Uzbekistan: What Changes can be Expected?
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Tashkent is trying to conduct relations with both its neighbors and outside powers (China, Europe, Russia, and the United States) from the position of regional leader. The situation in Central Asia is largely determined by the developments inside Uzbekistan.

The existing institutions in Uzbekistan – the presidency, parliament, and political parties – are mainly formal. The 1992 Constitution is ostensibly democratic, but the country is really governed by one person: President Karimov. However, it would be wrong to describe Uzbekistan’s actual political life as “dying,” given the traditional presence of inter-clan rivalry and power struggles in the president’s inner circle, as well as the existence of the illegal Islamist opposition.

A stable Islamist opposition that includes a multitude of factions appeared in Uzbekistan right after the country gained its independence. The Islamists’ main goal is to create a supranational califate in Central Asia with the Ferghana Valley serving as its territorial nucleus. The regime views the religious opposition as the main threat to its existence.

Closer ties with Washington against a backdrop of cautious distancing from Moscow is emerging as the leading trend in Uzbekistan’s multi-vector foreign policy. The constant search for partnership alternatives to Russia and the desire to escape Russia’s guardianship, while not turning down its economic and political support, are evident. Tashkent is not planning to participate in Moscow-led international organizations, considering them a threat to its sovereignty.

Uzbekistan’s key political issue is power succession. The new leader’s risky task of establishing himself will be accompanied by the elite’s internal struggle, which will be especially intense, since Uzbekistan lacks a single clan or interest group that is able to impose its will on the entire elite. External actors will not play a particularly significant role in the transition of power.

Uzbekistan sees itself as a regional Central Asian power. Indeed, the situation in the region is largely determined by Uzbekistan’s domestic situation, and it is precisely from the position of regional leader that Tashkent is trying to conduct relations with its neighbors as well as with outside powers – China, Europe, Russia, and the United States. Hence, external interest in the country’s internal political situation and in the anticipated changes within its ruling elite is understandable. The main source of intrigue is who will lead the country after its first president, Islam Karimov, and no one is able to predict the outcome.

The situation in Uzbekistan has two components: formal and traditional. Such institu-
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The opposition’s foreign websites, the Uzbek BBC website, and the site of the influential Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which publishes materials on Central Asia, are all blocked. After the Internet was used as a tool (albeit not the main one) to overthrow several Arab regimes, the government of Uzbekistan has been actively monitoring social networks. It is difficult to predict to what extent fears about the Internet are justified. At the same time, it is well known that the Internet did not play a role in the 2005 Andijan events, when mass protests resulted in government troops firing into the crowd and causing hundreds of deaths.

In one of the reports of the International Crisis Group, the political environment in Uzbekistan is described as “deteriorating.” Such an assessment is justified in relation to the activities of local parties, the insignificance of the Parliament, and the virtual lack of secular opposition. However, given the presence of the “traditional component” – inter-clan rivalry, power struggles in the president’s inner circle, and the existence of the illegal Islamist opposition – Uzbekistan’s political life cannot be seen as “dying.”

There are several clans in Uzbekistan: Samarqand (Samarqand-Bukhara), Tashkent, Ferghana, Karakalpakstan, Khorezm, and Surkash (which comprises the natives of Surkhandaria and Kashkadaria). The Tashkent and Samarqand clans are the most powerful in the country. Depending on who you talk to, Islam Karimov himself has been said to belong to either the former or the latter clan. However, it seems that Karimov’s behavior is not determined by his affiliation with one of the clans, but by his desire from the start to position himself as a national leader. Karimov had to constantly prove his leadership while maintaining the power that he inherited as a legacy from the Soviet era.

In the 2000s, Karimov definitively consolidated his position as national leader. The discussions about which clan the president belongs to have largely lost their importance. External powers, such as China, Russia, and the United States, no longer pay much attention to the clan factor. For them it is no longer very important which clan the next president of Uzbekistan represents.

In the absence of secular opposition, protest against the government can only take the form
of appeals to Islam. From the very beginning of the existence of Uzbekistan as an independent state, solid Islamic opposition has emerged comprising numerous factions, with Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) being among the largest. In addition to them, the Akromiya, Adolat Uushmasi, Islam Lashkari, Nur, Tovba, Izun Sokol, Ma’rifatchitlar, and Takfirshirlar movements are active. Most Islamic organizations are groups with small memberships, or even circles. However, according to the opposition leaders, more than 100 thousand of these organizations’ followers are kept in prisons. This figure is possibly greatly exaggerated, but it must be recognized that Islamists have a broad social base.

The main goal of Islamists is to create a supranational caliphate in Central Asia with the Ferghana Valley serving as its territorial nucleus. In essence, the pro-caliphate movement primarily stands for struggle against the regime and personally against Islam Karimov, who, in the publications of HUT and the IMU, is characterized as the “devil incarnate,” a supporter of the West and Zionism, and also Moscow’s accomplice in restoring the Soviet imperial space. One of the HUT leaflets stated that “his soul is full of hatred… to Islam …he does not like Islam. He is an infidel, who does not recognize Islam.”

In practical terms what these factions mostly do is disseminate propaganda and attract new supporters. HUT’s journals Al-Va’I (Conscience) and Al-Hadara (Civilization) are distributed in mosques, at universities, and in public transportation. The authorities regularly seize hundreds of thousands of leaflets. The content of these leaflets, as well as of other publications, is primitive, but accessible to ordinary people. Egalitarian ideas and social justice are emphasized. There are also many references to the Koran and Hadith. The leaflets are printed in both Uzbek and Russian.

Terrorist acts committed by religious extremists are perceived negatively by people and discredit the opposition in their eyes. The most well-known was an attempt on President Karimov’s life back in 1999. Several terrorist attacks occurred in 2004 in Tashkent, the Tashkent Oblast, and Bukhara. The Islamic Jihad organization took responsibility for these acts. A few days before the Andijan events of 2005, there was a terrorist attack in Khanabad.

The fact that even the radical IMU was not involved in the events in Khanabad and Andijan, as its head, Tohir Yo’ldosh, declared immediately after the attacks, is very revealing. The IMU and its leaders have repeatedly emphasized that their party rejects terrorism as a way to achieve the organization’s goals.

In terms of its policy toward Islam, the regime is focusing its efforts on two approaches. First, it attempts to use Islam as a tool to keep the regime in power, and also as a key part of the official ideology. Second, it suppresses religious opposition. In 1991, Karimov felt the power of the Islamists for the first time. Since then, he has always feared them, considering them the main threat to his regime. Struggle with the Islamists has become a principle of his domestic policy. Karimov’s critics believe that the aggressive fight against the Islamic opposition increases its popularity and that the Islamic threat itself is deliberately exaggerated by him.

Islam Karimov has successfully merged nationalism and Islam into an official ideology and made it part of the political life of the country. However, the question is whether his successor will be able to maintain the balance between the two. “Whether Uzbekistan remains a secular state depends upon whether this generation – and more importantly, subsequent generations – work out the balance between religion and nationalism.”

The state of the economy will also have an effect on the transition of power. On the one hand, the overall economic standing of the country is generally positive. The national economy is diversified. Industry contributes 24 percent to the country’s GDP, services – 44 percent, and construction – 7 percent, while 18 percent of GDP is produced in agriculture (at least 20 percent of which is represented by the production of raw cotton). The World Bank believes that Karimov’s government managed to achieve macroeconomic stability, restrain inflation by
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This economic success was largely due to increased state control. However, it was the very same involvement by the government in the economy that created barriers to the development of a free market, hindered necessary liberal economic reforms, and held back the emergence of small- and medium-size businesses. Apart from that, it also led to the proliferation of corruption. As a result, according to the American publication \textit{The Daily Beast}, Uzbekistan occupied fifth place of 183 countries on the list of the most corrupt states.\textsuperscript{11} The shadow economy accounts for approximately 40-60 percent of its GDP.

Unemployment remains one of the biggest problems in Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in 2012 it accounted for 5 percent of the number of employable people, and the number of unemployed has reached 625.5 thousand.\textsuperscript{12} In reality, unemployment is much higher; the European Union estimates it to be as high as 35 percent.\textsuperscript{13} It must be noted that more than 1 million Uzbek migrant laborers work in Russia every year. These workers transfer $4.3 billion to Uzbekistan \textsuperscript{14} (according to other sources, in 2011 they transferred $5 billion). Thus, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyayev’s statement that every year 1 million jobs are created in the country\textsuperscript{15} is highly questionable.

Demographics contribute to the increase in unemployment. A high birth rate and the constant inflow to cities of young people from rural areas lead to a permanent growth in social tensions. It will not be possible to solve these problems in the near future. A forecast, prepared by an international research center with the support of the Asian Development Bank and the UN Development Program, estimates that Uzbekistan’s population will reach 33.22 million in 2025, 7 million of whom will be unemployed.\textsuperscript{16}

The resolution of these and other problems will take a long time, stretching over generations. It is impossible to overcome difficulties without external assistance. Therefore, cooperation with foreign partners, first of all with China, Russia, and the United States, and recently with Europe, especially with Germany, has become increasingly important for Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia and the United States are full of intrigue, which, upon closer examination, has a simple and understandable explanation. Russia and the United States are competitors in the struggle for influence in Uzbekistan. Therefore, Uzbekistan’s multi-vector policy is largely based on the rivalry between these two countries. From time to time Tashkent either strengthens or diminishes the links with one of them. However, the general tendency in this balance is toward a closer rapprochement with Washington while slowly and carefully distancing itself from Moscow. The whole twenty-year history of Uzbekistan, as well as other former Soviet republics, is a continual search for partners that would provide an alternative to Russia. The former Soviet states want to escape Russia’s guardianship, while not turning down its economic and political support.

For Uzbekistan, the shift toward the United States began after 9/11. At the time, Karimov decided that it was precisely Uzbekistan that had become the key partner in the region for America in its fight against terrorism. However, economic and political dividends from this turned out to be less significant than Tashkent had expected. The allocated funding proved to be much lower, while the Americans continued to criticize the regime for the absence of democracy and violations of human rights.

If the events of 9/11 led to a rapprochement between the United States and Uzbekistan, the 2005 violent crackdown on protests in Andijan alienated Tashkent from Washington. Western countries adopted a number of sanctions against Uzbekistan, with a ban on arms sales in particular. Islam Karimov was again subjected to severe criticism. However, these measures could not make a significant impact on the Uzbek regime, which did not intend to change its domestic policy and had certainly no remorse for the methods used to suppress the Andijan protest. As world experience shows, the effect of sanctions in general is very low. Besides, having Russia as an ally, Uzbekistan did not have to worry about sanctions at all.
Moscow with few scruples fully accepted Uzbekistan’s official version that the uprising had been allegedly provoked by local radicals with the support of international terrorism.

Karimov adopted a wait-and-see attitude, since he was confident that sooner or later his actions would be forgotten and sanctions would be eased and eventually dropped altogether. Time showed that he had chosen the right tactics. Relatively quickly the Andijan drama became history, eclipsed by other events in Kyrgyzstan and the Middle East. The main factor that changed the approach to Uzbekistan was Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2014. This necessitated inevitable adjustments to the U.S. policy in Central Asia, making it subordinate to the main Afghan goal and requiring a more careful attitude toward U.S. partners in the region.

On September 22, 2012, the U.S. Congress agreed to resume arms supplies to Uzbekistan, lifting the ban introduced in 2004. A delegation led by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus made a visit to Tashkent in order to determine what kind of weapons Uzbekistan needs. The so-called “Mabus list” was drawn up, which included mine clearing, night vision, terrain scanning, and eavesdropping devices, as well as equipment making it possible to control the Internet and break into social networks. All these munitions and technologies have a dual purpose. In light of the fact that in the foreseeable future Uzbekistan will most likely not be confronted with Taliban aggression, the U.S. weapons that it expects to get are needed primarily for the regime’s internal purposes; moreover, they are for the fight not only against armed Islamic radicals but also against any discontent and dissent. Finally, they can be used on Uzbekistan’s borders with its neighbors.

Karimov’s desire to obtain weapons from the United States is a demonstration to Moscow that Uzbekistan can do without Russian arms. Supplying weapons remains one of the ways of binding Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov is more than frank about this situation. In 2009, at a meeting in Tashkent with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and then Advisor to the President on Russia and Eurasia Michael McFaul (who was later appointed U.S. Ambassador to Russia), Karimov argued, for example, that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created as a counterweight to NATO. The CSTO, he emphasized, has three goals: to promote Russian domination in the post-Soviet space; to provide multinational protection in case of Russian attacks on such problematic countries as Georgia and Ukraine; and to deploy Russian troops in Central Asia on a permanent basis. Karimov even suggested that the attack on Andijan was a signal to force Uzbekistan to join the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which had been created within the framework of the CSTO.

The United States repeatedly advised Uzbekistan to withdraw from the CSTO, declaring its willingness to provide it with military and technical assistance in return. However, Karimov continued to maneuver and did not let the American vector in his foreign policy work to the detriment of the Russian one. In 2012, a new stage in the development of relations with the United States began. Whether it may be considered a strategic turn, only time will tell. However, there are circumstances in favor of that very conclusion. First, after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in 2014, Tashkent is counting on finally becoming the main partner in the region for the United States. Second, there are concerns in Uzbekistan over Russia’s activity in the region, whose aim is the creation under its auspices of international organizations that could limit the sovereignty of their participants.

The Arab Spring, which resulted in Islamists coming to power in several Muslim states, contributed to the improvement of relations between Uzbekistan and the United States. Washington needs reliable partners in the Muslim world as never before, and Uzbekistan is positioning itself as such a partner. Moreover, it has been able to convince the United States of its sustainability and has shown itself to be stronger than the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. It is also important that hypothetically the alternative to the Uzbek regime is seen to be not moderate Islamism as in Turkey but rather religious radicalism.

At the same time, while making its choice in favor of the United States, Uzbekistan does not intend to cut off its relations with Russia. Karimov has managed to get Moscow accustomed to changes in its policy, paying no attention to Moscow’s displeasure. It must be noted that this irritation has been expressed by low-ranking Russian politicians, who only rarely
make comments on the escapades of the Uzbek top leadership, which are unpleasant for them, while Karimov criticizes Russia sharply and quite frequently.

Against the background of intense political passions, Uzbek-Russian economic relations are developing in a relatively positive way. According to the trade missions of both countries, the trade turnover between them reached $6.7 billion in 2011, which made Russia Uzbekistan’s top trading partner. In 2011 it accounted for almost a quarter of the country’s overall trade turnover. Uzbekistan occupies fourth place among Russia’s CIS partners.

Uzbekistan supplies natural gas, automobiles, and textiles to Russia. Gazprom purchases 13.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Soyuzneftegaz, Lukoil, and Transneftegaz also have projects in Uzbekistan. Lukoil is actively engaged in the Khauzak natural gas field, the projected capacity of which is estimated at 12 billion cubic meters. Lukoil plans to invest $5.5 billion in the Uzbek economy over the course of seven years.

Political relations between Tashkent and Moscow are becoming more and more complex. At the same time, it seems that both sides have become accustomed to this situation. Tashkent tries to build relations with Russia strictly on a bilateral basis, considering participation in international organizations created under the auspices of Moscow a threat to its sovereignty. Uzbekistan does not want to bind itself with any other commitments. While the CIS is considered an inevitable and useless vestige of the post-Soviet era, the CSTO is perceived by Tashkent with suspicion. On the other hand, the CSTO is of no use to Uzbekistan.

In the summer of 2012, Tashkent once again declared that it would suspend its membership in the CSTO. Given that the CSTO’s Charter does not provide for such a procedure, it means that Uzbekistan will withdraw. This decision was not unexpected, since even earlier Uzbekistan expressed its disagreement with a whole number of CSTO decisions. In particular, it did not agree with committing its troops in order to resolve internal conflicts in member states and, therefore, Tashkent refused to participate in the CRRF. Finally, Tashkent did not sign the agreement under which a military base of a third country can be built on the territory of a CSTO member only if approved by all members of the organization.

Moscow’s reaction to Tashkent’s decision to withdraw from the CSTO was rather moderate. Apparently, the Kremlin, as mentioned earlier, has already become accustomed to its ally’s unstable behavior, or it came to the conclusion that the CSTO can do without Uzbekistan. Moscow is beginning to understand that its recurrent attempts to pull Uzbekistan into the CSTO will make Moscow look like a supplicant. At the same time, the situation highlights the CSTO’s problems and makes other members more critical of the organization.

It was highly symbolic that the decision to leave the CSTO was made just a few weeks after Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tashkent. The aim of Putin’s visit was to engage Uzbekistan in Russia’s new integration projects. There were even rumors, initiated by Moscow, that Uzbekistan was interested in joining the Common Economic Space. However, the withdrawal from the CSTO unequivocally showed not only that Tashkent will continue to give priority to building relations on a bilateral basis but also that it is increasingly orienting itself toward the West.

The key issue of Uzbekistan’s internal and thus its foreign policy at the beginning of the 2010s is the issue of succession. The personification of power is typical for all Central Asian states. Whoever succeeds Islam Karimov will have to fulfill the role of national leader and bear personal responsibility for the situation in the country.
tablish himself and prove his right to leadership. This will be accompanied by a struggle within the elite, which can affect the situation in the society at large. Uzbekistan has neither a clan nor an interest group capable of imposing its will on the political elite or becoming the only support for the new president.

The influence of external actors on the transition of power will not be very significant. Neither China, nor the United States, and still less Russia have their own preferred candidates. Beijing, Washington, and Moscow will accept whomever the local elites present to them (regardless of whether he is “appointed” by Islam Karimov or determined by the consensus of the local elites). Apart from that, they do not have serious plans to change the nature of the regime. The West recognizes that liberalization can contribute to the strengthening of the Islamists.

As for Russia, any authoritarian regime is easier for it to deal with than something more liberal (Russian criticism of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan testifies to this).

The new leader will develop the main strategic directions that were set by Karimov and continue the multi-vector foreign policy, but with even greater focus on the West, specifically on the United States. In case the transition of power is soft, Uzbekistan might experience a brief period of limited liberalization. This will represent another gesture toward Europe and the United States.

The decline of Russian influence will endure and will be accompanied by assurances of friendship and cooperation, especially in the economy. There certainly aren’t any unambiguously pro-Russian politicians in Uzbekistan any more, and they are unlikely to appear.

The future of relations between Uzbekistan and Muslim countries will be intriguing. Tashkent will have to take into account the coming of Islamists into power in several countries and the general increase of the impact of the Islamic factor on international politics. One cannot exclude the possibility that in that context the government will have to modify its approach to the Islamist opposition, making it more pragmatic and recognizing the existence of a “moderate wing” within it.

**NOTES**


5 Sultan Khamadov, “Ot togo, kak budut stroit v Uzbekistane otnoshenia s oppozitsiei, zavisit situatsia v regione” [The situation in the region will depend on how relations with the opposition in Uzbekistan will be built], Biznes & Politika (Dushanbe) (September 15, 2000).


7 There are different versions of the reasons for the attack. Version one is that it was a consequence of inter-clan strife, and version two is that it helped further strengthen the power of the president.

8 The Union of Islamic Jihad, formerly known as the Islam Jihad, took responsibility for the act.


13 Mikhail Bushuev, “Kazhdy tretiy v Uzbekistane bez rabory” [Every third person in Uzbekistan is unemployed], Deutsche Welle, April 20, 2006, http://www.dw.de/%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%8B/a-1975415-1.
20 “Tashkent stal blizhe” [Tashkent has become closer], Rosiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii [Russia and the new states of Eurasia] (Moscow), no. 3 (2011): 82.
21 Elena Ionova, “Razvitie rossiysko-uzbekskikh otnosheniy” [The Development of Russian-Uzbek relations], Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii [Russia and the new states of Eurasia] (Moscow), no. 3, 2011: 82.
23 It is very revealing that on the eve of withdrawal from the CSTO, Uzbekistan refused to let military equipment from Kazakhstan pass through its territory. The weapons were being transferred for participation in the SCO’s military exercise Mission of Peace – 2012 (the equipment went to Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan, bypassing Uzbekistan). This testifies to Uzbekistan’s reluctance to participate in multilateral cooperation in the region.