and toxins may be easily moved a long distance. The main thing is that no country in the world today is able to protect its army, let alone population. But the concept of national

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By the time the Military Doctrine was adopted, Ukraine had its tactical nuclear weapons moved to the Russian Federation and had taken a decision to destroy strategic weapons (this “voluntary” decision was officially fixed in January 1994). The Military Doctrine reads: “Ukraine tacks reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons located on its territory with adequate actions of other nuclear powers and granting to them and the world community of reliable guarantees of its security”. It was free to “tack”, but nothing resulted from additional guarantees. “Guarantees” did not extend far enough to go beyond the framework of provisions of available documents (of the UN and OSCE), which meant that we were deprived of nuclear weapons for nothing.

Nevertheless, in 1993 we were looking into the future with optimism. The USA and Russian Federation were agreeing ceilings of warheads within the framework of START-2 treaty. There was confidence that START-3, START-4 will follow. Taking of France and Britain possibly joining the process of nuclear disarmament and of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe were heard. How young and naive we were! Honeymoon in relations between the USA and the Russian Federation has long finished. Russia never ratified START-2 Treaty. The last war in the former Yugoslavia’s wars involved only nuclear states (Britain, USA, Russia, China, France, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Peru, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zaire. Second, some of the above countries already possess stockpiles of the deadly weapons and are in a military conflict and, nuclear weapon hasn’t become a deterring factor for those so far. In 1993 the situation looked different.

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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND ON UKRAINE’S BORDERS

In 1993 great expectations were placed on confidence-building measures in Europe. Exchange of data on the strength of armed forces and weapons systems, advance notification about movement of troops, mobilization of reserves and exercises; possibility of prompt verification of military sites - those and other mechanisms of "transparency" are really needed. They allow to bate requirements to combat readiness of armed forces, to allocate less manpower and equipment for combat duty, and to promptly remove suspicion in

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Both Russia and Belarus are already forming a joint regional force, creating common defence infrastructure, and developing a joint military doctrine. Russia renders military assistance, supplies arms and equipment. President Lukashenko set a task: the power of Belarusian Armed Forces must be doubled within a two-year period. In the framework of the Russian-Belarusian union, joint projects or weapons development through the year 2001 and military-technical co-operation through the year 2005 have been worked out. Not all plans will become reality, but all this gives ground for thinking.

Military potential of the Tashkent pact dropped by approximately 10% after the withdrawal of three key members: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. If it leads to weaker control over all strategic weapons, the Western balance is obviously going to shift. Europe would try to compensate for the strategic vacuum in Europe, and it will try to compensate for the advantages of the Asian Union by building a military bloc by all means. On the 20th of May in Yerevan, at a meeting of the Council of CIS Defence Ministers, Russia proposed to develop an allied strategy of the Tashkent pact member nations. Participants backed this Moscow proposal. The Yerevan meeting also discussed composition and principles of creation of presumable "allied troops (forces) in the regions (areas) of collective security with the purpose of joint (collective) defence". It was specially stressed that it refers not to the joint air defence system, already operational; allied land forces are planned. Therefore, a military bloc is actually being formed, bearing signs of a collective defence system. Pressure is exercised on Ukraine from the north

to the south-west and to the north-east.

Ongoing developments have made many countries in the world to look at military issues differently. A new strategic concept has been adopted by NATO. Reform of the West European Union is planned. China and Russia began to revise their military doctrines, so did many CIS countries. Israeli defence doctrine undergoes significant change.

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It is unclear yet what will go out of GIUUM, a non-formal regional organisation uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova: a belt of security or a new holdback of conflicts? Recent members of the Tashkent pact, now members of GIUUM, make no secret of their aspiration to join NATO. Azerbaijan is ready to go further and sooner than the other. Russia strongly reacted on formation of GIUUM. Usually affable Foreign Minister Ivanov was not concealing his irritation and spoke in strong words. Karaganyov suggested a “sharpe reshakation of relations with some CIS countries that actually made choice in favour of NATO”. This snide remark of his refers to us, too. In case of signs of military cooperation within GIUUM pressure on Ukraine will increase.

Rapprochement of three Ukraine's GIUUM partners with NATO, strengthening of Turkey on the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, forcing the Russian Federation out of those regions - all this creates an entirely new military, political and strategic environment, fraught with new conflicts. Ukraine cannot but notice such a change.

Military opposition increases just hundreds of kilometres from Ukraine's borders: around Armenia, on the Balkans and on Cyprus. Despite a lull in Kosovo, danger of aggression persists. Inter-ethnic conflicts, involving Ukraine's neighbours, have not been liquidated in Transnistria (Moldova, Russia, Romania), in Abkhasia (Georgia, Russia, Turkey), in Karabakh (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey). Those regions remain potential hotbeds of military conflicts.

Ukraine plans to form five joint peacekeeping units with its neighbours. It's a new important tool of maintaining regional security. However, peacekeeping battalions will not ensure solution of main tasks of defence and therefore cannot serve as a basis for the future Ukrainian army. Besides, Ukraine's selectivity in choice of partners (we co-operate with Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but refuse to form joint peacekeeping units with the Russian Federation and Belarus) conceals some potential of conflicts.

The new strategic concept of NATO gives reasons for concern. The alliance will conduct military operations beyond its area of responsibility; it will act without the UN mandate; it doesn't rule out first use of nuclear weapons, neither does it give up the idea to place nuclear weapons near Ukraine's borders. If military doctrine of the Russian Federation copies those provisions, we will find ourselves in difficult situation.

Russian Defence Minister I. Sergeev considers that the new NATO military doctrine "will make Russia revise many provisions of its war safety". Among possible innovations are repudiation first use on nuclear weapons, the declared right to deliver not only a return nuclear strike or counter-strike, but also a pre-emptive nuclear attack (and we see the diffusion of impromptu nuclear strikes). The Defence Council of the Russian Federation addressed the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. One cannot rule out that the Russian Federation will stake on tactical nuclear weapon more actively than before. It's dangerous for two reasons. First, in the 80s nuclear projectiles, bombs, torpedoes and tactical missiles were considered the main destabilising factor in Europe, as the power to use them is assigned to division commanders, and because of control and transparency problems. Second, strategic nuclear weapons are hermetical devices: instead of "KAMAZ" and "URAL" heavy trucks, Obsolete production lines still remaining at former defence enterprises bring losses reimbursed by no one. In the first quarter of 2009 GIUUM budget covered a quarter of all military expenditure, and an even bigger share of the annual plan had already been spent. One can hardly believe the complexity and the scale of GIUUM budget, as submitted to the Parliament. In the first quarter $50 million were remitted for maintenance of the Armed Forces. It's the cost of keeping one US Air Force detached squadron, while our Minister of Defence is supposed to maintain all Armed Forces and even to make a military reform (?!). $500 thousand were allocated for acquisition of weapons equipment. This money would be enough to buy several air-to-air missiles or one "Tomahawk" with expired service life (a new one would cost twice as much), $200 thousand for training, and $10 thousand for food items. The Armed Forces - the price of a "hit with an elevator" on the outskirts of Kyiv: Last year the situation was also disturbing, but not that bad: the above articles of expenses totalled $140 million, $850 thousand and $620 thousand respectively. The trend is evident.

None of war agencies was financed in the planned volume, as collection of budget revenues has been frustrated. When everyone is in need, available funds are distributed in accordance with priorities. So it was this time. However, two things are interesting. First, none of war agencies was funded above the average level of budget expenditures. In the first quarter the annual budget was executed at a level of 17.6%, Internal troops obtained 17.1%, the National Guard - 16.6%, Security Service - 16.4%, Armed Forces - 12.9%, Border Troops - 10.8% of the planned yearly amount. It means that the military are off the list of government priorities. Second, distribution of funds among separate war structures is very interesting. The government financed the "National Defence" budget item at a level of 51.5% of the quarterly plan, Border Troops - 43.6%, Internal troops received 72.1% of the planned amount, the National Guard - 72.2%, and Security Service - 82.3%. Everyone may draw a conclusion without difficulty. What is difficult is to prove that Ukraine is not building a police state.

How will the military sector be financed in the future? In the current year no improvement can be expected - elections, you know! We are not Slovakia, where candidates may be re-elected in April, and the President is elected as soon as May, without any disturbances. Ukraine needs large scale: election campaign lasts six months, irrespective of who is elected, Parliament speaker or the President. However, there are not only elections, election expenses and short-term economic decisions; there is also external debt of Ukraine. Before November over 900 million are to be repaid to creditors. And what happens after the elections? The army will be cast loose: the new government will have to find more than $1.5 billion, otherwise Ukraine will have gone bankrupt by April. If we want to avoid a default, we'll have to give more than 70% of the budget revenues or to take new loans. A permanent financial crisis is foreseen for the next five years, too; over that period Ukraine will have to repay approximately 10 billion of foreign debt. Ukraine reached the red line where national stability (including that of the armed forces) depends on western creditors more than on deeds of its government. When the present Military Doctrine was being written, the situation was different; we had a different idea of the prospects of economic progress and defence sector development. Today we are in an entirely different situation, and to make-up the plans of military construction would be far from enough.

Quarterly defensive R&D funding at a level of 0.58% of the yearly plan may be called mockery of the domestic military-industrial complex. Of course, equipment may be manufactured on the basis of GIUUM funds, but it will be impossible to test new weapons. Quarterly R&D funding at 0.58% of the yearly plan may be called mockery of the domestic military-industrial complex. Of course, equipment may be tested in the field, but it will be impossible to test new weapons. New development in the military sector of Ukraine is "empty yellow pages" of GIUUM.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY SECTOR OF UKRAINE

Strength of Ukraine's Armed Forces dropped two-fold after the Military Doctrine was adopted. Weapons became 6 years older, most of them ran out of their service life and are no longer operational. Some weapon systems are still operational. It's a natural process, independent of our will. Somewhere in 2003-2005 one will hardly remember that Ukraine once was the 3rd strongest military power. Such was Ukraine at the time of development of its Military Doctrine. This fact alone leaves no doubt that the doctrine needs amendment.

The present doctrine contains a valuable thought: "The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is a basis of its military construction, it rests upon the analysis of geopolitical situation in the world and long-term scientific forecasts of its development". Unfortunately, those words were nothing more than words. Ukraine never commenced military construction. Experts are tired to repeat that construction of Armed Forces and military construction are two different things. Construction of the Armed Forces has been suspended. Steps of the 10-year program that required no funds have been completed. To go on further, money is needed, but there is no money in hand, and it will hardly appear.

http://www.uceps.org/eng/print.php?lng=ENG&news_id=15&address=article
Planning elements. The military don't know how to make ends meet and to obtain budget funds provided by the law. But in this struggle the military department is always the loser. Ukraine's war budget, strength of its armed forces and priorities of weapon systems' development are determined by the Ministry of Finance. Of course, we must be realists. If important decisions are taken by the Ministry of Finance only, it means that something is wrong with our state system. Under such circumstances the only duty of the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff is to take painful decisions on what military body should be cut tomorrow and which one will hold till the day after tomorrow. Such decisions result in very grave consequences. They are uneasy to take, given the obsolete Military Doctrine (that in reality determines few things) and the State Program of Armed Forces Construction (entirely deprived of financial backing and therefore impractical), but in absence of the State Program for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment. We have last year's macroeconomic forecast (stating that financing won't be better for the next 5-7 years) and two fresh propaganda programs: governmental program "Ukraine-2010" and parliamentary "Ukraine-2015". The two projects are promising everything for all, but somewhere in the future, when their developers retire. Meanwhile, we have to live today.

Let me cite two extracts illustrating the gap between the Military Doctrine and real life, to prove my words: "... priority should be given to precise weapons of increased power, intelligence, air/space defence, electronic warfare, missile troops and air mobile units, advanced types of surface ships and submarines". Those are priorities only! It's high time to tell the truth to the military and the whole nation: it's a mere gamble, unfortunately, fixed in a serious parliamentary document. Such a list of priorities may be implemented by one nation in the world only, and even that nation cannot do that in full volume. The listed items cost not dozens, but hundreds (!) billion (!) dollars (!) Ukraine needs to be more modest, it shouldn't make the world laugh at such documents, especially in the third millennium.

Another extract from the Military Doctrine: "Ukraine's Armed Forces will be equipped with unified automated command, communication, electronic and fire control systems ... throughout Ukraine's territory a single information space will be established". A nicely worded dream-like objective. In reality everything is different: neither "equipped", nor "established". Funds are lacking even to pay wages and telephone bills. Therefore all "unified" projects remain on paper. Politicians should not set targets before the military if they are not backed with funds, as it undermines trust in state power bodies.

The situation looks still more complicated because of the number of military formation and duplication of their duties. Ukraine's National Guard operates marines, army aviation, air defence units. It's a wholesome large military formation that enjoys priority funding. Why such a luxury on the background of poverty-ridden Armed Forces? Why not transfer the National Guard under their control? And the duties of the National Guard going beyond defensive functions may be fulfilled by the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ukraine maintains two fleets, and the one operated by the Border Troops is better equipped than Ukraine's Navy. Something is wrong here. The country's economy is unable to keep several "armies" with total strength reaching one million; in such conditions none of the war structure will ever become really strong. National Security and Defence Council, General Military Inspection - those presidential structures must say their weighty word.

By the way, a couple of words about presidential structures. Strategic planning of employment of manpower and equipment of different departments for the defence of the country is co-ordinated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the highest national level co-ordination is vested in the National Security and Defence Council. Why not introduce a new NSDC member - the Chief of the General Staff - to impart a new impetus to military construction? It won't require additional funds, but the word "defence" in the Council's name would become more meaningful. The issue may be solved after the elections, when the President signs a decree on the new NSDC composition. Such a decision by the head of state would be backed by the military.

WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD THE MILITARY DOCTRINE ANSWER?

The military doctrine is a system of views of Ukraine's political leadership on prevention of military conflicts, preparation of the country to defend against possible aggression, military construction as a whole, and the use of the state's military structure to defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats. The present doctrine has not fulfilled those tasks and has not become a document "obligatory for state power bodies, institutions, self-administration authorities and Ukrainian citizens".

In the new conditions military threat should be viewed and formulated as concrete as possible. Objectives, possibilities and limitations in Ukraine's co-operation with NATO, the Tashkent pact, the framework of GUAM, and with its powerful strategic partners, first of all the USA and Russia, should be defined more precisely. Efficiency of international procedures (of arms and armed forces limitation, confidence building measures, non-proliferation of weapons and high technologies, peace enforcement) should be critically assessed, as well as their limited possibilities of prevention and settlement of military conflicts in our region.

Requirements to the basic parameters of the Armed Forces should be correctly defined and co-ordinated with objects and capabilities of the state. The Armed Forces should not be excessively strong, as it frightens neighbours and provokes counter-action; the Armed Forces should not be too weak, as it threatens our independence; the Armed Forces should be not too expensive, as it ruins the economy. Balance should be maintained. If calculations are based on the number of soldiers per kilometre of the border, the length of the coastline, the population and the territory, Ukraine will need Armed Forces of approximately 500 thousand men. Today Ukraine's Armed Forces are 25% smaller and continue to reduce, but they remain inadmissible for the country. In general, Ukraine's law enforcement structures are almost twice as large, and reduction is less evident. Ukraine has two navies. Ukraine maintains two armies, one for defence and the other for solution of internal tasks. May be, we are breaking the balance? And, finally, it is not strength, or not only strength, that is important. Yugoslavia and Iraq had rather strong and well-equipped armies, so what? Were they able to oppose a serious enemy? They didn't even try to.

Leadership of the country should not avoid principle decisions and delicately keep off the problems of strategic choice. First choice: do we rely on our own forces or turn to strategic partners for military assistance? We won't be able to keep all-round defence. I remember that Leonid Kuchma more than once sceptically assessed a provision in the Doctrine of a "necessity of organisation of efficient defence on all directions".

Second choice: given a military doctrine, shall we plan only repulse of invasion, or do we envisage a possibility of preventive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy, if his readiness for aggression is evident? If so, what will make the basis of our strike forces: bombers, land or sea-based operational-tactical missiles, mobile special forces?

Third choice: how will the Armed Forces be manned in the future, by conscription, by contract or on a mixed basis, and if so, what will be the ratio? It's not an idle question, as indices set in the State Program of Armed Forces development are not reached. By the way, all European nations more and more stick to higher professionalism and reduction of conscripts' term of service.

Fourth choice: what principle will be laid in the State Program for defence on dangerous directions - priority development of mobile forces for prompt advance of troops from their present bases, or large-scale relocation for creation of new constant formations? What would be more efficient and cheap?

Fifth choice: shall we rely on efficient and numerous Armed Forces, or maintain less strong Armed Forces able to build-up reserve components rapidly? This second option was chosen by Finland. That country spends only 1.8% of the GDP on defence, but