After many years of distress and large social unrest, we came to the conclusion that it is impossible to accomplish something positive if the population does not engage fully in materializing the IDEA of NATIONAL INTEGRATION. Despite the fact that the Moldovan intelligentsia is divided and that some of its representatives contribute to the destabilization of the situation in the country, disseminating discord among its citizens, I think...that the time has come for us to have a creed. In my opinion, this belief could be an INTEGRATION IDEA for our entire NATION, namely the idea of building the Modern Moldovan State“.

There were also other recommendations formulated based on the integration idea. For example, Veaceslav Untila, one of the former leaders of „Moldova Democrată“ Electoral Bloc, believes that before uniting in the name of prosperity of Moldova, before taking a common cause around the slogan „The Supreme Law – the wellbeing of people“, it would be good to start with „what is more important, what constitutes the first point in all the lists of priorities – decrease the crime level, fight with the organized crime, because if before the supreme goal of the organized crime was to gain enormous profits, nowadays it tends to absorb the political... and executive power“ (10).

It is not the diversity of opinions on this issue that is discouraging, but rather the lack of signs that would give us the hope that sometimes this national idea will be formulated and accepted by most of sociopolitical formations from the country. This state of insecurity is still fueled by the behavior of the representatives of political elite from Chisinau, by the lack of ideas that would confirm the capacity to listen to each other, to have a constructive dialogue, and not only for promoting certain narrow group interests. This insecurity will continue to persist, once 32 percent of the representatives of the majority ethnic group consider that they are „residents of this locality“ and only a little more than half of the respondents – 57 percent – consider themselves Moldovan citizens. Accord-

dingly, the Russians consider themselves: residents – 36 percents and Moldovan citizens – 68 percent; the Ukrainians: residents – 42 percent, Moldovan citizens – 64 percent; the Gagauz: residents – 43 percent, Moldovan citizens – 46 percent; Bulgarians: residents – 34 percent, Moldovan citizens – 55 percent.

It would seem that the integration of Moldova with European Union could be considered a national idea, as the idea of creating an „European identity“ next to the existing strong national identities is actively supported on the old continent. However, the results of the Ethnobarometer show that the feeling of being European has not yet developed in the conscience of Moldovans: only 6 percent of them consider themselves Europeans (10 percent for Bulgarians, 7 percent for Russians, 6 percent for Gagauz and only 3 percent for Ukrainians), despite the fact that 62 percent of Moldovans support the idea of European integration. The prospect of European integration is even less likely according to the representatives of national minorities. In favor of this integration are 38 percent of Russians, 36 percent of Bulgarians, 21 percent of Ukrainians and only 18 percent of the Gagauz.

Obviously, the perspective of creating a „European identity“ is more distant in time, as this kind of identity can be thought only as a result of extensive social and political practices.

Presently, the ideal solution for Moldova in the creation of national idea would be to start from assuming the same fate, thus the political potential and the national sentiment would be incommensurable. The inspiration should come from the economic and social segment, since the most severe and crucial problems of Moldova, as identified by the respondents of all surveyed ethnic groups, were unemployment (48 percent Moldovans and 53 percent Ukrainians), low salaries (49 percent Bulgarians and 53 percent Moldovans, Gagauz, Ukrainians) and corruption (25 percent Ukrainians and 37 percent Moldovans).

National Identity in the Context of Harmonization of Interethnic Relations

A condition that could contribute to the harmonization of interethnic relations and establishment of a climate that is beneficial for the development of all ethnic minorities could be, in our opinion, the creation of a free space and opening of equal opportunities for all ethnic communities to form and promote the national identity of each national group. The national identity should become an instrument for preservation and cultivation of national conscience not only for the majority group but also for minorities. If we accept the idea formulated by Anthony D. Smith that national identity can be understood as a result of interaction between ethnic and political components, then when we refer to the national identity, we should consider equally both aspects: (I) ethnocultural and (II) political. Both components, although forming an entity, are in antagonist relations, which can be qualified as ... *constitutional*. Article 1, title I from the Moldovan Constitution stipulates that „Moldova is a sovereign and independent, **unitary** and indivisible state“.

And article 10 stipulates that „(1) The unity of the people of the Republic of Moldova constitutes the foundation of the state.

The Republic of Moldova is the common and indivisible motherland of all its citizens.

(2) The state recognizes and guarantees all its citizens the right to preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.

In our opinion, the concept of national identity has two dimensions: emotional and rational. Thus, both emotional and rational attitudes are manifested in the relationship with the „attributes of national identity“. We must admit that nowadays the national identity is marked by a new reality, is developing in a new sociopolitical and economic environment, even if the efforts to maintain and preserve the ethnic components are actively manifested and this tendency cannot be accused. The ordinary citizens should make considerable efforts to evade from their own ethno-cultural sphere into the sphere of interests of the society as a whole, especially in a society made of an ethnic and cultural mixture, like Moldova. In this process, the decisive role is to be played by the official authorities, constitutional imperative and legislation. The smaller the distance between the emotional and rational elements, and the more harmonious the correlation between these two components, the bigger the chances to hope for a sustainable development of the society and to have a greater clarity of Moldova's integration perspective with the European community.

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SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OF ETHNIC GROUPS FROM MOLDOVA

Vasile Cantarji

„There is a belief in our country that democracy means only election campaigns and eventual alternation to power of rival political forces; but democracy is actually all that happens in the long years between national and local elections, set of norms, procedures and institutions that promote the values and principles of the theory of democracy“.

Giovanni Sartori

Nowadays the „governance of multiethnic society“ is one of the most important issues in Moldova and requires the diagnosis of interethnic interactions, prevention and identification of latent forms of interethnic tensions.

The preliminary results of the October 2004 census reflect the essential changes that took place in our society in the last 15 years.

According to the data of both censuses, Moldovans represent the majority: in 1989 the share of Moldovans was 69.9 percent of the total population, and in 2004, based on the preliminary data, Moldovans represent 76.1 percent, registering a 6.2 percent growth (the census did not include the districts from the left bank of Nistru River).

The Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians are the other nationalities that represent an important share in Moldovan society and register 23.9 percent of the total population according to the preliminary data of the 2004 census. It is worth mentioning that in 1989, the share of these nationalities was 30.1 percent, which is 6.2 percent higher than in 2004. Among these, Ukrainian and Russian ethnics come second and third in the total number of country's population.

At the same time, the decrease of the share of Ukrainians and Russians by 2.9 and 4.0 percent, accordingly, was influenced by the migration that took place between these censuses.

The share of Gagauz experienced a 0.3 percent growth in the last 15 years, representing 4.4 percent of the total population, due to the relatively high birth rate compared to the average birth rate registered in the country.

The number of people identifying themselves as Romanians also increased, and comprises 70,275 people, which is 2.1 percent of the total population. It is necessary to mention that in 1989 the share of Romanians was 0.1 percent or 2,477 people.

At the same time, the share of Bulgarians experienced a 0.1 percent decrease. „Other nationalities“ registered a 1.5 percent decrease, compared to the data of the 1989 census.

The changes registered in the last census are mostly due to the migration of labor force, migration influxes caused by the collapse of USSR and, especially, by the exchanges of population between the banks of Nistru River. Nevertheless, Moldova remains a multi-ethnic state that requires a specific character of its domestic, as well as foreign policies, more than in other historical moments, after the proclamation of independence, and this conclusion is imposed, especially, by the pro-European orientation, declared recently as priority of Moldovan foreign policy.

In the present work, we will try to carry out a complex analysis of sociologic aspects of the self-consciousness of ethnic groups, relating it to another subjective aspect of ethnicity, such as the subjective perception of Moldovan citizenship.

As basic empiric indicators that characterize the ethnic conscience under the aspect of ethnic interaction, we will use:

- ethnic self-identification, which includes the attitude towards the one's ethnic affiliation, awareness of ethno-consolidating and ethno-differential features, national feelings of the representatives of the main ethnic groups from Moldova and their level of expression;
- relation between self- and hetero-stereotype, ethnic attitudes, the importance and the level of development of structural ethnocultural components, cultural assimilation level of the dominant ethnic group;
- forms of manifestation of the ethnic consciousness, and their level of influence of the character of interethnic relations, evaluation of the level of interethnic intensity.

Reflection of the citizenship perception will be achieved through the prism of new approaches of democratic theory and, especially Will Kymlicka's liberal theory on minority rights (theory of multicultural citizenship). For that purpose, we will use the indicators from the survey form that reflect the basic points of Kymlicka's theory, regarding the studied aspect, namely:

- perception of loyalty towards the state;
- collective rights:
 - a) specific rights of representation;
 - b) multiethnic rights;
 - c) rights for autonomy;
- citizenship as source of political identity.

In addition, we will also look at other indicators that will help us understand the interethnic relations in Moldova in general.

The empiric analysis will be carried out based on the results of the Ethnobarometer survey realized by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys (IMAS), at the request of the Institute for Public Policy (IPP), in December 2004-January 2005 on ethnic samples that included 822 Moldovans/Romanians, 431 Bulgarians, 472 Gagauz, 412 Russians and 413 Ukrainians.

Do we have democracy? One thing is sure, we exist at the moment in the context of a young democracy or even live in a period when the basic elements of a democracy are taking shape with difficulty, and will leave their mark on the most deep subjective points

of social conscience after long periods, which is as important for democracy as freedom, market economy, human rights, etc. The democracy relies not only on the civilian's virtual involvement in the governing process, but also on the real participation, and this is possible only in conditions of a profound awareness of norms and freedoms offered by democracy. We know how important the ethnic factor is for every state, regardless of how much the state has advanced in promoting democracy. Our purpose is not to list the strategies and ways of approaching interethnic relations of different states; neither will we try to offer evaluative statistics regarding the success of these strategies and experiences. We propose to reflect one of the basic elements of ethnicity, which is self-consciousness of the ethnic groups from Moldova, through the prism of new scientific approaches in the democratic theory regarding ethnicity.

One of the last events of significant importance in the theory of democracy is Kymlicka's liberal theory on minority rights (the theory of multicultural citizenship), which reflects the weaknesses of liberalism as a system of ideas, because of which he cannot propose articulated solutions for minority issues.

Young democracies face „double standards“ in the minority issue; more exactly, they deal with normative prescriptions regarding ethnocultural equity, prescriptions which the consolidated democracies did not have to consider at the moment of completion of their own national constructions.¹¹⁰

Kymlicka's Theory on Multicultural Citizenship¹¹¹

The liberal theory on minority rights (the theory of multicultural citizenship) developed by Will Kymlicka sets forth a possible solution regarding the management of consequences of ethnocultural diversity thorough the prism of normative political philosophy. The author asserts that in managing the ethnocultural conflicts, the states from all over the world tend to subordinate justice and equity to the imperative of internal stability. More than that, there is no consensus among the important international actors concerning the way of reaching solutions for ethnocultural conflicts without producing destabilization. On one hand, this causes double standards in approaching ethnocultural conflicts; on the other hand, it leads to violence on behalf of minorities craving for attention. By emphasizing these two consequences, Kymlicka ascertains the failure of political sciences, and concludes that the used concepts should be reconsidered.¹¹²

Two of the concepts mentioned by the author are relevant for the issues discussed here: ethnocultural neutrality in a rule of law and collective rights.

According to Kymlicka, when used abusively, the concept of *ethnocultural neutrality in a rule of law* describes the situation when the ethnicity issue is no longer relevant (the so-called *beneficial neglect*) in conditions of a rule of law based on liberal democracy.

¹¹⁰ Levente Salat, Multiculturalismul liberal, Polirom: Iași, 2001, pp.328-333

¹¹¹ This section is based exclusively on the subchapter „Teoria cetățeniei multiculturale a lui Kymlicka“ from the article of Alexandru F. Voicu „Percepția subiectivă a calității de cetățean român“, Barometrul relațiilor etnice 1994 – 2002, Cluj, 2005, pp. 41-54.

¹¹² Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995

From the perspective of this approach, the situations when minorities claim official recognition and rights, are similar to the „19th century nationalism“. Kymlicka argues that the theory of beneficial neglect is a myth, as long as most modern states are national and have official languages. Obviously disadvantaged by this reality, the minorities have three alternatives for action: assimilation, self-isolation or claiming legal right of building modernity *similarly to the majority* (implying autonomy). Kymlicka concludes that presenting the wish for autonomy as „19th century nationalism“ is not persuasive. In the same context, the author defines the concept of *societal culture* as being *that part of culture, which is institutionalized, which is found in the public space and which forms the basis of modernity*.

The other important concept described by the author of multicultural citizenship theory is the term **collective rights**, which began to be used excessively in politics. Kymlicka shows that, in the case of any collective right, there are two components which should balance each other: On one hand, a component of *internal protection* of community (against the members' dissidence), and on the other hand, a component of *external protection* against the decisions of the majority (according to one's own interests). The author identifies three types of institutional solutions for the protection of ethnocultural communities: *specific rights of representation* (positive discrimination), multiethnic rights (protection of those rights that cannot be supported in the conditions of market economy, like in the case of cultural rights) applicable, for example, to immigrants; and different forms of *autonomy*. Kymlicka draws our attention to the fact that the refusal to accept the legitimacy of collective rights indicates a conceptual confusion; he also shows that the institutionalization of collective rights should not imply violation of individual rights.

Kymlicka's theory can be synthesized in two fundamental theses and two auxiliary (adjacent) theses.

The first fundamental thesis postulates the existence of a permanent connection between individual freedom and cultural affiliation. Individuals can be free only if they have options; this brings up the need for existence of a *social context*, which is nothing else but the societal culture, as defined above. Thus, *in order to protect the individual, one has to protect the individual's right to context*.

The second fundamental thesis asserts that we *should admit the moral equality of cultural communities*. The immediate conclusion is that the predominantly liberal discourse cannot be always used in argumentation; the solutions to the issues of ethnocultural diversity can be achieved only by dialogue, and they differ from one case to another.

The first adjacent thesis treats the issue of intolerant communities.

There are anti-liberal communities, but the arbitrary interference of the majority, even animated by liberal goals, is in essence anti-liberal (of course, the extreme situations, grave and repeated violations of human rights are excluded¹¹³).

Even if the institutionalized protection of the social context can have certain anti-liberal consequences, one cannot give up the principles based on some limited cases. The

¹¹³ Kymlicka makes a distinction between the situation when the internal restrictions are based on the large consensus of community members (who have the possibility to leave the community if they wish) and the case when the community is ruled by an unpopular dictator, without having the possibility to leave the community (see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 170, in L. Salat, op. cit., p. 198).

author insists that there are liberal ways of disseminating liberal principles: persuasion, for example.

Finally, the second adjacent thesis approaches the *issue of social solidarity*, threatened by the differentiated (multicultural) citizenship, which results from granting three types of collective rights described above. Kymlicka admits that a normative solution to this problem *simply does not exist* within liberal multiculturalism. Nevertheless, he confines the issue to autonomy, showing that the other two cases (specific rights and multiethnic rights) follow the increase of chances for integration, and reaffirms that the refusal to acknowledge the right to context is less likely to have positive consequences in consolidation at the global scale.

Ethnic Consciousness and Perception of Moldovan Citizenship

In the conditions of a multiethnic region, the tendencies to develop ethnic consciousness can include preservation of its specific character, consolidation of the ethnic group as autonomous system, as well as unification of this ethnic group with other ethnic formations. Thus, self-identification is an empirical indicator, which characterizes ethnic consciousness, and particularly, the tendencies of processes determining the evolution of ethnic configuration. In this case, we should admit several nuances that require a special attention on behalf of the researcher and, at the same time, create more obstacles in investigation. The main problem is the nature of factors that determine self-identification. Often, the results of a statistical record cannot satisfy our claims because of some objective factors, which determine individuals to declare things that are contrary to their opinions. As an eloquent example is the problems related to Roma identification who, despite being a marginalized group because of the discrimination they were subject to, during the soviet period, maintain the tendency of „hiding“ their real identity. Therefore, scientists consider that censuses cannot offer eloquent information about this group. Fortunately, there are no strong factors that could distort the reflection of reality in the subjective perceptions, and attitudes of respondents, concerning the ethnic groups described in the study, maybe except the case of Moldovan-Romanian dilemma.

In the Ethnobarometer, the group affiliation was established based on the respondents' statements to the question, „Which of the following statements describe best your identity? I mainly consider myself...“ (See annex 1). The highest score to the option „Representative of the declared nationality“ was registered among Moldovan/Romanian respondents, this percentage being higher in the case of Gagauz and Bulgarians and lowest in the case of Russians.

Instead, Russian respondents mainly chose the option „citizen of Moldova“. Also high is the score for „resident of this locality“. This shows a strong identification based on citizenship or state identity, this option registering the lowest score (compared to other nationalities) among Moldovans, being rather significant and ranging from 15 percent in case of Moldovans to 31 percent in case of Russians. The legal identification with the European space is practically missing, despite the clamorous political declarations about the reorientation of Moldova's foreign policy.

Therefore, we found that besides the strong identification based on the ethnic group, we see state identification – a crucial moment, as it outlines at least two important things that underlie state consolidation:

- first, it was observed and proved many times that during the times of social unrests and crises, when the political regulators, in fact ideological and economic, of inter-group and interethnic relations dissolve and lose value, while the new ones form very slowly, the subjective regulators – ethnic, religious, etc. – come first. Usually, the process, when the importance of the ethnic factor grows, takes place and accompanies the moments of cardinal changes in the social, economic and political life, and in this case, it means that the reality has not returned to its normal situation yet. The population has not found yet the ideological factor that would serve as a warrant of stability and is based, respectively, on what is more stable in time, i.e. on the ethnic factor;
- the second idea refers exactly to this „ideological background“ or, in other words, to what represents a consolation idea, which was invoked many times as being necessary for the consolidation of the population, and the state on their way to democratization. The fact that the population identifies itself mainly based on ethnic background and less on citizenship, talks about the citizens' lack of trust in the Moldovan state. For almost 15 years from the declaration of independence and emergence of the Moldovan state, the population still does not view this structure as a warrant of stability and prosperity. This fact explains the lack of trust in state institutions reflected in all studies carried out until now. „What should be the direction of our country in the future?“ is one of the questions included in the Barometer of Public Opinion. The options are presented in the following table:

	May 2004	April 2003	November 2002	April 2002	January 2001
Should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	30%	29%	38%	41%	43%
Should integrate with the European Union	47%	42%	38%	40%	51%
Be independent of any alliance/ union	2%	4%	4%	4%	2%
Don't Know/No answer	21%	16%	20%	15%	4%

We see that a very small segment of people think that our country should remain independent; most respondents think that the state will not be capable to develop independently. We will try not to comment on these results since the situation is obvious.

The next aspect inspired from Kymlicka's theory seems to contradict with the previous statements made by the author, and namely the measure of **loyalty towards the state** reflected in the distributions of options to the question „*To what extent do you agree that people should support their country even if things are not quite easy?*“ (Q11a) We can

notice a pronounced loyalty regardless of the ethnic background. In all cases, the sum of answers „*totally agree*“ and „*rather agree*“ registers a share of over 85 percent. The highest share is registered among Russian and Ukrainian respondents (96.1 and 96.3 percent, accordingly), the lowest share among Bulgarians (86.8 percent), while the share of Moldovan/Romanian respondents represents 94.3 percent. It would be very useful to compare the relevant shares with the ones registered in Romania, where they constituted 94.1 percent among Romanians, 90.5 percent among Hungarians and 95.2 percent among Roma¹¹⁴. This comparison imposes at least the assumption that the causal chain of loyalty does not include things that would show that Moldova differs from Romania. For example, if the living standards in Romania are higher than in Moldova, this is not reflected in a subjective phenomenon such as loyalty towards the state.

	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Totally Agree	80.4	74.8	85.4	70.3	60.3
Somewhat agree	13.9	21.5	10.7	19.5	26.5
Disagree	2.6	1.0	1.2	4.4	10.0
Totally disagree	1.1	0.5	0.5	1.1	1.9
Don't Know/No answer	2.1	2.2	2.2	4.7	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 1. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy

The distribution of answers in table 2 offers a certain reflection over the approached aspect. In the Barometer of Public Opinion in Moldova from April 2003, respondents were asked, „*In an eventual war, would you be ready to fight for your country?*“. Of course, in the case of this distribution we should open some parentheses. First, the distribution for the ethnic minorities in this case is based on very few answers, because the sample was not divided by ethnic criteria. In order to show the similarities and differences between these questions, it is necessary to specify that the difference between the concrete character of these questions (the difference in attitudes towards the object and the concrete situation) leaves a mark. In addition, one should take into account that the military service implies certain restrictions based on gender, age, health condition and other social-demographic characteristics. For these reasons, we will accept only a general comparison.

The fact, that from the total number of adult population 60.4 percent declared their readiness to fight for the country, proves a rather high level of patriotism, as the rest of the respondents represent the elderly, women, and the disabled, and only a small number represents capable people who did not accept this situation.

The Gagauz and Bulgarians, compared to the other ethnic groups, registered again the lowest shares of affirmative answers. The Moldovans registered the highest share.

¹¹⁴ BAROMETRUL RELAȚIILOR ETNICE 1994-2002: O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România. Cluj, 2002

	Moldovans	Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Total
Yes	64.1	56.0	56.0	53.0	41.2	33.3	60.4
No	27.2	36.0	31.0	30.8	39.2	52.4	29.1
Don't know	7.2	4.0	7.1	12.8	15.7	14.3	8.3
No answer	1.5	4.0	6.0	3.4	3.9	.0	2.2
Base (number of respondents).	846	25	84	117	51	21	1155

Table 2. Would you fight for your country in case of a war?

What would be the explanation to the fact that the population, being quite loyal to the state, gives priority to the ethnic factor when it comes to self-identification, ignoring citizenship and affiliation to the state they are loyal to? The answer is determined by the nature of factors, and constitutes a real background. If in the case of self-identification people approach factors such as socio-economic, political stability and strength of the state, then in case of loyalty the answers are based on the psychological features of the population. The Moldovan people are famous for its hospitality, kindness etc, they are considered rather collectivist than individualist¹¹⁵. Moldovans help everyone who is in need, in this case even the state.

The way people perceive their ethnic affiliation is important when characterizing the ethnic consciousness. The data from table in annex 2 confirm the fact that the sacral perception of affiliation predominates: we notice that, regardless of the nationality, the respondents offer the highest scores to parents' nationality, when determining the ethnic affiliation of an individual. In addition, the language spoken in the family was noted, respect of the traditions, considering that the native language is indeed the language of this nationality. It is interesting to notice that the feeling of affiliation to the ethnic group registered a large share among the respondents of all nationalities.

At the same time, there are significant discrepancies in the share of each factor depending on the nationality of respondents. The share of „*parents' nationality*“ factor is higher among Bulgarians, Gagauz and Moldovans/Romanians, and less significant in the case of Russians and Ukrainians. The spoken language is more significant for Moldovan/Romanian and Bulgarian respondents, and least significant, compared to the rest of the nationalities, for Ukrainians. The share of customs and traditions is important, regardless of respondents' nationality. Significant differences were registered regarding the statement „*to honor the national flag of the state of the relevant nationality*“. The statement was supported by 19 percent of Russians, 9 percent of Moldovans/Romanians, 13 percent of Bulgarians, 6 percent of Ukrainians and 0 percent of Gagauz, a fact explained through different attitudes of each of these groups towards their historical homeland. The Gagauz are the only ethnic group that lives preponderantly in Moldova and does not have a nation-state.

¹¹⁵ See: Hofstede Geert „Managementul structurilor multiculturale“, London, 1996

The data from this table (see annex 2) determine us to talk about another important moment in the analysis of ethnic consciousness, namely about some features of identity ethno-consolidation, i.e. about the most important elements that approach representatives of one ethnic group to another. As dominant criteria, in the identification of the participants, were mentioned the language spoken in the family (48 percent among Moldovans and 29 percent among Russians), respect for traditions of the ethnic group (36 percent among Moldovans, 36 percent among Bulgarians and 29 percent among Russians), and the culture of the relevant nationality (32 percent among Moldovans and 25 percent among Gagauz and Ukrainians). Such a criterion as native language significantly varies from one nationality to another, thus this option was mentioned by 40 percent of Ukrainians, 33 percent of Bulgarians, 31 percent of Gagauz, 21 percent of Moldovans/Romanians and only 14 percent of Russians.

According to the research results, we can conclude that an important role in the formation and preservation of ethnic identity is played by ethnocultural elements. It is necessary to mention the importance of connections between ethnic and linguistic processes, because language is the most obvious factor in the formation and functioning of ethnic consciousness, bearing a formation character since this common language makes communication in the social space possible. Especially in Moldova, the language issue bears a specific character and generates many political and social tensions. In the conditions of a multiethnic environment, the usage of a common language does not imply that different groups of people belong to one ethnic group. Language should be regarded as an important element based on which more complicated structures, belonging to different cultural aspects, are formed. On one hand, being an obvious external indicator that differentiates the ethnic entity from other entities, a kind of solidarity symbol, language implies the unity of ethnic and cultural community and influences the character of interethnic relations; on the other hand, it is, to some extent, an indicator of the assimilation processes occurring in the region.

Generally, we can notice a relationship between the size of the ethnic group and the number of languages, native as well as spoken, practiced in this group. We notice that the smaller the group, the larger the number of the languages spoken within it. However, the statement based only on the size of the group will not be comprehensive. The languages practiced in particular and the assimilation processes in general, depend on many factors, but if we refer only to the objective factors, then besides the size of the group, a significant influence has the specific nature of distribution of an ethnic group in the territory, population area (whether concentrated or extended), co-habitation of different groups on the same territory, as well as other factors.

Concerning the languages practiced within each ethnic group (see annex3), the lowest disparity between native language and language spoken in the family exists only in the case of Moldovans/Romanians and Russians, where there are almost no differences in the share of the language declared native and the language spoken in the family. There is a large disparity among the rest of the ethnic groups: among Ukrainians, where 82 percent of respondents declared Ukrainian the native language and only 66 percent speak Ukrai-

nian at home, while 25 percent declared Russian the native language and 43 percent speak it at home. 97 percent of Gagauz respondents declared Gagauz language their native and only 83 percent speak it in the family. The largest fluctuation, as in the case of Ukrainians and Bulgarians, is registered for Russian language, which was declared native by 14 percent and spoken at home by 44 percent of respondents. 92 percent of Bulgarian respondents mentioned Bulgarian as native and only 71 percent speak it at home, while Russian was declared native by 22 percent and 47 percent speak it in the family.

The perception of national language as an important element of ethnic integration on one hand, and the use of a different language, in this case Russian, or both, reflect a difference between the real behavior and the projective behavior in this sphere, because the bilingualism is a necessary prerequisite in adapting to the conditions of a multiethnic environment. Obviously, there have been several debates on the question, which emerges from this situation. Theoretically, there can be two extremes in this sense: adoption of the language of majority, namely the official language, action that releases the assimilation processes or, on the other hand, the seclusion and use of the one's own language in the communication realm (impossible to realize in a pure form). The paradox of this situation has its roots in the period between 1812 and 1991, denoting the fact that the linguistic indicator of the ethnic processes still proves a pro-Russian tendency. From the perspective of objectives of the analysis, language, or more exactly the position of minority languages, would be part of collective rights.

Concerning the **specific rights of representation**, no direct adequate indicators could be found in the results of surveys available for the author, but the answers to the question regarding the Moldovan laws on minority rights could offer us a general reflection. We believe that this indicator presents a specific interest because it reflects directly the „ethnic“ legislation of Moldova.

The highest score is registered for the statement *enough rights*, but from the perspective of the specific goal of this analysis and because this share is homogeneous enough (in the range of 60-70 percent), we will present only the shares of the statements *too many rights* and *not enough rights* in a comparative analysis of ethnic groups. Among Moldovan/Romanian respondents, the highest share for the statement *too many rights* was registered with regards to the Russian ethnic group (21.7 percent). Concerning the rest of the ethnic groups, the size of this share in the answers of Moldovan respondents is in direct relationship with the size of each ethnic group.

In the case of ethnic minorities, the main tendencies are:

- the Romanians and Russians are considered the most advantaged from this perspective; they register the highest shares in the answers of minority groups for the option *too many rights*.
- the fact that the Gagauz ethnics represent the only group that has territorial-administrative autonomy is not reflected in the opinion of other ethnic groups, the shares for the answer *too many rights* referring to Gagauz group being very modest; there is a different situation in the case of Bulgarian respondents, among Bulgarians this share being the highest;

- the highest score for the option *not enough rights* is registered among Russian respondents who act as advocates of minority rights, and the lowest shares are registered among Moldovan respondents.

	Moldovans/ Romanians		Ukrainians		Russians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	too many rights	not enough rights	too many rights	not enough rights	too many rights	not enough rights	too many rights	not enough rights	too many rights	not enough rights
Russians have...	21.7%	4.0%	5.8%	10.7%	4.6%	20.1%	9.1%	6.6%	8.8%	14.2%
Ukrainians have...	11.2%	6.3%	1.5%	16.2%	2.7%	18.9%	3.2%	9.1%	3.5%	16.9%
Gagauz have...	9.6%	6.8%	2.2%	10.2%	3.2%	19.2%	5.7%	14.6%	9.7%	13.2%
Bulgarians have...	7.2%	6.0%	1.7%	11.1%	1.9%	19.7%	3.4%	9.3%	2.1%	22.3%
Romanians have...	5.8%	9.9%	6.3%	7.0%	12.6%	10.0%	5.7%	3.4%	9.3%	8.1%

Table 3. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?

Concerning the **multiethnic rights**, we will analyze the answers to the questions regarding the duty of Moldovan state to support the development of different aspects of identity of ethnic minorities (see table 4). The share of minority respondents who agreed that the Moldovan state should guarantee their children the opportunity to pursue education in the language of their minority, support the cultural organization of the ethnic groups and help develop the identity of ethnic minorities, in all cases was higher than 70 percent. The differences between the answers provided by Moldovans and minority groups are visible.

This difference is relatively smaller concerning the support of cultural organizations of the ethnic groups, a little higher (approximately 30 percent) in the case of education in minorities' language and very high in the case of a subjective aspect, such as assistance in developing the identity of ethnic minorities (differences between 40-50 percent). We find a higher level of tolerance of the majority group towards some institutionalized forms of multiethnic rights, such as the language of education and cultural organizations, than in the case of identity, i.e. the basic element in the conservation of evolution of interethnic relations. The majority ethnic group seems to „favor“ the Russians and little less the Ukrainians, in comparison with the Gagauz and Bulgarian groups. In the case of education in minority language and identity issue, the share of affirmative answers, offered by the Moldovan/Romanian respondents, is the highest compared to the rest of the minority groups, and second, in case of Ukrainians. We find again that Russian ethnics are the most consistent advocates of multiethnic rights. They support mostly the idea of education in the language of minorities, and development of the identities of these minorities. If we compare the shares in their case, and in the case of other ethnic groups, there is a paradox when the statement refers to this group: the ethnic Russians agree more with the statement, „the state should guarantee the opportunity to pursue an education in Ukrainian for the Ukrainian children and teenagers“ than ethnic Ukrainians (89.6 percent for Russians and 85.5 for Ukrainians). Compared to Gagauz, this ratio is 82.8 percent to 76.9, compared to the Bulgarian respondents 84.7 percent to 77.0 percent.

Do what extent do you agree with the following statements? Do you think that Moldova should...?	Moldovans/ Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	57.4	91.7	86.2	80.5	78.9
guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	53.2	89.6	85.5	81.8	76.3
guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	48.7	82.8	77.7	76.9	70.3
guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	49.5	84.7	77.7	80.5	77.0
support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova	65.6	86.2	80.6	74.4	79.4
help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	35.2	88.3	81.1	80.9	79.1
help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	33.3	85.4	80.1	73.5	76.6
help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	32.6	78.2	74.1	82.0	75.4
help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	33.0	77.7	71.9	75.0	79.1

Table 4. The numbers represent the share of „totally agree“ and „somewhat agree“ answers.

Regarding **autonomy**, we have only one finding. We find that among Moldovans/Romanians, those who totally agree or somewhat agree with the statement that „Moldova should grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents majority“ represent less than one third of the options, and a little more are those who totally disagree with this statement. The distributions are inversed in case of minority ethnic groups. In all cases, the sum of *totally* and *rather agree* answers represents over half of the options, and only in the case of Bulgarians 47.1 percent. It is worth mentioning that this sum is somewhat larger among the Russian and Gagauz respondents, respectively among them the lowest is the share of *totally disagree* answers, as compared to the Bulgarian and Ukrainian ethnics. The confusion resides in the fact that the Gagauz is the only ethnic group from Moldova enjoying territorial-administrative autonomy, based on ethnic configuration of the area where they reside, and the Russians are somewhat advantaged from the perspective of their rights compared to other minority groups, both in the opinion of Moldovans and minority groups (see table 3). Moreover, even among the Russian respondents, the share of those declaring that Russians have too many rights is higher than regarding the rights of other minority ethnic groups (besides Romanians) (see same table).

The ethnic consciousness, both at the individual and group level, is based on the opinions about one's own people (ethnic group), which definitely are related to the characteristic features of other ethnic communities that determine the formation of attitudes and stereotypes of behavior in the realm of interethnic interactions. Namely, the ethnic feelings, sometimes partly understood, form the basis for the ethnic complementarities and represent a very important indicator of ethnic consciousness.

	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Totally Agree	10.9	26.2	33.3	29.0	21.8
Somewhat agree	16.7	27.6	26.2	29.7	25.3
Disagree	24.6	14.3	12.6	19.9	21.8
Totally disagree	29.0	12.1	10.9	4.2	17.9
Don't Know/No answer	18.9	19.9	17.0	17.2	13.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 5. The state should grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents majority.

The Ethnobarometer results show certain contradictions regarding the attitude towards one's own ethnic affiliation, especially in case of Moldovans (see annex 4). Although the share of totally agree and somewhat agree answers to the statement the fact that I am Moldovan/Romanian makes me proud is 82 percent, which is one of the highest share compared to other groups, 58 percent of them mentioned that the affiliation with this group makes them feel ashamed, which is incomparable with the statements of respondents belonging to other ethnic groups.

Stereotypes also represent an important component of ethnic consciousness: the nature of interethnic relations, interaction or conflict and confrontation, depends on the balance between self and hetero stereotypes.

We can notice that ethnic Moldovans noted best the features of Russians, for the rest we conclude that the lower the group, the less visible its stereotypes, fact confirmed by the analysis of non-answers (see annexes 5, 6). Thus, the Moldovans assign all minorities negative features such as selfishness and aggressiveness.

The index of quality of social contacts (see table below), calculated based on the answers using the Bogardus social distance scale, presents a special interest. The Bogardus scale includes seven categories, each of them representing a certain level of social distance. The subject is asked to express the acceptance or rejection of a person from the distance group at different levels of distance (marriage, friendship, neighbor, employee, citizen, visitor and total rejection). The index of quality of social contacts is a sum of points attributed to each position depending on the distance (acceptance as part of the family equals 7 points, the rejection of the person equals 1 point). Thus, the 0-index means rejection of all positions and 28 – acceptance of all positions.

The scale used in the Ethnobarometer has only five positions (part of the family, friend, neighbor, resident of the same locality, resident of Moldova), and does not include a visibly negative position, such as total rejection from the country. In this case, a zero index means rejection of all positions, highest closeness, and index 5 implies full acceptance of all positions, respectively total openness. The average values of the indicator for each respondent sample are presented in the table below.

Social contact quality index *					
	Moldovans /Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Moldovans		14.26	13.91	13.13	13.21
Russians	11.17		13.99	13.06	13.03
Ukrainians	10.63	14.05		12.76	12.70
Gagauz	9.11	11.86	10.11		11.51
Bulgarians	9.75	12.18	10.01	12.68	
Romanians	12.47	11.79	9.89	11.19	10.75

Table 1a.

* The respondents' nationality is mentioned in the upper row; the ethnic groups for which the index is calculated are mentioned in the left column.

From the table data, we can notice a rather high general level of openness, in none of the cases the index is below 9, which means general acceptance up to the friendship level. If we perform a comparative analysis, we can say that Moldovans have the highest level of openness towards Romanians (12/47), Russians (11/17), Ukrainians (10/63), and are somewhat less open towards Bulgarians and Gagauz. If we refer to stereotypes (see annexes 15, 16), Moldovan respondents had the highest number of non-answers for these ethnic groups. Among other ethnic groups, Moldovans and Russians are more privileged, and Romanians is the least accepted group among ethnic minorities from the country. Romanians are the least accepted by the Ukrainian ethnics from Moldova in comparison with other ethnic groups. The studies of the Kiev International Institute for Sociology (KIIS) from Ukraine ascertain the same thing, and establish „an extremely high level of intolerance towards Romanians at the national level in Ukraine, overrun only by Roma and the black population“.¹¹⁶ We should comment on the indicator calculated in relation to Romanian ethnics, which makes us be more attentive and reserved in our statements and assumptions regarding this issue. The probability that Ukrainian respondents did not refer to the Romanian ethnics from Moldova but from Romania is very high.

In order to have a better image of reality, we will use the social distance index (SDI), calculated based on the same scale. If the indicator of the quality of social contacts presents an amount of the shares offered to each position, the social distance index represents a simple total of rejections of the relevant positions, so, the lower the value of SDI (**less possibilities for contact were refused**), **the more reduced the social distance towards member of the respective group**. In this case, the zero value of the indicator signifies an extremely reduced distance and acceptance of all positions, while a value equal to five signifies rejection of all positions (included on the scale) and the highest social distance, accordingly.

¹¹⁶ Dan Dungaciu. Materials of the National Conference „Republic of Moldova in a new regional security context», Chisinau, 11-12 May, 2005.

Social distance index						
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Romanians
Moldovans		0.17	0.24	0.42	0.42	
Russians	1.05		0.23	0.44	0.48	2.09
Ukrainians	1.23	0.23		0.51	0.57	1.91
Gagauz	1.71	0.84	1.34		0.88	2.27
Bulgarians	1.52	0.75	1.36	0.55		1.89
Romanians	0.73	0.87	1.39	0.97	1.16	

Table 2a.

The value of the social distance index with a value below one signifies highest openness and, namely, acceptance up to the level of family member. Generally, SDI is rather reduced and presents a general acceptance between acceptance at the friendship level and acceptance as a family member, regardless of the interviewed ethnic group and the ethnic group towards which the attitude was expressed. In case of Romanian ethnics, we have two cases when the value of SDI is between 2 and 3, i.e. the Russians and Gagauz are accepted by them only up to the level of neighbors. The calculated index shows that Moldovan ethnics are more closed in comparison with other ethnic groups. They accept Romanian ethnics, and only in a relatively small percentage, as family members, the other ethnic groups being accepted up to the friendship level in different shares. Russian ethnics manifest the highest level of openness. They accept all ethnic groups, in different proportions, up to the family level, SDI ranging from 0.17 for Moldovans to 0.87 for Romanians. It is necessary to note that, although all minority groups included in the sample are Russian speaking from the perspective of interethnic communication, Russian ethnics manifest the highest level of openness towards Moldovans (the lowest value of SDI in the sample being 0.17), and are less opened towards the Gagauz and Romanians.

Citizenship as a source of political identity. In order to reflect this aspect, we will use the frequency of distributions of answers regarding the statements *I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country* and *there are many things I should be ashamed of because I am a citizen of Moldova*.

In the case of minority groups, half of the respondents agreed more or less with the statements, but none of the groups reached the share of 60 percent (see table 6). It is remarkable that in the given case Russian ethnics register again the highest percentage (the combined shares of the options *totally* and *rather agree* is 59.9 percent). This number is not significantly higher in case of Moldovan/Romanian respondents, as the latter registered a share of 66.8 percent. For comparison, according to the results of the 2002 Barometer of Interethnic Relations in Romania, this number reached 85 percent among Romanian ethnics.

	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
The sum of distributions for <i>totally agree</i> and <i>rather agree</i>	66.8	55.4	59.9	52.1	51.3
Totally Agree	38.8	25.4	28.6	22.7	26.2
Somewhat agree	28.0	30.0	31.3	29.4	25.1
Disagree	15.5	23.5	18.7	25.4	30.4
Totally disagree	8.3	5.6	9.2	11.7	12.3
Don't Know/No answer	9.5	15.5	12.1	10.8	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 6. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country

Citizenship is embarrassing for almost one third of Moldovan ethnics (28.5 percent); in the case of minority groups this percentage does not differ too much, Ukrainians registering the lowest (22.5) and Russians the highest percentage (34.2 percent) (see table 7). This obvious aspect depends on many things, first on the general satisfaction of the population with the political, economic and social situation in the country. The existence of alternative citizenship options would be another factor. An eloquent example regarding the second factor would be the fact that in Romania (Barometer of Interethnic Relations 1994-2002, Romania) the lowest share of the affirmative answers to this statement was registered by Roma ethnics, who do not have an alternative citizenship (19.4 percent compared to 22.6 percent in case of Romanians and 42.3 percent in case of Hungarians).

	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
The sum of distributions for <i>totally agree</i> and <i>rather agree</i>	28.5	22.5	34.2	28.6	29.0
Totally Agree	7.3	7.5	13.1	9.7	9.3
Somewhat agree	21.2	15.0	21.1	18.9	19.7
Disagree	29.7	35.4	28.6	33.9	29.7
Totally disagree	29.7	24.5	24.3	27.1	34.1
Don't Know/No answer	12.2	17.7	12.9	10.4	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 7. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am a citizen of Moldova

* * *

This was an attempt to investigate the subjective perception of citizenship through the prism of elements of ethnic consciousness. Obviously, in decision-making and in the implementation of solutions in the spirit of liberal theory of minority rights, a deeper and more complex scientific investigation is necessary. The complex approach of this kind of subjective aspects results in more profound interdisciplinary implications, which is impossible to accomplish only by one researcher in a limited timeframe; nevertheless, we consider that we reflected the main aspects in this sense.

The first and main conclusion is that the Moldovan society is still facing a crisis of values, caused by the sudden transition from communist ideology to a democratic system. This event is revealed by the process of self-identification, regardless of ethnic background, the identification based on ethnic factor and much less on citizenship comes first, this situation being specific to transition and crisis periods that accompany a young and unconsolidated state.

Regardless of the ethnicity, the level of citizens' loyalty is rather high. It is worth mentioning that the highest shares in this respect do not belong to the majority group, but to Russian and Ukrainian ethnics, though the differences are not significant if we take into consideration the margins of error. The fact that the same shares are registered in Romania means at least two things: probably this aspect has nothing to do with a specific area and does not depend on economic development, the level of democracy and other things that distinguish Moldova from Romania at this moment.

To what concerns multiethnic rights, among ethnic minorities the shares of those who consider that minorities in Moldova do not have given enough rights are rather high. Generally, there is a polarization of opinions regarding minority rights, among majority group, and ethnics who declared themselves Romanians and minority groups. It is natural that respondents from the majority group are more reserved about granting specific additional rights to minorities comparing to those belonging to minority groups. In addition, universal is the idea that Russian ethnics are more favored in comparison with the rest of ethnic groups, and that they manifest to a greater extent, in comparison with other minority groups, dispositions in favor of specific additional rights for all minorities, except Romanians.

Another conclusion is that granting autonomy to ethnic groups does not solve the problems and does not favor this group, according to the population and even in the eyes of other minority groups. This conclusion is possible due to the observation that the autonomy granted to the Gagauz does not offer this group any advantages related to minority rights.

Moldovans are rather reserved about granting multiethnic rights to minorities. Approximately half of them do not agree with the idea that the state has to provide students of ethnic minorities the right to education in their native language, and about two thirds express their disagreement about state duty to help the development of minority groups' identity.

Another finding is the so-called paradox that Russian ethnics express more support for granting multiethnic rights to other minority groups than these groups themselves. On the other hand, the minority ethnic groups express more support for education in Russian language than for education in their own native languages offered to their own group. However, the second situation is explained first through the position, more precisely the usage, of Russian language and other minority languages on the territory of the country.

The Moldovan/Romanian ethnics do not welcome the idea of granting autonomy to

the districts where an ethnic group is dominant, while this idea is supported by less than two thirds of respondents belonging to ethnic minorities.

Of course, Kymlicka's theory does not limit its applicability only to the investigation of subjective perception of citizenship; it is also valid in case of other specific decisions.

Finally, we will make a little digression from the researched issue in order to reflect some moments that we consider important, namely, a more favorable position of the Russian ethnic group in the opinion of other ethnic groups, and the more prominent attitude of the Russian ethnics in favor of granting more rights to minority groups.

In this context, we wonder if it is correct to explain this phenomenon only from the ethnic perspective, or say that Russians favor additional specific rights only because they belong to the Russian ethnic group and because of the situation of this ethnic group in Moldova and in the ex-soviet space from the historical and geopolitical perspectives. We do not think so. The existence of other factors, maybe as important, it can be observed if we analyze the distribution of respondents by education level and by residence area. Let us refer only to one of the aspects that generate differences in the perception and opinion of citizens from rural and urban areas: fluctuation of information. We see, from the table below, that all ethnic groups except Russians are preponderantly residents of rural areas, while 84 percent of Russians live in cities.

	Moldovans/Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz
Urban	36.6	83.7	45.0	32.4
Rural	63.4	16.3	55.0	67.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Residence area

Based on this, it would be appropriate to present some correlations from the Barometer of Public Opinion (February 2005) on media coverage by residence areas (see annex 7). First, it is worth mentioning that the access to information in rural areas is very limited. There are only three television channels with national coverage (TVM, ORT and TVR). Only one of these channels (ORT) is broadcast in Russian, and the individuals who do not know the official language mainly watch this channel, moreover, the broadcast time of ORT Moldova is limited. 5.3 percent of urban and 13.1 percent of rural population do not have a TV. Only 94.3 percent of people from urban areas and 87 percent of people from rural areas watch TV daily or several times a week. To what concerns radio audience, the percentage represents 77.5 for urban areas and 76.9 for rural area, while the situation of printed media is more critical: 11.1 percent of the respondents living in cities mentioned that they read newspapers once a month or less, while 12.2 percent had not read newspapers in the last 3 months. Second, in rural areas, 28.4 percent of the respondents had not read newspapers in the last 3 months and 12.2 percent read newspapers once a month or less. Thus, there are village/city differences regarding the access to information.

Another question could be the „quality“ of information, i.e. how often and what exactly a person watches/listens/reads during the day. It is obvious that life in rural areas

is characterized by an abnormal working day, which is reflected on the duration of media reception. Referring to what exactly a person watches/listens/reads, it would be logic to admit the existence of a positive correlation between education of an individual and the types of received information. The higher the education level, more types of programs the individual is interested. In this case, we suggest looking at the distribution by education level of respondents belonging to different ethnic groups (see table below). Generally, we can say that Russian respondents have a higher level of education. They register the lowest scores in the case of lack of education, incomplete general education and general education, and the highest shares in the case of college and university education.

	Moldovans/ Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
No education	6.6	1.5	4.6	7.6	3.9
Incomplete secondary education	25.1	12.9	25.9	24.6	16.7
Secondary school	21.5	18.7	24.0	33.1	27.6
Vocational school	17.3	21.8	22.0	20.3	25.3
High school	3.0	1.5	.2	1.1	1.4
Post high school education (college)	11.4	10.9	8.7	3.8	6.0
Incomplete higher education	2.9	5.3	1.5	3.2	3.5
Complete higher education	11.3	20.9	10.2	5.5	13.5
Master's degree, PhD	.5	1.5	.5	.2	.2
Don't know		1.0	.5	.6	.5
No answer	.4	4.1	1.9		1.4

Education level

We noticed that the population from urban areas is already more advantaged regarding the access to information, education, differences in living standards in urban and rural areas. This would be one of the causes that explain why Russians are perceived as the richest, most influential etc.: not only because they were advantaged during the soviet times, but also probably because most of them live in the cities.

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ANNEX 1

Which of the following statements describe best your identity: I consider myself first of all... Multiple choice!	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Representative of the declared nationality	77%	59%	46%	66%	62%
Resident of this locality	6%	16%	14%	14%	14%
Citizen of Moldova	15%	20%	31%	17%	18%
CIS Resident	0%	4%	5%	2%	4%
European	1%	1%	2%	0%	,7%
Eastern European	0%	0%	1%		
Don't Know/No answer	0%	1%	2%	1%	,9%

ANNEX 2

In your opinion, what are the most important three things for a person to be considered representative of the declared nationality? Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Have parents of this nationality	51%	48%	46%	56%	59%
Speak the language of this nationality in the family	48%	29%	38%	38%	46%
Follow the customs and traditions of this nationality	36%	29%	31%	33%	36%
Feel part of this nationality	30%	37%	42%	31%	38%
Feel the culture of this nationality as his/her own culture	32%	25%	29%	25%	31%
Honor the national flag of the state of this nationality	9%	6%	19%	0%	13%
Live in the state of this nationality	26%	12%	34%	32%	10%
Be a native speaker of the language of this nationality	21%	40%	14%	31%	33%
To have the citizenship of the state of this nationality	21%	13%	18%	16%	12%

ANNEX 3

Language:	Moldovans/ Romanians		Ukrainians		Russians		Gagauz		Bulgarians	
	Native	Spoken in the family	Native	Spoken in the family	Native	Spoken in the family	Native	Spoken in the family	Native	Spoken in the family
Moldovan	86%	85%	4%	8%	6%	12%	-	1%	6%	13%
Romanian	17%	17%	1%	4%	3%	6%	-	1%	1%	1%
Russian	2%	7%	25%	43%	94%	93%	14%	44%	22%	47%
Ukrainian	-	1%	82%	66%	3%	4%	-	-	1%	2%
Gagauz	-	-	-	-	-	1%	97%	83%	2%	8%
Bulgarian	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	-	92%	71%
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No answer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%

ANNEX 4

To what extent do you agree with the following statements: the fact that I am the representative of the declared nationality...*	Moldovans/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
a. makes me proud	82%	72%	79%	83%	85%
b. makes my life easier	41%	23%	35%	39%	42%
c. makes me feel ashamed	58%	4%	6%	13%	15%
d. makes my life harder	11%	9%	12%	12%	15%

* The distribution represents the sum of the answers for *totally agree* and *rather agree*

ANNEX 5

Positive qualities attributed by Moldovan respondents to different ethnic groups	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Decent	14%	9%	8%	2%	3%
Kind-hearted	13%	4%	6%	2%	1%
Hearty	9%	3%	4%	1%	2%
Independent	4%	12%	6%	3%	1%
Civilized	2%	6%	2%	1%	2%
Educated	3%	5%	3%	2%	1%
Resourceful	3%	9%	5%	3%	2%
Joyful	7%	7%	8%	2%	2%
Clean	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%
Religious	5%	3%	3%	3%	3%
United	1%	7%	5%	4%	4%
Honest	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Modest	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Hardworking	26%	1%	3%	3%	3%
Intelligent	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%
Hospitable	8%	4%	3%	2%	2%
None	1%	6%	6%	9%	7%
Don't know/No answer	3%	20%	35%	61%	63%

ANNEX 6

Negative qualities, attributed by Moldovan respondents to different ethnic groups	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Selfish	10%	9%	8%	3%	3%
Aggressive	4%	20%	8%	6%	3%
Apathetic/cold	6%	5%	4%	1%	2%
Obedient	16%	1%	2%	2%	3%
Backward	3%	1%	2%	3%	2%
Uneducated	4%	3%	2%	1%	1%
Negligent	5%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Sad	4%	2%	2%	1%	1%
Dirty	1%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Superstitious	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Divided	4%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Thieves	4%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Vainglorious	1%	3%	2%	1%	1%
Lazy	1%	6%	2%	2%	1%
Stupid	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Hostile	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
None	13%	7%	10%	7%	7%
Don't know/No answer	21%	33%	48%	65%	68%

ANNEX 7

How often do you...		Residence	
		Urban area	Rural area
read newspapers	Daily (6-7 days a week)	20.3%	10.7%
	A few times a week	33.9%	25.0%
	A few times a month	19.6%	19.1%
	Once a month or less	11.1%	12.2%
	None in the last 3 months	12.4%	28.4%
	Don't know	1.5%	1.8%
	No answer	1.3%	3.0%
listen to the radio	Daily (6-7 days a week)	56.6%	62.1%
	A few times a week	20.9%	14.8%
	A few times a month	4.7%	4.4%
	Once a month or less	2.0%	2.5%
	Never in the last 3 months	10.8%	11.5%
	Don't know	.9%	1.4%
	No answer	4.1%	3.3%
watch TV	Daily (6-7 days a week)	86.9%	80.6%
	A few times a week	7.4%	6.4%
	A few times a month	1.6%	1.6%
	Once a month or more seldom	.4%	1.0%
	Never in the last 3 months	2.5%	7.8%
	Don't know	.1%	.3%
	No answer	1.0%	2.3%
Do you have a TV at home?	Yes	94.0%	86.6%
	No	5.3%	13.1%
	No answer	0.7%	0.2%

STEREOTYPES AND INTERETHNIC IMAGES

Natalia Cojocaru

The study of ethnic phenomenon and ethnic relations offer the possibility of knowing the effective dynamics, which guide the intergroup trends, as well as a richer and more accentuated understanding of social conflicts. Even if stereotypes were treated separately from the problems of intergroup relations, they represent one of the factors capable of deteriorating or improving the relations between various social groups. Further studies reveal the fact that images and stereotypes, created by group members about each other, result from the type of reports, developed by the groups themselves. The judgment errors that occur because of stereotyping „others“ could release xenophobic and discriminative attitudes towards other ethnic groups. Therefore, by having the knowledge of stereotypes, developed by individuals or groups in interaction with others, is necessary, moreover because of the fact that these will determine the positions and influences, usually negatively, as well as the behavior and intergroup relations

There have been many studies on national stereotypes at the level of common conscience, especially after the Second World War (50-60s), and then it was brought back during the post communist period.¹¹⁷ The majority of these studies have been developed through UNESCO program¹¹⁸, by reflecting a better mutual understanding and a reduction of negative stereotypes. A series of experimental studies have proved that the work groups, that initially were having a negative perception about each other, were getting closer together and were succeeding on psychological barriers, being engaged in the realization of „supraordinated“ projects.¹¹⁹ The activities completed collectively determine the formation of a favorable perception regarding the neighboring group, and the reports of collaboration concluded between the members, engaged in the group effort, are necessary to finish successfully the „supraordinated“ project¹²⁰.

¹¹⁷ I. Radu, *Social Psychology*, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. EXE SRL, 1994.

¹¹⁸ The researches were realized under the auspices of UNESCO - O. Klineberg (1950) has studied the images that nations have about each other, with the purpose of studying the false representations or the gaps, for the mutual knowledge and understanding. W. Buchanan and H. Cantril (1953) have researched on samples from nine countries (Austria, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Norway and USA) the way different nations „see themselves“ on the base of a check-list, which includes factors such as: diligent, intelligent, spirit, pragmatic, arrogant, generous, ruthless, shy, courageous, capable of self-controlling, ironic, progressive, pacifist. H. C. Dujker and N. Frida (1960) chose, as their field of study, the national characteristic and stereotypes, and C. Guillaumin (1974) – interethnic attitudes reflected in the mass media messages from the francophone countries (apud I. Radu, *Social Psychology*, Cluj-Napoca, EXE SRL, 1994).

¹¹⁹ I. Radu, *op.cit.*

¹²⁰ It is shown as evidence that the percent of sociometric elections at the end of the experiment is non – discriminatory in the context of those two groups involved, although the separation affects negatively the perceptive and emotional sphere of relations between the groups, apud I. Radu *op.cit.*

Stereotypes do not constitute rigid structures, but modify themselves under the influence of certain social events. In certain historical periods, there exists bewilderment about traditional stereotypes: some stereotypes could disappear and new characteristics would come into sight regarding certain groups. The collapse of Soviet Union and the formation of new states made possible for similar processes to occur.

Our goal, through out this study, was to determine and to evaluate social representations (images and stereotypes) of various ethnic groups from Republic of Moldova. We tried to reflect the way some members from different ethnic groups represent their group (autostereotype), the characteristics attributed to other ethnic co – habiting groups (heterostereotype), and based on this, the type of reports that are developed by a variety of ethnic groups. The study begins with a psychosocial analysis of the concept of stereotypes and relations between intergroups, by presenting definitions, dimensions and traditional explanations of the phenomenon, further continuing with the presentation of „ethnic portraits“, and concluded with the discussion on some strategies for demolishing negative stereotypes.

What are the stereotypes?

Stereotypes represent omnipresent elements of every day life, expressing the preferred themes of many studies in the field of social psychology. A definition widely used in the psychosocial literature treats stereotypes as an assembly of opinions and faiths regarding the personality characteristics and behaviors of a social group. Thus, stereotypes could be opinions, as well as beliefs.¹²¹ The difference is useful, because the opinions are flexible to the new information, and as a result could be changed easier, however the beliefs interfere as „solid representations“ that determine the individual’s behavior. Stereotypes function as „mechanisms of information reduction“, which facilitate the rational economy, event called „cognitive egoism“.¹²² Generally, stereotypes have a bad reputation, justified by their „participation“ in the formation of prejudices and discriminative attitudes.¹²³

The term’s origin

The term „stereotype“ is a mix of two Greek words: *stereos* (fixed, solid) and *typos* (character). The original meaning had technique significance to it and it meant multiplication of a typographic form through casting a copy in metal.¹²⁴ Taken over by the liberal sciences in the 30’s, the word stereotype undertook the meaning of “that corpus of beliefs shared regarding the personality and behavior characteristics, specific to one

¹²¹ A. A. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, p.197.

¹²² P. Iluș, Iluzia localismului și localizarea iluziei. Polirom, Iași, 2000.

¹²³ V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea socială. Polirom, Iași, 2002, p.163.

Usually stereotype are confused with prejudices or are used as synonyms in the common language, the difference though is referring to the following “ the prejudice is a negative attitude regarding each member of a group motivated just by its belonging to the group, but the stereotype is a cognitive stereotype of this attitude, while discrimination is referring to the behavior determined by negative attitudes. “ (D. Capozza, C. Volpato, Relații intergrupuri: perspective clasice și contemporane, în R. Y. Bourhis și J.-F. Leyens (coord.). Stereotipurii, discriminare și relații intergrupuri. Iași: Editura Polirom, p.12).

¹²⁴ S. Chelcea, Personalitate și societate în tranziție. Studii de psihologie socială, București, Editura „Societatea Știință și Tehnică“, 1994, p. 242.

group¹²⁵ The „Invention“ of this term belongs to Walter Lippmann (1922), who attributed the psychosocial meaning to it, in relation to the rigidity of our concepts about social groups.¹²⁶ The author considers that humans do not react directly to the spurs of the world, but instead to the images in their mind. „The right environment is very important, very complex, and very changeable for the direct knowledge. We are not equipped in order to endorse this subtlety, a variety of permutations and combinations. In order to travel the world one needs a map“.¹²⁷ These „super simplified images in our mind“, as Lippmann expressed himself, let us filter the objective reality, the awareness of the „other“, by presuming social judgment and perception of the other, these processes support the need for the individual to remain in a predictable and controlled world in order to adapt his/her behavior, and in order to act. We do not see before we define, as the author notes, but we define before we see.¹²⁸ Even if the etymological meaning of the word comes from the Greek *stereos*, which in translation means *solid, fixed*, and suggests the stillness nature of images on certain social groups, the psychological researches accentuate more on the flexibility, than on rigidity of faiths and expectations regarding a population relatively homogeneous.¹²⁹

How are stereotypes formed and what are they used for?

Lippmann underlined in *Public Opinion* that even if stereotypes are schematic and inexact, they are still inevitable: neglecting stereotypes means in fact impoverishment of human life. Later on, Gordon Allport (1954), in his book *The Nature of Prejudice*, brings back the discussion on the study of stereotypes, mentioning that the categorization process has the mission to simplify a complex environment, so stereotypes constitute a derivative of this necessary operation.

The mechanism of comparing with „others“ (other ethnic groups) is based on the formation of ethnic heterostereotype. There have been identified three comparison situations: *interethnic comparison of equality, interethnic comparison of superiority and interethnic comparison of inferiority*.¹³⁰ The ethnic stereotypes are considered more objective in the first comparison state, meaning that when an ethnic group is comparing with another one at an equal position vis-à-vis the status and accomplishments. In the other two cases, stereotypes are either preponderantly negative, or positive. These comparison situations reveal the following types of relations:

- Positive perception of the in-group and positive perception of the out-group;
- Negative perception of the in-group and negative perception of the out-group;

¹²⁵ V. Yzerbyt și G. Chadron, Stereotipuri și judecată socială, în R. Y. Bourhis și J.-F. Leyens (coord.). Stereotipuri, discriminare și relații intergrupuri. Iași: Editura Polirom, 1997, p.98.

¹²⁶ The American journalist and political analyst W.Cippmann (1889-1974) have introduced for the first time in his book *Public Opinion*, published in 1922, the term stereotype, borrowed from publisher's vocabulary, were stereotype means a metal form used for cliché.

¹²⁷ Quoted by: J.-Ph. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt și G. Schadron, 1996, p. 22 în S. Chelcea et al., Cercetări psihologice concrete privind reprezentarea socială a identității naționale a românilor, 1998, p. 264.

¹²⁸ V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea socială. Polirom, Iași, 2002, p.99.

¹²⁹ S. Chelcea, Reprezentarea socială a identității naționale a românilor, Sociologie Românească, 1994, 2-3, 194 –196.

¹³⁰ A. A. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, pp. 223–224.

- Negative perception of the in-group and positive perception of the out-group;
- Positive perception of the in-group and negative perception of the out-group.¹³¹

Stereotypes are released by various contextual situations, based on them, they have different specific functions. Tajfel (1981) distinguishes three social stereotype functions: *social cause explication*, *social justification* and *social differentiation*. The first is concerned with the attempt to understand social events or unsocial through the identification of one group, perceived as being responsible (the tendency of attributing a sort of responsibility to the group of emigrants for the economical crises, and the development of a negative stereotype in this way). *Social justification* represents an act of developing a specific stereotype for one group in order to justify the actions designed by it (for example, the case of negative stereotypes produced by colonial powers regarding the nations that exploit them). Nevertheless, social differentiation refers to the stability of social positive identity through the emphasis and clarification on differences between groups, in order to establish a distinction in the favor of the belonging group.¹³²

Have stereotypes a grain of truth?

Sometimes, stereotypes could contain some truth, but more often, it is just an incident.

(O. Klineberg)

The classic approaches on stereotypes have emphasized, in particular, the errors of perception and of social trial challenged by these images. Afterwards, the concern of accuracy has replaced the classical concept of false stereotypes.

When the issue of erroneous or true character of stereotypes is being discussed, the notion of *stereotype accuracy* then is being used, referred to the estimation of correspondences between the stereotype features attributed to one social group, and those real ones, which they already possess.¹³³ In the psychosocial literature there are many studies, that try to demonstrate the empirical accuracy or inaccuracy of stereotypes. The research on autostereotype and heterostereotype of Greeks and Americans (Triandis and Vassiliou, 1967), and of Japanese and Americans (Abate and Berrien, 1967) points out their relatively accurate character, although the data presented by McCaulez, Langavelu and Rozzin (1988) refutes this fact.¹³⁴

O. Klineberg has worked out a series of researches on the question if the stereotype is untrue or at least contains a grain of truth. The author's answer is a positive one – not all the stereotypes are false, they could be more or less close to truth. The study realized by Ch. Judd and B. Park (1993) reveals the fact that stereotypes for in-groups are more accurate than those for out-groups, the latter ones, in the author's opinion, being the expression of generalizations and super-generalizations.¹³⁵

¹³¹ A. Налчаджян, op.cit., p.223.

¹³² Apud V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea socială. Polirom, Iași, 2002, p.37.

¹³³ E. Stănculescu, Acuratețea stereotipului, în S. Chelcea și P. Iluț (coord.), Enciclopedie de psihosociologie, Editura Economică, București, 2003, pp.19-20.

¹³⁴ Ibidem.

¹³⁵ Ibidem.

Three types of inaccuracy are known:

- *The inaccuracy of stereotype information*, which refers to the tendencies of sub-estimating or supra-estimating the real attributes of the group;
- *The inaccuracy of valence*, the tendency of perceiving the group is more or less positive than in the reality;
- *Inaccuracy of dispersion*, the perception of the group is more or less heterogeneous than in the reality.

The Interaction with „the other“ – intergroup relations

The groups' encouragement constitutes the fertile soil where nationalism blossoms.

(T. Todorov)

More psycho-socialists point out the fact that the members of one in-group¹³⁶ tend to favor the belonging group, and produce stereotypes and discriminations against the members of an out-group. Each group fights for a social positive identity. Social positive identity is seen as a source of self-respect. Groups have the necessity of a self-high respect; however, members develop various strategies to cope with the lack of respect.

In the case of stereotype activation, the information is influenced by a series of intergroup effects, such are: *in-group favoritism; the familiarity effect, prototypical, auto-referential effect, the double treatment and the automatic vigilance*.¹³⁷ The in-group favoritism is translated through judgments or behaviors in favor of the belonging group, the familiarity effect indicates the tendency to evaluate positively the known stimulus; the prototypical resorts on a model (composed or unique) as a typical exponent of the same group; the auto-referential effect points out a more accentuated easiness, through which we process the information about ourselves, comparing to other categories of information; and at last the double treatment information indicates the tendency to activate strategies of various categories, in function of their belonging.

Beginning from 1953, Avigdor has demonstrated that the image that one group is developing about the „other“ depends on the contact type existent between those two groups. Thus, the author points out the following:

- The stereotype is generally detrimental if the relations between those two groups are in conflict, and favorable if they are friendly or have a cooperative character;
- The stereotype contains the most apt characteristics in order to induce behaviors that contribute either to the conflict digest or to the improving of relations between those two groups.¹³⁸

William G. Simmer (1906) said that the hostility regarding the out-group is proportional to the cohesion intensity in an in-group¹³⁹, but Ilut (2004) believes that even

¹³⁶ Referenșii to in-group are made in term of us (afiliation group), and to out-group in terms of others (other groups).

¹³⁷ L. Iacob, *Etnopsihologie și imagologie. Sinteze și cercetări*, Iași, Polirom, 2003, p.186, 201.

¹³⁸ Apud W. Doise et al. *Psihologie socială experimentală*, Iași, Polirom, 1999/1978.

¹³⁹ P. Iluț, *Valori, atitudini și comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie*, Polirom, Iași, 2004.

if it does not take the form of hostility, the pride of „ourselves“, accompanied often by an implicit or expressive disregard of „others“, is visible beginning with family groups (...)

As far as ethnicities and nations go, ethnocentrism phenomenon is significant in this sense.¹⁴⁰ Psychosocial research developed by Henri Tajfel (1969, 1971), through the model of minimalist intergroup situations, has demonstrated, experimentally, that only the simple dividing of subjects in two groups generates discrimination and favoritism of the in-group. Tajfel (1981) claims that the simple categorization, induced experimentally between „us“ and „them“, promotes favoritism between the members of the in-group and depreciation of those in out-group. This relation has been illustrated experimentally by another study as well. For example, in order to decipher the degree of similarity that exists, perceived by members of the in-group, and the degree of threatening to the evaluation of members in out-group, has resorted on the questioning of more than hundreds Russian students regarding three out-groups (Moldavians, Ukrainians, and Georgians), asking them to evaluate features such as: *hostility, friendship, intelligence, greed*, how much they look alike, and the degree of threat to Russia. The authors established that as threat becomes less important and similarities larger, then the descriptions are more favorable – in case of Moldavians and Ukrainians – and as perception of threatening is increasing and the degree of similarity is decreasing – the case of Georgians – then the descriptions are less favorable.¹⁴¹

Interethnic Perceptions

The goal of the current analysis is to delimit stereotypes that outline the ethnic portrait of various ethnicities in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the emphasis on the differences and similarities that exist between the autostereotype, and the representations of other ethnic groups regarding the analyzed group, and at last, the discussion on the common images between autostereotype and another's perception.

Starting with the theoretical principles and the conclusions of some empirical studies described earlier, our expectations are similar to the principles described by the authors, found in the results of the Ethno-barometer. Thus, the classical effect, due to perception, such as: *in-group favoritism and depreciation of out-group, the homogenous out-group and heterogeneous in-group*, the types of *interethnic comparisons* will be discussed with regards to stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes of the analyzed ethnic groups.

How did the subjects proceed? From a list¹⁴² of 32 bipolar attributes (16 positive and 16 negative), the subjects were required to choose three positive features and three nega-

¹⁴⁰ P. Iluș, op.cit., pp. 195-196.

¹⁴¹ E. Henderson-King, D. Henderson-King, N. Zhermer, S. Posokhova, V. Chicher, In-group favoritism and perceived similarity: A look at Russians perceptions in the post soviet era, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 1997, apud P. Iluș, Valori, atitudini și comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie, Polirom, Iași, 2004, p. 201.

¹⁴² honest – selfish, kind – aggressive, hearty – indifferent/cold, independent – obedient, civilized – backward, educated – uneducated, resourceful – procrastinators, joyful – sad, clean – dirty, religious – superstitious, united – disunited, loyal – thieves, modest – vainglorious, diligent – lazy, intelligent – stupid, hospitable – hostile.

tive ones that could describe best the Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, and the Romanians from the Republic of Moldova. The proposed attributes are referred to the intellectual sphere (*civilized, intelligent, stupid and so on*), the interpersonal relation sphere (*honest, kind, aggressive, hostile and so on*), the way one is at work (*diligent, lazy*), the in-group cohesion (*united, disunited*) and so on. The questioned ones could also choose from the following: *none, I don't know/no answer*.

The first result is that generally, the autostereotype is positive; the subjects choose in order to describe their own group with more positive attributes, the classic phenomenon, named *in-group favoritism*. The Moldavians' ethnic portrait, and possibly the Russians' one are distinguished through tendencies clearly delimited and trenchant. The Gagauz operate with the least negative descriptions for the portrayal of the „other“, however Bulgarians and Ukrainians, generally, use a large palette of attributes. The Russian autostereotype, comparing to other attributes, mentions *intelligence, the level of education, and politeness*, attributes that are not often seen in the hetero-stereotype of Russian for other ethnic group, but neither in other autostereotypes.

Ethnic stereotypes: are these truly stereotypes? What surprised us even from the beginning were the proportions relatively high registered for the answers *I do not know/no answer*, when the subjects had to select negative attributes for the description of other ethnic groups, and of the belonging group, such would be the case of Ukrainians and Gagauz. In our opinion, this fact is due to either the lack of information regarding certain ethnic groups, and thus, a perception about these groups is not formed, or is due to the type of a *defense mechanism*, expressed through the avoidance of pronouncing about that group, even making the „other“ – taboo.

Table 1. Answers (in percent) *I don't know / no answer*

	Moldovians		Ucrnians		Russians		Gagauz		Bulgarians		Romanians	
	SP	SN	SP	SN	SP	SN	SP	SN	SP	SN	SP	SN
M/R	5%	27%	38%	52%	24%	40%	62%	67%	64%	70%	38%	55%
U	17%	68%	24%	81%	31%	70%	73%	97%	79%	95%	77%	86%
R	16%	34%	17%	39%	17%	39%	52%	55%	53%	59%	48%	49%
G	26%	47%	34%	53%	28%	50%	22%	55%	37%	54%	59%	66%
B	12%	28%	23%	37%	15%	31%	21%	34%	12%	35%	41%	46%

PS – positive stereotype, NS – negative stereotype; M/R – Moldavians (Romanians), U – Ukrainians, R – Russians, G – Gagauz, B – Bulgarians.

Analyzing Table 1, we observed that only in the case of Bulgarians, concerning about its own group, and also other ethnic groups, the proportion of these answers is 50% smaller. In the Moldavian (Romanian), Russian, and Ukrainian heterostereotype, comparing to the Gagauz, and Bulgarian one, there are recorded proportions with more than 50%, much higher, even in the Ukrainian case. We could consider that this could happen due

to the lack of information regarding these ethnic groups, the lack of a geographic proximity, but clearly that this is not valid in the Ukrainian case, for which 81 % are attributed to the negative autostereotype.

The Ukrainian case could be explained by a high in-group favoritism, which clarifies the lack of desire in expressing in negative terms about the belonging group.

Our interrogation, regarding the existence of some stereotypes, is precisely referred to the absence of some obvious tendencies in stereotyping, being doubled by the high proportions of answers I do not know/ no answer. In the case of Moldavians and Russians we can discuss about some clear tendencies of stereotyping, in all the other cases the perception is very different, without identifying some tendencies. Further, we will analyze what are the different ethnic groups' portraits, by presenting the qualities and defects that appear in autostereotype and heterostereotype.

About Moldavians (Romanians)¹⁴³

a) „Diligent, but less welcoming...“ If we take in consideration the characteristics that have a higher frequency among the identified attributes in the ethnic autostereotype of the Moldovan/Romanians, then hospitality and diligence clearly resulted to be the psycho-moral features, which are most indicated by subjects. Thus, Moldavians/Romanians are considered diligent (57%), welcoming (41%), and less joyful (28%), kind (27%) and honest (22%), being characterized the same by Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians.

In table 2, the degree of the reflections of these attributes is represented through the voices of alteration in heterostereotypes.

Generally, according to the attributed stereotypes, we could deduct that other ethnic groups have a positive attitude towards Moldavians. There are registered even more mentions on feature, such as honesty to Ukrainians, Russians and Gagauz with correspondingly 34%, 25% and 24% comparing to the one identified in the Moldavian/Romanian autostereotype (22%). Moldavians are considered kind by 27% Moldavians/Romanians, 40% Ukrainians, 42% Russians 29% Bulgarians, who assign this feature to them.

¹⁴³ „According to the results from Ethnobarometer 2004, it is pointed out (still) the presence in the collective imagination of these two perceptive categories – Moldavians and Romanians. The author of the present study shares his opinion according to which the population with a Romanian ethnic represents the majority group in R. of Moldova. However, for the present analysis, the difference between Moldavians and Romanians could be done at the level of perceptive categories, and not the ethnic one. We base on theoretical principles described by H. Taifel (1981), who underlined the idea that if the members of one group consider that they are different from others, this is enough and sufficient for them to „exist“, even if these perceptive differences are not based on the objective level. Thus, even if the small amount of those who declared themselves Romanians, the Moldavians (Romanians) data regarding other ethnic groups will be presented separately from the heterostereotype of other ethnic groups, regarding Moldavians and Romanians. Nevertheless, we cannot expect to a greater amount of those who declare themselves Romanians, after so many years of developing a different type of identification. We try though to progress, but the hypothesis that „Moldavians do not want to be Moldavians anymore“ (we could depict a sentiment of frustration, according to the negative autostereotype), but, they are not even (at the perceptive level, not ethnic one) Romanians. This sinuous process of de-categorizing is a long lasting process. In addition, according to the functions of social events (and of official politically ones) is going to be produces the „passing“ to one or another category. Even though the group who declares itself Romanian is a minority, we can conclude that there exist rudimentary forms of stereotypical organizations of other groups concerning this group. A perceptive category and a representation related to this category in development!

Table 2. Positive stereotype. How are Moldavians perceived by...?

	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Honest	22%*	34%*	25%*	24%*	17%*
Kind	27%	40%	42%	29%	27%
Hearty	23%	20%	27%	23%	24%
Educated	13%	11%	-**	17%	13%
Joyful	28%	29%	29%	19%	30%
Diligent	57%	56%	43%	20%	29%
Hospitable	41%	11%	-	-**	-**
None	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%
Don't know/ no answer	5%	17%	16%	24%	12%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

The frequency of these positive stereotypes among the attributed features by other ethnic groups, and their presence in the Moldavian/Romanian stereotype lead us to the conclusion that these would represent the main characteristics of the Moldavian „ethnic portrait“. Moldavians remained as „diligent“ as they were before, but what has happened with the expression „hospitality“? In the soviet period, hospitality was considered, beside diligence and joyfulness, to represent specific features of Moldavians. Nowadays it seems that this fact does not hold truth anymore. While 41 percent of Moldavians/Romanians consider that this is a specific characteristic of Moldavians, and just 11% Ukrainians, 9% Russians, 8% Bulgarians and 5% Gagauz share this opinion.

The advocates of the functionalist theory maintain the idea that stereotypes depend on the evolution of the relations between the intergroups.

The bewilderment of the interethnic perception is realized according to certain conflicts or social events that have a major impact. Hence, the researches done by Katz and Braly (1933), and Gilbert (1951), with the theme of American stereotype regarding different nations show that the Second World War had a huge impact on the American's stereotype, vis-à-vis Germans and Japanese.¹⁴⁴ If Japanese were seen in 1933 as being intelligent, diligent, and progressive, then in 1951 they are perceived as being perfidious and malicious. The same type of bewilderment could be found in relation with Germans. Almost two decades later the stereotypes of these nations regained same aspect as before the conflict.¹⁴⁵

Basing on the conclusions of these studies, could we consider that the traditional stereotype of Moldavians has been modified after 1989? Which were really the causes that have bewildered the traditional stereotype of the Moldavians? Why Moldavians became less „hospitable“ in the perception of others, according to the high percent for this feature in the autostereotype?

¹⁴⁴ D. Katz, K. W. Braly, Racial stereotypes in one hundred college students apud V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea celuiilalt, Polirom, Iași, 2002, pp. 27-28.

¹⁴⁵ M. Karlins, T. L. Coffman, Walters, On the finding of social stereotypes: Studies in three generations of college students apud V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea celuiilalt. Polirom, Iași, 2002, p. 28.

b) „Obedient, but also aggressive...” After almost 15 years of independence, the majority ethnic group from Republic of Moldova is dealing with a severe identity crisis. Among Moldavian (Romanians) respondents, 95% declare themselves Moldavians and only 5% Romanians.¹⁴⁶

The identity crisis is reflected at the level of stereotyping as well. It was mentioned before that the groups tend to a positive identity, and the pride of „us“ is associated with a strong cohesion in-group. Regarding the negative autostereotype of Moldavians (Romanians), we can establish the presence of some features that lead to the lack of the cohesion and solidarity in-group. However, Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „others“ as *united!* The attribution of the characteristic *disunited* for your own group, and the idealized projection of the opposite – *united* – for the others, in our opinion, demonstrate a strong sentiment of frustration.

Thus, in the negative autostereotype (table 3), among the defects assigned to Moldavians/ Romanians with a higher frequency can be mentioned: obedient (30%), disunited (19%) and procrastinators (18%). They are considered to be *procrastinators and obedient* by others as well, however with a lesser frequency. Among Ukrainians and Gagauz' respondents, a higher amount of mentions *don't know/ no answer* (with respectively 68% and 47%) is registered. Even if Moldavians/Romanians are considered to be *disunited*, they are considered to be likewise by Ukrainians and Bulgarians with 11% and 15 % respectively. All the ethnic groups consider them *backward*: 11% Moldavians/Romanians, 11% Ukrainians, 16% Russians, 12% Gagauz and 17% Bulgarians. Russians consider Moldavians equally *aggressive* (18%), but *obedient* (18%). Moldavian *obedience* is classic, and is recognized by other groups as well in autostereotype, but why then *aggressive*? Were they perceived similarly in the soviet period as well? Were Moldavians as aggressive by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, event, which produced changes at the level of perception and intergroups relations, in the opinion of N. Enciu.¹⁴⁷ The author considers that the event provoked an absolute psychological shock for Russians, being the equivalent to the loss of the status of a soviet citizen and the acceptance of a new status, unordinary, the one of being the citizen of a new independent state and of a national minority. Because we do not have at our disposal the empirical data, that could support or refute these affirmations, we could just presume that the events after 1989 have influenced somewhat the classical perception, or either Moldavians remained as aggressive as before, or even more aggressive.

Those two defects that do not register significant frequencies in the autostereotype of Moldavians, but are mentioned by others are *superstitious and uneducated*.

In the autostereotype of each ethnic group, we can find positive features as well as negative ones. Most of the times, the amount of those positive is greater, the negative ones are present, but at times, during the existence of the group their number can become

¹⁴⁶ We consider that this percentage would be higher, if in the questionnaire could be included also some variables like: Romanian from Republic of Moldova, Moldavian Romanian or Bessarabian Romanian.

¹⁴⁷ N. Enciu, Populația titulară a Republicii Moldova față cu minoritățile naționale, in Arena Politicii, anul II, nr.4 (6), ianuarie, 1998.

larger. Nalceadgean considers that the presence of a great amount of negative features in autostereotype becomes as a *protection mechanism*, present in situations when:

- The ethnic group applies negative stereotypes for devaluing its own group and are used when more members of this group are not satisfied of the belonging to this group or are marked by an inferiority complex;
- The members of an ethnic group are very self - critics regarding the position of the belonging group and present a strong desire for self - perfectionism.

It seems obvious the frustration sentiment experienced by the members of the group, regarding the belonging group, through the clear opposition of „us *disunited* and them *united*“.

Table 3. *Negative stereotypes. How are Moldavians perceived by...*

	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Aggressive	10%*	13%*	18%*	-.**	12%*
Obedient	30%	22%	18%	10%*	19%
Procrastinators	18%	12%	11%	10%	11%
Selfish	14%	12%	12%	-	11%
Disunited	19%	11%	-.**	-	15%
Backward	11%	11%	16%	12%	17%
Superstitious	-.**	22%	10%	11	12%
Uneducated	-	14%	14%	11%	18%
None	14%	14%	15%	7%	7%
Don't know/ no answer	27%	68%	34%	47%	28%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

c) A new perceptive category or about Romanians

„*This kind of Moldavians*“. Even if there exist some similarities between „the old“ portrait of Moldavians and the features mentioned by other ethnic groups for Romanians, such as: *honest and joyful*, the differences are significant. Moldavians/Romanians assigned most of the qualities – effect caused by the in-group favoritism. However, we could observe that precisely the qualities that have not been attributed to Moldavians, are assigned to Romanians. Could this be a category of some sort of active minority described by S. Moscovici?¹⁴⁸

Romanians are seen as being *educated, independent and civilized* (table 4). Thus, it is registered a high percent of answers *don't know/no answer* among Ukrainians and Gagauz, which is caused, in our opinion, by uncertainties and ambivalent attitude regarding this

¹⁴⁸ The notion of active minority as described by S. Moscovici does not represent only the reduced number of persons, but the behaviorist style, the action. S. Moscovici considers the behaviorist styles of active minorities to be characterized by: investment (spending of money, energy, time in order to achieve the goals), autonomy (independence of thoughts and attitudes), consistency (the organization of information), rigidity (the majority reaction regarding minorities), equity (the minority preoccupation for stabilizing equitable relations with the majority). In order to influence the majority, the active minorities want their actions to be visible and recognized as a mark of originality, without being progressive or reactionary, active minorities militate for social changes. apud S. Chelcea, *Un secol de psihosociologie*, Iași, Polirom, 2002, pp. 143 -144.

perceptive category. As a prove could serve the fact that Romanians' representation is still in progress, without being sufficiently structures in the collective mentality.

Table 4. Positive stereotype. How are Romanians perceived by...

	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Honest	12%*	_**	14%**	_**	_**
Educated	14%	19%*	_*	-	-
Joyful	10%	15%	-	-	15%*
Religious	16%	18%	11%	-	16%
Intelligent	16%	14%	-	-	-
United	14%	-	-	-	11%
Independent	12%	12%	12%	-	12%
Civilized	21%	27%	21%	14%*	16%
None	4%	4%	4%	1%	3%
Don't know/ no answer	38%	77%	48%	59%	41%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

In the negative hetero-stereotype (table 5) there have been registered high proportions of answers *don't know/ no answer*, higher than in the Ukrainian case. Comparing to Moldavians, who are seen as the symbol of diligence, Romanians are considered lazy by Ukrainians and Moldavians/Romanians, and aggressive by Russians and Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians still cannot differentiate the feature *obedient* among Moldavians and Romanians, with 22% and 17% respectively. Moldavians (Romanians) consider them *vainglorious*, but Ukrainians and Bulgarians – *indifferent/cold*. It seems that precisely these attributes, which appear in the hetero-image of ethnic groups regarding Moldavians, are registered through the opposite side of them in hetero-image about Romanians.

Table 5. Negative stereotype. How are Romanians perceived by...

	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Vaniglorious	13%*	12%*	_**	_**	_**
Lazy	12%	18%	10%*	-	-
Aggressive	_**	12%	15%	-	-
Indifferent/cold	-	19%	12%	-	12%*
Subordinated	-	17%	-	-	-
Procrastinators	-	14%	-	-	10%
Selfish	-	17%	10%	-	10%
Uneducated	-	11%	-	-	12%
None	14%	10%	10%	5%	6%
Don't know/ no answer	55%	86%	49%	66%	46%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

These „different kind of Moldavians“ who are perceived to be more educated, intelligent and civilized, but aggressive as well could be perceived as a threat for „the other“¹⁴⁹, and can be used as a source for competitive or conflict relations.¹⁵⁰

About Ukrainians

a) „*Kind and joyful...*“. With a higher frequency, we can identify 12 qualities and 7 defects in the autostereotype of Ukrainians. They are referring to features such as: *diligent, honest and kind*, that could characterize them best, and respectively, we find out that approximately the same proportion regarding these qualities of the representation of other ethnic groups about Ukrainians, and slighter than in the case of Moldavians/Romanians. In table 6 the proportion of the chosen attributes in hetero-stereotypes of others regarding Ukrainians is represented.

Table 6. Positive stereotypes. How are Ukrainians perceived by...

	Ukrainians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Honest	27%*	12%*	10%*	15%*	12%*
Kind	26%	10%	26%	19%	21%
Hearty	23%	10%	22%	18%	19%
Educated	10%	-**	10%	14%	12%
Resourceful	10%	12%	18%	10%	11%
Joyful	24%	19%	27%	20%	23%
Diligent	50%	16%	19%	13%	15%
United	-**	14%	-**	-**	13%
Religious	13%	-	11%	15%	12%
None	0%	7%	0%	0%	1%
Don't know/ no answer	24%	38%	30%	34%	23%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

¹⁴⁹ One of the survey's questions is referring to the perception of threat: Thinking about Moldavians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Russians, Bulgarians from the Republic of Moldova, do you consider possible that they could become a threat for the nation, for the belonging ethnic group, for you or your family? An assemblage glance points out a relatively small percent for the answer choices: very much, and much, exception being the Moldavian (Romanian) group, for whom the perception of threat from other ethnic groups is relatively higher. Regarding Romanians from R. of Moldova, the highest percent is registered among Russian respondents. As comparison serves the fact that: just 3 % of Russians consider that Moldavians present a threat, and then 9% perceive Romanians being a threat for the nation, and 9% – for Russians. Romanians are perceived as being a possible threat for the nation for 6% of Ukrainians and 7% of Bulgarians.

¹⁵⁰ We are trying to evolve the idea that even if there would exist some interethnic tensions (even if we don't consider that it could become and interethnic conflict in R. of Moldova according to the results from the Ethnobarometer), the reference to the minority ethnic groups is not done by majority rule (tensions between majorities and minorities in the classical sense of approach, but we ascertain that it is more of a minority-minority rapport, taking in consideration that the rapport is created or might be created between Romanians (minorities by quantity, and not quality), comparing to Moldavians who represent the majority by quantity, not by quality.

Since this is the first Ethnobarometer organized in Republic of Moldova there is no possibility of comparing, so we establish that we can discuss it as of a situation case, and this is the reason why we keep uncertainties and we can develop more ideas that conclusions, hoping that we could use them during the realization of more in-depth studies, and comparing the earlier results with the future ones.

Even if Ukrainians are considered *diligent* by 50% from them, the proportion among respondents from other ethnic groups is smaller. In slighter proportions, Ukrainians mention the following features: *educated, honest and hospitable*, as well as specific attributes for them.

b) „Selfish and superstitious...“. Regarding the negative autostereotype, Ukrainians mentions among choices *obedient, procrastinators, selfish and superstitious*. Others also mention these features concerning this ethnic group; however, only Bulgarians (table 7) see Ukrainians as obedient.

Table 7. Negative stereotype. How are Ukrainians perceived by...

	Ukrainians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Aggressive	..**	14%*	11%*	..**	10%*
Indifferent/cold	-	11%	10%	-	13%
Obedient	14%*	..**	..**	-	11%
Uneducated	-	-	-	-	12%
Procrastinators	16%	-	11%	10%*	15%
Selfish	11%	12%	16%	-	12%
Vainglorious	-	-	-	-	13%
Disunited	11%	-	-	-	11%
Superstitious	20%	-	10%	-	11%
Backward	10%	-	-	-	-
Sad	14%	-	-	-	-
None	19%	11%	15%	6%	7%
Don't know/ no answer	81%	52%	45%	53%	37%

Even if *aggressiveness and indifference* are not mentioned as characteristics, Moldavians/Romanians, Russians and Bulgarians see them this way.

About Russians

a) Reminiscences of „older brother“: „We are like them, but more civilized“.

In the autostereotype of Russians, nine qualities and seven defects are predominant. In the description of its own group, Russians use same attributes mentioned at first by respondents of other ethnic groups as well: *honest, kind, hearty*. The content differences between self-image and hetero-image are not registered. Same qualities are found in the mentions of other ethnic groups about Russians, and having almost same percent value (table 8). However just 26% Russians consider themselves *honest*, and just 13% Moldavians (Romanians) and 14% Bulgarians consider Russians *honest*, a smaller percent than in the Gagauz and Ukrainian case, with 21%. Moldavians (Romanians) consider Russians *kind and hearty* in a much smaller proportion than percent value for these attributes, in the case of other ethnic groups, where the proportion is much higher (Table 8). Even if 15% Russians consider themselves *diligent*, we cannot find a consensus in other stereotype as well, with the exception of Bulgarians, 10% of which perceive them to be *diligent*. However, if 10% Russians consider themselves united, 25% Moldavians and 20% Ukrainians perceive them united as well.

Table 8. Positive Stereotype. How are Russians perceived by...

	Russians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Bulgarians	Gagauz	Ukrainians
Honest	26%*	13%	14%	21%	21%
Kind	22%	-**	28%	25%	17%
Hearty	26%	-	23%	17%	28%
Independent	18%	24%	17%	12%	19%
Civilized	17%	12%	16%	15%	14%
Educated	18%	11%	16%	15%	12%
Resourceful	14%	26%	16%	11%	20%
Joyful	21%	24%	25%	27%	27%
Diligent	15%	-	10%	-	-
Intelligent	12%	-	12%	-	11%
United	10%	25%	11%	-	20%
None	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know/no answer	17%	24%	15%	28%	31%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

We can observe some common tendencies in stereotyping Russians regarding the following attributes: *independent, civilized and joyful*. Nevertheless, what was left from the mentality of „older brother“? Russians consider themselves civilized (17%) and educated (18%), considered same by Ukrainians (16%) and Gagauz (15%), and less by Moldavians (Romanians). These qualities do not appear on the first positions, in neither autostereotype (position 5, 6), nor heterostereotype. (5, 6, 7).

b) „Aggressive and lazy“: Common tendencies regarding Russians' image is established as *indifferent, lazy and selfish*. In the negative autostereotype, Russians mention specific attributes of in-group: *aggressive (17%)*, and in a smaller proportion: *indifferent, lazy etc.* Regarding aggressiveness, one percent relatively high is established in the heterostereotypes of Moldavians/Romanians and Ukrainians, with respectively 31% and 20%.

Table 9. Negative stereotype. How are Russians perceived by...

	Russians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Bulgarians	Gagauz	Ukrainians
Aggressive	17%*	31%*	13%*	-**	20%*
Indifferent	13%	14%	14%	12%*	16%
Obedient	13%	-**	12%	-	-**
Uneducated	11%	13%	12%	11%	-
Procrastinators	12%	-	15%	-	27%
Lazy	13%	17%	16%	10%	17%
Selfish	10%	17%	14%	12%	13%
Vainglorious	-**	14%	11%	-	10%
None	17%	8%	7%	8%	17%
Don't know/no answer	39%	40%	31%	50%	70%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

This conclusion seems to confirm the fact that the representations about „the other“ are caused by intergroup's relations. The linguistic and national problems at the end of the 80's have modified the nature of the relations between Russians and Moldavians/Romanians from the Republic of Moldova. The east side of the republic, inhabited by mostly of Russian speaking population, has declared itself a cvasi-independent, justifying especially the decision of adoption a linguistic legislation, which was considered by them unjust, even if Russian has been declared as the interethnic language of communication. The aggravation of intergroups relations has blocked some reforms, moreover, it has developed a sentiment of guilt among the majority population for the failure of some economic reforms. No matter how banal would sound the idea of this association „Romanian language, history... – economic failure“ – it persists on the collective mentality level, activated when social problems are discussed at the level of common sense.

The Gagauz – under the sign of marginalization

a) ***Who are the Gagauz?*** Gagauz people are continuing to be ignorant and marginalized. Being named after Charles King „a nation forgotten by world and God“, Gagauz people represent with certainty the group least known, and the one that the subjects have less to discuss on. Bulgarians present the only exception, because of their geographical location, in the south part of the Republic of Moldova, region inhabited compactly by Gagauz people, had more common experiences with the members of this ethnic group, and the frequency of intergroups contacts generating a higher level of mutual familiarity. Incontestably, stereotypes are created by social interactions and respectively, intergroups interactions are influenced by stereotypes. Comparing the choice proportion of *don't know/no answer* for each analyzed group regarding Gagauz, we can observe the high frequency of the choices, either positive or negative (table 1).

In the table below, the data (percents) are illustrated, obtained through the measures of mentions indicated by Gagauz and other ethnic groups regarding Gagauz. In the auto-stereotype of Gagauz, we can observe a great number of positive attributes and practically the lack of a significant percent regarding the groups' defects. Some of the specific qualities of the Gagauz are *diligent* (32%), *honest* (27%), *kind* (24%), *hearty* (21%), *educated* (18%) etc. Comparing to the self-imagined of other ethnic groups and the attributed heterostereotype we have established a relative similarity, very few from the self-distributed qualities of Gagauz have reflected in the heterostereotype of other groups about them.

For example, just 10 % Russians and 11% Bulgarians perceive Gagauz as being *honest*, but for this quality, Gagauz had just 27% choices. Generally, Gagauz are not seen as *kind* as well, considered likewise by just 11% Bulgarians. A relative consensus exists regarding the quality of Gagauz as being *resourceful*, 8% Moldavians, 15% Ukrainians, 11% Russians and 17% Bulgarians considering them similarly. Gagauz are also perceived *diligent and religious*. Even if they are not considered *united*, 9% Moldavians/Romanians, 15% Ukrainians, 12% Russians and 26% Bulgarians consider them likewise.

Table 10. Positive Stereotype. How are Gagauz perceived by...

	Gagauz	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Bulgarians
Honest	27%*	_*	_*	10%*	11%*
Kind	24%	-	-	_*	11%
Hearty	21%	-	15%*	10%	15%
Educated	18%	-	11%	-	_*
Resourceful	10%	8%*	15%	11%	17%
Joyful	17%	-	16%	-	11%
Diligent	32%	8%	16%	12%	31%
Religious	13%	-	19%	11%	17%
Loyal	12%	-	16%	-	11%
United	-	9%	15%	12%	26%
Independent	-	-	17%	-	14%
None	0%	10%	4%	3%	1%
Don't know/no answer	22%	62%	73%	52%	21%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

Regarding the negative heterostereotype, Bulgarians have again offered more information. The table below represents the defects identified by them and other ethnic groups.

Table 11. Negative stereotype. How are Gagauz perceived by...

	Gagauz	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Bulgarians
Selfish	10%*	_*	-	13%	13%
Aggressive	-	11%	21%	13%	26%
Indifferent/cold	-	-	15%	-	13%
Procrastinators	-	-	14%	-	12%
Backward	-	-	12%	-	10%
Uneducated	-	-	17%	-	13%
None	12%	7%	11%	11%	7%
Don't know/no answer	55%	67%	97%	55%	34%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

Moldavians and Russians had the least amount of positive feedback, and Ukrainians probably do not even know the existence of Gagauz population in Moldova, since their proportion of answers *don't know/ no answer* is high. Moldavians/Romanians (11%), Ukrainians (21%), Russians (13%) and Bulgarians (26%) see them as being aggressive, however Gagauz do not see themselves likewise. Some of the negative attributes mentioned are *indifferent, procrastinators and backward*.

The conclusions of some studies¹⁵¹ show the low level of communicative abilities of Gagauz populations, regarding other ethnic groups, deficiency in expressing opinions,

¹⁵¹ Кауненко, Ирина; Гашпер, Лучия. (2002). Поиски путей формирования толерантности у молодежи – основа построения гражданского общества Молдовы. În *Symposia Professorum. Seria Psihologie și Științe ale Educației*. Chișinău: ULIM, pp. 100 – 101; N. Cojocaru, S. Suhan, Realități psihosociale în Găgăuzia, studiu realizat cu suportul financiar al IPP Chișinău, 2003.

perception of isolation comparing to „others“ and Chisinau („they know very few things about us“), as well as the lack of social mobility (the tendency of living and studying in the native places). These would be the conclusions that we could express when analyzing the representation on Gagauz.

About Bulgarians

Bulgarians, as well as Gagauz are not really known by other ethnic groups (table1). If in the case of Gagauz, Bulgarians had more things to say, the image on Bulgarians is mainly build by Gagauz. The majority of attributes in the autostereotype of other ethnic groups are present in the autostereotype of Bulgarians as well (table 12). Therefore, Bulgarians consider themselves diligent (41%), kind (25%), hearty (17%) and educated (17%). The image of Moldavians/Romanians about Bulgarians is very fragmented. There are no attributed qualities that are registered by Moldavians for this ethnic group to be greater than 10%. This could be explained by the fact that there exist some stereotype structures regarding Bulgarians, and respectively, the opinions expressed are the result of a direct knowledge, that changes the traditionalism and the other one is perceived by in function of the context, the experience in this case being the one to structure the content of the stereotype. In the Russian stereotype about Bulgarians, 5 qualities are emphasized with a bigger proportion, less then Ukrainians' mentions. However, the Gagauz tell us the most about this ethnic group. The Gagauz have a favorable attitude regarding the Bulgarians, their mentions being relatively similar to the one mentioned by the Bulgarians in the autostereotype.

Table 12. Positive stereotype. How are Bulgarians perceived by...

	Bulgarians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz
Honest	21%*	..**	..**	..**	12%*
Kind	25%	-	12%*	13%*	17%
Hearty	17%	-	11%	10%	14%
Educated	17%	-	11%	-	12%
Resourceful	14%	-	13%	-	10%
Joyful	15%	-	14%	-	14%
Diligent	41%	9%*	17%	16%	20%
Religious	10%	-	15%	10%	12%
United	11%	9%	18%	12%	11%
Loyal	14%	-	12%	-	11%
Independent	-	-	17%	-	10%
None	0%	8%	3%	3%	1%
Don't know/no answer	12%	64%	79%	53%	37%

*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

In the case of the negative stereotype, we are referring to the Gagauz stereotype. Bulgarians consider themselves obedient and disunited, and Gagauz perceive them as indifferent and selfish.

Table 13. Negative Stereotype. How are Bulgarians perceived by...

	Bulgarians	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz
Indifferent/cold	12%*	..**	12%*	..**	11%*
Obedient	17%	-	12%	-	..**
Procrastinators	11%	-	21%	-	-
Selfish	10%	-	..**	-	12%
Disunited	18%	-	14%	-	-
Backward	11%	-	10%	-	-
Superstitious	11%	-	14%	-	-
Vainglorious	11%	-	17%	-	-
None	10%	8%	10%	11%	7%
Don't know/no answer	35%	70%	95%	59%	54%


*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice

**less than 10 percent

The image of „the other“


Further, we will try to delimitate certain tendencies in stereotyping „the other“, and so, we will outline the type of relating to others. Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „the others“ as being joyful, united in the positive side, and aggressive in the negative one (Figure 1).

In the Russians' heteroimages we can distinguish many common features (figure 2). So, Russians' image about others is resumed to the following: kind and diligent at the positive side, and aggressive, obedient, backward, selfish at the negative side, comparing to the creation of a frame of equality with Romanians.



DP – Differentiated perception

Figure 1. How Moldavians (Romanians) perceive others as...



DP – Differentiated perception

Figure 2. How Russians perceive others as...





Figure 3. How Ukrainians perceive others as...

Ukrainians’ image regarding others is differentiated (figure 3). There are no tendencies registered. Romanians are *civilized and educated*, but *lazy*, the opposite from Moldavians and same as *obedient* Moldavians.



DP – Differentiated perception

Figure 5. How Gagauz perceive others as...

There are no differences remarked in the hetero-images of Bulgarians (figure 4) regarding Russians and Ukrainians („sort of Russians“). Common tendencies are *joyful and kind*, for Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians, and Gagauz are *united and aggressive*. Image of „others“ in the Gagauz perceptions are: everyone is *kind*, Russians and Ukrainians are *joyful*, Bulgarians and Moldavians are *diligent*, and Romanians and Russians being considered *civilized* (Figure 5).

Similarities and autostereotypes

R. A. Levine and D. T. Campbell (1972) have discovered the existence of a universal stereotype in the in the perception mode of ingroups and outgroups in conflict situations and of nations with a memory full of tragic events based on outgroups.¹⁵² The authors have developed a study in the period of cold war in countries with pro-American views, pointing out then the individual's tendency of attributing qualities to its own ethnic group, and respectively, the defects of the group with which it has conflict relations.¹⁵³ We have realized the presence of common features mentioned by each ethnic group in the autostereotype. Five qualities, respectively *honest, kind, hearty*¹⁵⁴, *joyful and diligent* are the features that appear in relatively similar proportions to other groups, exception being the *diligent* ones, who appear in different proportions in the self-perceptions of subjects. In the table below, the data is presented:

	Moldavians/ Romanians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Honest	22%	27%	26%	27%	21%
Kind	27%	26%	31%	22%	25%
Hearty	23%	23%	26%	21%	17%
Joyful	28%	24%	21%	17%	15%
Diligent	57%	50%	15%	31%	41%

Table 14. Common autostereotype

These are actual qualities that emphasize the tolerance character and openness towards the other, being present in the auto-stereotype, as well as in hetero-stereotype. The value of accuracy of these autostereotype has to be considered as well. The individual's behavior in society in a concrete situation could be different of what individuals believe about each other, even if some studies point out the „weight“ of stereotypes. We cannot know if the perceived qualities are also intrinsic characteristics of the group or represent just the desire of presenting the members of the group, as being tolerant, honest, and open towards „the other“. A modern tendency in the study of an ethnic stereotype is the discussion about the measurement of *general ethnic stereotypes and of contextual ethnic stereotypes*. The ethnic context stereotypes are referring to the members' behavior of an

¹⁵² R. A. Levine și D. T. Campbell, 1972, p. 183, cit. de Chelcea et al. Cercetări psihologice concrete privind reprezentarea socială a identității naționale a românilor, 1998, p. 270.

¹⁵³ The autostereotype which is found in the self image of all the nations, contains affirmation such as: we are proud, we have self respect and we respect our traditions; we are loyal, honest and we trust one another; but we are induced by error of the ruthless strangers, we are courageous and we were always like this; we defend our rights and properties, we do not accept to be humiliated; we are peaceful and amiable; we do not hate, but our worse enemies; we are moral and spiritually clean. And respectively, the group heterostereotype with which the respondents are in conflict contain negative characteristics (the negative sign regarding the outgroup represents the positive part in autostereotype): they cannot see but their interests, they are exclusive, if they could they would lie to us, do not have the sense of honor, do not respect the moral code regarding the relations with us; they are aggressive and expansionists, they want to progress on our behalf; they are hostile and they hate us, they are immoral and dirty spiritually.

¹⁵⁴ In the same time we presume that for the first three, such as honest, kind and hearty, could interfere the effect of order, these being on the first positions on the list presented by the subjects. (See annexes 1-5)

ethnic group in a specific role situations: as a marital partner, as a neighbor, as a friend, however the general ethnic stereotypes are referring to the attributed characteristics of the ethnic group, indifferent to the concrete situation in which this is manifesting. A series of psychological researches point out the importance, that the ethnic contextual stereotypes studies have, and referring to the „situation person“, it offers more information regarding the effective behavior comparing to the general stereotypes.¹⁵⁵

Interethnic perceptions. Conclusions

- ***The taboo of „the other“.*** Having the relatively high proportion of answers *don't know/ no answer*, we emphasize the lack of perceptive organizations, caused by either the lack of information regarding certain ethnic groups, or by a certain type of *defending mechanism*, manifested through the avoidance of pronouncing about the group, even the taboo „of the other“.
- ***The lack of clear tendencies of stereotyping:*** we can discuss on some clear tendencies in stereotyping more in the case of Moldavians and Russians, and in all other cases perception is very differentiated, without having identified some tendencies.
- ***A common autostereotype:*** we have found the presence of a common autostereotype to each ethnic group, respectively, *honest, kind, hearty, joyful and diligent* are features that appear in relatively similar proportions to all of the groups.
- ***Moldavians are not as hospitable:*** they are perceived as being as *diligent*, but what happened with the proverb of „hospitability“? While 41% of respondents Moldavians/Romanians consider that this is a specific attribute of Moldavians, just 11% Ukrainians, 9% Russians, 8% Bulgarians and 5% Gagauz consider them likewise.
- ***This kind of Moldavians:*** Romanians are seen *educated, independent and civilized*, but the representation about Romanians is still in the development, without being sufficient structured in the collective mentality.
- ***A sentiment of frustration:*** In the negative autostereotype of Moldavians (Romanians), we find the presence of some attributes that send to the lack of cohesion and solidarity in the ingroup, but Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „others“ *united!* The attribution of the characteristic *disunited* of its own group and the idealized reflection of the opposite – „they are *united*“ – for others; we consider the essence of a strong sentiment of frustration.
- ***What has left from the mentality of „the older brother“?*** Russians consider themselves *civilized* (17%) and *educated* (18%), being generally considered the same by Ukrainians (16%) and Gagauz (15%) and less than Moldavians (Romanians). These qualities do not appear on the first positions, neither in the autostereotype (position 5, 6), nor in the heterostereotype (5, 6, 7).
- ***There does not exist a representation about the Gagauz and the Bulgarians:*** the Gagauz and Bulgarians are ignored and marginalized, the subjects had less to tell about them. The Bulgarians' image is build mostly by Gagauz and the reverse.

¹⁵⁵ S.Chelcea, *Reprezentarea socială a identității naționale a românilor*, Sociologie Românească, 1994, 2-3, 194-196.

They and us – mirror images: where do we end and where does the alteration begin?

If each ethnic group is creating stereotypes about themselves, and about others, by how much the ingroup stereotyping is reflecting in the outgroup one?¹⁵⁶ We tried to represent the qualities and the defects of each ethnic group, according to the autostereotype in order to surprise which of these are attributed to others, correspondingly what is common and what is different in the autoperception. Thus, the attributed qualities and defects have been selected for the belonging group, as well as for the first and second choice, which had a percent of over 10. Afterwards there have been analyzed the qualities and defects, that appear in the autostereotype, and respectively, the ones that are attributed to other ethnic groups. Starting from the perception effect of the dissimilarity „they are different from us“, we have applied this procedure because we considered that the proportion of some qualities or defects from the autostereotype in heterostereotype, represents a factor of a perceptive similitude that contribute to the closeness or marginalization of some groups regarding others, as well as an indicator of social integration.

Moldavians (Romanians) about Them and about Others

The Other one like us. The autostereotype of Moldavians/Romanians is referred to the following attributes: *diligent* (57%), *hospitable* (41%), *obedient* (30%), *joyful* (28%), *kind*(27%), *hearty* (23%), *honest* (22%), *disunited* (19%), *religious* (18%), *procrastinators* (18%), *indifferent* (15%), *selfish* (14%), *educated* (13%), *thieves* (13%), *resourceful* (12%), *backward* (11%), *sad* (11%), *aggressive* (10%). The autostereotype of Moldavians/Romanians is referring to the following attributes: the closest to this autostereotype proved to be the heterostereotype for the Ukrainians – 10 common characteristics, from which 6 qualities and 4 defects: *diligent* (16%), *hospitable* (11%), *joyful* (19%), *kind* (10%), *hearty* (10%), *honest* (12%), *indifferent* (11%), *selfish* (12%), *resourceful* (12%) and *aggressive* (14%) are the attributes identified in the heterostereotype of Moldavians/Romanians regarding Ukrainians. In the Heterostereotype for Russians we have delimited 7 common features – 4 qualities and 3 defects: *joyful* (24%), *honest* (13%), *indifferent* (14%), *educated* (11%), *hospitable* (11%), *selfish* (17%), *resourceful* (26%) and *aggressive* (31%). The least common attributes are emphasized in the heterostereotype for the Gagauz and Bulgarians. Otherwise, in the case of the heterostereotype regarding Bulgarians and Gagauz, is remarked the relatively high proportion of choices such as *don't know/ no answer* (more than 60%). Thus, in a smaller common proportion for Moldavians and Gagauz, according to the heterostereotype, are the attributes: *diligent* (8%), *resourceful* (8%) and *aggressive* (11%), for Bulgarians it is mentioned just *diligent* (9%).

The other different from us – „They are all united, we are disunited“. Generally, Moldavians/Romanians do not consider them as *independent*, quality attributed to Russians and Ukrainians, and not even *united*, characteristic met on a higher proportion in heterostereotype for each of the ethnic mentioned groups.

¹⁵⁶ A. A. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, p. 236.

Ukrainians about themselves and others

The other like us. In the autostereotype of Ukrainians, we identify with a higher frequency 18 attributes, from which 12 are positive – an accentuated ingroup favoritism. Ukrainians perceive themselves: *honest* (27%), *diligent* (50%), *kind* (26%), *joyful* (24%), *hearty* (23%), *superstitious* (20%), *united* (20%), *procrastinators* (16%), *hospitable* (14%), *obedient* (14%), *sad* (14%), *loyal* (13%), *religious* (13%), *disunited* (11%), *selfish* (11%), *intelligent* (11%), *educated* (10%), *resourceful* (10%), *backward* (10%). They utilize a large palette of attributes for the description of the „other“. According to the number of common attributes, we could mention that the closest one could be Moldavians, because Ukrainians identify 15 similar features with the ones in autostereotype. However if we analyze the proportion of qualities, we find out the presence of a favoritism of the group, regarding other Slavic, Russian and Bulgarian groups. Hence, according to the positive heterostereotype, closest ones are Russians (10 qualities) and Bulgarians (10 qualities). Ukrainians consider Russians and Bulgarians to be *joyful*, *hearty*, *united*, *resourceful*, *hospitable* etc. Analyzing the negative autostereotype and heterostereotype, we are pointing out seven common defects for Moldavians (*superstitious*, *procrastinators*, *obedient*, *disunited*, *backward* *sad* and *selfish*), five defects for Bulgarians (*superstitious*, *procrastinators*, *obedient*, *disunited* and *backward*), three for Russians (*superstitious*, *procrastinators* and *selfish*) and two for the Gagauz (*procrastinators* and *backward*).

The other different from us – another does not really exist. Analyzing autostereotype and heterostereotype of Ukrainians regarding other ethnic groups, we conclude that Ukrainians utilize approximately same positive attribution, negative for the description of the ingroup and of the other ethnic groups, exception being Russians, who are perceived to be *lazy* and Gagauz, Bulgarians and Moldavians who are considered uneducated.

Russians about them and others

The other one like us. A higher proportion has been identified in the autostereotype of Russians regarding 17% of presented attributes, 10 qualities and 7 defects. Russians consider themselves to be *honest* (26%), *hearty* (26%), *joyful* (21%), *kind* (32%), *independent* (18%), *educated* (18%), *civilized* (17%), *diligent* (15%), *resourceful* (14%), *intelligent* (12%), *aggressive* (17%), *indifferent* (13%), *obedient* (13%), *lazy* (13%), *procrastinators* (12%), *united* (10%), *selfish* (10%) and *uneducated* (11%). Among the qualities there are mentioned, a series of attributes, such as *civilized*¹⁵⁷, *intelligent*, that are not attributed to other ethnic groups. Could these be the reminiscences of the mentality of an „older brother“, who is civilized and superior to others? The closest ones to the autostereotype of Russians are the Ukrainians, in their heterostereotype we have identifies 12 common attributes, eight qualities– *honest* (10%), *kind* (26%), *hearty* (22%), *diligent* (19%), *resourceful* (18%), *joyful* (27%) etc., and four defects – *aggressive* (11%), *selfish* (16%), *procrastinators* (11%) and *indifferent* (10%). Afterwards, in the heterostereotype of Moldavians have been identifies 11 common attributes indicated by Russians and in the autostereotype – 5 qualities:

¹⁵⁷ Exception being Romanians.

honest (25%), *kind* (42%), *hearty* (26%), *joyful* (29%) and *diligent* (43%), and 6 defects: *selfish* (12%), *aggressive* (18%), *uneducated* and others.

To the Gagauz and the Romanians there have been attributed seven common qualities to each, among the ones attributed by Russians to Russians. In the heterostereotype of Gagauz we identify six qualities, present in the heterostereotype of Moldavians and Ukrainians, such as *honest* (10%), *hearty* (10%), *resourceful* (11%), *diligent* (12%) etc., even so we learn that the proportion is much lower comparing to their frequencies from the heterostereotype from the mentioned groups. Generally, it is observed that a higher proportion of non-answers, regarding the Gagauz, with 53% for the positive attributes and 55% for the negative ones. Among the three qualities attributed to the Romanians, such as *honest* (14%), *independent* (12%) and *civilized* (21%), the last one is mentioned just in the heterostereotype of Romanians, without being mentioned in a significant proportion in the heterostereotype of other ethnic groups.

The Other one different from us – „we are intelligent, and they are religious“. Russians perceive themselves as intelligent, quality that is not attributes to others, as we mentioned above. They consider others as being *backward* (Moldavians), *superstitious* (Moldavians, Ukrainians), *united* (Gagauz and Bulgarians) and *religious* (Moldavians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians).

Gagauz about themselves and about the others

The other one like us.

As we mentioned previously, the Gagauz avoid formulating some opinions about the habits characteristic to its own group, and to other ethnic categories, especially about defects. *Diligent* (32%), *honest* (27%), *kind* (24%), *hearty* (21%), *educated* (18%), *joyful* (17%), *religious* (13%), *loyal* (12%), *resourceful* (10%) and *selfish* (10%) are the attributes that register higher frequencies among choices. All the mentioned qualities are found approximately with the same amount in heterostereotypes.

The other one different from us. If there are no huge differences regarding the positive stereotypes, then the negative heterostereotype are more emphasized. Thus, Russians are *indifferent and lazy*, Bulgarians – *indifferent and selfish*, and Moldavians – *backward and uneducated*.

Bulgarians about themselves and about the others.

The other one like us. Bulgarians and Ukrainians utilize a larger palette of attributes for the description of their own group, as well as other ethnic groups discussed in the present study. Generally, the percent obtained for the mentioned qualities is relatively small; there is no amount of attributes as in the case of the autostereotype of Moldavians and Russians. We ask ourselves if this perceptive complexity is caused by the experience, that changes the traditional stereotypes, or, the opposite, is caused by the ambiguity determined by the lack of an organization at the level of mentality of some stereotypes. Bulgarians see themselves as: *diligent* (41%), *kind* (25%), *honest* (21%), *hearty* (17%), *disunited* (18%), *educated* (17%), *obedient* (17%), *joyful* (15%), *loyal* (14%), *resourceful* (14%),

modest (13%), *indifferent* (12%), *united* (11%), *procrastinators* (11%), *religious* (10%), *selfish* (10%), *backward* (11%), *sad* (11%), *superstitious* (11%), *vainglorious* (11%) and *uneducated* (10%). It is also remarked a high level of resemblance regarding the autostereotype and heterostereotypes. Approximately same numbers of mentions for qualities and defects is found in the image of Bulgarians about them and others.

The other one different from us – is the other one more civilized? The only attribute that is reflected in the relatively small proportion of the image about themselves (just 6%), but it is mentioned in the stereotype about others is *civilized*. Bulgarians consider civilized Romanians (16%), Russians (16%), Moldavians (11%), Ukrainians (9%) and the Gagauz (10%).

Us and them – mirror images: conclusions

We synthesize the following aspects from what has been resumed previously in the study:

- According to the autostereotype and heterostereotype, and the number of common attributes, „closer“ to Moldavians/Romanians proved to be Ukrainians and Russians, and „further away“ – Bulgarians and Gagauz;
- Generally, Moldavians/Romanians do not consider themselves *independent*, the attributed quality to Russians and Ukrainians, and not even *united*, characteristic more often found in a higher proportion in heterostereotype for other ethnic groups;
- For Ukrainians, the closest ones seem to be Moldavians, however if we analyze the proportion of qualities, we learn the presence of a group favoritism regarding other Slavic, Russians and Bulgarian groups;
- We find out that Ukrainians utilize approximately same positive attributes, but negative as well, in order to describe its ingroup, and other ethnic groups; with the exception that Russians are perceived as *lazy*, but Gagauz, Bulgarians and Moldavians – *uneducated*;
- The closest ones to the Russians' autostereotype are Ukrainians, then Moldavians; we can observe a high proportion of non-answers regarding the Gagauz, and Moldavians are considered *civilized*, which is not a significant attribute in the heterostereotype of other ethnic groups;
- Russians perceive them as being *intelligent*, quality that is not attributed in a significant proportion; they consider others as *backward* (Moldavians), *superstitious* (Moldavians, Ukrainians), *united* (Gagauz and Bulgarians) and *religious* (Moldavians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians);
- The qualities mentioned by the Gagauz are found with approximately same proportion in the heterostereotypes, however the negative heterostereotypes are more emphasized: Russians are *indifferent and lazy*, Bulgarians *indifferent and selfish*, and Moldavians *backward and uneducated*;
- Bulgarians, as well as Ukrainians, utilize a large palette of attributes for the description of its own group, as well as of other ethnic groups, but the percent is relatively small, there does not exist a weight of some attributes such as the case of Moldavian and Russians autostereotype; we presume that this is caused by either the experience,

that changes the traditional stereotypes, or the lack of a stereotypic organization at the rational level;

- An attribute that can be found in a relatively small proportion in the Bulgarian stereotype about Bulgarians (just 6%), but it is mentioned in the stereotype about others is *civilized* (Romanians 16%, Russians 16%, Moldavians 11%, Ukrainians 9% and Gagauz 10%).

The Contact Hypothesis

If you obligate people to build a tower together you will then change them in brothers, but if you want, people to hate each other just throw them a hand of seeds
(A. de S.Exupery)

If the experimental researches show that among groups it is very easy to install attitudes and negative representations, the question then arises if it can change as easy. In 1954, the Court Supreme of USA decides that the school systems that have discrimination between black students and white students violate a series of articles from the American constitution. At the base of this thinking was the idea that the segregation between whites and ethnic minorities diminishes their chances of success and perpetuates prejudices and intolerance. Gordon W. Allport publishes the book *The Nature of Prejudice*, in which he makes an analysis of intergroup stereotypes and points out diverse recommendations to eliminate it. The assembly of these recommendations is known as *the contact hypothesis*, according to which the intergroups contact eliminates or reduce the prejudices and hostilities between the groups. The contact hypothesis postulates the idea that stereotypes are erroneous and thus, if stereotypes are the result of the lack of correct and sufficient information, and/or of the presence of some misleading information regarding the group, the solution consists in offering contact occasions and to misplace so the inexact perceptions¹⁵⁸. Even though Allport emphasizes the simple fact that groups are getting in contact it is not sufficient to reintegrate the harmony; contrary, the simple gatherings, without positive interdependency, represent for the hostile groups as many occasions to meet its rivals.

The simple contact is not a panacea

The contact has the anti-discriminatory efficiency if it is oriented towards meeting some common objectives, it has to be systematic and long-lasting, the superficial meetings that do not reduce the negative attitudes, the contacts among the unequal groups as prestige and social power do not really succeed in diminishing negative stereotype, the intergroup relations have to be encouraged and supported by the official authorities. An experiment realized with student groups (Kțoeva, 1986) had the purpose to research the type of modification of a negative ethno-stereotype in the conditions of a common group activity, having multinational component to it, with participants from four ethnic com-

¹⁵⁸ V. Yzerbut și G. Schadron, Cunoașterea și judecarea celuilalt, Iași, Polirom, 2002.

munities. The research was based on the description of the belonging group, and of other ethnic groups at the beginning of the practice period, and at its end (after 2 months). It has been found that a change of attributed from the „other“ portrait to the positive pole, at the end of the period in place of ambivalence or a unfavorable features in the image about „the other“ from the beginning of the period. The author's conclusion was that this is caused by the common activity, a progressive knowledge and close relationships¹⁵⁹.

T. F. Pettigrew (1997) has learned, by surveying 4000 European citizens, that the reduction of negative stereotype regarding other cultural groups is correlated not only with the number of outgroups friends of the respondent, but also with the experience that others from its own group have same friendships. This study demonstrated the contact hypothesis, proving that not only direct contact with the members from other groups contribute to the reduction of negative stereotypes, but also the fact that we know that in our group there are people who have positive relations with them. Although the conclusion of close relationships (friendships, successful marriages) between the members of different groups cannot contribute all the time to the reduction of stereotypes, the justification mechanism of these exceptional causes can lead to their conservation¹⁶⁰.

The model of ingroup identity proposed by Gaerner and other (1993) represents a continuation of the contact hypothesis, betting on the re-categorization mechanism, at the re-drawing of the borders between „us“ and „them“.¹⁶¹

Cooperation and integration. Recommendations

The main conclusion from this study is the sentiment of marginalization and isolation felt by Gagauz and Bulgarians. All the discussion with ethnic component to it after 1989 have been referred to Moldavians (Romanians) and Russians. There have been discussion about Gagauz at the beginning of the 90's, and after 1994 there were discussion on their voting pattern. We know less about Bulgarians. It happens that everybody „knows“ Moldavians (Romanians) and Russians, and so they know the evident tendencies in their stereotyping. Regarding Bulgarians and Gagauz there is no image, neither positive, not negative. Thus, it is imposing the assurance of adequate condition for he cultural development of the population belonging to these ethnic minorities, as well as for leaning Romanian and the realization of some activities (common projects) of integration, that would diminish the sentiment of marginalization and contribute to the consolidation of the perception of a citizen with equal rights.

The need of „us“ – supraordinated

Even if some differences are attested in stereotyping, there still exists some common tendencies that express through the attribution of common qualities: *kind, honest, hearty, diligent*. Therefore, we can conclude that a type of common perception of co -living ethnicities could exist, with some reminiscences from „the older brother“ in the case of

¹⁵⁹ I. Radu, Psihologie socială. Cluj-Napoca, EXE SRL, 1994.

¹⁶⁰ P. Iluș, Valori, atitudini și comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie, Polirom, Iași, 2004.

¹⁶¹ Ibidem.

Russians. Even is this perception is common, the rapport is made in ethnic sense: *we Russians, we Ukrainians...etc. we are kind, honest, hearty* and we miss this „we Moldavians...“; in the sense of the inhabitants of R. of Moldova, the citizens of this state. We still consider that the presence of this common attributes constitute a premise for the outline of us supraordinated. The common projects have to be oriented toward the development of the belonging sentiment of us supraordinated.

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ETHNIC/NATIONAL^{162*}

IDENTITY AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Loretta Handrabura

Under the pressure of the geopolitical changes that have shaken the world and, implicitly, the Republic of Moldova within the last decades, identity discourse makes its presence felt more and more obviously. Identity is being rethought versus alterity, but also with regard to ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship, in order to make a clear distinction between the concepts and to exclude any risk of unfounded interpretation and unjustified conflict at such levels as the interpersonal, ethnic-group, or national one.

In our case, that of a borderline zone with a „specific“ historical destiny, this topic is alternatively heavily or lightly stressed, depending on the historical period when the *identity of the prevalent ethnic group* is discussed. Today the issue is still spoken of in academic circles, in the media, at scholarly events – symposia, congresses, conferences, seminars – yet it is carefully disguised, if mentioned at all, during political and diplomatic events of any scale.

It has to be said that a significant segment of population, particularly the inhabitants of rural areas, do not show interest for this issue. According to them, it is insignificant, compared to other issues, as economic or social ones (e.g., unemployment, very low living standards, migration etc.), which become more and more acutely felt every year, although the government reports an improvement of living in the last five years. A part of the young people – especially those who had been caught by the wave of national renaissance and those whose schooling took place mostly after 1989 – together with that active segment of our society that is keen to manifest a national civic conscience are ready to admit that we, the native population of Moldova, have not yet surpassed the „crisis of identity“ we had been facing for centuries. The tension generated by the crisis is due to the „rupture“ of values consecutive to the shifting from an autocratic system of communist type to a democratic one. Since 2001 the latter became quite an oxymoronic mixture of communism and democracy that made us known in the world.

If we subscribe to the hypothesis¹⁶³ according to which every balanced period of time – one of continuous growth and clear rules, of stable politics and legitimate institutions – is complemented by a set of categories shared by the majority and contains a strongly interiorised symbolic system of designation and classification, we realise that the breaking of this balance is an important and specific dimension of the crisis.¹⁶⁴ *The reversal of*

¹⁶² * Etymologically, *ethnic* is the same as *national*: yet the latter will also continue to have the meanings bestowed upon it by political and social ideologies.

¹⁶³ Cf. Claude Dubar, *Criza identităților. Interpretarea unei mutații* (Chișinău: Știința, 2003), p. 15-16.

¹⁶⁴ „Identity becomes an object of interest and analysis there only where it ceases to be understood on its own, where common sense is no more pre-given and where actors do not succeed any longer in agreeing over the significance of the situation and over the roles they are supposed to play.“ (Michaël PoLLack, *L'expérience concentrationnaire. Essai sur le maintien de l'identité sociale*. Paris: A.-M. Métailié, 1990, p. 10).

norms, models, and terminology brings about a destabilisation of references, names, and former systems of symbols: this very destabilisation, confusion, uncertainty are clearly demonstrated by some answers of the Ethno-Barometer's respondents.

Accordingly, the „self-searching“ of the quantitative ethnic majority continues to electrify discussions and ignite the spirits.¹⁶⁵ It is noticeable at both the interpersonal and inter-group level, being alimanted and strategically and ideologically sustained by the national (Moldavian, that is) policy of the communist government since 2001, although after the national elections of March 6 2005 the voices denying the linguistic and ethnic identity of the ethnic majority with the Romanian people have apparently quieted down for well-known reasons, as a consequence of the declared option for the European vector and, obviously, of the change of optics in the relationship with the Ukrainian and Romanian neighbours, the latter having been accused several years ago in the European Parliament by the former Minister of Justice Ion Morei of „meddling into the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova“.

Even 15 years after declaring its independence, Moldova remains one of the few Eastern-European countries where the politic elite and the cultural elite do not agree upon the foundations of national culture. „Only in Moldova“, as Charles King justly observes in a study of the relationship between national identity, nation building, political tradition and cultural tendency, „there is still a clear distinction between strong groups whose members have divergent opinions concerning the fundamental problem of the meaning of belonging to an ethnic group that also gave its name to the country.“¹⁶⁶

Following the stated situation, our reference objectives for this study are:

- *Analysing the identity construction (self-identification) and the plurality of the ethnic image of the „Moldavian“ majority*
- *Researching the self- and hetero-representation of the five ethnic groups involved in the Ethno-Barometer questionnaire (Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes and Bulgarians) as elements of ethnic identity.*

I. The ethnic/national identity of the prevalent population of the Republic of Moldova

1.1 The building of the „Moldavian“ identity – a sinusoidal political artifice

The ethnic gaps of the past and of nowadays, seen in the native population of the Republic of Moldova, may and must be explained only through the objective prism of history and of the events that were circumscribed to the problem of identity. We believe that a brief retrospective is required in this case, even if it might risk becoming superfluous sometimes, given the number of literature concerning the theory of Moldavian identity.

¹⁶⁵ The generally promoted idea is that „identity is like a tooth: it only becomes a problem when it hurts“ (see Vintilă Mihăiescu, *Foreword to the Romanian edition*, in John Rex, *Rasă și etnie* (București: Du Style, 1998), p. 16). For us, the prevalent ethnic group of the Moldova situated between the Prut and the Dniestr, this controversial problem has been a sort of „Achilles' heel“ since 1812.

¹⁶⁶ Charles King, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica culturală* (Chișinău: Arc, 2002), p. 231.

It will also contain some personal accents. This digression will also allow us to understand both the confusion and the ethno-identification option of the Moldavians/Romanians involved in the study.

As historiography shows, the problem of identity exists for nearly two centuries, with a certain specific emphasis, given Russia's 1812 annexation of the Moldova between Prut and Dniestr and the prolongation of this statute until the fall of the Soviet regime.

The persistence of this topic until nowadays both on the political agenda and on the scientific and cultural one is determined, first of all, by the *political factor*, represented by Communists and pro-Russian formations, supported from outside of the country. They track their pro-Moldavian position from the well-known Soviet ideology, which has been methodically promoted and inoculated by all possible means before 1988, in order to hinder the clear affirmation of Romanity and Romanism on this territory.

We speak, of course, of the five decades of Soviet occupation that had favoured the consolidation of a Moldovenist theory. The intellectual precursors of this fabrication – A. Lazarev, N. Mohov, I. Grosu, Afteniuc, V. Stati, V. Senic etc. – have set the foundations of „Moldovenism“, through which an attempt is made to a „scholarly“ justification of a centuries-long existence of a „Moldavian state“ and „Moldavian language“. The central idea of this theory is that Moldavians are not Romanians, and that Romanians are of an anti-Moldavian disposition. In order to secure the continuous evolution of the „Moldavian state“, speculations were made between 1995 and 2002-2003 about the fact that the separation of the Moldavians living on the left bank of the Prut from the Romanians inhabiting the right bank was beneficial, particularly since the „Moldavian nation“ had strong (esp. economic) ties with CIS nations.¹⁶⁷

Between 1988 and 1991 a series of events occurred that were circumscribed to the troublesome itinerary of the indigenous inhabitants of the RSSM, which were then called „Moldavians“, towards their identification with the Romanians as a nation. We refer to the return to Romanian language and Latin-based alphabet (August 31 1989); the adopting of the Romanian tricolour flag with the heraldic symbol of Moldova (the head of a *bour*, a native bison-like species) and of the Romanian anthem *Deșteaptă-te, române* („Awake, O Romanian“); the change of the country's name from RSSM to Republic of Moldova (May 23 1991); the proclamation of national sovereignty (June 23 1990) and independence (August 27 1991); the law of citizenship, adopted in June 1991, one of the most generous of its kind in Eastern Europe, giving the right to Moldavian citizenship automatically to all citizens living in Moldova by the date of the declaration of sovereignty (June 23 1990), regardless of ethnicity, language and other criteria (the law „Concerning the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova, June 5 1991). All these events were essential changeovers in the historical and political evolution of Bessarabia, and were perceived as such also by foreign authors¹⁶⁸.

Yet the national movement at the end of the 1990s had as its initial mobile the rejection of the differentiation between Moldavians and Romanians. In the eyes of certain Westerners,¹⁶⁹ the national movement has been nothing else but a mass „confession“ that, despite decades of Soviet propaganda, Moldavians were actually Romanians.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Iftene Pop, *Basarabia din nou la răscruce* (București: Demiurg, 1995), p. 11.

¹⁶⁸ Klaus Heitman, *Limbă și politică în Republica Moldova* (Chișinău: Arc, 1998), p. 130.

¹⁶⁹ The *New York Times*, February 25th, 1990, apud Klaus Heitman, quoted above.

Nevertheless, the issue of the „Moldavians“ national identity would keep returning after 1991, making itself noticeable in political discourse and in the media, and always present in philology and history. The „true“ ethnicity of the Moldavians, seen as *de dicto*, not *de iure*, has been the object of many controversies in the republic. After the declaration of independence the Moldavian political evolution was featured by repeated disputes between factions embracing radically opposite conceptions concerning „Moldovenism“.

The „crossroad“ moment, when the balance between different components of ethnic identity broke, occurred after the Parliament elections of February 27 1994. It was then that the parliamentary majority, belonging to the Agrarian party, and the deputies of the Interfront faction openly displayed themselves as „anti-Romanians“. Embracing Moldovenism as a state ideology is back into fashion again, particularly since it is „opportune in their tendency to remain in governing and respond to any Moscow services“.¹⁷⁰

The development principles of a state policy concerning „the building of a Moldavian conscience“, „the saving of statehood, integrity and sovereignty of the state“ were backed by *Pro-Moldova*, a patriotic movement initiated by the pseudo-historian and pseudo-philologist V. State. He even hammered together a book dedicated to the new state ideology, called *Moldovenii în istorie* („The Moldavians in History“), and published it under the eloquent pseudonym *P. P. Moldovan*. One of the ideas this book promoted was that „the students and teachers who do not respect the Moldavians' right to remain a nation distinct from the Romanians“ ought to be barred from the teaching process.

Mircea Snegur was to pay tribute to the same ideology when promoting Moldovenist theses at the so-called congress *Our Home — the Republic of Moldova* (February the 5th, 1994). By this discourse he demolished all his former „oeuvre“, as did I. Druță, H. Corbu and other intellectuals. His arguments concerning the „viability of the centuries-long tradition of our statehood“ and „the legitimacy and the historical basis of our right to be a state, to be called the Moldavian nation“¹⁷¹ did puzzle a large segment of population, which, after years of denial, obstruction and annulment of the generic national being had redefined its belonging in 1989 by identifying with the Romanian nation.

The insistent underlining of the national – Romanian – identity, although natural after decades of official „Sovietisation“, has often inspired fear among ethnic minorities and is counted among the main causes of the unrest in the first years of independence. The ongoing debate about the definition of the „nation“ concept, taking place between the ethnic minorities (over a third of population) and the majority, has strong reasons.

The ethnic minorities representing other states – Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Poles, Jews etc. – were worried about the fact that the affirmation of the national identity of the Republic of Moldova at the end of the 1980s would endanger the relative interethnic stability, which had „dominated“, being well directed and kept under control, during the URSS period, particularly through cultural policy and the protecting „Elder Brother“ theory.

¹⁷⁰ Maria Neagu, „Identitatea românilor basarabeni între speculații politice și adevăr istoric“, in *Unitatea națională a românilor între ideal și realitate. Materialele Dezbaterilor Naționale*, București, 27-28 martie 2001 și Chișinău 9-11 aprilie 2001. Chișinău, 2001, p. 168.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Marian Enache, Dorin Cimpoieșu, *Misiune diplomatică în Republica Moldova 1993-1997*, Iași: Polirom, 2000, pp. 304-311.

The national Constitution that was promulgated in 1994 and had been modified and completed until October 11 2004 does not contain any mention that ethno-national identity is the defining feature of the state. The Constitution repeatedly employs the term „the people of the Republic of Moldova“, in order to avoid allusions to any connection between state and ethnicity.¹⁷²

The legitimization of the Moldovenist theory through the Preamble and the 13th and 118th Articles of the Constitution is another chapter that has to be taken into account in this game of identities. The notions of „Moldavian people“ and „Moldavian language“ are legitimised against historical and academic truth. To this day, they are promoted by the sustainers of Communists and of the political parties or unions that tend towards extremism, as *Patria Rodina*, *Edinstvo*, *Ravnopravie*, but also by other factions that made a political capital by tacitly accepting the concession.

Two other meaningful moments state a group's political intention of methodically inculcating, through the media and through pretended academic investigation (the latter being fabricated on political orders), the idea of a new, „Moldavian“, nation. The first is the publishing in 2003 of the so-called *Moldavian-Romanian Dictionary* by that prolific exponent of Moldovenism, V. Stati. Through this book „the historical and ethno-cultural parameters of the national language of the Moldavian people are being reconfirmed, together with a disclosure of the expansionist and nationalistic essence of the various re-christeners and foreign falsifiers of fundamental Romanian values“¹⁷³. Another is the replacement in loyal schools of the *Romanian History* course by a course of *Integrated History*.

After the 2005 elections the members of the parliamentary factions PPCD and PSL, known for their combating spirit and pro-Romanian option, have renounced to insist any longer on this vulnerable subject. They allowed themselves to be convinced by the President V. Voronin, whom they had sustained during the April 4 2005 elections, that there are issues much more stringent than history and the correct name of a language, although these were issues explicitly and implicitly concerning the identity of the ethnic majority.

Therefore, as the above excursus infers, the policy proclaiming the individuality of the „Moldavian people“, appeared from a rationing for the justification of the old Russian policy in a new conjuncture, is only meant to sustain a political ambition in an ambiguous situation – a situation of new perturbations in the comparatively stabilised (at the beginning of the 1990s) relationship between certain elements that structure the ethno-identity and/or the nationality of the majority. Apparently, this situation is becoming normality.

1.2 Discord in ethno-identity representation

Despite the steady efforts of the new „Moldavian nation“ pioneers, the identity (and, implicitly, nationality) confusion of the ethnical majority is usually evident in any polls including questions about ethnicity/nationality or cultural identity. For instance, the poll organised between May 3 and 9 2004 within the project *Tolerance and social integration. Information and formation* included 94 Education, Psychology and Philology students from

¹⁷² *Constituția Republicii Moldova*, Chișinău: Moldpress, 1994; Moldpress, 2004.

¹⁷³ V. Stati, *Dicționar moldovenesc-românesc*, Chișinău, 2003, p. 9.

the State Pedagogical University „Ion Creangă“ of Chişinău, aged 18 to 25. 4 of the questioned students identified themselves as Romanian, 89 – as Moldavian, and 1 as Ukrainian.

Within another module of the same project, *Intercultural education for the understanding of alterity*, 16 teachers from rural, district and urban schools gave to the initial assessment questionnaire the following answers (on May 10 2005):

Ethnicity (nationality): Moldavian – 11, Romanian – 5 (with specifications as „Bessarabian Romanian“ or „Romanian – Moldavian“)

Cultural identity: Moldavian – 2, „a Romanian’s“, – 2, „Romanian“ – 4, „Romanian culture“ – 2; together – 8.

„I am an intellectual formed by Romanian, Russian, and world literature“ – 1

No answer – 5

Linguistic competence: native language Romanian – 14, Russian – 2.

What language do you prefer to communicate in? Romanian – 16, Russian – 4.

These results are by no means representative as a sample and thus cannot be taken for a basis. We only referred to them in order to show an example of the incertitude to be found in an occasional group of intellectuals concerning the correlation between ethnicity (nationality) and cultural identity. Only for two respondents out of the eleven self-declared *Moldavians* ethno-identity coincided with cultural identity. Three *Moldavians* assumed Romanian cultural values, one related himself to more than one culture, and five teachers (of Romanian language and literature) provided no answer.

It is also worth noticing that 14 teachers had named *Romanian* as their native language, and all 16 respondents indicated as favourite language of communication the *Romanian*, not *Moldavian*, idiom, although it is under the latter name that it appears in the Constitution. We believe the obtained information is important also as a psycho-social phenomenon – identity itself being defined as a psycho-social variable – from which it becomes clearly visible that the members of the ethnic majority still do not succeed to agree over their common identity. This situation is also evident in the results of the November 2004 population census – how objective and credible are these is altogether another question. The same situation is to be found in *Ethno-Barometer – the Republic of Moldova* and in the data of the *Delphi* study, which was the exploring stage of the *Ethno-Barometer*.

In the *Delphi* study, where the participants were chosen from different realms of social life (political: central and local, mass-media, academic (university), associating medium), 12 of 30 declared themselves Moldavian as ethnicity, 5 as Romanians and the remaining respondents identified with other national groups inhabiting Moldova.

The data collected by the *Ethno-Barometer* will allow a pertinent and complex analysis of this subject. Our intention in this study is to investigate these data, correlating them and other bibliographic¹⁷⁴ resources. A primary objective of this study, developed by IMAS between December 2004 and January 2005, was the *monitoring and assessment*

¹⁷⁴ We refer particularly to Flavius Solomon, *Identitate etnică și minorități în Republica Moldova. O bibliografie*, Iași: Fundația Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, a useful working instrument gathering hundreds of book names concerning the inter-ethnic relationships in Bessarabia and the historical Transnistria; Iulian Frunțașu, *O istorie etnopolitică a Basarabiei (1812-2002)*, Chişinău: Cartier, 2002, and other quoted sources.

of the current ethnic situation in the Republic of Moldova. The ethnic situation can be seen from the answers to the 64 questions asked to 5 sample groups: Moldavians/Romanians (822), Ukrainians (413), Russians (412), Gagauzes (472), and Bulgarians (431).

The very first question (Q1) — *People believe the Republic of Moldova is inhabited by several ethnic groups (Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzes, Bulgarians etc.). How do you perceive yourself?* — reveals an obvious old issue. If the sample groups of Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzes and Bulgarians show 100% identification with their ethnic groups of belonging, then the quantitatively larger sample group is divided thus: 95% call themselves Moldavian and only 5% identify as Romanians.

The percentage differences shown by the prevalent group speak for themselves of a reality whose exponents perceive themselves differently, notwithstanding a communion of nation, territory, culture, and language. In this respect, Al. Zub, the reputable historian from Iași, is right in saying that „Historical conscience is never a definite gain, and the nation — as we know ever since Renan — is continuously ‘plebiscited’”.¹⁷⁵

Concerning the *natural correlation between ethnic identity and native language*, which is interdependent, the situation found is similar to the one noticed in the above-mentioned questionnaires. Thus, of the 95% of respondents declared as Moldavians, only 86% call Moldavian their native language (and only 85% admit to speaking it at home usually), 17% named Romanian as their mother tongue, and 2% said it was Russian.

The ethno-linguistic variable derives also from the answers to Q65 and Q66, both of which concern state languages and what these ought to be. 77% pleaded for Moldavian as a state language; 25% plead for Romanian, 22% — for Russian and 1% each — for Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian. The hypothesis imposing itself (and remaining open, like all other hypotheses) is the following. The oscillation of the group members between Moldavian and Romanian language is due partially to the linguistic policy in the context of the promoted ideology about the Moldavian people, and partially to the indirect disagreement of the Moldavians that the Romanian language is different from Moldavian, and that, respectively, the name of the country (the Republic) ought to coincide *with* / to be found *in* the name of the language.

We find therefore an internal disequilibrium of the prevalent ethnic group concerning the issue of ethnic identity. Generally speaking, as we do not aim to construct theories, this state of affairs fits into a well-recognized and accepted phenomenon. Ethnic type identity has a *cinematic character*, that is — *a character of change and reform through social relationships, since identity is shaped on the basis of certain social processes*. The identified situation can be explained and justified (first of all based on the above historical digression) by the loss in time, due to the historical context, of the founding memory of the ethnic group, the one rewriting history, and the building of another cultural memory of the past, not without the help of interested political forces. Still, at least two other moments must be considered. We mean, of course, the different possibilities of information and formation of the prevalent ethnic group members, a difference that determines the cognition of „us“ versus „others“ and the self-knowledge of „self“ in order to learn the difference, but also the different use and meanings of the word *Moldavian*, which we

¹⁷⁵ Alexandru Zub, *Basarabia în căutarea identității: excurs istoriografic*, in: *Basarabia. Dilemele identității*. Iași: Fundația Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, p. 20.

must take into account when discussing the ethnic and / or linguistic component. Concerning the term *Moldavian*, it may have several meanings and thus perceptions:

- The individuals animated by the national ideal of reintegration into one state entity perceive it as a blasphemy, when used with regard to Romanians living over the Prut.
- Some accept it with its regional meaning, just as Transylvanian, Wallachian etc.
- Others believe that *Moldavian* is naturally included into the term *Romanian*.
- A certain segment of population uses it to designate another ethnic and national category, somewhat different from Romanians.

We can notice from the third hypothesis that all these differences of attitude are ethnically charged and politically loaded. After all, „It is the political loading of ethnicity that creates the anthropological side of nationalism, the one giving birth to xenophobia, extremist intransigency, chauvinism etc.“¹⁷⁶

II. Self- and hetero-image in the construction of ethnic identity

2.1. Self- and hetero-identification of the ethnic groups

Generally, the identity configuration shows an intertwining of identity forms, which can be grouped in two categories: 1. for „oneself“, called *self-image*, 2. for „the other“, known as *hetero-image*. Further, we intend to study the issue of self- and hetero-identification of the ethnic groups of Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes, and Bulgarians by means of certain ethnic and cultural marks.

Almost in all cases when an ethnic group's identity is sought to be re-established, the cultural dimension becomes the starting point. Addressing cultural identity attributes (language, religion, traditions, education, the media) is inevitable, since it is precisely through the cultural pattern of group life that ethnic organization become visible, gets to manifest its similarities and differences vs others. The members of the groups questioned by the *Ethno-Barometer* on this issue have mentioned, too, preponderantly the cultural dimension as an important element of ethnic identification within a larger range of options for Q14 — *According to you, what are the three most important things for one to be considered a Moldavian, Ukrainian etc.* — through which reference to origin, political symbols, and citizenship was made:

- a. to have Moldavian parents
- b. to speak Moldavian/Romanian at home
- c. keep Moldavian customs
- d. to feel Moldavian
- e. to perceive Moldavian culture as his/her own
- f. to perceive Romanian culture as his/her own
- g. to respect the Moldavian national banner
- h. to live in the Republic of Moldova
- i. to have Moldavian/Romanian as native language
- j. to have Moldavian citizenship

¹⁷⁶ Cătălin Turluc, *Etnic și național în Basarabia secolului XX*, in *Basarabia. Dilemele identității*. Iași: Fundația Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, p. 54.

k. to be born in the Republic of Moldova

l. I don't know/no answer provided.


The comparative analysis of the self- and hetero-image of ethnic groups during the study of ethnic identities has allowed us to notice the following tendencies.

I. Each ethnic group has opted for a set of identity elements/indexes, as a rule, both referring to „self“ and „others“. These indexes differ very little as a priority or as a model of founding one's self-identity from one ethnic group to another.


Example: **Moldavians** have opted, for „self“ and for „others“, for **a, b, c**, that is — for *blood relation, language spoken in the family, and customs*. The „others“, on the other hand, found **d** (feel Moldavian) more important than c (keep Moldavian customs).

The three most important things for one to feel MOLDAVIAN

	Moldavians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauzes	Bulgarians
a. To have Moldavian parents	51%	40%	45%	48%	55%
b. to speak Moldavian/Romanian at home	48%		33%	32%	35%
c. to keep Moldavian customs	36%	30%			
d. to feel Moldavian			37%	29%	36%
e. to perceive Moldavian culture as his/her own					
f. to perceive Romanian culture as his/her own					
g. to respect the Moldavian national banner					
h. to live in the Republic of Moldova					
i. to have Moldavian/Romanian as native language		35%			
j. to have Moldavian citizenship					
k. to be born in the Republic of Moldova					
l. I don't know/no answer provided					



The Moldavians. Self- and hetero-identification.




The ROMANIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.

Romanians, too, are hetero-identified by Moldavians through **a** (to have Romanian parents), **b** (to speak Romanian at home), and **c** (to keep Romanian customs). The other four ethnic groups believe **a**, **b**, and **h** (to have Romanian as native language) to be the proof of ethnic belonging to the Romanian nation.

The three most important things for one to feel ROMANIAN

	Moldavians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauzes	Bulgarians
a. Having Romanian parents	46%	37%	43%	48%	55%
b. Speaking Romanian at home	40%			28%	40%
c. Keeping Romanian customs	34%				32%
d. Feeling Romanian		29%	36%		
e. Perceiving Romanian culture as his/her one					
f. Respecting the Romanian national banner					
g. Living in Romania					
h. Having Romanian as native language		36%	32%	29%	
i. Having Romanian citizenship					
j. Being born in Romania					
k. I don't know/No answer provided					

The **Ukrainians**, the second ethnic group of our study (and the largest Ukrainian minority group in all former URSS republics) believe **a**, **h** (having Ukrainian as native language), and **d** (feeling Ukrainian) important for „self“, but also for Gagauzes, Bulgarians, and Romanians. They insist, therefore, on the *native language and feeling* dimension, combined with a self-conscience of belonging to a distinct ethnic group, while Moldavians and Russians prefer **a**, **i** (keeping customs), and **d**. The „others“ also expect of Ukrainians, beside **a**, **h**, and **d**, also **b** (speaking Ukrainian at home).




The UKRAINIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.

The three most important things for one to feel UKRAINIAN

	Ukrainians	Moldavians	Russians	Gagauzes	Bulgarians
a. Having Ukrainian parents	48%	49%	47%	49%	53%
b. Speaking Ukrainian at home		37%	34%	31%	39%
c. Keeping Ukrainian customs		32%			
d. Feeling a Ukrainian	37%		37%		38%
e. Perceiving Ukrainian culture as his/her own					
f. Respecting the Ukrainian national banner					
g. Living in Ukraina					
h. Having Ukrainian as native language	40%			34%	
i. Having Ukrainian citizenship					
j. Being born in Ukraina					
k. I don't know/no answer					

The **Russians** are the most prominent ethnic minority of Moldova, due to their current position the country's public life, Moscow's insistence on sustaining the rights of the neighbouring countries' Russian-speaking communities, and the dominant statute of Russian culture during URSS rule. They perceive both „themselves“ and the „others“ through **a**, **d**, and **b**. for the „others“, too, a Russian can be identified by **a**, **b**, and **d**.



The RUSSIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.

The three most important things for one to feel RUSSIAN


	Russians	Moldavians	Ukrainians	Gagauzes	Bulgarians
a. Having Russian parents	46%	51%	44%	47%	51%
b. Speaking Russian at home	38%	48%		33% ²	37%
c. Keeping Russian customs		36%	30%	27%	
d. Feeling Russian	42%				36%
e. Perceiving Russian culture as his/her culture					
f. Respecting the Russian national banner					
g. Living in Russia					
h. Having Russian as native language				33% ²	
i. Having Russian citizenship			37%		
j. Being born in Russia					
k. I don't know/no answer provided					

The **Gagauz** people do not form a separate „nation“. Their ethnic and linguistic identity is not elucidated or unanimously accepted until this day, even by the most remarkable representatives of this ethnic group. Similarly to Moldavians, their ethnicity indicators are **a**, **b**, and **c**, which they also mark/suggest for Russians and Bulgarians. For Ukrainians and Romanians they invoke, beside **a** and **b**, **h** — the native language as a


cultural mark; for Moldavians they also suggested **d** (feeling Moldavian). The latter element is to be found also at „others“ conception about the members of the Gagauz ethnic group, along with the three priority criteria, which coincide.

The three most important things for one to feel GAGAUZ

	Gagauzes	Moldavians	Ukrainians	Russians	Bulgarians
a. Having Gagauz parents	56%	48%	39%	47%	55%
b. Speaking Gagauz at home	38%	37%		33%	41%
c. Keeping Gaguz customs	33%	35%			
d. Feeling a Gagauz			25%	34%	36%
e. Perceiving Gagauz culture as his/her own					
f. Respecting the Gagauz national banner					
g. Live in the Gagauz ATU					
h. Having Gagauz as native language			32%		
i. Being born in Gagauzia					
j. I don't know/no answer provided					



The GAGAUZES. Self- and hetero-identification.



The BULGARIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.

For **Bulgarians** parentage, the linguistic component and identification with all Bulgarian (a, b, d) test the belonging to the Bulgarian ethnic group; the same marks were provided from Ukrainians, Moldavians, Russians, and Gagauzes. Only for Romanians c (keeping Romanian customs) was mentioned instead of d (feeling a Romanian). In the eyes of the „others“, a, b, and c are the three forms of identification for Bulgarians.

The three most important things for one to feel BULGARIAN

	Bulgarians	Moldavians	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauzes
a. Having Bulgarian parents	59%	49%	36%	48%	49%
b. Speaking Bulgarian at home	46%	38%		34%	32%
c. Keeping Bulgarian customs		34%			33%
d. Feeling a Bulgarian at heart	38%		25%	36%	
e. Perceiving Bulgarian culture as his/her own					
f. Respecting the Bulgarian national banner					
g. Living in Bulgaria					
h. Having Bulgarian as native language			35%		
i. Having Bulgarian citizenship					
j. Being born in Bulgaria					
k. I don't know/no answer provided					

II. To summarise, all ethnic groups in Moldova tend distinctly towards a (having ... parents), b (speaking [the language] at home), d (feeling a [ethnicity] at heart), then h (having [the language] as a native language), c (keeping the [national] customs), e (perceiving the [national] culture as his/her own). The named indicators concern generally

1) **the blood-relation conscience**; 2) **the family-spoken language conscience**; 3) **the common-destiny conscience** for ethnic minorities, while Moldavians tend to choose for founding their own identity the criterion of respecting national customs.

We must specify that the coexistence of these ethnic groups continues for centuries, and only predominance varies. By the end of the 1980s, for instance, the prevalent ethnic group was first language-conscious, and then nation- and culture-conscious. During the Transnistria War common-destiny conscience prevailed, being expressed by the conscious solidifying of an ethnic segment in its wish to preserve national (territorial) unity with any cost and sacrifice.

Today, in time of peace, but also with an as yet unsolved conflict in the Dniestr region, and with a policy clearly oriented towards the individuality and affirmation of the new „Moldavian nation“, other consciences dominate the minds. According to *Ethno-Barometer* data these are *blood-relation conscience*, followed by *family-spoken-language conscience* and *ethnic-*, or *national-community conscience*. The latter actually integrates the former two in this identity macrosystem. Therefore, as well-known authors have also shown in their exegeses on this topic¹⁷⁷, everything depends on the historical circumstances through which the people of the Republic will live, and one form of conscience will give way to another.

What directly influences the (either negative or positive) self-projection of the individual or of the ethnic group compared to other groups is, first of all, a lack of inter-group consensus. Yet a lack of out-group consensus is to be noticed, too, for instance in the case of the integrating elements of the Moldavians' nationality. Usually, the referential criterion of „self“ – personal identity – appears with a strongly positive projection, similar to that of „ours“ – collective, group identity – compared to „others“, confirming social identity theories. The self-assessments of the ethnic groups and the inter-group assessments from Q11, dimension b-g „*The world would be better if the rest of the people were like the Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians etc. of the Republic of Moldova*“, appear particularly eloquent in this respect.


Simply evoking one ethnic category starts the ecart through comparison as a principle and means of construction of self- and hetero-images. At the same time, it tends to activate the afferent prejudices and their specific corollary, the stereotypes.

Each ethnic group, as it can easily be seen from the following diagram, tends to set itself highest of all. It is a natural inclination of any ethnic group to „overestimate its capacities and values“¹⁷⁸ compared to „others“. This very partiality is the source of positively deformed, ethnocentric self-images.

The Gagauz ethnic group appears to overestimate itself most of all (41%), followed by the Russians (36%). It is known that overestimation belongs to the anthropologic fund, which is common to all ethnic groups. At the same time, it is determined by particular historical and cultural factors, which nourish the intensity of the excessively positive assessment attitudes. Such are, on the one hand, the specific factors of the Gagauz ethnic

¹⁷⁷ We refer to the writings of V. Conta, Ion Petrovici, Nae Ionescu, Mircea Vulcănescu, Constantin Noica, Emil Cioran et al., concerning the Romanian space.

¹⁷⁸ Grigore Georgiu, „Etnocentrismul și paradoxul diversității culturilor“, in *Societate & Cultură*, nr. 4, 1991, p. 27.




group, the only one lacking a metropolis and tending towards self-affirmation, and, on the other hand, those of the Russian ethnic group, which as a nation has been favoured by historical circumstances in different periods and used to have (and still preserves) an important position in the East of Europe.

It is probably due to the privileged position of the Russians in the former URSS, and accordingly due to their culture, well known by the others, to the information concerning them, to their relationships and to the more special and intense contacts that this ethnic group is generally assessed best of all. In this respect, Klaus Heitmann is right in stating: „However doubtful stereotype building upon the global representations of one ethnic group’s about another may be, these stereotypes do nevertheless build upon inter-ethnic encounters and historical experiences resulting either from peaceful exchanges or armed conflicts.“¹⁷⁹

The Gagauz ethnic group is the most underrated of all groups. Bulgarians make the only exception, living next to them in the same region and thus knowing them better. For this reason Bulgarians perceive and estimate the Gagauzes in a more objective manner than Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians or Russians do. These peoples only detain superficial and over-simplified information about the Gagauzes, and thus have a negatively deformed image of them. Generally, the ethnic groups are largely enclosed in enclaves, as the *Delphi* study was ready show. Although they do not have many common values, there are still a few exchanges, some communication and solidarity between them.

In the process of correlating one ethnic group to another – the hetero-image gap is defined by *alter vs ego*, *alter vs others* — or the personal „self“ to the social group one belongs to, the „self“ may attribute to itself either a positive self-identity image or a negative one (of shame for what they have been/have done or are/do, behave among themselves as a community or towards „others“), which clashes with its personal value and principles. We believe that this phenomenon conditions the start-off, existence or lack of an **ethnic and/or national dignity feeling**. This feeling grows and is directly related to the feeling of national/ethnic conscience. The data gathered by the *Ethno-Barometer* are very suggestive in this respect, too, if we analyse the picture shaping on the feeling of pride for one’s ethnic identity and citizenship, for example.

¹⁷⁹ Klaus Heitmann, *Imaginea românilor în spațiul lingvistic german, 1777-1918. Studiu imagologic*. București: Univers, 1985, p. 43.



The ethnic/citizenship feeling


We can see from the above diagram that Moldavians appear to be the ethnic group which is most proud of what it is (66%), compared to other ethnic groups, while Ukrainians appear to show the least pride in this respect (40%). This statement risks to prove irrelevant and even wrong if we stop here and omit a comparative analysis of the answers for „makes me feel ashamed“. So what do we find here?

	<i>Makes me feel proud</i>	<i>Makes me feel ashamed</i>
The fact of being <i>Moldavian/Romanian</i> ...	a total 66% agree	49 % rather agree
The fact of being <i>Ukrainian</i> ...	a total 40% agree	40% totally disagree
The fact of being <i>Russian</i> ...	a total 47% agree	56% totally disagree
The fact of being <i>Gagauz</i> ...	a total 54% agree	58% totally disagree
The fact of being <i>Bulgarian</i> ...	a total 49% agree	61% totally disagree

If for ethnic minorities the correlation between „pride“ and „shame“ shows more or less a feeling of satisfaction for belonging to that given ethnicity, and the feeling is shared by most of the group members, then for Moldavians/Romanians the feeling is clearly oscillating between contentment, satisfaction, trust in the qualities of one's group and disagreement, dissatisfaction and even shame.

In our opinion, the disbalance within the prevalent in-group, once more acknowledged on the *national feeling* dimension, may and must be interpreted in separate studies through the different ways in which group members perceive and assess the past and the chances for future evolution, self-assess their group features and their limits as to the answer given to the challenges of natural and social environment.

Naturally, the self-image of ethnic groups is updated according to the groups' response reactions – either positive or negative – to the challenges of natural and social environment. From this perspective the criteria of assessment for successes and failures, of their acknowledgement or denial appear as fundamental, and the results can lead either to mobilisation for the surpassing of obstacles or to an attitude of discouragement and immobility. Where do we stand ourselves, we, the Moldavians, at the beginning of the 21st century, must be our constant preoccupation and has to be found as an goal in any social policy discourse in order to appreciate objectively the state of things that might



contribute to our cohesion as a group, so that our self-image would cease to be continually „hurt“, vague, and rather negative, but would instead become a positive one.

After all, social practice proves that the ethnic groups with a positive self-image show much more performance than the ones with a negative self-image. Only societies with a positive self-image can enjoy a healthy regime of collective and individual life. Societies with a permanently „bombarded“ (both inside and outside) self-image will be pushed towards obstruction, illness and suffering. In such societies the first thing to collapse will be the „self-respect“¹⁸⁰, which – let us stress it again – is still a problem for us, the ethnic Moldavians. It is high time to solve this problem, and it can only be done if each of us applies their will and effort towards it.


To resume: we believe that the *feeling of pride/dignity* for the quality of being a Moldavian/Romanian, Ukrainian or Gagauz is connected not only with the *blood-relation, culture-communion, destiny* and other *consciences*, but also with *attachment* and *responsibility*; and it generates *patriotism*, too. Taken together, these are indicators of belonging, whether only ethnic or national as well.

The indicators of ethnic/national belonging

2.2 Successive identities

Ethnic identity is only a part of personal identity, but it tends to be more and more important. In ethnic and/or national context, any individual assumes several identities, consciously or unconsciously, asked or not. In the questionnaires we had formerly mentioned, two teachers answered the question concerning ethnicity with the formulas „Roma-

¹⁸⁰ Ilie Bădescu, Dan Dungaciu, Rada Baltasiu, *Istoria sociologiei. Teorii contemporane*. București: Eminescu, 1996, p. 304.



Successive identities of the ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova

nian-Bessarabian“ and „Romanian-Moldavian“. Through these answers they had specified, along with their ethnic belonging, their regional appurtenance, in the first case, and their citizenship, in the second. They obviously found them relevant enough to be mentioned.

Reality proves that indeed successive identification mechanisms may co-exist, without coming into opposition. I, for instance, can state about myself, while in Bălți, that I am a Baraboian; in Chișinău – that I am a Northener; in the Republic of Moldova – that I am a Chisinauian; in the region Moldova of Romania – that I am a Bessarabian; in Bucharest – that I am a Moldavian; in Europe – that I am a Romanian, and in Africa I can call myself a European.

Ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova also assume simultaneously and successively

- first, their **ethnic identity**, except for the Russians, for whom citizenship is set before ethnic identity;
- second, the fact of being a **citizen of the Republic of Moldova**;
- third, **local identity**, „local subject“;
- fourth, the fact of **living in CSI**;
- fifth, being a **European**;
- sixth, Russians and Gagauz also mention the fact of being an **Eastern-European**.

None of these identities induce traumas in their owners. Moreover, they reflect a „social construction“ from which we deduce a hierarchy of values which the owners adopt at the moment. Just one remark — the feeling of ethnic identity is more profound than that of citizenship, prevalent in Israel, USA, Great Britain, France etc., and this fact leaves enough place for economically, socially and culturally-employed speculations.

Conclusions

At the closing of our study over the way in which an ethnic group identifies itself, is identified by others and assesses itself versus the others, several conclusions and recommendations may be formulated:

1. There is no interethnic conflict in the Republic of Moldova. We do notice certain tensions between the Moldavian/Romanian group, on one side, and the Russian group, on the other side (plus, to a minor degree, other Russian-speakers) on linguistic matters. The nature of other tensions is attitudinally-behavioural, taking place at the inter-personal level, and is explained by the lack of knowledge over *the other* or by a poor, distorted, prejudices and stereotyped knowledge. Different information sources may be responsible for the dissemination of such erroneous and misleading information.
2. The *identity gaps* of yesterday and today of the indigenous population of the Republic of Moldova *concerning ethnicity/nationality* may and must be explained only through an objective vision of history, not a prefabricated one, and of the events that are circumscribed to the issue of identity.
3. The geographic setting, the ethnic groups kaleidoscope, the historical and political factor are the primary determinants of the building/shaping of a distinct, „Moldavian“ identity of the quantitative ethnic majority. Therefore, the policy of the „Moldavian“ people’s individuality has appeared from an idea of justification for the old Russian policy in the new conjuncture. What it does is supporting a political ambition in an ambiguous situation, which appears to become normality. And yet new perturbations of the intra-ethnic relationship, which had been relatively stabilised at the beginning of the 1990s, tend to appear between certain elements that structure ethno-identity and/or nationality.
4. **The members of the prevalent ethnic group do not succeed to agree upon their common identity.** The situation is visible from both the data of the *Republic of Moldova Ethno-Barometer* and the *Delphi* study data (the latter being the exploring stage of the *Ethno-Barometer*). It is to be found also in the population census data of 2004 – how objective and credible these are is another question.
5. **The internal disbalance of the quantitatively prevalent ethnic group over the ethnic identity issue** can be generally explained through a recognised and accepted phenomenon – *the cinematic (transformative, reforming through social relationships, since identity is being shaped around certain social processes) character of the ethnic-type identity*. To this we shall add several interdependent hypotheses:
 - A. the lost in time, due to the historical context, of the founding memory of the ethnic group, the one rewriting history, and the building of another cultural memory of the past, not without the help of interested political forces;
 - B. the different information and formation possibilities of the prevalent ethnic group members, which determines „our“ knowledge versus the „others“ and the self-knowledge of the „self“;
 - C. the use, with different ethnically and politically charged meanings, of the term *Moldavian*, which must be taken into account when discussing the ethnic and/or linguistic component.
 - Individuals animated with the national ideal of reintegration into one state

- entity consider it as a blasphemy when used with reference to the Romanians on the other bank of the Prut;
- Some accept it with a regional meaning, like Wallachian, Transylvanian etc.
 - Others find it natural than *Moldavian* is naturally included into *Romanian*;
 - A certain segment of population use the term to indicate another ethnic and national category, somewhat distinct from *Romanian*.
6. As a whole, the option of all ethnic groups of the Republic of Moldova concerning self- and hetero-identification inclines clearly towards **a** (having parents belonging to the given nation), **b** (speaking the given language at home), **d** (feeling a [name of the nation]), and then **h** (having [the given language] as native), **c** (keeping the customs of...), and **e** (perceiving the culture of... as one's own). Generally, these indicators reflect 1) the blood-relation conscience, 2) family-spoken language conscience, and 3) common-destiny conscience for minority ethnic groups, while Moldavians tend to choose the criterion of respecting the customs for the founding of their identity.
7. We suggest that the disbalance of the prevalent in-group, re-acknowledged also on the national feeling dimension, must be interpreted in separate studies, via the different ways through which group members perceive and assess their past and chances for future evolution, self-assess their group characteristics/features and their limits as to the answer given to the challenges of natural and social environment.

Suggestions

As it is known, the self-image of ethnic groups is updated according to the groups' response reactions — either positive or negative — to the challenges of natural and social environment. From this perspective the criteria of assessment for successes and failures, of their acknowledgement or denial appear as fundamental, and the results can lead either to mobilisation for the surpassing of obstacles or to an attitude of discouragement and immobility. Where do we stand ourselves, we, the Moldavians, at the beginning of the 21st century, must be our constant preoccupation and has to be found as an goal in any social policy discourse in order to appreciate objectively the state of things that might contribute to our cohesion as a group, so that our self-image would cease to be continually „hurt“, vague, and rather negative, but would instead become a positive one.

Educational policy ought to centre also on the intercultural axis from the teaching and educating process, first of all for the understanding of alterity within the Republic of Moldova. The cultivation of tolerance and mutual respect between the members of cohabitating ethnic groups through cognitive, attitudinal and behavioural experiences must become a distinct frame goal in both the curriculum and extracurricular activities.

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH REPORT

Delphi Study

This study represents the exploratory phase of a year long research conducted in Moldova, with the purpose to collect the information necessary for the development of working tools for the Ethnobarometer research.

Ethnobarometer is a survey performed on a representative national sample, which will give us the opportunity to evaluate and monitor regularly the interethnic relations in Moldova. At the same time, the poll results will be a useful database for subsequent researches and analyses, and can become topics for public debates.

During the exploratory phase, a two-stage Delphi study was realized among 30 participants selected from different social sectors (political, both central and local level, mass media, academia, and nongovernmental sector).

Objectives

The objectives of the Delphi study were:

- Identification of important items on Moldova's public agenda;
- Identification of topics that have generated or generate controversies/conflicts;
- Identification of issues likely to generate interethnic conflicts;
- Identification of the most important positive and negative features used by respondents in describing the ethnic groups from Moldova;
- Identification of representations defining the national identity from different perspectives;
- Identification of perceptions and attitudes regarding Moldova's politics and policies;
- Identification of relevant opinion leaders and reference groups in the relationships between different ethnic groups from Moldova.

Methodology

The exploratory phase used the Delphi research method. This method can be defined as a method of structuring the communication process so that it allows a group of individuals to confront a complex problem. In order to get to this structured communication, one needs:

- A feedback of individual contributions;
- Evaluations of group thinking;
- Possibility of individuals to redefine their opinions;
- Anonymity of individual responses.

The study was realized in two stages. The first phase included the conduct of in-depth interviews with personalities from different social sectors (political life, academia, nongovernmental sector, local authorities and mass media). The second phase implied the use of a self-completed survey form. In this second working session, the participants had the opportunity to learn the information collected from the entire group, to redefine and complete their positions, and to comment on the research report.

The final report was compiled from the information collected through 30 in-depth interviews and 20¹⁸¹ survey forms completed by the participants of the first stage. The participants had the opportunity to consult in advance the research report of the first stage.

¹⁸¹ The 20 participants of the second phase were the participants of the first phase that were contacted and accepted to participate in this working session.

The information collected in the qualitative research should be used for orientation purposes only since it could not be extrapolated at the national level! Some conclusions can measure inadequately (too extensively, or too intensively) the identified issues, because of the distortions that appeared due to the number of participants!

Participant group structure

	Declared ethnic background	Area of activity	Interview location	Language of the interview
F1¹	Moldovan	Political Science Dept.	Chisinau	Romanian
M2	Moldovan	Political Science Dept.	Chisinau	Romanian
M3	Moldovan	History Dept.	Chisinau	Romanian
M4	Romanian	History Dept.	Cahul	Romanian
M5	Moldovan	Institute of Philosophy, Social Sciences and Law	Chisinau	Romanian
M6	Romanian	Academy of Sciences	Chisinau	Romanian
M7	Russian	Parliament	Chisinau	Russian
F8	Moldovan	UNICEF	Chisinau	Romanian
M9	Romanian	NGO	Chisinau	Romanian
F10	Moldovan	Mass Media	Chisinau	Romanian
M11	Romanian	Mass Media	Chisinau	Romanian
M12	Romanian	NGO	Chisinau	Romanian
M13	Moldovan	NGO	Chisinau	Romanian
M14	Ukrainian	Business	Balti	Russian
M15	Roma	Business	Soroca	Romanian
M16	Moldovan	Business	Chisinau	Romanian
M17	Romanian	Business	Cahul	Romanian
M18	Moldovan	Parliament	Chisinau	Romanian
M19	Ukrainian	Local authorities	Cahul	Romanian
M20	Moldovan	Local authorities	Balti	Romanian
M21	Bulgarian	Local authorities	Taraclia	Russian
M22	Bulgarian	Local authorities	Taraclia	Russian
M23	Roma	Roma leader	Soroca	Romanian
M24	Ukrainian	Mass Media	Chisinau	Russian
F25	Gagauz	Mass Media	Gagauz region	Russian
M26	Gagauz	Mass Media	Gagauz region	Russian
M27	Armenian	Mass Media	Chisinau	Russian
M28	Moldovan	Parliament	Chisinau	Romanian
M29	Moldovan	Business	Hincesti	Russian
M30	Russian	NGO	Chisinau	Russian

Major conclusions

- The research studied three central issues: Perception of politics/perception of Moldovan politics and policies, items on Moldova's public agenda/controversial issues, and interethnic relations. These issues are discussed in details in the next chapters.

Perceptions on politics/relation to politics and policies from Moldova

- The answers to the questions that referred to the first two issues in the first stage can be divided in two large categories, based on two different ideological and normative perspectives. The adoption of one of these two perspectives will have consequences on the entire discussion, determining the participants' options regarding politics, history, economy, etc. Even if the expressed opinions do not fully fit the two ideological models described below, since they vary from case to case, the differences in the participants' opinions are large enough to determine their placement on one side or the other.
- The first perspective (independence as national revival + democratization –NR+D)

This is a position referring to the 1991 Independence, which is perceived in a double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to the Romanian spirit on one side, and as the beginning of democratization of the political regime, on the other side. From the first perspective, the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic restoration of the links between the two banks of Prut River are natural things related to the newly created historical reality and redefinition of national identity. From the second perspective, the free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the main international structures (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, external orientation towards the EU) are victories that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The outbreak of the Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia's attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The resolution of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.

- The second perspective (independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new nation – NN)

At the other extreme, a different position defines the moment of independence as a moment, signaling the emergence of a new nation – the Moldovans, nation with a distinct history and identity, which initially implied a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc).

Therefore at least two official languages are needed – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by everyone).

From this second perspective, the newly created democratic institutions have not proven their advantages. The multiparty system and the political unrests related to the struggle for power of different political formations have hindered the accomplishment of a good governance, have consequently lead to division and impoverishment of the society, weakening the state authority, launching slogans without real support during electoral campaigns in order to gain political capital. On the other hand, Moldova did little to affirm itself as a partner with an important word to say within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war occurred because of the „Romanianization“ policy of Chisinau at the beginning of the 1990s, and misunderstandings related to the use of official languages. The federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible solution of the conflict.

- In many instances, the participants belonging to different ethnic groups placed themselves on different ideological positions: Moldovans (NR+D) on one side, and national minorities (NN) on the other side.

- The participants of the second stage viewed with suspicion the opinions formulated by the advocates of the opposing perspective. In most situations, the reaction was to close the communication process, either by denying the legitimacy of the opposing perspective, by attacking the correctness of the study, by reducing to the minimum or neutralizing their own comments in the second stage. Most of the participants limited themselves to criticizing the opposite position or to emphasizing their own position.

National identity

- Most of the participants are proud of the country where they were born and where they live, calling it their motherland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and epithets.
- Some participants view the country as part of a larger political entity (Romania or Russian Federation).
- Other participants believe that Moldova is about to collapse due to poverty, economic decline, as well as political inconsistency. This abyss is getting wider in front of a weak country with a territory fragmented by the Transnistrian conflict, with an uncertain identity and with an extremely short and tumultuous history.
- The opinions regarding the definition of national identity can be divided in two large categories. Some participants conceive the idea of national identity only within a common history, a common memory, and one nation. Other (individualists) believe that the way of self-identification is an issue related to the freedom of the individuals to join a group or the values they believe in.

Policy towards minorities

- Most participants believe that Moldova led a balanced policy towards national minorities, adjusting its legislation to the requirements of international bodies and managing to avoid excesses.
- Some participants find that in this field, the things remained at the formal level of „content-empty“ legislation and that the state has not implemented any policies that would stimulate the interethnic communication and collaboration, would reduce the development gaps between the North and the South (regions with different ethnic configurations) or set common goals for the majority and minorities.

Public agenda

- We have grouped the relevant topics listed by participants in three large categories: politics, economy, and society (see also annex 1, page 25).
- Among the issues related to the **politics** of the past years, considered by the participants as important, we can note some events related to the emergence of the new state: declaration of independence in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, adoption of the Constitution and the Transnistrian war. The more recent events mentioned by the participants are: the victory of the Communist Party in the 2001 elections, federalization plan of Moldova proposed by Moscow, introduction of the integrated history and Russian language classes in schools, granting rights to national minorities, development of the poverty reduction strategy by the Government with the clearance of the international bodies. These issues are perceived differently, depending on the perspective adopted by the participants.

- Some political issues can only be seen from one position. Thus, the victory of the Ilascu case at the European Court for Human Rights, negotiation of the action plan for European integration, consolidation of the right wing forces in one political formation - Moldova Democrata Bloc, corruption extended at all administrative levels, violation of democratic freedoms, particularly the freedom of mass media, during the communist rule are issues identified mostly from the NR+D perspective. On the other hand, from the other perspective (NN), in the last years Moldova witnessed a political and economic stabilization, the governmental policies were oriented towards ordinary people, the services rendered to the citizens were improved.
- Other political issues considered important by the participants (only NN perspective) were the installation of Stefan cel Mare (The Great) monument, renovation of Capriana Monastery, elaboration by the Government of a strategy for social, youth and tourism development, organization of the wine festival with the involvement of the President of the country.
- The issues identified by the participants as important for **economy** – noted from both perspectives, but again differently – are the stabilization of the national currency, elimination of arrears in the payment of salaries and pensions, the absence of the infrastructure for processing of agricultural products in the context of a predominantly agrarian economy.
- The issues related to the national economy noted only from the NR+D perspective are: lack of competition on the market or failure of market economy, challenges, often insuperable, for private businesses (issue sometimes perceived from the NN perspective!), lack of investments, scandals related to the state interference with the economy, corruption.
- The economic issues perceived only from NN perspective are: achievement of economic stability, creation of a socially-oriented market economy, achievement of economic growth.
- Concerning **society**, most of the participants believe that the most important challenge for Moldova at this moment is the extreme poverty and massive migration (often illegal) of labor force.
- In the second phase of the study, the participants completed the public agenda or confirmed some issues contained in this agenda.

Controversial issues

- The topics with the highest conflict potential noted during the first phase of the research by the participants were: the Transnistrian situation and the ways for solving the conflict, the issue of state configuration - unitary or federal, the issue of strategic orientation of Moldova's foreign policy: towards the EU or CIS, issues related to the national identity (Romanians or Moldovans?, official language, the dangers of Romanianization), the threat of disintegration of Moldova – by unification with Romania, by disintegration with the federalization, or due to pressures on behalf of the Russian Federation.
- **This set of issues with high conflict potential, generally identified by the participants, overlaps perfectly in the first stage with the set of issues identified by the participants as likely to generate interethnic conflicts!**
- In the second phase of the study, many participants considered the conflict potential of all these topics, with the exception of the Transnistrian issue, as being more reduced, compared to the estimations of the first phase. However, many of the NR+D participants have oriented themselves towards the issues related to the politics and economy from the public agenda that positioned them in contrast with the other ideological perspective, considering the

latter as having the highest conflict potential. Other participants considered that there are no debate topics with a high conflict potential, and some have reconfirmed the issues identified during the first phase.

Interethnic relations

- Regarding the topic of interethnic relations in Moldova, the general opinions concentrate around two main ideas. In the opinion of some participants, in Moldova there has never existed and there is no potential for an interethnic conflict (except the 1992 crisis, which was successfully solved by granting autonomy to the Gagauz region). The relationship between different ethnic groups residing in Moldova is peaceful, cordial, and based on mutual understanding.
- According to other participants, there are no interethnic conflicts in Moldova, however, the ethnic groups barely communicate. The Moldovans and different ethnic minorities from the country practically live in different worlds.
- In the second phase of the study, the participants confirmed one of these two ideas.
- Many participants believe that the Transnistrian conflict is not ethnic, but political.

Positive and negative features, stereotypes and common values

- Each of the discussed ethnic groups (Moldovans, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, and Roma) was described by positive as well as negative features. In the case of Romanians and Gypsies, the negative features visibly outnumber the positive ones.
- Many of the positive features applied to Moldovans actually represent more defensive qualities – inaction (kind, peaceful, respectful, obedient, etc) than dynamic qualities, such as the ones attributed to Russians or Ukrainians (resourceful, prompt, helpful, strong, belonging to great cultures, etc.). In the negative representation, Moldovans are viewed as inferior to Romanians, Russians or Ukrainians, being considered a rather rural, backward and uneducated population.
- Romanians are perceived by Moldovans rather as examples to follow, since they are more civilized, preserve better their traditions, culture and language, and are well defined in their identity. On the other side, Romanians are perceived by minorities rather as foreigners, more dangerous and more intolerant than Moldovans.
- Many negative features used to describe Russians represent features related to aggressiveness and domination (occupants, colonists, grumpy, arrogant, dominators, suffering from „big brother“ syndrome, imperialists, etc.).
- The negative representation applied to Ukrainians was that of „younger brother of the big brother“, people who achieve their goals regardless of the means and consequences. The positive representation describes them as decided, joyful people who follow their traditions, who have beautiful songs and dances.
- The Bulgarians and Gagauz are the less known ethnic groups among people who do not belong to these ethnic groups. Many of the used identification features characterize only the respective ethnic group (e.g. Christian-Orthodox of Turkic origin – for Gagauz,

vegetable growers – for Bulgarians). Nevertheless, at times they are regarded as similar ethnic groups.

- The representation of Jews is close to the universal image: they are a very strong community of people that help each other, are educated, professional, and successful in business. However, in the negative perspective they are viewed as people who influence the economy and politics from the shadow, and are always ready to buy and sell if they have the opportunity.
- Gypsies represent the ethnic group with the most negative features, and the dominant representation is that they do not take seriously the social norms accepted by the rest of the people.
- Some of the positive features listed by the participants are common to several ethnic groups. Thus, the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians are considered hardworking and thrifty. If you add the Roma, what is common for them, is that all these groups are joyful, good singers and good dancers. The Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians have in common the hospitality. Moldovans and Russians are considered the masters of the country.
- There are certain attributes that are absent among Moldovans but are applied to other ethnic groups. Except for Russians and Moldovans, the rest of the ethnic groups are considered as communities preserving and cultivating their traditions. Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians and Jews are viewed as educated people (intellectuals, professionals, etc.). Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz can be called brothers, and Russians Bulgarians and Jews are successful in business.

Reference groups

- The groups and individuals are perceived influential (rather negative than positive) for the interethnic relations in Moldova, and represent almost exclusively personalities and political parties.

Relationship with the state

- Most of Moldovan participants consider that being a citizen of Moldova goes in line with an undetermined identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration.
- Some participants belonging to ethnic minorities say that they live in a beautiful country; they are confident in Moldova's future, and believe that they all are citizens of the same country, regardless of ethnic background.
- Other participants belonging to national minorities avoided to answer this question.
- Russians are viewed by most of the Moldovan participants as the ethnic group that in the past had the advantage of power, in the detriment of other ethnic groups, and who have not yet given up the idea of preserving this advantage. They are arrogant and continue to behave like foreigners, without even trying to adapt to the local values, culture, and language.
- Many participants believe that the autonomy granted to Gagauz was a good solution, and that the representatives of this minority now perceive Moldova as their motherland.
- Some participants look with suspicion at the assistance provided by the neighboring countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio stations, television stations, newspapers, etc. financed by Russia for the Russian minority, Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority, etc.). The greatest suspicions are raised by Romania's assistance to Moldovans and Turkey's assistance to the Gagauz ethnics.

Work assumptions for qualitative research

1. The ethnic groups from Moldova generally live in enclaves, having few common values, goals and little communication among them.
2. The issues related to domestic policy (those identified above + limitation of democratic rights and freedoms) or the issues related to Moldova's foreign policy (orientation towards the EU, CIS or Romania) can place the ethnic groups on conflicting positions (see also annex 1, page 24).

Perception on politics/relation to politics and policies in Moldova

The opinions formulated for all these topics form a range with two completely different ideological positions at the extremes:

- First perspective (independence as national revival + democratization – NR+D)

This is a position referring to the moment of independence from 1991, which is perceived from a double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to the Romanian spirit on one side, and as the beginning of democratization of the political regime, on the other side. From the first perspective, the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic restoration of the links between the two banks of Prut River are natural things related to the newly created historical reality, and redefinition of national identity. From the second perspective, the free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the main international structures (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, the external orientation towards the EU) are victories that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The outbreak of the Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia's attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The resolution of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.

- The second perspective (independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new nation – NN)

At the other end, another position defines the moment of independence as a moment of the emergence of a new nation: the Moldovans, nation with a distinct history and identity, which initially implied multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc). Therefore at least two official languages are needed – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by everybody). The newly created democratic institutions have not proven their advantages. The multiparty system and the political unrests related to the struggle for power of different political formations have hindered the accomplishment of a good governance, have consequently lead to division and impoverishment of the society, weakening the state authority, launching slogans without real support during electoral campaigns in order to acquire political capital. Meanwhile, Moldova did little to affirm itself as a partner with an important word to say within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war broke out because of the „Romanianization“ policy of Chisinau at the beginning of the 1990s, and misunderstandings related to the use of official languages. The federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible solution of the conflict.

Observations

- The better part extracted from participants' opinions is situated between these two extremes, having more nuances, being more complex and sometimes less consistent than the ones outlined here. However, the opinions contrast to the extent of their inclusion on one ideological position or another.

- The two different ideological options have largely affected all answers to other discussed issues.
- In many instances, the participants belonging to different ethnic groups positioned themselves on different ideological positions: Moldovans (NR+D) on one side, and national minorities (NN) on the other side.
- The common denominator of these two opposed positions is the appropriation of a distinct identity of the Moldovan state, as independent entity on the world map.
- At the same time, the new Moldovan state is perceived as young, unconsolidated, lacking a well-shaped national identity. Moldova is perceived as a state that has gone through instability in its strategic foreign policy, exposed to threats of institutional erosion or loss of state authority.

Other perceptions and attitudes towards the Moldovan state

- National -optimists: Most of the participants are proud of their country, calling it their motherland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and epithets.
 - „(Moldova) reminds me of a vine leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will notice how much it resembles the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily are missing“, M7;
 - „When I was in school, it was associated with a grape“, M17;
 - „I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova. When we were part of the USSR, I served in the army in the Far East. When I was asked where I was from they were surprised to hear that there were Bulgarians living in Moldova. And when people were asking me about the life in Moldova, I was telling them that Moldova was a blooming region with many orchards, grain fields and everything you want“, M21; „Its people, its land, its traditions. When we say Moldova, we suddenly see vineyards and blooming orchards, a good wine, vegetable and fruit, hardworking people. This is Moldova’s significance for us“, M24.
- The unionist perspective: people that consider the country as part of a larger political entity.
 - „The second Romanian state“, M6.
- The skeptics: people who believe that Moldova is on the edge of an abyss due to poverty, economic decline, as well as its political inconsistency. This abyss is getting wider in front of a weak country with a territory fragmented by the Transnistrian conflict, with an uncertain identity, and with an extremely short and tumultuous history.
 - „Poor country“, M4; „Poverty“, M9;
 - „The country I live in. A poor country that has not yet determined its direction – East or West“, M11;
 - „A country of miserable people, without any future, who cannot articulate clearly what they want“, M12;
 - „Moldova is rather a territory than a state, because it does not control a part of its territory (Transnistria)“, M3.

National identity

The opinions regarding the definition of national identity can be divided in two large categories.

- Those who conceive the idea of national identity only within a common history, a common memory, and one nation:
 - „It is a conscience of affiliation to a certain community where the members have something in common: common cultural, historical foundation, common aspirations and future“, F1;

„It is what makes you identify with a nation, feel part of that nation. As a rule, the nation is defined as something that meets a set of criteria and features: language, culture, same race, traditions, etc. and the understanding of the affiliation or loyalty to these values“; M5;
„The national identity is the defining element of a person belonging to a certain ethnic group. It is a notion that consolidates an ethnic group and gives it the aspect of nation. It is a community of people speaking the same language, sharing the same traditions, customs, deriving from the same blood and having a common history“; M6.

- And individualists, who consider that self-identification is an issue related to the freedom of the individuals to join a group or the values they believe in:

„I define it as an individual option. Even though it has been extensively declared that the national identity is taken for granted, that you are born with it and that you cannot deny it, I believe that it is an individual option. The individuals can leave, can learn a different language, or, even as in our case, can stay, can speak the same language, but consider themselves Romanians or Moldovans. Therefore, it is an individual option, it is a political option, and it is a socially formed option. There is nothing in-born here, there is nothing for granted, there is nothing. It becomes something insignificant when an individual can choose to give up or to ignore“; F10.

„This moment of self-identification is something very personal. How do you perceive yourself? By culture, by your way of thinking... In my opinion, in this case it is not even about being a local. Another thing is that there should not be a forced, imposed identification. There is a notion – „assimilation“. Assimilation represents the possibility of a representative of a nation to change the ethnic background when in another ethnic environment. This is exactly the issue of mixed marriages. Now we do not have nationality specified in our passports, however it existed before. At that time, people deriving from mixed marriages, a Moldovan and a Ukrainian parent for example, had to determine who they were: Moldovans or Ukrainians. You could not choose „Moldo-Ukrainian“; you had to determine your identity, but it was voluntary. The voluntary assimilation happens everywhere, and generally does not cause rejection, as in the case of forced assimilation. I believe that the issue of self-identification is rather serious for us, especially in relation with the title nation, and can be problematic for other ethnic groups. Maybe it is just a personal problem“; M7.

Perceptions on minority-related policies

Most respondents consider that Moldova had a balanced policy towards minorities, adjusting its legislation to the requirements of the international bodies, and managing to avoid the excesses.

Some participants find that in this field, the things remained at the formal level of „content-emptiness“ legislation, and that the state has not implemented any policies that would stimulate the interethnic communication and collaboration, that would reduce the development gaps between the North and the South (regions with different ethnic configurations) or set common goals for the majority and minorities.

If from the legislative perspective the situation could be considered satisfactory, there are aspects that make certain ethnic groups more advantaged than others. The opinions on this issue were divided:

- There are opinions according to which Moldovans are advantaged due to their number (the fact that they represent the majority), and that the official language of the country is their native language. This situation facilitated, at the beginning of 1990s, the replacement

of other ethnic groups from administration and state institutions with Moldovans.

- According to another set of opinions, the Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other ethnic groups, even though they represent the majority. This thing is possible due to the advantages the Russian speaking ethnic groups, especially the Russians and Ukrainians, enjoyed at the beginning of 1990s. These minorities were living mainly in urban areas, compared to the Moldovans who were rather a rural population; were more educated and had representatives in key economic and political positions. If from the political perspective the situation was in favor for Moldovans by introducing the use of Moldovan language in administration and organizing free elections, then from the economic perspective, the country is currently dominated by the Russian and Ukrainian minorities. Moreover, if Moldovan became the language of politics and administration, then Russian is the language of economy.
- There are also opinions that view the Gagauz, Bulgarians and Roma as disadvantaged minorities. This happens because Gagauz and Bulgarians are minorities that live mostly in rural areas, very poor regions in southern Moldova. The Roma represent an ethnic group that adheres with difficulty to the social norms and values of the majority and few things have been done so far for their integration.

In all situations where participants indicated the advantage of an ethnic group over the other, no examples of corrective policies were offered.

Some participants' opinions show acceptance of cultural assistance provided by the countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio and television stations, newspapers, etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority or by Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority, etc.)

Romania's case seems more special, and ethnic minorities regard suspiciously at the involvement of this state in supporting certain cultural initiatives. There are fears that, for example, a TV channel in Moldova funded by Romania could try to influence the opinions in favor of the Romanian interests, unknown to Moldova.

Some respondents also view the aid provided by Turkey to ethnic Gagauz with suspicion. This assistance could separate even more the Gagauz minority from Moldova.

At the same time, there are opinions according to which the best solution is for each state to solve its problems alone and that the funding of schools, universities, and TV channels should be the responsibility of each government of the relevant state.

Moldova's Public Agenda, controversial issues

We divided this chapter in two distinct parts. On one side there were questions regarding the relation of participants to the recent past or to the present, on the other side we pursued the identification of those issues that have generated or generate the most ardent controversies within public debate.

Items on participants' agenda

The important events of the recent years perceived by the participants can be grouped in several categories: political, economic, socio-economic events. The political events can be further grouped in events related to the emergence of the new state, events related to the political changes of the transition period, and local issues. Each of these three categories registered different ideological positions.

1a. Politics

- A. Issues related to the emergence of the new state
- B. Issues related to the political changes of the transition period
- C. Other

2b. Economy**3c. Society (See also annex 1, p.24)****1a. Politics****A. Issues related to the emergence of the new state**

The respondents identified the following most important events:

- The collapse of the Soviet Union
- Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova (1991)
- The adoption of the Constitution (1994)
- The Transnistrian war (1992)

As we noted before, these events were interpreted differently in those two ideological perspectives: Independence as national revival + democratization, and Independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new nation.

B. Issues related to the political changes of the transition period

Among these, the most important events perceived by the respondents are:

- Granting certain rights to national minorities (e.g. opening of Ukrainian schools, a newspaper in Ukrainian, the status of Gagauzia as an autonomous region, adjustment of the relevant legislation to the European standards);
- The victory of the Communists in the 2001 elections; this event is seen from two distinct perspectives:
 - At one end are the opinions that this moment guaranteed political stability, consistency of the policies and economic development in Moldova;
 - „An economic growth“, „the growing accountability of businesses in relation with the state budget“, M21; „consolidation of the country“, M22; „stability in politics, economy, pensions paid on time“, M26. According to this perspective, the transformation of the semi presidential regime into a parliamentary system in 2000 lead to the consolidation of state institutions.
 - „Improvement of the legal framework regarding the separation of powers within the state“, M28; „it looks like the President and the Executive branch have everything under control, [...] provide assistance and advice to the local public administration“, M21. The reforms initiated by the previous governments (privatization, administrative decentralization, etc) were wrong, and lead to the impoverishment of the population, and its abandonment by the political class; returning to these issues may be appropriate.
 - At the other end are the opinions that the victory of the communists represents a decline in the process of consolidation of democratic institutions; lately there have been limitations of democratic rights and freedoms. Despite the existent parliamentary regime, one can notice a consolidation of President's position, which now controls the other branches (the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary).
 - „We experienced perestroika once: multiparty system. Now we arrived at where we started, most of the population pleads for one party. We do not have a truly independent newspaper. Human rights and freedoms are restrained“, F1;

„The exercise of citizens' rights and freedoms was restricted, for example, freedom of expression; there were abuses against the opposition, the ruling party tried to split certain organizations, media institutions, trade unions etc.“ M9.

„The system is unstable from the political point of view. In 2000, for example, Moldova became *de jure* a parliamentary republic, but *de facto* it is a presidential republic: the President currently controls the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches,“ M3.

- The federalization plan proposed by the Russian Federation (Kozak Memorandum) This event is also viewed from two opposite perspectives:
 - On one side, those who believe that this plan was a good opportunity for Moldova as long as it solved the Transnistrian issue.
 - On the other side, those who believe that this plan threatened the unity of the Moldovan state, maybe even its independence.
- Introduction of integrated history course, introduction of Russian classes in schools (these issues were also either rejected or supported):
 - According to the advocates of these measures, the history of Moldovans is totally different from the history of Romanians and must be studied as such; Russian is necessary for Moldovans in order to be able to communicate with other ethnic groups, the bilingualism being at the same time a national pride;
 - According to those opposing these measures, the new history course is a phony intertwined with political options not historical truths; Russian is not more important than any other language of international use, as long as Moldovan is considered the official language.
- The development of the poverty reduction strategy with the clearance of the international financial institutions was an event mentioned by both perspectives.
- Health insurance issue.

Besides these events noted from both ideological perspectives, there are the issues noted only from one perspective:

From the NR+D perspective the following issues are important:

- The winning of the Ilascu's case at the European Court for Human Rights.
- Negotiation of the action plan for integration with the European Union (2003),
- The consolidation of right wing forces in one political formation (Moldova Democrata Bloc)
- Extended corruption

From the NN perspective, other issues are important:

- Economic and political stabilization;
- Orientation of state policies towards simple people
- Improvement of services for citizens
- Elaboration of strategies for social, youth and tourism development

„Elaboration and approval of the program for social development, approval of the strategy for youth development in Moldova, the affirmation of the Government in the world through tourism, rehabilitation of the national heritage (e.g. Capriana Monastery)“, M20.

C. Other issues perceived by participants

(Only from NN perspective)

- Installation of Ștefan cel Mare („The Great“) monument
- Renovation of Capriana Monastery
- The Wine Festival organized with the involvement of the President.

2b. *Economy*

Again, some things are visible from both perspectives while others are visible only from one perspective. The most important events noted by both perspectives are:

- Stabilization of Moldova's national currency;
- Payment of salaries and pensions on time;
- Lack of agricultural processing facilities in the context of a predominantly agrarian economy.

The aspects noted only from NR+D perspective are:

- Lack of competition on the market, failure of market economy, impossibility of starting a business
- Lack of investments
- Impossibility to start a business
- Corruption
- Massive interference of the state with the economy

„Statistics show economic stability, but the situation is deplorable: lack of competition, high prices, low salaries, unemployment, and massive emigration. The poorest country in Europe. (...) Current problems: Extended corruption, lack of competition, undeveloped market economy, impossibility to start a business, lack of processing facilities in agriculture, deficiencies in education and social assistance“, F1.

The aspects noted only from NN perspective are:

- Economic stabilization
- Economic growth
- Creation of a socially oriented market economy

3c. *Society*

The most important events noted by many participants are:

- Massive migration of labor force abroad, often under illegal circumstances, and
- Extreme poverty among ordinary people.

„The social issues come first: there is no work, jobs and funds, and the results are: poverty, disorientation, because there is no clear way of Government activities“, M28.

Most of the aspects perceived by the participants as related to the recent past are perceived as actual (see B. and C., 2b and 3c.). The noted issues are the same and cannot be solved quickly. The future is viewed from an insecure perspective, there are more question marks related to Transnistria and the results of the next elections. Some participants are pessimistic, perceiving the current situation as a *„silence before the storm“*. M9, others are skeptical and concerned, others, being more optimistic, and are content that there are no extremist manifestations or that *„the country did not move 180 degrees, did not turn 360 degrees“*, M14

The issue of definition of national identity, with all its distinguishing features (language, history, state configuration, options for foreign policy) stays open, and in the opinion of the survey participants is a problem that will continue to generate controversies in the future.

Issues generating ardent controversies

The issues perceived as the most controversial are grouped by two levels of intensity.

Issues with average intensity level:

- Scandals related to irregularities within administration or business sector (Megadat situation, Dacia Hotel or Eurofarmaco).

- Controversies related to the government's policies
 - On one side, criticism of the former governments for the implemented reforms („thoughtless“ privatization, administrative decentralization etc.);
 - On the other hand, side criticism of the present government for the tendency to centralize and restrain the democratic freedoms.

Issues with a pronounced conflict potential (positions the opinions by the above-mentioned ideological perspectives):

- The situation from Transnistria and ways for solving the conflict; here, expressed opinions are the most hesitant, the participants were not able to identify clear ways for solving the conflict; the adopted positions are rather normative than pragmatic (e.g. „the best solution would be to accept the federalization plan“ or „the conflict would be solved if Transnistria accepted the solution of the unitary state“).
- The issue of state configuration: unitary state with autonomous regions or federal state with few prerogatives for the central government
- Issues of foreign policy orientation: closer to the European Union or closer to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States
- Threat of disintegration of Moldova by unification with Romania, by federalization that would leave too little for the Government from Chisinau, or due to the pressures exercised by the Russian Federation
- The issue of national identity:
 - Who are we: Romanians or Moldovans?
 - What is our history: a national history of Moldovans, a continuum of the Moldovan political formations, which culminated with the Independence of Moldova or a history of Romanians and minorities who reside on this territory, isolated by artificial borders that obstructed their natural political development?
 - What is the official language and what language should be official: Romanian, Moldovan, Russian or more official languages?
 - If the Moldovans will be subject to „Romanianization“, will the other ethnic minorities suffer? Will they also fall under this process of Romanianization?

Interethnic relations in Moldova

Since the number of participants belonging to different ethnic groups was too small to be able to define the in-group and out-group features and stereotypes for each individual group, we presented the features through which the participants define their own ethnic group, together with the features chosen by other ethnic groups for that particular group (see annex 2).

What we can say at the first glance from the resulted information is the fact that the various ethnic groups barely communicate amongst each other. The problems and aspects related to one ethnic group are less visible for the other groups.

The second remark we can make regarding the perception of interethnic relations in Moldova is that most of the respondents believe that these relationships are not tense, moreover, they are considered even cordial. In their opinions, each ethnic group taken separately is tolerant, respects, and understands the position of the other ethnic groups with whom they share the territory.

Stereotypes for the ethnic groups from Moldova

Moldovans¹⁸²

The positive representation of Moldovans describes them as joyful, hospitable, good singers and good dancers. On the other hand, they are kind, peaceful, patient, sympathetic, respectful, decent, hard working and generous.

Observation

The positive features applied to Moldovans represent, unlike the ones assigned to Russians or Ukrainians, rather defensive qualities, inaction rather than dynamism.

The negative representation of Moldovans characterizes them as less educated, less urban, unstable (inconsistent, coward, indecisive, impressionable), easier to deceive compared to other groups, sometimes humble. They are disoriented and do not know with whom or with what to identify. Are not competitive when they have to work with other ethnic groups, the other groups are faster.

Romanians

Romanians are perceived by Moldovans as examples worth following, since they are more civilized and preserve better their traditions, culture, and language, and have a well-defined group identity.

They are more attached to the European principles and values, and speak correct Romanian, are intelligent and romantic; they excel in poetry and philosophy.

On the other hand, the minorities perceive Romanians rather as foreigners, people that are more dangerous, more intolerant than Moldovans.

They want to expel the Russian speaking population from the country; they want unification with Romania at any price. *They are liars, extremists, fascists, they prosecuted Gypsies during the World War II, they were worse than the Nazis.*

Russians

The Russians are considered honest, openhearted, and always ready to sacrifice their lives for their friends, and at the same time merciless with the enemies. They belong to a large culture (unlike the other ethnic groups from the country), to a large and respectable people, and are aware of this fact. They brought their culture, freedom and development to Moldova.

At the other end, they are described as occupants, colonists, people who held a privileged position in the past compared to other ethnic groups, and who have never gotten rid of the „big brother“ syndrome. Because of their arrogance, they have never adapted to the local traditions, they were not interested in learning the language of the locals. Alcoholics, greedy, unpredictable, people who brought their communism and Russian imperialism to Moldova.

Ukrainians

People caring about their traditions, are at the same time communicative, joyful, like parties, have a good sense of humor; they eat, sing and dance well. They are hardworking, ingenious, resourceful, and ambitious.

On the other hand, they are viewed as an ethnic group that let themselves assimilated by Russians in order to get the advantages („big brother's younger brother“), they are people who would do anything to get what they want regardless the means and consequences, they are ethnocentric, more chauvinistic than Russians.

¹⁸² Below you will find selections of some positive or negative features collected by the researchers. The features listed here were always selected based on the criterion of internal consistency of the representation it suggests. However, each representation taken separately can be affected by distortions, outside of a quantitative study that would test the consistency of the respective features. Go to annex 2 in order to see the full list of collected features.

The Gagauz

Thrifty, Christians of Turkic origin, quick-witted, hardworking, they have rich traditions that they follow, they like parties, they like wine and dancing. They are united, like the freedom and justice, cope well with people around them regardless of ethnic background, and are tolerant. They enjoy autonomy, but follow the laws of the Republic of Moldova.

On the other hand, although they are stupid as Moldovans, they are aggressive as Russians. Rural population, unsophisticated, incapable to analyze their perspectives. They are however sly and impertinent.

Observation

Like Bulgarians, the Gagauz represent an ethnic group less known by the out-group participants as compared to other groups. Many identification features could be only applied to this particular group (e.g.: Christian orthodox of Turkic origin – for Gagauz, vegetable growers – for Bulgarians). Nevertheless, at times they are regarded as similar ethnic groups.

Bulgarians

Bulgarians are hardworking, thrifty, successful in business, punctual, smart, wealthy, scrimpy, civilized, pragmatic, calculated, and attentive, think a lot and make good decisions, united, live in solidarity, follow their traditions, etc.

They can be considered as something in between the Gagauz and Ukrainians, they do not differ as a separate ethnic group, they are just like the other Russian-speakers, ugly (physically), pro-soviet, they hate the locals for their stupidity, they are harsh, pursue their goals regardless of the means or consequences.

Jews

People who care much about their community, they help each other, smart, educated, resourceful. They are professionally well trained, inclined towards business. Calculated, farsighted. Martyrs, suffered from communism and the Holocaust. The people who gave us Jesus Christ. Usurers, businesspeople, do not identify with their country of residence, they can always betray it. Jews brought the communism; they rule the country by influencing it from the dark. They are not too honest, they believe they are smarter, cynical, they can buy or sell you whenever they want, they disregard the rest.

Gypsies

People who love their traditions, customs, songs, and language. They take good care of their children, proud, clean, craftspeople, joyful, singers, and good fellows. Freedom is their brother, they are free. The Gypsies from Moldova are more emancipated, more civilized, and more sedentary comparing to Gypsies from Romania.

They do not adapt to the modern life, nomads, do not respect the social norms recognized by the rest of the people. Easy, illiterate, unorganized, fortunetellers, do not send their children to school, do not work, a people without goals, horse stealers.

Common values

Some of the positive features listed by the participants are common for several ethnic groups. Thus, the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians are considered hardworking and thrifty. If you add the Gypsies, what are common for all these groups are the joy, and the fact that they like to sing and dance. Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians share hospitality. Moldovans and Russians are considered the masters of the country.

There are certain features that are lacking among Moldovans but are shared by other ethnic groups. Besides Russians and Moldovans, the other ethnic groups are considered communities

that follow and cultivate their traditions. Romanians, Russians Bulgarians, and Jews are viewed as educated (intellectuals, professionals, etc.) Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and the Gagauz can be called brothers, and Russians, Bulgarians and Jews are successful in business

Features	Moldovans	Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Jews	Gypsies
Hardworking	▪			▪	▪	▪		
Joyful	▪			▪	▪	▪		▪
Hospitable	▪		▪	▪				
Good singers and dancers	▪			▪	▪	▪		▪
Thrifty	▪			▪	▪	▪		
Masters of the country:	▪		▪					
Keepers of their traditions		▪		▪	▪	▪	▪	▪
Educated		▪	▪			▪	▪	
Brothers			▪	▪	▪	▪		
Successful in business			▪			▪	▪	

* Shows that the relevant label was applied to the ethnic group

Reference groups

Besides some structures more or less dependent on the state (Department of Interethnic Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Science), the groups or persons perceived as having influence (rather negative than positive) on interethnic relations in Moldova are almost exclusively politicians or political parties (the Popular Front, Interfront, Christian-Democratic Party, Mircea Snegur, Klimenko, Roșca, Dabija, Yedinstvo Movement etc.)

Participants are divided in two different categories concerning governmental structures:

On one side – those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute to the improvement of the interethnic relations, their most frequently listed activity is organization of multiethnic cultural events and festivals; on the other side - people believing that these structures are totally inefficient, and their activity does not manage to solve the actual problems.

„All these [institutions] are formal, and they only create the impression –exhibits, folk festivals, etc. However, nobody cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go way beyond these cultural dimensions. The leaders of these organizations are always the same. They sit at different cultural manifestations but don't do anything real“, M27.

The way ethnic groups perceive themselves and are perceived in relation with the state

The way Moldovans perceive themselves as citizens of Moldova:

- Most of the Moldovan respondents believe that being a citizen of Moldova implies an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration:

„It means to have little opportunities for existence, it means to want to leave the country and look for a job abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your identity“, M5;

„To strive to survive in a village by doing farming, in a town by doing retail business or to create an ideal to leave the country and find a job abroad. To be Romanian and live in

Moldova means to wait until the President comes up with another anti-Romanian initiative so that you can then react accordingly“, M12;

„Probably, it means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled acts of the state authorities; it means to exercise with great risks you civic and constitutional rights. It means to be unable to live a decent life from the incomes generated by local businesses, but only from the income generated by foreign enterprises, businesses, and non-commercial institutions. Despite this, to be a happy person, which probably helps Moldovans to keep away from depression“, M12;

„It means to think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any other country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. Many of them feel humans, I do not know why. Even though they work hard, they are paid for that and feel useful. Here they don't feel that“, F10

The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive themselves as citizens of Moldova:

- People who believe in the future of this country think that they live in a beautiful country, they enjoy living here and consider themselves citizens of this country.

„I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people, because we live in such a wonderful country, we have the chance to admire all that and live a decent life“, M7;

„It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me happy?“, M15.

- People who avoided the answer to the questions related to this topic:

„It is difficult for me to answer this question. I think Moldovans should answer it“, M26;

„I like very much the popular idea in America – there are no nations, there are only Americans. Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country you live in, you have to love it and do something for it“, M14.

The way Moldovans perceive Russians as citizens of Moldova: Since Russians are perceived as different, and as having a special status in relation to other ethnic groups, we treated this issue in a distinct way. Russians are viewed by many of the Moldovan participants as the ethnic group, which has had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethnic groups, and which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage. They are arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners or as conquerors.

„(Russians) are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much more favorable. Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region. They should learn our language, culture, and traditions. They should integrate and become true citizens“, F1;

„For Russians it is a problem because they do not identify themselves with this country since it is a young state and it's normal not to identify yourself with a country that never existed“, M2;

„To continue to behave as if you are the nation that dominates in this country. To promote your interest, hoping that Russia's policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian policy“, M12.

The participants formulated two ideas with regard to the Gagauz ethnic group living in Moldova:

- The Gagauz perceive Moldova as their motherland.

„They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as their motherland, they have the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cultural perspective“, F1;

„For the Gagauz living here, this is their motherland“, F25;

„I think this is great for the Gagauz. The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they

have managed to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for development“. F8

- The Gagauz minority or the assistance and support coming from Turkey are viewed by the non-Gagauz with suspicion:

„To identify more and more with Turkey, to wait for its help and investments, and to listen to the advice and suggestions from outside, remaining, at the same time, a separated group“, M5.

„In the last years, more and more Gagauz and Bulgarians leave Moldova and settle in Turkey and Bulgaria because of the social and economic problems of Moldova. They are allured by the higher living standards and common cultural affinities. Especially that there are certain tempting offers from Turkey, scholarships, etc. This exodus of Gagauz ethnics proves that they are not too attached to Moldova. The feeling of affiliation to Moldova is not so developed because they, however, succeeded in forming the political formation Gagauz-Yeri, and I believe that they perceive themselves rather as citizens of this autonomous political unit within Moldova“, M6.

Conflicting issues regarding interethnic relations perceived by the participants

Many participants believe that there are no issues that could generate conflict among ethnic groups from Moldova.

„I don't think there has ever been an ethnic conflict in Moldova. Maybe only locally. But I don't think so, especially since Moldovans are very tolerant“, M4.

Another opinion adopts the idea of inexistence of relationships between ethnic groups. There is neither conflict nor consensus between the minorities and the Moldovan majority, because each ethnic group lives in a completely different world.

People from Moldova live in parallel universes. For example, a Russian radio station always broadcasts the weather forecast for Moscow, but I am not interested in that. If I want to hear the weather forecast for Bucharest I tune my radio to ProFM or KissFM, because I studied in Bucharest for 4 years. Probably there are people who studied in Moscow. Therefore, we have parallel worlds, which do not intersect linguistically; they do not intersect at all. Probably this exists in other countries but our case is more tragic“. F10

When the conflict topics are identified, these overlap perfectly with the conflict topics from the public agenda.

The conflict issues related to interethnic relations are:

- Transnistrian issue: „Even though many of the respondents consider that the conflict is rather political than ethnic, the issue can lead to confrontations between the positions of Moldovans and those of Russian ethnics/Russians speaking groups. The former would be more inclined to the return to the unitary state and would agree with the politics from Chişinău, the latter would side with the separatist regime from Tiraspol. From the perspective of Russians/Russian speaking ethnics, the Moldovans could be accused of intolerance to what concerns state language or guaranteeing autonomy to Transnistrian territory, a reason for which Transnistria separated from Moldova.
- The issues related to Moldovan state configuration are closely linked to the other two conflict issues: Transnistrian war and national identity would also oppose the opinions of Moldovans and Russians, or other Russian speaking ethnic groups. The Moldovan ethnics could be on the side of the present formula regarding state organization, while the Russian speaking ethnic groups would be on the side of the federal state. Moreover, the minority groups

could be afraid of the majority's intentions to unite with Romania in the future, while the majority group could be afraid that federalization would lead to the growth of Russian influence in Moldova, and very strong Russian control over some states of the federation, even to the loss of Moldovan statehood.

- Foreign policy options: the Moldovans might wish a pro-European orientation, while the ethnic minorities aspire for a foreign policy oriented towards the CIS states. There is the assumption that the Russian ethnics support Russia's policy regardless of the issue. When Moscow and Chisinau are on divergent positions, the Russian ethnics would automatically disagree with the Moldovans.
- The issues related to national identity are the ones described above: the language issue, ethnic affiliation, history, etc. (See page 16). Moldovans would be discontent by the following situation: fear of political identification with Romania and conflicts that this situation could generate, they are refused or refuse to assume a Romanian cultural identity. This artifice leads to an internal misbalance of the ethnic group and to extreme identity fragility among Moldovans. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities influence this way of self-relation of the majority group. The appropriation of Romanian identity by Moldovans could make them feel excluded as ethnic group, but also as citizens of the same state. How long can they declare themselves Moldovans of Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic background? („*We are all Moldovans*“), how will they call themselves when the Moldovans become Romanians overnight? Moreover, there would always be a fear that once they become Romanians, the Moldovans would also like to unite with Romania. In both cases (minorities, majority) there are identification barriers difficult to overcome. Both situations (that of majority and that of minorities) contribute to the stability of the vicious circle created in this situation.
- In the second phase of the study, many participants considered the conflict potential of all these topics, with the exception of the Transnistrian issue, as being more reduced compared to the estimations of the first phase. Many of the NR+D participants have oriented themselves towards the issues related to the politics and economy from the public agenda that positioned them in contrast with other ideological perspective, considering the latter as having the highest conflict potential.
- Other participants considered that there are no debate topics with a high conflict potential, and some have reconfirmed the issues identified during the first phase.

The issues identified by the participants as having the potential to generate a consensus among all residents of Moldova, could be those that propose general social and economic goals: concentration of all groups on the economic development, assistance in case of natural disasters, consolidation of Moldova as an independent country.

ANNEX 1

Public Agenda, Issues with High Conflict Potential

Category	Items on public agenda	
1 Politics		
A. Issues related to the formation of the new state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The collapse of the Soviet Union. ▪ Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova (1991) ▪ The adoption of the Constitution (1994), ▪ The Transnistrian war (1992) 	
B. Issues related to the political changes of the transition period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Victory of the Communists in the 2001 elections ▪ Granting rights to national minorities ▪ Plan for federalization of the Republic of Moldova ▪ Introduction of the integrated history course in schools ▪ Introduction of Russian language classes in schools ▪ Development of the poverty reduction strategy by the Government with the clearance of the international financial institutions. ▪ Medical insurance issues 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The winning of the Ilascu's case at ECHR. ▪ Negotiation of the action plan for integration with the European Union (2003), ▪ The consolidation of the right wing forces in one political formation (Moldova Democrita Bloc). ▪ Extended corruption. ▪ Limitation of democratic freedoms* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Economic and political stabilization; ▪ Orientation of state policies towards simple people; ▪ Improvement of services for citizens ▪ Elaboration of strategies for social, youth and tourism development**
C. Other (noted only from NN perspective)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ installation of Ștefan cel Mare („The Great“) monument ▪ Renovation of Capriana Monastery ▪ Wine festival organized with the involvement of the President. 	
2. Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Stabilization of the national currency ▪ Payment of salaries and pensions without delays ▪ Inexistence of an infrastructure for agricultural processing 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of competition on the market, failure of market economy ▪ Impossibility to start a business ▪ Lack of investments; ▪ Corruption ▪ Massive interference of the state with the economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Economic stabilization ▪ Creation of a socially-oriented market economy ▪ Economic growth**

3. SOCIETY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Massive migration of labor force abroad, often illegal ▪ Extreme poverty among ordinary people.
<p>Topics with high conflict potential = topics that could place different ethnic groups on conflicting positions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Transnistrian situation and ways for solving the Transnistrian conflict ▪ The issue of state configuration: unitary state with autonomous regions or federal state ▪ Issues of foreign policy orientation: European Union or Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States; ▪ The danger of losing the Moldovan state ▪ Issues related to the national identity (Romanians or Moldovans? history, official language, the danger of „Romanianization“

**issues noted only from a certain ideological perspective*

■ Political issues that can put ethnic groups on conflicting positions (Some issues are subject to different interpretations; thus the existence of these opinions from one perspective or another is conflicting).

ANNEX 2

Features and stereotypes identified by the participants describing the ethnic groups from Moldova

Below we will present how the participants identified the stereotypes and the features characteristic for each ethnic group.

Ethnic group	Features and stereotypes identified by the participants
Moldovan, Moldovans	<p>Moldovans are hardworking, diligent, joyful, hospitable, good dancers and singers, sympathetic, hilarious, with a good sense of humor, speak broken Romanian, do not have serious education, are not intellectuals, if they are, then it is the first generation of intellectuals. They are one of a kind. Moldovans are good only for agricultural work, they are craving for everything coming especially from the east, they criticize themselves, lack an ethnic or territorial identity, are backward, farmers, Romanians from historical Moldova and Odessa region. They can be kind, thrifty, calm but uneducated and ill bred.</p> <p>Represent the majority population or the title nation, their name has geographic connotation, it is not an ethnonym.</p> <p>We are Moldovans, those living in Moldova.</p> <p>On the other hand, the Moldovans are inconsistent, indecisive, impressionable, coward but at the same time respectful, decent, hardworking but poor. They do not evaluate their efforts, troublemakers, illiterate, and do not keep their promises.</p> <p>They are, at times, tragically pathetic, lazy, generous, live in Moldova, puzzled, patient, obedient, docile, „blockhead“, stupid, easy to deceive, confused, do not know what to identify with, unorganized, are not united, distraught, friendly, humble, coward, people on whose back one can get rich, submissive or envious.</p> <p>Talented but also envious, masters of the country, but in Moldova, a very small country, there are too many sociopolitical trends and movements.</p> <p>Peaceful, kind-hearted, hearty, polite, lively, patriots, our ancestors.</p> <p>Their symbols: Ewe-lamb, wine, mamaliga (polenta), Codru (forest), Miorita (traditional ballad), rose, the rulers - Bogdan, Stefan cel Mare (the Great), Vasile Lupu, Dimitrie Cantemir.</p> <p>It is hard to say anything about them.</p>

<p>Romanian, Romanians</p>	<p>Romanians are keeper of traditions, devoted to their traditions and their affiliation with the Romanian kin, they cultivate their language, the most knowledgeable and educated population, represent a nation attached to the European principles, trained, speak correct Romanian, nationalists. Thus, Romanians want unification with Romania, at any price, they want to get rid of the Russian-speaking population, the slogan „baggage, Railway station, Russia“ is in their actual case, they want unification.</p> <p>There is a negative attitude on behalf of Ukraine towards this nationality. On the other hand, Romanians are gypsies, poor, liars, extremists, fascists, inconsistent, undecided, impressionable, and coward. Although more and more people prefer to recognize their national affiliation (especially the young generation), they still face the problem of self-identification.</p> <p>They are trickier than Moldovans, there are differences between Romanians from Romania and those living in Moldova, the latter are pathetic in their attempt to prove their identity. Romanians are also hesitant, lack firmness, intelligent, energetic, arrogant, radical, frustrated, people that yell and then think of the consequences of their words. However, they move faster and are on the right track, they represent the local population.</p> <p>We have not yet understood that we are of the same blood.</p> <p>Romanians are behind Moldovans, you cannot be Moldovan today and Romanian tomorrow, they are an imitation of something, during the War, they prosecuted the Gypsies, they were worse than the Germans. They are citizens of the neighboring state, intelligent, romantic, (poetry and philosophy is their vocation), but they deceive you, they confuse you, they are neither sincere nor honest, they can pickpocket you, they can deceive you.</p> <p>Their symbols: Capital, Romanian kin, Danube.</p>
<p>Russian, Russians</p>	<p>They are open, sincere, aware of their affiliation to a great nation, convivial, hospitable, communicative, friendly, close, colleagues, neighbors, brothers.</p> <p>They left their country, they are occupants and colonists, in the past they held a better social position, they are marked by the inferiority complex, they live in a foreign country, grumpy, arrogant, enclaved, communicate only with Russians, do not try to establish a dialog with other ethnic groups, but they are better educated than Moldovans.</p> <p>They want a revival of the USSR, they dominate the country from the economic perspective, they represent a frustrated community that lost the privileges it had in the Soviet times, and realize that now they are a minority in an independent country, they have the mentality of the „besieged“. They are aggressive and consider that the best way of defense is the offence.</p>

<p>Russian, Russians</p>	<p>They belong to a vast culture – Russian culture, are resourceful, consider themselves superior in relation with Moldovans, live mainly in urban areas, they are foreign to the Moldovan customs and traditions, they have not learned the language of the locals, ignore and reject the values of Moldovans. Russians living outside Chisinau are more pragmatic and more adapted to the customs of the local population.</p> <p>Russians claim rights as liberators, they have the „big brother syndrome“, they try to benefit from others, are very prompt in conflicts, alcoholics, „red“, organized the revolution and wanted to spread communism around the world, harsh, defiant, arrogant, „pigs“, vulgar, live with the myth that they civilized this place, brought freedom and development, imperialists, chauvinists. Are at the same time organized, dominating, they want to impose Russian, greedy, think only about present not about future, are unpredictable.</p> <p>Russians are soviet people, or people like any others, live on huge territories, open soul, can give up on everything just to help their friends and relatives, you don't upset them... they feel their blood, oriented towards the Russian Federation. Russians are our peers, they are citizens of the former USSR. The resources are there, our markets are there, they have given up on many things for this periphery, their leaders cared about the people. They are great, respectable people, blood brothers, Slavs, they can give everything for alcohol, strong, smart, try to impose their opinions (cultural, linguistic), „it was better under Russians“. The Russian is a bear who walks forwards, who bursts in.</p> <p>All Russian speakers can be called Russians, regardless of the ethnic background.</p> <p>Symbols: Dostoievski, Chekhov, Vladimir (One of the first princes of Russia), Petr I, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Russian language.</p> <p>You cannot say much about them.</p>
<p>Ukrainian/Ukrainians</p>	<p>Ukrainians follow their traditions, respect their language, are communicative, good cooks, eat much, drink much, convivial, like to eat fat, good people, hospitable, nationalistic.</p> <p>One of the oldest ethnic communities from medieval Moldova, the ones from rural areas are different from the ones living in urban areas, and they preserved their traditions. Those from urban areas largely identify themselves with the former majority population of the USSR – the Russians.</p> <p>There are no big differences between Russians and Ukrainians, the latter are however more chauvinistic than Russians. It is one of the most Russified ethnic groups from Moldova. They have a weak character because they were Russified, they became foreign to the country of their origin, are invisible as a separate ethnic group, identify with the Russian-speaking population, they are Russians' little brothers and are fooled by the bigger brother, the trunk of the Russian minority, witty, selfish, profiting from others, unorganized, passive minority, heterogeneous.</p>

<p>Ukrainian Ukrainians</p>	<p>Rural population from Odessa region, live in villages, preserved their specific character, traditionalists; men wear traditional clothes, like to party, sympathetic, hardworking, best when it comes to folk songs, witty, ingenious, and greedy.</p> <p>Neighbors, brothers, peers, have a good sense of humor; keep their roots, good dancers and good singers.</p> <p>Ukrainian is not a nationality, it is a job. They are resourceful, cope with each other, they understand and respect each other, „when the Ukrainian was born, the Jew hiccupped“, people who find a place to live in Moldova and who do not claim anything. They want silence, they want others to consider their opinions, they want their language and culture to develop, they see first of all the humanity in everyone, then they look at the ethnicity, and are hospitable, greedy, joyful.</p> <p>Ukrainians are the citizens of the neighbor country.</p> <p>Their symbols: „Gorilka“ (A kind of hard liquor), „Gopak“ (Traditional dance), Ruthenians, Bogdan Hmelnytsky, Taras Bulba, the colors of their flag.</p> <p>You cannot say much about them.</p>
<p>The Gagauz</p>	<p>The Gagauz relate better than other ethnic groups to their ethnicity, they are largely oriented towards relationships within their group than towards other groups. Are thrifty, Christians of Turkic origin, isolated, peaceful. By intellect, they resemble Moldovans, as expression they resemble Russians (Russian-speaking), aggressive, backward, farmers, traders, Turks, betrayers, have an ugly language, and fight for autonomy.</p> <p>Are Russified, they did not have sufficient conditions to return to their language and traditions after 1991. It is a compact population in the southern Moldova, live in rural areas, small ethnic group, came to Moldova during the Russo-Turkish war, and they always got along with the local population, enjoy autonomy.</p> <p>Are one of a kind: Turks of orthodox orientation, men are handsome, somewhat mean, confused, hard to label with an ethnic or cultural category, not to capable from the intellectual perspective, victims of their history, with ambitions inspired from outside, incapable to analyze their opportunities and prospects.</p> <p>The least educated ethnic group, mean, part of our garden, brothers, peers, witty, hardworking, proud, tolerant towards other ethnicities, people enjoying autonomy, comply with Moldovan laws, neighbors, persons upset by the fate.</p> <p>Receive assistance from Turkey which can influence them negatively, one could say that they are Turks. Have rich traditions, like parties, like good wine and dances, get along with everyone, freedom-loving people, hot-blooded, aspire towards freedom, and respect the people belonging to other ethnic groups from around them.</p> <p>Impertinent, try to impose their opinion, loyal. Are considered rich, traders, deceitful.</p> <p>You cannot say much about them.</p>

<p>Bulgarian, Bulgarians</p>	<p>There is no big difference between Gagauz and Bulgarians, they are like Russians and Ukrainians (Russian- speaking), they do not differ as separate ethnic group, Russified, closed community, united.</p> <p>Bulgarians are vegetable growers, thrifty, united, live in compact groups in the south of Moldova, hardworking, ambitious, vainglorious, and successful in business, punctual, a mathematical average between Ukrainians and Gagauz.</p> <p>They have also identified with the Russian speaking population. Those from Bulgaria have rough features, are ugly.</p> <p>Slav people, present in public life, pro-soviet, hate the locals for their stupidity, pursue their interests, people you cannot trust too much, residents of Taraclia district, poor, active, wealthy, smart.</p> <p>Bulgarians and the Gagauz have a common history.</p> <p>People with authority, cohabitants, greedy, united, honest, hardworking, neat, resourceful, follow their traditions, do not want to be assimilated, care about the aspect of their homes, have their own district, comply with the Moldovan legislation, can be appreciated, should not lose their culture and traditions, good craftsmen.</p> <p>Like to party, good wines and dances, good people, harsh, not too open, our Slav brothers, attentive, calculated, very pragmatic, like accuracy, think much then make a correct decision.</p> <p>Their symbols: „Bratushka“ (Little brother), the Bulgarian elephant is the best friend of the Russian elephant (old saying), good wine, good sheep cheese.</p> <p>You cannot say much about them.</p>
<p>Jew, Jews</p>	<p>Jews care much about their community; help each other, united, smart, educated, and tricky. Cope well with every situation, adaptable, well trained, ready to leave the country, dynamic, inclined towards business, nostalgic for Soviet times.</p> <p>Usurers, businesspeople, do not identify with their country of residence, and they can always betray it. Jews brought the communism.</p> <p>Are cosmopolitan, joyful, are tolerant with other ethnic groups, influence everything from the shadow. Are perseverant in everything they do, consistent, wide intellectual horizons, many of them speak Romanian; know how to solve their problems, very ingenious, intelligent.</p> <p>Know their purpose, are everywhere, you can send them wherever you want, have suffered a lot, transformed the Holocaust into an ideology, made profits out of everything.</p> <p>Are not always honest. Traders, profit from others, traditionally they place themselves in highly influential economic and political positions, think they are smarter, they buy and they sell you, cynical, disregard the others.</p> <p>Martyrs, have suffered from communism and Holocaust, sensible, catalysts, they feel well the economic situation.</p> <p>Our religion comes from them, biblical nation protected by the God, reasonable, organized, quick-witted, see the shortest way to achieve their goals using the principles specific to Jews, calculated, farsighted, preoccupied with their future.</p> <p>It is better not to deal with them.</p> <p>Symbols: Jesus Christ, Jews are scattered everywhere like the Gypsies.</p>

Gypsy, Gypsies.

Less educated compared to other ethnic groups, do not put much effort into education, are not hardworking. They deal with illegal businesses, do not get along with the sanitary norms and education, have large houses surrounded by garbage.

Gypsies are dirty, uneducated, thieves, more of a tribe than an ethnic group, drug and human traffickers, build homes but never finish them, backward community, are not law obedient, have eccentric and extravagant customs, large houses and many cars.

Beggars, families with many children, wealthy, have earned everything through illegal means, liars, barely assimilate and socialize, nomads.

Population loving their traditions, customs, clothes, songs, language.

They have a problem accommodating to the modern life and they easily preserve their ethnic group.

Gypsies from Moldova are more emancipated, more civilized and more sedentary comparing to Gypsies from Romania. However, they are nomads, conservative, dishonest, they represent a small group.

Exotic, inventive, they like abnormal and bizarre things. „The Gypsy has money but lacks honesty“.

Miserable people that need help and compassion.

Easy, illiterate and unorganized, an interesting people. Care about their children, proud people, instable people, neat. Deal with drugs, nomads, fortune-tellers, do not send their children to school, do not recognize the social principles respected by all, wear dirty clothes, and never work. People without goals, horse stealers.

They were offered the opportunity to affirm themselves, they have their own leader (Baron) who solves their problems, one should create conditions for them so they feel that they belong to the same social entity.

The Gypsy is a crafts person, musician, free man, good follow, joyful, good singer, hard worker (if he tries to do something).

Symbols: Sorooca, Huge houses on Sorooca Hill, Budulai (Film character), chaos.

ANNEX 3

Interview Guide

Delphi Study, Phase one

Issue/objectives	Questions
Agenda, Initiation questions, Identification of interethnic issues	<p>What are the most important events that marked the recent history of Moldova? <i>Please explain what were the problems and their causes, the successes and their cause. Provide arguments.</i></p> <p>What is the current situation?</p> <p>What are the major current issues? Why?</p> <p>What are the things that went well and what are the things that will go well in the future? <i>Provide arguments.</i></p>
Controversial issues Identification of issues with conflict potential.	<p>What were the topics of public debates that generated the most stringent controversies in Moldova?</p> <p>What were the reasons for these (for each topic)? Who were the message carriers and what were their positions (pro or against) in relation to each?</p> <p>Which of these issues generated controversies? Provide arguments.</p> <p>What issues are likely to generate controversies or conflicts in the future? Why?</p>
Identification of in-group and out-group features and stereotypes	<p>What are the first things that come to your mind when I say:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Moldovan - Gagauz - Romanian - Bulgarian - Ukrainian - Jew - Russian - Gypsy (<i>ask one at a time, rotate the list for each interview</i>) <p>What are the stereotypes for the following ethnic groups from Moldova: Moldovans, Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, and Gypsies? Which of these ethnic groups provide political elites in Moldova? What about economic elites? What about cultural elites?</p> <p>What are the disfavored ethnic groups?</p>
Controversial issues	<p>What were the issues that placed the ethnic groups in conflict over the time (Moldovans-Russians, Moldovans-Ukrainians, Russians-Ukrainians, Russians-Gagauz, etc.)? Provide arguments.</p> <p>What are the current issues? What are the issues that registered consensus over the time? (issues generating understanding, consensus, etc.) <i>Please provide arguments.</i></p>

Opinion leaders, reference groups	<p>What are the personalities or organizations dealing with interethnic relations in Moldova?</p> <p>What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the improvement of interethnic relationships (Russian-Moldovans, Ukrainians-Moldovans, Moldovans-Gagauz, Moldovans-Gypsies, etc.)?</p> <p>What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relationships?</p>
National identity/Ethnic identity	<p>What are the first things that come to your mind when I say 'Republic of Moldova'?</p> <p>What characterizes the Republic of Moldova? <i>Provide arguments.</i></p> <p>What does it mean to be Moldovan and live in Moldova?</p> <p>.....Russian.....?</p> <p>.....Ukrainian.....?</p> <p>.....Bulgarian.....?</p> <p>.....Gagauz.....?</p> <p>.....Jew.....?</p> <p>.....Gypsy.....?</p> <p>How do you define national identity?</p>
Perceptions and attitudes on politics/policies	<p>What was the Moldovan policy with regard to ethnic minorities until now?</p> <p>What are the rights of ethnic minorities from Moldova? If you were to compare the Moldovan legislation with the similar legislation from other countries, what would you mention?</p> <p>What are the relationships between the majority and the minorities (who represents the majority and who represents the minorities) in Moldova?</p> <p>What would be your opinion if Romania financed Romanian language schools in Moldova? What about universities? What about radio and television stations?</p> <p>.....Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority.....?</p> <p>.....Bulgaria for Bulgarian minority.....?</p> <p>.....Russia for Russian minority.....?</p> <p>.....Turkey for Gagauz minority.....?</p> <p>What were the policies that improved these relationships? Provide arguments.</p> <p>What were the policies that worsened these relationships? Provide arguments.</p>
Summary	<p>What else would you say regarding the issues discussed so far, important things I did not think of...?</p> <p>What are your greatest fears for the future?</p> <p>What are your hopes?</p>

Thank you very much for your participation!

ANNEX 4

Self-completed survey form

The research report that you received represents the first stage of a project dedicated to the study of interethnic relations in Moldova. The report data were collected through in-depth interviews conducted with 29 people from Moldova. You also participated in these interviews. The report summarizes the opinion of participants.

For the second stage of the research, we ask you to express your opinions regarding the issues subject to debates. This survey form includes the important issues included in the report (next to each topic from the survey form you will find the pages from the report that correspond to the issue). Below each issue, you will see a free space. We ask you to fill it in, expressing your opinions and observations regarding that matter.

Q1	Items on Moldova's public agenda, controversial issues
<p>A. What were the most important recent events in the Republic of Moldova?</p>	
<p>In the attached report, you will find this chapter containing three parts: political, economic and socio-economic events. Please express your opinion regarding these issues.</p> <p>1. Political events (pages 5-7 from the report)</p> <p>Economic events (pages 7-8 from the report)</p> <p>Socio-economic events (page 8 from the report)</p>	
<p>B. What were the most controversial issues?</p>	
<p>The report formulated three categories of controversial issues, depending on the intensity of their appearance in the daily discourse. Please express your opinion regarding the issues included in the report or specify others if it is the case.</p> <p>Issues with a relatively low conflict potential (p 8 of the report)</p> <p>Issues with an average conflict potential (p. 8 of the report)</p> <p>Issues with a high conflict potential (p. 8-9 of the report)</p>	

Q2	Interethnic relations in Moldova
A. What are the features and stereotypes describing better the ethnic groups from Moldova?	
<p>In the report, you will find a “picture“ for each ethnic group, realized by applying different features by the members of the respective group as well as members of other ethnic groups. Please comment on this description for each individual ethnic group (pages 10-14 of the report)</p> <p>Moldovans.....</p> <p>Romanians.....</p> <p>Russians.....</p> <p>Ukrainians.....</p> <p>Gagauz.....</p> <p>Bulgarians.....</p> <p>Jews.....</p> <p>Gypsies.....</p>	
B. How do you describe the interethnic relations in Moldova?	
<p>The two outlined positions are:</p> <p>Inexistence of controversial issues, and inexistence of any relationship between these ethnic groups. Do you believe these positions reflect the realities from Moldova? Provide arguments. (Page 14 from the report)</p> <p>There are certain issues that place the ethnic groups in conflict positions: Transnistrian conflict, national identity, orientation of Moldovan foreign policy, and configuration of the country. Do you agree? Provide arguments. Are there other conflict issues in addition to these? (p. 14-15 from the report)</p>	
<p>What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova? (Page 15 from the report)</p> <p>What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova? (Page 15 from the report)</p>	
Q3	Perceptions and attitudes on politics/policies in Moldova
A. What are the perceptions and attitudes towards the Moldovan state?	
<p>The relevant opinions were grouped in three categories: “national-optimists“, “unionists“, and “skeptics“. How do the Moldovan citizens relate to the Moldovan state? What does this country mean to them? (Page 16 from the report)</p> <p>What is national identity? (pages 16-17 from the report)</p>	

B. How do different ethnic groups perceive themselves in relation with the state?

What does it mean to be Moldovan and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Russian and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Ukrainian and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Gagauz and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Bulgarian and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Gypsy and live in Moldova? Do you agree with the conclusions of this text? Provide arguments. (pages 17-18 from the report)

C. What were the policies of Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? (Pages 18-19 from the report)

What are the advantaged ethnic groups? Provide arguments.

What are the disadvantaged ethnic groups? Provide arguments.

What were the good policies from Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? Provide arguments.

What were the bad policies from Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? Provide arguments.

Q4 Personal observations after reading the study

Thank you very much for your participation!

ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: MOLDOVANS/ROMANIANS

Q1. People believe that there are several ethnic groups living in Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you consider yourself?	Moldovan	95%	-> CONTINUE!
	Russian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Ukrainian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Gagauz	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Bulgarian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Romanian	5%	-> CONTINUE!
	Other: _____	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't know	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't answer	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!

Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Russians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	6%	22%	27%	28%	7%	10%
b. 5 years ago	3%	23%	38%	24%	4%	9%
c. last year	2%	19%	45%	19%	5%	9%

Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	20%	37%	15%	4%	21%
b. 5 years ago	2%	18%	46%	12%	2%	20%
c. last year	2%	15%	49%	11%	3%	19%

Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and the Gagauz from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	13%	26%	16%	5%	38%
b. 5 years ago	1%	12%	34%	13%	4%	37%
c. last year	1%	12%	38%	9%	4%	37%

Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	2%	12%	30%	11%	4%	41%
b. 5 years ago	1%	12%	36%	8%	3%	40%
c. last year	1%	11%	39%	6%	2%	40%

Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Romanians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	6%	28%	30%	13%	3%	21%
b. 5 years ago	5%	26%	36%	11%	2%	20%
c. last year	4%	21%	36%	15%	4%	20%

Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the relationship between different ethnic groups in Moldova?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Moldovans and Russians	71%	12%	7%	2%	8%
b. The relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians	71%	7%	6%	2%	14%
c. The relationship between Moldovans and Gagauz	51%	10%	8%	3%	27%
d. The relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians	58%	6%	6%	3%	27%
e. The relationship between Moldovans and Romanians	74%	4%	3%	3%	16%

Q8. How can you describe the interethnic relationships in your area?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	No relationships between ethnic groups	Other	Don't Know/No answer
a. The relationship between Moldovans and Russians	66%	6%	4%	17%	2%	5%
b. The relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians	56%	4%	3%	27%	2%	8%
c. The relationship between Moldovans and the Gagauz	29%	3%	3%	49%	2%	14%
d. The relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians	31%	2%	3%	50%	2%	13%
e. The relationship between Moldovans and Romanians	53%	2%	1%	32%	2%	10%

Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible that any of these could become a threat?

Q9_3. Russians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	9%	18%	31%	31%	11%
b. for Moldovans	7%	19%	30%	33%	11%
c. for you or your family	5%	10%	27%	48%	10%

Q9_2. Ukrainians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	3%	10%	30%	45%	13%
b. for Moldovans	2%	9%	30%	46%	13%
c. for you or your family	1%	6%	24%	57%	12%

Q9_3. The Gagauz can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	3%	12%	25%	35%	24%
b. for Moldovans	2%	10%	27%	37%	24%
c. for you or your family	1%	5%	24%	47%	23%

Q9_4. Bulgarians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	2%	7%	26%	41%	24%
b. for Moldovans	2%	5%	26%	43%	24%
c. for you or your family	1%	3%	21%	52%	23%

Q9_5. Romanians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	4%	23%	59%	14%
b. for Moldovans	1%	4%	20%	62%	14%
c. for you or your family	1%	2%	17%	66%	14%

Q10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I was born in Moldova...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	61%	25%	9%	2%	2%
b. makes my life easier	13%	19%	49%	12%	6%
c. makes me feel ashamed	2%	9%	28%	57%	5%
d. makes my life harder	5%	14%	35%	38%	7%

Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/No answer
a. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy	80%	14%	3%	1%	2%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like Moldovans from Moldova.	33%	30%	20%	8%	10%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians from Moldova.	5%	20%	36%	19%	20%
d. The world would be better if all the people were like Ukrainians from Moldova.	6%	19%	34%	17%	24%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like the Gagauz from Moldova.	4%	12%	32%	21%	31%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like Bulgarians from Moldova.	4%	14%	32%	18%	32%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like Romanians from Moldova.	11%	27%	26%	13%	23%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova	7%	21%	30%	30%	12%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country	39%	28%	15%	8%	9%

Q12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I am Moldovan/Romanian	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/No answer
a. makes me proud	66%	21%	9%	2%	2%
b. makes my life easier	14%	20%	49%	10%	6%
c. makes me feel ashamed	2%	8%	31%	54%	6%
d. makes my life harder	4%	13%	37%	38%	9%

Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your identity? I mainly consider myself Show list Q13! Multiple choice!	1. First choice	2. Second Choice	Total
Moldovan	70%	11%	81%
Romanian	7%	8%	14%
Resident of this locality	6%	27%	32%
Citizen of Moldova	15%	42%	57%
CIS Resident	0%	2%	3%
European	1%	4%	6%
Eastern European	0%	0%	0%
Don't Know/No answer	0%	6%	6%

Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Moldovan? Show list Q14! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Moldovan parents	36%	10%	5%	51%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family	19%	20%	9%	48%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions	8%	16%	12%	36%
d. Feel Moldovan	8%	11%	11%	30%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture	3%	10%	10%	23%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	2%	3%	3%	9%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag	1%	3%	5%	9%
h. Live in Moldova	5%	6%	14%	26%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian	5%	7%	9%	21%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship	4%	8%	9%	21%
k. Be born in Moldova	7%	4%	8%	18%
l. Don't know/No answer	1%	2%	5%	8%

Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Russian? Show list Q15! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Russian parents	35%	7%	5%	48%
b. Speak Russian language in the family	14%	17%	6%	38%
c. Respect Russian traditions	7%	12%	12%	32%
d. Feel Russian	7%	10%	8%	26%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture	4%	9%	9%	21%
f. Honor the Russian national flag	2%	4%	4%	10%
g. Live in Russia	4%	8%	9%	21%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian	7%	7%	12%	26%
i. Have Russian citizenship	4%	8%	11%	23%
j. Be born in Russia	8%	6%	9%	23%
k. Don't know/No answer	9%	11%	14%	33%

Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Ukrainian? Show list Q16! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents	36%	7%	5%	49%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family	14%	17%	6%	37%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions	8%	12%	11%	32%
d. Feel Ukrainian	6%	12%	9%	27%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture	3%	9%	9%	22%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag	2%	4%	4%	9%

g. Live in Ukraine	4%	7%	9%	20%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian	6%	7%	11%	24%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship	4%	6%	12%	22%
j. Be born in Ukraine	6%	5%	8%	20%
k. Don't know/No answer	11%	13%	16%	40%

Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Gagauz? Show list Q17! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Gagauz parents	37%	7%	5%	48%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family	13%	17%	7%	37%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions	8%	15%	12%	35%
d. Feel Gagauz	7%	10%	9%	26%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture	2%	9%	12%	23%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag	2%	3%	4%	9%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia	5%	9%	13%	27%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language	5%	8%	11%	24%
i. Be born in Gagauzia	8%	5%	9%	22%
j. Don't know/No answer	13%	16%	19%	48%

Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Bulgarian? Show list Q18! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents	38%	7%	4%	49%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family	14%	18%	7%	38%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions	8%	14%	13%	34%
d. Feel Bulgarian	6%	9%	10%	26%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture	3%	9%	10%	22%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag	2%	4%	3%	8%
g. Live in Bulgaria	2%	6%	7%	15%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian	6%	7%	11%	24%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship	3%	6%	10%	18%
j. Be born in Bulgaria	6%	6%	8%	19%
k. Don't know/No answer	13%	16%	17%	46%

Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Romanian? Show list Q19! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Romanian parents	33%	7%	6%	46%
b. Speak Romanian in the family	17%	16%	6%	40%
c. Respect Romanian traditions	8%	14%	13%	34%

d. Feel Romanian	8%	10%	10%	28%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	2%	13%	11%	26%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag	2%	4%	3%	9%
g. Live in Romania	3%	6%	5%	14%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian	7%	7%	11%	25%
i. Have Romanian citizenship	4%	7%	14%	24%
j. Be born in Romania	6%	6%	8%	21%
k. Don't know/No answer	9%	11%	13%	33%

Q20. How much do you trust...	Very much	Much	Little	Don't trust	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People from Moldova	9%	49%	36%	5%	2%
b. Moldovans from Moldova	9%	53%	30%	5%	3%
c. Russians from Moldova	3%	33%	43%	15%	6%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova	2%	29%	43%	16%	11%
e. Gagauz from Moldova	2%	16%	37%	22%	23%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova	2%	19%	36%	19%	23%
g. Romanians from Moldova	7%	35%	34%	12%	12%

Q21. Please specify what would be your reaction if persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova:	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	100%	0%	88%	12%	86%	14%	80%	20%	83%	17%	94%	6%
b. lived in your area	100%	0%	83%	17%	80%	20%	71%	29%	75%	25%	91%	9%
c. were your neighbors	99%	1%	77%	23%	74%	26%	64%	36%	68%	32%	86%	14%
d. were your friends	99%	1%	76%	24%	72%	28%	60%	40%	65%	35%	83%	17%
e. were part of your family	95%	5%	65%	35%	61%	39%	51%	49%	56%	44%	76%	24%

Q22. Are you a member of any organization?	Yes	6%	-- SKIP TO Q23
	No	93%	-- SKIP TO Q24
	Don't Know/No answer	0%	-- SKIP TO Q24

Q23. How often do you attend the meetings of this organization?	Daily	11%	There are no formal meetings of the members	6%
	Weekly	11%	I do not take part in meetings of the members	8%
	Monthly	26%	Don't know	-
	A few times a year	19%	Don't answer	2%
	Once a year	17%		

Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) with people of other ethnic background? (public event)	Yes	21%
	No	77%
	Don't Know/No answer	2%

Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova.

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choice!

Positive features: For **each** ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For **each** ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Positive features	Q24. Moldovans		Q25. Russians		Q26. Ukrainians		Q27. Gagauz		Q28. Bulgarians		Q29. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
1. Decent	14%	8%	9%	4%	8%	4%	2%	2%	3%	2%	8%	4%
2. Kind-hearted	13%	14%	4%	4%	6%	4%	1%	2%	1%	3%	2%	4%
3. Hearty	9%	14%	3%	6%	4%	6%	1%	3%	1%	3%	3%	6%
4. Independent	4%	4%	12%	12%	6%	6%	3%	3%	1%	2%	5%	7%
5. Civilized	2%	3%	5%	7%	2%	5%	1%	3%	2%	2%	7%	14%
6. Educated	3%	10%	5%	6%	3%	6%	1%	2%	1%	3%	5%	9%
7. Resourceful	3%	9%	9%	17%	5%	7%	3%	5%	2%	3%	3%	8%
8. Joyful	7%	21%	7%	17%	8%	11%	2%	4%	2%	3%	4%	6%
9. Clean	1%	6%	2%	4%	1%	4%	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%	3%
10. Religious	5%	13%	3%	6%	3%	6%	3%	3%	3%	3%	6%	10%
11. United	1%	3%	7%	18%	5%	9%	4%	5%	4%	5%	5%	9%
12. Honest	1%	5%	1%	4%	1%	3%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
13. Modest	1%	4%	0%	4%	2%	6%	1%	3%	1%	4%	2%	5%
14. Hard-working	26%	31%	1%	5%	3%	13%	3%	5%	3%	6%	2%	6%
15. Intelligent	0%	2%	1%	7%	1%	4%	0%	3%	0%	3%	5%	11%
16. Hospitable	8%	33%	4%	7%	3%	8%	1%	3%	1%	5%	3%	7%
17. None	1%	0%	6%	1%	6%	1%	9%	1%	7%	1%	4%	0%
18. Don't Know/No answer	3%	2%	20%	4%	35%	3%	61%	1%	63%	1%	34%	4%

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choice!

Negative features: For **each** ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For **each** ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Negative features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
19. Selfish	9%	5%	9%	8%	8%	4%	3%	2%	3%	2%	5%	4%
20. Aggressive	4%	6%	20%	11%	8%	6%	6%	5%	3%	3%	3%	5%
21. Indifferent/ cold	6%	9%	5%	9%	4%	7%	1%	4%	2%	4%	3%	5%
22. Obedient	16%	14%	1%	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%
23. Backward	3%	8%	0%	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	2%	3%	1%	1%
24. Uneducated	4%	5%	3%	10%	2%	4%	1%	5%	1%	3%	2%	2%
25. Negligent	5%	13%	2%	7%	2%	7%	1%	2%	2%	4%	2%	3%
26. Sad	4%	7%	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%
27. Dirty	1%	3%	3%	4%	2%	4%	2%	4%	2%	2%	2%	4%
28. Superstitious	2%	5%	2%	6%	2%	6%	1%	2%	2%	3%	2%	4%
29. Divided	4%	15%	1%	3%	2%	3%	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%	3%
30. Thieves	4%	9%	2%	6%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	5%	6%
31. Vainglorious	1%	5%	3%	11%	2%	7%	1%	4%	1%	2%	7%	6%
32. Lazy	1%	2%	6%	11%	2%	5%	1%	4%	1%	3%	3%	9%
33. Stupid	1%	2%	0%	2%	0%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%
34. Hostile	0%	3%	1%	4%	1%	4%	0%	2%	0%	1%	0%	2%
35. None	13%	1%	7%	1%	10%	1%	7%	0%	7%	1%	12%	2%
36. Don't Know/ No answer	21%	6%	33%	7%	48%	4%	64%	3%	68%	2%	50%	5%

Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most politically influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!

	The richest		The most politically influential		The most respected	
	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice
Moldovans	23%	20%	33%	17%	37%	13%
Russians	39%	21%	32%	25%	19%	25%
Ukrainians	2%	9%	2%	7%	1%	7%
Gagauz	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%
Bulgarians	1%	3%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Romanians	2%	5%	2%	6%	4%	6%
Other_____	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Don't Know/ No answer	29%	39%	29%	40%	36%	46%

Q32. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: <i>Moldova</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries	78%	14%	2%	1%	5%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	23%	34%	21%	12%	10%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	19%	34%	23%	13%	11%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	20%	29%	25%	15%	11%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	20%	30%	24%	15%	12%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad	49%	26%	10%	3%	12%
g. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad	51%	30%	6%	2%	11%
h. support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova	30%	36%	16%	4%	14%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	14%	21%	29%	17%	20%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	14%	20%	31%	15%	20%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	12%	20%	29%	17%	21%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	13%	20%	30%	17%	21%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova.	29%	42%	11%	4%	15%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majority	11%	17%	25%	29%	19%

Q33. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Russia</i> should...?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Russian background studying in Moldova	54%	33%	5%	1%	6%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova	43%	35%	11%	2%	9%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from Moldova	45%	33%	11%	3%	8%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from Moldova	33%	27%	19%	10%	12%

Q34. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Ukraine</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova	50%	36%	5%	1%	8%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova	41%	37%	10%	2%	10%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from Moldova	43%	34%	11%	3%	10%
d. help develop the identity of the Ukrainians from Moldova	32%	29%	18%	10%	12%

Q35. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Turkey</i> should...?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Gagauz background studying in Moldova	45%	32%	7%	3%	12%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova	39%	31%	12%	4%	15%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova	40%	28%	14%	4%	14%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova	29%	25%	18%	11%	16%

Q36. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Bulgaria</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova	47%	33%	7%	1%	12%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova	40%	32%	12%	2%	13%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from Moldova	41%	30%	14%	3%	13%
d. help develop the identity of the Bulgarians from Moldova	31%	27%	17%	10%	15%

Q37. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Romania</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Romanian background studying in Moldova	58%	32%	3%	0%	7%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova	53%	32%	5%	0%	9%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from Moldova	52%	30%	7%	1%	9%
d. help develop the identity of Romanians from Moldova	46%	30%	8%	4%	11%

Q38. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?	too many rights	enough rights	not enough rights	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Russians have...	22%	62%	4%	13%
b. Ukrainians have..	11%	67%	6%	15%
c. Gagauz have..	10%	64%	7%	19%
d. Bulgarians have...	7%	67%	6%	20%
e. Romanians have..	6%	69%	10%	15%

Q39. Do you think that ethnic background affects the <u>employment</u> in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovans have..	12%	65%	13%	10%
b. Russians have...	14%	64%	9%	14%
c. Ukrainians have...	7%	63%	14%	17%
d. Gagauz have..	3%	58%	14%	26%
e. Bulgarians have...	3%	58%	15%	25%
f. Romanians have..	4%	62%	16%	19%

Q40. Do you think nationality matters to have a successful business in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovans have..	10%	67%	11%	12%
b. Russians have...	15%	61%	9%	16%
c. Ukrainians have...	8%	62%	12%	18%
d. Gagauz have..	4%	56%	14%	26%
e. Bulgarians have...	4%	56%	15%	26%
f. Romanians have..	5%	60%	14%	21%

Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	27%	20%	23%	24%	5%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools	73%	16%	7%	0%	3%
c. Children of other nationalities should study together with Moldovan children	48%	32%	11%	4%	5%
d. There should be mixed marriages	51%	33%	8%	3%	5%
e. There should be organizations and associations promoting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova	42%	35%	7%	3%	13%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (festivals) attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova	39%	35%	11%	3%	13%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) with the participation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	43%	35%	9%	2%	10%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	41%	37%	10%	3%	8%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups from Moldova	32%	40%	16%	4%	9%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)	34%	31%	16%	9%	9%

Q42. Please list three personalities contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Vladimir Voronin	15%	a.	Communist Party of Moldova	6%
b.	Vasile Tarlev	6%	b.	Christian-Democratic Party	2%
c.	Iurie Roșca	6%	c.	United Nations	1%

Q44. Please list three personalities contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Iurie Roșca	11%	a.	Christian-Democratic Party	5%
b.	Vladimir Voronin	4%	b.	Communist Party of Moldova	2%
c.	Eugenia Ostapciuc	2%	2%		

Q46. How do the following political parties influence interethnic relations?	Rather improves	Neither improves nor worsens	Rather worsens	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova	35%	17%	16%	32%
b. Christian-Democratic Party	13%	18%	26%	43%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc	12%	26%	6%	56%
d. Agrarian Party	3%	27%	7%	63%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova	5%	27%	6%	63%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova	3%	23%	7%	67%

Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our country. Please tell me if you consider each of these problems crucial, severe or not too serious.		Crucial	Severe	Not too serious	Don't know	No answer
1.	Unemployment	48%	48%	1%	2%	1%
2.	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	15%	46%	27%	7%	3%
3.	Low salaries	53%	45%	1%	1%	1%
4.	Violation of human rights	24%	55%	12%	7%	2%
5.	Housing issue	24%	56%	14%	4%	2%
6.	Health condition	39%	53%	6%	1%	1%
7.	Environmental issues	24%	50%	15%	8%	2%
8.	Corruption	37%	51%	2%	8%	2%
9.	Crime level/insecurity	29%	53%	8%	8%	2%
10.	Drug trafficking	25%	52%	11%	11%	2%
11.	Armed conflicts	14%	42%	31%	11%	2%
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	10%	40%	36%	12%	2%
13.	Lack of rule of law	20%	53%	15%	11%	1%
14.	Lack of press freedom	14%	43%	26%	14%	3%
15.	Drug abuse	25%	53%	9%	12%	2%
16.	Trafficking in women	38%	48%	3%	9%	1%
17.	Relations with the Transnistrian region	40%	48%	5%	6%	1%

Q48. Do you agree or disagree that...?	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor.	63%	25%	12%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work	62%	28%	10%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods.	87%	8%	5%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens.	90%	7%	3%
e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to reduce the crime level.	87%	8%	5%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults.	86%	8%	6%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the average ones.	37%	53%	10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state.	64%	27%	9%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself.	63%	29%	8%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own.	82%	10%	8%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our country.	78%	13%	8%

Q49. Do you agree with the following statement? During the current government...	True	Somewhat true	Somewhat false	Totally false	Don't Know/ No answer
1. ...the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people	16%	24%	35%	14%	12%
2. ...the state services rendered to citizens improved	9%	25%	40%	15%	11%
3. ...corruption expanded at all levels	22%	40%	15%	4%	19%
4. ...the freedom of expression of the media was limited	13%	27%	25%	5%	31%
5. ...the democratic rights of citizens were limited	13%	31%	23%	4%	29%
6. The Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the weakness of Moldovan politicians	28%	29%	15%	4%	24%
7. ...Moldova's position was respected abroad	5%	20%	30%	10%	35%

8. ...the number of poor people from Moldova decreased	5%	15%	34%	33%	13%
9. ...the national currency was stabilized	4%	24%	33%	12%	28%
10. ...the national economy was stabilized	3%	21%	35%	10%	30%
11. ... salaries and pensions were paid without delays	29%	46%	11%	4%	10%
12. ...the farmers were supported	5%	21%	33%	21%	19%
13. ...market economy was consolidated.	3%	18%	31%	9%	39%
14. ...obstacles to foreign investors were created.	6%	16%	24%	6%	48%
15. ...small investors were encouraged.	3%	17%	26%	9%	45%
16. ...there was illegal interference with the economy.	9%	22%	17%	4%	48%
17. ...an economic growth was achieved.	4%	19%	33%	11%	33%
18. ...market economy failed	6%	18%	22%	4%	50%
19. ...measures to stop massive migration were not taken.	27%	30%	15%	4%	24%

Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, would you vote?	I would definitely vote	70%
	I would probably vote	18%
	I would probably not go	3%
	I would definitely not go	5%
	I don't know (don't read)	3%
	I don't answer (don't read)	0%

Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent !

Communist Party of Moldova	30%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc* (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party)	10%
Christian Democratic Party	10%
Agrarian Party	1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova	2%
Socialist Party	-
Other, please specify _____	0%
Independent candidate, please specify _____	0%
I would not vote	3%
Don't know	34%
Don't answer	8%

* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Alliance, Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“

Q52. In your opinion, what should be the direction of our country?	Be independent of any alliance/union	7%
	We should integrate with the European Union	62%
	We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	14%
	Don't know	16%
	Don't answer	1%

Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration of Moldova?	Very much	23%	At all	14%
	Quite much	29%	Don't know	12%
	Quite a little	14%	Don't answer	8%

Q54. What do you believe will happen in five years...	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	To a very small extent	Don't Know/No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong country	3%	19%	41%	24%	13%
b. Moldova's position will be taken in consideration abroad	2%	19%	40%	20%	19%
c. the status of Transnistria will be decided	3%	18%	33%	27%	18%
d. income of the population will grow	1%	21%	40%	23%	16%
e. market economy will consolidate	1%	22%	33%	20%	24%
f. democracy will consolidate	1%	19%	34%	20%	26%
g. young people living in Moldova will have large opportunities in the country	2%	18%	33%	30%	16%

Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict with the neighboring countries is possible?	Yes	30%	-- SKIP TO Q56
	No	57%	-- SKIP TO Q57
	Don't Know/No answer	13%	-- SKIP TO Q57

Q56. If yes, with what country is Moldova likely to enter an armed conflict?	Romania	0%	Transnistrian region	82%
	Russia	9%	Other, please specify _____	0%
	Ukraine	5%	Don't Know/No answer	4%
	Bulgaria	-		

Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?

- a. _____ | | | |
- b. _____ | | | |
- c. _____ | | | |

Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to Transnistria?

- a. _____ | | | |
- b. _____ | | | |
- c. _____ | | | |

Q59. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life.	4%	14%	43%	30%	9%
b. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova	3%	9%	45%	34%	8%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life.	2%	12%	44%	31%	12%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova	2%	11%	43%	33%	11%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life.	3%	13%	36%	28%	20%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova	3%	12%	37%	29%	19%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life.	3%	11%	39%	27%	19%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova	3%	10%	39%	30%	19%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life.	2%	7%	40%	39%	13%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova	2%	5%	38%	42%	12%

Q60. What is your native language? Do not read the options for answers! Multiple choice!	a. Moldovan	86%	e. Gagauz	0%
	b. Romanian	17%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	2%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	0%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q61. What language do you usually speak at home? Do not read the options for answers! Multiple choice!	a. Moldovan	85%	e. Gagauz	0%
	b. Romanian	17%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	7%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	1%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your...

	a. mother	b. father	c. grandparents	d. children
Moldovan	72%	69%	59%	76%
Romanian	11%	11%	10%	12%
Russian	3%	3%	2%	3%
Ukrainian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Gagauz	0%	0%	0%	0%
Bulgarian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other	0%	0%	0%	1%
It's not the case	14%	16%	26%	7%
Don't know/No answer	0%	1%	2%	0%

Q63. How well do you speak ...?	a. Moldovan	b. Romanian	c. Russian	d. Ukrainian	e. Gagauz	f. Bulgarian
I speak it perfectly	91%	56%	27%	2%	0%	0%
Fluently but with an accent	5%	32%	35%	4%	0%	0%
I can make myself understood in most situations	2%	7%	24%	13%	1%	1%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty	0%	1%	7%	17%	2%	1%
I only know a few words	0%	0%	4%	25%	5%	6%
I do not know any word	0%	1%	2%	37%	89%	88%
No answer	1%	3%	1%	3%	4%	4%

Q64. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. I am disturbed when people around me speak Russian	5%	9%	20%	27%	36%	3%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak Ukrainian	5%	8%	22%	28%	34%	4%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak Gagauz	7%	9%	21%	23%	30%	9%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak Bulgarian	6%	9%	24%	22%	31%	9%
e. There are many Russians who avoid speaking Moldovan/Romanian although they know it	36%	34%	11%	5%	5%	8%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking Moldovan/Romanian although they know it	29%	32%	15%	8%	4%	12%
g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking Moldovan/Romanian although they know it	24%	25%	14%	5%	4%	28%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking Moldovan/Romanian although they know it	23%	25%	15%	6%	5%	27%
i. All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian	73%	12%	7%	4%	2%	3%
j. All residents of Moldova should know Russian	15%	20%	25%	21%	13%	5%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian	10%	16%	25%	23%	13%	13%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz	11%	17%	23%	22%	13%	14%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Bulgarian	10%	16%	24%	23%	13%	15%

Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova?			Q66. Which ones?	
One state language	72%	-- SKIP TO Q66	a. Moldovan	77%
Two state languages	20%	-- SKIP TO Q66	b. Romanian	25%
More than two state languages	3%	-- SKIP TO Q66	c. Russian	22%
Don't know/No answer	5%	-- SKIP TO Q67	d. Ukrainian	1%
			e. Gagauz	1%
			f. Bulgarian	1%
			g. Other	1%
			h. Don't know/no answer	0%

Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?					
a. as a tourist	Yes	11%	→ aa. What country will you go to?	_____	
	No	89%			
b. for temporary work	Yes	14%	→ bb. What country will you go to?	_____	
	No	86%			
c. for studies	Yes	2%	→ cc. What country will you go to?	_____	
	No	98%			
d. to settle permanently	Yes	2%	→ dd. What country will you go to?	_____	
	No	98%			

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

D1. Gender	Male	44%
	Female	56%

D2. What is your age?	Years old	Don't know	8	No answer	9

D3. Are you presently employed?	Yes	32%	-- SKIP TO D5!
	No	67%	→ Continue with D4!
	No answer	0%	→ Continue with D4!

D4. If you don't have a job, what is your occupation?	High school student, university student	7%	Temporary unemployed. Looking for a job	26%
	Retired (age or sickness)	47%	Unemployed. Does not look for a job	6%
	Housewife, maternal leave	11%	Other (specify)	0%
			Don't know	0%
			no answer	2%

D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? *Note as many details for the answer!* |__|__|

Don't know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99

D6. What is your education background	No education	7%	Post high school education (college)	11%
	Incomplete secondary education	25%	Incomplete higher education	3%
	Secondary school	22%	Completed higher education	11%
	Vocational school	17%	Master's degree, PhD	0%
	High school	3%	Don't know	-
			No answer	0%

D7. What is your civil status?	Married	65%	Unmarried, living together	3%
	Divorced	4%	Never married	11%
	Widow(er)	16%	Don't know	-
			No answer	1%

D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?	Don't know	8
	No answer	9

D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net income of your family for the last month. Show list D9!

Under 200 Lei	14%	801-900 lei	3%	1501-1750 lei	2%
201-300 lei	14%	901-1000 lei	5%	1751-2500 lei	3%
301-400 lei	10%	1001-1100 lei	2%	2501-3500 lei	1%
401-500 lei	7%	1101-1200 lei	2%	3501-5000 lei	1%
501-600 lei	5%	1201-1300 lei	1%	5001-7000 lei	0%
601-700 lei	5%	1301-1400 lei	0%	Over 7001 lei	0%
701-800 lei	4%	1401-1500 lei	2%	Don't know	7%
				No answer	10%

D10. How do you evaluate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	38%
	The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes	41%
	We have money for food and we can save a little but it is not enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge)	13%
	We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge)	3%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	0%
	Don't know	1%
	No answer	3%

D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?

I have only the Moldovan citizenship	98%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify _____	
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify a. _____ b. _____	
No answer	-

ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: RUSSIANS

Q1. People believe that several ethnic groups live in Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you consider yourself? Wait for the answer! Do not read the options for answers!	Moldovan	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Russian	100%	-> CONTINUE!
	Ukrainian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Gagauz	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Bulgarian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Romanian	-	-> CONTINUE!
	Other: _____	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Doesn't know	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Doesn't answer	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!

Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Moldovans from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	11%	19%	37%	20%	7%	6%
b. 5 years ago	5%	23%	43%	19%	5%	4%
c. last year	4%	18%	53%	16%	5%	4%

Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Ukrainians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	6%	14%	59%	8%	1%	11%
b. 5 years ago	3%	15%	62%	8%	1%	11%
c. last year	3%	11%	66%	8%	1%	10%

Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Gagauz from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	4%	10%	49%	5%	2%	30%
b. 5 years ago	2%	9%	51%	7%	1%	30%
c. last year	2%	6%	56%	6%	2%	29%

Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Bulgarians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	4%	11%	52%	5%	1%	27%
b. 5 years ago	2%	10%	54%	6%	1%	27%
c. last year	2%	8%	57%	6%	1%	26%

Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Romanians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	5%	13%	38%	11%	8%	24%
b. 5 years ago	2%	14%	41%	15%	7%	22%
c. last year	1%	10%	44%	16%	6%	22%

Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the relationships between different ethnic groups from Moldova?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Russians and Moldovans	75%	12%	6%	5%	3%
b. The relationship between Russians and Ukrainians	86%	4%	1%	4%	6%
c. The relationship between Russians and Gagauz	68%	5%	4%	5%	18%
d. The relationship between Russians and Bulgarians	70%	5%	4%	5%	17%
e. The relationship between Russians and Romanians	56%	11%	10%	5%	18%

Q8. How can you describe the interethnic relationships in your area?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	No relationships between ethnic groups	Other	Don't Know/No answer
a. The relationship between Russians and Moldovans	86%	5%	2%	2%	3%	2%
b. The relationship between Russians and Ukrainians	89%	2%	0%	2%	3%	3%
c. The relationship between Russians and Gagauz	56%	2%	2%	26%	4%	10%
d. The relationship between Russians and Bulgarians	59%	1%	2%	25%	4%	8%
e. The relationship between Russians and Romanians	52%	4%	6%	21%	5%	12%

Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that is it possible that any of these could become a threat?

Q9_1. Moldovans can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	2%	17%	75%	4%
b. for the Russians	1%	4%	19%	71%	5%
c. for you and your family	0%	3%	18%	75%	3%

Q9_2. Ukrainians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	2%	18%	76%	4%
b. for the Russians	0%	2%	17%	76%	4%
c. for you and your family	0%	1%	17%	78%	4%

Q9_3. The Gagauz can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	4%	16%	69%	10%
b. for the Russians	0%	3%	16%	70%	10%
c. for you and your family	0%	3%	13%	74%	9%

Q9_4. Bulgarians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	3%	15%	72%	10%
b. for the Russians	0%	1%	15%	72%	11%
c. for you and your family	0%	1%	13%	75%	10%

Q9_5. Romanians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	8%	20%	59%	11%
b. for the Russians	1%	8%	20%	61%	11%
c for you and your family	1%	7%	19%	63%	10%

Q10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I was born in Moldova	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	33%	28%	13%	4%	22%
b. makes my life easier	9%	18%	30%	16%	27%
c. makes me feel ashamed	1%	6%	26%	42%	25%
d. makes my life harder	3%	8%	28%	37%	25%

Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy	85%	11%	1%	0%	2%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like Moldovans.	21%	22%	24%	12%	20%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians from Moldova.	23%	34%	16%	7%	20%
d. The world would be better if all the people were like Ukrainians from Moldova.	17%	28%	23%	9%	23%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like the Gagauz from Moldova.	14%	19%	24%	11%	32%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like Bulgarians from Moldova.	15%	20%	23%	10%	33%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like Romanians from Moldova.	15%	20%	19%	16%	30%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova	13%	21%	29%	24%	13%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country	29%	31%	19%	9%	12%

Q12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I am Russian...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	47%	32%	12%	3%	6%
b. makes my life easier	10%	24%	40%	15%	10%
c. makes me feel ashamed	0%	5%	29%	56%	10%
d. makes my life harder	4%	8%	34%	44%	9%

Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your identity: I mainly consider myself ... <i>Show list Q13! Multiple choices!</i>	1. First choice	2. Second choice	Total
Russian	46%	12%	58%
Resident of this locality	14%	22%	36%
Citizen of Moldova	31%	36%	68%
CIS Resident	5%	8%	12%
European	2%	5%	7%
Eastern European	0%	0%	1%
Don't Know/No answer	1%	17%	18%

Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered MOLDOVAN? <i>Show the list Q14! Multiple choices!</i> <i>Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Moldovan parents	33%	8%	3%	45%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian in the family	14%	12%	8%	33%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions	8%	13%	10%	31%
d. Feel Moldovan	12%	13%	11%	37%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture	8%	16%	7%	31%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	2%	3%	2%	6%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag	2%	2%	5%	9%
h. Live in Moldova	5%	9%	12%	27%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language	5%	9%	15%	29%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship	4%	4%	8%	16%
k. Be born in Moldova	4%	2%	6%	12%
l. Don't know/No answer	4%	7%	13%	24%

Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered RUSSIAN? <i>Show the list Q15! Multiple choices!</i> <i>Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Russian parents	34%	6%	6%	46%
b. Speak Russian language in the family	14%	13%	11%	38%
c. Respect Russian traditions	9%	12%	9%	31%
d. Feel Russian	13%	18%	11%	42%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture	8%	12%	9%	29%
f. Honor the Russian national flag	1%	5%	4%	10%
g. Live in Russia	4%	7%	8%	19%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language	7%	12%	15%	34%
i. Have Russian citizenship	2%	4%	8%	14%
j. Be born in Russia	5%	5%	8%	18%
k. Don't know/No answer	3%	7%	11%	20%

Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered UKRAINIAN? <i>Show the list Q16! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents	36%	8%	4%	47%
b. Speak Ukrainian language in the family	11%	13%	9%	34%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions	8%	15%	9%	32%
d. Feel Ukrainian	11%	16%	10%	37%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture	8%	11%	8%	27%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag	3%	4%	3%	10%
g. Live in Ukraine	4%	6%	10%	20%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language	6%	8%	14%	28%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship	2%	3%	8%	13%
j. Be born in Ukraine	3%	5%	8%	16%
Don't know/No answer	8%	11%	17%	35%

Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered GAGAUZ? <i>Show the list Q17! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Gagauz parents	35%	8%	5%	47%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family	12%	12%	9%	33%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions	7%	14%	8%	29%
d. Feel Gagauz	12%	14%	8%	34%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture	8%	12%	10%	30%
f. Honor the Gagauz National flag	2%	3%	3%	8%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia	8%	11%	15%	33%
h. Be a native speaker of Gagauz language	5%	9%	14%	27%
i. Be born in Gagauzia	3%	5%	9%	17%
j. Don't know/No answer	9%	13%	18%	40%

Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered BULGARIAN? <i>Show the list Q18! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents	35%	9%	4%	48%
b. Speak Bulgarian language in the family	12%	13%	9%	34%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions	8%	12%	9%	29%
d. Feel Bulgarian	12%	15%	10%	36%

e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture	7%	11%	11%	29%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag	2%	4%	2%	8%
g. Live in Bulgaria	2%	5%	7%	14%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language	9%	8%	15%	32%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship	1%	5%	7%	13%
j. Be born in Bulgaria	3%	4%	8%	15%
Don't know/No answer	9%	13%	18%	41%

Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered ROMANIAN? <i>Show the list Q19! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Romanian parents	33%	6%	4%	43%
b. Speak Romanian language in the family	11%	11%	9%	31%
c. Respect Romanian traditions	6%	13%	7%	26%
d. Feel Romanian	12%	15%	9%	36%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	7%	13%	9%	28%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag	2%	3%	2%	8%
g. Live in Romania	5%	8%	5%	17%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language	7%	9%	16%	32%
i. Have Romanian citizenship	2%	6%	14%	22%
j. Be born in Romania	5%	4%	8%	17%
Don't know/No answer	9%	13%	17%	40%

Q20. How much do you trust...	Very much	Much	Little	Don't trust	Don't Know/ No answer
a. people from Moldova	11%	58%	25%	2%	4%
b. Moldovans from Moldova	12%	59%	25%	3%	2%
c. Russians from Moldova	14%	64%	18%	2%	1%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova	12%	58%	23%	3%	4%
e. Gagauz from Moldova	7%	49%	23%	5%	16%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova	8%	50%	23%	5%	15%
g. Romanians from Moldova	6%	46%	26%	9%	13%

Q21. Please specify what your reaction would be if persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	94%	6%	95%	5%	93%	7%
b. lived in your locality	99%	1%	100%	0%	99%	1%	91%	9%	92%	8%	90%	10%
c. were your neighbors	98%	2%	99%	1%	96%	4%	82%	18%	84%	16%	83%	17%
d. were your friends	98%	2%	100%	0%	95%	5%	80%	20%	81%	19%	78%	22%
e. were part of your family	89%	11%	100%	0%	87%	13%	69%	31%	73%	27%	69%	31%

Q22. Are you a member of any organization?	Yes	8%	-- SKIP TO Q23
	No	92%	-- SKIP TO Q24
	Don't Know/No answer	-	-- SKIP TO Q24

Q23. How often do you attend the meetings of this organization?	Daily	17%	There are no formal meetings of the members	6%
	Weekly	23%	I do not take part in meetings of the members	-
	Monthly	17%	Don't know	9%
	A few times a year	23%	Don't answer	3%
	Once a year	3%		

Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) with people of other ethnic backgrounds?	Yes	31%
	No	66%
	Don't Know/No answer	4%

Q25 - Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three negative features describing best... the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians living in Moldova.

OPERATOR: Show the list 25! Multiple choices!

Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column „a“ the first choice and in column „b“ the rest of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice from column „a“ and the other two choices from column „b“!

Positive features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
1. Decent	19%	6%	18%	8%	6%	4%	7%	3%	5%	4%	10%	4%
2. Kind-hearted	18%	24%	19%	13%	16%	10%	5%	4%	7%	6%	3%	5%
3. Hearty	7%	20%	12%	14%	11%	11%	4%	6%	5%	5%	4%	5%
4. Independent	2%	5%	7%	11%	5%	8%	4%	5%	2%	5%	5%	7%
5. Civilized	2%	5%	4%	13%	2%	5%	1%	3%	1%	4%	8%	13%
6. Educated	2%	7%	3%	15%	3%	7%	2%	3%	2%	4%	2%	7%
7. Resourceful	1%	5%	4%	10%	7%	11%	3%	8%	1%	6%	1%	3%
8. Joyful	10%	19%	7%	14%	9%	18%	3%	6%	2%	7%	3%	6%
9. Clean	2%	3%	1%	4%	2%	5%	2%	7%	2%	4%	2%	5%
10. Religious	3%	12%	1%	6%	3%	8%	5%	6%	5%	5%	2%	9%
11. United	1%	2%	3%	7%	3%	6%	4%	8%	5%	7%	2%	4%
12. Honest	2%	7%	2%	7%	2%	4%	2%	4%	2%	5%	1%	4%
13. Modest	1%	6%	0%	4%	2%	6%	1%	4%	3%	3%	1%	2%
14. Hard-working	18%	25%	4%	11%	5%	14%	4%	8%	6%	10%	2%	6%
15. Intelligent	0%	1%	3%	9%	1%	6%	0%	3%	1%	3%	4%	3%
16. Hospitable	1%	8%	1%	7%	3%	10%	1%	7%	1%	5%	1%	4%
17. None	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	3%	0%	4%	0%
18. Don't Know/No answer	8%	8%	8%	9%	21%	9%	47%	5%	46%	7%	42%	6%

OPERATOR: Show the list 25! Multiple choices!

Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column „a“ the first choice and in column „b“ the rest of the statements! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice in column „a“ and the other two choices in column „b“!

Negative features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
19. Selfish	8%	4%	6%	4%	11%	5%	9%	4%	3%	2%	6%	4%
20. Aggressive	11%	7%	9%	8%	5%	6%	7%	6%	5%	4%	9%	6%
21. Apathetic/cold	3%	7%	5%	8%	5%	5%	2%	6%	3%	4%	6%	6%
22. Obedient	8%	10%	5%	8%	4%	5%	1%	5%	2%	4%	1%	5%
23. Backward	6%	10%	1%	3%	2%	4%	2%	5%	2%	5%	1%	4%
24. Uneducated	5%	9%	4%	7%	3%	5%	2%	5%	1%	4%	2%	5%
25. Negligent	2%	9%	3%	9%	3%	8%	1%	5%	1%	4%	2%	5%
26. Sad	2%	5%	3%	4%	1%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%	1%

27. Dirty	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%	1%	3%	2%	4%	2%	3%
28. Superstitious	4%	6%	2%	5%	4%	6%	2%	4%	4%	3%	2%	6%
29. Divided	2%	7%	3%	4%	1%	6%	1%	3%	1%	2%	2%	3%
30. Thieves	3%	5%	1%	2%	1%	4%	1%	4%	2%	3%	1%	5%
31. Vainglorious	1%	3%	1%	6%	2%	5%	1%	4%	1%	4%	3%	5%
32. Lazy	1%	3%	7%	6%	3%	6%	2%	4%	1%	2%	3%	7%
33. Stupid	1%	4%	0%	2%	0%	2%	1%	2%	0%	2%	0%	1%
34. Hostile	1%	4%	0%	2%	1%	4%	3%	3%	1%	2%	2%	7%
35. None	15%	0%	17%	0%	15%	0%	11%	0%	11%	0%	10%	0%
36. Don't Know/No answer	25%	9%	31%	8%	37%	8%	50%	5%	56%	3%	44%	5%

Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most politically influential/ most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!

	The richest		The most politically influential		The most respected	
	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice
Moldovans	37%	13%	49%	8%	41%	9%
Russians	15%	27%	10%	30%	15%	33%
Ukrainians	1%	6%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Gagauz	3%	1%	3%	2%	1%	3%
Bulgarians	3%	4%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Romanians	1%	3%	3%	7%	1%	2%
Other_____	3%	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Don't Know/No answer	36%	46%	31%	47%	38%	48%

Q32. Do you agree with the following statements: <u>Moldova should...</u>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries	77%	16%	3%	1%	3%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	68%	23%	3%	2%	3%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	58%	31%	4%	2%	4%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	53%	30%	8%	4%	6%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	51%	33%	6%	4%	6%

f. support Moldovan businesses abroad	48%	31%	9%	4%	9%
g. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad	51%	33%	5%	2%	8%
h. support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova	52%	34%	6%	1%	7%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	53%	35%	6%	0%	6%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	49%	36%	7%	1%	6%
k. help in develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	45%	33%	9%	5%	8%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	43%	34%	11%	3%	8%
m. organize cultural events attended by people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova.	50%	34%	5%	1%	10%
n. grant a larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majority	33%	26%	13%	11%	17%

Q33. Do you agree with the following statements: <u>Russia</u> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support the high school and university students of Russian background studying in Moldova	70%	22%	3%	2%	3%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova	59%	28%	4%	2%	7%
c. support the cultural organizations of the Russians from Moldova	62%	30%	2%	1%	4%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from Moldova	60%	30%	2%	3%	5%

Q34. Do you agree with the following statements: <u>Ukraine</u> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support the high school and university students of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova	62%	26%	6%	2%	4%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova	54%	29%	8%	1%	8%
c. support the cultural organizations of Ukrainians from Moldova	57%	32%	5%	1%	5%
d. help develop the identity of Ukrainians from Moldova	53%	33%	6%	3%	6%

Q35. Do you agree with the following statements: Turkey should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Gagauz background studying in Moldova	53%	26%	8%	3%	9%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova	47%	27%	12%	3%	11%
c. support the Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova	46%	30%	10%	4%	10%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova	42%	31%	11%	5%	11%

Q36. Do you agree with the following statements: Bulgaria should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support the high school and university students of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova	53%	30%	7%	3%	8%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova	46%	31%	10%	3%	9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Bulgarians from Moldova	46%	33%	8%	3%	9%
d. help develop the identity of Bulgarians from Moldova	42%	34%	10%	5%	9%

Q37. Do you agree with the following statements: Romania should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Romanian background studying in Moldova	55%	30%	6%	3%	8%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova	49%	30%	8%	4%	10%
c. support the cultural organizations of Romanians from Moldova	49%	32%	7%	4%	9%
d. help develop the identity of the Romanians from Moldova	44%	33%	8%	6%	9%

Q38. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities from Moldova?	too many rights	enough rights	not enough rights	don't know/ no answer
a. Russians have...	5%	71%	20%	5%
b. Ukrainians have...	3%	70%	19%	9%
c. Gagauz have...	3%	65%	19%	13%
d. Bulgarians have...	2%	64%	20%	14%
e. Romanians have...	13%	64%	10%	13%

Q39. Do you think that ethnic background affects the employment in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	don't know/ no answer
a. Moldovans have...	25%	64%	4%	7%
b. Russians have...	6%	69%	17%	7%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	69%	19%	9%
d. Gagauz have...	3%	63%	19%	15%
e. Bulgarians have...	2%	64%	19%	14%
f. Romanians have...	15%	62%	9%	14%

Q40. Do you think the ethnic background matters to have a successful business in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	don't know/ no answer
a. Moldovans have..	22%	67%	3%	8%
b. Russians have...	8%	70%	14%	8%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	70%	16%	10%
d. Gagauz have..	2%	65%	17%	16%
e. Bulgarians have...	2%	64%	18%	16%
f. Romanians have..	13%	65%	6%	16%

Q41. Do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	56%	20%	11%	9%	4%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools	73%	20%	4%	1%	1%

c. Children of other nationalities should learn together with Russian children	72%	22%	3%	1%	2%
d. There should be mixed marriages	74%	20%	4%	0%	2%
e. There should be organizations and associations promoting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova	67%	25%	2%	1%	4%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (festivals) attended by different ethnic groups from Moldova	67%	23%	4%	1%	5%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) with the participation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	67%	25%	4%	0%	4%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	67%	24%	4%	1%	4%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups from Moldova	64%	24%	5%	3%	4%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)	65%	23%	7%	1%	3%

Q42. Please list three personalities contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Vladimir Voronin	31%	a.	Communist Party of Moldova	17%
b.	Vasile Tarlev	10%	b.	Democratic Moldova Alliance	8%
c.	Serafim Urecheanu	6%	c.	Social-Democratic Party	5%

Q44. Please list three personalities contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Iurie Roșca	36%	a.	People's Christian Democratic Party	20%
b.	Vlad Cubreacov	9%	b.	Agrarian Party	5%
c.	Serafim Urecheanu	5%	c.	Democratic Moldova Alliance	4%

Q46. How do the following political parties influence interethnic relations	Rather improves	Neither improves nor worsens	Rather worsens	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova	54%	14%	7%	26%
b. Christian Democratic Party	2%	13%	49%	36%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc	8%	28%	13%	51%
d. Agrarian Party	3%	30%	11%	55%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova	4%	29%	10%	57%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova	3%	30%	10%	58%

Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our country. Please tell me if you consider each of these problems crucial, severe, or not too serious.		Crucial	Severe	Not too serious	Don't know	No answer
1.	Unemployment	42%	58%	0%	1%	0%
2.	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	13%	42%	38%	5%	2%
3.	Low salaries	44%	54%	1%	0%	0%
4.	Violation of human rights	21%	59%	13%	6%	1%
5.	Housing issue	27%	60%	11%	1%	0%
6.	Health condition	30%	65%	4%	1%	0%
7.	Environmental issues	25%	61%	10%	2%	1%
8.	Corruption	31%	60%	3%	5%	1%
9.	Crime level/Insecurity	23%	66%	6%	3%	1%
10.	Drug trafficking	18%	58%	14%	9%	1%
11.	Armed conflicts	13%	46%	31%	8%	2%
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	13%	46%	34%	7%	1%
13.	Lack of rule of law	17%	59%	14%	8%	1%
14.	Lack of press freedom	11%	50%	26%	11%	1%
15.	Drug use	20%	60%	11%	8%	1%
16.	Trafficking in women	30%	58%	6%	6%	1%
17.	Relations with the Transnistrian region	22%	67%	6%	3%	2%

Q48. Do you agree or disagree that...?	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor.	56%	33%	12%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work	59%	34%	7%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods.	88%	6%	6%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens.	90%	6%	4%
e. The state should impose higher penalties in order to reduce the crime level.	88%	7%	5%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults.	85%	10%	5%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the average ones.	41%	53%	6%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state.	70%	24%	6%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself.	61%	32%	7%
j. You must fight for your interest by your own.	80%	14%	6%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our country.	80%	13%	7%

Q49. Do you agree with the following statements: During the current government...	True	Somewhat true	Somewhat false	Totally false	Don't Know/ No answer
1. ...the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people	20%	34%	23%	9%	13%
2. ...the state services rendered to the have citizens improved	13%	31%	34%	10%	11%
3. ...corruption expanded at all levels	32%	34%	15%	3%	15%
4. ...the freedom of expression of the media was limited	14%	20%	29%	6%	31%
5. ...the democratic rights of citizens were limited.	14%	26%	28%	9%	22%
6. ...the Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the weakness of the Moldovan politicians	20%	31%	20%	8%	20%
7. ...Moldova's position was respected abroad	8%	23%	30%	8%	31%
8. ...the number of poor people from Moldova decreased	5%	20%	31%	28%	16%

9. ...the national currency was stabilized	5%	30%	28%	11%	25%
10. ...the national economy was stabilized	6%	25%	32%	12%	25%
11. ... the salaries and pensions were paid without delays	34%	44%	12%	3%	7%
12. ...the farmers were supported	3%	25%	28%	8%	36%
13. ...the market economy was consolidated	3%	28%	25%	9%	36%
14. ...obstacles to foreign investors were created	7%	16%	29%	7%	41%
15. ...small investors were encouraged	5%	25%	21%	5%	44%
16. ...there was illegal interference with the economy	6%	21%	21%	5%	48%
17. ...an economic growth was achieved	7%	26%	27%	7%	33%
18. ...market economy failed	7%	23%	25%	6%	39%
19. ... measures to stop massive migration were not taken	27%	28%	15%	6%	23%

Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, would you vote?	I would definitely vote	64%
	I would probably vote	20%
	I would probably not go	5%
	I would definitely not go	8%
	I don't know (don't read)	3%
	I don't answer (don't read)	1%

Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regarding of their answer to Q51! Operator! Show list Q5 to 1the respondent!

Communist Party of Moldova	46%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party)	5%
Christian Democratic Party	1%
Agrarian Party	1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova	1%
Socialist Party	-
Other, please specify _____	0%
Independent candidate, please specify _____	-
I would not vote	4%
Don't know	34%
Don't answer	8%

* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra („Our Moldova“) Alliance, Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“

Q52. In your opinion, what should be the direction for our country?	Be independent of any alliance/union	6%
	We should integrate with the European Union	38%
	We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States	41%
	Don't know	12%
	Don't answer	2%

Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration of Moldova?	Very much	10%	At all	23%
	Quite much	29%	Don't know	11%
	Quite a little	13%	Don't answer	14%

Q54. What do you think will happen in five years...	Highly possible	Very possible	Some possibility	Little possible	Don't Know/No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong country	1%	22%	42%	25%	10%
b. Moldova's position will be taken in consideration abroad	2%	25%	40%	18%	15%
c. status of Transnistria will be decided	5%	25%	34%	19%	17%
d. income of the population will grow	2%	25%	42%	19%	12%
e. market economy will consolidate	3%	26%	37%	17%	17%
f. democracy will consolidate	2%	25%	37%	16%	20%
g. young people living in Moldova will have large opportunities in the country	1%	23%	38%	22%	15%

Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict with the neighboring countries is possible?	Yes	13%	-- SKIP TO Q56
	No	75%	-- SKIP TO Q57
	Don't Know/No answer	13%	-- SKIP TO Q57

Q56. If yes, with what country is Moldova likely to enter an armed conflict?	Romania	8%	Transnistrian region	81%
	Russia	2%	Other, please specify _____	-
	Ukraine	4%	Don't Know/No answer	6%
	Bulgaria	-		

Q57. In your opinion, what were the causes for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?

- a. _____ | | | |
- b. _____ | | | |
- c. _____ | | | |

Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to Transnistria?

- a. _____ | | | | |
 b. _____ | | | | |
 c. _____ | | | | |

Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in the everyday life.	1%	5%	28%	64%	2%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova	0%	1%	28%	69%	2%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in the everyday life.	1%	3%	27%	66%	2%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova	1%	2%	26%	68%	3%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in the everyday life.	2%	5%	22%	58%	12%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova	1%	4%	22%	58%	14%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in the everyday life.	1%	4%	22%	61%	12%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova	1%	3%	23%	60%	13%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in the everyday life.	3%	7%	22%	57%	12%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova	2%	7%	21%	58%	12%

Q60. What is your native language? <i>Do not read the options! Multiple choice!</i>	a. Moldovan	6%	e. Gagauz	1%
	b. Romanian	3%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	94%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	3%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q61. What language do you usually speak at home? <i>Do not read the options! Multiple choices!</i>	a. Moldovan	12%	e. Gagauz	1%
	b. Romanian	6%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	93%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	4%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	1%

Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your...

Moldovenească	a. mother	b. father	c. grandparents	d. children
Moldovan	6%	5%	5%	5%
Romanian	1%	1%	1%	2%
Russian	69%	69%	51%	80%
Ukrainian	4%	4%	5%	2%
Gagauz	0%	0%	1%	1%
Bulgarian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other	0%	0%	1%	0%
It's not the case	18%	19%	34%	8%
Don't know/No answer	0%	1%	2%	2%

Q63. How well do you speak ...?	a. Moldovan	b. Romanian	c. Russian	d. Ukrainian	e. Gagauz	f. Bulgarian
I speak it perfectly	12%	7%	98%	16%	2%	0%
Fluently but with an accent	20%	14%	1%	11%	0%	1%
I can make myself understood in most situations	23%	20%	0%	20%	1%	1%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty	20%	19%	0%	11%	2%	3%
I only know a few words	17%	17%	0%	24%	11%	15%
I do not know any word	5%	14%	0%	15%	75%	73%
Don't answer	2%	8%	1%	3%	8%	8%

Q64. Do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. I am disturbed when people around me speak Romanian/Moldovan	1%	2%	6%	21%	68%	2%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak Ukrainian	1%	0%	7%	21%	69%	2%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak Gagauz	1%	4%	6%	16%	64%	10%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak Bulgarian	1%	2%	8%	17%	63%	8%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking Russian although they know it	16%	21%	20%	11%	24%	9%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking Russian although they know it	7%	16%	23%	17%	24%	13%

g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking Russian although they know it	5%	13%	20%	12%	21%	29%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking Russian although they know it	7%	15%	19%	12%	19%	28%
i. All residents from Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian	47%	24%	11%	7%	6%	5%
j. All residents from Moldova should know Russian	33%	31%	15%	8%	7%	7%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian	13%	23%	25%	17%	13%	10%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz	12%	24%	24%	16%	13%	11%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Bulgarian	12%	24%	23%	16%	14%	11%

Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova?			Q66. Which ones?	
One state language	16%	-- SKIP TO Q66	a. Moldovan	89%
Two state languages	70%	-- SKIP TO Q66	b. Romanian	13%
More than two state languages	9%	-- SKIP TO Q66	c. Russian	82%
Don't know/No answer	5%	-- SKIP TO Q67	d. Ukrainian	7%
			e. Gagauz	2%
			f. Bulgarian	1%
			g. Other	2%
			h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?					
a. as a tourist	Yes	17%	• aa. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	83%			
b. for temporary work	Yes	7%	• bb. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	93%			
c. for studies	Yes	1%	• cc. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	99%			
d. to settle permanently	Yes	4%	• dd. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	96%			

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

D1. Gender	Male	35%
	Female	65%

D2. What is your age?	___	___	Don't know	8	No answer	9
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D3. Are you presently employed?	Yes	35%	-- SKIP TO D5!
	No	65%	→ <i>Continue with D4!</i>
	Don't answer	1%	→ <i>Continue with D4!</i>

D4. If you don't have a job, what is your status?	High school student, university student	10%	Temporary unemployed. Looking for a job	14%
	Retired (age or sickness)	57%	Unemployed. Does not look for a job	7%
	Housewife, maternal leave	10%	Other (specify)	0%
			Don't know	-
			Don't answer	1%

D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? *Note as many details for the answer!*

|_|_|_|

Don't know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99

D6. What is your education background	No education	1%	Post high school education (college)	11%
	Incomplete secondary education	13%	Incomplete higher education	5%
	Secondary school	19%	Completed higher education	21%
	Vocational school	22%	Master's degree, PhD	1%
	High school	1%	Don't know	1%
			Don't answer	4%

D7. What is your civil status?	Married	57%	Unmarried, co-living	1%
	Divorced	7%	Never married	9%
	Widow(er)	24%	Don't know	-
			Don't answer	2%

D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?	_ _ people	Don't know	8
		Don't answer	9

D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net income of your family for the last month. Show the list D9!

Under 200 Lei	6%	801-900 lei	4%	1501-1750 lei	3%
201-300 lei	10%	901-1000 lei	6%	1751-2500 lei	4%
301-400 lei	8%	1001-1100 lei	4%	2501-3500 lei	2%
401-500 lei	7%	1101-1200 lei	2%	3501-5000 lei	0%
501-600 lei	4%	1201-1300 lei	2%	5001-7000 lei	0%
601-700 lei	6%	1301-1400 lei	2%	Over 7001 lei	1%
701-800 lei	5%	1401-1500 lei	5%	Don't know	8%
				No answer	13%

D10. How do you evaluate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	32%
	The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes	38%
	We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge)	21%
	We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge)	5%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	1%
	Don't know	1%
	Don't answer	2%

D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?

I have only the Moldovan citizenship		97%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify _____		_ _
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify:	a. _____ b. _____	_ _ _ _
	Don't answer	-

ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: UKRAINIANS

Good morning/Good afternoon/Good evening! My name is _____ and I come on behalf of the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc., Chisinau. Currently our institute is conducting a survey on the relationship among people from Moldova. For this reason, I would like to ask you some questions. We guarantee that you were randomly selected and that your answers are strictly confidential.

Q1. People believe that there are several ethnic groups living in Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you consider yourself? <i>Wait for the answer!</i> <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i>	Moldovan	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Russian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Ukrainian	100%	-> CONTINUE!
	Gagauz	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Bulgarian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Romanian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Other: _____	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't know	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't answer	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!

Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Moldovans from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	7%	17%	52%	14%	4%	6%
b. 5 years ago	4%	17%	60%	12%	1%	6%
c. last year	4%	15%	66%	9%	1%	5%

Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Russians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	4%	11%	69%	8%	0%	8%
b. 5 years ago	3%	11%	72%	6%	0%	8%
c. last year	2%	11%	74%	6%	0%	7%

Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Gagauz from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	1%	5%	38%	5%	1%	51%
b. 5 years ago	0%	4%	40%	4%	1%	51%
c. last year	0%	4%	40%	4%	0%	51%

Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Bulgarians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	0%	5%	38%	4%	0%	52%
b. 5 years ago	0%	4%	39%	4%	0%	52%
c. last year	1%	3%	40%	3%	0%	52%

Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Romanians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	1%	7%	34%	9%	4%	46%
b. 5 years ago	1%	6%	36%	8%	4%	45%
c. last year	1%	6%	38%	8%	3%	45%

Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the relationship between different ethnic groups from Moldova?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Ukrainians and Moldovans	90%	5%	1%	1%	3%
b. The relationship between Ukrainians and Russians	93%	1%	1%	1%	4%
c. The relationship between Ukrainians and Gagauz	58%	2%	3%	2%	36%
d. The relationship between Ukrainians and Bulgarians	57%	2%	2%	2%	38%
e. The relationship between Ukrainians and Romanians	56%	4%	2%	3%	35%

Q8. How can you describe the interethnic relationships in your area?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	No relationships between ethnic groups	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Ukrainians and Moldovans	93%	5%	1%	0%	0%	1%
b. The relationship between Ukrainians and Russians	96%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
c. The relationship between Ukrainians and Gagauz	34%	1%	1%	52%	1%	12%
d. The relationship between Ukrainians and Bulgarians	30%	1%	2%	54%	0%	12%
e. The relationship between Ukrainians and Romanians	36%	3%	3%	47%	1%	10%

Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible that any of these could become a threat?

Q9_1. Moldovans can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	3%	22%	62%	12%
b. for Ukrainians	0%	3%	23%	63%	12%
c. for you and your family	0%	2%	22%	65%	11%

Q9_2. Russians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	-	5%	23%	61%	11%
b. for Ukrainians	-	3%	23%	62%	12%
c. for you and your family	-	2%	22%	65%	11%

Q9_3. The Gagauz can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	4%	21%	46%	29%
b. for Ukrainians	0%	3%	20%	48%	29%
c. for you and your family	0%	3%	20%	49%	28%

Q9_4. Bulgarians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	-	1%	20%	48%	31%
b. for Ukrainians	-	1%	20%	48%	31%
c. for you and your family	-	1%	20%	48%	31%

Q9_5. Romanians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	6%	27%	44%	23%
b. for Ukrainians	0%	6%	26%	45%	23%
f. for you and your family	0%	5%	25%	47%	23%

Q10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I was born in Moldova...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	26%	32%	16%	3%	23%
b. makes my life easier	5%	12%	41%	12%	31%
c. makes me feel ashamed	1%	6%	32%	31%	30%
d. makes my life harder	1%	6%	35%	27%	31%

Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy	75%	22%	1%	0%	2%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like Moldovans from Moldova.	14%	22%	19%	14%	31%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians from Moldova.	14%	24%	17%	13%	33%
d. The world would be better if all the people were like Ukrainians from Moldova.	16%	27%	15%	11%	31%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like Gagauz from Moldova.	8%	12%	15%	13%	52%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like Bulgarians from Moldova.	8%	12%	15%	13%	52%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like Romanians from Moldova.	9%	12%	16%	16%	47%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova	8%	15%	35%	24%	18%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than any other country	25%	30%	23%	6%	15%

Q12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I am Ukrainian...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	40%	32%	14%	2%	12%
b. makes my life easier	8%	15%	49%	9%	19%
c. makes me feel ashamed	0%	4%	37%	40%	18%
d. makes my life harder	1%	8%	41%	33%	17%

Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your identity? I mainly consider myself <i>Show list Q13! Multiple choice!</i>	1. First choice	2. Second Choice	Total
Ukrainian	59%	12%	71%
Resident of this locality	16%	26%	42%
Citizen of Moldova	20%	45%	64%
CIS Resident	4%	8%	12%
European	0%	2%	3%
Eastern European	0%	0%	0%
Don't Know/No answer	0%	7%	8%

Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered MOLDOVAN? <i>Show list Q14! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Moldovan parents	27%	10%	6%	40%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family	8%	13%	7%	25%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions	7%	11%	15%	30%
d. Feel Moldovan	11%	12%	9%	29%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture	7%	12%	10%	26%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	0%	2%	3%	5%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag	1%	3%	4%	6%
h. Live in Moldova	7%	7%	10%	21%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language	17%	10%	11%	35%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship	2%	4%	9%	13%
k. Be born in Moldova	4%	2%	6%	10%
l. Don't know/No answer	8%	15%	11%	31%

Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered RUSSIAN? <i>Show list Q15! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Russian parents	29%	11%	7%	44%
b. Speak Russian language in the family	10%	13%	6%	27%
c. Respect Russian traditions	7%	12%	14%	30%
d. Feel Russian	9%	11%	11%	29%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture	6%	10%	12%	25%
f. Respect the Russian national flag	1%	4%	4%	8%
g. Live in Russia	4%	5%	4%	12%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language	20%	9%	12%	37%
i. Have Russian citizenship	3%	4%	11%	15%
j. Be born in Russia	3%	3%	7%	12%
k. Don't know/No answer	7%	17%	11%	32%

Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered UKRAINIAN? <i>Show list Q16! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents	33%	11%	7%	48%
b. Speak Ukrainian language in the family	10%	15%	7%	29%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions	7%	10%	15%	29%
d. Feel Ukrainian	11%	16%	13%	37%

e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture	6%	10%	12%	25%
f. Respect the Ukrainian national flag	1%	3%	3%	6%
g. Live in Ukraine	4%	4%	5%	12%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language	20%	9%	14%	40%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship	2%	4%	8%	13%
j. Be born in Ukraine	3%	3%	7%	12%
k. Don't know/No answer	3%	16%	9%	26%

Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered GAGAUZ? <i>Show list Q17! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Gagauz parents	27%	10%	7%	39%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family	7%	12%	7%	21%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions	6%	9%	14%	22%
d. Feel Gagauz	8%	12%	12%	25%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture	5%	12%	12%	23%
f. Respect the Gagauz national flag	0%	4%	7%	8%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia	8%	10%	13%	24%
h. Be a native speaker of Gagauz language	19%	7%	11%	32%
i. Be born in Gagauzia	5%	5%	8%	14%
j. Don't know/No answer	17%	20%	11%	41%

Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered BULGARIAN? <i>Show list Q18! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents	25%	10%	5%	36%
b. Speak Bulgarian language in the family	9%	10%	7%	22%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions	6%	10%	15%	24%
d. Feel Bulgarian	8%	13%	11%	25%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture	4%	12%	13%	22%
f. Respect the Bulgarian national flag	0%	3%	6%	7%
g. Live in Bulgaria	3%	4%	6%	10%
h. Be a native Bulgarian speaker	21%	9%	12%	35%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship	3%	4%	7%	11%
j. Be born in Bulgaria	4%	3%	10%	13%
k. Don't know/No answer	17%	22%	9%	41%

Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered ROMANIAN? Show list Q19! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Romanian parents	27%	8%	5%	37%
b. Speak Romanian language in the family	8%	12%	6%	23%
c. Respect Romanian traditions	4%	10%	15%	23%
d. Feel Romanian	10%	12%	11%	29%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	4%	11%	13%	22%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag	0%	2%	2%	3%
g. Live in Romania	5%	8%	8%	17%
h. Be a native Romanian speaker	20%	10%	10%	36%
i. Have Romanian citizenship	1%	3%	10%	11%
j. Be born in Romania	6%	5%	9%	17%
k. Don't know/No answer	14%	19%	11%	38%

Q20. How much do you trust...?	Very much	Much	Little	At all	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People from Moldova	8%	67%	19%	4%	2%
b. Moldovans from Moldova	10%	63%	20%	6%	1%
c. Russians from Moldova	10%	65%	20%	3%	1%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova	13%	67%	17%	2%	1%
e. Gagauz from Moldova	4%	39%	20%	8%	28%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova	4%	41%	20%	6%	29%
g. Romanians from Moldova	4%	40%	21%	12%	23%

Q21. Please specify what your reaction would be if persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova:	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	100%	0%	99%	1%	100%	0%	92%	8%	92%	8%	91%	9%
b. lived in your locality	99%	1%	99%	1%	100%	0%	85%	15%	85%	15%	84%	16%
c. were your neighbors	97%	3%	97%	3%	98%	2%	67%	33%	67%	33%	67%	33%
d. were your friends	96%	4%	97%	3%	99%	1%	66%	34%	64%	36%	63%	37%
e. were part of your family	83%	17%	84%	16%	93%	7%	57%	43%	56%	44%	55%	45%

Q22. Are you a member of any organization?	Yes	5%	-- SKIP TO Q23
	No	94%	-- SKIP TO Q24
	Don't Know/No answer	1%	-- SKIP TO Q24

Q23. How often do you attend the meetings of this organization?	Daily	20%	There are no formal meetings of the members	15%
	Weekly	15%	I do not take part in meetings of the members	5%
	Monthly	25%	Don't know	-
	A few times a year	20%	Don't answer	-
	Once a year	-		

Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festivals) with people of other ethnic background? (public events)	Yes	21%
	No	77%
	Don't Know/No answer	1%

Q25 – Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova.

OPERATOR: Show list 25 Multiple choices!

Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Positive features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
1. Decent	21%	13%	15%	6%	13%	14%	3%	6%	2%	5%	4%	4%
2. Kind-hearted	20%	20%	10%	7%	15%	11%	2%	6%	4%	8%	2%	4%
3. Hearty	7%	13%	16%	12%	7%	16%	3%	12%	2%	9%	3%	9%
4. Independent	1%	3%	8%	11%	2%	5%	3%	14%	2%	15%	2%	10%
5. Civilized	1%	5%	3%	11%	1%	4%	1%	8%	1%	8%	10%	17%
6. Educated	3%	8%	3%	9%	4%	6%	2%	9%	2%	9%	4%	15%
7. Resourceful	1%	4%	5%	15%	3%	7%	2%	13%	2%	11%	1%	5%
8. Joyful	8%	21%	7%	20%	7%	17%	2%	14%	1%	13%	2%	13%
9. Clean	1%	4%	1%	5%	1%	3%	1%	9%	0%	10%	1%	10%
10. Religious	2%	15%	2%	6%	4%	9%	3%	16%	2%	13%	3%	15%
11. United	0%	3%	4%	16%	1%	4%	2%	13%	2%	16%	1%	8%
12. Honest	1%	8%	2%	8%	1%	12%	0%	16%	0%	12%	0%	8%
13. Modest	0%	6%	0%	2%	1%	6%	1%	10%	2%	8%	1%	8%
14. Hard-working	24%	32%	2%	6%	27%	23%	2%	14%	2%	15%	1%	9%
15. Intelligent	0%	2%	4%	7%	2%	4%	1%	5%	0%	8%	2%	12%
16. Hospitable	2%	9%	7%	4%	2%	12%	1%	9%	2%	9%	1%	4%
17. None	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	3%	0%	4%	0%
18. Don't Know/ No answer	7%	10%	11%	20%	8%	16%	66%	7%	70%	9%	58%	19%

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices!

Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Negative features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
19. Selfish	7%	5%	6%	7%	5%	6%	4%	4%	2%	6%	3%	14%
20. Aggressive	8%	5%	10%	10%	3%	6%	5%	16%	2%	6%	2%	10%
21. Indifferent/cold	1%	8%	4%	12%	2%	5%	1%	14%	2%	10%	3%	16%
22. Obedient	8%	14%	3%	6%	6%	8%	1%	8%	2%	10%	1%	16%
23. Backward	4%	7%	0%	4%	2%	8%	1%	11%	0%	10%	1%	5%
24. Uneducated	3%	11%	2%	7%	1%	8%	1%	16%	0%	10%	1%	10%
25. Negligent	3%	9%	6%	21%	2%	14%	0%	14%	0%	21%	1%	13%
26. Sad	3%	11%	1%	5%	3%	11%	1%	7%	1%	6%	0%	7%
27. Dirty	0%	4%	1%	1%	0%	6%	0%	4%	0%	13%	0%	8%
28. Superstitious	6%	16%	2%	10%	4%	16%	1%	7%	1%	13%	1%	9%
29. Divided	2%	9%	1%	7%	1%	10%	0%	7%	1%	13%	1%	7%
30. Thieves	1%	8%	1%	5%	0%	5%	1%	7%	0%	3%	1%	5%
31. Vainglorious	1%	2%	0%	10%	1%	5%	0%	5%	1%	16%	2%	10%
32. Lazy	1%	3%	8%	9%	2%	7%	2%	2%	0%	6%	2%	16%
33. Stupid	1%	4%	1%	0%	0%	3%	0%	5%	0%	6%	1%	2%
34. Hostile	1%	3%	1%	3%	1%	1%	3%	5%	1%	3%	3%	4%
35. None	13%	1%	16%	1%	19%	0%	10%	1%	10%	0%	10%	0%
36. Don't Know/ No answer	37%	31%	37%	33%	47%	34%	69%	28%	74%	21%	67%	19%

Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /have most political influence/ are most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!

	The richest		The most politically influential		The most respected	
	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice
Moldovans	24%	9%	31%	9%	26%	5%
Russians	22%	15%	13%	20%	11%	20%
Ukrainians	2%	7%	2%	4%	4%	7%
Gagauz	2%	3%	1%	3%	0%	1%
Bulgarians	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Romanians	0%	2%	2%	3%	1%	2%
Other _____	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't Know/ No answer	47%	62%	48%	60%	56%	63%

Q32. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Moldova should...?</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries	63%	28%	1%	0%	8%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	50%	36%	5%	1%	8%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	46%	39%	6%	1%	8%
e. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	38%	39%	9%	2%	12%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	39%	38%	8%	3%	12%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad	44%	32%	8%	3%	13%
g. Should support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad	42%	41%	5%	2%	10%
h. Support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova	39%	42%	7%	2%	11%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	38%	43%	7%	1%	11%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	39%	41%	8%	1%	11%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	34%	40%	9%	3%	14%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	34%	38%	11%	3%	15%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova.	40%	42%	6%	1%	11%
n. grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents a majority	26%	28%	14%	12%	20%

Q33. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Russia should...</i>	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Russian background studying in Moldova	55%	34%	2%	1%	8%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova	50%	36%	4%	1%	9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Russians from Moldova	53%	34%	3%	1%	9%
d. help develop Russians' identity in Moldova	50%	36%	3%	1%	9%

Q34. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Ukraine should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova	56%	34%	1%	1%	8%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova	54%	34%	2%	1%	9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Ukrainians from Moldova	55%	34%	1%	1%	8%
d. help develop Ukrainians' identity in Moldova	53%	36%	2%	1%	9%

Q35. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Turkey should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Gagauz background studying in Moldova	48%	31%	2%	1%	18%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova	44%	30%	6%	2%	19%
c. support the cultural organizations of Gagauz from Moldova	43%	32%	4%	1%	19%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova	39%	33%	5%	3%	20%

Q36. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Bulgaria should...?</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova	49%	31%	1%	1%	17%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova	44%	30%	6%	1%	19%
c. support the cultural organizations of Bulgarians from Moldova	43%	35%	2%	2%	18%
d. help develop the identity of Bulgarians from Moldova	39%	36%	3%	2%	19%

Q37. Do you agree with the following statements: <i>Romania should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Romanian background studying in Moldova	50%	33%	1%	1%	14%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova	47%	31%	5%	1%	16%
c. support the cultural organizations of Romanians from Moldova	46%	33%	3%	2%	15%
d. help develop the identity of Romanians from Moldova	42%	34%	5%	3%	16%

Q38. What is your opinion about the Law regarding the rights of minorities in Moldova?	too many rights	enough rights	not enough rights	don't know/ no answer
a. Russians have...	6%	68%	11%	16%
b. Ukrainians have..	1%	67%	16%	15%
c. Gagauz have..	2%	58%	10%	29%
d. Bulgarians have...	2%	57%	11%	30%
e. Romanians have..	6%	60%	7%	27%

Q39. Do you think ethnic background affects the employment in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	don't know/ no answer
a. Moldovans have..	15%	63%	7%	15%
b. Russians have...	5%	65%	15%	15%
c. Ukrainians have...	2%	64%	18%	15%
d. Gagauz have..	1%	50%	15%	35%
e. Bulgarians have...	1%	47%	16%	36%
f. Romanians have..	6%	51%	11%	32%

Q40. Do you think nationality matters to be successful in business in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	don't know/ no answer
a. Moldovans have..	10%	69%	5%	16%
b. Russians have...	5%	66%	12%	16%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	65%	16%	16%
d. Gagauz have..	0%	51%	12%	37%
e. Bulgarians have...	0%	50%	12%	38%
f. Romanians have..	3%	53%	8%	35%

Q41. Do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	46%	29%	9%	3%	13%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools	67%	26%	3%	1%	3%
c. Children of other nationalities should learn together with Ukrainian children	65%	27%	4%	0%	4%

d. There should be mixed marriages	66%	27%	3%	0%	4%
e. There should be organizations and associations promoting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova	59%	32%	3%	0%	6%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (festivals) attended by people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	60%	30%	2%	2%	6%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) with the participation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	60%	30%	4%	0%	6%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	61%	30%	3%	0%	6%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups from Moldova	60%	30%	5%	0%	5%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)	60%	29%	4%	0%	6%

Q42. Please list three personalities contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Vladimir Voronin	39%	a.	Communist Party of Moldova	15%
b.	Vasile Tarlev	8%	b.	Democratic Moldova	2%
c.	Eugenia Ostapciuc	4%	c.	Social-Democratic Party	2%

Q44. Please list three personalities contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Iurie Roșca	27%	a.	Christian Democratic Party	16%
b.	Vlad Cubreacov	3%	b.	Agrarian Party	2%
c.	Mircea Snegur	2%	c.	Moldovan state structures	1%

Q46. How do the following political parties influence interethnic relations?	rather improves	neither improves nor worsens	rather worsens	don't know/ no answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova	50%	14%	4%	33%
b. Christian Democratic Party	2%	13%	38%	46%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc	2%	22%	8%	67%
d. Agrarian Party	4%	21%	7%	68%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova	2%	21%	6%	71%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova	2%	20%	6%	72%

Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our country. Please tell me if you consider each of these problems crucial, severe, or not too serious.		Crucial	Severe	Not too serious	Don't know	No answer
7.	Environmental issues	22%	51%	15%	11%	1%
8.	Corruption	25%	59%	6%	9%	1%
9.	Crime level/Insecurity	19%	69%	8%	4%	1%
10.	Drug trafficking	17%	57%	11%	13%	1%
11.	Armed conflicts	9%	53%	26%	11%	2%
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	7%	42%	36%	13%	1%
13.	Lack of rule of law	10%	52%	20%	16%	2%
14.	Lack of press freedom	7%	37%	34%	19%	2%
15.	Drug abuse	20%	54%	13%	13%	1%
16.	Trafficking in women	22%	51%	13%	12%	2%
17.	Relations with the Transnistrian region	18%	56%	13%	12%	1%

Q48. Do you agree or disagree that...?	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor.	70%	20%	10%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work	63%	29%	8%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods.	84%	5%	11%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens.	89%	6%	5%
e. The state should impose higher penalties in order to reduce the crime level.	83%	9%	8%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults.	87%	7%	6%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the average ones.	49%	40%	10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state.	70%	19%	11%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself.	64%	29%	8%
j. You must fight for your interest by your own.	81%	11%	8%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our country.	79%	13%	8%

Q49. Do you agree with the following statement: <i>During the current government:</i>	True	Somewhat true	Somewhat false	Totally false	Don't Know/ No answer
1. ...the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people	24%	37%	20%	7%	14%
2. ...the state services rendered to the citizens have improved	18%	30%	28%	7%	17%
3. ...corruption expanded at all levels	24%	34%	13%	5%	24%
4. ...the freedom of expression of the media was limited	9%	17%	19%	10%	45%
5. ...the democratic rights of citizens were limited.	9%	20%	23%	9%	38%
6. ...the Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the weakness of the Moldovan politicians	23%	22%	15%	8%	32%
7. ...Moldova's position was respected abroad	6%	15%	26%	8%	45%
8. ...the number of poor people from Moldova decreased	5%	13%	25%	37%	21%
9. ...the national currency was stabilized	5%	21%	26%	16%	32%
10. ...the national economy was stabilized	5%	24%	24%	18%	29%
11. ... the salaries and pensions were paid without delays	45%	34%	12%	3%	6%
12. ...the farmers were supported	6%	17%	24%	21%	33%
13. ...the market economy was consolidated	2%	21%	25%	7%	45%
14. ...obstacles to foreign investors were created	3%	15%	19%	7%	57%
15. ...small investors were encouraged	5%	19%	16%	6%	54%
16. ...there was illegal interference with the economy	5%	15%	20%	4%	57%
17. ...an economic growth was achieved	5%	20%	21%	15%	39%
18. ...market economy failed	6%	15%	21%	7%	51%
19. ... measures to stop massive migration were not taken	23%	20%	15%	9%	31%

Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, would you vote?	I would definitely vote	61%
	I would probably vote	19%
	I would probably not go	7%
	I would definitely not go	7%
	I don't know (don't read)	5%
	I don't answer (don't read)	1%

Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!

Communist Party of Moldova	54%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party)	2%
Christian Democratic Party	1%
Agrarian Party	-
Social Democratic Party of Moldova	-
Socialist Party	-
Other, please specify _____	2%
Independent candidate, please specify _____	-
I would not vote	10%
Don't know	26%
Don't answer	6%

* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra („Our Moldova“) Alliance, Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“

Q52. In your opinion, what should be the direction of our country?	Be independent of any alliance/union	3%
	We should integrate with the European Union	21%
	We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	48%
	Don't know	24%
	Don't answer	4%

Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration of Moldova?	Very much	7%	Not at all	14%
	Quite much	22%	Don't know	24%
	Quite a little	20%	Don't answer	13%

Q54. What do you believe will happen in five years...	Highly possible	Very possible	Some possibility	Little possible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong country	1%	19%	43%	21%	16%
b. Moldova's position will be taken in consideration abroad	1%	15%	45%	18%	21%
c. status of Transnistria will be decided	2%	18%	37%	19%	24%
d. population income will grow	1%	21%	41%	22%	15%
e. market economy will consolidate	2%	25%	35%	17%	22%
f. the democracy will consolidate	1%	18%	37%	19%	25%
g. young people living in Moldova will have more opportunities in the country	2%	15%	39%	24%	20%

Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict with the neighboring countries is possible?	Yes	14%	-- SKIP TO Q56
	No	65%	-- SKIP TO Q57
	Don't Know/No answer	21%	-- SKIP TO Q57

Q56. If yes, with what country is Moldova likely to enter an armed conflict?	Romania	5%	Transnistria	81%
	Russia	2%	Other, please specify _____	-
	Ukraine	4%	Don't Know/No answer	7%
	Bulgaria	2%		

Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?

- a. _____ | | | | |
- b. _____ | | | | |
- c. _____ | | | | |

Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to Transnistria?

- a. _____ | | | | |
- b. _____ | | | | |
- c. _____ | | | | |

Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life.	2%	7%	18%	67%	6%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova	2%	2%	20%	69%	7%
c. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life.	0%	6%	18%	69%	7%
d. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova	0%	4%	20%	69%	7%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life.	0%	6%	16%	59%	19%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova	0%	4%	17%	58%	20%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life.	0%	5%	18%	56%	20%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova	0%	4%	18%	57%	20%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life.	2%	7%	18%	56%	17%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova	2%	6%	18%	57%	18%

Q60. What is your native language? <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i> <i>Multiple choice!</i>	a. Moldovan	4%	e. Gagauz	0%
	b. Romanian	1%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	25%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	82%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q61. What language do you usually speak at home? <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i> <i>Multiple choice!</i>	a. Moldovan	8%	e. Gagauz	0%
	b. Romanian	4%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	43%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	66%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with you...

	a. mother	b. father	c. grandparents	d. children
Moldovan	2%	1%	1%	5%
Romanian	1%	1%	0%	2%
Russian	19%	18%	11%	41%
Ukrainian	58%	59%	57%	48%
Gagauz	0%	0%	0%	0%
Bulgarian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%
It's not the case	17%	18%	25%	3%
Don't know/No answer	3%	2%	5%	1%

Q63. How well do you speak ...?	a. Moldovan	b. Romanian	c. Russian	d. Ukrainian	e. Gagauz	f. Bulgarian
I speak it perfectly	11%	7%	80%	89%	0%	0%
Fluently but with an accent	19%	15%	14%	5%	0%	0%
I can make myself understood in most situations	26%	20%	4%	4%	0%	0%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty	20%	17%	1%	1%	0%	1%
I only know a few words	18%	15%	0%	1%	7%	7%
I do not know any word	4%	15%	0%	0%	78%	77%
No answer	0%	12%	1%	0%	14%	14%

Q64. Do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/No answer
a. I am disturbed when people around me speak Romanian/Moldovan	1%	2%	8%	15%	70%	5%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak Russian	0%	1%	6%	13%	76%	4%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak Gagauz	1%	1%	8%	14%	62%	14%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak Bulgarian	0%	2%	8%	14%	62%	14%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking Ukrainian although they know it	6%	16%	23%	18%	24%	14%
f. There are many Russians who avoid speaking Ukrainian although they know it	6%	17%	25%	19%	17%	16%
g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking Ukrainian although they know it	3%	10%	23%	10%	13%	42%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking Ukrainian although they know it	4%	11%	22%	9%	13%	41%
i. All residents from Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian	43%	25%	14%	7%	6%	6%
j. All residents from Moldova should know Russian	37%	30%	16%	8%	5%	5%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian	10%	32%	23%	14%	13%	8%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz	8%	30%	23%	13%	9%	17%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Bulgarian	8%	32%	22%	12%	9%	17%

Q65. How many official/state languages should be in Moldova?			Q66. Which ones?	
One state language	18%	-- SKIP TO Q66	a. Moldovan	93%
Two state languages	62%	-- SKIP TO Q66	b. Romanian	7%
More than two state languages	13%	-- SKIP TO Q66	c. Russian	76%
Don't know/No answer	7%	-- SKIP TO Q67	d. Ukrainian	17%
			e. Gagauz	1%
			f. Bulgarian	1%
			g. Other	1%
			h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?					
a. as a tourist	Yes	11%	→ aa. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	89%		_____	_ _
b. for temporary work	Yes	8%	→ bb. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	92%		_____	_ _
c. for studies	Yes	1%	→ cc. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	99%		_____	_ _
d. to settle permanently	Yes	1%	→ dd. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _
	No	99%		_____	_ _

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

D1. Gender	Male	39%
	Female	61%

D2. What is your age?	_____	Don't know	8	No answer	9
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D3. Are you presently employed?	Yes	27%	-- SKIP TO D5!
	No	73%	→ <i>Continue with D4!</i>
	Don't answer	0%	→ <i>Continue with D4!</i>

D4. If you don't have a job, what is your status?	High school student, university student	2%	Temporary unemployed. Looking for a job	17%
	Retired (due to age or sickness)	67%	Unemployed. Does not look for a job	4%
	Housewife, maternal leave	8%	Other (specify)	0%
			Don't know	-
			Don't answer	1%

D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? *Note as many details for the answer!*

_____ |_|_|
 Don't know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99

D6. What is your education background	No education	5%	Post high school education (college)	9%
	Incomplete secondary education	26%	Incomplete higher education	1%
	Secondary school	24%	Completed higher education	10%
	Vocational school	22%	Master's degree, PhD	0%
	High school	0%	Don't know	0%
			Don't answer	2%

D7. What is your civil status	Married	60%	Not married, living together	1%
	Divorced	4%	Never married	6%
	Widow(er)	25%	Don't know	-
			Don't answer	3%

D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?	_ _ people	Don't know	8
		Don't answer	9

D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net income of your family for the last month. Show list D9!

Under 200 Lei	9%	801 - 900 lei	2%	1501 - 1750 lei	1%
201 - 300 lei	18%	901-1000 lei	4%	1751 - 2500 lei	4%
301 - 400 lei	13%	1001-1100 lei	1%	2501 - 3500 lei	1%
401 - 500 lei	7%	1101-1200 lei	2%	3501 - 5000 lei	1%
501-600 lei	10%	1201 - 1300 lei	1%	5001 - 7000 lei	0%
601-700 lei	8%	1301-1400 lei	1%	Over 7001 lei	4%
701 - 800 lei	3%	1401-1500 lei	3%	Don't know	8%
				No answer	1%

D10. How do you evaluate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	41%
	The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes	38%
	We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge)	17%
	We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge)	2%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	0%
	Don't know	0%
	Don't answer	1%

D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?

I have only the Moldovan citizenship		98%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify _____		_ _
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify	a. _____	_ _
	b. _____	_ _
	Don't answer	1%

December 2004	Form #. _ _ _ _
Operator Code _ _ _ _	Date: _ _ Month: _ _ 2004
The interview was taken after the _ visit	Interview start time _ _ : _ _

ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: THE GAGAUZ

Good morning/Good afternoon/Good evening! My name is _____ and I come on behalf of the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc. Chisinau. Currently our institute is conducting a survey on the relationships among people from Moldova. For this reason, I would like to ask you some questions. We guarantee that you were selected randomly and that your answers will remain strictly confidential.

Q1. People believe that there are several ethnic groups living in Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you consider yourself? <i>Wait for the answer!</i> <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i>	Moldovan	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Russian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Ukrainian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Gagauz	100%	-> CONTINUE!
	Bulgarian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Romanian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Other: ____	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't know	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't answer	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!

Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Moldovans from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	7%	24%	40%	15%	3%	11%
b. 5 years ago	3%	25%	46%	13%	2%	11%
c. last year	2%	27%	47%	11%	1%	12%

Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Gagauz and Ukrainians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	5%	19%	52%	7%	0%	17%
b. 5 years ago	2%	17%	57%	6%	0%	18%
c. last year	2%	19%	56%	6%	0%	17%

Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Russians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	6%	23%	56%	4%	0%	10%
b. 5 years ago	4%	20%	60%	6%	0%	11%
c. last year	4%	21%	59%	5%	0%	11%

Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	4%	19%	54%	4%	1%	18%
b. 5 years ago	2%	17%	57%	6%	0%	18%
c. last year	2%	17%	57%	6%	0%	18%

Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Romanians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	11%	26%	6%	2%	52%
b. 5 years ago	1%	10%	28%	7%	1%	53%
c. last year	0%	10%	29%	6%	2%	53%

Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the relationship between different ethnic groups from Moldova?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between the Gagauz and Moldovans	78%	4%	5%	4%	9%
b. The relationship between the Gagauz and Ukrainians	82%	3%	1%	4%	11%
c. The relationship between the Gagauz and Russian	85%	3%	1%	4%	8%
d. The relationship between the Gagauz and Bulgarians	80%	3%	2%	4%	11%
e. The relationship between the Gagauz and Romanians	48%	3%	3%	7%	39%

Q8. How can you describe the interethnic relationships in your area?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	No relationships between ethnic groups	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between the Gagauz and Moldovans	81%	3%	4%	2%	4%	6%
b. The relationship between the Gagauz and Ukrainians	79%	2%	2%	7%	3%	7%
c. The relationship between the Gagauz and Russians	83%	2%	1%	4%	4%	6%
d. The relationship between the Gagauz and Bulgarians	78%	3%	2%	6%	4%	7%
e. The relationship between the Gagauz and Romanians	33%	3%	1%	41%	5%	17%

Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible that they could become a threat?

Q9_1. Moldovans can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	6%	28%	52%	12%
b. for the Gagauz	1%	7%	27%	54%	11%
c. for you and your family	1%	5%	23%	59%	11%

Q9_2. Ukrainians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	1%	27%	59%	12%
b. for the Gagauz	1%	1%	24%	63%	11%
c. for you and your family	1%	1%	21%	66%	11%

Q9_3. Russians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	3%	26%	60%	10%
b. for the Gagauz	1%	3%	22%	64%	10%
c. for you and your family	1%	1%	19%	68%	10%

Q9_4. Bulgarians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	1%	2%	25%	61%	11%
b. for the Gagauz	1%	2%	22%	64%	11%
c. for you and your family	1%	2%	20%	66%	11%

Q9_5. Romanians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	2%	3%	22%	49%	24%
b. for the Gagauz	2%	3%	19%	52%	24%
c. for you and your family	2%	2%	17%	56%	24%

Q10. Do you agree with the following statements? The fact that I was born in Moldova...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	45%	32%	11%	4%	7%
b. makes my life easier	7%	28%	40%	11%	14%
c. makes me feel ashamed	2%	13%	19%	54%	12%
d. makes my life harder	2%	14%	32%	38%	15%

Q11. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy	70%	19%	4%	1%	5%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like Moldovans from Moldova.	16%	30%	31%	7%	15%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians from Moldova.	15%	36%	27%	5%	16%
d. The world would be better if all the people were like Ukrainians from Moldova.	17%	28%	34%	4%	18%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like Gagauz from Moldova.	22%	41%	19%	4%	14%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like Bulgarians from Moldova.	15%	32%	30%	4%	19%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like Romanians from Moldova.	11%	26%	25%	12%	27%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova	10%	19%	34%	27%	10%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country	23%	29%	25%	12%	11%

Q12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I am Gagauz...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	54%	29%	10%	3%	4%
b. makes my life easier	10%	29%	42%	8%	11%
c. makes me feel ashamed	1%	12%	18%	58%	10%
d. makes my life harder	2%	10%	30%	44%	14%

Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your identity? I mainly consider myself Show list Q13! Multiple choice!	1. First choice	2. Second Choice	Total
Gagauz	66%	15%	81%
Resident of this locality	14%	29%	43%
Citizen of Moldova	17%	29%	46%
CIS Resident	1%	13%	14%
European	0%	6%	6%
Eastern European	0%	1%	1%
Don't Know/No answer	1%	7%	8%

Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Moldovan? <i>Show list Q14! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Moldovan parents	33%	8%	8%	48%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family	14%	11%	6%	32%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions	7%	9%	11%	27%
d. Feel Moldovan	8%	13%	8%	29%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture	4%	10%	6%	20%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	1%	4%	5%	11%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag	1%	5%	5%	11%
h. Live in Moldova	7%	7%	12%	26%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language	4%	8%	12%	25%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship	4%	8%	6%	18%
k. Be born in Moldova	2%	1%	3%	6%
l. Don't know/No answer	14%	16%	18%	48%

Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Russian? <i>Show list Q15! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Russian parents	31%	9%	7%	47%
b. Speak Russian in the family	14%	13%	7%	33%
c. Respect Russian traditions	7%	9%	11%	27%
d. Feel Russian	8%	9%	7%	24%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture	4%	10%	10%	23%
f. Honor the Russian national flag	1%	4%	4%	9%
g. Live in Russia	6%	6%	7%	19%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language	5%	14%	14%	33%
i. Have Russian citizenship	5%	6%	8%	18%
j. Be born in Russia	4%	4%	6%	14%
k. Don't know/No answer	16%	17%	18%	51%

Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Ukrainian? <i>Show list Q16! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices</i>	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents	30%	10%	8%	49%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family	13%	11%	6%	31%
c. Follow Ukrainian traditions	9%	8%	12%	29%

d. Feel Ukrainian	7%	10%	7%	24%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture	4%	10%	7%	22%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag	1%	4%	5%	10%
g. Live in Ukraine	5%	7%	7%	18%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language	5%	13%	16%	34%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship	4%	4%	7%	15%
j. Be born in Ukraine	4%	4%	5%	13%
k. Don't know/No answer	17%	18%	20%	56%

Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Gagauz? Show list Q17! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Gagauz parents	40%	9%	7%	56%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family	13%	16%	8%	38%
c. Follow Gagauz traditions	9%	9%	15%	33%
d. Feel Gagauz	9%	13%	9%	31%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture	3%	11%	11%	25%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag	2%	7%	5%	14%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia	7%	11%	14%	32%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language	6%	11%	14%	31%
i. Be born in Gagauzia	3%	6%	6%	16%
j. Don't know/No answer	7%	8%	10%	26%

Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Bulgarian? Show list Q18! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents	33%	8%	8%	49%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family	14%	12%	7%	32%
c. Follow Bulgarian traditions	9%	9%	14%	33%
d. Feel Bulgarian	8%	10%	6%	25%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture	3%	10%	8%	21%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag	1%	5%	5%	11%
g. Live in Bulgaria	4%	7%	6%	17%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language	5%	12%	14%	30%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship	3%	4%	7%	14%
j. Be born in Bulgaria	3%	4%	5%	13%
k. Don't know/No answer	17%	18%	20%	55%

Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Romanian? Show list Q19! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Romanian parents	33%	8%	7%	48%
b. Speak Romanian in the family	11%	11%	6%	28%
c. Follow Romanian traditions	7%	8%	11%	26%
d. Feel Romanian	8%	9%	7%	25%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	2%	9%	6%	17%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag	1%	6%	5%	12%
g. Live in Romania	4%	7%	7%	17%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language	4%	12%	14%	29%
i. Have Romanian citizenship	4%	4%	6%	14%
j. Be born in Romania	3%	4%	6%	14%
k. Don't know/No answer	22%	24%	26%	71%

Q20. How much do you trust...	Very much	Much	Little	Don't trust	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People from Moldova	5%	61%	26%	4%	4%
b. Moldovans from Moldova	5%	60%	25%	6%	4%
c. Russians from Moldova	6%	70%	18%	4%	4%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova	4%	63%	24%	4%	5%
e. Gagauz from Moldova	11%	67%	16%	3%	4%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova	4%	63%	22%	4%	7%
g. Romanians from Moldova	3%	35%	21%	12%	29%

Q21. Please specify what your reaction would be if persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova:	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	99%	1%	94%	6%
b. lived in your area	99%	1%	100%	0%	99%	1%	100%	0%	98%	2%	92%	8%
c. were your neighbors	96%	4%	93%	7%	92%	8%	96%	4%	90%	10%	82%	18%
d. were your friends	89%	11%	91%	9%	87%	13%	96%	4%	85%	15%	74%	26%
e. were part of your family	74%	26%	73%	27%	70%	30%	100%	0%	72%	28%	60%	40%

Q22. Are you a member of any organization?	Yes	8%	-- SKIP TO Q23
	No	92%	-- SKIP TO Q24
	Don't Know/No answer	0%	-- SKIP TO Q24

Q23. How often do you attend the meetings of an organization?	Daily	5%	There are no formal meetings of the members	0%
	Weekly	27%	I do not take part at meetings of the members	0%
	Monthly	54%	Don't know	5%
	A few times a year	8%	No answer	0%
	Once a year	0%		

Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) with people of other ethnic background? (public event)	Yes	20%
	No	78%
	Don't Know/No answer	2%

Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova.

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices!

Positive features: For **each** ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For **each** ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Positive features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
1. Decent	13%	11%	9%	13%	8%	7%	14%	13%	5%	7%	3%	4%
2. Kind-hearted	14%	15%	12%	13%	10%	9%	12%	12%	7%	10%	4%	3%
3. Hearty	8%	15%	9%	8%	8%	10%	8%	13%	7%	7%	3%	3%
4. Independent	6%	7%	6%	6%	4%	8%	3%	6%	4%	6%	4%	3%
5. Civilized	3%	8%	5%	10%	3%	8%	3%	6%	3%	6%	4%	10%
6. Educated	5%	12%	5%	10%	4%	10%	5%	13%	4%	8%	3%	3%
7. Resourceful	3%	6%	4%	7%	4%	6%	3%	7%	3%	7%	2%	6%
8. Joyful	7%	12%	11%	16%	6%	14%	5%	12%	3%	11%	2%	5%
9. Clean	3%	7%	1%	4%	3%	4%	3%	6%	3%	4%	2%	3%
10. Religious	3%	11%	4%	6%	6%	9%	4%	9%	6%	6%	3%	4%
11. United	2%	4%	1%	8%	5%	4%	2%	6%	5%	6%	4%	3%

12. Honest	1%	4%	2%	8%	2%	5%	4%	8%	4%	7%	3%	3%
13. Modest	2%	4%	1%	7%	2%	5%	3%	6%	2%	6%	2%	4%
14. Hard-working	6%	14%	2%	7%	2%	11%	13%	19%	8%	12%	2%	6%
15. Intelligent	0%	2%	2%	7%	0%	6%	1%	6%	1%	8%	1%	6%
16. Hospitable	1%	4%	0%	2%	1%	5%	1%	6%	1%	4%	0%	3%
17. None	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
18. Don't know/ No answer	23%	3%	25%	3%	31%	3%	18%	4%	34%	3%	58%	1%

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices!

Negative features: For *each* ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of the choices! For *each* ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Negative features	Q25. Moldovans		Q26. Russians		Q27. Ukrainians		Q28. Gagauz		Q29. Bulgarians		Q30. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
19. Selfish	6%	3%	8%	4%	4%	4%	7%	3%	7%	5%	3%	2%
20. Aggressive	3%	3%	2%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	4%	4%	4%	3%
21. Indifferent/cold	3%	5%	4%	8%	3%	4%	2%	7%	4%	7%	2%	4%
22. Obedient	3%	7%	3%	6%	3%	6%	2%	4%	3%	6%	1%	6%
23. Backward	5%	7%	2%	5%	3%	6%	1%	4%	2%	6%	2%	4%
24. Uneducated	5%	6%	3%	8%	3%	3%	3%	5%	3%	4%	2%	5%
25. Negligent	4%	6%	3%	4%	4%	6%	4%	4%	3%	5%	3%	3%
26. Sad	4%	6%	4%	4%	3%	6%	2%	2%	4%	5%	3%	1%
27. Dirty	4%	4%	5%	5%	2%	5%	2%	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%
28. Superstitious	3%	8%	3%	5%	3%	6%	3%	2%	1%	5%	1%	3%
29. Divided	2%	7%	3%	6%	4%	4%	3%	5%	3%	4%	2%	4%
30. Thieves	1%	8%	1%	7%	3%	4%	2%	4%	2%	5%	1%	3%
31. Vainglorious	1%	4%	1%	7%	2%	6%	2%	3%	1%	5%	1%	4%
32. Lazy	1%	4%	5%	5%	0%	5%	1%	3%	1%	3%	1%	5%
33. Stupid	2%	4%	0%	1%	0%	5%	0%	2%	1%	3%	0%	4%
34. Hostile	2%	3%	0%	2%	0%	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	2%
35. None	7%	0%	7%	1%	6%	0%	11%	1%	7%	0%	5%	0%
36. Don't know/ No answer	44%	3%	48%	2%	52%	1%	51%	4%	51%	3%	65%	1%

Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most politically influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!

	The richest		The most politically influential		The most respected	
	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice
Moldovans	26%	10%	28%	7%	19%	12%
Russians	15%	15%	15%	20%	13%	12%
Ukrainians	1%	4%	2%	3%	1%	1%
Gagauz	3%	11%	3%	8%	10%	8%
Bulgarians	2%	4%	1%	2%	1%	4%
Romanians	0%	1%	0%	3%	1%	3%
Other _____	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't Know/No answer	51%	54%	51%	57%	54%	60%

Q32. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Moldova</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. should support Moldovan students studying in other countries	56%	30%	8%	1%	5%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	41%	39%	11%	3%	5%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	39%	43%	9%	3%	7%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	40%	37%	14%	3%	6%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	39%	42%	9%	2%	8%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad	35%	29%	18%	3%	15%
g. should support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad	34%	38%	11%	2%	15%
h. support the cultural organizations from different ethnic groups in Moldova	37%	37%	14%	1%	11%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	38%	43%	7%	2%	10%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	38%	36%	14%	2%	10%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	41%	41%	7%	2%	10%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	38%	37%	11%	2%	11%
m. organize cultural events attended by people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova.	35%	43%	10%	1%	11%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majority	29%	30%	20%	4%	17%

Q33. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Russia</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Russian background studying in Moldova	65%	28%	2%	0%	5%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova	58%	31%	4%	0%	7%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from Moldova	58%	29%	5%	0%	7%
d. help develop Russians' identity in Moldova	54%	28%	7%	3%	8%

Q34. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Ukraine</i> should...	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova	61%	30%	2%	0%	6%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova	58%	30%	4%	0%	7%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from Moldova	57%	28%	5%	1%	8%
d. help develop Ukrainians' identity in Moldova	54%	26%	6%	6%	8%

Q35. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Turkey</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Gagauz background studying in Moldova	65%	26%	2%	1%	5%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova	60%	28%	4%	1%	7%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova	59%	27%	5%	1%	8%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova	57%	25%	6%	4%	8%

Q36. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Bulgaria</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova	62%	30%	2%	1%	6%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova	57%	31%	3%	1%	8%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from Moldova	56%	29%	6%	1%	8%
d. help develop Bulgarians' identity in Moldova	54%	26%	6%	5%	9%

Q37. Do you agree with the following statements? <i>Romania</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Romanian background studying in Moldova	57%	29%	2%	2%	9%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova	53%	31%	3%	2%	11%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from Moldova	52%	28%	5%	3%	12%
d. help develop Romanians' identity in Moldova	51%	25%	5%	7%	12%

Q38. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?	too many rights	enough rights	not enough rights	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Russians have...	9%	71%	7%	14%
b. Ukrainians have...	3%	71%	9%	16%
c. Gagauz have...	6%	66%	15%	14%
d. Bulgarians have...	3%	71%	9%	16%
e. Romanians have...	6%	63%	3%	28%

Q39. Do you think ethnic background affects the <u>employment</u> in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovans have...	11%	75%	4%	10%
b. Russians have...	5%	79%	5%	11%
c. Ukrainians have...	4%	78%	7%	11%
d. Gagauz have...	6%	76%	7%	10%
e. Bulgarians have...	4%	77%	7%	11%
f. Romanians have...	4%	65%	8%	23%

Q40. Do you think nationality matters to have a successful business in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	not enough opportunities	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovans have...	6%	78%	4%	13%
b. Russians have...	4%	77%	6%	13%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	76%	7%	14%
d. Gagauz have...	4%	76%	8%	13%
e. Bulgarians have...	3%	76%	8%	14%
f. Romanians have...	3%	65%	10%	22%

Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	44%	29%	11%	6%	8%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools	50%	26%	16%	4%	4%
c. Children of other nationalities should study together with the Gagauz children	52%	31%	11%	2%	4%
d. There should be mixed marriages	58%	18%	15%	3%	6%
e. There should be organizations and associations promoting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova	48%	32%	8%	3%	9%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (festivals) attended by people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	47%	26%	15%	4%	7%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) with the participation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	47%	32%	11%	3%	7%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova	50%	26%	12%	5%	7%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups from Moldova	47%	33%	10%	3%	6%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)	53%	25%	12%	4%	6%

Q42. Please list three personalities contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Vladimir Voronin	15%	a.	Mayor's Office	1%
b.	Vasile Tarlev	5%	b.	Schools	1%
c.	Tabunșci	5%	c.	Parliament	1%

Q44. Please list three personalities contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Iurie Roșca	6%	a.	Christian Democratic Party	1%
b.	Serafim Urecheanu	1%	b.		
c.	Dumitru Braghîș	1%	c.		

Q46. How do the following political parties influence interethnic relations?	Rather improves	Neither improves nor worsens	Rather worsens	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova	29%	19%	10%	41%
b. Christian Democratic Party	5%	22%	19%	54%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc	6%	22%	11%	61%
d. Agrarian Party	5%	20%	11%	64%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova	4%	19%	12%	66%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova	4%	19%	11%	66%

Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our country. Please tell me if you consider each of these problems crucial, severe or not too serious.		Crucial	Severe	Not too serious	Don't know	No answer
1.	Unemployment	52%	42%	1%	2%	3%
2.	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	19%	56%	14%	8%	2%
3.	Low salaries	53%	41%	1%	3%	2%
4.	Violation of human rights	26%	57%	6%	9%	2%
5.	Housing issue	16%	60%	16%	5%	2%
6.	Health condition	37%	52%	4%	4%	3%
7.	Environmental issues	28%	56%	7%	7%	2%
8.	Corruption	32%	55%	2%	10%	1%
9.	Crime level/insecurity	33%	51%	5%	9%	1%
10.	Drug trafficking	17%	58%	12%	11%	2%
11.	Armed conflicts	15%	44%	26%	13%	2%
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	15%	48%	21%	14%	2%
13.	Lack of rule of law	21%	54%	10%	13%	2%
14.	Lack of press freedom	15%	53%	15%	15%	2%
15.	Drug abuse	16%	64%	5%	13%	2%
16.	Trafficking in women	26%	60%	1%	11%	2%
17.	Relations with the Transnistrian region	28%	52%	6%	12%	2%

Q48. Do you agree or disagree that...?	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor.	42%	43%	16%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work	55%	35%	10%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods.	74%	17%	9%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens.	77%	17%	6%

e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to reduce criminality.	78%	13%	10%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults.	78%	15%	7%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the average ones.	34%	56%	10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state.	63%	26%	11%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself.	58%	32%	10%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own.	76%	15%	9%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our country.	75%	15%	10%

Q49. Do you agree with the following statement? During the current government...	True	Somewhat true	Somewhat false	Totally false	Don't Know/ No answer
1. ...the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people	11%	35%	26%	10%	18%
2. ...the state services rendered to citizens have improved	7%	29%	37%	8%	19%
3. ...corruption expanded at all levels	15%	42%	14%	3%	26%
4. ...the freedom of expression of the media was limited	5%	31%	23%	6%	35%
5. ...the democratic rights of citizens were limited	6%	36%	21%	6%	31%
6. The Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the weakness of Moldovan politicians	12%	36%	21%	3%	29%
7. ...Moldova's position was respected abroad	6%	20%	23%	9%	41%
8. ...the number of poor people from Moldova decreased	4%	17%	33%	22%	24%
9. ...the national currency was stabilized	5%	29%	19%	8%	39%
10. ...the national economy was stabilized	5%	23%	24%	8%	40%
11. ... salaries and pensions were paid without delays	18%	45%	18%	4%	15%
12. ...the farmers were supported	5%	26%	37%	8%	23%
13. ...market economy was consolidated.	4%	23%	21%	4%	49%
14. ...obstacles to foreign investors were created.	4%	17%	21%	7%	50%
15. ...small investors were encouraged.	4%	23%	15%	3%	55%
16. ...there was illegal interference with the economy.	5%	18%	16%	4%	58%
17. ...an economic growth was achieved.	4%	28%	15%	4%	50%
18. ...market economy failed	4%	18%	18%	7%	54%
19. ...measures to stop massive migration were not taken.	7%	36%	17%	4%	35%

Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, would you vote?	I would definitely vote	70%
	I would probably vote	14%
	I would probably not go	2%
	I would definitely not go	8%
	I don't know (don't read)	6%
	I don't answer (don't read)	1%

Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!

Communist Party of Moldova	37%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party)	5%
Christian Democratic Party	2%
Agrarian Party	1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova	0%
Socialist Party	1%
Other, please specify _____	0%
Independent candidate, please specify _____	0%
I would not vote	3%
Don't know	42%
No answer	8%

* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Aliance, Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party), the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“

Q52. In your opinion, what should be the direction for our country?	Be independent of any alliance/union	8%
	We should integrate with the European Union	18%
	We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	48%
	Don't know	19%
	No answer	7%

Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration of Moldova?	Very much	5%	Not at all	24%
	Quite much	22%	Don't know	20%
	Quite a little	18%	No answer	11%

Q54. What do you think will happen in five years...	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	To a very small extent	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong country	2%	20%	35%	18%	24%
b. Moldova's position will be taken in consideration abroad	2%	18%	32%	16%	32%

c. the status of Transnistria will be decided	2%	17%	34%	18%	31%
d. income of the population will grow	1%	16%	31%	24%	28%
e. market economy will consolidate	1%	18%	29%	18%	34%
f. democracy will consolidate	1%	15%	32%	17%	35%
g. young people living in Moldova will have greater opportunities in the country	2%	16%	31%	22%	30%

Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict with the neighboring countries is possible?	Yes	10%	-- SKIP TO Q56
	No	74%	-- SKIP TO Q57
	Don't Know/No answer	16%	-- SKIP TO Q57

Q56. If yes, with what country is Moldova likely to enter an armed conflict?	Romania	10%	Transnistrian region	60%
	Russia	6%	Other, please specify _____	0%
	Ukraine	13%	Don't Know/No answer	10%
	Bulgaria	0%		

Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?

- a. _____ | | | |
- b. _____ | | | |
- c. _____ | | | |

Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to Transnistria?

- a. _____ | | | |
- b. _____ | | | |
- c. _____ | | | |

Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/No answer
a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life.	3%	18%	32%	43%	4%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova	1%	9%	37%	49%	4%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life.	2%	12%	35%	45%	6%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova	1%	6%	36%	50%	6%
e. It is better not to deal with the Russians in everyday life.	1%	9%	39%	46%	6%
f. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova	0%	6%	39%	48%	6%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life.	2%	11%	35%	44%	7%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova	2%	7%	36%	48%	7%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life.	3%	13%	28%	36%	20%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova	2%	10%	30%	38%	20%

Q60. What is your native language? <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i> <i>Multiple choices!</i>	a. Moldovan	0%	e. Gagauz	97%
	b. Romanian	0%	f. Bulgarian	1%
	c. Russian	14%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	0%	h. Don't know/No answer	0%

Q61. What language do you usually speak at home? <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i> <i>Multiple choices!</i>	a. Moldovan	1%	e. Gagauz	83%
	b. Romanian	1%	f. Bulgarian	0%
	c. Russian	44%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	0%	h. Don't know/No answer	0%

Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your...

	a. mother	b. father	c. grandparents	d. children
Moldovan	0%	0%	1%	0%
Romanian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Russian	11%	10%	7%	34%
Ukrainian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Gagauz	79%	78%	77%	61%
Bulgarian	1%	1%	1%	0%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%
It's not the case	9%	11%	14%	4%
Don't know/No answer	0%	0%	0%	0%

Q63. How well do you speak ...?	a. Moldovan	b. Romanian	c. Russian	d. Ukrainian	e. Gagauz	f. Bulgarian
I speak it perfectly	1%	1%	60%	1%	97%	1%
Fluently but with an accent	2%	2%	29%	2%	0%	1%
I can make myself understood in most situations	18%	11%	8%	8%	1%	5%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty	17%	15%	1%	12%	0%	8%
I only know a few words	28%	19%	1%	19%	1%	19%
I do not know any word	33%	50%	1%	57%	1%	64%
No answer	0%	2%	0%	1%	0%	1%

Q64. Do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Rather agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. I am disturbed when people around me speak Romanian/Moldovan	2%	8%	14%	24%	50%	2%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak Ukrainian	1%	3%	16%	25%	52%	2%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak Russian	1%	7%	9%	25%	54%	3%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak Bulgarian	2%	3%	15%	23%	53%	3%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking Gagauz although they know it	4%	18%	19%	19%	18%	23%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking Gagauz although they know it	3%	15%	19%	19%	17%	26%
g. There are many Russians who avoid speaking Gagauz although they know it	1%	15%	18%	18%	15%	32%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking Gagauz although they know it	3%	15%	18%	19%	16%	29%
i. All the residents from Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian	27%	29%	14%	14%	9%	7%
j. All the residents from Moldova should know Russian	33%	30%	11%	11%	9%	6%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian	3%	26%	32%	18%	9%	12%
l. All the residents from Gagauzia should know Gagauz	6%	27%	29%	18%	9%	11%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Bulgarian	3%	27%	31%	17%	10%	13%

Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova?			Q66. Which ones?	
One state language	16%	-- SKIP TO Q66	a. Moldovan	92%
Two state languages	50%	-- SKIP TO Q66	b. Romanian	1%
More than two state languages	21%	-- SKIP TO Q66	c. Russian	83%
Don't know/No answer	12%	-- SKIP TO Q67	d. Ukrainian	3%
			e. Gagauz	27%
			f. Bulgarian	3%
			g. Other	3%
			h. Don't know/No answer	0%

Q67. In the next 12 months, do you plan to visit a foreign country?							
a. as a tourist	Yes	6%	• aa. What country will you go to?		_____	___	___
	No	94%			_____	___	___
b. for temporary work	Yes	13%	• bb. What country will you go to?		_____	___	___
	No	87%			_____	___	___
c. for studies	Yes	1%	• cc. What country will you go to?		_____	___	___
	No	99%			_____	___	___
d. to settle permanently	Yes	1%	• dd. What country will you go to?		_____	___	___
	No	99%			_____	___	___

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

D1. Gender	Male	50%
	Female	50%

D2. What is your age?	___	Don't know	8	No answer	9
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D3. Are you presently employed?	Yes	32%	-- SKIP TO D5!
	No	68%	→ Continue with D4!
	No answer	0%	→ Continue with D4!

D4. If you don't have a job, what is your occupation?	High school student, university student	4%	Temporary unemployed. Looking for a job	24%
	Retired (age or sickness)	48%	Unemployed. Does not look for a job	7%
	Housewife, maternal leave	13%	Other (specify)	1%
			Don't know	0%
			No answer	2%

D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer! |__|__|

Don't know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99

D6. What is your education background	No education	8%	Post high school education (college)	4%
	Incomplete secondary education	25%	Incomplete higher education	3%
	Secondary school	33%	Completed higher education	6%
	Vocational school	20%	Master's degree, PhD	0%
	High school	1%	Don't know	0%
			No answer	1%

D7. What is your civil status?	Married	74%	Unmarried, living together	1%
	Divorced	2%	Never married	8%
	Widow(er)	15%	Don't know	0%
		0%	No answer	0%

D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?	_ _ people	Don't know	8
		No answer	9

D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net income of your family for the last month. Show list D9!

Under 200 Lei	5%	801 - 900 lei	3%	1501 - 1750 lei	1%
201 - 300 lei	12%	901-1000 lei	4%	1751 - 2500 lei	0%
301 - 400 lei	13%	1001-1100 lei	3%	2501 - 3500 lei	0%
401 - 500 lei	9%	1101-1200 lei	3%	3501 - 5000 lei	0%
501-600 lei	10%	1201 - 1300 lei	2%	5001 - 7000 lei	0%
601-700 lei	6%	1301-1400 lei	1%	Over 7001 lei	0%
701 - 800 lei	7%	1401-1500 lei	0%	<i>Don't know</i>	4%
				<i>No answer</i>	15%

D10. How do you evaluate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	46%
	The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes	37%
	We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge)	15%
	We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge)	1%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	1%
	Don't know	0%
	No answer	1%

D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?

I have only the Moldovan citizenship		99%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify _____		_ _
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify	a. _____	_ _
	b. _____	_ _
	No answer	-

ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: BULGARIANS

Q1. People believe that there are several ethnic groups living in Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you consider yourself? <i>Wait for the answer!</i> <i>Do not read the options for answers!</i>	Moldovan	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Russian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Ukrainian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Gagauz	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Bulgarian	100%	-> CONTINUE!
	Romanian	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Other: _____	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	Don't know	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
	No answer	-	-> STOP THE INTERVIEW!

Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Moldovans from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	26%	46%	12%	6%	6%
b. 5 years ago	3%	27%	53%	10%	2%	5%
c. last year	4%	24%	58%	7%	2%	4%

Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Ukrainians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	22%	49%	6%	1%	18%
b. 5 years ago	4%	22%	53%	3%	1%	17%
c. last year	5%	18%	55%	4%	1%	17%

Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Bulgarians and the Gagauz from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	24%	52%	8%	1%	11%
b. 5 years ago	4%	23%	55%	7%	1%	11%
c. last year	4%	23%	56%	6%	0%	10%

Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Russians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Ceva mai bune	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	4%	24%	57%	6%	0%	9%
b. 5 years ago	4%	26%	56%	4%	0%	8%
c. last year	5%	23%	60%	4%	0%	8%

Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Romanians from Moldova better or worse than ...?

	Much better	Somewhat better	The same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Don't Know/ No answer
a. 15 years ago	3%	18%	31%	9%	3%	36%
b. 5 years ago	3%	17%	33%	8%	3%	36%
c. last year	1%	19%	35%	7%	1%	36%

Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the relationship between different ethnic groups from Moldova?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Bulgarians and Moldovans	83%	6%	7%	1%	4%
b. The relationship between Bulgarians and Ukrainians	88%	1%	2%	2%	7%
c. The relationship between Bulgarians and the Gagauz	85%	4%	3%	3%	5%
d. The relationship between Bulgarians and Russians	91%	2%	2%	2%	4%
e. The relationship between Bulgarians and Romanians	61%	4%	7%	5%	23%

Q8. How can you describe the interethnic relationships in your area?	Collaboration	Conflict	Mutual ignorance	No relationships between ethnic groups	Other	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The relationship between Bulgarians and Moldovans	86%	4%	4%	3%	0%	3%
b. The relationship between Bulgarians and Ukrainians	79%	2%	2%	13%	0%	4%
c. The relationship between Bulgarians and the Gagauz	81%	4%	4%	7%	0%	3%
d. The relationship between Bulgarians and Russians	87%	1%	2%	6%	0%	3%
e. The relationship between Bulgarians and Romanians	49%	3%	6%	30%	1%	11%

Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible that they could become a threat?

Q9_1. Moldovans can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	5%	28%	60%	7%
b. for Bulgarians	0%	5%	28%	60%	7%
c. for you and your family	1%	3%	26%	63%	6%

Q9_2. Ukrainians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	3%	27%	63%	7%
b. for Bulgarians	0%	2%	23%	68%	7%
c. for you and your family	0%	1%	22%	70%	7%

Q9_3. The Gagauz can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	4%	32%	56%	8%
b. for Bulgarians	0%	3%	26%	63%	8%
c. for you and your family	0%	3%	23%	66%	8%

Q9_4. Russians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	1%	30%	62%	6%
b. for Bulgarians	0%	1%	23%	69%	6%
c. for you and your family	0%	1%	22%	71%	6%

Q9_5. Romanians can become a threat	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	Impossible	Don't Know/ No answer
a. for the country	0%	7%	29%	47%	17%
b. for Bulgarians	1%	6%	28%	48%	17%
c. for you and your family	0%	4%	25%	54%	16%

Q10. Do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I was born in Moldova...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	37%	26%	22%	5%	10%
b. makes my life easier	12%	28%	33%	14%	14%
c. makes me feel ashamed	2%	16%	24%	45%	13%
d. makes my life harder	3%	17%	28%	38%	13%

Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy	60%	26%	10%	2%	1%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like Moldovans from Moldova.	12%	25%	36%	12%	15%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians from Moldova.	15%	31%	29%	8%	17%

d. The world would be better if all the people were like Ukrainians from Moldova.	12%	22%	40%	7%	19%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like the Gagauz from Moldova.	11%	29%	28%	13%	19%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like Bulgarians from Moldova.	17%	31%	31%	6%	16%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like Romanians from Moldova.	9%	23%	27%	13%	28%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova	9%	20%	30%	34%	7%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country	26%	25%	30%	12%	6%

Q12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: The fact that I am Russian...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. makes me proud	49%	35%	12%	2%	2%
b. makes my life easier	13%	29%	46%	6%	6%
c. makes me feel ashamed	1%	14%	20%	61%	4%
d. makes my life harder	2%	13%	31%	49%	5%

Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your identity? I mainly consider myself ... Show list Q13! Multiple s	1. First choice	2. Second Choice	Total
Bulgarian	62%	16%	79%
Resident of this locality	14%	20%	34%
Citizen of Moldova	18%	37%	55%
CIS Resident	3%	11%	15%
European	1%	10%	10%
Eastern European	0%	0%	0%
Don't Know/No answer	1%	5%	6%

Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Moldovan? Show list Q14! Multiple s Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Moldovan parents	43%	8%	3%	55%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family	12%	18%	5%	35%
c. Follow Moldovan traditions	9%	11%	14%	34%
d. Feel Moldovan	12%	13%	12%	36%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture	3%	11%	13%	27%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	2%	5%	5%	11%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag	0%	6%	6%	12%
h. Live in Moldova	6%	8%	10%	24%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language	2%	9%	14%	25%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship	3%	4%	7%	13%
k. Be born in Moldova	4%	2%	3%	9%
l. Don't know/No answer	5%	6%	8%	19%

Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Russian? Show list Q15! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Russian parents	39%	6%	6%	51%
b. Speak Russian in the family	15%	17%	5%	37%
c. Follow Russian traditions	9%	13%	12%	34%
d. Feel Russian	12%	14%	10%	36%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture	3%	13%	14%	30%
f. Honor the Russian national flag	2%	5%	5%	12%
g. Live in Russia	4%	8%	9%	21%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language	5%	10%	17%	32%
i. Have Russian citizenship	3%	6%	10%	19%
j. Be born in Russia	4%	2%	5%	10%
k. Don't know/No answer	5%	6%	8%	19%

Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Ukrainian? Show list Q16! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents	41%	7%	5%	53%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family	16%	18%	5%	39%
c. follow Ukrainian traditions	10%	11%	11%	32%
d. Feel Ukrainian	11%	16%	11%	38%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture	4%	12%	14%	30%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag	2%	5%	7%	13%
g. Live in Ukraine	2%	8%	8%	18%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language	3%	9%	18%	30%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship	2%	5%	8%	15%
j. Be born in Ukraine	3%	2%	5%	10%
k. Don't know/No answer	6%	7%	9%	21%

Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Gagauz? Show list Q17! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Gagauz parents	40%	8%	7%	55%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family	17%	19%	5%	41%
c. Follow Gagauz traditions	9%	13%	13%	35%
d. Feel Gagauz	12%	12%	13%	36%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture	4%	12%	14%	29%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag	2%	7%	9%	18%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia	3%	9%	14%	27%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language	4%	10%	13%	27%
i. Be born in Gagauzia	4%	2%	3%	10%
j. Don't know/No answer	6%	7%	10%	22%

Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Bulgarian? Show list Q18! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents	45%	7%	6%	59%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family	18%	22%	7%	46%
c. Follow Bulgarian traditions	9%	10%	17%	36%
d. Feel Bulgarian	12%	13%	13%	38%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture	3%	13%	16%	31%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag	0%	7%	6%	13%
g. Live in Bulgaria	2%	5%	3%	10%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language	2%	13%	17%	32%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship	2%	4%	6%	12%
j. Be born in Bulgaria	3%	1%	3%	6%
k. Don't know/No answer	4%	5%	6%	15%

Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a person to be considered Romanian? Show list Q19! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices	1.	2.	3.	Total
a. Have Romanian parents	43%	7%	5%	55%
b. Speak Romanian in the family	18%	17%	6%	40%
c. Follow Romanian traditions	8%	13%	12%	32%
d. Feel Romanian	7%	14%	10%	30%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture	3%	12%	13%	29%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag	1%	6%	6%	14%
g. Live in Romania	2%	6%	7%	15%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language	3%	9%	16%	28%
i. Have Romanian citizenship	2%	5%	8%	15%
j. Be born in Romania	4%	1%	5%	10%
k. Don't know/No answer	9%	10%	12%	32%

Q20. How much do you trust...	Very much	Much	Little	Don't trust	Don't Know/ No answer
a. People from Moldova	4%	64%	23%	4%	5%
b. Moldovans from Moldova	4%	66%	21%	5%	3%
c. Russians from Moldova	6%	71%	18%	3%	3%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova	4%	64%	21%	4%	7%
e. Gagauz from Moldova	3%	60%	25%	8%	4%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova	13%	68%	13%	3%	3%
g. Romanians from Moldova	3%	44%	22%	10%	21%

Q21. Please specify what would be your reaction if persons belonging to the following ethnic groups in Moldova:	a. Moldovans		b. Russians		c. Ukrainians		d. Gagauz		e. Bulgarians		f. Romanians	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
a. lived in Moldova	99%	1%	98%	2%	97%	3%	98%	2%	100%	0%	91%	9%
b. lived in your area	98%	2%	98%	2%	97%	3%	94%	6%	100%	0%	87%	13%
c. were your neighbors	94%	6%	90%	10%	88%	12%	79%	21%	93%	7%	75%	25%
d. were your friends	89%	11%	89%	11%	86%	14%	77%	23%	96%	4%	72%	28%
e. were part of your family	78%	22%	77%	23%	74%	26%	64%	36%	100%	0%	60%	40%

Q22. Are you a member of any organization?	Yes	11%	-- SKIP TO Q23
	No	87%	-- SKIP TO Q24
	Don't Know/No answer	1%	-- SKIP TO Q24

Q23. How often do you attend the meetings of this organization?	Daily	4%	There are no formal meetings of the members	0%
	Weekly	21%	I do not take part at meetings of the members	2%
	Monthly	27%	Don't know	2%
	A few times a year	38%	No answer	2%
	Once a year	4%		

Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) with people of other ethnic background? (public event)	Yes	34%
	No	65%
	Don't Know/No answer	1%

Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova.

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices!

Positive features: for *each* ethnic group circle the first choice in column a. and in column b. the rest of the choices! For *each* ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Positive features	Q24. Moldovans		Q25. Russians		Q26. Ukrainians		Q27. Gagauz		Q28. Bulgarians		Q29. Romanians	
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
1. Decent	10%	7%	7%	7%	6%	6%	5%	6%	11%	10%	3%	3%
2. Kind-hearted	14%	13%	17%	11%	13%	8%	6%	5%	14%	11%	4%	3%
3. Hearty	9%	15%	9%	14%	9%	10%	5%	10%	4%	13%	3%	5%
4. Independent	4%	13%	5%	12%	4%	9%	5%	9%	2%	7%	6%	6%
5. Civilized	2%	9%	6%	10%	3%	6%	1%	9%	2%	4%	6%	10%
6. Educated	4%	9%	5%	11%	3%	9%	3%	6%	5%	12%	3%	6%
7. Resourceful	5%	6%	4%	12%	3%	8%	6%	11%	6%	8%	3%	5%
8. Joyful	13%	17%	12%	13%	9%	14%	4%	7%	5%	10%	6%	9%
9. Clean	3%	5%	5%	3%	5%	5%	4%	6%	4%	8%	6%	4%
10. Religious	6%	10%	4%	5%	6%	6%	6%	11%	3%	7%	6%	10%
11. United	3%	5%	5%	6%	7%	6%	10%	16%	6%	5%	4%	7%
12. Honest	3%	4%	3%	9%	4%	8%	3%	8%	3%	11%	2%	6%
13. Modest	2%	8%	1%	6%	1%	9%	2%	6%	3%	10%	4%	7%
14. Hard-working	10%	19%	2%	8%	3%	12%	16%	15%	18%	23%	1%	6%
15. Intelligent	1%	3%	3%	9%	2%	6%	1%	4%	3%	6%	1%	5%
16. Hospitable	2%	6%	2%	8%	2%	7%	2%	4%	1%	6%	0%	4%
17. None	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%
18. Don't Know/ No answer	10%	2%	11%	4%	20%	3%	17%	4%	10%	2%	39%	2%

OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices!

Negative features: for *each* ethnic group circle the first choice in column a., and in column b. the rest of the choices!
For *each* ethnic group one can have **up to 3 choices** from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!

Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most politically influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!

	The richest		The most politically influential		The most respected	
	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice	First choice	Second choice
Moldovans	35%	8%	50%	5%	34%	11%
Russians	12%	17%	9%	25%	15%	15%
Ukrainians	2%	4%	2%	3%	2%	5%
Gagauz	6%	12%	1%	13%	3%	5%
Bulgarians	5%	10%	1%	7%	6%	12%
Romanians	0%	2%	1%	4%	0%	5%
Other_____	2%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Don't Know/No answer	38%	45%	35%	42%	39%	46%

Q32. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? <i>Moldova should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries	63%	23%	12%	0%	2%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers	52%	27%	12%	7%	2%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers	42%	34%	16%	5%	3%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers	41%	29%	23%	4%	3%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers	43%	34%	18%	3%	2%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad	42%	29%	18%	3%	9%
b. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad	44%	34%	13%	3%	6%
h. Support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova	44%	35%	13%	3%	5%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group	42%	37%	13%	2%	6%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group	39%	38%	16%	2%	5%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group	40%	36%	18%	1%	6%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group	42%	37%	14%	3%	4%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova.	47%	36%	11%	1%	5%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majority	22%	25%	22%	18%	13%

Q33. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? <i>Russia should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Russian background studying in Moldova	68%	25%	3%	1%	2%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova	65%	21%	8%	1%	4%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from Moldova	67%	25%	4%	1%	3%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from Moldova	61%	21%	9%	4%	5%

Q34. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: <i>Ukraine should...</i>	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova	66%	27%	3%	1%	3%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova	64%	24%	6%	1%	5%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from Moldova	65%	26%	4%	1%	4%
d. help develop the identity of the Ukrainians from Moldova	60%	23%	6%	6%	6%

Q35. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: <i>Turkey</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Gagauz background studying in Moldova	66%	23%	5%	2%	3%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova	61%	23%	7%	2%	6%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova	60%	26%	8%	1%	5%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova	56%	21%	10%	7%	6%

Q36. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: <i>Bulgaria</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova	69%	25%	2%	1%	2%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova	67%	25%	3%	1%	5%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from Moldova	72%	21%	3%	0%	4%
d. help develop the identity of the Bulgarians from Moldova	65%	22%	5%	2%	6%

Q37. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: <i>Romania</i> should...	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. support high school and university students of Romanian background studying in Moldova	62%	25%	5%	1%	6%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova	59%	24%	6%	2%	9%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from Moldova	60%	22%	8%	2%	8%
d. help develop the identity of the Romanians from Moldova	56%	19%	9%	7%	10%

Q38. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?	too many rights	enough rights	not enough rights	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Russians have...	9%	70%	14%	7%
b. Ukrainians have...	3%	70%	17%	10%
c. Gagauz have...	10%	69%	13%	8%
d. Bulgarians have...	2%	68%	22%	7%
e. Romanians have...	9%	64%	8%	19%

Q39. Do you think ethnic background affects the employment in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	Not enough opportunities	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldovans have...	19%	75%	1%	5%
b. Russians have...	6%	78%	10%	6%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	81%	10%	6%
d. Gagauz have...	4%	78%	11%	7%
e. Bulgarians have...	3%	77%	14%	6%
f. Romanians have...	11%	68%	6%	15%

Q40. Do you think nationality matters to have a successful business in your area? What do you think the situation is?	too many opportunities	enough opportunities	Not enough opportunities	Don't Know/No answer
a. Moldovans have...	13%	76%	2%	9%
b. Russians have...	6%	79%	6%	10%
c. Ukrainians have...	3%	81%	6%	10%
d. Gagauz have...	4%	78%	8%	10%
e. Bulgarians have...	4%	77%	10%	9%
f. Romanians have...	8%	71%	5%	16%

Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/No answer
a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	31%	27%	23%	15%	4%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools	58%	21%	13%	6%	1%
c. Children of other nationalities should study together with Bulgarian children	58%	24%	15%	3%	1%
d. There should be mixed marriages	61%	21%	13%	4%	1%
e. There should be organizations and associations promoting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova	55%	26%	12%	3%	3%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (festivals) attended by people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova	57%	23%	15%	3%	2%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) with the participation of people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova	59%	24%	12%	4%	1%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs about the lives of people of different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova	60%	22%	13%	4%	2%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups from Moldova	53%	27%	15%	3%	2%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)	58%	23%	13%	4%	1%

Q42. Please list three personalities contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Vladimir Voronin	23%	a.	Communist Party of Moldova	6%
b.	Vasile Tarlev	7%	b.	Ministry of Culture	3%
c.	Mircea Snegur	5%	c.	House of Nationalities	2%

Q44. Please list three personalities contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova			Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova		
a.	Iurie Roșca	19%	a.	Christian Democratic Party	8%
b.	Mircea Druc	6%	b.	Customs	3%
c.	Dumitru Braghiș	4%	c.	Parliament	2%

Q46. How do the following political parties influence interethnic relations?	Rather improves	Neither improves nor worsens	Rather worsens	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova	46%	27%	8%	19%
b. Christian Democratic Party	4%	35%	30%	30%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc	9%	40%	14%	37%
d. Agrarian Party	7%	41%	9%	43%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova	5%	38%	12%	45%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova	4%	38%	11%	47%

Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our country. Please tell me if you consider each of these problems crucial, severe or not too serious.		Crucial	Severe	Not too serious	Don't know	No answer
1.	Unemployment	52%	46%	2%	1%	0%
2.	Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars	18%	46%	25%	9%	1%
3.	Low salaries	49%	48%	2%	1%	0%
4.	Violation of human rights	27%	52%	13%	6%	1%
5.	Housing issue	21%	58%	18%	3%	0%
6.	Health condition	32%	58%	8%	2%	1%
7.	Environmental issues	27%	56%	12%	5%	0%
8.	Corruption	33%	53%	8%	6%	1%
9.	Crime level/insecurity	23%	62%	10%	3%	1%
10.	Drug trafficking	22%	48%	16%	14%	1%
11.	Armed conflicts	16%	39%	29%	14%	2%
12.	Ethnic conflicts/tensions	19%	35%	32%	12%	2%
13.	Lack of rule of law	28%	43%	17%	10%	2%
14.	Lack of press freedom	21%	38%	27%	13%	2%
15.	Drug abuse	18%	52%	15%	14%	1%
16.	Trafficking in women	32%	46%	10%	9%	2%
17.	Relations with Transnistria	25%	57%	7%	9%	2%

Q48. Do you agree or disagree that...?	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor.	53%	39%	8%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work	65%	31%	4%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods.	82%	15%	2%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens.	86%	12%	2%
e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to reduce criminality.	86%	12%	2%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults.	84%	13%	3%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the average ones.	31%	65%	5%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state.	68%	27%	4%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself.	56%	40%	3%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own.	78%	20%	3%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our country.	72%	22%	6%

Q49. Do you agree with the following statement? During the current government...	True	Somewhat true	Somewhat false	Totally false	Don't Know/ No answer
1. ...the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people	13%	39%	29%	11%	9%
2. ...the state services rendered to citizens have improved	9%	27%	37%	19%	9%
3. ...corruption expanded at all levels	20%	38%	18%	6%	18%
4. ...the freedom of expression of the media was limited	9%	26%	30%	9%	26%
5. ...the democratic rights of citizens were limited	7%	31%	29%	9%	24%
6. ...the Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the weakness of Moldovan politicians	13%	32%	22%	5%	28%
7. ...Moldova's position was respected abroad	4%	24%	26%	17%	30%
8. ...the number of poor people from Moldova decreased	4%	26%	30%	26%	13%
9. ...the national currency was stabilized	6%	39%	22%	9%	24%
10. ...the national economy was stabilized	5%	33%	29%	8%	25%
11. ... salaries and pensions were paid without delays	27%	44%	17%	5%	7%
12. ...the farmers were supported	6%	31%	35%	13%	16%
13. ...market economy was consolidated.	4%	26%	26%	6%	38%
14. ...obstacles to foreign investors were created.	5%	23%	24%	7%	41%
15. ...small investors were encouraged.	4%	23%	23%	4%	46%
16. ...there was illegal interference with the economy.	3%	21%	23%	6%	46%
17. ...an economic growth was achieved.	5%	32%	25%	7%	32%
18. ...market economy failed	6%	20%	26%	7%	41%
19. ...measures to stop massive migration were not taken.	15%	28%	19%	7%	31%

Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, would you vote?	I would definitely vote	67%
	I would probably vote	20%
	I would probably not go	2%
	I would definitely not go	7%
	I don't know (don't read)	3%
	I don't answer (don't read)	1%

Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!

Communist Party of Moldova	41%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party)	7%
Christian Democratic Party	3%
Agrarian Party	4%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova	2%
Socialist Party	0%
Other, please specify _____	-
Independent candidate, please specify _____	0%
I would not vote	4%
Don't know	29%
No answer	11%

* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Aliance, Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party), the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“

Q52. In your opinion, what should be the direction of our country?	Be independent of any alliance/union	7%
	We should integrate with the European Union	36%
	We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	35%
	Don't know	19%
	No answer	3%

Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration of Moldova?	Very much	5%	Not at all	26%
	Quite much	19%	Don't know	20%
	Quite a little	26%	No answer	5%

Q54. What do you think will happen in five years...	Highly possible	Very possible	Little possible	To a very small extent	Don't Know/ No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong country	1%	16%	42%	28%	13%
b. Moldova's position will be taken in consideration abroad	1%	19%	38%	24%	19%
c. the status of Transnistria will be decided	1%	16%	39%	20%	24%
d. income of the population will grow	1%	20%	42%	22%	15%
e. market economy will consolidate	0%	22%	36%	18%	23%
f. democracy will consolidate	1%	18%	40%	16%	26%
g. young people living in Moldova will have greater opportunities in the country	1%	16%	39%	29%	16%

Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict with the neighboring countries is possible?	Yes	8%	-- SKIP TO Q56
	No	81%	-- SKIP TO Q57
	Don't Know/No answer	11%	-- SKIP TO Q57

Q56. If yes, with what country is Moldova likely to enter an armed conflict?	Romania	3%	Transnistrian region	81%
	Russia	3%	Other, please specify _____	-
	Ukraine	-	Don't Know/No answer	14%
	Bulgaria	-		

Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian conflict?

- a. _____ | | | | |
- b. _____ | | | | |
- c. _____ | | | | |

Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to Transnistria?

- a. _____ | | | | |
- b. _____ | | | | |
- c. _____ | | | | |

Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life.	1%	13%	35%	48%	3%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova	1%	6%	28%	62%	3%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life.	1%	13%	26%	58%	3%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova	1%	8%	27%	61%	3%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life.	1%	14%	28%	53%	4%

f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova	1%	8%	28%	59%	3%
g. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life.	0%	11%	26%	60%	2%
h. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova	0%	8%	27%	62%	2%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life.	2%	12%	27%	44%	15%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova	2%	10%	26%	48%	14%

Q60. What is your native language? <i>Do not read the options for answers! Multiple choices!</i>	a. Moldovan	6%	e. Gagauz	2%
	b. Romanian	1%	f. Bulgarian	92%
	c. Russian	22%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	1%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q61. What language do you usually speak at home? <i>Do not read the options for answers! Multiple choice!</i>	a. Moldovan	13%	e. Gagauz	8%
	b. Romanian	1%	f. Bulgarian	71%
	c. Russian	47%	g. Other	0%
	d. Ukrainian	2%	h. Don't know/refuse to answer	1%

Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your...

	a. mother	b. father	c. grandparents	d. children
Moldovan	4%	4%	3%	6%
Romanian	0%	0%	0%	0%
Russian	16%	15%	12%	32%
Ukrainian	0%	0%	0%	3%
Gagauz	2%	1%	1%	3%
Bulgarian	64%	65%	63%	50%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%
It's not the case	12%	13%	19%	4%
Don't know/No answer	1%	1%	1%	2%

Q63. How well do you speak ...?	a. Moldovan	b. Romanian	c. Russian	d. Ukrainian	e. Gagauz	f. Bulgarian
	I speak it perfectly	12%	10%	67%	4%	8%
Fluently but with an accent	14%	11%	23%	2%	3%	6%
I can make myself understood in most situations	19%	10%	8%	12%	4%	2%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty	15%	9%	1%	17%	7%	1%
I only know a few words	25%	24%	0%	27%	26%	1%
I do not know any word	14%	30%	0%	36%	50%	1%
No answer	1%	5%	1%	2%	2%	0%

Q64. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:	Totally Agree	Somewhat agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	Don't Know/ No answer
a. I am disturbed when people around me speak Romanian/Moldovan	1%	8%	12%	22%	56%	1%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak Ukrainian	0%	5%	15%	17%	61%	1%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak Gagauz	2%	11%	11%	17%	57%	2%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak Russian	1%	4%	14%	17%	62%	1%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking Bulgarian although they know it	5%	17%	22%	20%	21%	15%
e. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking Bulgarian although they know it	3%	15%	22%	20%	23%	18%
e. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking Bulgarian although they know it	3%	14%	20%	20%	23%	20%
e. There are many Russians who avoid speaking Bulgarian although they know it	3%	15%	19%	19%	23%	22%
i. All residents of Moldovan should know Moldovan/Romanian	37%	24%	16%	13%	7%	3%
j. All residents of Moldovan should know Russian	25%	30%	18%	16%	9%	2%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian	5%	18%	27%	26%	16%	8%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz	5%	16%	29%	23%	18%	8%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Bulgarian	6%	17%	29%	24%	17%	7%

Q65. How many state languages should be in Moldova?			Q66. Which ones?	
One state language	23%	-- SKIP TO Q66	a. Moldovan	93%
Two state languages	64%	-- SKIP TO Q66	b. Romanian	6%
More than two state languages	10%	-- SKIP TO Q66	c. Russian	75%
Don't know/No answer	3%	-- SKIP TO Q67	d. Ukrainian	2%
			e. Gagauz	4%
			f. Bulgarian	8%
			g. Other	1%
			h. Don't know/refuse to answer	0%

Q67. In the next 12 months, do you plan to visit a foreign country?					
a. as a tourist	Yes	11%	• aa. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _ _
	No	89%			
b. for temporary work	Yes	10%	• bb. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _ _
	No	90%			
c. for studies	Yes	0%	• cc. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _ _
	No	100%			
d. to settle permanently	Yes	1%	• dd. What country will you go to?	_____	_ _ _
	No	99%			

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

D1. Gender	Male	45%
	Female	55%

D2. What is your age?	_____	Don't know	8	No answer	9
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D3. Are you presently employed?	Yes	39%	-- SKIP TO D5!
	No	61%	→ Continue with D4!
	No answer	-	→ Continue with D4!

D4. If you don't have a job, what is your status?	High school student, university student	7%	Temporary unemployed. Looking for a job	26%
	Retired (age or sickness)	47%	Unemployed. Does not look for a job	10%
	Housewife, maternal leave	9%	Other (specify)	1%
			Don't know	-
			No answer	0%

D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer!

|_|_|_|

Don't know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99

D6. What is your education background	No education	4%	Post high school education (college)	6%
	Incomplete secondary education	17%	Incomplete higher education	3%
	Secondary school	28%	Completed higher education	13%
	Vocational school	25%	Master's degree, PhD	0%
	High school	1%	Don't know	0%
			No answer	1%

D7. What is your civil status?	Married	71%	Unmarried, living together	1%
	Divorced	3%	Never married	10%
	Widow(er)	15%	Don't know	-
			No answer	-

D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?	_ _ people	Don't know	8
		Don't answer	9

D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net income of your family for the last month. Show the list D9!

Under 200 Lei	4%	801-900 lei	5%	1501-1750 lei	2%
201-300 lei	10%	901-1000 lei	9%	1751-2500 lei	4%
301-400 lei	10%	1001-1100 lei	6%	2501-3500 lei	3%
401-500 lei	7%	1101-1200 lei	3%	3501-5000 lei	1%
501-600 lei	9%	1201-1300 lei	2%	5001-7000 lei	0%
601-700 lei	7%	1301-1400 lei	0%	Over 7001 lei	0%
701-800 lei	6%	1401-1500 lei	3%	Don't know	3%
				No answer	7%

D10. How do you evaluate the current income of your family	Money is not enough even for food	33%
	The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes	41%
	We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge)	20%
	We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge)	0%
	We can afford to buy anything we want	3%
	Don't know	0%
	Don't answer	2%

D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?

I have only the Moldovan citizenship		96%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify _____	_ _	
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify	a. _____	_ _
	b. _____	_ _
	No answer	1%