Abstract

During the last decade, in many European countries and cities, area-based Urban Development Programmes have been initiated, in response to major problems of poverty and social exclusion. Urban Development Programmes are usually developed in a complex interplay between different governmental levels, and implemented by a wide variety of public and non-public parties. This paper addresses the organisation of these programmes, concentrating in particular on the form and extent of 'public-public partnership', i.e. on the role that the different levels of the public administration play and on the relation between them. In addition, the paper aims to get an indication of the extent to which UDPs are able to influence and perhaps even change existing power relations between different levels of government. The paper mainly applies an institutional perspective and concentrates less on the more usual economic and social approaches in analysing power relations.

The analysis of the UDPs focuses on the form and extent of 'public-public partnership', i.e. on the role that the different levels of the public administration play and on the relation between them. The paper mainly applies an institutional perspective and concentrates less on the more usual economic and social approaches in analysing power relations.

UDPs are usually embedded in a complex interplay between national, sub-national, local and sub-local levels of government. The leading role of the local (municipal) governments in the establishment and implementation of UDPs might be limited both from above and from below. On the one hand, the upper tiers of the administration, such as the central and regional governmental departments, of ten have a substantial influence on the UDPs, either directly, through administrative regulations defined by law, or indirectly, through financial decisions, political control, national framework programmes, etc. On the other hand, local governments may, in turn, transfer substantial power to governmental levels or entities below them. In the case of larger municipalities, this might imply lower (district) levels in a general-purpose two-tier governmental structure, or sub-local entities with less or no formal administrative power at all (housing associations or even civil organisations might serve as examples).

The analysis of the involvement of divergent governmental levels in UDPs connects directly to issues of decentralisation and subsidiarity and gets its importance in the light of the ongoing debates on governance. In many countries, there are heated debates about decentralising political decision-making, even towards sub-municipal units of government. On the other hand, however, the need for involvement of higher levels of government in decision-making is acknowledged, in order to avoid social and ethnic exclusion and ensure the necessary level of territorial integrity.

Under these contradictory challenges it is interesting to examine how UDPs are organised and managed and to what extent shifts of power between the national and municipal, and between the municipal and sub-municipal levels, influence the development and implementation of UDPs in European cities. This paper aims to investigate these issues, from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We will examine a variety of European countries, focusing primarily on national and sub-national governmental levels and on shifts of power and authority between them. The concept of Multi Level Governance will be used to describe the context of European countries, in which policy networks are organised across policy areas and governmental levels. Non-governmental actors, representing public, private, voluntary and community sectors, are not the primary focus of interest in this investigation.

Our research questions are twofold: To what extent are the systems of public administration and that of policy-making influencing the success of area-based UDPs? What can be told about the level of centralisation/decentralisation and of the strength of national policies if looking for 'optimal' circumstances for UDPs? Which indication can be found about possible influences of UDPs on existing power relations between different levels of government? The 'empirical' basis for this paper lies in the UGIS case studies.1 The secondary analysis of some of these case studies focused mainly on the organisational and management aspects and much less on the content of these cases.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, attention will be paid to the concept of governance. Then, an overview will be given of the models of public administration within the European Union, developments that have forced them to change and resulting transitions within them. Next, we will turn to the issue of decentralisation in European countries, examining both national-local relationships and patterns of local decentralisation: How is the balance struck between centrality and fragmentation? In the empirical overview that follows, a number of UDP case studies from different European cities will be analysed within the context of national and local decentralisation respectively.

1 UGIS: 'Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability,' a research programme financed by the European Commission, DG RTD (http://www.uisfa.ac.be/ugis/) in which the authors participated.

Introduction

Since the 1990s, many European countries have initiated various area-based Urban Development Programmes. These programmes were developed in answer to major problems of poverty and social exclusion in European cities and were introduced to promote local development and urban regeneration. Their area-based character distinguishes them from thematically organised policies, dealing with for example employment or education, but also from preceding urban programmes, in terms of their organisation and (integrated) approach towards problems (Dukes 2004).

This paper aims to discuss the organisation and management of area-based Urban Development Programmes (UDP)s in the con text of centralisation/decentralisation. Two aspects will be highlighted: the centralisation and decentralisation of public administration and of urban policy-making.

The analysis of the UDPs focuses on the form and extent of 'public-public partnership', i.e. on the role that the different levels of the public administration play and on the relation between them. In addition, the paper aims to get an indication of the extent to which UDPs are able to influence and perhaps even change existing power relations between different levels of government. The paper mainly applies an institutional perspective and concentrates less on the more usual economic and social approaches in analysing power relations.
Finally, the two dimensions will be brought together and conclusions will be drawn about the potential link between the success of UDPs and the extent of decentralisation at national and local levels.

GOVERNANCE, MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND URBAN GOVERNANCE

Over the last ten years, the term ‘governance’ has made a remarkable appearance in various disciplines (van Kersbergen et al. 2001), as reflected in divergent meanings, uses or versions. According to Kickert (1997), the term signifies a shift toward network-like relations beyond the formal structures of ‘government.’ Kooiman, on the other hand, focuses on its dynamics, arguing that governance includes ‘all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that... guide, steer, control or manage society’ (Kooiman 1993, p. 2; 2003). Peters & Pierre (2001, p. 131), in turn, point to changes in the balance of power accompanying the shift towards governance: ‘political power and institutional capability is less and less derived from formal constitutional powers accorded to the state but more from a capacity to wield and coordinate resources from public and private actors and interests.’ While the debate on governance is highly compartmentalised, Pierre (2000) argues that the overarching questions in the debate relate to new forms and shapes that the pursuit of the collective interest can and should take; the extent in which the traditional, liberal-democratic model of the state should be rethought; the steering instruments with which the state has to impose its will on society and the economy, and so on.

Within the context of this paper, two uses of ‘governance’ require more attention: multilevel governance and urban governance. Multi Level Governance (MLG) is a concept that was initially developed around the EU integration process (see Heinelt 1996; Hooghe 1996; Marks 1996). In its conceptualisation of the European Union as a single, multi-level policy, the MLG approach tries to capture changes in processes of decision-making and control over territories in all their complexity. Its point of departure is that there is an interconnectedness of (supranational and national) policy arenas and that subnational actors operate in both arenas at the same time; authoritative decision-making competencies have become dispersed across multiple territorial levels and, coherently, (political) control over activities in the territories has become shared. Strikingly, in this multi-level governance model, the main focus seems to be on government levels.

According to van Kersbergen et al. (2001), MLG theorists posit a set of policy networks, organised across policy areas and governmental levels, which connects the body of multi-level governance literature directly to the governance-as-network literature. They refer to Eising & Kohler-Koch (2000), who speak of ‘network governance’ instead of multi-level governance. Although the MLG concept was developed in a particular context, we agree with Wilks-Heeg et al. (2002) that the model has much wider uses and could be applied to more general accounts of the changing nature of urban and regional governance in Europe as well.

At the local level, the governance debate amounts to a concern with the strategies of coordination available to urban actors in the context of a globalised, market economy (Stoker 2000). It is captured in catchwords like ‘urban’ or ‘local’ governance, or in terms of (local) partnerships as a common manifestation of urban governance (Elander & Bianc 2001). This debate has been strengthened due to a growing concern of city governments with a range of intractable cross-cutting policy issues, such as economic development, employment, social exclusion, crime prevention, environmental problems, and so on. Early attempts of modelling urban politics have resulted in models such as ‘growth machines’ and ‘urban growth coalitions’.

These models basically argue that in most cities parties that benefit from growth, form coalitions that drive development policy (Logan & Molotch 1987, or see Stoker 2000). A more recent model of urban politics relates to ‘urban regimes’ (see e.g. Stone 1989, 1997; Stoker 1990; Harding 1994,1995,1997): regimes are likely to draw on actors from public and private sectors and from civil society, as political coalitions are seen as inadequate to the task of governing. ‘Governance’ thus expresses the (quest for) new forms of governing, at different governmental levels and in different policy arenas and policy networks.

THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Territorial structures of public administration across Member States - Within the European Union, the territorial structures of public administration vary across Member States. A basic distinction that can be made is between federal and unitary systems. The last category can be subdivided into classic unitary states, devolving unitary states and regionalised unitary states. Bullmann (1997) characterises the different systems as follows:

- Classic unitary states centralise most power on the national level and have subnational government only at the local level. Regional structures may exist for administrative purposes, but are strictly subordinated to the central state.
- Devolving unitary states have undergone a process of reform to establish elected regional authorities above the local level. The regional tier enjoys a certain degree of constitutional protection and autonomy. Balchin et al. (1998, p. 4) make a sub-distinction between unitary states that delegate power to the local authority level, having no or only weak intermediary level of government and unitary states that delegate power both to the local and regional levels of government.
- Regionalised unitary states are characterised by the existence of a directly-elected tier of regional government with constitutional status, wide-ranging autonomy and legislative powers. These countries have gone furthest down the road of regional devolution among the unitary states in the EU.
- Federal states involve a constitutional sharing of powers and the coexistence of sovereignties. The regional tier exists in its own right and cannot be abolished or restructured unilaterally by the federal or central government.

From the description of the different systems it is clear, that the main difference between the subcategories of the unitary states is in the relative power of the local and the subnational (regional) levels of government. These different systems imply a wide variation in the degrees of political decentralisation (Loughlin 1997), and that the relative political influence and autonomy of territorially-based government (Hooghe 1996; Marks 1996; SCP 2000). Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, territorial structures of public administration in Europe that had mostly been laid down in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, have come under pressure.3

Of crucial importance has been the impact of global economic transformation. Brenner (1999) conceives globalisation as a re-territorialisation of both socio-economic and political-institutional spaces that unfold simultaneously at multiple geographical scales. He argues that processes of re-territorialisation, in terms of reconstruciton and re-scaling of territorial organisation such as cities or states, should be understood as an intrinsic moment of the present round of globalisation. Bennett (1989) points at four main influences that have required the existing structures to change: first, the influence of territorial problems that resulted from continuing developments of urbanisation and functional regions; second, changes to the needs and the technology underpinning economic and public service provision; third, changes in social and cultural identity that required reforms of methods of encouraging participation and interest articulation and finally, demands to rethink the total pattern of public service provision and its finance. In Western Europe this implied rethinking the welfare state, in terms of the role and functions of the state and administration, whereas in Eastern Europe this meant radically modifying the political-administrative links. A final impact on the structures of government relates to the European Union (SCP 2000; Knill 2001), in terms of policy and its implementation, an important stimulus being the principle of subsidiarity.4 Regarding the consequences for the national governments, Salet et al. (2002) argue that resulting major institutional transformations in Europe in the 1980s have changed their position dramatically, although it varied from one country to another. The authors distinguish three overlapping dimensions that were at stake in this transformation: a reduction in the government’s proactive role in the economy and society; the

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3 The following part, describing these transitions, is derived from Dukes (forthcoming).

4 The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible at the citizen-level and that constant checks are made as to whether action at community level is justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level (European Commission 2004). Member States are stimulated by the EC to apply this principle themselves as well.
diversification of decision-making throughout a wide range of organisations and the restructuring of intergovernmental relationships.

The first dimension refers to the increasing emphasis on privatisation, that has been dominant in the economic organisation of European states, as well as in most sectors of public policy and that implied the receding of government centrism. The authors argue that this revival of citizenship, the tendencies towards the social organisation of public responsibilities and the new attempts 'to privatise the organisation of the public domain' are all important signals of a transformation of the cultural and economical relationships that used to be self evident in the welfare state (Salet et al. 2002).

The second dimension implies the diversification of decision-making, a trend that can be linked to the reduction of direct government involvement and the increased 'enabling' role of government (Salet et al. 2002). In the literature this diversification is encapsulated in the broadly proclaimed shift from 'government' to 'governance' (see e.g. Hajer & Wagenaar 2003; Geddes 2000), as described earlier. Geddes (2000) refers to wider restructuring patterns of European governance, in terms of shifts in relationships between supranational, national and subnational tiers of the state that intersect with the blurring or crossing of former boundaries and demarcations between actors or institutes from the spheres of the state, the market and civil society.

The final dimension concerns the restructuring of intergovernmental relationships. Peters & Pierre (2001, p. 133) emphasise the changed accessibility between governmental levels, arguing that 'decentralization and European integration have jointly reshuffled institutional relationships and created a system where institutions at one level can enter into exchanges with institutions at any other level.' Moreover, the Europeanisation of intergovernmental relationships has stimulated the rise of meso-government (Salet et al. 2002). Other authors point at a 'hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes 1994) or at the transfer of powers and responsibilities between different governmental levels. The complexity of this transfer is pointed out by Brenner (1999). This author refers to two processes taking place at the same time: state territorial restructuring and urban-regional restructuring. On the one hand these processes reflect two distinctive forms of re-territorialisation that have emerged in conjunction with globalisation processes. On the other hand, these two processes are closely intertwined each continually influencing and transforming the conditions under which the other unfolds.

What have been the consequences for subnational governmental levels? The pressure of decentralisation has stimulated most national governments to relinquish various responsibilities of theirs, based on the idea that many allocative decisions would be handled far more efficiently at lower tiers of decision-making (Salet et al. 2002). An additional tendency of decentralisation, mostly affecting the medium and large cities, has been decentralisation from the top to the neighbourhood level. Loughlin (2005, p. 211) refers to 'the new sub-national governance' and discerns three important features. The first concerns the freedom of local authorities to act within certain limits of the central authorities, their policy approaches and form of (political and administrative) organisation. The second element relates to different balances of funding between central and local governments, although trends across Europe seem to be somewhat paradoxical: while local authorities tend to rely less on their own resources and more on central government grants, at the same time, a high level of 'own resources' does not necessarily imply more autonomy if the use of these resources is determined by a higher authority. The third feature of the new subnational governance is intergovernmental competition, both horizontally - local authorities competing with each other for scarce resources - and vertically - small communes competing with medium or large cities, for example. Tosics (2004) emphasises that the decentralisation towards sub-local government units, together with the privatisation efforts, may endanger the capability of the public sector as such, to address the complex challenges of sustainable urban development.

In the MLG debate it is argued that due to these processes of decentralisation, in most European countries the role of local governmental actors has strongly increased (Hooghe 1996). But the position of the local administration within the national administration varies between European countries and according to Salet et al. (2002), in practice some institutional groupings have been more appropriate than others in responding to the pressure of decentralisation. It thus seems to be appropriate to establish that the (changing) nature of local government will be strongly related to the (changing) structure of intergovernmental relations, but in a very complex way.

Brenner (1999) refers to new geographies of urban governance that are currently crystallising at the multiscale interface between processes of urban restructuring and state territorial restructuring. Focusing on urban-regional restructuring processes, Brenner notices that there is an upwards pressure from the local to the 'metropolitan' scale, related to economic globalisation processes that create denser socioeconomic interdependencies on urban-regional scales. As these interdependencies generally supersede the reach of both the urban and the regional scale, in many European cities the issue of metropolitan governance has returned to the political agenda. However, while the debates on metropolitan government during the 1960s and 1970s mainly concerned administrative efficiency and local service provision, contemporary discussions focus predominantly on the need for administrative flexibility, regionally co-ordinated economic development strategies and the issue of intensified global competition (Brenner 1999). In conclusion, various countries have moved from centrally directed uniformity to variation and experimentation, implying important changes in terms of territorial governance. While central governments continue to exercise a dominant role, they now interact with other levels of government in far more complex ways (Loughlin 2005) and have to strike a balance between centralisation and complete fragmentation. In terms of policy, the new differentiation in intergovernmental relationships has resulted in a multi-level pattern of governmental competencies in which policy might be developed at and implemented by various levels of government (Salet et al. 2002).

The different models of public administration and the issue of decentralisation - as has become clear in the previous section, models of public administration vary between European countries, from unitary states (in various forms) to federal states, with far reaching implications for the relative power of the local and regional levels of government.

Regarding central-local relationships as described in Western public policy literature (Page & Goldsmith 1987), another important distinction in administrative systems is one between integrated and non-integrated administrative systems. In the former, the size of local (governmental) units is typically larger, as it is determined on the supposed optimal size for the effective provision of public services. Examples are the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian systems, where the local government reforms of the 1970s led to the amalgamation of local governments, reducing their number significantly in these countries (Horváth 2000, p. 36). In the non-integrated administrative systems, on the other hand, preference is given to local autonomy over the aspect of service provision: local governments are typically small (most settlements might have their own municipality), and integrative institutions ensure the coordination required for public services. In this case, present in France and in the South European countries, the dilemmas around intermediate intergovernmental levels - e.g. counties, regions with integrative powers - are usually much sharper.

Decentralisation from the central to the local level has a somewhat different meaning in an integrated versus a non-integrated administrative system: the positive elements of decentralisation, e.g. the subsidiarity aspect, can only be fully utilised in a system where local governments are sufficiently large, being able to develop the institutional systems required for exerting their delegated powers. Considering the various models of public administration in different European countries, there is a clear connection between these models and the type of local governments in terms of integrated versus non-integrated systems. The link between decentralisation and the integrated/non-integrated character of the administrative system can be analysed with the help of Table 1. Within the group of EU-15 and EFTA, the countries with a strong local authority (type 2) are those, where local authorities are the most integrated. This connection, however, does not apply to all the new Member States: while the Baltic States, Slovenia and
Table 1. Models of public administration in different European countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government structure</th>
<th>EU-15 and EFTA countries</th>
<th>New Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Classic unitary countries</td>
<td>Luxembourg, Greece and Ireland</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Baltic states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unitary countries with strong local authority level</td>
<td>Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway</td>
<td>Portugal, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unitary countries with strong local and regional level</td>
<td>Portugal, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands</td>
<td>Italy and Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalised unitary countries</td>
<td>Austria, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Federal states | Stockho1m has 18 district councils (since 1996), that have overall responsibilities for their areas, within the overriding responsibility of the municipal council in taxation and budget issues. Each district has an administration under the leadership of a director. The membership of the district authorities is not directly elected, their composition in each district corresponds to the proportion of seats for the political parties on the city level. Three-quarters of the city's resources are transferred to the districts. Amsterdam has a layered administration and is subdivided into 15 districts, the first of which were established in the early 1980s. Most of these districts are headed by their own administration, including a district council, an elected chairperson and an executive committee. While the central city council decides on the municipal budget and on the distribution of government revenues among the districts, it has decentralised a number of powers to the districts: they are responsible for the supervision of public space; decree zoning schemes; and decide to a large extent on policy related to art, sport and social care. However, some types of powers have not been delegated as they cannot be delegated for legal reasons (such as decisions on the municipal budget), should not be delegated for practical reasons (such as the water supply); or are necessary to be kept at municipal level in order to guard or enhance city cohesion (for example in the case of metropolitan projects). Budapest has had since 1950 a two-tier government system, consisting of the city municipality and district administrations. This administrative structure became extremely decentralised from 1990 on, when the new law on local governments transferred most local government tasks to the district level (Tosics 2005). The municipality of Budapest has acquired ownership of the public utilities, and has also assumed the responsibility for some issues (e.g. homelessness, strategic planning) spanning the city as a whole, or at least the great majority of it. At the same time districts enjoy considerable autonomy with an elected Mayor and an elected assembly, a separate budget, and devolved responsibilities for many policy domains, such as the operation of lower level public services, e.g. primary and partly secondary schooling and basic health care (Ebel & Simon 1995, p. 122). The ownership of the previously state-owned real estate has been transferred largely to the district governments, and even the ownership of public spaces is divided between the two levels of local governments: the municipality, for example, owns some large squares and those streets where public transportation exists, while the rest belongs to the districts. PARTLY based on the discussed cases, partly on empirical information from GLE (2003), the following models can be hypothesised in Table 2. The different types of local governmental structures of larger municipalities can be illustrated with the following examples.

\[ \text{Centralised city}: \text{having all the power at the municipal level, with practically no submunicipal units (e.g. Copenhagen).} \]

\[ \text{Centralised two-tier city}: \text{having the real power at the municipal level, with districts getting only some minor administrative tasks and insignificant budget and decision-making rights (e.g. Vienna and Madrid).} \]

\[ \text{Deconcentrated two-tier city}: \text{having districts with substantial competencies and financial means, but without elected leadership (e.g. Stockhol m).} \]

\[ \text{Real two-tier system}: \text{having both the municipal and the district level as elected local governments, with equally important tasks, sharing the power, tasks and responsibilities and budget according to a legal regulation (e.g. Budapest and Amsterdam).} \]

\[ \text{Decentralised city}: \text{having the leading role at the level of the districts, leaving only some coordinating role to the upper, municipal level (e.g. Warsaw, before the changes of 2002).} \]

Poland have relatively large local government units, in the other countries decentralisation was strong even if the local governments were small, non-integrated (their average population size varies between 1,600 and 3,200 in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). This resulted in the latter group of countries having a fragmented local government system, with high relevance of regional issues, as in these countries a new, 'regional' level of government is needed to make real decentralisation of power from the central government feasible.

Table 1 contains some very recent changes. The United Kingdom, for example, used to be a classic unitary country, until the partial devolution of power to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in 1999. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, along with the other former socialist countries were classic unitary countries, until the change of the political system around 1989/90 brought about the devolution of a substantial part of power to democratic local governments. As another step of devolution, these countries have recently started developing their subnational, regionalisation of government, partly as preparation for the extensive use of Structural Funds in the first full period of their EU membership from 2007.

They now differ substantially from each other in terms of type and strength of the regional level. These different models of public administration, with their divergent extent of decentralisation imply different conditions for area-based programmes. For this paper, two aspects deserve special attention:

1. Local governments have substantial political strength in all categories to establish and implement area-based programmes on their own, except for the countries listed in the first column of Table 1. In the classical centralised countries, local area-based programmes are of ten led by national-level authorities, or by special organisations that are not or only partly responsible to the local authority (quangos, semi-governmental organisations, for example, Temple Bar, Dublin).

2. The other (2-5) categories of countries all devolve substantial political power to the local governmental level. However, they differ from each other in terms of whether it is the national or the subnational (regional) level that controls the functioning of the local governments. Additionally, the extent of this control is very different as well.

The case studies that will be discussed later all belong to the categories 2-5, having local governments powerful enough to manage area based programmes.

Regarding decentralisation, the 1980s and the 1990s not only brought about changes at the national level (devolution towards subnational levels), but in many countries also at the local level (devolution towards the sublocal level). Most of the larger municipalities established some version of a two-tier local governmental structure. Despite this common tendency, however, there are huge differences between countries (and sometimes even within the same country, between cities), regarding the type of administrative unit that has been created at the submunicipal level, and the way in which the rights and responsibilities are shared between higher and lower tiers of the local government.

In Spain bigger cities are subdivided in administrative districts (Madrid, for example, has 21 districts), however, these districts only function as administrations instead of political institutions.

Stockholm has 18 district councils (since 1996), that have overall responsibilities for their areas, within the overriding responsibility of the municipal council in taxation and budget issues. Each district has an administration under the leadership of a director. The membership of the district authorities is not directly elected, their composition in each district corresponds to the proportion of seats for the political parties on the city level. Three-quarters of the city’s resources are transferred to the districts. Amsterdam has a layered administration and is subdivided into 15 districts, the first of which were established in the early 1980s. Most of these districts are headed by their own administration, including a district council, an elected chairperson and an executive committee. While the central city council decides on the municipal budget and on the distribution of government revenues among the districts, it has decentralised a number of powers to the districts: they are responsible for the supervision of public space; decree zoning schemes; and decide to a large extent on policy related to art, sport and social care. However, some types of powers have not been delegated as they cannot be delegated for legal reasons (such as decisions on the municipal budget), should not be delegated for practical reasons (such as the water supply); or are necessary to be kept at municipal level in order to guard or enhance city cohesion (for example in the case of metropolitan projects). Budapest has had since 1950 a two-tier government system, consisting of the city municipality and district administrations. This administrative structure became extremely decentralised from 1990 on, when the new law on local governments transferred most local government tasks to the district level (Tosics 2005). The municipality of Budapest has acquired ownership of the public utilities, and has also assumed the responsibility for some issues (e.g. homelessness, strategic planning) spanning the city as a whole, or at least the great majority of it. At the same time districts enjoy considerable autonomy with an elected Mayor and an elected assembly, a separate budget, and devolved responsibilities for many policy domains, such as the operation of lower level public services, e.g. primary and partly secondary schooling and basic health care (Ebel & Simon 1995, p. 122). The ownership of the previously state-owned real estate has been transferred largely to the district governments, and even the ownership of public spaces is divided between the two levels of local governments: the municipality, for example, owns some large squares and those streets where public transportation exists, while the rest belongs to the districts. Partly based on the discussed cases, partly on empirical information from GLE (2003), the following models can be hypothesised in Table 2. The different types of local governmental structures of larger municipalities can be illustrated with the following examples.

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The division of power between the municipal and the submunicipal level is less relevant in those cases, where the local level is generally weak. In this sense it might be possible to define an additional category, the ‘powerless city’, in which case the regional or national level has the leading role, with the city having hardly any power at all, as compared to the higher administrative levels. One example was Tirana, until recent administrative and personnel changes. It is less clear to what extent cities can be considered as powerless in countries where they have formal power but where central policies are extremely strong (e.g. the Netherlands).

Similar to the case of the national models of public administration, local models can also change over time. The general tendency in Europe is that many of the centralised-type cities consider devolving some of their power to the submunicipal level.

Area-based programmes usually target an area that is a part of a submunicipal unit, such as a district or a neighbourhood. However, in larger municipalities, with a two-tier local governmental structure, this does not necessarily mean that the lower (district) level has substantial influence over such programmes. This influence depends on the political, administrative and financial arrangements between the municipal and the district governments. In this regard it has to be emphasised that not only the formal administrative structure (i.e. whether a mayor or a chairperson and an elected assembly exist at the district level) determines the extent of decentralisation and power at the district level, but also the share of budgetary means. The comparison of Vienna and Budapest serves as a good example: in both cities the districts have elected mayors and assembly members. However, in Vienna their influence is very limited, having decision-making rights in only about 1-2 per cent of the city budget, while in Budapest approximately 50 per cent of the financial means belong to the decision-making competence of the districts. Besides this, informal processes, such as the political influence of the local leaders plays a role. An example is Budapest, where the success of the districts depends very much on the personality and political links of the district mayor.

The lack or weakness of district level administrative control over area-based programmes means that such programmes are embedded in a top-down local governmental structure. This does not necessarily mean that all aspects are determined by higher governmental levels, as the influence of the local population can also be organised outside the district government, with different partnership models. This, however, relates to an other aspect of area-based programmes, the aspect of participation, an issue that is discussed in this dossier’s contribution by Bianc & Beaumont (pp. 293-304).

Summarising the above, the point of departure of the UDPs, their ‘setting’, varies between European countries, among others in terms of decentralisation: both the different national models of public administration, with their various extent and forms of decentralisation; and the extent and form of decentralisation at the local level together determine the extent to which UDPs can be planned, approved and implemented at the local level.

THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF URBAN POLICIES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Aside from differences in models of public administration, there are also substantial differences between countries, in terms of the existence and organisation/form of an upper-level (national or subnational) framework for UDPs. Even if UDPs are most of ten adopted by the local assembly in the end, the influence from the upper level diverges strongly in terms of extent and form. The two extremes might be UDPs designed as part of a national programme versus UDPs that are developed at the local level, not even resembling any higher-level programme.

The upper-level (national or subnational) framework for UDPs can simply be called an urban policy. A recent analysis prepared on the initiative of the Dutch presidency of the EU, gives an overview of the form and the extent of national urban policies, both in the 15 old, and in the 10 new Member States. This overview (Baan et al. 2004; van den Berg et al. 2004) clearly shows the heterogeneity of approaches among EU countries. There are many examples of national urban policy by this upper level policy (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). However, there are also examples of the lack of national urban policies (Hungary, Italy and Spain), where UDPs are developed exclusively at the local level, without any guidance and/or help from above.

Policy making at the national level and the relationship between the national and the local level - In principle, in all countries the central government has the possibility - independently from the public administration system - to exert control over UDPs, through a special flow of financial resources, connected to an urban policy framework. There are well known examples in Europe of national urban policies, such as the Big Cities Policy in the Netherlands, the Metropolitan Development Initiative in Sweden, the Kvarter111 programme in Denmark, the Politique de la Ville in France, the Social Impulse Fund in Flanders and, to a certain extent, the Soziale Stadt in Germany.

Other European countries, however, show very different examples on the real influence of the central (national) level on the locally implemented UDPs. In the following, some UGIS case studies are summarised, in decreasing order of central influence, i.e. in decreasing order of the existence and power of national urban policy in the analysed countries.

In the Netherlands, area-based UDPs in the larger cities take place within a national policy framework, the Big Cities Policy (BCP). Under this framework the central government demands local governments decide upon local priorities, policy design and implementation. The central state also requires that programmes are designed in co-operation with other partners such as private companies, residents and/or social organisations, and in this regard some responsibilities are devolved to lower levels. This might happen within some of the cities. The cities feel the influence of the central governmental level as the BCP money that they receive is earmarked at that level: while it is officially labelled as ‘BCP money’, it is actually sent to the separate sectors (departments) of the cities. In that sense, one might argue that the central government, through participation in the communalised budgets and the regulations of the flows of money, has a firm grip on the urban development programmes.

In Sweden the Metropolitan Development Initiative (MDI) represents an attempt by the central government to address a set of burning political issues relating to the integration/segregation problem by making local development agreements between the state and the seven participating councils. Thus, basically the agreement is a clear case of public-public partnership where the central government sets the general goals: (i) to create conditions for a long term sustainable growth in the city regions; and (ii) to break down the social, ethnic and discriminatory segregation in the city regions and to promote equality and equal living conditions for the residents of the cities. The other side of the agreement is that the local governments translate these goals into action. In terms of centralisation/decentralisation one may conclude that policy formulation is in the hands of central government as is the power over the extra financial resources needed for implementation (to be eligible for funding, a particular local government has to mobilise an amount of money corresponding to the sum given by the central government). The MDI has been set up by the central government, that decides which municipalities are to receive financial support, while the selected municipalities get a decisive role in proposing the target areas. Costs are then shared equally (i.e. on a fifty-fifty financial basis) in all local development agreements. With the framework of the development agreements and the centrally stated general goals, local governments are relatively free to set and implement locally defined goals and tasks. If the MDI does not remain merely ad hoc as it is now, it will become integrated within the more structural, growth-oriented regional development strategy recently stated by the government, a move towards a comprehensive urban policy on the national level could become a real possibility.

In Germany, the ‘Soziale Stadt’ programme, initiated by the national government, forms the general framework for UDPs. The flow of power can be described by a chain from the State through the länder to the cities. The relation between the State and the länder is laid down in an agreement (the ‘Verwaltungsvereinbarung’), that has to be renewed annually and is only valid when all länder sign. The
other relation, between the länder and the cities, cannot be described in a general way, since this depends on how each land defines the conditions for the cities to receive funding. Common to all is the requirement by the State that cities can only apply for funding if they can present an 'integrated action concept' for the power and responsibility. Even in the most centralised Villaverde-Usera case, where financing came from a share of unemployed or recipients of social assistance among the inhabitants, shows the need for urban renewal and if the proposal includes a detailed plan of integrated measures for each of the planned projects, the land usually accepts the area to participate in the programme. Even though it is a national programme, the funding of the 'Social City' is split equally between the State, the land, and the city levels. Funds from the national level are not allocated to the projects directly, but distributed to the länder first.

In Amsterdam the district councils, which consist of elected members, are strongly involved in the UDPs but development of UDPs. Within this general picture, however, there is a relatively large variation in the role played by regional and local authorities in the development of UDPs. In the example of the UDP in Villaverde-Usera, the UDP is financed primarily by the regional government, and this level of administration plays a very important role in the allocation of funds within the project. In other cases neither the national, nor the regional level plays a substantial role in the UDPs.

In Hungary the political changes of 1989/90 (see e.g. Andruss et al. 1996; Toscis 2005) have resulted in a strong fragmentation of the administrative system: local governments became very independent, while the middle tier of government (the counties) were substantially weakened in power. However, having the aspect of local independence much stronger than that of service delivery, the local governments became very small (having barely more than 3,000 as an average number of population), thus this change can better be interpreted as fragmentation, instead of decentralisation, as the new entities became too small to exert real power over all aspects of their development.

Another basic feature of the transition from planned to market economy was the extreme privatisation of housing. This, combined with the financial autonomy of cities, means that the responsibility for urban development was transferred to the local governmental level (see e.g. Hegedüs & Toscis 1996). With the exception of two smaller initiatives, in the 1990s no national framework programme existed in Hungary for urban development, as the central government did not consider this as an important task. In the absence of any overarching framework, urban development became the full responsibility of the municipalities, resulting in very different outcomes (Szemző & Toscis 2004).

Summarising the above, the five cases are more or less ranked according to the extent of national level urban policies. In the first three cases there is a (national) policy framework, but the influence of the national government varies: it seems to be largest in the Netherlands, more of an ad hoc character in Sweden and rather indirect in Germany. In the last two cases, there is no (national) policy framework and in that sense no national level intervention. But, while in Spain the regions might play some role, in Hungary it is the municipalities that are mainly responsible for urban development programmes.

Earlier it was pointed out that in all the case studies (none of them being a classic unitary state), local governments have substantial political strength to establish and implement UDPs. However, if there are overarching urban policy frameworks (such as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany), these frameworks regulate the relationships between and the involvement of the different (national, regional, local) governmental levels regarding UDPs, regardless of the model of public administration. On the other hand, if there is no overarching policy framework existing (like in Spain or Hungary), the model of public administration will be decisive.

Policy-making at the local level and the relationship between the local (municipal) and the sublocal level—Compared to the central level, the analysis of local urban policy making is more difficult because of a wider variety between institutional arrangements and contexts. For that reason, the following examples only serve as illustrations of many possible models.

In Spain, local governments tend to be the main policy entrepreneurs in urban matters. In some cases grassroots civil society organisations play an important role in introducing issues on the political agenda through mobilisation and political pressure on the authorities. The role of the local government vis-à-vis sublocal entities varies strongly between Spanish cities as well as within cities, depending on the sublocal entity in question. In two Spanish inner-city UDPs, the local government plays the main role during the whole process. The cases analysed in the outskirts of the cities reflect a much more complex governance scheme, where citizens’ involvement in the UDP create a whole new scheme of incentives and disincentives for the different public authorities, facilitating the appearance of ad hoc structures of distribution of power and responsibility. Even in the most centralised Villaverde-Usera case, where financing came from the shares of unemployed and social assistance among the inhabitants, shows the need for urban renewal and if the proposal includes a detailed plan of integrated measures for each of the planned projects, the land usually accepts the area to participate in the programme. Even though it is a national programme, the funding of the ‘Social City’ is split equally between the State, the land, and the city levels. Funds from the national level are not allocated to the projects directly, but distributed to the länder first.

In Stockholm district councils with overall responsibilities for their areas, without, however, having direct responsibility in urban planning, except for local environmental work and maintenance of streets and parks. The districts may influence the UDPs through contracts with higher-level authorities.

In Amsterdam the district councils, which consist of elected members, are strongly involved in the UDPs but do not play a decisive role in them. In the first phase of the Big Cities Policy, proposals for including deprived neighbourhoods in the BCP-programme came from the districts, but were evaluated by the municipal council where the final selection of these neighbourhoods also took place. Money from the BCP flowed from the central government to the municipal government and from there to the district government. Both the central government and the municipal government played an important role in the determination of the use of BCP money in the districts.

While the Big Cities Policy-I programme in Amsterdam definitely implied examples of a tendency towards decentralisation from the local level of and new partnerships, it could not be referred to as an ‘emancipation of the city districts.’ An important issue in this context was the fact that for a long time the city districts had had the characteristics of a merely administrative organisation and had often not been very well equipped for their tasks, due to a lack of capacity, continuity and knowledge.

In Budapest the dual power system affords great flexibility and adaptability in various local matters, but creates enormous difficulties when city-wide policies have to be implemented. In the first part of the 1990s neither national, nor municipal framework programmes for complex urban development existed in Budapest. Thus, the development of such programmes was typically ad hoc, and even in the case of the small BCP disadvantaged area, money of small number was able to set up strategic goals and start comprehensive urban development programmes. It was only in one of the 23 districts where an overarching plan for urban renewal has been passed by the district government, on the basis of which compulsory privatisation of housing could be avoided and the public sector could play a leading role in the process of renewal. A slight change occurred in 1994, when the role of the municipality in strategic issues was strengthened, and in 1996, with the adoption of the Budapest Urban Rehabilitation Concept and Programme: since then the municipal level offers some financial backing for district programmes. The urban rehabilitation programme, however, operates in the form of an open competition, which means that the task of the establishment of the urban development programmes still remains with the districts.

All this results in enormous differences between the districts in their abilities (and willingness) to develop and carry out local area-based urban development programmes. (The role of the municipality has been strengthened since 2003, with the approval of the Strategic Development Concept of Budapest, and with the launching of the medium term Urban Development Programme in 2005; these new elements of municipal level urban policy will, however, only affect district-based UDPs with several years delay.

The four cases discussed above are ranked according to the extent of impact of the municipal government level, as compared to that of the districts, on urban policies. In the case of Madrid the power of the municipal level is somewhat constrained, not so much due to the districts, but rather due to grassroots civil society organisations, active in some parts of the city.

The cases of Stockholm and Amsterdam show efforts at the city level towards decentralisation, to move decision-making somewhat closer to the citizens. However, in the Stockholm case the districts are rather only deconcentrated units, and the Amsterdam districts also have limited power to act as independent units within the city. Accordingly, these lower-level units only play a limited role in the UDPs: they are mainly involved in the implementation, instead of in the decision-making about the basic parameters of the UDPs. Among the four studied cities discussed, almost full decentralisation of urban planning-making to the district level, with all its disadvantages (and some advantages) is only observable in Budapest.
The ‘local urban policy decentralisation slope’ can thus be described as follows: from centralisation and bottom-up participation (Madrid) through deconcentration (Stockholm) and partial decentralisation (Amsterdam) to strong decentralisation (Budapest). This grouping coincides strongly with the group ing based on general power-sharing between the municipal and the district levels (see Table 2). This shows that UDPs are rarely further decentralised from the municipal level towards sublocal entities, except for the cases when the local level is decentralised in general, and the sublocal entities dispose considerable power. An additional reason for that might be the fact that other types of organizational forms also exist to carry out area-based UDPs (e.g. area-offices, Public-private partnerships arrangements, local participation models), which might be more flexible and more efficient than the delegation of the tasks to general purpose sublocal government units.

The links between central and local policymaking - Regarding urban policies at the national level, countries strongly diverge. At one extreme, one might find countries with a national-level urban policy framework and a financial subsidy system for urban development programmes. Examples of these are the Big Cities Policy in the Netherlands, the Metropolitan Development Initiative in Sweden, the Kvarter108 programme in Denmark, the Politique de la Ville in France, the Social Impulse Fund in Flanders and, to a certain extent, the Soziale Stadt in Germany. An opposite model, with a total lack of a national level urban policy, can be found, for example, in Spain, Italy and Hungary.

Countries also differ in terms of the role that the local level plays in urban policy-making. This relates to the amount of independence of the submunicipal government in determining important aspects of the programme, such as housing policy, social policy, determination of local taxes, investment decisions, etc. Practice shows that in the ‘locally centralised’ cities all these functions are controlled at the municipal level, while districts get some role in the programme negotiations and implementation. In the ‘locally decentralised’ cities the main decisions are taken by the district local government, getting probably only some financial support from the municipality. In many cases the municipal control over the local level is influenced (constrained) by semi-governmental, nongovernmental organisations or grass roots civil society movements, aiming to influence the UDP.

Combining these two dimensions of policymaking results in a 2 x 2 table, in which the cells represent very different circumstances and institutional settings for UDPs (see Table 3). For analytical purposes a simplified classification is used, that makes the overview and understanding of the different types of cases somewhat easier. This classification is, however, not a static one, as the position of countries or even cities within a country might change between categories over time. In some cases the changes can be considered the result of conscious policies.

Table 3. UDPs in the context of policy-making at the national and local level in various European countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban policy making at the local level</th>
<th>Centralised: UDP determined by the municipal level</th>
<th>Decentralised: UDP determined by a submunicipal entity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralised (existing, strong national urban development policy)</td>
<td>A: Denmark and Flanders</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralised (non-existing or weak national urban development policy)</td>
<td>C: Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France</td>
<td>D: Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/D: Spain and Italy</td>
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The main tendencies of such changes in recent years have been the following:

- Changes from Al C towards B/D: these changes imply the involvement of sub-municipal entities in the design, implementation and monitoring of urban development programmes. This application of partnership, however, does not necessarily include the transfer of final decision-making rights to the district level.

A good example of such conscious policy-development can be seen in the case of the Netherlands, where UDPs developed within the Big Cities Policy framework are characterised by a shared policy responsibility expressed in partnerships between different political levels, as well as between political levels and other stakeholders. These partnerships are established through written agreements, such as covenants between the national government and the city governments; covenants between the cities and their districts; agreements between the districts and other parties involved; plans at the district/ neighbourhood-level; and co-operation of almost all state departments, co-ordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

Within the limits of these agreements, policy implementation is devolved to political authorities at lower levels, to a much larger extent than in earlier policy frameworks. The city covenants form the basis for the allocation of national money for the implementation of Big Cities Policy. In other cases the changes are less the consequence of conscious decisions, but rather the result of the success of individual innovative programmes initiated ‘from below’.

In both types of initiatives it might happen that the UDP, because of its specific organisational requirements, based on participation and partnership, leads to (formal) changes in the relationships and interplay between actors at different governmental levels and between public and non-public actors. Moreover, these changes, if part of a successful UDP, might serve as a pattern for future governmental policies. In other words, successful UDPs might stimulate new forms of (urban) governance, making a difference in terms of existing power structures. The main examples on this potentially innovative character of UDPs are the analysed cases from the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, while the lasting effect of the following two ‘bottom-up’ cases is much more doubtful.

The Spanish example shows that UDPs developed on the basis of a bottom-up initiative and mobilisation represent the most innovative schemes creating new forms of urban governance: One sign of that is that those grassroots organisations which remained involved in the running of the programme have been successful in getting the right to influence the distribution of resources. Whether those new institutional arrangements survive after the end of the UDPs (that is to say, the sustainability of those schemes of distribution of power) remains uncertain.

This depends both on the grass-roots organisations’ capacity to adapt to their ‘success’ and to the ever changing institutional environments of which they form a part, as well as on the will of public administrations to continue co-operating with those civil society organisations.

Under the extremely decentralised circumstances of Hungary, the case of District IX in Budapest, with by far the most successful urban renewal programme in the whole country, is clearly exceptional. A series of special circumstances, such as stable political leadership in the district, the early acceptance of a local urban renewal plan, on the basis of which privatisation could be avoided, together led to the successful urban renewal of a huge area of the district. In other districts, however, nothing comparable happened. During the implementation of the UDP, the institutional structure within the district municipality (the responsibilities allocated between the departments) and also the links between the district and other organisations (with the creation of a non-profit organisation responsible for implementation) have changed from time to time, and the innovative solutions introduced are well known in other municipalities. It remains to be seen, however, how much of the innovative practices can be applied by other districts of Budapest and by other local governments in Hungary, and how big - if at all - the effect of this UDP will be on the formulation of a national-level urban policy in Hungary. (From this aspect the contrast of this successful UDP and the lack of similar results in other local governments clearly points towards the need to have more municipal and central government involvement in shaping urban development.)
CONCLUSION

We started this paper with the aim of discussing the organisation of Urban Development Programmes, particularly concentrating on the form and extent of 'public-public partnership', i.e. on the role that the different levels of the public administration play, both through the administrative system and through policymaking. From our short analysis it is clear that both the model of public administration, in terms of the extent and form of decentralisation, and the presence (or Jack) of a national policy framework determine the extent in which UDPs can be planned, approved and implemented at the local level.

Urban Development Programmes are usually developed in a complex interplay between different governmental levels, and implemented by a wide variety of public and non-public parties. Considering the institutional settings in which these programmes take place, there is an enormous variation:

- There is a wide variety in national systems of public administration between European countries, ranging from unitary states to federal states. These different systems imply various degrees of decentralisation, with huge implications for the relative power and autonomy of regional and local levels of governments.
- Besides, the local system of public administration is also an important factor for the setting of UDPs. The extent of local decentralisation, from the local level to the sublocal levels varies enormously.
- Additionally, the settings of UDPs are also strongly determined by the presence or absence of a national urban policy framework.

The institutional climate in which the UDPs are embedded not only differs between countries, but the climate is also turbulent: the national models of public administration in Europe have been subjected to change, as expressed in processes of state territorial- and urban-regional restructuring. Within countries there have been contradictory challenges: at the same time there have been tendencies towards centralisation and decentralisation.

While an increasing emphasis on privatisation has reduced the proactive role of the national government in the economy and society, generally speaking central states continue to exercise a dominant role. Because of a diversification of decision-making and a restructuring of intergovernmental relationships in which the relative strength of the different governmental levels has changed, national governments now interact with other levels of government in far more complex ways. Caused by decentralisation processes, subnational governments now seem to have more freedom to decide, although of ten within limits set by the central authorities. Moreover, both in a vertical and in a horizontal sense, the 'new subnational governance' is characterised by intergovernmental competition.

At the same time, there are also upwards pressures, for example from the local to the 'metropolitan' scale, related to economic globalisation processes that create denser socio-economic interdependencies on urban-regional scales.

The UDPs and the ways in which they are implemented are thus affected by (the quest for) new forms of governing and changes in processes of decision-making and control over territories in all their complexity, captured by the term 'governance.' The case studies examined (Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary and Spain) represent the large variation existing in European countries, showing also the fact that the two dimensions of our analysis are independent from each other (Germany and Spain have a more or less similar structure of public administration while their urban policy-making is very different; and the same applies to Sweden and Hungary).

All the case studies are taken from (devolving or regionalised) unitary states and federal states. In theory, in these models of public administration, local governments would be expected to have substantial political strength to establish and implement UDPs. However; a closer look at the cases indicates that if there are overarching urban policy frameworks (such as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany), these frameworks regulate the relationships between and the involvement of the different (national, regional and local) governmental levels regarding UDPs. In these cases, the central influence over UDPs is (rather) strong, irrespective of the model of public administration.

Thus, these cases show that the central influence over UDPs can be successfully ensured through an urban policy framework of the central government, even in cases where the system of public administration of the country is strongly decentralised.

On the other hand, if there is no overarching policy framework (as in Spain or Hungary), the model of public administration will be decisive in terms of relative strength of the regional or municipal governmental levels. One could thus argue that the central influence over UDPs depends more on the urban policy framework of the central government than on the model of public administration of a country.

Governance at the local level, whether modelled as an ‘urban coalition’ or an ‘urban regime’, implies that political power and institutional capabilities are less derived from formal constitutional processes, but more from a capacity to wield and co-ordinate resources from public and private actors and interests. Power, in terms of capacities to change or maintain resources, as a power base for control, has become more widely spread. In this regard the involvement of the sublocal government units is only one of the options to ensure co-operation between actors. However, the transfer of too much power to the sublocal government units might be controversial, especially in non-integrated administrative systems, where these units might not be able to control some important aspects of local development (e.g. economic development, employment, etc.).

The key for the success of an individual UDP lies in the local public administration: not only should sufficient power be given to the local level, this administration should also be open for co-operation with the subnational level and actors. Thus, we could argue that sufficient decentralisation of public administration to the municipal level and the use of governance methods at the local level both open up possibilities for successful UDPs.

This is, however, not enough. In order to ensure the replicability of successful UDPs (especially in run down areas) and to control their external effects, there is a strong need for national (regional) urban policies. Without such policies, successful local UDPs will remain isolated cases and might cause even more trouble in the broader territorial area (e.g. by pushing poor people out) than positive changes in their small local area.

Thus, a given extent of administrative decentralisation, and a well developed national (regional) urban policy are both needed to create optimal circumstances for the success and broader positive effects of UDPs.

Recent developments in many European countries and cities show tendencies towards (1) the formulation of overall national policy frameworks, and (2) the wishes/ considerations of local governments for decentralisation from the municipal level towards submunicipal levels, such as districts. While the first seems to be essential for the success of UDPs, the usefulness of the second is much more doubtful. It should be handled with care, within the framework of local governance models, in which other types of co-operation are also included.

UDPs are of ten renewing, in the sense that their organisational requirements are formulated in terms of concepts such as partnership and participation. In a broader sense, the analysed UDPs reflect characteristics of more general policy orientations developed in European socio-economic contexts in the 1990s. Thus UDPs, as area-based programmes, reflect the structure and functioning of the national and local power structures, and their relations. Consequently, UDPs are among those means, with which the usual functioning of these structures can be analysed, questioned and changes can be initiated.

In some cases, under specific national/local circumstances, certain UDPs might become innovative examples of new forms of co-operation (governance) between highly divergent actors, breaking through the normal, usual functioning of the central and local power structures and act as 'forerunners' for changes in administrative patterns which later become generally accepted. This might be true in both directions: UDPs might become early examples of decentralisation in over-centralised systems, or the reverse, they might become the early examples of regaining central power in over-decentralised systems.


