Monitoring Active Citizenship

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INTRODUCTION

The first of the European Union’s 11 Common Basic Principles on Integration (CBPs) defines the term as a two-way process of mutual accommodation that requires efforts by immigrants and by the general public in many areas, which are stated in nine following CBPs. The last CBP recommends that the integration process and everyone’s efforts be monitored through indicators and evaluation mechanisms, which government and stakeholders use to evaluate progress, exchange information, and improve policy. Poland, like most of Europe’s new countries of immigration, lacks this evaluation mechanism. Indeed, monitoring the integration process and policies is a novel and evolving practice across the European Union. The EU Member States have shown interest in the longitudinal surveys that help make integration more successful in traditional settler countries like Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States.¹ So far, few European countries have basic monitoring systems, let alone these expensive longitudinal surveys.

Given how new and costly these systems can be for national governments, the European Union has instead piloted “common European indicators for migrant integration.” Eurostat assessed the quality and reliability of the data and published the results for all EU Member States, including Poland, in 2011.² These core indicators are supposed to correspond to the 11 CBPs and the broader objectives for society that Member States have agreed for the future. The indicators compare immigrants’ and the public’s participation in four areas of public life. Three areas – employment, education, and social inclusion – used the same indicators as the EU’s 2020 and Education and Training 2020 Strategies. While the latter apply to the whole population using EU data, the former disaggregate this data to specifically compare third-country nationals or the foreign-born to the rest of the population. For example, Poland’s results in the three areas indicate that immigrants and Poles face similar problems of unemployment, educational underperformance, and risk of poverty.

The indicators’ approach in these three areas can mainstream newcomers into governments’ and the EU’s overall objectives for ‘integrating society’ by raising levels of employment, educational attainment, and social inclusion. Mainstreaming requires that ministries like employment, education, and social inclusion play a greater role. A country’s general policies and context may have the greatest impact on immigrants’ socio-economic participation. It is unclear what targeted integration policies in these three areas can realistically achieve to raise these rates.

Table 1: EU Common indicators of migrant integration: Employment, Education, Social Inclusion...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social Inclusion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>employment rate</td>
<td>highest educational attainment</td>
<td>share of 30–34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate</td>
<td>share of low-achieving 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and science</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>activity rate</td>
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¹ For more on longitudinal surveys, see “Long-term follow-up of migrants’ trajectories across the European Union: Draft summary and conclusions,” Produced after European Migration Network Conference under Belgian EU Presidency (2010).
• share of early leavers from education and training

_Social inclusion_
• median net income – median net income of the immigrant population as a proportion of the median net income of the total population
• at risk of poverty rate – population with net disposable income of <60% of national median
• share of population perceiving their health status as good or poor
• ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population

Compared to these three areas, the fourth area—Active Citizenship—is new and unique to Ministries of Home Affairs, Justice, and Immigration, whose policies have a greater systematic and observable impact on integration. They facilitate political participation, access to legal status, and access to nationality, which have an effect on broader societal, economic, and cultural participation. EU Member States agreed on the following three core indicators:

**Table 2: EU Common indicators of migrant integration: Active Citizenship**

_Core indicators_
• share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship
• share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits
• share of immigrants among elected representatives (no data collected)

_Additional agreed indicators_
• trust in public institutions (no data collected)
• voter turnout among the population entitled to vote (no data collected)
• sense of belonging (no data collected)

Despite this technical-level agreement, EU Member States could find “no unified view” on the goals and frameworks of their active citizenship policies. This lack of agreement reflects one of the major findings of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) that political participation and access to nationality policies are both weak across Europe. Policies diverge significantly between established and new countries of immigration. The few countries that open political opportunities for immigrants as foreigners also tend to encourage them to become citizens. The other countries, where governments are not democratically accountable to foreigners, often make it harder for foreigners to become citizens. Among these new and often restrictionist countries is Poland, where naturalisation and political participation have been missing from its national commitments on immigrant integration. Indeed, Poles overall are some of the least civically active people in Europe today.

As Poland begins to recognise itself as a ‘country of immigration,’ policymakers and stakeholders need not only to monitor the integration process, but also to improve Poland’s policies on long-term residence, access to nationality, and political participation and to monitor the results of these active citizenship policies on immigrant and public participation in public life. This paper for the Institute of Public Affairs explains how to monitor integration efforts. Policy actors must go beyond the EU’s core indicators for migrant integration to link these outcomes with specific policies and their broader impact on immigrant and societal integration. The proposed evaluation framework is then applied to the EU’s two core indicators on active citizenship for which data is collected and the two related MIPEX policy areas of long-term residence and access to nationality. The paper draws on MPG’s publications in these two areas as well as the design of integration indicators.

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SECTION ONE: HOW TO MONITOR INTEGRATION POLICY AND PROCESS

Background

Monitoring integration sounds like a straightforward process of measuring immigrants’ participation, behaviours, or attitudes. These measurements are meant to answer one deceptively simple question: “is an immigrant integrated?” The scientific literature on integration suggests that it is impossible to know whether or not any single person is integrated. When searching for a definition of integration, academics tend to treat the concept as a catch-all buzz-word for the two-way, multi-dimensional, long-term and non-linear processes of immigrant settlement (usually called immigrant integration) and social inclusion in increasingly diverse societies (often called societal integration). Inequalities increase and decrease over time between different individuals and groups and between different societies. These processes lie at the intersection of many policies, personal and societal factors and of divergent policy realms, uncoordinated bureaucratic structures, and contradictory public attitudes. There is no homogenous immigrant or native population, no uniform integration process, and no prevailing understanding of the impact of policies on these processes.

Indicators sound like the perfect policymaking tool—scientifically valid, politically relevant, and easy to design and use. As part of performance-based policy and service delivery, they are meant to answer another deceptively simple question: “have policies failed or succeeded?” The literature on good governance, which emerged from the World Bank and other international institutions, suggests that it is impossible to qualify any policy as a success or a failure based on a few core statistics. When searching for a definition of indicators, the literature on good governance tends to treat them as rather blunt, imperfect proxies for what are complex concepts that policy actors intend to objectively capture. There are many data gaps and non-measurable components, no one type of indicator, and no given hierarchy or causal relationship between them. A few statistics cannot replace robust evaluations, high-quality data-sets and the scientific literature.

So when indicators are applied to integration, integration indicators need to counter the risk of becoming blunt tools for a catch-all concept. They must capture the different steps in policy development and in societal processes that are meant to answer a lot of highly specific questions about the success or failure of integration policies: “What are the inequalities and trends over time within the immigrant population and within broader society?” “Are policies justified and proportionate to the aims of equal treatment?” “Are policies properly implemented?” “Are policies effective?” “Are these policy results impacting these inequalities and trends in immigrant and societal integration?” It is not surprising that policy actors face great conceptual challenges in designing and using a complete evaluation framework to monitor the integration process and the impact of their policies and programmes.

Baby steps towards integration monitoring in Europe

Integration monitoring and policy evaluation is in its infant stages in Europe. A few Member States with extensive integration governance structures have invested in monitoring systems of national integration indicators. The European Commission’s 2007 annual report on migration and integration observed that governments were increasingly aware of the need for tools and indicators but further progress was necessary. Since then, more information has been collected in 2009 responses from a majority of EU’s National Contact Points on Integration (NCPs), the EU-funded PROMINSTAT project, and the European Website on Integration (EWSI). Most official national monitoring systems were created within just the past five years:
Table 3: EU Member States with national integration monitoring systems in 2011

- Austria (since 2010 in 9 areas and at Länder level)
- Belgium (new Diversity Monitor)
- Estonia (integration monitoring since 2007 with 100 questions)
- Germany (first report in 2009 with 100 indicators in 14 areas)
- Netherlands (bi-annually since 1988 in 7 areas)
- Norway (36 indicators)
- Portugal
- Sweden (regularly under former Integration Board, restarted in 2009)

Additional systems were under development in 2009, according to NCPIs from Finland, France, Greece, and Spain. National actions of the European Integration Fund have prioritised the development of national indicators in countries like Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, and Slovakia. NGOs also undertake national integration monitoring like Caritas in Italy or the Integration Centre in Ireland (using the new EU common indicators for migrant integration). Ambitious local and regional integration plans have also designed their own indicators (i.e. Athens, Berlin, Catalonia, Flanders, Frankfurt, North Rhine-Westphalia, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, and Vienna).

The EU agenda on integration indicators rose to the level of the EU ministers responsible for integration in 2007 and resulted in a common set of core indicators in 2010. Commissioner Frattini suggested during the May 2007 Potsdam informal inter-ministerial meeting that the EU develop yardsticks for various integration areas as part of a common rigorous EU evaluation system in parallel to developing national monitoring mechanisms. He noted that DG Justice and Home Affairs had started this work through support for the MIPEX and its extensive and focused list of indicators that could be used throughout Europe. The 2009 Swedish Presidency Malmö Conference Conclusions defined a list of core areas and outcome indicators that were approved at the 3-4 June 2010 JHA Council. The Commission recently launched a tender for a study to analyse the relevance and results of these indicators. To date, immigrants have rarely been included in European indicators within EU open methods of coordination. The Commission hopes that these new indicators will encourage better monitoring and evaluation at EU, national, local, and regional level. The Commission’s July 2011 Second Agenda for Integration sees these common indicators as the basis for systematic follow-up in relation to European targets on employment, education, and social inclusion, enhanced policy coordination, Commission-led monitoring and recommendations in dialogue with Member States.

Eurostat’s 2011 pilot study presented the initial results of the EU and its Member States for the indicators, where harmonised EU data was available and high-quality. In 2010, third-country national men and women appeared to suffer higher rates of unemployment, poverty, over-qualification for their jobs, and a lower educational level. Young people with a migrant background were at greater risk of school drop-out without obtaining upper secondary qualifications. According to these indicators, the societal challenges for immigrants in Poland are similar to those for Poles themselves. Foreign-born men and women are just as economically active, employed, and unemployed. On some indicators, the data suggests that both foreign and foreign-born men and women face fewer challenges and offer more opportunities to Poland than the average Pole. Adult foreign and foreign-born men and women are more likely to have a tertiary education than their Polish counterparts. As a group, they are less at risk of poverty after accounting for social transfers. Some key data is missing. For example, too few immigrant children are sampled to analyse educational achievement and dropout. Other data is difficult to explain. It is hard to say why third-country nationals have one of the highest overall rates of citizenship acquisition in the EU because of Poland’s various and sometimes discretionary nationality procedures for different categories of foreigners. While these statistics do not answer whether immigrants are integrated or policies have succeeded, they do facilitate further debate on the integration situation in Poland in comparison to other countries.
**Shortcomings of an outcomes-only approach**

Major gaps appear in monitoring systems based only on outcome indicators. The Eurostat pilot report outlines several gaps in data comparability and quality despite recent improvements in EU and national data-sources on migration and mainstreaming integration. For example, EU data-sources currently have small sample sizes of immigrants, high non-response rates among these groups, and an under-representation of very recent arrivals or migrants with limited-or-no knowledge of their new country’s national language(s).

Beyond these technical challenges lie four theoretical shortcomings in the construction of outcome-based monitoring systems. Firstly, these systems usually focus on the total foreign-born, foreign, and/or third-country national population, even though these groups are constantly changing. New immigrants arrive, while some emigrate. Foreigners that naturalise may ‘disappear’ into the statistics on national citizens. The current focus only captures the overall situation for certain statistical groups. It does not capture individuals’ changes over time. These indicators may suggest that the integration situation is much more static than in reality. Instead, integration is a non-linear, long-term, and multi-generational process with both progress and setbacks.

Secondly, outcome indicators often compare these immigrant groups to the overall population, even though the differences between the two may not be attributable to factors related to immigration. On average, immigrants may be younger (or older) than the overall population, have a higher proportion of men (or women), or have a higher (or lower) socio-economic status or education level. For example, age may explain a higher overall unemployment rate for the foreign-born if they are generally younger than the native-born and both foreign- and native-born youth have high unemployment rates. Once the different age-structure of the immigrant population is taken into account, the observed differences in the indicator results may disappear. Data must therefore be disaggregated to capture the differences in relevant factors like age, gender, socio-economic status, and education. Since few national systems do so, some of their results may be less accurate and meaningful for policymakers and practitioners.

Thirdly, these indicators do not capture integration in all areas of life or the links between these areas. Many researchers challenge the primacy of economic indicators which cannot tell the full story of integration. Immigrants can be well integrated in one sphere like intermarriage but not in another sphere like education. Moreover, immigrants can have strong transnational links to their country of origin while maintaining high levels of participation in their country of residence. As integration is a multidimensional process, monitoring systems try to capture the situation in each area and facilitate comparisons between them. Currently, the EU indicators address the broad areas of employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship. Established national monitoring systems, according to the NCPIs, better capture areas like employment, education, vocational training, language, and housing than they do areas like family, income, racism and discrimination, health, and access to justice. Though few of the current monitoring systems reduce integration to one key domain, none of them can claim to capture them all.

Lastly, these systems capture people’s ‘outcomes’ in life, but not necessarily the ‘outcomes of integration policies’ that their designers or users claim. The indicator results provide a general picture of the position of certain immigrant groups in society. Dronkers (2008) and Czaika and de Haas (2011) give four explanations for efficiency and effectiveness gaps. Policies may not be well implemented by authorities. The policies designed may simply be out-of-touch with immigrants’ different realities. In practice, the policy may be counter-productive to its stated objectives. Moreover, general factors and policies in the country of residence (and country of origin) may be too strong for any integration policy, no matter what type, to influence integration outcomes. Some of the additional factors that may influence societal integration are:
Table 4: Factors influencing societal integration other than targeted integration policies

- People’s personal backgrounds (age, gender, education, socio-economic status, etc.)
- General structures in society (type of labour market, political system, education structures)
- General government policies (i.e. policies on employment protection legislation, labour market activation, politically under-represented groups, disadvantaged pupils)
- General conditions in society (i.e. public attitudes, business cycle, political discourse, local and regional differences)
- Similar structures, policies, and conditions in immigrants’ country of origin

In the face of all these factors, the EU indicators—much like several national monitoring systems—are labeled as the “outcomes of integration policies.” Although researchers sometimes investigate correlations between these outcomes and a specific integration policy, their analysis often jumps over different time-periods, generations, groups, steps in policy delivery, and types of indicators. Behind such outcome-driven analyses lay the assumption that targeted policies are the major factors that influence migrants’ social realities. The truth of the matter is that significant analysis is necessary to evaluate whether these statistics are the outcomes of integration policies. For this reason, the European Commission is preparing a forthcoming mutual learning process about the effects of not only different integration policies, but also different migration policies, migrant populations, and general policies and contexts.

Indicators for integration policy evaluation

Drawing on the work of the World Bank, policy evaluation frameworks should include both ‘intermediate indicators’ and ‘results indicators.’ A policy that has a clearly stated objective articulates a certain vision of how society should change and improve. Intermediate indicators examine what policy actors are doing to make that desired change happen for people in society. These indicators will then monitor the quantity and quality of their policies, resources and activities. Results indicators examine what is the situation of the people whose lives the policy actors aim to improve. The focus is the specific areas of social life that correspond to the changes desired by policy actors. The indicators will then monitor the possible societal effects of these policies, resources and activities. The practitioners who commission policy evaluations often neglect intermediate indicators, which the World Bank dubs the “missing middle.”

Intermediate and results indicators are broken down into five main types of indicators and four types of efficacy indicators:

Table 5: Indicators for an evaluation framework of social change

The main indicators are the links in the evaluation chain from policy and input, to output, outcome, and impact. The output of one is the input for another. In other words, policies determine the scope for implementation, which in turn determine the types of outputs, then the changes in societal outcomes, and then the broader impact on society. Skipping one link in the chain would neglect one potentially significant explanatory factor and give a misleading interpretation of integration policy performance. Each of these indicators is linked together by performance (also known as efficacy) indicators. Efficacy indicators measure how the first link relates to the second: How efficient are policies and inputs for producing outputs? How effective are outputs for changing outcomes? How sustainable are these outcomes to have a real impact on society? What additional external factors in society make the policy more or less successful? Together, these main and efficacy indicators allow for a full evaluation of policy success or failure.

‘Outcome’ indicators, around which most monitoring systems are constructed, monitor the areas of life that a policy aims to change. An integration monitoring system is composed of indicators in the several areas that are critical for the equal opportunities and participation of immigrants in society. Each indicator focuses on a specific target group (e.g. entire population, foreign-born, third country national women). Data is collected through administrative sources, general surveys including immigrants, or targeted surveys of immigrants. This data captures the target group’s situation at one point in time (e.g. monthly, quarterly, yearly). The level of the data is often a national aggregation. The indicator results could be disaggregated to capture variation within the country between regions and cities, depending on the size and structure of the datasets. The results could also be compared internationally to results for other countries and for a European or international average, depending on the comparability of data between countries.

The resulting monitoring system (also known as ‘relevance’ or ‘contextual’ indicators) can monitor the situation over time of the target group and the entire population. Some outcome indicators can monitor individual progress over time, but most cannot. ‘Target group’ indicators are designed at macro level to measure the general situation of the target group, often in comparison to the entire population. ‘Participant’ indicators are designed at micro level to follow an individual member of the target group. The situation of individual participants or all participants can then be compared with the entire population. Preferably, participants’ situation is also compared to that of a control group that has the same profile. ‘Participant’ indicators require either longitudinal surveys or inter-linked administrative datasets, both of which pose challenges of costs, retention, and data protection.

‘Policy’ indicators, such as MIPEX, measure whether a government’s commitment to a certain issue have been translated into specific laws and policies. These commitments set out a specific vision of change that legislators want to see in society. They are often articulated as objectives, principles, plans, strategies or political philosophies. These commitments may be made at European or international level as well as at national level. For example, EU integration ministers agreed with the 1999 Tampere Presidency Council Conclusions and the 2009-2014 Stockholm Programme that third-country nationals should enjoy a legal status and set of rights and obligations that are comparable to those of EU citizens. The agreed policy areas that are critical to equal opportunities for immigrants include residence rights like family reunion, long-term residence, and naturalisation as well as anti-discrimination, education, and employment. Where these equality legal standards and integration policies are missing, countries run the risk of obstructing rather than facilitating equal opportunities. The onus is upon their government to scrutinize the objectives, proportionality, and effectiveness of these gaps. To change these policies, opinion- and policymakers must create political will and use their political capital. As the major tool in any policymaker’s toolbox, laws and policies set the conditions for this societal change. Policymakers can be deemed successful when all relevant policies are present and coherent with their commitment.
'Implementation' indicators measure whether these laws and policies are properly interpreted and delivered as practices. The governmental and non-governmental actors who are charged with implementation provide the necessary inputs. Laws set the conditions for government action and the later allocation of its administrative and financial resources. These resources set the conditions for the target group to know and use the law. They can be measured both qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of administrative support (i.e. implementing guidelines, specialised units and client services, information campaigns) and material support (e.g. funds, human resources, training, equipment, materials). Some systems have greater general problems with the implementation of legislation. The rule of law, control of corruption, independence of the judiciary, and democratic structures may not measure up to international standards and monitoring by bodies like the World Bank. Implementing actors should not only take heed of these good governance standards. They can also use implementation indicators (also known as performance or process indicators) as benchmarks to continuously improve performance. These benchmarks maintain focus on the commitments behind the law and the impact that the law intended to have on society.

‘Output’ indicators measure whether people are using the law and other inputs as intended. They measure how the target group accesses, uses, and is satisfied with opportunities created by policy. For integration practitioners, these outputs can be the number of eligible immigrants applying and receiving a legal status, attending and completing a course, accessing mainstream services, joining or founding voluntary organisations, or reporting cases of discrimination. These outputs are needed for the policy to have any impact on the target’s group situation in society, which is being monitored through outcome indicators.

‘Impact’ indicators measure whether these outputs and changing outcomes lead to positive medium- and long-term changes for immigrants and the entire population. Impact indicators are perhaps the most important and challenging of all the measurements within a policy evaluation framework.

Success in one area affects other areas. Labour market participation improves knowledge of the national language. The acquisition of nationality improves labour market and civic participation. Overall participation in society improves immigrants’ sense of belonging to a city, region, and eventually country. Success for immigrants can bring benefits for the entire population.
SECTION TWO: HOW TO MONITOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

Active citizenship, as defined by the European Commission’s Handbook on Integration, is the exercise of the rights and responsibilities that come with being a member of a liberal democratic community. Civic and political participation of immigrants may have a positive effect on their socio-economic participation. Even though some countries’ integration policies are limited to latter areas like labour market participation, education, and language learning, civic and political participation may be just as important for societal integration. Active citizenship links the multiple identities of its members together and enables them to contribute more to economic, social, cultural, civic and political life in their country of residence.

The concept of active citizenship is relevant for many of the EU Commons Basic Principles on Integration, especially #9: “The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.” Active citizenship is not far from the concept of civic citizenship, which was promoted by the European Commission’s then Directorate General of Justice and Home Affairs under EU Commissioner Antonio Vitorino. States would enhance solidarity and a shared sense of belonging in society by granting non-EU nationals greater rights and responsibilities, based on the length of their residence. According to this blueprint, integration policies would expand to areas of legal, civic, and political integration. Immigrants would exercise their new rights and responsibilities to participate in these areas and interact more with EU citizens.

Monitoring the outcomes and improving policies on active citizenship poses several problems for the EU integration indicators, as in the other three core areas. All four sets of indicators bridge areas that are inside and outside EU competence. They also tackle policies whose impact on integration is under-researched and often-politicised. Active citizenship is operationalised through three core indicators covering immigrants’ uptake of long-term residence and citizenship as well as their election to public office. Data gaps emerge where Eurostat cannot capture all – or even any – relevant data for each indicator from its administrative migration statistics. On the one hand, measuring active citizenship policies for immigrants has been undertaken by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in three areas related to the EU core indicators: long-term residence, access to nationality, and political participation. On the other hand, measuring levels of active citizenship among immigrants and non-immigrants is a very new exercise at national level or at European level, whether through the European Commission or the European Social Survey. These types of studies often examine both individuals’ participation in political life, civil society and community life and their values on human rights, democracy, and intercultural education.

The area of active citizenship also poses particular problems for both Poles and immigrants in Poland. Analysis of the European Social Survey suggests that Poles and other Central Europeans are some of the least likely to participate politically when living abroad in another European country. Similarly, immigrants and non-immigrants in Poland or other Central European countries report the lowest levels of political participation in Europe. According to one European Commission Index, Poles have consistently low levels of active citizenship, alongside Hungarians and Southern Europeans like...

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4 See the European Social Survey, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
Greeks, Italians, and Portuguese. On the positive side, Poles are among the most likely in Europe to hold many values associated with active citizenship and to participate in religious organisations. Overall, Poles are reportedly the least active in Europe in civil society, human rights organisations, community organisations, or political life. Corruption in public and political life is also perceived as a more important problem in Poland and other Central European countries than in the EU on average.

It is not surprising that active citizenship has been missing from Poland’s integration strategy. Poland has less favourable policies for promoting integration through political participation (scoring only 13/100 on MIPEX and ranking 29th) or through access to nationality (scoring 35, ranking 18th). Secondary analysis of MIPEX confirms that the situation in Poland is similar to several new and emerging countries of immigration in Europe, especially in Central Europe. Their slightly inclusive policies for migrants becoming long-term residents have little to do with their policies for migrants becoming citizens or politically active. Immigrants who are able to become long-term residents are granted many of the rights and obligations associated with active citizenship, with the major exception of political rights and national citizenship. These two areas are treated as separate from the other areas of foreigners’ law that are often linked to the state’s integration objectives. Since these two areas are outside EU competence, Central European stakeholders will have to find their own ways to raise these issues at national level. Indeed, a few new countries of immigration like Greece have caught up with Europe’s more established countries of immigration in areas like access to nationality, where Poland is now falling behind.

This section outlines the indicators needed to monitor active citizenship as part of the integration process, from policies to implementation, outcomes, and impact. Each type of indicator is explained and any available results are presented for the European Union and for Poland. This section covers areas related to the two EU core indicators where data is collected on active citizenship: long-term residence and access to nationality.

LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Policies

The relevant European standard on long-term residence is the EU Directive 2003/109/EC on EU long-term residence. This EU law aims to secure a common EU residence status for long-term residents, including uniform rights which are as close as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens and, under certain conditions, the right to reside in other Member States. Third-country nationals who have resided legally in an EU country for a maximum of 5 years can become EU long-term residents if they meet the legal conditions under national and EU law. EU long-term residents should enjoy

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13 See Niessen and Huddleston (2009).
judicial oversight of the procedure, basic residence security, and the same rights as EU citizens to access employment, social benefits, education, and procedures for the recognition of qualifications. In terms of its impact on integration, long-term residence enables these permanently settled third-country nationals to participate more in many areas of life on an equal legal footing with nationals and EU citizens.

Policy indicators that measure and compare long-term residence policies are provided by MIPEX. The other current comparative policy indexes do not directly address access to long-term residence. The MIPEX strand applies both to EU Member States (procedures for non-EU residents) and other countries of immigration (procedures for foreign residents). It analyses whether countries facilitate access to long-term residence as a means to facilitate integration. The long-term residence indicators are averaged together into four dimensions of the policy:

- **Eligibility:** Can all legal non-EU citizens apply for long-term residence?
- **Conditions for acquisition:** Are applicants only required to fulfill basic conditions that are necessary to live in the country and apply to all people in society?
- **Security of status:** Are rights guaranteed and discretion limited throughout the procedure?
- **Rights associated:** Do long-term residents have the same residence and socio-economic rights as EU citizens?

The four dimensions are then averaged together to obtain a score for each country’s long-term residence policy. The MIPEX scale classifies long-term residence policies as favourable for the integration of reuniting families (80-100% on this strand), slightly favourable (60-79%), halfway favourable (41-59%), slightly unfavourable (21-40%), unfavourable (1-20%), or critically unfavourable (0%). EU Member States scoring 100% on this MIPEX strand grant their non-EU residents a right to long-term residence that is comparable to the residence rights of EU citizens who have moved from another EU Member State. EU and Non-EU families would be treated equally under the law.

According to MIPEX, long-term residence policies are a slight area of strength for most European countries’ integration policies, including Poland. Residents in these countries can work, study, retire and live in the country just like nationals. Migrants must pass many different eligibility requirements and conditions – some more restrictive than others. Some permit-holders cannot apply, even if they have been living in the country for 5 years or more. The conditions once reserved for citizenship are increasingly applied to long-term residence. But the conditions for long-term residence better encourage applicants to succeed. With a focus on basic language knowledge, they take slightly better account of individuals’ abilities and disabilities, and can be more easily supported with courses. Countries retain discretion to refuse or withdraw a long-term resident’s permit, although personal circumstances must be taken into account and there are grounds for an appeal. Most new immigration countries, including Poland, do not impose burdensome conditions, even though procedures remain highly discretionary. Most countries are focusing their policy changes on new and demanding conditions circulating in European debates. In 1999, Germany was the only EU Member State to impose a language requirement. Now, the trend on language and integration conditions extends from Europe’s established countries of immigration to new countries of labour migration in Southern and Central Europe.

EU standards are largely behind Poland’s strong score on long-term residence policy. Because Central European countries could not participate in negotiations on pre-accession Directives like the EU Long-Term Residence Directive, many felt little ownership of these new national laws. They often took the national translation of the Directive and quickly passed it without changes or links to the broader legislative framework. Because of Poland’s transposition strategies, little national thinking has gone into the country’s areas of strength, just like the four MIPEX areas outside EU competence where Poland averages only a score of 31 out of 100.
Outcomes

The share of immigrants who acquired permanent or long-term residence was agreed in the EU Integration Indicators as the relevant outcome measure for long-term residence. Currently, the numerator used is the number of third-country nationals with an EU long-term residence permit. The denominator is the total number of third-country nationals with any legal residence permit. This numerator does not capture all long-term residents. Alternative national categories of long-term residence (permits of ≥5 years’ duration) are currently only reported for countries where the Directive does not apply—Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. This denominator does not measure how many residents are interested or eligible to become long-term residents. It is not possible to estimate how many non-EU citizens have been legally resident for 5 years, which is the main criterion for long-term residence. Eurostat’s available statistics cannot be broken down by years of residence or eligible vs. ineligible residence permits. Instead, the resulting long-term residence indicator describes how common or uncommon EC long-term residence is in a given country. This part of the population is guaranteed the equal rights and responsibilities associated with civic and active citizenship. A stronger outcome indicator would be the number of EU or national long-term residents as a fraction of the total number of non-EU citizens resident in the country for at least 5 (or 6) years.

Data for this outcome indicator is based on the administrative records of the national authorities, mainly interior ministries or immigration agencies. EU Regulation 862/2007 requires that authorities report certain residence permit data, including long-term residence as defined by the EU Directive. Moreover, age and sex disaggregations are not possible for Eurostat long-term residence data. Beginning in 2011, Eurostat will include these national categories and disaggregations.

Relationship between policies and outcomes?

Despite these relatively high-scoring policies, long-term residence outcomes have been weak. The European Commission’s 28 September 2011 application report on the Directive\(^{16}\) deplored the weak impact of the Directive in most EU Member States. Five years after most Member States had to transpose the Directive, an insignificant number of third-country nationals have become EU long-term residents. Only .04% of the (approximately) 600,000 third-country nationals in the EU have an EC long-term resident permit. Four fifths of the EU long-term residents live in just 4 Member States: Estonia (187,400), Austria (166,600), Czech Republic (49,200), and Italy (45,200). In comparison, France and Germany only have around 2,000. High rates in Estonia and Latvia are explained by ‘recognised non-citizens’ who were former Soviet citizens permanently resident in these countries. The share of LTRs is insignificant in Europe’s major countries of immigration. The share of long-term residents in Poland is also relatively low:

Table 6: Long-term residents: defined in Art. 2(b). Directive 2003/109/EC  
(as % of total legally-resident third-country national population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>187,411</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>166,607</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>49,207</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45,247</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>25,860</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>19,986</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>19,648</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>19,351</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Romania 9,679 (14.6%)
10. Poland 4,524 (4%)
11. Hungary 3,537 (3.3%)
12. Slovakia 2,946 (5.3%)
13. Portugal 2,331 (0.4%)
14. Germany 2,103 (0.0%)
15. France 1,905 (0.0%)
16. Belgium 1,774 (0.2%)
17. Sweden 381 (0.1%)
18. Latvia 207 (0.0%)
19. Malta 165 (2.2%)
20. Greece 134 (0.0%)
21. Bulgaria 124 (1.6%)
22. Cyprus 100 –
23. Finland 16 (0.0%)

Sources: Eurostat 31 December 2009, No data available for Luxembourg.

No systematic correlation emerges between the MIPEX long-term residence indicator and the number of EC long-term residents,17 perhaps due to the incomplete nature of the EU’s long-term residence outcome indicator. Instead, policies restricting access to long-term residence are one part of the problem, according to both the European Commission’s Application Report and the MIPEX framework. MIPEX concluded that the overall eligibility restrictions were most unfavourable in several other countries that exclude many ‘temporary’ permit-holders who have legally lived in the country for the required five years. The Commission states that Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and Poland apply too broad a reading of the exception of certain temporary categories, since many of these permits can be renewed indefinitely. The Commission is awaiting the outcome of a preliminary referral on this issue from the European Court of Justice (C-502/10 M. Singh). The Commission also finds it problematic to restrict the 5-years’-residence time on certain residence permits, as occurs in France, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Slovakia. The European Commission states that language and integration conditions for long-term residence may go against EU law if they are proven not to be proportionate and effective. To perform such an assessment, the Commission lists the following as valuable indicators:

- Nature and level of the knowledge expected from applicant
- Cost of exam
- Accessibility of integration training and tests
- Comparison between requirements for long-term residence and naturalisation

These indicators are similar to the MIPEX Policy Indicators on integration conditions for long-term residence and access to nationality. Based on these indicators, the MIPEX III concluded that the conditions were slightly unfavourable for integration and language-learning in Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia. The conditions are just or nearly as demanding for long-term residence as for naturalisation in at least 12 EU Member States.

Other factors

The other factors that help explain the low acquisition rates are many and perhaps more important than immigrants’ interest in becoming long-term residents. A full evaluation of the Directive’s impact must weigh all these factors. Depending on how present these factors are in the various countries,

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17 See Reichel and Healy (forthcoming)
Measuring life (political, The integration implementation longitudinal "Nationality" Policies ACCESS provisions guides suggests, unfavourable nationality on immigrants, impact only role withdrawal in acquisition of a common term within the European Commission’s 2011 Application Report assumes that poor implementation measures play a role in the low number of long-term residents. For example, third-country nationals may generally lack information about the EU LTR status and the many rights attached to it. Some authorities, including at local and regional level, also may not know. These authorities then may not inform people about applying or exercising their rights as long-term residents in practice, as the Commission suggests, based on the number of complaints it receives from concerned immigrants. Based on these assumptions, the Commission encourages Member States to use the European Integration Fund and other forms of EU technical cooperation on integration to launch awareness-raising campaigns, guides for applicants, and informational websites. The European Integration Fund could also support longitudinal studies that measure the short, medium, and long-term impacts of long-term residence. This “before and after” snapshot would reveal how non-EU citizens’ participation in different areas of life changes after acquisition of a national or EU long-term residence permit.

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Policies

“Nationality” is defined in the European Convention on Nationality as the “legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin.” This bond sets out the rights (political, economic, social, cultural, etc) and responsibilities that are reserved for only nationals of a state. European standards on access to nationality for immigrants remain weak for integration. The only existing European standard, the Council of Europe 1997 Convention on Nationality n.166, is unfavourable from an integration perspective, according to an unofficial MIPEX assessment. Its provisions limiting administrative discretion, statelessness, and grounds for withdrawal would slightly improve the security of citizenship in several countries, mostly in Central Europe. But its provisions on acquisition and facilitation have little effect on citizenship eligibility, conditions, and dual nationality for immigrants. The Convention’s impact is also limited to the small but increasing number of Member States ratifying the Council of Europe, of which Poland is not one.

The EU has modestly begun technical cooperation on nationality and integration. In 1999, EU integration ministries agreed at Tampere that naturalisation should be part of their strategies on comparable rights and responsibilities. According to the 2005 Common Agenda for Integration, the implementation of Common Basic Principle 9 (participation of immigrants in the democratic process) is strengthened at national level through the elaboration of national preparatory citizenship and
naturalisation programmes. The 2007 Potsdam informal meeting of EU Integration ministers invited European cooperation to explore and clarify “the various conceptions of and approaches to ideas of participation and the various conceptions of citizenship under discussion, taking into account the relevant EC acquis that relate to the integration of immigrants and Member States’ Constitutional and legal systems as well as exchange views and experiences on naturalisation systems applied by Member States.” This exchange led to a chapter on acquisition of nationality in the third edition of the European Commission’s Handbook on Integration. The Commission has also supported this research agenda through a handful of Community Actions under the European Integration Fund.  

MIPEX offers the most comprehensive set of policy indicators on access to nationality for immigrants. Other recent comparative policy indexes on this topic each contain the same half-a-dozen-or-so indicators (Howard et al. 2009, Banting and Kymlicka 2011, Koopmans et al. forthcoming). 20+ policy indicators in MIPEX analyse whether countries facilitate access to nationality as a means to facilitate integration. The indicators are averaged together into four dimensions that are largely similar to those for long-term residence:

- **Eligibility:** Which foreign residents and their children born in the country can apply?
- **Conditions for acquisition:** Are applicants only required to fulfill basic conditions that are necessary to live in the country and apply to all people in society?
- **Security of status:** Are rights guaranteed and discretion limited throughout the procedure?
- **Dual nationality:** Does the country accept dual nationality for all legally resident foreigners and their children born in the country?

These MIPEX indicators will be further developed and used as Citizenship Law Indicators within the new EU-project on Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration.  

Without EU standards, access to citizenship remains a weakness in most countries’ integration strategies. Most parts of the procedure still discourage or exclude many from trying. Immigrants in Europe wait on average 7 years in total because of some long-term residence requirements. Half of the countries make citizenship conditional upon income and high fees. Applicants are normally required to know the language, often at high or unclear levels. Tests rarely come with the support to pass them. Even if an applicant meets all the legal requirements, they can still be rejected on vague grounds in rather discretionary procedures. **Nationality policies are more unfavourable for societal integration in many new immigration countries, i.e. Austria, Denmark, and the EU12 (Baltics, Central Europe, Cyprus, and Malta).**

Nevertheless, reform trends are spreading across many EU Member States as they recognise themselves as countries of immigration and open clearer paths to citizenship. 15 MIPEX countries have created some form of birthright citizenship for immigrants’ children or grandchildren born in the country. 18 in MIPEX now allow all citizens to hold dual nationality. Although these trends are little supported by European cooperation, MIPEX is increasingly used to identify national weaknesses, spread knowledge of these European reform trends, and support proposals for change, from Greece to Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Over the past decade, these reforms have significantly improved the legal conditions for integration in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, and most recently Luxembourg and Greece. According to MIPEX, these recently reformed countries in the EU15 are now giving their foreign residents a slightly favourable

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19 For more on ACIT project, see [http://www.migpolgroup.com/projects_detail.php?id=60](http://www.migpolgroup.com/projects_detail.php?id=60)
path to citizenship, just like the traditional birthright citizenship countries like Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Naturalisation procedures in Central European countries like Poland are more likely to discourage or exclude immigrants from becoming full citizens. Poland’s current naturalisation policies miss out on international reform trends, as newer countries of immigration often shorten the required residence period, introduce some form of ius soli, and accept dual nationality for all citizens. The 2009 Citizenship Bill would have addressed at least the first issue. Most of all, it limits the unlimited discretion of the Polish President in the acquisition procedure. Perhaps not surprisingly, MIPEX observes how the Polish President vetoed this reform in April 2009, largely to keep Poland’s voivodeships from diminishing his role. If the Constitutional Court review allows the Bill to become law, my unofficial MIPEX impact assessment\textsuperscript{20} shows that Poland’s slightly unfavourable procedures would now become ‘halfway’ favourable for promoting societal integration. Rising by 12 points, Poland’s nationality policies would now be ‘average’ — no more favourable than most EU Member States.

Outcomes

The share of immigrants who acquired citizenship was agreed in the EU Integration Indicators as the relevant outcome measure for naturalisation. The numerator used is the number of foreigners who acquired citizenship in the given year. These foreigners were either citizens of foreign countries or stateless. Eurostat excludes acquisitions of citizenship at birth (for the second or third generation) or from abroad (for non-residents). Some countries have problems reporting this data because they cannot collect data on citizenship granted by regional or local authorities, acquisitions by residents vs. non-residents, or all procedures of acquisition. Nevertheless, Eurostat’s data can be disaggregated by age and gender.

The denominator is the total number of resident foreigners during the given year, similar to the long-term residence. The resulting ‘naturalisation rate’ is the number of foreign residents who acquired citizenship in that year as a fraction of the total number of foreign residents. Unlike the long-term residence rate which measures how common it is for foreigners to be long-term residents, the naturalisation rate measures how common it is for foreigners to become citizens every year. The numerator would be stronger if countries could determine how many citizens acquired their citizenship through the naturalisation of foreign residents. At present, most countries can only calculate how many citizens were born abroad. The denominator would be stronger if countries could determine how many foreign residents were eligible to naturalise based on their status and years of residence, as is done in Canada and the United States. For that, Eurostat would have to agree on one residence duration for all countries. For example, 10 years is the maximum residence period set in the European Convention on Nationality.

An alternative measure to the naturalisation rate is the share of immigrants with citizenship of the country. This rate measures what percent of foreign residents have become citizens after 10 years’ residence. The rates are over 90% in traditional countries of immigration like Australia and Canada. The OECD\textsuperscript{21} used the EU Labour Force Survey to calculate these rates for its EU Member States, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2007/8, the average rate was only 59%, while the range stretched from 12% in

\textsuperscript{21} OECD (2010), International Migration Outlook SOPEMI, Paris, France.
Luxembourg to 82% in Sweden. Among non-EU immigrants, the rates jumped significantly from 1999/2000 to 2007/2008 in Belgium (48 to 78%) and Sweden (79 to 93%).

Relationship between policies and outcomes?

The fact that Europe’s settled immigrant population has been growing in recent decades implies that more candidates are eligible for the acquisition of EU’s nationalities. Acquisition rates have tended to rise in most countries, but diverge and fluctuate across the EU:

Table 7: Share of third-country nationals acquiring citizenship
(as percent of total third-country national population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Eurostat 31 December 2009

Eurostat’s rates are high in Belgium, United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, and, surprisingly, Poland. Non-EU nationals are more likely to become nationals than EU citizens. Children, young adults, and women are often more likely to acquire citizenship under the various naturalisation procedures. Despite these positive examples, the rates remain surprisingly low across the EU. In the EU-27 in 2006, only 25 citizenships were granted per 1,000 foreign residents. Only a small percentage of the non-nationals eligible to acquire nationality actually apply. The rest remain “civic citizens” for the rest of their lives in the country, whether by choice, circumstance, or complications in the naturalisation process.
Eurostat (2011)\textsuperscript{22} and researchers like Vink and Dronkers (2011)\textsuperscript{23} and Reichel (2011)\textsuperscript{24} have investigated whether citizenship liberalisations are behind the increasing naturalisation rates in the EU that are reported by Member States. Both found a positive correlation between MIPEX scores on access to nationality and naturalisation rates, although slightly weaker than one might expect. In other words, citizenship policies explained 50% of the variation in naturalisation, according to Eurostat’s bi-variate comparison:

![Figure 7: Correlation between naturalisation rate and MIPEX access to nationality](image)

In particular, Reichel 2011 finds that the requirement to renounce previous citizenship appears to be one of the most important reasons why persons cannot or do not want to get naturalised. Above and below Eurostat’s trend-lines are clear groupings of countries. Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltics have low naturalisation rates and restrictive policies. Countries like Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have high-scoring rates and policies. Middle-scoring countries include Cyprus, Denmark, and Spain. In contrast, Malta and Poland naturalise higher than expected numbers of their foreign resident population within their restrictive but also highly discretionary naturalisation policies. Countries like Greece, Ireland, and Italy naturalise fewer than expected.

This research will need to be expanded, since the current samples involve a small number of countries, sources with an oversampling of national language speakers, and imperfect measures of citizenship acquisition like the naturalisation rate. The early indications from this type of analysis are that the legal restrictions vs. liberalisations have a significant impact on increasing vs. decreasing naturalisation rates.

Other factors

The other 50% of variation in naturalisation rates in Eurostat’s calculations may be explained by the ways policies work out differently for different people. Vink and Dronkers 2011 identified some of the other factors behind naturalisation rates. They found no significant effects of gender, education level, employment, or religion. Instead, the immigrants who are more likely to naturalise are from outside the EU, poorer and politically unstable countries, former colonies, long-settled residents or retired persons, and speakers of the country’s language. Rates are also higher among the second generation, especially of mixed parentage. Another factor that may or may not play a significant role is the citizenship policy in the country of origin, specifically on acceptance of dual nationality. Countries with more of these types of people within their foreign resident population are likely to have higher naturalisation rates, which makes their policy liberalisations more effective and their policy restrictions less effective.

Measuring implementation?

So far, no major comparative research exists on the implementation of naturalisation policies across Europe. The new research project on Access to citizenship and its impact on immigrant integration intends to design implementation indicators that make the link between citizenship law and acquisition. These indicators describe how people actually apply for nationality and how authorities decide who to accept and who to reject. Eligible foreign residents must be informed and able to apply. Applicants must prove that they meet the legal conditions. Authorities determine whether or not their application is successful. Various authorities must be willing and able to check the application and come to a final decision. This process may -and, in some cases, must -be based on the legal conditions. The ways that laws are implemented can lead to significant variation in naturalisation rates within a country, between groups of applicants, and over time. Citizenship implementation indicators can cover several dimensions of administrative practices and procedures on naturalisation:

- Promotion: how much do authorities encourage eligible applicants to apply?
- Documentation: how easy is it for applicants to prove that they meet the legal conditions?
- Discretion: how much room do authorities have to interpret the legal conditions?
- Bureaucracy: how easy is it for authorities to come to a decision?
- Review: how strong is judicial oversight of the procedure?

Implementation indicators should be analysed alongside the law and acquisition indicators, compared to available national statistics on procedures, and used to create citizenship flowcharts that describe the application process.

Measuring impact

Citizenship impact data has been used by the OECD25 and other researchers.26 Using longitudinal sources, their research finds that citizenship works as a tool that helps many immigrants become better integrated in several areas of life. These researchers prove that citizenship works as a tool; Naturalisation tends to improve labour market outcomes. They obtain better-paid and higher-skilled jobs, especially in the public sector. The most vulnerable immigrant groups are most likely to see their economic integration improve through naturalisation: first generation from low-income

countries, the second generation, groups with low employment rates, and women in a few cases. Three hypotheses bolster these findings about citizenship effects on jobs, income, and sector:

1) Employers may more easily hire nationals because they think that foreigners involve higher administrative costs and legal barriers (e.g. legal access to public sector jobs).

2) Employers may prefer naturalised immigrants because the passport is a ‘signal’ that they are or intend to be settled in the country and better integrated. This preference is evidenced by situation testing where employers more frequently give an interview to naturalised applicants among CVs with the exact same qualifications.

3) Immigrants during or after naturalisation may invest more in their host-country human capital (especially language). Employers may also invest more in training naturalised immigrants who have a secure status. Naturalised immigrants may indirectly be better able to invest because nationals have better access to housing, scholarships.

Other non-longitudinal data suggests that naturalisation may also improve political participation, housing, and social inclusion, although research is limited. Based on the findings, the OECD recommends that policies be facilitated for naturalisation, especially dual nationality. Immigrants and policymakers should also be informed about these positive benefits of citizenship. These policy actions could create a more encouraging discourse on citizenship, which could impact immigrants’ naturalisation rates and employers’ perceptions. Citizenship impact indicators could be further analysed by using other data sources on labour market participation and by extending them to other important areas of integration.

Conclusions

The EU’s current indicators are not yet the integration monitoring system that the EU needs at national and European level. Immigrants’ position in society has not yet proven to be the “outcomes of integration policies” as public authorities assume. Active and civic citizenship, two areas supported by the European Commission but understood differently by different Member States, are two policies ready for a more comprehensive evaluation. Extensive comparative research has already been conducted on naturalisation policies, rates, and impacts. The European Commission has taken greater interest in the policies and outcomes of EC long-term residence. Political participation and representation remains one of many integration priorities at EU level that is poorly implemented in many Member States and poorly documented in national statistics and surveys.

The MIPEX policy indicators are a necessary and reliable start for any evaluation of integration policy outcomes. The fact that EU standards regulate access to EC long-term residence but not to national long-term residence may undermine this relative area of strength in Member States’ integration policies. In contrast, access to nationality and political participation policies are often areas of weakness in national integration strategies—without strong European standards, but with some domestic reform trends.

Measuring policies is not enough for a full evaluation. Practitioners are needed for data and dialogue on implementation indicators, which countries can develop through further European research and technical cooperation. Despite this limited knowledge on implementation, analysis of policy, outcome, and impact indicators suggest that active citizenship policies matter. Policies like access to nationality, especially dual nationality, may have a significant effect on naturalisation rates. The size of these effects will depend on the makeup of the country’s immigrant population. Policies in

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countries of origin may also matter. Policy liberalisations that lead to higher naturalisation rates may also lead to improvements in economic and broader integration. Legal obstacles may limit naturalisation and simply delay desired integration effects. Active citizenship may work as a tool for integration by changing minds among the general public and by opening opportunities for immigrants, especially vulnerable groups.
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