Since November 2007 the new Polish government has achieved a re-orientation of the Polish EU policy by pursuing an active, unprejudiced, constructive and coalition-based approach within the EU.

The results of this approach have been both positively and negatively affected by external factors, such as the economic crisis, the conflict in Georgia, and the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis.

The successes of Tusk’s government include the adoption of the Eastern Partnership initiative, the outcome of negotiations on the new emissions trading scheme, changing EU perceptions with regard to energy security, and a pro-European and pro-integration approach towards the EU policies in response to the economic crisis.

Questions remain as to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the Euro, the problems with EU unity in its relations with Russia, and the domestic follow-up on the diplomatic achievements on the European arena.
1. Re-orientation of the Polish European policy

The PO-PSL government has now been responsible for Polish foreign policy for almost eighteen months. It came to power partly thanks to heavy criticism concerning the inadequacy of the European policy of its predecessor. From November 2007, Polish foreign policy was to become more effective through an open, constructive, unprejudiced and coalition-based approach. The goals of Donald Tusk’s government were outlined in his *exposé* from November 2008, as well as the Foreign Affairs Minister’s speeches in the Sejm in May 2008 and February 2009. One year and five months is a relatively short period in European foreign-policy making due to time-consuming negotiations and bargaining processes. However, a re-orientation of Polish European policy in the spirit of team playing and coalition building is evident. It is also possible to make a preliminary assessment of Poland’s role and influence in such areas as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), security and defence policy, climate change and energy, enlargement, or relations with Russia. Moreover, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and preparations for the Polish Presidency will be discussed, as they exert a significant impact on both European and Polish foreign policy-making. Last but not least, while evaluating Polish weight in Europe, major external factors, such as the economic crisis or Russia’s conflicts with its neighbours, need to be taken into consideration.

The strategic goal of Polish foreign policy is to become a key player and a leading EU member¹. Poland wishes to achieve this aim while strengthening the community solidarity in the EU arena and conducting wide social dialogue domestically. Poland’s success in the EU depends on common action and consensus among the main political forces and decision-makers as to the goals and instruments of European policy. The government puts an emphasis on realizing Polish interests, but wishes to do it in the framework of a larger Polish vision of the EU development².

According to Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski, Poland has strongly engaged itself in deepening the European integration and has become a stable and reliable partner. The success of Polish foreign policy is now to be measured by its effectiveness rather than by its ‘assertiveness’³. In this vein, Poland managed to react adequately to the Russian intervention in Georgia by pressing for an urgent EU reaction. The extraordinary European Council meeting in August 2008 was convened at the initiative of Prime Minister Tusk³. Yet the much needed


comprehensive vision of European integration and Poland’s role in the process is still to be defined, hopefully in connection with the elaboration of the Polish presidency’s priorities.

2. The impact of external factors

The economic crisis
The economic crisis has triggered protectionist tendencies around the globe, and most importantly within the EU. The reinforcement of such inclinations puts European values and mechanisms of solidarity at risk. The Polish position is fully in line with the ideas of the Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, which he expressed when he addressed the European Parliament: ‘the current crisis is to a great extent a crisis of trust, (...) if protectionism and mercantilism win, we will all lose (...) our strength and our only chance for the future is to stand together’⁴. Also for Poland the only way to tackle the crisis is to reinforce the cohesiveness and solidarity of EU actions. These were the imperatives of the Polish strategy for the extraordinary European Council summit on 1 March 2009. Upon the initiative of Prime Minister Tusk, an informal meeting of CEE Member States with the Commission’s President was convened prior to the EU-27 meeting in order to demonstrate full support of the New Member States (NMS) for the single market rules and the Commission’s actions⁵. The cooperative and coalition-based spirit together with the alliance with the Commission in the name of European principles has clearly contributed to the new active and pro-integrationist image of Poland. Poland will also be the largest beneficiary of a 5 billion Euro stimulus package, most of which will be spent in the energy sector. On the other hand, Poland and other CEE partners have not succeeded in softening the euro zone accession criteria.

The conflict between Russia and Georgia
From the Polish point of view, the conflict between Russia and Georgia made it clear that thinking in terms of power politics, zones of influence and a zero sum game is still very much alive in the vicinity of the EU. This kind of political thinking follows a completely different logic than the one underlying European integration⁶. The conflict in the Caucasus also implies substantial destabilization potential in the European neighbourhood. It reflects the doctrine of the existence of the regions of Russia’s ‘privileged interests’. Russia expects Western states to recognize them in the

⁵ http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/116455,tusk_w_brukseli_europa_musi_uniknac_pokusy_protekejonizmu_i_egozimu.html
⁶ Sikorski (2009), op. cit.
name of a ‘pragmatic’ approach deriving from the EU’s economic (energy) and political (cooperation on combating terrorism) needs. This also holds true for the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The reaction of the EU to the Georgia crisis was criticised in Poland and elsewhere for its timidity and inadequacy. Nevertheless, the French presidency made a relatively strong statement, stressing that the conflict has affected trust that is necessary for the partnership between EU and Russia. The Commission was invited to carry out an in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations, which would be taken into account in negotiations of the new agreement. As a result the talks have been suspended for several months.

The gas crisis: the conflict between Russia and Ukraine

The 2009 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine follows an earlier crisis in 2006, although the recent dispute has had more severe consequences for the gas supplies to the EU and especially to the heavily dependent Central European states such as Hungary or Slovakia. As a result, Russia is now seen in Europe as an indispensable, but no longer fully reliable partner. At the same time, increasingly more attention is being devoted to the consolidation of the intra-EU infrastructure in order to reduce the dependence of individual Member States.

3. Goals and outcomes

The Lisbon Treaty

The government believes that both the deepening of cooperation within the EU and the enlargement are in the interest of all Member States. The strengthening and improvement of the institutional foundations of the EU are considered a top priority. This refers above all to the reinforcement of the common foreign and security policy. At the same time, the prime minister signed the Lisbon Treaty together with the British Protocol, which had been negotiated by the former, more euro-sceptic government. In Tusk’s perspective, this was the only way to guarantee the a smooth ratification process, while taking into consideration the doubts of the President and the main opposition party. For Poland one of the most important provisions of the new treaty regarding foreign policy was the clause on energy solidarity among EU members.

The ratification crisis has to be regarded as a failure, both for Poland and the European Union as a whole. It is worth stressing that the key Polish priority, namely

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the security of energy supplies, obtains the legal basis only with the Lisbon Treaty (art. 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Other core areas, such as enlargement and foreign and security policy, would also considerably benefit from the new provisions. Poland is one of the few countries that has not completed the ratification process of the treaty, as the president has decided to wait with his signature for the final say of the Irish voters in the second referendum (scheduled for October 2009). This can also be seen as a failure of the Polish authorities to reach a domestic political consensus and present a clear pro-integration stance. The lack of this ratification gives a very mixed message as to the Polish commitment to the internal consolidation of the Union. Moreover, it is clear that Polish policy priorities are impossible to achieve without the Lisbon Treaty.

**The Polish Presidency in 2011**

The government sees the upcoming presidency as a perfect and unique opportunity to promote Poland both on a European level and globally. The challenge is to fully exploit this opportunity.

Presidency priorities, preliminarily outlined at this stage, concern notably the EU Eastern dimension and the development of a common foreign and security policy. Negotiations on the new budgetary perspective, further strengthening of the single market and diversification of energy sources, are also on the agenda. Numerous concrete preparatory actions have already been undertaken: a) the appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Presidency (15.07.2008), b) the first parliamentary debate on the state of preparations (06.11.2008), and c) the programme of preparations adopted by the Council of Ministers (13.01.2009). The programming of the presidency budget has entered its final phase. The first priorities will be defined in mid-2009 together with Denmark and Cyprus, other members of the presidency trio. The government hopes to stimulate a debate on the priorities in the 2nd half of 2009. On a more detailed level, legislative planning will be done together with the European Commission at the beginning of 2010. The government also wishes to closely coordinate the three Central European Presidencies: Czech, Hungarian and Polish, where the Eastern Partnership is supposed to play the major role. Regarding organizational aspects, special working groups have been established and the training needs for each ministry have been identified. A special motivational scheme for officials directly involved in the preparations has also been designed.

**The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership**

Poland has the ambition of shaping the EU Eastern dimension. In this context, the future of Ukraine shall become a key element of the reformed ENP. Poland is concerned with re-invigorating the ENP, in particular the Eastern dimension. Most

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importantly, the East is already considered to be the Polish *spécialité de la maison* by Western partners, and Poland should focus on developing EU policy in this respect in order to improve the political and social standards of the neighbours and to assist them in reaching EU standards in the future\(^\text{10}\). The Polish government aims at encouraging EU partners to use the conditionality principle effectively, while both stimulating reforms and demanding substantial progress in the transformation process.

Poland, together with Sweden, promoted the initiative of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which has been then transformed into a European project with the communication of the Commission being published in early December 2008. Polish competence in the Eastern agenda is appreciated by the EU partners. But so far Poland has not succeeded in persuading EU Member States to open a clear European perspective for the Eastern partners, most importantly for Ukraine. This, however, is a long-term goal, and reinforced cooperation within the Partnership might provide additional arguments to Ukraine’s benefit over time. The Foreign Affairs Ministry itself sees the Commission proposal very positively as a vast majority of Polish preferences have been incorporated into the communication. Certain reservations concern the lack of a special coordinator for the EaP within the Commission, as well as the final funding proposal\(^\text{11}\).

It seems, however, that in terms of finances the Commission was relatively generous, as some Member States, especially France, have already voiced concerns during the February GAERC. The attempt to reduce funding for EaP partly derived from a fear of shifting political attention away from the Mediterranean and partly from the unwillingness to spend additional funds at the time of serious economic challenges that the EU is facing due to the economic crisis. Moreover, ‘Member States have noted that there were a number of issues, such as visa liberalization, articulation between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy, participation of third countries or the financing, which will require further discussion as part of the process of developing and implementing the Eastern Partnership’\(^\text{12}\). Prior to the approval of the EaP by the European Council in March, it seemed that the above-mentioned reservations might significantly water down the previous diplomatic success of the Polish government. However, the fact that the Council approved an additional 600 million Euros for the EaP means that the initiative will not remain a ‘paper tiger’.

**Energy & Climate Change**

Poland is profoundly concerned with European energy security being built on the basis of the solidarity of the whole Union. Under no circumstances can it depend on short-term interests of particular Member States or financial benefits deriving from

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\(^{10}\) Sikorski (2009), op. cit.

\(^{11}\) IPA interview with a high official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 18 December 2008.

political or economic egoism\textsuperscript{13}. The Polish priorities are the following: a) no energy enterprises will be funded by the EU as long as some of the Member States consider them to be counterproductive to their efforts aiming at improving their energy security, b) strong resistance of the Union against any pressures and blackmailing from non-EU suppliers, c) diversification of sources and transit routes, and d) creation of an intra-EU infrastructure allowing for the delivery of energy resources to a Member State suffering from deficits due to external factors\textsuperscript{14}.

With regard to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, Poland’s aim was to prevent drastic increases in electricity prices due to the fact that 90\% of electricity in Poland is produced from coal. The new post-2013 emissions trading scheme would have had a devastating effect on the Polish economy. The goal was to change the Commission’s proposal accordingly.

Success has been achieved at the European Council in December 2008 with regard to the climate-energy package. Polish demands were largely incorporated into the final compromise: costs both for Polish companies and households have been substantially reduced in comparison to the initial proposal of the Commission. Additional funds have been acquired for the modernization of the Polish energy infrastructure until 2020. In this respect Central European cooperation has proven successful. The countries where in 2006 at least 30\% of the electricity was produced from one fossil fuel and where the 2006 GDP per capita was less than 50\% of the EU average will pay for 100\% of the carbon allowances only in 2020, instead of 2013. In addition, profits from the trading scheme are be allocated for the modernization of energy sectors in selected countries in a specific situation (such as Poland)\textsuperscript{15}.

Poland successfully achieved the reduction of costs in a medium-term perspective. The recognition of the specificity of the Polish (or Central European) economy is certainly a positive development. Moreover, the EU has finally recognized the strength of Polish arguments concerning the energy security that had been voiced by subsequent Polish governments. Poland has been actively promoting an ambitious EU approach to the security of energy resource supplies by lobbying for the energy solidarity mechanism to be triggered as soon as 50\% of the supplies for one Member State are being endangered, and not only when 20\% of supplies for the EU are endangered, which is currently the case. Such a change, in line with the Polish position, was agreed upon at the March summit. Furthermore, The Council agreed to use unspent money from the 2008 budget for funding energy infrastructure projects, including the Nabucco pipeline, which would decrease the EU’s dependence on Russian imports by bringing Caspian gas to a hub in Austria via the Balkans.

\textsuperscript{13} Tusk, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{14} Sikorski (2009), op. cit.
\textsuperscript{15} Ernest Wyciszkiewicz, ‘Najważniejsze elementy kompromisu energetyczno-klimatycznego’, Biuletyn PISM, nr 64 (532), 19 December 2008.
Negotiation of the new agreement between the European Union and Russia

Poland stopped blocking the start of the EU-Russia negotiations on the new agreement as soon as its demands on lifting the Russian embargo were satisfied. Additionally, the European Commission has accepted the notion of EU energy solidarity as the guiding principle for these negotiations. The Polish government believes that the EU-Russia summit in Samara (May 2007) contributed to the realization of the fact that the consolidation and unity of the EU position would also make Russia policy more constructive. Poland’s goal is to avoid any situation where Russia would be able to play on the differences between EU Member States.

An agreement has been reached with European partners on the contents of the mandate for negotiations with Russia. It responds to Poland’s concerns in the area of energy security. The Polish government withdrew its veto of the negotiation mandate which allowed for influencing the policy of the whole Union towards Russia.

Most of the EU Member States have modified their attitude towards Russia in recent years. This, however, is less due to Polish persuasion efforts, but more to the Russian behaviour both in international and domestic politics. Among the most important factors one can find: a) the repeatedly threatened energy security of the Western countries (2006, 2009), b) the policy towards a shared neighbourhood (conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine), and c) the persecution of the democratic opposition and neglect for basic democratic standards and values.

The negotiations were suspended following the Georgia conflict and resumed in November 2008 despite the opposition from Lithuania. Poland supported the suspension of the talks to maintain European unity on this issue, although it was convinced that Russia had failed to fulfil the conditions of the ceasefire agreement negotiated by President Sarkozy in August last year. Little progress has been made in the negotiations ever since, even though the Czech presidency hoped however for the real developments to take place during its term until June 2009.

EU Enlargement

The priority with regard to enlargement policy is the future membership of Ukraine and the creation of a political consensus around this issue within the EU itself.

Poland is constantly insisting on the fact that any European state respecting democratic principles can apply to join the EU. Poland strongly supports the integration of Ukraine with the Western international institutions. On the other hand,

18 See: article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.
Poland does not seem to be particularly active as far as the current enlargement process is concerned. The Western Balkans constitute a priority for the former Slovenian, current Czech and future Hungarian presidencies. In fact, it can be argued that Poland, a traditionally pro-enlargement Member State, is not sufficiently working on promoting the Turkish agenda.

**European security and post-conflict management**

From the government’s point of view, it is essential to engage in peace-keeping and humanitarian missions led by the EU. Poland is convinced that the EU should become more active in the security area, both regionally and beyond Europe. At the same time, the EU should always complement and not double NATO activities. Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Poland aims at focusing its attention on crisis management, humanitarian intervention and the European Defence Agency. The Polish government is also active in the discussions on the revision of the European Security Strategy.

Poland has taken an active part in EU military operations, with the aim of contributing to global security. For example, 170 soldiers have been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (out of a total of 2500 troops from EU Member States). In 2006, 130 members of gendarmerie participated in the EUFOR RD Congo operation, forming the fourth largest Member State contingent. The presence is also assured in the EUFOR Chad/RCA operation (350 soldiers). Poland is also responsible for the preparation and functioning of a Battlefield Group (in the framework of the Rapid Response Concept) that consists of German, Slovak, Latvian and Lithuanian troops and is supposed to be fully deployable in the first half of 2010\(^1\).

Poland is increasingly active when it comes to reinforcing EU military capabilities. A Polish officer, General Adam Sowa, has been appointed Deputy Chief Executive for Operations in the European Defence Agency. Poland is also among eleven Member States who are participating in the 2\(^{nd}\) R&T Joint Investment Programme (ICET – Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies, established in May 2008), while remaining one of its largest contributors\(^2\).

The European Security Strategy (ESS), conceived in 2003, did not really integrate the security concerns and ideas of the then incoming EU members from Central Europe. In Poland it was often perceived as being designed for the ‘old’ EU only\(^3\). In this perspective, the renewed ESS presented in December 2008 incorporated Polish preferences into the EU strategic thinking on security to a significant extent. Increased concerns about energy dependence are acknowledged and the latter is considered


a serious security threat. Greater diversification of sources of supplies and transit routes is deemed essential. The potential of the Eastern Partnership, as well as the Union for the Mediterranean, together with close cooperation with Ukraine and Turkey are underlined in this respect. It has been pointed out that EU-Russia relations have deteriorated over the conflict in Georgia. The idea of the French and Russian presidents ‘re-designing’ Europe’s security architecture by drawing in Russia has found little support. However, the text also reflects the division of perspectives on Russia and it fails to mention the fact that EU observers have not been allowed into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Moscow has recognized as independent states.

With regard to most recent security and development challenges in the Eastern neighbourhood, Poland has delivered the 3rd largest contingent (30 participants) to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), an independent civilian observer mission to Georgia deployed under European security and defence policy on 1 October 2008.

An international Donors Conference was organized by European Commission and the World Bank (22 October 2008) in order to ‘mobilize a critical mass of external assistance to support the country in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, reintegration of internally displaced people and in accelerating Georgia’s recovery from the impact of the August 2008 conflict on its economy’. The European Community pledged over 480 million Euros for the period 2008–2010, with additional contributions from the vast majority of Member States accounting for over 130 million Euros (however, the USA declared almost 760 and Japan over 150 million Euros). The largest EU donors were Sweden and Germany (40 and 33 million Euro respectively). Poland pledged only 3.3 million Euros, which is quite surprising in the light of its political support for Georgia and its general commitment to the Eastern agenda.

Conclusions

The re-orientation of Polish European policy towards a more active, pro-integrationist, constructive and coalition-based approach has become a reality. The main elements of the political strategy for the Polish role in EU foreign affairs, such as the eastern policy, openness towards enlargement, energy security, ESDP development, European solidarity and close cooperation with

23 Ibid., p. 10.
24 http://euobserver.com/9/27275
25 http://euobserver.com/9/26741
26 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/conference/index_en.htm
27 Greater funding within the EU was declared notably by the Netherlands (11.5 million Euro), Denmark (9.5), France (7.5) and the Czech Republic (6.4); http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/conference/donor_eur_en.pdf
Germany, Central Europe and Scandinavian countries, are in place. However, certain ambiguities, like the Lisbon Treaty ratification, do not help communicate the Polish vision of integration to EU partners.

On the particular aspects of the European foreign policy the following elements should be stressed:

- **ENP and Eastern Partnership**: Poland managed to push through a reasonable, yet ambitious proposal on the table and to obtain preliminary approval of the European Council and 600 million Euros have been earmarked as additional funding for this initiative. Constant communication efforts have to be directed at our partners in order to explain that we are dealing with European neighbours of the EU in the East, but only with neighbours of Europe in the south.

- **Energy and Climate Change**: Poland contributed to the EU’s changing perception about the seriousness of energy challenges and resulted in the incorporation of security and diversification into the ‘Western-oriented’ climate change agenda. Major success has been achieved in relation to the post-2010 emissions trading scheme. However, much depends on domestic policy making and the willingness of EU partners to finance the modernization of CEECs’ energy infrastructure. The latter becomes highly problematic at the time of recession and increased focus on a purely national approach to problem-solving. However, taking into account the amount of time and funds necessary for energy investments, the transition period until 2020 is not a particularly long one. Poland has achieved diplomatic success, but it now has to be translated into immediate domestic political and legislative actions. Also, significant questions remain on the funding of the so-called Ekofund aimed to finance CC2 reduction investments in poor countries of Africa and Asia, which could be potentially very expensive for Poland.

- **Relations with Russia**: The Commission has recognized the importance of energy security concerns for negotiating a mandate with Russia. Poland is no longer blocking the new partnership talks with Russia, although negotiations have been practically frozen in the aftermath of the Georgian and gas crises.

- **Enlargement**: Poland is very much focused on the European perspective of Ukraine. However, we are not taking the opportunity to become an active supporter of the Turkish membership. The upcoming trio presidency provides a perfect opportunity to work on the Cyprus problem with the Republic of Cyprus. A coherent approach and leadership on the enlargement agenda are missing in Polish European policy.

- **European security**: Poland is an increasingly active player with regard to military missions and military capabilities. Certain changes in the renewed ESS reflect at least partial Polish success in introducing to the document the notion of energy security, as well as a slightly more assertive approach towards Russia. However, concrete involvement in post-conflict Georgia, especially in financial terms, has not yet been realized.
- **Lisbon Treaty**: a very unclear message from Poland constitutes one of its major weaknesses in European politics. In this context, domestic political conflicts negatively affect Polish weight and influence in the EU.

- **Presidency**: the debate on Presidency priorities planned for the 2nd half of 2009 could provide for an important turning point with regard to foreign policy-making in Poland, which tends to be a relatively closed and secretive process. This will happen as long as the opinions of civil society organisations, business and academia are actively searched for and duly taken into consideration.