

# MILITARY POLICY: A DIALOGUE WITH LEADERS OF PARTIES AND BLOCS



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In order to clear up and specify the positions of participants of the 2002 election campaign on military policy issues, Razumkov Centre turned to leaders of parties and blocs with a request to assess the current status, priorities and prospects of the reform of the Military organisation of the state.

The results of questioning of leaders of parties and blocs are presented in the Table *“Ukraine’s military policy and military security: questions and answers”*. They have showed that participants of the election campaign, as a rule, have quite definite positions as to the concrete directions of military policy and military building in Ukraine, events and terms of the Armed Forces reform.

The analysis of the stated positions allows making some assumptions as to the possible solution of the problems in the military sphere by newly elected Parliament.

## Foreign policy directions

The main problem of foreign policy direction of the military policy is that of future of Ukraine’s non-aligned status or joining either NATO or the CIS Collective Security Organisation (the Tashkent Treaty).

**Only two parties — Green Party of Ukraine (GPU) and Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) — intend to resolutely advocate Ukraine’s non-aligned status. Others believe that Ukraine should join one or another military-political bloc.** At that, centre right and centrist political structures (Viktor Yushchenko’s Bloc “Our Ukraine”, Bloc “For a United Ukraine!”, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(u))) see Ukraine as a NATO member, and the left (Nataliya Vitrenko’s Bloc and Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)) — as a participant of the Tashkent Treaty.

Certain inconsistency of GPU strikes the eye. While defending, in line with the party ideology, Ukraine’s non-aligned status, the Greens declare the necessity of a fully professional army — the feature usually not intrinsic to non-aligned countries.

SPU does not support Ukraine’s course towards joining NATO or the Tashkent Treaty but considers it expedient to establish “a new security system”. It may be assumed that after the establishment of such a system, SPU will change its position as to Ukraine’s non-aligned status.

It is noteworthy that the adherents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO refer the act of accession to remote future, while the advocates of joining the Tashkent Treaty intend to do this “immediately”, or “right now”. Some grounds for such a position of the left (apart from their ideological and geopolitical directions) exist — after all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and of CIS countries were established on the basis of once united Soviet Army, and their present state is roughly the same. Therefore, there are actually no technical problems with such an accession. The problem is that the possible representation of the left in future Parliament is unlikely to ensure the required number of votes in favour of the decision on Ukraine’s accession to the Tashkent Treaty.

**The adherents of Ukraine’s course towards NATO membership are divided about its terms and preconditions.** For instance, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc and SDPU(u) believe that Ukraine may join the Alliance as early as in 5-10 years, irrespective of its possible transformations. Bloc “Our Ukraine” stands for accession only “after NATO transformation into an OSCE structure” — this position requires elaboration, since, as far as we know, such a transformation is not on the agenda, current discussions cover only the identification of the place and role of NATO in the new Euro-Atlantic security system. Bloc “For a United Ukraine!” does not set concrete terms of Ukraine’s accession to NATO adding that “the time of joining will depend on the state of the national economy, settlement of the social problems of the Armed Forces, comprehension of the necessity to join the Alliance by entire society”.



**UKRAINE'S MILITARY POLICY AND MILITARY SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**

	Viktor YUSHCHENKO's Bloc "OUR UKRAINE"	Electoral Bloc DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE - PARTY "DEMOCRATIC UNION"	Bloc "FOR A UNITED UKRAINE!"	Nataliya VITRENKO's Bloc	Yuliya TYMOSHENKO's Bloc	All-Ukrainian Political Association "WOMEN FOR THE FUTURE"	COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	GREEN PARTY OF UKRAINE	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE (united)	SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
<b>1. How do you assess the present level of budget expenditures on national defence?</b>										
Very low										
Low	•		•	•	•			•		•
Sufficient		—				—			•	
High								•		
Very high										
<b>2. Are Ukraine's Armed Forces and other military formations capable of effective defence of the state's sovereignty against military threats?</b>										
Yes									•	
No	•	—	•	•	•	—	•	•		•
Hard to say			•							
<b>3. Is the level of maintenance of Ukraine's military formations sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to them?</b>										
The Armed Forces										
Yes										
No	•	—	•	•	•	—	•	•	•	•
Hard to assess										
Border Troops										
Yes										
No	•	—	•	•	•	—	•	•	•	•
Hard to assess								•		
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs										
Yes	•		•	•				•	•	•
No		—	•			—				
Hard to assess					•		•			
Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry for Emergencies										
Yes								•	•	
No	•	—	•		•	—				•
Hard to assess				•			•			
Military Structures of the Security Service of Ukraine										
Yes	•		•	•					•	
No		—	•			—				•
Hard to assess					•		•	•		
<b>4. Is the level of professional training of Ukraine's military formations sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to them?</b>										
The Armed Forces										
Yes			•				•	•	•	
No	•	—		•	•	—				•
Hard to assess										
Border Troops										
Yes			•				•		•	
No	•	—		•		—				•
Hard to assess					•		•			
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs										
Yes	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•
No		—				—				
Hard to assess										
Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry for Emergencies										
Yes	•		•				•	•	•	
No		—		•		—				•
Hard to assess					•					
Military Structures of the Security Service of Ukraine										
Yes	•		•	•			•		•	
No	•	—				—				•
Hard to assess					•		•	•		
<b>5. Is the level of morale and discipline in Ukraine's military formations sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to them?</b>										
The Armed Forces										
Yes			•						•	
No	•	—		•		—	•	•		•
Hard to assess					•					
Border Troops										
Yes			•		•				•	
No	•	—		•		—	•			•
Hard to assess							•	•		



	Viktor YUSHCHENKO's Bloc "OUR UKRAINE"	Electoral bloc DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE - PARTY "DEMOCRATIC UNION"	Bloc "FOR A UNITED UKRAINE!"	Nataliya VITRENKO's Bloc	Yuliya TYMOSHENKO's Bloc	All-Ukrainian Political Association "WOMEN FOR THE FUTURE"	COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	GREEN PARTY OF UKRAINE	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE (united)	SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
<b>Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs</b>										
Yes			•		•				•	
No	•	—		•		—	•			•
Hard to assess								•		
<b>Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry for Emergencies</b>										
Yes	•		•		•				•	
No		—		•		—	•			•
Hard to assess								•		
<b>Military Structures of the Security Service of Ukraine</b>										
Yes			•						•	
No	•	—		•		—	•			•
Hard to assess					•			•		
<b>6. Is the level of social security of Ukraine's military personnel sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to them?</b>										
<b>The Armed Forces</b>										
Yes			•							
No	•	—		•	•	—		•	•	•
Hard to assess							•			
<b>Border Troops</b>										
Yes			•							
No	•	—		•	•	—		•	•	•
Hard to assess							•			
<b>Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs</b>										
Yes			•							•
No	•	—		•	•	—		•	•	•
Hard to assess							•			
<b>Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry for Emergencies</b>										
Yes			•							
No	•	—		•	•	—		•	•	•
Hard to assess							•			
<b>Military Structures of the Security Service of Ukraine</b>										
Yes			•							•
No	•	—		•	•	—		•	•	•
Hard to assess							•			
<b>7. Which of the following assessments most accurately describes the changes in the Armed Forces in the period of independence?</b>										
Planned process of reform										
Forced process of reduction with attempts of reform	•							•		
Poorly managed process of reduction with imitation of reform		—			•			•		
Gradual collapse that acquired signs of an irreversible process				•		—				•
No changes are taking place										
Other (specify)										
<b>8. How should the problem of the Armed Forces of Ukraine funding be resolved?</b>										
Reduce the Armed Forces strength to the level whereby the standard requirements will be satisfied with the present funding (30-40 thousand)										
Reduce the Armed Forces strength with a simultaneous increase of their funding	•		•	•	•			•	•	•
Raise funding of the Armed Forces of the present strength to the level of the standard requirements at the expense of other articles of the state budget						—				
Leave everything as it is without any changes										
<b>9. Which way of resolution of the problem of obsolescence and wear and tear of weapon systems is best suitable for Ukraine in the next 10 years?</b>										
Development and production of domestic weapon systems								•		
Leasing of arms from other countries										
Purchase of arms from other countries										
Production of arms in co-operation with other countries	•			•						•
Local modernisation of available weapon systems		—			•					
Modernisation of available weapon systems in co-operation with other countries									•	
Other (specify)										
Hard to say								•		
<b>10. Does the present military-political situation in the region and in the world allow radical reduction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?</b>										
Yes	•		•	•					•	•
No		—			•	—	•			
Hard to say								•		



	Viktor YUSHCHENKO's Bloc "OUR UKRAINE"	Electoral bloc DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE + PARTY "DEMOCRATIC UNION"	Bloc "FOR A UNITED UKRAINE!"	Nataliya VITRENKO's Bloc	Yuliya TYMOSHENKO's Bloc	All-Ukrainian Political Association "WOMEN FOR THE FUTURE"	COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	GREEN PARTY OF UKRAINE	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE (united)	SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
<b>10.1. If reduction is expedient, to what level should they be reduced?</b>										
250 thousand			•							•
200 thousand				•					•	
150 thousand										
100 thousand	•	—				—				
Other (specify)										
Hard to say								•		
<b>11. Should the present term of conscript service be changed?</b>										
It should be reduced	•		•	•				•	•	•
It should not be changed		—			•	—	•			
It should be extended										
<b>11.1. If so, to what term?</b>										
To 12 months	•		•	•				•	•	•
To 9 months		—				—				
To 6 months										
<b>12. Should the Armed Forces of Ukraine entirely transfer to a professional basis?</b>										
Yes	•		•	•	•			•	•	•
No		—		•		—	•			
Hard to say										
<b>12.1. If so, when?</b>										
In 3-5 years	•							•		
In 5-7 years		—				—				•
In 7-10 years									•	
In 10-15 years			•		•					
<b>13. Should the Government of Ukraine publish the White Paper "Defence Policy of Ukraine"?</b>										
Yes	•		•	•			•	•	•	
No		—				—				
Hard to say					•					•
<b>14. Should the Verkhovna Rada give consent to the appointment of the Minister of Defence and heads of other military and law-enforcement structures?</b>										
Yes, this will strengthen parliamentary control of the activity of military and law-enforcement structures	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•
No, this will complicate the procedure of appointment		—	•			—				
Hard to say								•		
<b>15. Should the post of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine be occupied by a civilian person?</b>										
Yes, this corresponds to the practice of democratic countries	•		•	•	•			•	•	•
No, Ukraine is not yet ready for such practice		—		•		—	•			
<b>16. Should the Law of Ukraine "On Defence of Ukraine" be amended to envisage approval of the programmes of reform (development) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada?</b>										
Yes, this will strengthen the responsibility of the Verkhovna Rada for programmes implementation	•		•	•			•	•	•	•
No, this will lead to delays in programmes approval		—				—				
Hard to say					•					
<b>17. Should the mechanisms of parliamentary control in the field of arms trade be introduced in Ukraine?</b>										
Yes, the Verkhovna Rada should be entitled to obtain from the Government full information on export control issues and hold open hearings in this connection	•			•				•		
Yes, the Verkhovna Rada should be entitled to obtain from the Government full information on export control issues but only on the condition of confidentiality		—			•	—	•	•	•	
Yes, the Government should grant limited information on the condition of confidentiality only to the Verkhovna Rada Committees on National Security and Defence and on International Relations			•							
No, this will only lead to leakage of information and political speculations										
<b>18. Should the Government of Ukraine annually publish a report about arms exports by the results of the year?</b>										
Yes, a detailed report should be published in the media	•									
Yes, but with presentation of only general data in the media		—	•			—			•	
Yes, but only for the Verkhovna Rada on the condition of confidentiality				•	•		•	•		•
No										
<b>19. Should Ukraine pass the Law "On State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designed for Military Purpose and Dual-Use Goods"?</b>										
Yes, this bill should be considered immediately, as a priority one	•		•	•			•	•	•	•
Yes, this bill should be considered in accordance with the standard procedure			•					•		
No, existing by-laws passed by the President and the Government are sufficient for export control		—				—				
Hard to say					•					



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<b>20. Should Ukraine join EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports?</b>										
Yes	•		•					•	•	•
No		—		•		—	•			
Hard to say					•					
<b>21. Whose export control experience is the most useful for Ukraine?</b>										
Of the EU	•		•	•	•			•	•	•
Of Russia			•	•		—				
Of the USA		—	•							
Of other countries (specify)										
Hard to say							•			
<b>22. How would you assess the level of your information about the situation in Ukraine's Armed Forces and other military formations?</b>										
Sufficient	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•
Insufficient		—			•	—		•		
We are actually barred of trustworthy information										
<b>23. Does your party (bloc) have candidates for the post of:</b>										
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security and Defence	•		No comments	•	•		•	•	•	•
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legislative Support of Law-enforcement Activity	•			•	•		•			•
Minister of Defence	•	—		•	•	—	•			•
Minister of Internal Affairs	•			•	•		•			•
Minister for Emergencies	•			•	•		•	•		•
Head of the Security Service	•			•			•			•
Head of the State Committee of Border Control	•			•			•			•
<b>24. Which organisation should be the key actor in the process of maintaining regional security in Europe?</b>										
UN				•					•	
NATO			•			—		•		
EU		—			•					
OSCE	•						•			•
<b>25. Should Ukraine join NATO in the future?</b>										
Yes	•		•	•	•			•	•	•
No		—		•		—	•	•		•
Hard to say										
<b>26. If so, when?</b>										
In 5-10 years					•				•	
In 10-15 years		—				—				
Other (specify)	note 1		note 2							
<b>27. Should Ukraine join the CIS Collective Security Organisation (the Tashkent Treaty) in the future?</b>										
Yes				•	•		•	•	•	
No	•		•	•	•	—		•	•	
Hard to say										•
<b>28. If so, when?</b>										
In 5-10 years				Immediately,		—	Right now.			
In 10-15 years		—								
Other (specify)										note 3
<b>29. Should Ukraine remain a non-allied state?</b>										
Yes							•	•	•	•
No	•	—	•	•	•	—			•	
Hard to say										

Notes:

1 — After NATO transformation into an OSCE structure.

2 — The term of accession will depend on the state of the national economy, solution of social problems of the Armed Forces, comprehension of the necessity of joining the Alliance by entire society.

3 — New security system is required.

“—” No answer.



The positions of parties and blocs as to the key actor of the process of maintaining regional security in Europe also differ. Here, the positions of Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc and SDPU(u) unexpectedly coincide — both believe that it should be the UN. "For a United Ukraine!" and GPU see NATO as the main actor; other parties and blocs give preference to the EU (Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc) and OSCE ("Our Ukraine", CPU, SPU).

Given such differences in positions, Parliament-2002 will hardly manage to ultimately set foreign policy directions of the national military policy and fix them through adoption of a certain legal act: an agreement of Ukraine's accession to one or another military-political bloc, or amendment of the Constitution to establish Ukraine's non-aligned status. Proceeding from the responses of the leaders, it is possible to predict further co-operation of Ukraine both with NATO and European regional security structures and with Russia — the leader of the Tashkent Treaty.

### Domestic policy directions

The positions of political parties (blocs) as to domestic policy directions of military reform are determined, first and foremost, by their assessment of the current situation, fundamentals and prospects of reform of the Military organisation of the state.

Leaders of parties and blocs are united in their criticism of the process of reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. None of them agreed that the changes in the Armed Forces might be called a "planned process of reform". Instead, Bloc "Our Ukraine" and CPU assessed them as a "forced process of reduction with attempts of reform"; Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc and GPU — as "poorly managed process of reduction with imitation of reform"; Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc and SPU produced harsher assessment: "gradual collapse that acquired signs of an irreversible process". "For a United Ukraine!" and SDPU(u) believe that they witness a planned process of reform, but — under limited (or "in absence of regular") funding. Such an assessment seems controversial: if a process is planned, its financing should also be planned; and if funding is limited or absent, the planned character of reforms may be questioned.

The level of budget funding of national defence was recognised unsatisfactory almost unanimously. At that, left and opposition parties and blocs called it "very low", pro-presidential and centre right parties gave a less emotional assessment — "low". Only GPU called the level of budget funding of defence sufficient, which, however, may be viewed not as establishment of the real state of affairs but rather as an expression of understandable attitude of GPU to military problems and expenditures in general.

At the same time, leaders of parties and blocs called support of different military formations with resources unbalanced. All respondents described maintenance of the Armed Forces and Border Troops insufficient, maintenance of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was called sufficient by almost all respondents. Correlation between those assessments is demonstrative and points to the predominant attention of the authorities to military formations called to ensure order within the state.

When assessing the level of professional training of the Armed Forces and other military formations, parties (blocs)

were united only with respect to the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose level of professionalism was called sufficient. As for the Armed Forces and other military formations, views of the respondents split, which bears witness to the existence of certain doubts among politicians about the qualification of the formation intended for the defence of the state against external threats.

The assessment of the Armed Forces ability to guarantee the defence of national sovereignty against external threats may be viewed as a general assessment of the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Next to all parties (blocs), with the exception of SDPU(u), deny such ability of the Armed Forces, for the time being. Bloc "For a United Ukraine!" holds a special opinion on this issue. It is based on identification of military threats. The bloc believes that "among the potential threats to Ukraine, the threat of a regional war with the use of weapons of mass destruction is not ruled out. In such a war, the Armed Forces are unlikely to be victorious". At the same time, according to that bloc, in a local armed conflict "our army is capable to defend [our] state sovereignty".

Parties (blocs) intend to resolve the problems of raising combat potential of the Armed Forces and other military formations, in particular, by means of strengthening civilian control of the Military organisation of the state. For instance, the expediency of publication by the Government of the White Paper "Defence Policy of Ukraine" is out of the question, as this will promote strengthening of responsibility of the Government for the state of the army, transparency of its activity in the military sphere, better informing of the citizens about relevant issues.

Next to all parties and blocs share the view that the Verkhovna Rada should give its consent to the appointment of the defence minister and heads of other power structures, since "this will strengthen parliamentary control" of their activity. The only exception is Bloc "For a United Ukraine!": it believes that introduction of such a practice will "complicate the procedure of appointment".

Parties (blocs) also support amendment of the Law of Ukraine "On Defence of Ukraine" to envisage approval of the programmes of reform (development) of the Armed Forces by the Verkhovna Rada. Their leaders believe that "this will strengthen the responsibility of the Verkhovna Rada for the programmes implementation".

All parties and blocs with the exception of the left (Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc, CPU) believe that the post of the Minister of Defence should be occupied by a civilian person, since "this corresponds to the practice of democratic countries". However, Bloc "For a United Ukraine!" favours introduction of such a practice for the future.

All parties and blocs without exception agree with the necessity of introduction of mechanisms of parliamentary control in the sphere of arms trade in Ukraine. However, only three of them support public parliamentary hearings on this issue: "Our Ukraine", Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc and GPU. Other leaders believe that the Verkhovna Rada should obtain complete information about export control but solely on the condition of confidentiality; in the opinion of Bloc "For a United Ukraine!", such an information may be granted only to the two specialised parliamentary committees.

The leaders were similarly united in their support for adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designed for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods". Here, differences arose only regarding the procedure of its adoption: as a priority (Bloc "Our Ukraine", Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc, CPU, SDPU(u), and SPU) or under the usual procedure ("For a United Ukraine!", GPU).

While supporting toughening state export control and broader participation of Parliament in this process, almost all parties and blocs are ready to restrict public information about arms trade. Only Bloc "Our Ukraine" stands for the media publication of the most detailed annual report of the Government of Ukraine about arms exports. Bloc "For a United Ukraine!" and SDPU(u) admit the possibility of publication of only general information, and all other leaders stick to the opinion that the Government should report about arms exports only to the Verkhovna Rada on the condition of confidentiality.

Such a position seems somewhat unexpected, since Bloc "For a United Ukraine!", Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc, GPU, SDPU(u), and SPU, while supporting full or partial restriction of the subject of arms trade for the public, at the same time speak about usefulness of the EU experience of export control for Ukraine and/or stand for Ukraine's accession to EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports (only Nataliya Vitrenko's Bloc and CPU opposed such an accession). As is known, the Code envisages rather high degree of accessibility of information about arms trade to citizens<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, the intention of some parties and blocs to preserve the practice of non-transparency in the sphere of arms trade runs contrary to their declarations of orientation towards the European experience of export control.

Hence, if the parties and blocs, whose positions are presented above, come to Parliament, one may hope for certain strengthening of parliamentary control of the military sphere.

### Military priorities

Proceeding from responses given by leaders of parties and blocs, they are all united in definition of the directions of exit of the Armed Forces' of Ukraine out of crisis: reduction of the Armed Forces numerical strength with a simultaneous increase in their funding.

Almost all parties and blocs (with the exception of Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc and CPU) believe that the present military-political situation in the region and in the world allows Ukraine to perform a radical reduction of its Armed Forces. They cited different future expedient levels of the Armed Forces strength: from 250 thousand (Bloc "For a United Ukraine!", SPU) to 100 thousand servicemen (Bloc "Our Ukraine").

The majority of parties (blocs) share the opinion that the term of conscript service may be reduced to 12 months.

At the same time, parties (blocs) are practically unanimous (again, with the exception of the left) in their support for transition to the Armed Forces manning on a contract basis. At that, Bloc "Our Ukraine" and GPU

consider such a transition possible as early as in 3-5 years; other leaders were more restrained and referred it to more remote future: from 5-7 years (SPU) to 10-15 years (Bloc "For a United Ukraine!" and Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc).

It may be assumed that the problems of radical reduction of the Armed Forces combined with the level of their funding, as before, will be rather actively debated in Parliament. At the same time, in absence of a coordinated position as to the level of cuts, one may hardly hope for any resolute steps in this direction in the near future. The same relates to transition to the Armed Forces manning on a contract basis, since the majority of political structures postpone this transition far beyond the time-limit of activity of Parliament-2002. The only question that can practically be resolved by this Parliament is that of reduction of the term of conscript service.

### Economic and social aspects of military policy

Next to all parties and blocs described the level of social security of personnel of Ukrainian military formations as insufficient. Only Bloc "For a United Ukraine!" sticks to the opposite opinion.

It would be logical to suggest that the insufficient social security of servicemen noted by next to all leaders (as well as the poor maintenance and support of the Armed Forces and other military formations mentioned above) affects the morale and discipline of servicemen. However, the leaders' answers do not allow drawing an unambiguous conclusion that political actors really see direct correlation between these components of combat readiness. Positions of some parties (blocs) strangely combine admission of insufficiency of army maintenance and statements of the level of morale and discipline of servicemen sufficient for performance of their functions. Such a situation may be attributed to the fact that spread of information about the moral and psychological state of the Armed Forces, statistical data of delinquencies, suicides, mortality in the army are under an unofficial but nevertheless effective ban in Ukraine.

Now, back to the problem of social security of the military. It should be noted that this problem is raised in prospective and long-term programmes of practically all of the political parties. Hence, there are reasons to hope that its solution will remain in focus of new Parliament.

Generally speaking, familiarisation with the responses of leaders of parties (blocs) to the questionnaires, party and election programmes leaves rather optimistic impression. Although the problems of military policy are not among the priorities of political actors, they remain in their focus. Parties and blocs declare their intention to resolve the most acute problems of funding of military formations and social security of personnel, strengthen civilian control over the Military organisation. For this purpose, they have certain programme instruments, legislative initiatives and — equally important — are ready to contribute human resources capable of heading not only specialised parliamentary committees but also military and law-enforcement agencies. We only have to wait for the results of elections, hope for activity and responsibility of the new members of Parliament. ■

<sup>1</sup> For more detail about EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, see special issue of *National Security & Defence*, 2001, No.6, <http://www.uceps.com.ua>.