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THE EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE: THE WEAKNESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY?

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 3
   A. RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ......................... 4
   B. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH .................. 4
   C. GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS ........................................ 6
   D. OUTLINE .................................................. 7
      1. CHAPTERS BREAKDOWN .................................. 7
      2. MAIN ARGUMENTS ....................................... 7

## II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ..................................... 8
   A. EUROPEANISATION AS A VARIETY OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY ... 8
   B. EXECUTIVE ADAPTATION ....................................... 11
   C. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY .... 13
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................... 16

## III. EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN MOLDOVA ............ 20
   A. OVERVIEW OF THE MOLDOVAN EXECUTIVE ........................ 20
   B. EU-MOLDOVA ACTION PLAN .................................... 21
   C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ............................ 22
      1. STRUCTURES ............................................. 22
      2. PROCESSES ............................................. 24
      3. AGENTS ................................................ 26

## IV. EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE ............... 27
   A. OVERVIEW OF THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE ........................ 27
   B. EU-UKRAINE ACTION PLAN ..................................... 28
   C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ............................ 29
      1. STRUCTURES ............................................. 29
      2. PROCESSES ............................................. 31
      3. AGENTS ................................................ 32

## V. CHALLENGES IN EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ........................................ 34

## VI. CONCLUSIONS .................................................. 36
   BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 39
   ABBREVIATIONS ................................................ 45
I. INTRODUCTION

This paper\textsuperscript{2} analyzes effects of Europeanisation beyond the EU and it focuses on a particular institution: the national governments of two Eastern European countries – Moldova and Ukraine – that do not have a credible accession perspective. Europeanisation of domestic executive is a new, and small, but in the same time, a tremendously growing research area (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 1). Scholars in this field focus mainly on member and candidate states, particularly on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Nevertheless, adjustment of political-administrative structures occurs also beyond the EU borders (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 1). It is particularly worthy of mentioning states form the European Economic Area (EEA). Also, as a result of the recent development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as an alternative to enlargement, (Dannreuther, 2006) the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbours should be considered as well.

The scope of this paper is twofold. First, to contribute to Europeanisation debate. Second, the paper aims to shed more light on the impact of Europeanisation on domestic politico-administrative structures beyond EU candidacy, bringing examples from core executive adjustment in Moldova and Ukraine.

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A. RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The former Soviet Union republics Moldova and Ukraine gained their independence in 1991. After a tumultuous transition period they, however, did not catch the 2004 enlargement wave that included three other former soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. For the time being, Moldova and Ukraine proved to be the only countries from the so-called Western New Independent States (WNIS)\(^3\) that expressed their strong wish to join the EU. Their demarche is supported by the announced readiness to implement necessary reforms thus following the way of former Eastern candidates. Although they do not have a clear membership perspective, both are involved in implementation of the ENP instruments which are clearly moulded on the enlargement process (Kelley, 2006, p. 30). Besides the socialisation component, which emerges from the direct neighbourhood of the EU, the very presence of enlargement institutional patterns creates certain elements of political conditionality. As a result of the above mentioned factors, domestic executives encounter structural and functional adjustments and they imitate to some extent national governments of candidate countries.

How uniform and durable is this process? To what extent and how the EU’s ‘transformational diplomacy’ and post communist legacy is shaping the process? What is the *raison d’être* and *finale* of Europeanisation of governance in these two countries? Where this institutional adaptation could lead to? These are the questions addressed in this research.

B. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Choosing a theoretical approach to suit the purpose of this research is a difficult task. First of all, the approach should rely on new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, cited in Gwiazda, 2002, p. 7), as it focuses on institutional adjustment as a result of domestic impact of Europe. The difficulty appears when selecting one of its varieties. One distinguishes three distinctive approaches for analysis: historical,

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\(^3\) WNIS include former republics of the Soviet Union that have a common border with the EU: Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
rational and sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalism traditionally applies to the study of the impact of the EU on executive governance (see, for example, Laffan, 2003, p. 5). Even though the time frame the paper focuses on is quite reduced – generally starting since countries’ independence and particularly since the conclusion of bilateral action plans within the ENP – there is still enough room for tracking structural adjustments within executives. Sociological institutionalism (or constructivism) seems to be the appropriate framework for analysis as it follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998) and it involves adaptation through socialization and learning. Indeed, the EU applies to Moldova and Ukraine predominantly cognitive and normative mechanisms (Gwiazda, 2002, p. 8) of Europeanisation. On the other hand, candidate countries are entrenched within political conditionality, and they follow the ‘logic of consequences’ of the rational institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1998). Although these two approaches use distinct mechanisms, they complement each other which is confirmed by the EU behaviour, which never relies on conditionality only (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 10). Unfortunately, the EU never promised membership to Moldova and Ukraine, and it did not explicitly rule it out either. Therefore, over time, their relations with EU will involve more conditionality and one could anticipate that research in this field will increasingly need a rational approach. Assuming that persuasive tactics dominate the relations of the EU with these two countries, sociological institutionalism remains the main theoretical framework for this paper. Therefore, in order to capture a full picture of consequences of institutional changes and to draw similarities between Moldova and Ukraine and candidate countries, one will have recourse to both rational and historical institutionalism.

The methodology used is analytical and comparative. This is a qualitative research that implies interpretative methods of analysis of official governmental documents on central public administration reform and policies of both Moldova and Ukraine combined with an academic literature review. Comparison is used also to show differences between member states and these two countries. Both case studies on executive reforms involve identification of similarities, differences, successes and of potential challenging areas within national governments that might delay the Europeanisation process. A focus on Europeanisation of Moldova and Ukraine at country level, or at some particular field level would add an important contribution to
the central debate of this topic. However, the research will concentrate on core executive structures, processes and agents (Laffan, 2003, p. 5) liable to adjustments under the EU influence only.

C. GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS

Why focus on Moldova and Ukraine? Despite immense differences in territory and population, these countries have been grouped together for several reasons. First, they have a common past – both are former Soviet Union republics. Second, both are neighbours, and since recently – direct EU neighbours. Moreover, both are land neighbours as opposite to EU’s Southern neighbours. While both are European states and partner countries within the ENP and subsequently both are beyond the EU candidacy, according to the Treaty of the European Union, they could request to advance their status. Third, both found themselves in a situation of double exclusion. Neither of these two was invited to join the EU while having to face economic and political pressures coming from Russia. Nevertheless, contrasting from the other two WNIS – Belarus and Russia – Moldova and Ukraine expressed their strong wish to become EU members. Fourth, in terms of political regime, immediately after independence both chose semi-presidentialism with a strong popularly elected president enjoying extensive powers, and both recently shifted towards semi-parliamentarism. The list is not exhaustive, one could continue, for example, with the Transnistrian conflict at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border where the EU is recently involved through finding a peaceful conflict settlement. It has been suggested even that the main rationale of the ENP is to offer an alternative to enlargement particularly to Moldova and Ukraine: ‘Ukraine together with Moldova is the only country that really needs a new policy of the EU, no other Wider Europe country needed it and for all of them the concept looked at least artificial’ (CPCFPU, 2004, p. 6).

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4 Moldova has a territory of 33.7 thousands sq km and a population of nearly 4 millions inhabitants, while Ukraine has 603.7 thousands sq km and counts a 46 millions population.
D. OUTLINE

1. Chapters breakdown

The next chapter explores the conceptual framework. It examines the concept of Europeanisation as a variety of political conditionality and how it could be applied to executive adaptation of countries in the proximity of the EU. The second major issue of this chapter tackles the ENP concept as a normative framework for Europeanisation beyond the EU. The following two chapters are analytical and are focused on Europeanisation of core executive structures, processes and agents in Moldova and Ukraine. The last chapter is comparative and aims to explore similarities, differences, successes and problems in adaptation of core executives in these two countries.

2. Main arguments

There is much more functional EU pressure on Moldovan and Ukrainian core executives than on other two Eastern neighbours – Belarus and Russia. The first two countries are better engaged in the ENP by signing its main instruments – bilateral EU-country action plans. These documents are structured similar to association agreements, thus offering an official framework for transposing the *acquis communautaire* into national legislation. Moreover, while drawing the ENP, similar patterns with those used for eastward enlargement were used (Dannreuther, 2006, Cremona, 2004). As a result, the European neighbourhood concept is modelled on enlargement process and the two governments are implementing European policies and adjusting theirs structures in order to deal efficiently with European affairs. This fact means that in certain situations they behave similar to candidate state governments. The policy of sharing with these two countries everything excepting EU institutions leads to an inevitable convergence of administrative structures and procedures with those of EU member states. This process, however, is quite dispersed because the existent framework encourages governments to be selective, i.e. to implement some convenient reforms, while others, more important, are neglected. The conclusion is that the Europeanisation of executive governance in Moldova and
Ukraine will remain a fragmented process, as long as the main rationale of EU’s political conditionality – an open perspective for a full EU membership – is absent.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. EUROPEANISATION AS A VARIETY OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

Burgeoning of research on Europeanisation coincided with collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and with coming into use of domestic politicians of slogans ‘return to Europe’ and ‘Europeanisation’ in order to justify more or less painful reforming of their countries (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 6-7). Despite its fashionability (Olsen, 2003, p. 334, Featherstone, 2003, p. 3), Europeanisation is one of those ‘essentially contested concepts’ which is no wonder since debates on what ‘Europe’ means are not new (Gwiazda, 2002, p. 7). One should admit that given its novelty, Europeanisation is quite an ambiguous term and still leaves room for various interpretations. The purpose of this paragraph is to review the essence of Europeanisation as a form of political conditionality and to clarify how it will be used in this paper.

Given its predominantly technical nature, research on political conditionality is mostly case-focused and often descriptive (Zanger, 2000, p. 295). Barnes and Randerson (2006, p. 351) proposed a generally applicable definition of conditionality: ‘the exercise of policy instruments by one party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another party.’ The drawback of this definition is the ambiguity in identifying the main actors of ‘conditionality game’. Charillon (2004, p. 258) brings more light into this issue defining conditionality as ‘linking, by a state or the international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concession), to the fulfilment of economic and political conditions’. This definition exemplifies with conditionality instruments, making clear that conditionality could be political and economic, and that it could stem from a state or an international organisation. The bias of such a definition is that it does not include the EU, as it is
neither a state, nor an international organisation. However, it does not exclude that a source for conditionality could be a group of states.

*Political conditionality* represents a set of requirements that developing countries have to fulfil as a response to international donor’s development assistance in order to strengthen the implementation of good governance principles. This does not necessarily mean financial aid only. To look at the EU example, political conditionality could involve as well access to further stages of integration or cooperation; importing legislative and institutional templates; advice and technical assistance a.o. (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1020).

There is a broad agreement of students of European integration that by the end of 1980s EU’s external policies shifted from apolitical content to conditionality and especially towards political conditionality (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 11). Before the falling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, international organisations used conditional levers sporadically and selectively only, relevant examples being Greece, Portugal and Spain. The end of the Cold War revealed a systemic need to support the newly emerged democracies in CEE. This resulted in a more consistent application of political conditionality and this paved the way for ten of the post-communist countries to join the EU. These developments made of membership conditionality the most powerful foreign policy instrument of the EU (Smith, 2003 p. 108) and provided the necessary instruments for Europeanisation of candidate, ‘quasi-candidate’ (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 11) and countries which do not have a clear membership perspective.

In social sciences literature on Europeanisation one could distinguish two big debates: what Europeanisation means and through what mechanisms it becomes effective. Within the earliest definitions of Europeanisation, the one proposed by Robert Ladrech (1994, p. 12) is the definition cited the most. According to him, Europeanisation means a ‘process of reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’. As Howell (2004, p. 1) confirms, ‘in its most explicit form Europeanization is conceptualised as the process of downloading EU regulations and institutional structures to the domestic level.’

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5 In 2004 - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and in 2007 – Bulgaria and Romania.
A common point of reference for both widely cited definitions are domestic consequences of European integration. It seems that this is the most common understanding of the term both in research and in public discourse.

Another well-known scholar of Europeanisation Claudio Radaelli (2003, p. 3) considers that it is more appropriate to point out what Europeanisation is not, and distinguishes it from other concepts, namely convergence, harmonisation, integration, and policy formation. Moreover, he goes further and adds value to the above mentioned conceptualisations proposing a broader definition which could pretend to a commonly agreed one. Thus, he ascertains that Europeanisation is:

‘a process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and than incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies’.

Others attempted to systematize Europeanisation’s different senses as well. Thus, Olsen (2003, pp. 333-346) identified five meanings: (I) the territorial expansion of Europe’s (or EU’s) borders, or, in other words, enlargement; (II) European -level institutionalisation; (III) the export of European institutions to the rest of the world; (IV) strengthening the political component of the European integration project, and (V) the impact of European-level institutions at the national level. Featherstone (2003, p. 5) also develops a typology of Europeanisation identifying four broad categories: (I) a historical process; (II) a matter of cultural diffusion; (III) a process of institutional adaptation; and (IV) as adaptation of policy and policy processes.

Europeanisation is a ‘multifaceted concept’ (Quaglia et al, 2006, p. 406) and it is argued that it ‘lost any precise meaning’ (Kassim, 2000, p. 235). However most of the proposed definitions feature several similarities. First, obviously, all of them assume a transformation. Second, Europeanisation is seen rather as a process than a status (Lenschow, 2006, p. 57). Third, the primary focus of Europeanisation is the EU, (Gwiazda, 2002, p. 9) with other synonyms used: ‘EU-isation’, (Radaelli, 2003, p. 27), ‘EU Europeanisation’, ‘Unionisation’, ‘Communiation’, (Goetz, 2001 in
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 7). This approach fits into the so-called ‘top-down’ (from the EU towards national states) approach in studying Europeanisation. However, when it comes to other directions of work of Europeanisation (national state – EU (bottom-up), state – state (horizontal) and national state – EU – national state (round-about)) (Lenschow, 2006, p. 57) it is important to clarify what a ‘state’ means in all these cases. Although most researchers tend to focus on member states, and recently on candidate countries, states beyond the EU candidacy have also experienced the impact of the EU. ‘Europeanisation can also be exported’ confirm Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003, p. 4). Here, again, Radaelli (2003, p. 27) features his tendency towards generalization and uses an alternative term ‘Europeification’, thus geographically extending the research area. Some authors (Goetz, 2000; Grabbe 2003; Dimitrova, 2002) examine the ‘Eastern style’ Europeanisation, where it is considered as a synonym of ‘Westernisation’ for CEE states (Agh, 1999). Despite the impressive number of definitions of Europeanisation, in general terms they complement each other, and more important, they do not exclude each other (Olsen, 2002).

Moving from the question of ‘what Europeanisation is?’ to ‘how Europeanisation works?’ could bring more clarity on the purpose of this research. Thus, the meaning of Europeanisation in this paper is the impact of the EU on domestic institutions, i.e. Europeanisation of polity.

**B. EXECUTIVE ADAPTATION**

Obviously, the EU membership is Europeanising many aspects of domestic political life. Grabbe (2001, p. 1014) identifies Europeanisation as ‘the impact of the EU accession process on national patterns of governance’. The study of EU’s impact on domestic institutions is a distinctive branch of Europeanisation research. Usually the focus in this field is public administration generally, locally, regionally or centrally; national government, civil service, parliaments, courts. In other words, all three branches of power: executive, legislative and judicial are closely scrutinized by researchers on Europeanisation.
The *executive governance* is a term that defines the executive branch from the classical Montesque’s theory of separation of powers. It concerns not only institutions that execute laws (i.e. cabinet ministers and subordinated institutions, and presidential institutions in certain presidential republics) passed by parliament, but it concerns their working style and the way they interact with society as well. The terms *legislative governance* and *judicial governance* are used as well in social science literature. The core executive is the main actor that manages European affairs at national level and ensures the link between domestic and European policy. Thus, executives are first institutions to face effects of Europeanisation.

As the present paper focuses on institutional adaptation as a consequence of the EU influence beyond its borders, a fair question would be: ‘why executive?’ This question has several answers. Executive reforms represent a part of wider institutional reforms that Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999 cited in Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 6) have linked with Europeanisation. First, speaking about member states, it is considered that ‘national governments occupy the most privileged position in the EU, as they negotiate treaty changes, set the EU’s medium term goals, and adopt or reject European legislation in the EU Council’ (Quaglia *et al*, 2006, p. 411). Called by Genschel (2001, p. 98) ‘translator devices’ because ‘they translate EU requirements into domestic laws and regulations in order to make domestic policy compatible with EU policy’, executives have a privileged role in comparison with legislatures and courts (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 6). Goetz (2003, p. 70) even advances the concept of the ‘Europe of executives’. Executives play a central role in accession process of candidate countries but adaptation of executive structures is rather a deliberate decision of members and candidates than an explicit requirement of the EU (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 15). One could say that within national institutions, executives are the most affected (by European integration) structures. The national coordination systems for management of European affairs that both members and candidates have created in order to cope with European integration institutional pressures affect almost everything: structures (institutional design of national administration), processes (the way executives operate) and personnel (civil servants). Thus, the way executives respond to changes has a significant impact on the nature of Europeanisation of national public policy.
What about European countries for which, for the time being, membership is ruled out, but have a strong connection with the EU? Referring to the focus of this paper, Moldova and Ukraine, why executive governance would be an appropriate field in order to research the effects of Europeanisation? The answer is twofold. First, as one can see further, the ENP puts on these countries institutional pressures similar with those for candidate states. Second, as one saw above, the EU does not have specific requirements about how national administrations should look and act. The general architecture of the national government and the way it works and interacts with other institutions is a matter of administrative culture and constitutional provisions at domestic level. The EU lacks an ‘administrative acquis’, which is replaced by the so-called obligation de résultat – principle of obligatory results and occasionally by jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (OECD/SIGMA, 1998a). In this respect, the reason why the Moldovan and Ukrainian executives are scrutinized in this paper is the fact that in many fields they face the same adaptation pressures as candidate countries without having an explicit signal from the EU about their membership perspective.

C. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Any international actor influences behaviours of both those who accept or deny the established normative order. The question of how and why norms influence states behaviour in international relations has become a central issue for debates among researchers (Park, 2006). Increasing attention is paid to a relatively new concept ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002). Researchers generally avoid formulating a definition of ‘normative power’. Some authors admit that it could be rather an analytical tool, appropriate for analysing EU policies, than a special type of power, different from ‘military power’, ‘economic power’ etc. (Sjursen, 2006b, p. 170). Manners (2002) suggests that ‘normative power’ is ‘the ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’. What normality means, though, could be differently understood and interpreted by international actors. As this definition leaves margins for interpretations, other authors indicated the need for a
further elaboration (Diez, 2005). A more comprehensive definition, which enumerates the main features of the EU ‘normative power’ is offered by Juncos (2004, p. 1): ‘a normative power would be characterised by the centrality of civilian instruments (economic, financial and diplomatic tools); the use of force as the last resort, being possible and necessary in specific circumstances; and the promotion through its external action of democratic values, multilateralism, and regional cooperation as the main feature of the EU’s external action.’ Enumerating could bring more light on this issue, although it can also raise claims about its exhaustibility.

Reviewing debates in the social science literature one could say that a ‘normative power’ is a ‘soft power’ par excellence (Hyde Price, 2001, p. 117) – as opposed to ‘hard power’ – although it is not clear whether it is so deliberately, or because it has no coercive capabilities (Sjursen, 2006b). This does not mean that a ‘normative power’ would not use force, but the latter could be applied only when the whole reserve of peaceful-civilian instruments (diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation, compromise) is exhausted. A ‘normative power’ would prefer long term anticipating measures of conflict preventing as opposed to short term armed coercion. It includes and complements the ‘civilian power’. Besides the civilizing tools it has an important ‘ideational dimension’ (Manners, 2002, p. 239) meaning diffusion of ideas, norms, principles, values. ‘Normative power’ could be broadly applied to any international actor because any of them may adopt normative approaches, but traditionally is attributed to the EU, given its originality as international actor. As Manners points out, ‘normative power Europe’ […] ‘exists as being different to pre-existing political forms and this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way’ (Manners, 2002, p. 241).

So, what is the ENP, and how different is norms diffusion through this policy from membership conditionality? From the very beginning the ENP was conceived as an ‘eastern initiative’ – a compromise between inclusion and exclusion of WNIS. Thus, in 2002, with the UK as one of its main promoters, the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative was launched, focusing on Eastern European neighbours of the EU: Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (Smith, 2005, p. 759). It did include neither former soviet republics from Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) nor

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6 Belarus and Ukraine became EU’s direct neighbours at the same time with the 2004 enlargement, and Moldova in 2007, after the last two countries – Bulgaria and Romania – joined the EU.
Mediterranean neighbours (Ibidem). Countries from Western Balkans and Turkey, whose candidate status is not clear for how long it is going to last, were not considered neighbours, and subsequently, are not the aim of the ENP. The Copenhagen European Council endorsed the initiative in December 2002, but approved also the proposal of Southern member states (mainly France and Italy) to extend the ENP to Mediterranean neighbours: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority. Commission’s communication: ‘Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, (Commission, 2004) endorsed later by the European Council, was released in March 2003. The ENP Strategy Paper released in May 2004 contains its main objectives: to develop a ‘ring of friends’ who would support the EU in spreading its values and norms and in maintaining stability and security along its external borders while not offering to these friends the membership ‘carrot’. It was emphasized that the ENP does not replace, but complement existing agreements (Euro-Mediterranean and Partnership and Cooperation agreements) and financial aid instruments (MEDA and TACIS). In June 2004, after the ‘Roses’ Revolution’ in Georgia, the EU satisfied endeavours of Southern Caucasian republics to join the ENP.

Returning to the region which is the focus of this research, from the very beginning Moldova and Ukraine tried to obtain a differentiated approach, showing their interest for a closer integration. First, one could say that geographically they are the only ‘willing’ partner countries within the ENP that could have a claim on the fact they are European states, and according to treaties, could aspire to the EU membership. Russia declined participation in the ENP and opted for a bilateral partnership on equal basis which presupposes developing of four common spaces with the EU (economic; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research and education). Belarus, although is formally a partner country, given its internal problems with human rights, is not connected yet to primary ENP instruments – Action Plans (APs). After negotiation, usually APs have an implementation period of five years. However, Moldova and Ukraine insisted on a three years implementation term, given their membership aspirations. The APs are often criticised because their occasional ambiguity in determining the part responsible for accomplishment of
actions, non-measurable outcomes and lack of clearly stipulated deadlines (Smith, 2005, p. 764).

How does the ENP and its main instrument – APs, relate to our research? According to the ENP concept, improving the effective functioning of public institutions, with a view to ensuring high standards of administrative efficiency, is a shared interest between the EU and partner countries (ENP Strategy Paper, 2004). Moreover, it has been argued that the ENP ‘was largely developed in path dependency with enlargement policy […] copying key instruments and procedures of the pre-accession strategy while ruling out membership’ (Lippert, 2006, p. 87), an approach confirmed by Kelley (2006, p. 31). This claim is quite well documented. First, APs are moulded on association agreements with candidate countries (Cremona, 2004). The reason is that the ENP is an extension and adaptation of Commission’s active foreign policy role during enlargement and it has largely been conceptualized within DG Enlargement, by the same officials who worked on enlargement. Only recently it was transferred to the DG External Relations (Kelley, 2006, p. 31-34).

Second, this is not only reflected in copying institutional and structural enlargement templates, but it is reflected at conceptual level as well: conditionality and socialisation strategies were used both for enlargement and the ENP (Kelley, 2004).

Third, the future prospects indicate strengthening of this approach. Thus, the European Commission examines the prospects by which ENP partner countries could benefit from association or even from full participation in EU agencies and community programs. This proposal was supported by the European Council in March 2007 (Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu, 2007, p.13). It is even anticipated an advanced institutional participation (as observers in the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee) for ENP countries that could presumably sign enhanced agreements (Ibidem).

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The social science literature related to research questions could be divided into several distinct groups. First, it is necessary to mention that papers touching
topics similar with those addressed in this research are extremely rare. Studies examining Europeanisation of executive governance in Moldova are absent. As regards to Ukraine, there is a recent research of Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) that addresses ‘Europeanisation further East’ and that examines the impact of the EU on Ukrainian domestic institutions. There is also an article that explores the capacity of the ENP to promote political reforms. Thus, Judith Kelley (2006) attempts to find whether the policy of sharing with neighbours ‘everything but institutions’ would motivate them to implement democratic and human rights reforms. An important conclusion that author draws and which is substantiated by significant arguments is that it is unlikely that the ENP would be an efficient agent for promoting reforms in the European neighbourhood, because of absence of membership perspective. The paper also examines political conditionality and path-dependency concepts, concerning Eastern European neighbours, which is relevant to this research topic. In the same category, Dimitris Papadimitriou (2003) examines Europeanisation of administrative structures through institutional twinning beyond the EU. There are many studies tackling different aspects of the ENP: Roland Dannreuther (2006), Rutger Wissels (2004), Karen E. Smith (2005), E. Johansson -Nogués (2005), Susanne Milcher, Ben Slay and Mark Collins (2006), Barbara Lippert (2006), John Lowenhardt, Ronald J. Hill and Margot Light (2001), but they relate to a limited extent to this research, which is more narrowed-down. Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu (2007) examine perspectives of an added value to the current ENP strategy, proposing an ‘ENP plus’ concept. Of a particular interest are their proposals for a deeper involvement of partner countries within the EU institutions, in particular with the EU agencies. Usually ENP researchers concentrate on Ukraine, because it is considered ‘the most vocal state in the neighbourhood proclaiming its desire to join the EU’ and ‘the EU’s leading partner in the Eastern neighbourhood’ (Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu, 2007, p. 24).

Second, it is necessary mentioning the group of sources focusing on Europeanisation. Regarding the nature of the research, there should be distinguished two types of papers in this category: conceptual literature and papers concentrated on Europeanisation of public administration in general and of core executives in particular. One of the most comprehensive reviews of existing trends in defining Europeanisation of CEE countries, and identifying gaps in this research area is
provided by the paper ‘Europeanisation in new member and candidate states’ by Ulrich Sedelmeier (2006). In the same series, ‘Living reviews in European governance’, Frank Schimmelfenning (2007) in his work: ‘EU governance beyond the European Union’, puts himself in position of a sceptical reader asking ‘is there Europeanisation beyond Europe?’ The paper seeks to systematize the literature on EU influence beyond member and candidate states. This review, however, focuses on three distinctive areas of Europeanisation beyond Europe: regionalism, democracy and human rights. One of Schimmelfenning’s findings is that literature on the EU impact beyond Europe often does not use the term ‘Europeanisation’. At best it is featured in books and articles titles while within text it is substituted by other ‘favourite concepts’ like ‘civilian’ or ‘normative power’. Europeanisation related to CEE member states constitutes also the concern of Heather Grabbe (2002). Among others, of a particular interest in this work are the findings about real boundaries of the EU order as well as analysis whether theoretical and empirical studies on Europeanisation in the EU-15 could be usefully applied to Eastern European candidate countries. There is no a wide research on EU impact on Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 1).

Markus Haverland (2005) examines theoretical approaches and methodologies used while researching Europeanisation, both within Member States and non-members, and this is relevant from the point of view of choosing the appropriate methodology. An important contribution in order to identify existent approaches in defining Europeanisation is made by Borzel and Risse (2003), Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Howell (2004), Lenshow (2006), Olsen (2003).

As regards to literature assessing the EU impact on national administrations, it should be mentioned SIGMA papers (OECD/SIGMA, 1998a,b), which provide substantiation of Europeanisation of public administration and development of its institutions, such as European Administrative Space and common European principles for public administration. Of course, as the present research is focused on one national institution only, there is a particular interest in analysing literature on adaptation of domestic executives. One of the most significant in this field is the comparative analysis on impact of the EU on executive government focused on six member states performed by Brigid Laffan (2003). The work is important because of two aspects. First, it provides an overview of the existent literature on core executive
adjustment. Second, it offers a framework for analysis, which is suitable for the present paper. Thus, the research is focused on adaptation structures, procedures and agents (civil servants) within core executives of six member states that are mostly exposed to adaptation pressures. Two other papers refer to membership negotiations as a shaping power for Europeanisation of CEE candidate states (Barbara Lippert, Gaby Umbach, Wolfgang Wessels, 2001 and Danica Fink-Hafner, 2005). Relevance of these works is related to possibly identifying patterns between former candidates and Moldova and Ukraine. Andrew Jordan (2003) looks on what has been deeper Europeanised: domestic policies or national governments. In his work Genschel (2001) examines national governments through optic of ‘key translator devices’ between national and European levels. A significant number of works on Ukrainian executive governance have been published by Oleh Protsyk (see, for example, ‘Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement’, 2003). Finally, the book of Vesselin Dimitrov, Klaus Goetz and Hellmut Wollman (2006) brings a fundamental analysis of the institutional legacies and new challenges in the field of central government reforms in Eastern European countries. This source offers a supplementary analytical support for identification of the way post-communist legacy shapes the process of Europeanisation of executive governance.

The literature on political conditionality is quite vast, therefore only those papers relevant for this research will be mentioned. Thus, studies of Heather Grabbe (2006), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) as well as of Sabine Zanger (2004) explain how EU influence worked in CEE. These papers would represent a suitable source for drawing the main determinants in promoting Europeanisation of executive governance in introductory theoretical chapter.

Also, one should mention primary sources: normative acts; documents adopted by the leadership of both countries and official statements concerning the above-mentioned issues from official websites of Moldova and Ukraine (www.gov.md, www.rapc.gov.md, www.kmu.gov.ua, www.guds.gov.ua); periodicals, newspapers and opinion polls; interviews with officials, policy-makers, analysts and researchers in Moldova and Ukraine on topics relevant for the research.
III. Europeanisation of Executive Governance in Moldova

A. Overview of the Moldovan Executive

After gaining independence Moldova established a dual executive entrenched in a semi-presidential system with a popularly elected president, who enjoys extensive constitutional powers. After consulting the Parliament, the President is entitled to designate the candidature for the office of Prime Minister. The head of state has real possibilities for increasing executive power efficiency, as he/she can suspend government acts coming in contradiction with legislation, reshuffle the cabinet, etc. Most of reform processes are based on presidential decrees, developed later by government decisions. In absence of the EU conditionality, from the very beginning European integration has been perceived by politicians and administrators as a component of foreign policy. Thus the President often appears as the main policy initiator on European integration, (Gheorghiu, 2005a, pp. 1-2) given his powers in foreign policy field. In 2000 Moldova shifted towards a parliamentary republic. Even then, being elected by legislature, however, the President remains the main policy initiator. First, constitutional amendments affected rather elections procedures than presidential powers. Second, for the second term the Moldovan President is combining the office of head of state and ruling party leader, which allows him to exert influence on the Parliament.

The Government is entrusted to carry out the general management of public administration, which, together with the head of the state, represents the executive power of the country, performing both political and administrative functions. The Government participates in development of political decisions necessary for implementation or through preparing draft laws on the one hand, and approves its own administrative decisions aimed at creating the organizational framework for implementation of political decisions on the other hand.
B. EU-Moldova Action Plan

Although negotiations’ closure on the new AP coincided with the 2004 enlargement, the EU-Moldova Action Plan (EU-MAP) was signed on 22 February 2005 only that is almost one year later. Due to Brussels’ regional approach Moldova had to wait for negotiations with other countries to be concluded (Gheorghiu, 2005b, p. 3).

The preamble mentions that ‘Enlargement offers the opportunity to the EU and Moldova to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation, to involve a significant measure of economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation.’ Although economic integration is emphasised while the political field is restricted to ‘co-operation’, seven out of ten proclaimed priorities aim the political dimension of the EU-Moldova cooperation process. The plan also mentions EU’s acknowledgements of Moldova’s European aspirations and makes reference to the Concept of Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU.

The plan puts adaptation pressure on executive from several perspectives. First, 80 objectives and 294 actions (most of which aim internal reforms) distributed in seven policy areas fall under incidence of government’s activity. Only some of them, for example legislative harmonisation, involve a coordinated executive-legislature effort.

Second, the EU-MAP’s structure corresponds to the Copenhagen criteria (Gheorghiu, 2005b, p. 3) which occasionally determines the Moldovan Government to operate as an executive of a candidate state.

Third, the plan involves Government’s modernisation. Thus, it stipulates the following priorities: ‘further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law’ and further reinforcing administrative capacity. Also, under ‘Political dialogue and reforms chapter’ it encourages continuation of administrative reform (EU-MAP, 2005).

The EU-MAP is a short-term policy document; it has an implementation term of three years, which is less than in case of agreements with candidate countries. This

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7 Political dialogue and reform; co-operation for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; economic and social reform and development; trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform; co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs; transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, and research, development and innovation; and people-to-people contacts.
is not a legal act, a drawback that the Moldovan Government tried to oust by adopting it by a decision in order to consolidate the AP as a national strategic policy paper (Government Resolution, 2005a). Its likeliness with association agreements based on Copenhagen criteria would be an opportunity for the Moldovan Government, but it is weakened by absence of clear benchmarks in appreciating the progress (Gheorghiu, 2005b). Despite all these facts, however, the EU-MAP offers a favourable framework for strengthening government structures thus making them able to implement European integration policies and to transpose and implement the acquis communautere, which could lead to fulfilment of membership criteria.

C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

1. Structures

An efficient management of European affairs is a difficult task especially for small countries like Moldova because they have to mobilize comparably more administrative resources than bigger states have to. Since 2002, there have been significant changes in the organizational structure of executive, in order to establish the Moldova’s European integration coordination system. The first attempt to coordinate efforts of executive structures came quite late. On 13 November 2002, the Moldovan President decreed the formation of the National Commission for European Integration (NCEI) (President of the R. Moldova, 2002). Following the Presidential Decree, NCEI was established to pursue two major goals:

1. Draft the Strategy of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova and submit it for Parliament’s approval;

2. Draft and approve the plan of actions designed to facilitate the Strategy of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova and coordination of its further implementation.

Under Article 3 of the presidential decree, ‘the European integration policy shall be carried out by one of the public administration institutions to be established in accordance with the law.’ NCEI consists of 30 members who represent mostly the
Government, but includes also a limited number of MPs and representatives of local
government, and non-governmental sector.

The European Integration Department (EID), a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) subdivision has been created later under the Government resolution on 4 August 2003 (Government Resolution, 2003a) ‘in order to consolidate the powers of national institutions in their activities and initiative in regard to integration of our country into the European community, as well as to promote the strategy of Moldova’s accession to the European Union’. The Department was established on the basis of the European Integration Agency within the MFA and the National South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact Bureau within the same ministry, and was empowered to perform some of relevant functions of the Ministry of Economy (Government Resolution, 2003b). Simultaneously with the establishment of EID, the Government called on ministries and departments to establish European integration subdivisions subordinated to them. While differences between number of employees and specific sectoral European integration tasks of these structures is understandable, variations between their authority levels puts some of them in a lower position, which is not suitable for interministerial cooperation.

Later on, after signing the EU-MAP, Moldova established a national coordination system traditional for candidate states. It fits into the Foreign minister led system model (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, p. 993). Thus, in 2005 the MFA has been added the words ‘and European Integration’, and the minister has been appointed as vice prime minister. The choice for such a system has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) is perceived as neutral in interministerial conflicts that often emerge. On the other hand, it strengthens the perception that European integration is rather a priority of foreign affairs than of home affairs. Illustrative is also the example of European integration departments created within ministries by replacing former ministerial departments for international relations.

As European integration issues request a cooperated effort of many ministries, Moldova had also established an interministerial coordination mechanism. It resides in four interministerial commissions, each having a ministry responsible for coordination of other ministries for implementation of the EU-MAP in four fields: law and security (coordinator Ministry of Justice); socio-economic problems
(coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce); infrastructure (Ministry of Transport and Roads); cultural-humanitarian problems (Ministry of Education and Youth). MFAEI appears as the main national coordinator (Government Resolution, 2005b). The drawback of this structure is that it amplifies the competition between ministries for the same attributions. A similar problem appears within the coordination of foreign technical assistance. For the time being the responsibility for coordinating technical assistance is divided between the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the Ministry of Finances (coordinating assistance for development) and MFAEI (coordinating assistance for European integration). Attributions in this field also have a prime vice prime minister and a coordinator from the presidential office. This framework often conducts to overlaps of competencies.

Finally, an important role in management of European affairs is played by the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, which would need a strengthening of institutional capacities. Of course, it does not receive the same pressure as diplomatic missions of candidate or member states, but a number of only four diplomats could be insufficient in circumstances when Moldova cannot benefit from a strong lobby in Brussels. Moreover, the diplomatic mission has been opened quite late, in 2004. Before this the EU-related tasks have been performed by Moldovan embassy to Belgium. Embassies in Baltic States, whose experience in European affairs is quite relevant for Moldova, given the common past, were opened also late, in 2005 only.

2. Processes

Preparations for the EU-MAP proper implementation started long time before the AP had been officially signed (Gheorghiu, 2005b, p. 5). The EU-MAP provisions were further developed into a National Program for Action Plan Implementation (NPAPI) which specifies the way, time frame and responsible institutions for implementation of specific actions. The NPAPI, however repeats the mistakes of the EU-MAP by avoiding naming responsible persons or institutions for the fulfilment of specific tasks, or by vaguely formulating the time frame, for example ‘2006-2007’. This approach is not productive, given the fact that the EU-MAP is a short term document. The vagueness of the AP and lack of the EU conditionality lead to a
fragmented tempo of work on European issues. Another important document that serves as guideline for the Moldovan Government is the European Integration Strategy of the Republic of Moldova. The strategy is structured similarly to association strategies of former candidate countries: each policy field is analyzed following the same pattern: legislative framework; institutional framework; current problems; short and medium term priorities.

The Moldovan Government conceptualises Moldova’s way to the EU membership through the ‘South-East European way’ (Gabanyi, 2006, p. 53). This approach is the main red line of the Conception of European Integration of Moldova into the EU. The main rationale for such an approach is the hope to be considered for the EU membership within the Western Balkans wave. It is accompanied not only by attempts to prove that historically and geopolitically Moldova belongs to the South Eastern Europe, but by policy prioritisation and changes in organisational structure as well. At policy level, Moldova intensified bilateral and multilateral contacts with South-East European countries and is involved in any regional initiatives that comprise them. Thus it became a founding member of the South East European Cooperation Initiative (1996); it participated as observer in the South East European Cooperation Process (1999 and full member from 2006); member of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2001) Central European Free Trade Agreement (2006) (Gheorghiu, 2005a). Also, as mentioned above, the European Integration Department of the MFAEI is structurally based on the former National South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact Bureau. The EU has indirectly accepted this approach by referring to the Conception in the preamble of the EU-MAP.

As opposite to Ukraine, the Moldovan Ministry of Justice did not face the need to translate the acquis communautaire, because Romania, being candidate, already did it. The language affinity between these two countries might quite useful for twinning instruments.

The ‘way of doing things’ of Moldovan executive is characterised by an excessive centralisation. The Government often performs improper tasks that constitute responsibility of subordinated ministries or even local government (Popa, 2006). Problems that could be solved at a lower level are brought to central executive’s agenda. This fact overloads the government and embarrassed

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8 Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the UN administration of Kosovo.
concentrating on strategic tasks. This has projected on coordination of European affairs system and is characteristic for other post-communist former candidates (Laffan, 2003, p. 15) which does not feature precise rules and guidelines for the management of European affairs.

3. Agents

The study of the Moldovan ‘EU cadre’ (Laffan, 2003, p. 16) is difficult because of a lack of any official statistics on civil servants. Needless to say there are no statistics on their studies, language and professional abilities. One could mention only public authorities where these ‘boundary managers’ (Ibidem) between national and European level activate: MFAEI, especially the EID, European integration units within ministries. Also some of them work with authorities dealing with border management and immigration issues, as these fields constitute a special concern of the EU, which has financed training sessions for civil servants from these structures. The lack of statistics are due partially to the fact that there is no national agency on civil servants that would deal with civil service issues. Such a structure is traditional for the EU member states. From European integration perspective these statistics are vital in order to identify training necessities, both on general EU issues and sectoral in fields exposed to adaptation pressures.

Working in a foreign language seems to be a problem for civil servants. Thus, negotiations on the EU-MAP were difficult because each time when the European Commission submitted proposals in English, they had to be translated in Romanian, sent to ministries, after discussing them ministries were sending back their proposals, which after being compiled had to be translated again in to English (Gheorgiu, 2005b, p. 10).

Absence of an integrated strategy of European training of civil service is a serious drawback which is partially compensated by attempts to introduce European studies faculties and courses on European law within universities.

Usually, in former candidates, the EU cadre gains great experience from negotiating agreements with the EU, management of accession and of EU funding programmes (Laffan, 2003, p. 17). Moldova has been exposed to a limited extent to this type of pressures (management of the EU funds and negotiation of the EU-MAP).
The best place for developing the EU cadre is diplomatic missions but unfortunately in some member states Moldova still has no embassies or consulates. Lack of motivation and poor remuneration amplifies the EU personnel deficit, and civil servants often resign in favour of projects funded by international donors. The impact of this phenomenon on Moldova is more destructive because a small country means less specialized persons in particular fields within administrative structures and when a person leaves from a department in a ministry, the whole expertise leaves with him.

**IV. EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE**

**A. OVERVIEW OF THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE**

After becoming independent in 1991 Ukraine, as other former Soviet republics also opted for semi-presidentialism. Very soon the popularly elected President, combining large constitutional powers with informal political leverages became dominant over other power branches and neutralised attempts to create a ‘checks and balances’ system (Woczuk, 2004, p. 3). Government’s authority has long been reduced as President had important powers of issuing decrees which by content are similar with laws issued by legislature (Protsyk, 2003b, p. 3). This situation resulted in a lack of transparency and accountability of executive. Anticipating that 2004 presidential elections will result in coming in power of a new pro-European leadership, the former President Leonid Kuchma initiated constitutional reforms in order to weaken powers of the office of presidency. Strengthening Government and in particular Prime Minister’s office on expense of presidency was the main compromise between conflicting parties for a peaceful conclusion of the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’. By the time being Ukraine faces a power crisis characterized by confrontation between the President Viktor Yuschenko and the Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich which left marks on executive’s efforts on European integration. Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course, as discussed below, with emphasize on the ‘Atlantic’ component, is one of issues of this conflict, reflected in a dispute on foreign policy.
powers. It is less probable that, at list in a short-term perspective, the anticipated parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2007 will help overcome the power crisis.

B. EU-Ukraine Action Plan

An AP between the EU and Ukraine is not a new idea. The first attempt to develop such a plan occurred back in 1994. Results of implementation of this document are hardly known merely because of absence of any positive outcomes (CPCFPU, 2004, p. 1). While negotiating a new AP within the ENP, Ukraine’s position were: (I) a limited time frame (maximum three years); (II) the main objective of this document should be paving the way to an association agreement; (III) establishing of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between Ukraine and the EU (CPCFPU, 2004, p. 9). This was different from EU’s view. It had serious claims regarding the time frame and membership preconditions. Finally, parts found a compromise on FTA and agreed on a three years term. However, EU’s position of not offering membership remained unchanged (Ibidem). During negotiations, EU officials mentioned that reforms that should be implemented according to the AP would need to be fulfilled anyway if Ukraine was a candidate state (Wolczuk, 2004).

It was clear that Ukrainian elite did not like the idea of the ENP and they did not like a vague document that does not offer a membership perspective. In absence of an alternative, however, the new document was finally signed on 21 February 2005. After the Orange Revolution, there were attempts to renegotiate the document. Thus, as Solonenko (2006, p. 47) points out, ‘with the change of the domestic situation following the Orange Revolution, the ENP Action Plan was called into question by the new Ukrainian leadership which saw itself as a new democratic elite and claimed that the document negotiated with the old leadership did not suit the “new” Ukraine anymore.’

In many fields the EU-UAP’s provisions are similar to the EU-MAP. The preamble also emphasizes ‘gradual economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation’. Chapters’ structure is also similar as well as likeliness with association
agreements. Provisions that concern modernisation of Ukrainian executive are mostly word by word the same as those from the EU-MAP.

C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

1. Structures

All measures focused on establishment of an institutional framework for European integration are based on presidential decrees. The first attempts are back in 1993 when the President Kravchuk, in order to organise negotiations for conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, decreed creation of an intergovernmental committee on cooperation with the EU. The next President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, initiated further changes while, simultaneously, he was the main brake on institutional development on European integration. As Wolczuk (2007, p. 11) ascertains, under Kuchma Ukraine’s European aspirations could be labelled ‘integration by declaration’. Thus he issued in June 1998 the decree ‘On Ukraine’s Strategy of Integration into European Union’, which outlined an action plan in this respect (President of Ukraine, 1998). Another executive order issued in June 1999 ‘On the Central Government Bodies Responsible for the Implementation of Ukraine’s Strategy of Integration into European Union’ aimed the proper establishment of the institutional framework. The MFA tried to endorse declarations on Ukraine’s European aspirations with foreign policy measures. These proved to be a difficult task and did not have a significant impact on institutional framework. First, the main source of these efforts were pro-European oriented officials of the MFA. Second, measures at international level were not backed by a domestic ‘reform balance sheet’. Third, MFA’s position was relatively weak because of the dominant Presidential Administration (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14).

Further, a work division has been set up. Thus the Ministry of Economy became Ministry of Economy and European Integration (MEEI), to be responsible for economic issues of integration. Within the MFA a Department of European Integration having a coordinating role has been created. As in Moldova, coordination of technical assistance is disputed between several public authorities, especially
between the MEEI and MFA. The Ministry of Justice has been assigned the task of harmonisation of the Ukrainian legal system with that of the EU. Within Ministry of Justice in 2004 the State Department for Legal Approximation has been created, whose main outcome by the end of 2006 was 30% of *acquis communautaire* translated into Ukrainian (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 17). Also, European integration units within most of ministries have been created, although there are significant differences between them. Competition between all these structures further hastened poor coordination of European integration issues (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14).

A specific feature of the Ukrainian institutional framework is a ‘Euro-Atlantic’ approach which resulted defence and security structures aiming NATO membership with civilian institutions seeking joining of the EU. In January 2003 the President disposed creation of the State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. This step brought more vagueness in the institutional system of European integration because the Council included a limited number of ministers. Coordination of European integration issues needs a wide effort involving all ministries. In candidate countries, all ministries are expected to be involved in structural adaptation. Probably for these reasons in November 2005 this structure was liquidated (President of Ukraine, 2005b). Previously, in March 2005, it was replaced by a structure dealing with interministerial coordination comprising vice ministers for almost all ministries (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2005).

Overall, the ‘wind of change’ of the Orange Revolution attempted to improve the institutional framework. A new office of vice prime minister for European integration was established. The fact that this was a minister without portfolio (and subsequently lacking stuff, resources and authority) weakened the coordination system (Solonenko, 2006). However, by trial-and-error method and by intensifying contacts with EU institutions, members and candidate countries, the institutional framework for European integration became more ‘EU sensitive’. As Protsyk (2003a, p. 9) ascertains, ‘overall, the cabinets in Ukraine have become increasingly assertive on the issue of European integration. A high level of cabinet instability and lack of internal coordination, however, constitute serious political problems that prevent the cabinet in Ukraine from maintaining a systematic approach on European matters.’

By the time being, it is quite difficult to categorize the Ukrainian coordination system on European affairs within the classical typology: ‘prime-minister led’,
‘foreign minister led’ and ‘in-between type’ (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, pp. 992-993). This is due mainly to often cabinet reshuffles which entails changes in European affairs system as well. Also, despite the fact that day -by-day coordination of European integration issues is naturally an executive task, occasionally, for example before conclusion of an important agreement with the EU, or when an important reform requested by the EU is postponed, presidency assumes a leading role. One could say that most likely Ukraine has a mixed coordination system which could latter develop in a Prime Minister led. Prime Minister Yanukovych is attempting to assume control on country’s negotiations with the EU. The foreign minister is also loosing initiative because of tensions between the President and the Prime Minister, because according to legal provisions, foreign and defence ministers are appointed by the President only, while other ministers are proposed by prime minister and confirmed by Parliament.

2. Processes

The major policy initiatives on European integration come from presidency. Usually a presidential decree is followed by Government decisions that make reference to presidential acts as to policy documents. Protsyk (2003a, p. 3) counted more than 80 presidential decrees and orders on European integration and EU - Ukraine cooperation matters. As he exemplifies, the 1998 presidential decree ‘On Strategy of Ukraine of Integration into the European Union’ is cited in more than 20 normative acts like cabinet resolutions, ministries’ acts etc. Presidency’s impetus led to cabinet’s subordinated role, although the latter has normatively stipulated levers (Ibidem).

The policy-making process in this field could be characterised as centralisation, which is being gradually replaced by formalisation. After the ‘Orange Revolution’ the perception in Ukraine that European integration is exclusively a foreign policy domain has been replaced with a comprehensive reform agenda (Solonenko, 2006). Aiming to deal with issues such as lack of coordination and inter-institutional competition, many public authorities approved a set of rules and guidelines on management of European affairs. For example, on 16 May 2006 the Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine (MDCSU) issued the decree ‘On Work
Organization concerning Implementation of EU-Ukraine Action Plan’ (MDCSU, 2005b) containing details on: performer of action, project or draft of normative act; responsible persons; institutions or persons that should be consulted regarding the project and both interdepartmental and final deadlines for project conclusion. The second aspect of formalization is scrutinizing by the Ministry of Justice on compliance of any draft law or departmental normative act with the EU legal norms. One of the most explicit examples of ‘domestication’ of European integration policies (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 17) is the annual ‘Road Map on the Implementation of the AP’ containing reform measures with precise deadlines and responsibilities.

Overall, the work of state structures on European integration issues is characterized by the so-called ‘Euro-Atlantic’ approach. The reason for such an approach is the belief that joining NATO represents a precondition, a kind of gate towards the EU membership. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements are suitable examples confirming this hypothesis. All 12 new member states joined NATO before becoming EU members. Also, 25 out of 27 member states are currently NATO members. The weakness of such an approach has domestic roots. Recent opinion polls show that majority of questioned Ukrainians are in favour of EU membership, while they are reticent to NATO association (Shumylo, 2006, p. 7). NATO membership is a highly debated issue in the Ukrainian society and a major issue in conflict between President and Prime Minister. However, it is not a fact that separating these two issues would bring more efficiency into the national coordination system. Moreover, it proved to be successful when applied by Baltic States which first joined NATO and later the EU.

3. Agents

Annually, every fifth Ukrainian civil servant (about 20%) resigns (MDCSU, 2005a, p. 6). One could consider two basic reasons explaining this phenomenon. First, there is a low level of remuneration which naturally orients specialists towards private sector or international projects. Second, there is no merit-based promotion system, based on open competition. Most of senior officials within civil service are appointed, this type of designation being a traditional post-communist legacy.

9 Austria and Ireland are not NATO members.
Given the fact that Ukraine belongs to the category of big states, effects of cadre turnover are less damageable than they are for small countries. Big states have more specialists working in the same field. A genuine ‘EU-cadre’ school are diplomatic missions abroad. Ukraine opened diplomatic missions in member states shortly after independence. The Mission of Ukraine to the EU has been opened in 1996. However a number of 12 diplomats only assigned to this mission is not enough to effectively deal with Brussels’ machinery.

Given that ‘the state apparatus remains starved of skilled bureaucrats, knowledgeable in various aspects of European integration’ (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14), the ‘Orange Revolution’ brought a different approach to civil service. The MDCSU is maintaining a comprehensive database of civil servants, that allow s drawing of a precisely targeted civil service reform. In 2005 the MDCSU prepared 42 draft laws and subordinated normative acts aiming civil service reform and modernization. The department focused its activity on several directions: general adaptation of civil service to European standards; civil servants work organization on EU-UAP implementation; training in European and Euro-Atlantic affairs, including language training (MDCSU website). Obviously, the Ukrainian ‘post-revolutionary’ power crisis affected civil service as well, that become less focused on domestic reforms agenda.

However, as Wolczuk (2007, p. 15) points out ‘the most important impact of the AP in Ukraine has been the emergence of enclaves within bureaucracy, which possess the necessary technocratic expertise, resources, professionalism and connections with EU-level institutions, similar to what has been observed in the candidate states’. Overall, one could say that things are definitely moving forward. Since the ‘Orange Revolution,’ the legal framework on civil service has been widely changed, modernized, and thus adapted to European requirements on civil service. Of course, the importance of adopting good laws should not be overestimated. Preparing good normative acts that are drawn on Western standards and subsequently satisfy external partners is hardly a half of work. Good laws without a proper implementation are not a novelty for the post-soviet space.
V. CHALLENGES IN EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE
GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Finding themselves independent, both Moldova and Ukraine opted for semi-presidential systems, characterised by the dominant role of a president elected by popular vote. This choice concentrated policy initiative powers, inclusively on European integration, in presidency’s hands. It seems that such a system, especially in republics that recently escaped from a totalitarian regime, offers fewer possibilities for a reciprocal checks and balances institutional framework. Being the main initiators of European integration policies, presidents are simultaneously their main brakes. This situation replicates to lower levels of administration, where senior and junior civil servants, in spirit of the best communist traditions, are guided by the principle ‘forbidden if not ordered’. After a decade of experiments, however, hoping to benefit from a more accountable political environment, Moldova and Ukraine shifted towards a parliamentary regime, characteristic for most of the EU members.

Assessment of the EU impact on the two countries’ executives reveals the following findings. In terms of institutional framework, both countries established systems for coordination of European affairs similar to those of candidate countries: a national coordination structure, interministerial working groups, European integration units within ministries. As opposite to candidate countries, Moldova and Ukraine strengthened this framework without being exposed to membership conditionality. Moldova chose a classical foreign minister-led system with a European Integration Department within the MFAEI. This model has both positive and negative aspects. Given the nature of its work, the MFAEI being focused primarily on foreign policy is perceived as neutral in interministerial conflicts which often occur in candidate countries. The fact that he is simultaneously vice prime minister gives him more authority for playing the coordinating role. Another basic model is a Prime Minister-led system, which is characteristic to candidate countries close to membership, when the chief of cabinet aims to assume control over European integration issues in order to gain political authority (Verheijen, 2000, p. 37). In this case one could obtain more authority in solving interministerial conflicts and promptness in coordination and decision-taking. There is also an in-between type with a quasi-independent coordination structure. Usually, this is a separated Ministry of European Integration.
or a (vice prime) minister of European integration without portfolio. In this case one opts for neutrality, independence and freedom of initiative. Ukraine, most probably, fits into this last type, although changes are frequent, due to instability caused by power crisis. In some candidate countries, for example Poland, the coordination system also often changed (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, p. 994). Some candidates even experienced all three models. Also in both countries a standardization of European integration units within ministries would be required. Their authority status should be equalized in order to improve interministerial cooperation.

While the institutional framework on coordination of European affairs is similar to candidate countries, in terms of processes involved, however, there is a lack of efficiency. Speaking about coordination styles, Moldova tends toward a centralisation style, while Ukraine involved a mixture between formalisation and centralisation (Laffan, 2003, p. 14). In absence of membership conditionality, both countries tried to elaborate the European affairs processes on a main rationale – a ‘remote beacon’ that would give a membership hope to administrators that perform the day-to-day work. For Moldova this is the ‘South-Eastern European way’ and for Ukraine is the ‘European and Euro-Atlantic integration’. While the first approach has more credibility, as it does not involve significant budgetary expenditures and major Moldovan political parties neither accept nor deny it, the Ukrainian one is a highly debated issue in conflict between the President and the Prime Minister as it involves a military component. NATO membership does not enjoy a large population support, especially of Eastern regions that traditionally had pro-Russian attitudes. However, it is not a fact that escaping from this approach would make the coordination system more efficient, as though the major issues in this conflict by no means concern foreign policy issues (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 12).

The unreasonable centralisation stemming from presidential leadership inhibits policy initiatives at lower levels of administration. Attempts to obtain a more accountable system failed in both countries. In Moldova because the ‘double-hated’ situation of the head of state – chairman of the ruling party and President, which gives him more authority, even if the constitutional order has been changed into a parliamentary republic. In Ukraine constitutional changes degenerated in a power crisis. In both countries there are no mechanisms of accountability for cases when required actions regarding European integration were not performed.
In terms of agents of change – civil servants – that systematically work on European affairs, in Ukraine the turnover proves to be high. Moldova lacks such kind of statistics, but one could assume that situation is similar because of the low level of work remuneration. However, working on European integration involves prestige and opportunities for career development. European integration issues are coordinated within ministries of foreign affairs, where personnel could be motivated by the possibility of being sent in a diplomatic mission. Establishment of certain institutions and units within institutions working on European integration led to creation within some of them of ‘islands of excellence’ – teams of civil servants that obtained a specific expertise learning from candidate and member states experience and were successful in performing certain tasks. A next move for Moldova and Ukraine would be to keep the institutional memory accumulated in this way and to extend these success stories to other institutions.

As Genschel (2001, p. 98) points out ‘similar external pressures lead to similar institutional responses’. The answer to the question where these responses could lead to is the concept of path-dependency: ‘the influence of historical choices on present institutional options’ (Kelley, 2006, p. 30). Whether a country that has vague perspectives for the EU membership but behaviours like a candidate state and implements all necessary reforms, it will experience an increasing convergence with member states and there would be no reasons for this state to remain outside the club.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This paper analysed the process of Europeanization focusing on two European countries that are beyond EU candidacy, but which, according to the Treaty of the European Union, could request to advance their status. While the research scope is narrow, and it analyzes one institution in-depth, the paper contributes to Europeanisation research in several ways. First, it contributes to the ‘top-down’ Europeanisation research, which tries to capture the impact of the EU on domestic policies and institutions. Second, studying Europeanisation process in Moldova and Ukraine contributes to the study of this discipline ‘further East’, in non-member states from Eastern Europe thus covering gaps in Europeanisation research from a
geographical perspective. Finally, analysis of Europeanisation of executive governance in this region is required in academic scholarship in order to assess how the EU hits domestic institutions using enlargement patterns without membership conditionality.

To conclude, first, one foresees detachment of a new branch of Europeanisation research that concerns Eastern European countries whose clarification of membership perspective has been delayed for an undetermined time. These countries\textsuperscript{10} would like to join the EU, but are not encouraged (as opposed to EEA countries, that would be encouraged but do not want). For Ukraine, the ‘uncoordinated implementation of EU conditionality’ has been conceptualised by Wolczuk (2007, p. 23) as ‘sporadic Europeanisation’ – that is enactment of the EU-defined reform agenda which is localised, unsystematic and often shallow’. Given similarities in Europeanisation of domestic governance identified within this paper, this approach is well-suited to Moldova as well.

Second, changes in the governance structure of Moldova and Ukraine show typical patterns of candidate countries. National coordination systems of European affairs have been put in place (with a leading structure within the MFA, interministerial coordination committees, institutional framework for legislative approximation and coordinating technical assistance, European integration units within ministries) and teams of ‘EU cadres’ are being created of civil servants within institutions mostly exposed to adaptation pressures. Nevertheless, in terms of pressures, there are certain elements emerging from the communist past, which are against the EU norms and principles, such as over-centralisation, lack of transparency, reactive approaches to ‘ways of doing things’.

However, this type of problems occur occasionally in EU member states as well. Also, reluctance and selective approaches in reforming executive governance in Moldova and Ukraine stems not only from the totalitarian past but from the lack of clarity what are partners’ goals. The bilateral action plans are based on Copenhagen criteria but they do not have clear benchmarks in order to identify when a reform measure has been fully implemented, thus offering room for interpretations. Even

\textsuperscript{10} Especially Moldova and Ukraine but for future Belarus could be considered as well as countries from Southern Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – whose location in Europe still remains questionable, and whose ‘European future’ depends, besides significant oil resources in this region, on membership perspective of Turkey.
leaving aside the wish of two countries to join the EU as full members, the ENP approach of offering to Moldova and Ukraine ‘everything but institutions’ is not properly translated into practice. Except EU-level institutions, it is supposed that the EU and neighbours have to share the four freedoms: free movement of persons, services, goods and capitals. Even in this field, however, the EU is evasive, without saying explicitly what has to be done, how to measure progress, what are the time frames by when ENP partners could be fully involved in these mechanisms.

Thus, the *raison d’être* of europeanising national governments in Moldova and Ukraine are clear from EU’s perspective only: stability and security in the Eastern neighbourhood. This is confirmed by the European Commission (2004) which aims ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union.’ One could seem that for both examined countries the *raison d’être* of Europeanisation of domestic institutions could well be the creation of a framework for modernisation. However, modernisation is not always synonym with Europeanisation, the latter often implying structural adjustments in order to reach convergence with EU structures. Thus Moldovan and Ukrainian governments have to double their efforts in order to perform their day-to-day duties, and they have to focus on alleviation of poverty, economic growth, modernisation while facing communist legacy and external pressures, coming both from East and West. The main question that remains is can one have good neighbours using the same strategy as for obtaining good members? Is it feasible using ‘sticks’ without even showing ‘carrots’? While for the EU the *raison d’être* for Europeanisation of Moldova and Ukraine coincides with its *finalité*, the latter is not clear for these two countries. What happens if, say, during a ten-year period their institutions become convergent with those of the EU member states and why not to hasten this process by making it more uniform and efficient?  Hopefully partial answers to this question will be found in the new framework for cooperation to be established after the conclusion of Action Plans implementation.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EID</td>
<td>European Integration Department</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU-MAP</td>
<td>EU-Moldova Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-UAP</td>
<td>EU-Ukraine Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDCSU</td>
<td>Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEEI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and European Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MFAEI</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCEI</td>
<td>National Commission for European Integration</td>
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<td>NPAPI</td>
<td>National Program for Action Plan Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WNIS</td>
<td>Western New Independent States</td>
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