EUROPEAN SECURITY: NEW THREATS – OLD RESPONSES?

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For more than half a century, NATO, as a military-political alliance, has been at the core of West European defence; today, it in fact remains the only workable defence structure in Europe. At the same time, given the existing differences in the interests of the allies, limitations caused by the mainly military character of the NATO activity, and the will of the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security, there has emerged an objective necessity for developing an effective European security and defence structure.

Such a structure is being actively constructed under the auspices of the EU within the framework of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). At present, this process resembles establishment of a European branch of NATO rather than a proper response to the contemporary challenges facing Europe’s security. However, it may already be stated that united Europe has real chances of becoming a weightier actor not only in the economic but also in the security domain.

For Ukraine, the development of CESDP offers the possibility of strengthening the distinctive partnership with NATO in parallel with developing security and defence relations with the European Union, accession to which has been proclaimed the strategic goal of our state.

A HOT PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War allowed mankind to progress in a normal way, without fear of perishing in the flame of a nuclear conflict caused by ideological confrontation. However, the removal of the global threat and, along with it, of the total control of information, movement of people, capital, technologies and arms inherent in inter-bloc confrontation led to other threats — ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, illegal migration, international crime, arms and drug trafficking, environmental (natural and manmade) accidents — coming to the forefront.

Among the above-mentioned threats, the greatest danger fraught with possible evolution into military conflict is posed by ethnic and religious conflicts. Usually, they have a very long history, are quickly aggravated and slowly resolved. Europe has many such conflicts, at different stages and in different forms, including near Ukraine’s borders: in the Caucasus (Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorny Karabakh, Ossetia), Moldova (Transdnistria), Cyprus, the Balkans (Albania, FRY, Macedonia and other countries), Turkey. The Balkan and Caucasian conflicts have been Europe’s primary headache over the recent decade.

It is noteworthy that inter-ethnic and religious contradictions appear stronger than people’s adherence to the values of a democratic system and respect for universal human rights and freedoms. To cite just a few examples, one could mention the multiyear confrontation between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, separatist movements of Basques in Spain or Corsicans in France. This arouses particular concern, since even established democracies have failed so far to find effective remedies of such conflicts. Some European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Romania, Russia) are witnessing a

1 The reluctance of the USA to get immediately involved in the solution of all problems of European security beyond the framework of allied commitments.
strengthening of extreme right groupings that act under nationalist slogans and demand expulsion of foreigners. Open clashes between indigenous population and representatives of different cultural communities, strengthening of radical nationalist groupings prove that the developed European countries increasingly often appear unable to ensure lasting inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace using customary (legal, social and cultural) instruments of state policy. There arises the task of searching for other, adequate means of prevention and containment of potential conflicts on ethno-cultural grounds.

International terrorism poses a real threat to European security. Despite the decrease in the total number of terrorist acts committed all over the world, the events in the USA on September 11, 2001, prove that the threat of terrorism is not decreasing, but increasing. Huge human losses, impressive material damage and the psychological shock experienced by not only Americans, but people in the majority of countries of the world, show that counteraction to terrorist organisations should be viewed as the primary assignment of security structures, including Europeans. The leaders of the majority of West European countries have displayed a comprehension of the importance of this task.

As a rule, terrorists deliver asymmetrical strikes, when strategic goals are attained by tactical means, without the employment of sophisticated weapons. At the same time, the technical capabilities of terrorists are expanding: they employ commonly accessible new information technologies, satellite communications, and modern methods of forgery. The recipes for making explosive devices may be found in the Internet. On the other hand, the use of new information technologies in systems of state management and community support (power engineering, transport, banking sector) makes these especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Today, there are no effective defences against such threats. This was proved by the consistent attempts at penetration of hackers into the Pentagon databases, British satellite control systems, etc. So, international computer terrorism is viewed as one of the main threats to security, particularly of European countries.

Recently, there have been terrorist acts aimed not at attainment of concrete political demands (or assassination of specific persons) but at the general political and economic destabilisation of a country (region). This kind of terrorism was experienced by Russia, when in September, 1999, a series of explosions in residential blocks has been organised. Similar tactics (along with other terrorist acts) have been employed by fighters of the Irish Republican Army. The recent events in the USA have confirmed this trend. Such kind of terrorism has the following traits: a readiness to die in a symbolic act of revenge, arouse shock and fear in as many as possible people, cause huge material losses and therefore disorganise the activity of the authorities and provoke a political and economic crisis in the country (region).

The threat of terrorism should be viewed with account of the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. While in the early 1990s, the primary threat was believed to lie in the use of nuclear devices by terrorist groups, at the present time, primary attention is paid to chemical and biological weapons. The use of nuclear technologies requires technical qualification, a solid financial base and is hardly affordable for terrorist organisations, if they are not supported by a state. Chemical and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction for the ‘poor’) are much more accessible, and their production, storage and transportation are much harder to control than of nuclear weapons. Even the USA is unable to cope with the consequences of employment of bacteriological weapons, which was demonstrated more than once during simulation exercises held in the recent years.

Transborder crime and terrorist organisations are merging, using one another for attaining their goals. Radical groups obtain funds from trafficking of drugs and arms. Criminal organisations rather often hire terrorist gunmen for the removal of politicians and for subversive acts. For instance, there were reports about contacts between the Basque nationalist terrorist organisation ETA and Colombian drug cartels in the form of mutual assistance in arranging explosions in exchange for financial assistance to terrorists from drug cartels.

2 While in the late 1980s, more than 800 terrorist acts were committed annually (1987 — 832, 1989 — 856), in the late 1990s, there were no more than 400 such cases a year. See the article byUCEPS expert: I.Zhdanov. Terror means fear. — Dzerkalo Tsynya, August 14, 2001, p.5, http://www.zerkalo- nedeli.com.ua; http://www.uceps.com.ua
3 For more detail on the lessons and consequences of those terrorist acts, see the article byUCEPS President A.Grytsenko “Starting Point” published in this journal.
5 According to assessments made public at the 10th Crime Prevention Congress (April, 2000, Vienna), the overall income of terrorists from computer crimes makes $500 million a year. Losses from computer terrorists amount to $3.5 billion a year and increase by 35% annually; average losses inflicted by a single computer terrorist attack make up $560 thousand. See: Introduction to information security. — http://www.warning.dp.ua/comp4.
The struggle against illegal arms and drug trafficking is becoming increasingly topical for Europe, since, apart from direct negative consequences, a large share of profit from those criminal transactions is channelled to finance participants of armed conflicts and terrorists. In particular, there were reports that Kosovars bought arms and trained their fighters for funds obtained from drug trafficking. Hence, opposition to this threat presents one of the main tasks of the recently established Europol, along with struggle against international terrorism, human slavery, ‘laundering of money’ and transnational crime.

The threats mentioned above extremely rarely emanate from states whose leadership may be pressed into negotiations and agreements; the international scene is increasingly seeing the actions of non-governmental (out of governmental control) actors whose activity covers the territory of several countries or entire regions. The carriers of the new threats very rarely wear uniforms and do not observe norms of the international law that regiment combat operations, treatment of combatants and civilian population. The overwhelming majority of them is integrated into the common public, may freely travel around the world and enjoy all benefits of civilisation using them for attaining their goals. Furthermore, terrorist activity acquires a global character. For instance, the network of terrorist organisations operated by international terrorist Osama bin Laden, who is the main suspect of the terrorist acts committed in the USA, may encompass as many as 34 countries, including Great Britain. This was stated in a report prepared by the US Congress far before the tragedy of the 11th of September, 2001. It is not ruled out that this network has access to air defence assets and chemical weapons.

The terrorist attacks on the USA showed that transborder terrorist (or other criminal) groupings may inflict no less damage than a sudden attack of armed forces of a sovereign state or an organised separatist movement. Transborder groupings are formally not controlled by any government, so, the effectiveness of classical means of international diplomacy, economic pressure, traditional military operations against them (by NATO forces or the WEU Eurocorps) is limited.

Of late, Europe has witnessed the accumulation of a new potential for conflict created by strong flows of migration, particularly from the Arab East, North Africa, Central Asia. Refugees from regions of armed conflict and labour migrants are coming in. Stratification of countries by the standard of life criterion increases the number of those willing to flee from poverty to rich West European states, especially on the background of the labour market decline in some EU countries. The inflow of illegal migrants is increasing, and a significant number of those emerge in the ‘shadow’ sector: experts put the number of illegal workers in the EU countries at approximately 20 million. According to Europol, organised illegal immigration presents an increasing problem for the EU. Every year, hundreds of thousands of immigrants illegally come to Europe. There are estimates that their number (including those who later managed to get naturalised) amounts to 10% of West Europe’s population. Under the EU PHARE Programme, Austria, Germany and other countries grant Hungary, Poland and Slovakia significant funds for strengthening of their eastern borders. Poland is implementing a programme of border infrastructure development on the border with Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

Europe is also witnessing a deterioration of the natural and manmade environment, which may lead to significant human and material losses. Over the recent years, nature more than once showed its ruinous strength — hurricanes called ‘the storm of the century’ in France; forest fires in France and Slovakia; the ‘Lothar’ hurricane in Germany; winds up to 250 km/h in Switzerland; 43°C heat in Greece; blocking of railways by many days of rain in Scotland and England in 2000; floods of 2001 in Poland and France, etc. The 1997 flood on the river Oder flooded Poland and Germany alike (55 people died, losses exceeded $1 billion). All this points to the trans-border nature of threats that require joint efforts on the international level for joint prevention and containment of consequences of emergencies.

This threat is topical for Ukraine, too: rains accompanied with hurricanes on the territory of seven regions in July-August, 2000, icing in November-December, 2000, in 12 regions, a disastrous flood in
Transcarpathia in March, 2001, and a tornado in January of the same year. According to official data, over three years, material losses inflicted by natural accidents alone have increased in Ukraine more than ten-fold: from $28 million in 1997 to $294 million in 2000. It is no wonder that Ukraine put forward the initiative of establishment of a joint military unit (involving Ukraine, Romania and Hungary, later joined by Slovakia) — "Tysa" engineer battalion designated for prompt solution of tasks emerging in regions hit by a natural disaster in any of the member countries.

These and other threats are usually of a composite character, and are therefore accompanied with significant human losses and economic damage. So, their containment requires composite co-ordinated efforts of many countries.

Therefore, ten years after the end of the Cold War, the European situation is characterised by aggravation of transnational threats. Traditional military means are becoming less and less suitable for countering those threats. Diplomatic, political, economic, informational, law enforcement measures, along with military assets used in their new quality — compact, mobile, highly effective, trained to cope with a range of tasks at all stages of a conflict, are becoming far more important. Correspondingly, much more attention should be paid to co-ordination of security efforts on the international level: the role of the existing structures of European security, including NATO and the EU, is not decreasing but changing considerably, in line with the nature of present and future threats and their possible consequences.

ADAPTATION OF NATO AND THE EU TO NEW CONDITIONS: THE BEGINNING OF A LONG ROAD

After the end of the Cold War, it became clear that the fundamentally different military-political situation in Europe required a revision of the foundations and principles of activity of NATO, the EU and other European structures and their adaptation to new conditions.

Changes in NATO’s European policy

Immediately after 1991, the Alliance began transforming its concepts and structures. Collective defence of the member countries remained the main task of NATO, but it was supplemented with the task of strengthening security all over the European continent. The increased attention of the Alliance to the European scene was strengthened by the USA desire to raise the Europeans’ responsibility (first of all, financial) for their own security.

NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept announced its intention to develop a European Security and Defence Identity, which presumed: promotion of the WEU role as a defence component of the EU; granting WEU access to NATO assets within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); implementation of a new concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) presenting unified NATO structures that could be used for operational planning and the conduct of WEU and NATO operations.

The CJTF concept is based on the establishment of a flexible system of NATO headquarters to be provided with combat-ready “supporting” modules depending on the concrete situation. Such staffs are formed to manage military units of different composition, from different countries (including non-NATO) led by WEU (from 1999 — also by the EU). CJTF should be “separable but not separate” from NATO, i.e., they will rely on NATO infrastructure but will formally perform operations under the auspices of the EU, not NATO. For several years, the CJTF has been tested at field training exercises involving NATO and the EU members and partner countries; concept’s introduction should be completed before 2004.

Changes in the EU security environment

Changes in the international situation in the early 1990s had an impact not only on NATO but also on the EU. A significant reduction of the US presence in Europe, NATO transformation, strengthening of the economic posture of the EU — all this made members of this primarily economic union form a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Formation of the CFSP was envisaged by the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht, 1992) that stressed the need for addressing “all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence”; Article J.4.2 of the Treaty allowed the EU to task the WEU “to prepare and execute the decisions and actions of the Union relating to the defence sector”. At their meeting in Petersberg near Bonn (June, 1992), the WEU foreign and defence ministers outlined the range of CFSP tasks (the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”) — humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking — and coordinated the issues of detachment of assets and capabilities at EU disposal.

In fact, up until 1999, CFSP had existed on paper only, but the recent three years have seen the rapid development of a CFSP element — the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that envisages the establishment of effective structures under the EU auspices, using the WEU’s potential in particular.

Such a development was made possible by: the will and readiness of the EU countries to back the
advanced economic component of the Union with adequate measures in the security sector and decrease the excessive dependence of Europe on the USA for the resolution of European problems; changes in the nature and priorities of threats to the regional security after the end of the Cold War that required new counteractions not inherent in NATO (military-political alliance created for collective defence of its members).

Formation of CESDP was fixed in Article 17 of the new version of the Treaty of European Union (Amsterdam, 1997). Such a decision by the EU countries was probably prompted, among other things, by a dramatic experience of conflict management in Bosnia and Herzegovina by European countries under UN auspices in 1992-1995 — Europeans displayed their inability to contain a conflict in the centre of Europe without the US assistance. The EU has already spent Euro 20 billion to mitigate the consequences of the Balkan conflict (200,000 deaths, 1.8 million refugees), which European countries failed to prevent.

In November, 2000, the WEU Council of Ministers in Marseilles, France, agreed to rather radical measures: to assign the existing structures to EU disposal before July, 2001, and formally leave the functions of collective defence, parliamentary supervision of the security domain and promotion of co-operation in the arms production sector with the WEU.

In pursuance of the decisions taken on CESDP, a number of executive bodies of the EU has been established: the Office of the High Representative for the CFSP (supported by a planning cell of 40 persons), the EU Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff (130-150 persons). Before the end of 2001, those structures should enable the European Union to conduct humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations.

The immediate plans for the future envisage the establishment of the EU rapid reaction force (corps) before 2003. The Table “Details of the EU rapid reaction corps” gives some impression of the future shape of this military structure of the EU.

Therefore, in the 1990s, the EU countries gradually became firmly convinced that an economic union of such geographic reach, with a population of over 400 million people and GDP of nearly $8.5 trillion, cannot further develop without an effective security and defence capability. It seems that this time, after previous unsuccessful attempts by the EU to develop military structures, political declarations have better chances of coming true.

**Evolution of the NATO-EU relations: problem areas**

Presently, we are witnessing the development of NATO-EU relations with the purpose of avoiding duplication of functions and structures, establishment of mutually complementary capabilities of armed conflict prevention on the European continent. This process is not trouble-free. It is characterised by the declared coherence of NATO and the EU, confinement of the CESDP to primarily peacekeeping operations and at the same time — the vast vagueness of the powers and tasks of the EU in the sphere of security and defence.

The analysis of the practical steps taken by the EU, including for the creation of the rapid reaction force, allows to state that the European Union plans to perform essentially the same military tasks as transformed NATO, with the exception of collective defence. The most topical problem areas in relations between the USA and its European allies, NATO and the EU, are the following: the parity of resource contribution to the strengthening of the European security; imbalance of military capabilities; division of the areas of responsibility (both geographically and functionally);

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* Contributors: Germany — 13,500, United Kingdom — 12,500, France — 12,000, Italy — 6,000, Spain — 6,000, Holland — 5,000, Greece — 3,500, Austria — 2,00, Finland — 2,000, Sweden — 1,500, Belgium — 1,000, Ireland — 1,000, Portugal — 1,000, Luxembourg — 100. Denmark has not committed troops to the force but will provide them if the need arises — probably to a Swedish and Finnish Nordic Battalion. See: Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Brussels, 20 November 2000. ** Proposal of the Minister of Defence of France A. Richard.
co-ordination of positions of the two organisations’ member countries (for strategic and operational decision-making); consideration of interests of the member countries, etc.

The NATO leadership believes that the Common European Security and Defence Policy of the EU should be inalienably connected and compatible (integrated) with the NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity. At the same time, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity and CJTF are taking place on the background of accusations by allies of the inadequacy of European countries’ defence expenditures and the combat strength of their armed forces when compared with present day requirements, in other words, of an unjust division of responsibility between the USA and Europe for European security.

As Table “Strength of armed forces and defence expenditures of the USA and their European NATO allies” shows, by the numerical strength, the European component of NATO exceeds the USA figure more than two-fold, but military expenditures of the Europeans make up a meagre 64% of the USA.

According to different assessments, the aggregate combat potential of the European NATO members makes up 10-30% of the USA potential, since Europeans spend far less than the United States on research and development and procurement of weapons. Additionally, the USA applies much higher requirements to combat readiness, compared to European armed forces. For instance, average annual flying practice of combat pilots in the European NATO countries in late 1990s was 160 hours (NATO requirement — 180 hours), while in the USA — the figure was 220 hours. The imbalance between the capabilities of the USA and European allies was most vividly demonstrated by the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999. It involved 13 members of the Alliance, but 85% of night and bad weather sorties were flown, and 80% of precision-guided ammunition and 95% of cruise missile strikes were delivered by the US forces. All in all, that NATO military campaign brought European leaders a very unpleasant discovery: it proved that European countries lag behind the USA in such fields as projection of forces, use of sophisticated defence technologies, computer and intelligence systems.

The desire of the Europeans to close the “gap” in military capabilities between them and the USA is not yet backed by resources. Immediately after Kosovo, the total defence expenditures of the European NATO members increased (by $8 billion in 1999), but later this growth stopped, and a decline began. According to calculations made by French experts, implementation of CESDP will require an increase of annual expenditures of the EU countries on modernisation and procurement of new weapons almost two-fold — from the present $30-35 billion to $60 billion. Given the halt of growth of defence budgets in the EU countries (and even their decrease in 2000), the prospects for CESDP do not look very optimistic.

From the very beginning of CESDP development, the US officials expressed reservations that CESDP should in no way weaken NATO, for instance, by setting tasks for the European rapid reaction corps that would make it a competitor to NATO structures. The USA continues to emphasise the need for inalienable unity and full co-ordination of action between NATO and the EU. At the end of 2000, the USA expressed concern by the fact that, in its opinion, “the path to a successful strengthening of the European pillar of transatlantic security may appear, on occasion, excessively long and needlessly contentious”. Americans said that “NATO and the EU must work co-operatively to develop (and avoid unnecessary duplication of) the military assets and capabilities required by both organisations”.

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17 Falkenrath R. European Security and NATO. — National Security & Defence, 2000, No.7, p.33. During the Kosovo operation, there were cases when some NATO countries disagreed with decisions taken by NATO under the US pressure. So, one of the declared targets of CESDP was to enable the EU countries to conduct crisis management operations where “the USA or NATO as a whole for some reason decide not to be engaged”.
18 This was stressed in an article by P.Volten “The EU as an Actor in Security Policy: Rival or Partner of the USA?", published in this journal.
19 Ryter M.-A. EU Capabilities for Autonomous Military Crisis Management: Possibilities and Limits. — National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Helsinki, 2001, p.34.
20 Then Secretary of State M.Albright, Secretary of Defence W.Cohen, the US Ambassador to NATO A.Vershbow and others.
22 Note 21, p.21.
Defence Minister A. Richard, “the minimum should be 0.05% of GDP and we would do better to aim for 0.06% or 0.07%” says Richard (the current figure for France is 0.06%). “Unfortunately, many in Europe have fallen well below even the bare minimum we are recommending.”

So far, Europeans are unable to channel enough funds even into the identified key sectors — transportation and space intelligence. The intention of Great Britain, Italy, Germany and France to develop satellite intelligence systems might be hailed as an example of fruitful cooperation of the EU countries in the framework of CESDP, had the funds allocated thereto been not that meagre: the USA invests 10 times more than all EU countries for this purpose. Being reluctant (unable) to give up their social programmes for the benefit of defence expenditures, European countries are trying to raise combat effectiveness of their armed forces in two ways: through more effective use of available funds and armed forces reform (on a professional basis).

When identifying the EU resource requirements, one should take into account the actual conditions for achieving military objectives. The declared goal of a 60,000-strong rapid reaction corps means that the EU countries should have a combat-ready contingent of three times that size, i.e., 180,000, since full deployment of a 60,000-strong force requires the same number of troops on training for the tasks and rotation, and in the event of a durable operation, another third will be restoring combat effectiveness and recreating after the assignment.

The uncertainty of the EU as to the Union’s security strategy and area of responsibility within the framework of CESDP remain problem issues. This particularly manifests itself in the geographic coverage of AOR of the EU CESDP. What should that area be like? The same as defined for NATO, presuming possible use of force beyond the borders of the member countries, or different? Will that area cover all regions (countries) where the EU has interests (without any limitations), or will it have a radius of 4000 km around Brussels, as stated by some European leaders? There are no clear answers to those questions. Moreover, “constructive ambiguity” has taken root in the EU and NATO diplomatic lexicon, and this term is designed to cover the existing contradictions of the parties and their unpreparedness to agree their positions within the EU and NATO framework, let alone the positions of other European states outside the two organisations.

In this context, the particular position of Turkey on the EU access to the NATO infrastructure strikes the eye. Turkey as a NATO member may bar the use of the Alliance’s infrastructure in EU-led operations if it is not guaranteed a say in relevant political decision making, as well as in planning and conduct of EU operations in the regions of interest to Turkey. Co-ordination of contrary positions seems uneasy, since Turkey is not an EU member; furthermore, the situation may be further complicated after Cyprus’ accession to the EU. It is not difficult to predict that in several years, after the EU and NATO expansion, contrary positions of the member countries will be still more difficult to agree, since political decisions on the use of military forces are to be taken by consensus. When taking such decisions, the political leadership of many countries may meet with a lack of understanding and opposition of its own population — due to the reluctance to look for answers to difficult questions now.

The last two years have seen a number of measures aimed at strengthening co-ordination between NATO and the EU. In January, 2001, when neutral Sweden took the EU presidency, the EU and NATO signed an agreement on fundamentals of permanent consultations and co-operation aimed at co-ordination of problem issues emerging in course of NATO and EU transformation, to provide better understanding of the future CESDP. According to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden for policy issues S.-U. Petersson, “ESDP is not a military alliance, nor is it a European army. There are no mutual or collective defence guarantees, no special standing forces and no common command system. The ESDP is limited to crisis management and conflict prevention; it is not about territorial self-defence.” Assessing the practical steps, one

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25 It is worth notice that some ambiguity is also intrinsic in the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept (on obtaining a UN mandate for operations outside the Alliance’s geographic area, possibility of the first use of nuclear arms, their stationing on the territories of the new members, etc.).
26 These problems are analysed in an article by UCEPS expert M. Pashkov “Problems of European Security: Positions of the Population of Ukraine” published in this journal.
can point out some attempts of CESDP to identify its place with respect to NATO. For instance, in November, 1999, representatives of the WEU Eurocorps offered its headquarters to exercise control of the KFOR operation on its basis. In January 2000, this offer was accepted, and the KFOR headquarters is primarily made up by the Eurocorps officers.

Experts believe that traditional military assets are becoming increasingly less suitable for countering the present threats, especially at the preventive stage. Today, much more important are political, diplomatic, economic, informational and law enforcement instruments, along with military assets of a new type — compact, mobile, highly effective. The situation requires new solutions that NATO will not readily offer, because of its specificity as a collective defence organisation. This gap is probably to be filled by Europeans with their CESDP.

The rapid reaction force being formed by the EU may counter threats at the phase of direct collision of the conflicting parties, conflict escalation, and only to a limited extent deal with other phases — growing of tension between the conflicting parties, division of the conflicting parties after the conflict is over; at the same time, the phases of conflict origination, growth into crisis, restoration of peace and post-conflict settlement so far remain beyond the CESDP focus.

The EU intention to complement the military component of CESDP with a civilian (law enforcement) one deserves attention: in addition to the formation of the rapid reaction corps, the EU countries must be ready to assign 5000 police officers for crisis management operations, of whom, 1000 should be ready to perform their duties within 30 days after the decision on their deployment.

Another noticeable development was the EU decision of May 22, 2000, to set up a new structure — the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. This Committee will evidently supplement CESDP. Additionally, immediately after the terrorist attack in the USA, the EU countries urgently decided to “make every effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts against terrorism”. Sadly, the awareness of the importance of those measures came late.

There are also external factors that may complicate the relations between NATO and the EU in the security domain. First of all, this refers to Russia’s position, its readiness (unreadiness) to practical co-operation with those organisations. Russia strongly opposes NATO expansion and consistently insists on the forced character of its co-operation with the Alliance. At the same time, it seems more friendly towards the EU and sees no danger in its expansion. Russia also expressed a desire to take an active part in CESDP; at that, it opposes the USA domination in the unipolar world, and particularly views the united Europe as a counterbalance to the USA, including in the security and defence domain. Experts believe that after the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001, one may expect changes in the relations between Russia and the USA.

All in all, it can be stated that neither NATO nor the EU (jointly or separately) can offer an adequate response to the new challenges. The ambiguity of the “Petersberg tasks” of the EU does not allow detailed planning and distribution of assets. This increases the probability of a new crisis in the European security domain.

It is logical to assume that with time, security responsibilities will be divided between NATO and the EU into basically military (NATO) and basically “non-military” (the EU). NATO may organise collective defence and conduct large-scale military operations, while the EU may concentrate on conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation measures, maintaining at the same time limited peacekeeping capabilities. The EU has sufficient financial, technical and other resources and the experience for successful performance of such tasks.

Should the EU appear unable to back its political declarations with adequate resources, the situation similar to observed in 1992-1995 in Yugoslavia may repeat itself: Europeans take a decision to conduct a joint military operation on their own but then it appears that they lack military assets and political will for its performance, and again have to turn to the USA and NATO as a whole for assistance.

28 See, e.g., an article by R.Dwan "Common European Security and Defence Policy: Crisis Prevention and Management" published in this journal.
29 It goes only about the involvement of law enforcement bodies in conflict settlement (peacekeeping operations), not about co-ordination and interaction under the CESDP auspices with the purpose of conflict prevention or containment.
30 See: “We Will Make Every Effort to Strengthen Our Intelligence Efforts against Terrorism”, — Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, September 14, 2001.
EUROPEAN SECURITY: NEW THREATS — OLD RESPONSES?

UKRAINE IN SEARCH OF ITS PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

The relations between NATO and the EU in the security domain are entering a decisive phase. Despite the above problems of CESDP framing, the recent three years have shown that this structure has become established, although it is not quite clear yet in what form — as a European duplicate of NATO, its natural supplement, or otherwise.

At the same time, at present, there is only one workable military-political structure in the European security system — NATO, and it is primarily based on permanent readiness of the US to lavishly invest in the defence sector and maintain close ties with Europe. There is also the EU, with its dependence on the US in the security sphere, claims to greater independence in that domain and questionable readiness to back declarations of intentions with substantial resources.

Anyway, regardless the present uncertainty and contradictions in the NATO-EU relations, Ukraine should more actively develop ties with both institutions. This is its right and obligation of an integral part of Europe, the more so as Europe’s security means security for Ukraine.

Ukraine is ready for active co-operation with both NATO and the EU: it maintains rather fruitful relations of distinctive partnership with the Alliance and tries to develop strategic partner relations with the EU. As Ukraine’s Foreign Minister A. Zlenko put it, “Doctrinally, Ukraine shares the concept of the new Europe based on the European Union, the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Exactly those institutions present the basic pillars of Ukraine’s European course.” Despite some reservations relating to the transitional character of the socio-economic situation in the country and the need to take into account Russia’s position, Ukraine is trying to be a reliable partner and extends its assistance for resolution of European problems.

What place can Ukraine occupy in the future European security architecture? On whom does this depend — on itself, on the European countries or on the US and NATO, that over the recent decade have been granting the greatest support for building an independent democratic Ukraine? There is no ultimate answer, as this place is almost equally determined by all named actors.

Ukraine-NATO

The relations established between Ukraine and NATO are quite constructive and based on mutual understanding and readiness for the establishment and maintenance of peace in problem regions of the world. NATO views Ukraine as an integral part of Europe that intends to approach the Western standards (in particular, in building its national security system) and make a weighty contribution to stability and security in the European region and throughout the world. For Ukraine, special relations with NATO are a precondition for deepening interaction with the Alliance member countries and approaching the EU. Framing of the CESDP gives Ukraine one more chance to use partner relations with NATO for joining the development of the new system of European security.

Ukraine has one of the vastest programmes of cooperation with NATO among all 27 partner countries (Diagram “Dynamics of military co-operation between Ukraine and NATO”) and is the only participant of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), apart from Russia, with which NATO maintains relations of distinctive partnership.

Dynamics of military co-operation between Ukraine and NATO

![Diagram showing dynamics of military co-operation between Ukraine and NATO](image)

Apart from joint co-operation on purely defensive issues, NATO substantially helps Ukraine in the development of the legislative basis and implementation of democratic civilian control of the military sector, assists with adaptation of retired servicemen, supports the activity of non-governmental research organisations and Ukrainian scholars, grants informational and technical assistance, etc. Co-operation with NATO in the field of removal of aftermath of natural and technological accidents also looks promising.

With NATO support (and dependent on available capabilities), Ukraine already takes part in strengthening stability and security in the European region and throughout the world. In addition to active military contacts within the PfP framework, Ukraine co-operates with NATO in the Kosovo and Macedonian peacekeeping operations.

NATO has recently reiterated the Alliance’s interest in Ukraine: “Its size and pivotal geostrategic role make Ukraine a key to ensuring Europe’s long-term stability. That is why NATO has consistently sought to assist Ukraine, as it charts its way into the future”32.

A new development in Ukraine-NATO relations was evidenced by G.Robertson’s statement that “cooperative ventures of Ukraine and NATO are intended to complement Ukraine's wider process of reform. They are a clear expression of the Alliance's determination not to leave Ukraine alone as it charts its course into the future”33.

Ukraine, on its part, is ready for deepening relations with NATO and extending its participation in the events aimed at strengthening stability in Europe and throughout the world. “Ukraine is ready, — A.Zlenko said, — to deepen partnership with the Alliance inasmuch as this meets our national interests, the interests of pan-European and global security”34.

At this difficult time for NATO, after the terrorist attack on the US, Ukraine unconditionally supported the Alliance. The statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission of September 12, 2001, reads: “NATO and Ukraine condemn in the strongest possible terms these atrocities, and stand united in their commitment to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice and punished. In the spirit of its distinctive partnership with NATO, Ukraine stands ready to contribute fully to this effort”35.

The deepening of co-operation with NATO exerts a significant positive impact on Ukraine’s security and meets its national interests. The potential for co-operation with NATO is quite significant and far exceeds the attained level of co-operation. The Alliance remains open for active interaction, whether Ukraine intends to join it or not. It depends on Ukraine alone whether it will be able to fully utilise this potential.

33 Note 32.
36 The Agreement was signed and ratified in 1994 and became effective of March 1, 1998.
37 Belashov V. Revolution in European Military Affairs. — Polityka i Chas, 2001, No.5, p.34.
38 In particular, the Ukrainian side proposed raising the relations between Ukraine and the EU in the sphere of foreign policy and security to the level of “distinctive or associated strategic partnership”, following the example of relations with NATO, and made concrete proposals as to the mechanism of such partnership. See: ibid.
39 From the beginning of 2001, the President of Ukraine four times met Secretary General of the European Council, the EU High Representative for the CFSP J.Solana.
In their Joint Statement by the Results of the Yalta Ukraine-EU Summit (September 11, 2001), the Parties “marked further progress of our dialogue, co-operation and consultations on security and defence issues” and noted that “Ukraine may be invited to take part in operations conducted by the EU”\(^40\).

However, real bilateral co-operation in the sphere of CFSP so far significantly lags behind the declared goals. The Programme of Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union defines Ukraine’s joining CFSP as a long-term priority (2004-2007); it also states that “at the present stage, Ukraine-EU relations in the security domain are on the stage of formation”. Section 17 of the Programme, devoted to Ukraine’s co-operation with the EU in the issues of foreign and security policy does not outline the financial requirements and other resource necessary for such co-operation, nor names the sources of funds. The Plan of action at implementation of the priority provisions of the Programme specifies the activities at implementation of only one out of ten long-term priorities that must be attained in 2001.

At the Yalta summit, the EU and Ukraine were to sign “Ukraine-EU Action Plan on Justice and Internal Affairs”, but its signing was again postponed, this time — till the end of 2001. The idea of such Plan was proposed by the Ukrainian side in 2000. The Plan should envisage concrete steps of fighting illegal migration, human slavery, terrorism, money laundering, illegal drug trafficking, illegal arms trafficking, along with practical steps at strengthening borders, visa policy, reform of the Ukrainian judicial system and harmonisation of the Ukrainian criminal law with that of the EU. Signing of such document might assure the EU of Ukraine’s readiness to resolute actions in said spheres, i.e., become a step aimed at prevention of the country’s isolation in the process of the EU approaching Ukraine’s borders.

Hence, the institutional level of Ukraine’s co-operation with the EU in the security sphere so far lags behind the level of Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO. At the same time, concrete practical steps are being made in some directions.

This primarily refers to the bodies of justice and internal affairs, since this domain acquires special significance in the context of the EU enlargement — the European Union is interested in strengthening security of its eastern borders after the accession of candidates from Central Europe. The Joint Statement by the Results of the Yalta Ukraine-EU Summit stressed “common desire of the EU and Ukraine to fight organised crime, money laundering, illegal drug and arms trafficking, and closely co-operate in the issues of illegal immigration, refugees, smuggling and human trafficking”.

At present, assistance for the strengthening of borders is being granted not only to candidates for the EU membership (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary), but also to Ukraine. In particular, significant assistance for strengthening of the Ukrainian-Russian border was extended by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany (DM 3 million in 2001), which allowed to improve the protection of that border sector thanks to the shift of 60 units from the western border. It is noteworthy that the flow of illegal migrants going via Ukraine has significantly decreased (Diagram “Number of illegal migrants detained at attempt of illegal crossing of Ukraine’s state border”).

\(^{40}\) Recently, Ukraine has again offered the EU its military transport aviation for CESDP purposes (in 1997, a Document on “Co-operation between Ukraine and WEU in the field of long-distance air transportation” was signed) and its military assets, by the pattern of those earmarked for the NATO “Partnership for Peace” Programme. In particular, it announced the intention to detach a group of officers led by a general to the EU Military Staff and a strengthened air mobile battalion, a combined (transport and combat) helicopter squadron, a squadron of IL-76 aircraft from transport air command of Ukraine’s Air Force and some other military assets to the EU rapid reaction corps, and grant the EU nearly 500 policemen.
Within the framework of the TACIS programme, a separate project of technical assistance for the strengthening of Ukraine's state border with the Republic of Moldova and a decrease in the flow of illegal migrants on that segment is being developed; the European Commission took a decision to grant 3.9 million Euro for that project. The EU grants significant technical assistance in 2001 for the creation of the Narkobiznes inter-departmental databank in Ukraine intended to raise the efficiency of fight against illegal drug trafficking.

All in all, the experience of Ukraine's co-operation with the EU proves that Ukraine has realistic prospects for becoming a member of the united Europe. To be sure, the speed of Ukraine's movement towards the EU will first and foremost depend on the strengthening of democratic fundamentals of Ukraine's society and the development of the market economy. Despite the existing problems in those domains, even in the present conditions, the potential of deepening Ukraine's co-operation with the EU in the security domain should not be underestimated.

First of all, exactly in the security domain Ukraine has realistic chances of taking a decent place among European democracies and improve its chances of joining the European Union. Ukraine stands out among other EU applicants: in the security domain, it may be not only a consumer but a real contributor — in the sphere of strategic transport, space, intelligence, peacekeeping, law enforcement, elimination of aftermath of natural and technological disasters, etc.

Second, Ukraine may move towards the EU membership both through direct co-operation immediately with the Union and using the available possibilities for co-operation with NATO: “The status of Ukraine as a state that has special relations with NATO opens real prospects for approach to the start line where it could be seen as a potential member of the European Union”.

CONCLUSIONS

The intention of the West European countries to create their own defence structure is almost 50 years old, but up until recently, Europe has had only one workable multilateral defence structure — NATO.

Under the conditions of the Cold War, when West European countries were preoccupied with the idea of the Soviet military threat, the exceptional role of NATO in the European security domain was justified. Now, the situation has radically changed, and the formulation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy is a natural reflection of those changes.

The Balkan events and the existence of situations fraught with conflicts in other European countries prove that the danger of a military conflict in Europe persists. This time, such danger originates not from the ideological inter-bloc confrontation

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41 Practice shows that the process of reform of border structures of countries - candidates for the EU membership in accordance with the EU standards requires significant funds. For instance, the budget of one project of adaptation of the border regime management system of the Bulgarian border police to the EU norms and standards makes 2 million Euro, and implementation of the entire programme of adaptation of the Bulgarian border service through 2005 — over 160 million Euro.

but from complex effects of threats of the “new range”. Threats to European security are real; moreover, there is a tendency towards their aggravation.

If those threats are not timely removed, they will constantly provoke new conflicts. Europe is not fully aware of this thing so far; at least, the responses of NATO and the EU to the new threats are still inadequate.

NATO has proved its effectiveness and will remain the core of the European security architecture for the time to come. However, if the Alliance is not transformed in the future into a more flexible and all-inclusive security structure, its influence on the European security will remain confined primarily to those situations that require settlement by military means.

As for the EU, until recently, that organisation has lacked political will, strategic vision, concentration and openness to co-operation with other European countries, including Ukraine, in the security domain. At present, the attitude of Europeans to their responsibility for their own security is gradually improving in some sectors (fight against illegal arms trafficking, illegal migration, formation of executive structures dealing with the issues of security, co-operation with NATO, etc.). Co-operation with Ukraine in those spheres is on the rise, too. At the same time, the question of the EU readiness to invest in the sphere of security in line with the scope of the set political tasks remains open.

It seems evident that the European Union should not create a European analogue of NATO (without the USA and Canada but with some neutral countries). Instead, the sphere of CESDP should encompass law enforcement and the removal of aftermath of emergencies. In other words, it is desirable that CESDP become not the EU Peacekeeping Ministry but a kind of committee of the EU military and law enforcement structures.

The common European security and defence policy of the EU should be really common and really European, not just West European, which is the case today. The road to successful prevention and resolution of conflicts is to be found only through broad co-operation, involving good will and capabilities of all European countries.

Despite the present uncertainty and contradictions in the NATO-EU relations, Ukraine’s interests require active co-operation in the security domain with both organisations, such co-operation being not confined to the military sector only, as was in the past.